diff --git a/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md b/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md
index bdf5cd6..a520118 100644
--- a/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md
+++ b/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md
@@ -257,4 +257,23 @@ remove historical client-side annotations or prove native consumer adoption.
 The last-rotated timestamp records successful script steps only. No live rotation
 was run for these source tests. CUST-WP-0073-T05 remains founder-deferred. RSA
 rotation recovery/rollback, delegated helper argv/annotation handling and
-`privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` still require source and native acceptance.
+`keycape/create-pi-token.sh` still require source and native acceptance. The
+admin-bootstrap source repair below leaves native MFA and legacy-object revocation open.
+
+
+## Current-profile admin bootstrap (2026-10-12 source repair)
+
+The current KeyCape profile does not consume the old Keycloak trigger-admin
+credential. `privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` now creates/verifies only pi-admin
+and its explicitly scoped bootstrap policy; it creates no trigger account, token
+or Kubernetes Secret. It never deletes existing objects. Owner inventory and
+revocation are required for historical credentials, independent of source repair.
+
+Input is one private generated service-file assignment, parsed without sourcing
+shell content. The password is sent through kubectl stdin into a version-scoped
+privacyIDEA 3.12.2 adapter. That adapter verifies existing passwords and uses
+insert-only writes for absent account/policy rows. It refuses broad/changed
+legacy policies and existing installations that require policy migration.
+The success receipt proves account/password and scoped-policy state only; MFA,
+effective privileges, deployed-image behavior and consumer acceptance remain
+attended native gates. See the privacyIDEA README for the exact operation scope.
diff --git a/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md b/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md
index 19f1810..7bbd142 100644
--- a/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md
+++ b/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co
 - [x] `k8s/privacyidea/middleware.yaml` — rate-limit + admin IP allowlist (ipWhiteList, Traefik v2)
 - [x] `k8s/privacyidea/ingress.yaml` — pink.coulomb.social + pink-account.coulomb.social
 - [x] `k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh` — extract enckey + audit keys post-start
-- [x] `k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` — create pi-admin + trigger-admin
+- [x] `k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` — create/verify pi-admin (current KeyCape profile)
 - [x] `k8s/verify-t04.sh` — verify pod, service, middlewares, ingresses, TLS, secrets, PVCs
 
 ### BLOCKER — wrong image (2026-03-20)
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co
 - [ ] `kubectl apply -f pvc.yaml configmap.yaml middleware.yaml deployment.yaml ingress.yaml`
 - [ ] Wait for pod Running/Ready (up to 3 min — DB migrations run on first boot)
 - [ ] `./enckey-bootstrap.sh` — extract enckey+auditkeys, store in KeePassXC, create DR Secrets
-- [ ] `./bootstrap-admin.sh` — create pi-admin and trigger-admin
+- [ ] `./bootstrap-admin.sh` — create/verify pi-admin (current KeyCape profile)
 - [ ] Log in to pink.coulomb.social, enroll TOTP for pi-admin, verify MFA challenge
 - [ ] Run `../verify-t04.sh` — 0 FAILs
 - [ ] Commit and mark T04 done
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co
 ### Done-criteria for T04
 - privacyIDEA pod Running+Ready in mfa namespace
 - pink.coulomb.social and pink-account.coulomb.social reachable with valid TLS
-- pi-admin and trigger-admin accounts exist
+- pi-admin exists and attended MFA acceptance is recorded; no legacy trigger account is required
 - pi-admin has enrolled a TOTP token and MFA challenge fires on login
 - privacyidea-enckey and privacyidea-auditkeys Secrets exist (DR copies)
 - verify-t04.sh: 0 FAILs
diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md
index 1a96795..5ef5d3b 100644
--- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md
+++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md
@@ -86,14 +86,45 @@ the local copies.
 ./bootstrap-admin.sh
 ```
 
-Creates `pi-admin` (full admin) and `trigger-admin` (triggerchallenge only).
-Also creates the `privacyidea-trigger-admin` K8s Secret used by Keycloak in T05.
+Creates or verifies `pi-admin` for the current KeyCape profile. It does not
+provision the legacy Keycloak `trigger-admin` account, policy or Kubernetes Secret.
+Existing legacy objects are not deleted: inventory their actual consumers and
+approve revocation separately before removing them.
 
-**Immediately after the script completes:**
-1. Log in to `https://pink.coulomb.social` as `pi-admin`.
-2. Navigate to **Users → pi-admin → Enroll token** and enroll a TOTP or hardware token.
-3. Log out, log back in — the MFA challenge must appear.
-4. Verify the `trigger-admin-rights` policy at Config → Policies.
+Run this only as an authorized, exclusive first-bootstrap or verification
+operation. Password resets and policy migration are separate procedures. The private secrets directory and privacyidea
+subdirectory must be owned by the operator without group/other access. Its
+single-link regular `secrets.env` file must also be private; the script parses
+exactly one generated alphanumeric `PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD` assignment without
+executing shell content. Values travel over kubectl stdin, not argv, environment
+assignments, REST bearer output or terminal text. No public-URL fallback is used.
