NK-WP-0026 finished: user-engine caller identity verified live against railiance01

T02 done. Deployed user-engine digest c501aeb2 reads the projected flex-auth
token per decision (verified in the running container); flex-auth-user-engine
138aa347 serves with caller-auth enforce. Probes: valid 200
decision:d9aef25f08e17b84, missing token 401, wrong-system 403.

Closes manifest drift: runtime.yaml pinned e3b5f65b, the digest T01 warned
against, while the cluster ran c501aeb2. Re-applying it would have rolled the
portal back to an image that cannot authenticate to a PDP now in enforce.
kubectl diff is now empty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

WORK-RECORDS.md

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 | workplan | NK-WP-0023 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md |
 | workplan | NK-WP-0024 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
 | workplan | NK-WP-0025 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
+| workplan | NK-WP-0026 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-07-02-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-02.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-07-02-T02 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-02.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-08-14-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-14.md |
@@ -72,5 +73,7 @@
 | task | NK-WP-0025-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0025-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0025-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0026-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0026-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md |
 | intake | NK-IN-0001 | closed | blue | docs/intakes/activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md |
 | intake | NK-IN-0002 | closed | blue | docs/intakes/activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md |

canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md

@@ -114,9 +114,11 @@ Rules:
 
 Performance model:
 
-- the live-lookup API must be fast and highly available, since `flex-auth`
-  calls it synchronously on the request path for privileged actions; slow
-  or unavailable `tenant-engine` lookups fail closed (deny), never fail open;
+- the live-lookup API must be fast and highly available, since `flex-auth` is
+  required to call it synchronously on the request path for privileged actions;
+  slow or unavailable `tenant-engine` lookups fail closed (deny), never fail
+  open. The adapter existing without a production caller does not satisfy this
+  contract and does not permit either service to claim I3;
 - the cached-claim read API used by `key-cape` may be slower, since it only
   runs at token issuance, not per-request;
 - request-scoped memoization within a single `flex-auth` decision is

sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml

@@ -40,12 +40,13 @@ spec:
       labels: *labels
     spec:
       automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      serviceAccountName: user-engine
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         seccompProfile: {type: RuntimeDefault}
       containers:
         - name: portal
-          image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/user-engine@sha256:e3b5f65bafc1c0260dfdf2567a52766e67506ceb878a51759a2e9a307c4b5eb8
+          image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/user-engine@sha256:c501aeb204154d85017565a87fd34cff12e5c48f600d124d3f8c82f11bb9d59c
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           ports: [{name: http, containerPort: 8080}]
           env:
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ spec:
             - {name: USER_ENGINE_OIDC_REDIRECT_URI, value: "https://users.92-205-62-239.nip.io/oidc/callback"}
             - {name: USER_ENGINE_OIDC_BACKEND_URL, value: "http://keycape.sso.svc.cluster.local:8080"}
             - {name: USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL, value: "http://flex-auth-user-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080"}
+            - {name: USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE, value: "/var/run/secrets/flex-auth-caller/token"}
             - {name: USER_ENGINE_EVENT_URL, value: "http://audit-core.audit-core.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/events"}
             - {name: USER_ENGINE_MAIL_URL, value: "http://email-connect.email-connect.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/send"}
             - name: USER_ENGINE_EVENT_TOKEN
@@ -90,6 +92,10 @@ spec:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
             capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}
             readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: flex-auth-caller
+              mountPath: /var/run/secrets/flex-auth-caller
+              readOnly: true
           resources:
             requests: {cpu: 50m, memory: 64Mi}
             limits: {cpu: 500m, memory: 256Mi}
@@ -103,6 +109,15 @@ spec:
           livenessProbe:
             httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
             periodSeconds: 20
+      volumes:
+        - name: flex-auth-caller
+          projected:
+            defaultMode: 0440
+            sources:
+              - serviceAccountToken:
+                  audience: flex-auth
+                  expirationSeconds: 3600
+                  path: token
 ---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
@@ -111,6 +126,11 @@ spec:
   selector: {app.kubernetes.io/name: user-engine}
   ports: [{name: http, port: 8080, targetPort: http}]
 ---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata: {name: user-engine, namespace: user-engine}
+automountServiceAccountToken: false
+---
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: NetworkPolicy
 metadata: {name: user-engine-default-deny, namespace: user-engine}

tests/test_user_engine_platform_expansion.py

@@ -19,11 +19,14 @@ class UserEnginePlatformExpansionContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("dead-letter", text)
         self.assertIn("OpenBao", text)
 
