diff --git a/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md
index 01eea8c..09b2d18 100644
--- a/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md
+++ b/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ declaration; the reserved-name rule applies to credential-holding accounts, not
 | railiance-platform | F-1 and `aal2` prepared in source, rollback written; nothing applied | RPF-WP-0065; the `aal2` live step is the founder's |
 | key-cape | Agent tokens are feasible **with changes**, not today. Autonomous agents: `client_credentials` with a new agent client class (2 to 3 days). Delegated agents: RFC 8693 token exchange (1 to 1.5 weeks). Missing: `principal_type` `agent`, the `agent{id,mode}` claim, `act.sub`. Risks: revocation state is in memory; client registrations are static | KEY-WP-0043 |
 | glas-harness | Per-session identity and attribution are feasible **only for sessions the harness launches**. Interactive terminals stay outside | GLAS-WP-0018 |
-| state-hub | Option A recommended: record `X-Actor-*` headers in an append-only attribution table, labelled `claimed`, `unattributed` or `legacy`; real authentication needs key-cape tokens (Option C) | STATE-WP-0100; five founder decisions in its design |
+| state-hub | Option A recorded: `X-Actor-*` headers into an append-only attribution table, labelled `claimed`, `unattributed` or `legacy`; real authentication needs key-cape tokens (Option C). **Decided 2026-10-25:** Option A is phase 1 with no `hub_core` schema change; correlation by equal session and run id only (no commit verifier); phase 3 observes tokens and enforcement is a separate later decision; existing authors are not backfilled | STATE-WP-0100 |
 
 **Needs an amendment:** IAM Profile v0.3 asks for assurance evidence for "any delegated human authority" but defines no
 nested claim for it. Delegated agent tokens need one; it belongs in the IAM Profile v0.4 amendments.
diff --git a/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md b/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md
index f3c5b0a..9081aa8 100644
--- a/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md
+++ b/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md
@@ -103,3 +103,8 @@ Draft-4 of the standard applies the security-canon corrections and records the o
   `22b7294e24137c0a350764b9cf37f3d4f2e9f35eb7c97a287d9c89477ef24d7a`) after reading the diff of the card text. The
   acceptance is a human review of an agent-prepared change, recorded here and sent to emergent-security for its
   EMERGENT-WP-0002 tracking. That commit is still local to that repository and is not pushed by net-kingdom.
+- **state-hub attribution design (STATE-WP-0100), decided:** Option A is phase 1 with no `hub_core` schema change;
+  correlation by equal session and run id only, no commit verifier (Option B deferred); phase 3 verifies tokens in
+  observe mode once key-cape issues agent tokens, and enforcement is a separate later decision; existing free-text
+  authors are not backfilled (a read-only count may be run later to size a mapping). Hub authorship stays a declared
+  gap in the standard until phase 3.