+The obsolete optional `pi-url` argument is refused.
+
+The in-pod adapter is scoped to privacyIDEA 3.12.2. It verifies an existing
+password without changing it. New account and policy rows use insert-only DB
+writes; conflicts fail instead of updating existing records. The bootstrap
+`pi-admin-all-rights` policy is restricted to `adminuser=pi-admin`. A conflicting
+legacy policy, unknown version, credential mismatch, ambiguous pod or command
+failure stops the script. Introducing a first admin policy into an existing
+multi-admin/policy installation requires a separate owner-reviewed migration.
+Configured `SUPERUSER_REALM` entries are refused because this local-admin profile
+cannot safely grant username-based rights across administrative realms.
+An error after a DB commit can leave created state; rerun only after reviewing
+metadata, using the same approved credential. A successful retry never rotates it.
+
+The secret remains in the selected private custody file. Transfer it through the
+approved encrypted handoff and reconcile successful recovery before cleanup.
+The helper does not prove runtime agent isolation or perform MFA enrollment.
+
+**Attended acceptance remains required:**
+1. Review effective admin policies and current identity mappings.
+2. Complete the approved MFA enrollment procedure for the admin identity.
+3. Perform a fresh login and confirm the required MFA challenge and denial cases.
+4. Record the result; script success and `pi_admin_created` are not MFA acceptance.
+
+No live bootstrap or account/policy change was performed for this source repair.
+The source audit found that the upstream 3.12.2 `admin add` path can update an
+existing password, so the old retry behavior was not reliably create-only.
 
 ---
 
@@ -133,7 +164,7 @@ privacyIDEA sits entirely behind the NetworkPolicies applied in T02 (netpol-mfa.
 | Source | Destination | Port | Purpose |
 |--------|-------------|------|---------|
 | Traefik (kube-system) | privacyIDEA (mfa) | 8080 | User-facing portal |
-| Keycloak (sso) | privacyIDEA (mfa) | 8080 | Provider API (triggerchallenge) |
+| KeyCape (sso) | privacyIDEA (mfa) | 8080 | MFA API |
 | privacyIDEA (mfa) | PostgreSQL (databases) | 5432 | Database |
 
 Outbound to anything other than PostgreSQL and kube-dns is denied.
@@ -144,9 +175,9 @@ Outbound to anything other than PostgreSQL and kube-dns is denied.
 
 ### Rate limiting adjustment
 
-The default rate limit (20 req/min, burst 5) is conservative. If Keycloak's
-triggerchallenge calls trigger false positives (HTTP 429), raise the average
-in `middleware.yaml` and reapply. Alternatively, the Keycloak-to-PI path is
+The default rate limit (20 req/min, burst 5) is conservative. If KeyCape's
+MFA calls trigger false positives (HTTP 429), raise the average
+in `middleware.yaml` and reapply. Alternatively, the KeyCape-to-PI path is
 cluster-internal and not subject to the Ingress middleware.
 
 ### Admin WebUI IP restriction
diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97a6b5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Version-scoped in-pod bootstrap. Password input is JSON on stdin only.
+
+Existing credentials/policies are never updated. Insert-only DB writes and
+unique constraints protect against concurrent creation. Native MFA/effective
+policy acceptance is a separate attended procedure.
+"""
+import json
+import logging
+import re
+import sys
+
+NAME = 'pi-admin'
+POLICY = 'pi-admin-all-rights'
+
+
+class Refused(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+def admitted_policy(policy):
+    if (policy.get('name') != POLICY or policy.get('scope') != 'admin'
+            or policy.get('adminuser') != [NAME] or policy.get('action') != {'*': True}
+            or policy.get('active') is not True or policy.get('priority') != 1
+            or policy.get('check_all_resolvers') is not False
+            or policy.get('user_case_insensitive') is not False):
+        return False
+    return all(not policy.get(key) for key in (
+        'realm', 'adminrealm', 'resolver', 'pinode', 'user', 'client', 'time', 'conditions', 'user_agents'))
+
+
+def ensure(password, admins, policies, verify, insert):
+    existing = NAME in admins
+    named = [policy for policy in policies if policy.get('name') == POLICY]
+    if len(named) > 1 or (named and not admitted_policy(named[0])): raise Refused()
+    if not named:
+        # Introducing the first admin policy changes defaults for every admin.
+        # Existing deployments need their owner's policy migration, not bootstrap.
+        if any(admin != NAME for admin in admins) or any(p.get('scope') == 'admin' for p in policies):
+            raise Refused()
+    if existing and not verify(NAME, password): raise Refused()
+    if not existing or not named:
+        insert(password, account=not existing, policy=not named)
+    if not verify(NAME, password): raise Refused()
+    return {'result': 'verified' if existing else 'created', 'mfa_verified': False}
+
+
+def main():
+    from importlib.metadata import version
+    if version('privacyIDEA') != '3.12.2': raise Refused()
+    raw = sys.stdin.buffer.read(1025)
+    if len(raw) > 1024: raise Refused()
+    payload = json.loads(raw)
+    if (not isinstance(payload, dict) or set(payload) != {'password'}
+            or not isinstance(payload['password'], str)
+            or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', payload['password'])):
+        raise Refused()
+    # Avoid library diagnostics carrying credential/configuration data.
