Deploy KeyCape client MFA override for coulomb-social

Register coulomb-social with mfaRequired: false, roll key-cape image that
honors client policy, and track NK-WP-0025 public registration orchestration.

workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md

@@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Cut over NetKingdom identity to railiance01 and retire CoulombCore"
 domain: infotech
 repo: net-kingdom
-status: active
+status: blocked
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: netkingdom
 created: "2026-07-27"
-updated: "2026-07-28"
+updated: "2026-08-08"
 depends_on:
   - USER-WP-0020
   - NK-WP-0023
@@ -313,9 +313,10 @@ Done when railiance01 is the sole authoritative identity stack, all evidence
 is reconciled, and the workplan is marked finished.
 
 Retention gate: keep the reversible CoulombCore identity resources through at
-least 2026-08-29. T08 then requires a successful railiance01 restore/restart
-drill and a new explicit approval for destructive deletion. Until both occur,
-the workplan remains active with only T08 waiting.
+least 2026-08-29. The workplan is blocked until that review date, when T08 can
+be checked for readiness to finish. Reaching the date does not authorize
+deletion or completion: T08 still requires a successful railiance01
+restore/restart drill and new explicit approval for destructive deletion.
 
 ## Safety gates
 

workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+id: NK-WP-0025
+type: workplan
+title: "Provide NetKingdom self-registration and application first-login provisioning"
+domain: infotech
+repo: net-kingdom
+status: active
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+created: "2026-08-09"
+updated: "2026-08-09"
+depends_on:
+  - NK-WP-0024
+  - USER-WP-0022
+  - KEY-WP-0008
+  - CSOC-WP-0003
+state_hub_workstream_id: "1638183b-e2cb-4da2-92b8-d39592d62e86"
+---
+
+# NK-WP-0025 - public registration and application JIT provisioning
+
+Provide two safe entry paths for ordinary users of NetKingdom-enabled
+applications, beginning with coulomb.social:
+
+1. an existing LLDAP user signs in through KeyCape and receives an
+   application-local profile on first successful login; and
+2. a new person self-registers through a NetKingdom-owned flow, verifies the
+   address, establishes an LLDAP login, then continues through the same
+   application first-login path.
+
+The design is additive to coulomb.social's local-account model. NetKingdom
+owns authentication and identity lifecycle; coulomb.social/helix-forge owns
+its application profile, preferences, content, and application authorization.
+An OIDC subject is linked to an application profile, not merged with an
+unverified email-only local account.
+
+## T01 - Ratify identity and account-linking semantics
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "523d5894-6ab6-4097-a28c-0f77880744b1"
+```
+
+Record the source-of-truth split, stable key `(issuer, subject)`, optional
+verified-email matching rules, explicit-link requirements for pre-existing
+local accounts, unlink/recovery behavior, username/display-name handling, and
+collision policy for `tegwick` and `bernd.worsch@gmail.com`.
+
+Done when email alone cannot silently take over an existing application
+account and the standalone application-account decision remains intact.
+
+Implemented by coulomb.social's unique `(issuer, subject)` Member binding and
+idempotent first-login creation. Email and username remain mutable profile
+attributes and are not account-link keys.
+
+## T02 - Provide secure LLDAP self-registration orchestration
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T02
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "bc220e2b-4cd1-4dcf-b107-12ef3595fe14"
+```
+
+Expose a NetKingdom registration service behind user-engine. Validate and
+normalize username/email, verify mailbox control, create the LLDAP identity
+through the existing privileged provisioning adapter, establish password via
+a one-time provider-owned handoff, assign only the ordinary baseline group,
+and support idempotent resume/expiry/cleanup. Browsers and user-engine must
+never receive LLDAP admin credentials.
+
+Done when an unknown user can reach a normal KeyCape login without operator
+provisioning and without acquiring tenant-admin or platform authority.
+
+Implementation resumed with
+`docs/public-registration-orchestration-contract.md`. The contract fixes the
+anonymous/verified actor boundary, non-enumerating start response, durable
+verification request, digest-only single-use verification state, baseline
+group provisioning, provider-owned password setup, and fresh OIDC handoff.
+The user-engine registration domain already requires verified factors and
+uses the privileged provisioning adapter; the next implementation slice is
+the persisted intent and verification-port API. Source implementation now
+includes allow-listed, non-enumerating anonymous start and purpose-bound
+verification consumption. Verification attaches an email factor only after
+client/tenant/username binding checks and deliberately stops before user or
+LLDAP creation. The remaining slice is resumable completion, baseline
+provisioning, provider-subject linking, and password-setup handoff.
+
+## T03 - Integrate registration entry points and return flow
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T03
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "3ec4a9a0-cbce-4c63-8ed8-db36f4cae0fb"
+```
+
+Publish a NetKingdom registration URL and allow applications to provide
+`return_to`, client, and tenant hints through a signed/allow-listed state
+envelope. Add "Create account" beside "Sign in" on the coulomb.social landing
+page. After registration, start a fresh OIDC authorization-code/PKCE flow;
+never treat the registration browser session as application authentication.
+
+Done when direct NetKingdom registration and coulomb.social-initiated
+registration converge on the same verified identity flow without open
+redirects or client confusion.
+
+## T04 - Apply optional MFA policy safely
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T04
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "cf2e4d05-fd07-4bc3-92ff-b2a5ade97846"
+```
+
+Replace global mandatory MFA for this consumer with the KeyCape policy from
+KEY-WP-0008. Ordinary coulomb.social login is password-only unless the
+application profile, requested action, tenant policy, or risk/assurance rule
+requires step-up. Platform administration and other existing high-assurance
+clients remain MFA protected.
+
+Done when lowering assurance for this application cannot lower assurance for
+OpenBao, platform administration, or another client.
+
+Source implementation adds a per-client minimum override and honors explicit
+`acr_values=aal2`; only the coulomb-social static registration selects AAL1.
+Other clients retain provider-driven mandatory MFA. Live rollout remains.
+
+## T05 - Prove both cases end to end
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T05
+status: todo
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "5d13f9f6-16b1-44c9-8e1d-4630cfe60a7b"
+```
+
+Test an existing LLDAP identity with no coulomb.social profile, a completely
+new registrant, repeated callback/JIT, existing-email collision, expired and
+replayed verification, duplicate username, provider outage and compensation,
+cross-tenant attempts, optional MFA, profile-requested step-up, unlink, and
+offboarding. Use `tegwick` only for the attended positive acceptance test;
+automated tests use disposable identities.
+
+Done when both user journeys work on railiance01 and all negative cases leave
+no orphaned privileged identity or duplicate application profile.