+    logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL)
+    from privacyidea.cli import create_silent_app
+    from privacyidea.lib.auth import list_db_admin, verify_db_admin
+    from privacyidea.lib.crypto import hash_with_pepper
+    from privacyidea.lib.policy import get_policies
+    from privacyidea.models import Admin, Policy, db
+    from privacyidea.models.config import save_config_timestamp
+    app = create_silent_app()
+    with app.app_context():
+        # Username-only bootstrap policy must not admit namesakes in other realms.
+        if app.config.get('SUPERUSER_REALM', []): raise Refused()
+        def insert(password, *, account, policy):
+            try:
+                # Do not call Admin.save/create_db_admin or set_policy: they upsert.
+                if account:
+                    db.session.add(Admin(username=NAME, password=hash_with_pepper(password)))
+                if policy:
+                    db.session.add(Policy(name=POLICY, scope='admin', action='*', adminuser=NAME))
+                db.session.flush()  # constraint conflicts fail without updates
+                if policy: save_config_timestamp()
+                db.session.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                db.session.rollback()
+                raise Refused() from None
+        result = ensure(payload['password'], [admin.username for admin in list_db_admin()],
+                        get_policies(), verify_db_admin, insert)
+        if not any(admitted_policy(p) for p in get_policies()): raise Refused()
+    return result
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    # Only the fixed receipt may reach the caller; suppress all library output.
+    import os
+    receipt_fd = os.dup(1)
+    with open(os.devnull, 'w') as sink:
+        os.dup2(sink.fileno(), 1); os.dup2(sink.fileno(), 2)
+    try:
+        result = main()
+        os.write(receipt_fd, (json.dumps(result) + '\n').encode())
+    except Exception:
+        sys.exit(1)
+    finally:
+        os.close(receipt_fd)
diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3796767
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Pass one private bootstrap credential to the admitted pod over stdin."""
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+
+class Refused(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+def private(info, directory=False):
+    kind = stat.S_ISDIR if directory else stat.S_ISREG
+    if not kind(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077:
+        raise Refused()
+    if not directory and info.st_nlink != 1:
+        raise Refused()
+
+
+def read_password(root):
+    root = Path(os.path.abspath(root))
+    for ancestor in (root, *root.parents):
+        if ancestor.is_symlink(): raise Refused()
+    descriptors = []
+    try:
+        flags = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW
+        root_fd = os.open(root, flags); descriptors.append(root_fd)
+        private(os.fstat(root_fd), True)
+        parent_fd = os.open('privacyidea', flags, dir_fd=root_fd); descriptors.append(parent_fd)
+        private(os.fstat(parent_fd), True)
+        fd = os.open('secrets.env', os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=parent_fd)
+        descriptors.append(fd); private(os.fstat(fd))
+        raw = os.read(fd, 65537)
+        if len(raw) > 65536: raise Refused()
+        values = [line.split('=', 1)[1] for line in raw.decode().splitlines()
+                  if line.startswith('PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=')]
+        # This entry point consumes gen-secrets.sh's format, never shell code.
+        if len(values) != 1 or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', values[0]): raise Refused()
+        return values[0]
+    finally:
+        for fd in reversed(descriptors): os.close(fd)
+
+
+def run(args, payload=None):
+    completed = subprocess.run(args, input=payload, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                               stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60, check=False)
+    if completed.returncode or len(completed.stdout) > 4096: raise Refused()
+    return completed.stdout
+
+
+def main():
+    if len(sys.argv) > 2: raise Refused()
+    here = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+    password = read_password(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) == 2 else here / '../../bootstrap/secrets')
+    pod = run(['kubectl', 'get', 'pod', '-n', 'mfa', '-l', 'app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea',
+               '--field-selector=status.phase=Running', '-o', 'jsonpath={.items[*].metadata.name}']).decode().strip()
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9.-]*[a-z0-9])?', pod): raise Refused()
+    script = (here / 'bootstrap-admin-remote.py').read_text()
+    response = run(['kubectl', 'exec', '-i', '-n', 'mfa', pod, '--', 'python3', '-c', script],
+                   json.dumps({'password': password}).encode())
+    receipt = json.loads(response)
+    if (not isinstance(receipt, dict) or set(receipt) != {'result', 'mfa_verified'}
+            or receipt['result'] not in ('created', 'verified')
+            or receipt['mfa_verified'] is not False): raise Refused()
+    print('pi-admin bootstrap credential and scoped bootstrap policy verified.')
+    print('MFA enrollment, effective-policy review and a fresh sign-in remain required; this is not MFA acceptance.')
+    print('Use the approved custody entry for pi-admin; no credential is printed or exported.')
+    print('Legacy trigger accounts and Secrets require a separate inventory/revocation review.')
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    try:
+        main()
+    except (Refused, OSError, ValueError, TypeError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        print('ERROR: admin bootstrap refused or failed; use approved metadata-only diagnostics. No credential was printed.', file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh
index cd03247..56d7f15 100755
--- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh
+++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh
@@ -1,178 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# bootstrap-admin.sh — create pi-admin and trigger-admin in privacyIDEA
-#
-# Run AFTER enckey-bootstrap.sh (key material must exist before admin setup).
-#
-# What it does:
-#   1. Creates pi-admin — full admin (single-credential bootstrap moment).
-#   2. Creates trigger-admin — limited admin for Keycloak's triggerchallenge calls.
-#   3. Creates the trigger-admin policy (triggerchallenge right only, via REST API).
-#   4. Prints instructions to immediately enroll MFA for pi-admin.
-#
-# Usage:
-#   ./bootstrap-admin.sh [secrets-dir] [pi-url]
-#
-# <secrets-dir> default: ../../bootstrap/secrets
-# <pi-url>      default: https://pink.coulomb.social
-#
-# The script uses the in-cluster kubectl exec path for creating admin users
-# (avoids the need for a network route to pink.coulomb.social during bootstrap).
-# The trigger-admin policy is created via REST API, so the URL must be reachable.
-
+# First-bootstrap/verification entry point for the current KeyCape profile.
+# No legacy Keycloak trigger credential is generated or published.
+set +x
 set -euo pipefail
-
-NAMESPACE="mfa"
-SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}"
-PI_URL="${2:-https://pink.coulomb.social}"
-PI_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env"
-
-if [[ ! -f "$PI_ENV" ]]; then
-    echo "ERROR: $PI_ENV not found — run gen-secrets.sh first." >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-PI_ADMIN_PASS=$(bash -c "source '$PI_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
-if [[ -z "$PI_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then
-    echo "ERROR: PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD not found in $PI_ENV" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-# trigger-admin gets its own random password (generated here, stored in KeePassXC).
-TRIGGER_PASS=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d '\n/+=' | head -c 40)
-
-# ── 1. Find running pod ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-PI_POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$NAMESPACE" \
-    -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea \
-    --field-selector=status.phase=Running \
-    -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-
-if [[ -z "$PI_POD" ]]; then
-    echo "ERROR: no Running privacyIDEA pod found in namespace '$NAMESPACE'." >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-echo "Using pod: $PI_POD"
-
-# ── 2. Create pi-admin (full admin) ──────────────────────────────────────────
-echo ""
-echo "Creating admin: pi-admin"
-if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \
-    pi-manage admin add pi-admin --password "$PI_ADMIN_PASS" 2>&1 | grep -q "already exist"; then
-    echo "  pi-admin already exists — skipping."
-else
-    echo "  pi-admin created."
-fi
-
-# ── 3. Create trigger-admin (limited admin) ───────────────────────────────────
-echo ""
-echo "Creating admin: trigger-admin"
-if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \
-    pi-manage admin add trigger-admin --password "$TRIGGER_PASS" 2>&1 | grep -q "already exist"; then
-    echo "  trigger-admin already exists — skipping password update."
-    echo "  WARNING: if you need to rotate trigger-admin's password, do so manually."
-else
-    echo "  trigger-admin created."
-fi
-
-# ── 4. Create K8s Secret for trigger-admin credentials ───────────────────────
-# Keycloak's privacyIDEA Provider reads the trigger-admin credentials from
-# a K8s Secret that is referenced in the Keycloak realm configuration (T05/T06).
-echo ""
-echo "Creating K8s Secret: privacyidea-trigger-admin (namespace: mfa)"
-kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-trigger-admin \
-    --namespace=mfa \
-    --from-literal=username=trigger-admin \
-    --from-literal=password="$TRIGGER_PASS" \
-    --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
-
-echo "  Done."
-
-# ── 5. Create pi-admin-all-rights policy via pi-manage ───────────────────────
-# Once ANY admin policy exists, privacyIDEA enforces it for all admins.
-# The trigger-admin-rights policy (step 6) restricts trigger-admin to
-# triggerchallenge only — but that restriction also locks out pi-admin from
-# the REST API unless pi-admin has its own explicit policy granting full rights.
-# This policy must be created via pi-manage (in-pod) because there is no REST
-# access before it exists.
-echo ""
-echo "Creating pi-admin-all-rights policy via pi-manage ..."
-if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \
-    pi-manage config policy create pi-admin-all-rights admin "*" 2>&1 | grep -qi "already exist\|exists"; then
-    echo "  pi-admin-all-rights already exists — skipping."
-else
-    echo "  pi-admin-all-rights created."
-fi
-
-# ── 6. Create trigger-admin policy via REST API ───────────────────────────────
-# This restricts trigger-admin to the triggerchallenge action only.
-# Requires pink.coulomb.social to be reachable.
-echo ""
-echo "Creating trigger-admin policy via REST API ($PI_URL)..."
-echo "  (Skip this step if $PI_URL is not yet reachable — do it via the WebUI instead.)"
-echo ""
-
-# Authenticate as pi-admin to get a bearer token.
-AUTH_RESPONSE=$(curl -sf -X POST "$PI_URL/auth" \
-    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-    -d "{\"username\":\"pi-admin\",\"password\":\"$PI_ADMIN_PASS\"}" || echo "CURL_FAILED")
-
-if [[ "$AUTH_RESPONSE" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then
-    echo "  Could not reach $PI_URL — skipping REST policy creation."
-    echo "  Create the trigger-admin policy manually (see README.md — Post-deploy steps)."
-else
-    PI_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESPONSE" | python3 -c \
-        "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['result']['value']['token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-
-    if [[ -z "$PI_TOKEN" ]]; then
-        echo "  ERROR: could not extract auth token from response." >&2
-        echo "  Create the trigger-admin policy manually (see README.md)." >&2
-    else
-        # Create policy: trigger-admin can only call triggerchallenge.
-        POLICY_RESP=$(curl -sf -X POST "$PI_URL/policy/trigger-admin-rights" \
-            -H "Authorization: $PI_TOKEN" \
-            -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-            -d '{
-                "scope": "admin",
-                "action": "triggerchallenge",
-                "adminrealm": "*",
-                "adminuser": "trigger-admin",
-                "realm": "*",
-                "priority": 1
-            }' || echo "CURL_FAILED")
-
-        if [[ "$POLICY_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then
-            echo "  WARNING: policy creation request failed." >&2
-            echo "  Create the trigger-admin policy manually (see README.md)." >&2
-        else
-            echo "  Policy 'trigger-admin-rights' created."
-        fi
-    fi
-fi
-
-# ── 7. Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-echo ""
-echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-echo "  Admin bootstrap complete."
-echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
-echo ""
-echo "CRITICAL — Do these steps NOW:"
-echo ""
-echo "  1. Store trigger-admin password in KeePassXC:"
-echo "       KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/privacyIDEA"
-echo "       Entry: trigger-admin  →  username=trigger-admin  password=<below>"
-echo "       trigger-admin password: $TRIGGER_PASS"
-echo "     Then shred this terminal history."
-echo ""
-echo "  2. Log in to the privacyIDEA WebUI as pi-admin:"
-echo "       $PI_URL"
-echo "     Enroll MFA for pi-admin IMMEDIATELY (TOTP or hardware token)."
-echo "     Until MFA is enrolled, pi-admin has only password authentication."
-echo ""
-echo "  3. Verify the trigger-admin policy:"
-echo "       WebUI → Config → Policies → trigger-admin-rights"
-echo "       Scope: admin  Action: triggerchallenge  AdminUser: trigger-admin"
-echo "     If it was not created automatically, create it here."
-echo ""
-echo "  4. Test admin MFA:"
-echo "       Log out, log back in as pi-admin — MFA challenge must appear."
-echo ""
-echo "Next step: run ../verify-t04.sh"
+umask 077
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/bootstrap-admin.py" "$@"
diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml
index 7c110fd..bcccc83 100644
--- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml
+++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #
 # After first pod starts successfully:
 #   5. enckey-bootstrap.sh — extract enckey + audit keys, create DR Secrets
-#   6. bootstrap-admin.sh  — create pi-admin (+ MFA enrolment) and trigger-admin
+#   6. bootstrap-admin.sh  — create/verify pi-admin; attended MFA acceptance follows
 #
 # Container port: 8080.
 # ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker listens on port 8080 (gunicorn).
diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh
index 9a3f541..141c554 100755
--- a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh
+++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh
@@ -143,11 +143,11 @@ for secret in privacyidea-config; do
 done
 
 # DR secrets — created by enckey-bootstrap.sh (may not exist yet on first run)
-for secret in privacyidea-enckey privacyidea-auditkeys privacyidea-trigger-admin; do
+for secret in privacyidea-enckey privacyidea-auditkeys; do
     if kubectl get secret "$secret" -n "$NAMESPACE" &>/dev/null; then
         pass "Secret $secret exists"
     else
-        warn "Secret $secret not found — run enckey-bootstrap.sh / bootstrap-admin.sh"
+        warn "Secret $secret not found — run enckey-bootstrap.sh"
     fi
 done
 
@@ -189,12 +189,8 @@ if [[ -n "$PI_POD" ]]; then
         warn "pi-admin not found — run bootstrap-admin.sh"
     fi
 
-    if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \
-        pi-manage admin list 2>/dev/null | grep -q "trigger-admin"; then
-        pass "Admin user trigger-admin exists"
-    else
-        warn "trigger-admin not found — run bootstrap-admin.sh"
-    fi
+    # Legacy trigger-account presence is not a current KeyCape readiness gate.
+
 else
     warn "Skipping key material checks — no running pod"
 fi
diff --git a/tests/test_admin_bootstrap.py b/tests/test_admin_bootstrap.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7875e93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_admin_bootstrap.py
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Bootstrap tests use synthetic credentials and fake kubectl, never a cluster."""
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+PI = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea'
+PASSWORD = 'SyntheticAdminCredential12345678901234567890'
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def bootstrap(tmp_path):
+    scripts = tmp_path / 'privacyidea'; scripts.mkdir()
+    for name in ('bootstrap-admin.sh', 'bootstrap-admin.py', 'bootstrap-admin-remote.py'):
+        if (PI / name).exists(): shutil.copyfile(PI / name, scripts / name)
+    private = tmp_path / 'private'; private.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    component = private / 'privacyidea'; component.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    file = component / 'secrets.env'; file.write_text('PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=' + PASSWORD + '\n'); file.chmod(0o600)
+    binary = tmp_path / 'bin'; binary.mkdir()
+    (binary / 'kubectl').write_text('''#!/usr/bin/python3
+import json,os,sys
+args=sys.argv[1:]
+raw=sys.stdin.read() if '-i' in args or args[-1:]==['-'] else ''
+with open(os.environ['CALLS'],'a') as f:f.write(json.dumps({'args':args,'stdin':raw})+'\\n')
+if args[0]=='get':
+ print(os.environ.get('PODS','privacyidea-disposable'))
+elif 'python3' in args:
+ if os.environ.get('FAIL'):
+  print(os.environ['PASSWORD'],file=sys.stderr);sys.exit(1)
+ print(os.environ.get('REMOTE_RESULT','{"result":"verified","mfa_verified":false}'))
+else:
+ print(os.environ['PASSWORD'])
+ if os.environ.get('FAIL'):sys.exit(1)
+''')
+    (binary / 'curl').write_text('#!/bin/sh\necho CURL_FAILED\nexit 1\n')
+    (binary / 'openssl').write_text('#!/bin/sh\nprintf "%s" "$PASSWORD"\n')
+    for command in binary.iterdir(): command.chmod(0o700)
+    env={'PATH':str(binary)+':'+os.environ['PATH'],'HOME':str(tmp_path),'KUBECONFIG':str(tmp_path/'unused'),
+         'CALLS':str(tmp_path/'calls'),'PASSWORD':PASSWORD}
+    return scripts,private,file,env
+
+
+def invoke(bootstrap, **extra):
+    scripts,private,_,env=bootstrap
+    return subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(scripts/'bootstrap-admin.sh'),str(private)],
+                          env={**env,**extra},capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=10)
+
+
+def calls(bootstrap):
+    p=Path(bootstrap[3]['CALLS'])
+    return [json.loads(line) for line in p.read_text().splitlines()] if p.exists() else []
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_has_no_secret_output_or_secret_command_arguments(bootstrap):
+    result=invoke(bootstrap)
+    assert result.returncode==0
+    assert bool(PASSWORD in result.stdout+result.stderr) is False
+    observed=calls(bootstrap)
+    assert bool(PASSWORD in json.dumps([c['args'] for c in observed])) is False
+    remote=next(c for c in observed if 'python3' in c['args'])
+    assert json.loads(remote['stdin'])=={'password':PASSWORD}
+    assert 'MFA' in result.stdout
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_does_not_create_legacy_trigger_account_or_secret(bootstrap):
+    result=invoke(bootstrap)
+    assert result.returncode==0
+    commands=[c['args'] for c in calls(bootstrap)]
+    assert all('trigger-admin' not in ' '.join(c) for c in commands)
+    assert all(c[0] not in ('create','apply','delete') for c in commands)
+
+
+def test_failed_admin_operation_is_not_reported_as_complete(bootstrap):
+    result=invoke(bootstrap,FAIL='1')
+    assert result.returncode!=0
+    assert bool(PASSWORD in result.stdout+result.stderr) is False
+    assert 'bootstrap complete' not in result.stdout.lower()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('pods',['','privacyidea-one\nprivacyidea-two','unexpected/shape'])
+def test_missing_or_ambiguous_pod_refused(bootstrap,pods):
+    result=invoke(bootstrap,PODS=pods)
+    assert result.returncode!=0
+    assert all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(bootstrap))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['missing','duplicate','public-file','public-directory','symlink','hardlink','executable-value'])
+def test_invalid_credential_input_never_reaches_cluster(bootstrap,defect):
+    _,private,file,_=bootstrap
+    marker=private/'executed'
+    if defect=='missing':file.unlink()
+    elif defect=='duplicate':file.write_text(file.read_text()*2)
+    elif defect=='public-file':file.chmod(0o644)
+    elif defect=='public-directory':file.parent.chmod(0o755)
+    elif defect=='symlink':
+        target=file.with_name('other');file.rename(target);file.symlink_to(target)
+    elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(file,file.with_name('alias'))
+    else:file.write_text('PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(touch '+str(marker)+'; echo '+PASSWORD+')\n')
+    result=invoke(bootstrap)
+    assert result.returncode!=0
+    assert not marker.exists()
+    assert not calls(bootstrap)
+    assert bool(PASSWORD in result.stdout+result.stderr) is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('response',['not-json','{"result":"verified","mfa_verified":0}','{"result":"verified","mfa_verified":true}', '{"result":"verified","mfa_verified":false,"password":"extra"}'])
+def test_malformed_or_unexpected_remote_receipt_refused(bootstrap,response):
+    result=invoke(bootstrap,REMOTE_RESULT=response)
+    assert result.returncode!=0
+    assert response not in result.stdout+result.stderr
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def remote():
+    import importlib.util
+    spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('admin_bootstrap_remote',PI/'bootstrap-admin-remote.py')
+    module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def policy():
+    return {'name':'pi-admin-all-rights','scope':'admin','adminuser':['pi-admin'],
+            'action':{'*':True},'active':True,'priority':1,'check_all_resolvers':False,
+            'user_case_insensitive':False}
+
+
+def test_new_account_and_scoped_policy_requested_together(remote):
+    effects=[]
+    def insert(password,**flags): effects.append(flags)
+    result=remote.ensure(PASSWORD,[],[],lambda *_:bool(effects),insert)
+    assert effects==[{'account':True,'policy':True}]
+    assert result=={'result':'created','mfa_verified':False}
+
+
+def test_existing_matching_account_is_verified_without_mutation(remote):
+    effects=[]
+    result=remote.ensure(PASSWORD,['pi-admin'],[policy()],lambda *_:True,lambda *a,**kw:effects.append(kw))
+    assert result=={'result':'verified','mfa_verified':False}
+    assert effects==[]
+
+
+def test_existing_mismatching_account_is_never_reset(remote):
+    effects=[]
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):
+        remote.ensure(PASSWORD,['pi-admin'],[policy()],lambda *_:False,lambda *a,**kw:effects.append(kw))
+    assert effects==[]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('change',[{'adminuser':[]},{'scope':'user'},{'action':{'triggerchallenge':True}},
+                                   {'active':False},{'conditions':[('restriction',)]},{'user_case_insensitive':True}])
+def test_existing_unexpected_policy_is_never_overwritten(remote,change):
+    effects=[]
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):
+        remote.ensure(PASSWORD,['pi-admin'],[{**policy(),**change}],lambda *_:True,lambda *a,**kw:effects.append(kw))
+    assert effects==[]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('admins,policies',[(['other-admin'],[]),(['pi-admin'],[{'name':'other','scope':'admin'}])])
+def test_policy_migration_requires_owner_review(remote,admins,policies):
+    effects=[]
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):
+        remote.ensure(PASSWORD,admins,policies,lambda *_:True,lambda *a,**kw:effects.append(kw))
+    assert effects==[]
+
+
+def test_failed_post_creation_verification_is_failure(remote):
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):
+        remote.ensure(PASSWORD,[],[],lambda *_:False,lambda *a,**kw:None)
diff --git a/tests/test_admin_bootstrap_privacyidea.py b/tests/test_admin_bootstrap_privacyidea.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aec7910
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_admin_bootstrap_privacyidea.py
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+"""Run the in-pod adapter against actual privacyIDEA 3.12.2 models on SQLite.
+
+Install that exact package in a disposable environment. No native cluster or
+production config is used; this does not replace deployed-image acceptance.
+"""
+import importlib.metadata
+import importlib.util
+import io
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+pytest.importorskip('privacyidea')
+if importlib.metadata.version('privacyIDEA') != '3.12.2':
+    pytest.skip('adapter verification requires privacyIDEA 3.12.2', allow_module_level=True)
+
+from flask import Flask
+from privacyidea.models import Admin, Policy, db
+from privacyidea.lib.crypto import hash_with_pepper
+from privacyidea.lib.auth import verify_db_admin
+import privacyidea.cli
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+PASSWORD='SyntheticAdminCredential12345678901234567890'
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def native(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('admin_remote_native',ROOT/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py')
+    remote=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(remote)
+    app=Flask('disposable-bootstrap')
+    app.config.update(SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI='sqlite:///'+str(tmp_path/'db.sqlite'),
+                      SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS=False,PI_PEPPER='synthetic-pepper',SECRET_KEY='synthetic-key')
+    db.init_app(app)
+    with app.app_context(): db.create_all()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(privacyidea.cli,'create_silent_app',lambda:app)
+    def invoke(password=PASSWORD):
+        import json
+        monkeypatch.setattr(sys,'stdin',io.TextIOWrapper(io.BytesIO(json.dumps({'password':password}).encode())))
+        return remote.main()
+    import logging
+    previous_disable = logging.root.manager.disable
+    try:
+        yield app,remote,invoke
+    finally:
+        logging.disable(previous_disable)
+
+
+def test_real_model_creation_and_repeat_preserve_password_hash(native):
+    app,_,invoke=native
+    assert invoke()=={'result':'created','mfa_verified':False}
+    with app.app_context():
+        before=Admin.query.filter_by(username='pi-admin').one().password
+        assert verify_db_admin('pi-admin',PASSWORD)
+        assert [a.username for a in Admin.query.all()]==['pi-admin']
+        assert Policy.query.one().adminuser=='pi-admin'
+    assert invoke()=={'result':'verified','mfa_verified':False}
+    with app.app_context(): assert Admin.query.one().password==before
+
+
+def test_real_model_mismatch_never_resets_password(native):
+    app,remote,invoke=native
+    invoke()
+    with app.app_context(): before=Admin.query.one().password
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):invoke('DifferentSyntheticPassword1234567890123456')
+    with app.app_context(): assert Admin.query.one().password==before
+
+
+def test_real_legacy_broad_policy_refused_before_account_creation(native):
+    app,remote,invoke=native
+    with app.app_context():
+        db.session.add(Policy(name='pi-admin-all-rights',scope='admin',action='*'));db.session.commit()
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):invoke()
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert Admin.query.count()==0
+        assert Policy.query.one().adminuser==''
+
+
+def test_real_other_admin_requires_explicit_policy_migration(native):
+    app,remote,invoke=native
+    with app.app_context():
+        db.session.add(Admin(username='other-admin',password=hash_with_pepper(PASSWORD)));db.session.commit()
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):invoke()
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert [a.username for a in Admin.query.all()]==['other-admin']
+        assert Policy.query.count()==0
+
+
+def test_real_failed_policy_insert_rolls_back_account(native,monkeypatch):
+    app,remote,invoke=native
+    original=db.session.add
+    def fail_policy(obj,*args,**kwargs):
+        if isinstance(obj,Policy):raise RuntimeError('synthetic-failure')
+        return original(obj,*args,**kwargs)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(db.session,'add',fail_policy)
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):invoke()
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert Admin.query.count()==0
+        assert Policy.query.count()==0
+
+
+def test_real_concurrent_account_conflict_never_updates_existing_row(native,monkeypatch):
+    import privacyidea.lib.auth
+    app,remote,invoke=native
+    with app.app_context():
+        db.session.add(Admin(username='pi-admin',password=hash_with_pepper('ExistingSyntheticPassword1234567890123456')))
+        db.session.commit();before=Admin.query.one().password
+    # Simulate an account appearing after the initial absence observation.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(privacyidea.lib.auth,'list_db_admin',lambda:[])
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):invoke()
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert Admin.query.one().password==before
+        assert Policy.query.count()==0
+
+
+def test_real_external_admin_realm_requires_owner_profile(native):
+    app,remote,invoke=native
+    app.config['SUPERUSER_REALM']=['directory-admins']
+    with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):invoke()
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert Admin.query.count()==0
+        assert Policy.query.count()==0
diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
index a00a6eb..678b3d4 100644
--- a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
+++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
@@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ signal deferral and arbitrary-child copy retention are explicitly not solved by
 this helper. Evidence: Custodian `custody-entrypoints.json`.
 
 Concrete uncovered callers remain (T02 stays progress):
-- `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` prints the trigger-admin password
-  and publishes a fresh generated Secret even when the existing account retained
-  its previous password. Its command pipelines can misreport failures as creation.
+- The separate `keycape/create-pi-token.sh` still uses credential-bearing argv,
+  ambient/public-URL fallback, raw child-output handling and client-side Secret
+  apply. Its token lifecycle and current consumer authority need reconciliation.
+- Legacy trigger account/Secret inventory and owner-approved revocation are still
+  required; removing automatic creation does not revoke historical credentials.
 - RSA rotation rollback/custody and native multi-consumer acceptance remain open;
   the output repair below is not lifecycle closure.
 - Delegated create/apply helpers still need full tracing/error/Secret-annotation
@@ -106,6 +108,23 @@ script timestamps are not native consumer/revocation evidence; partial updates
 retain the local candidate for recovery. No live rotation occurred. Evidence:
 Custodian `rotation-output.json`. T02 and the founder-deferred rotation stay open.
 
+2026-10-12 admin-bootstrap reconciliation: current SCOPE marks Keycloak backlog;
+KeyCape uses the separate pi-admin token path. Removed automatic legacy trigger
+account/policy/Secret creation and corresponding current readiness expectations.
+Fourteen old-source tests failed (two passed). The new entry point parses owned
+private input without executing shell code, sends credentials only on kubectl
+stdin, sanitizes failures and requires one pod plus a strict value-free receipt.
+
+Upstream 3.12.2 inspection corrects the earlier mismatch hypothesis: `admin add`
+uses an upsert and may reset an existing password. The new version-scoped in-pod
+adapter verifies existing credentials and refuses mismatches or conflicting
+policies; new rows use insert-only transactional writes and a policy scoped to
+pi-admin. Disposable actual privacyIDEA 3.12.2/SQLite tests verify repeat stability,
+wrong-password refusal, legacy-policy/other-admin refusal, rollback and conflict
+handling. These do not prove the deployed image/PostgreSQL or effective MFA.
+Existing objects are not deleted or rotated. Current callers and the native
+acceptance gate remain open. Evidence: Custodian `admin-bootstrap.json`.
+
 ## Verify owner-approved recovery and current native callers
 
 ```task