-    def test_live_manifest_does_not_enable_partial_integration(self):
+    def test_desired_manifest_authenticates_flex_auth_calls(self):
         manifest = (ROOT / "sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml").read_text()
-        self.assertNotIn("USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL", manifest)
-        self.assertNotIn("USER_ENGINE_EVENT_URL", manifest)
-        self.assertNotIn("USER_ENGINE_MAIL_URL", manifest)
+        self.assertIn("USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL", manifest)
+        self.assertIn("USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE", manifest)
+        self.assertIn("serviceAccountName: user-engine", manifest)
+        self.assertIn("audience: flex-auth", manifest)
+        self.assertIn("mountPath: /var/run/secrets/flex-auth-caller", manifest)
+        self.assertIn("automountServiceAccountToken: false", manifest)
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+---
+id: NK-WP-0026
+type: workplan
+title: "Promote user-engine workload identity to flex-auth"
+domain: infotech
+repo: net-kingdom
+status: finished
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+created: "2026-08-18"
+updated: "2026-08-19"
+state_hub_workstream_id: "3a9b7b04-d283-4101-8b6a-31624c6d5de6"
+---
+
+# NK-WP-0026 — user-engine caller identity rollout
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0026-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "8da592be-cbc7-49a4-bb2e-1c04e5c80336"
+```
+
+Declare a non-automounted `user-engine` ServiceAccount and a one-hour projected
+token with audience `flex-auth`; mount only that token into the portal. Source
+completed 2026-08-18. Existing NetworkPolicy already permits only the named
+flex-auth user-engine instance on port 8080.
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0026-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "9dbaf763-31fc-4538-93a2-5df4bb9fa6ae"
+```
+
+Both sides promoted and probed. Verified live on railiance01, 2026-08-19, by
+net-kingdom against the cluster rather than against another repo's assertion.
+
+**Deployed digests**
+
+| Side | Object | Digest |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| user-engine | `deploy/user-engine` (ns `user-engine`), pod `user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px` | `forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/user-engine@sha256:c501aeb204154d85017565a87fd34cff12e5c48f600d124d3f8c82f11bb9d59c` |
+| flex-auth | `deploy/flex-auth-user-engine` (ns `flex-auth`), pod `flex-auth-user-engine-b745b6b5c-zhsfv` | `forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/flex-auth@sha256:138aa3471c46bca6e814691fa1e6520aedda3dffd743e6b09141ab433afdb64b` |
+
+flex-auth serves with `--caller-auth-mode enforce` and
+`--caller-binding user-engine=system:serviceaccount:user-engine:user-engine`.
+The warn stage was run on flex-auth's side under FLEX-WP-0011 / FLEX-WP-0015-T02;
+net-kingdom observed the end state, not the intermediate warn window.
+
+**The T01 caveat is cleared.** The old digest did not read the projected file.
+The deployed digest does: `user_engine/runtime.py:45` makes
+`USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE` a *required* setting (`_required(...)`, so the
+portal cannot start without it), and
+`user_engine/adapters/flex_auth.py:62-68` re-reads the file **per decision** —
+deliberately, so projected-token rotation needs no restart — and sends it as
+`Authorization: Bearer`. Both were read out of the running container, not out of
+the source tree.
+
+**Probes** — `POST /v1/check` against
+`flex-auth-user-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080`, run from inside the
+workload pods so NetworkPolicy and identity are exercised as in production. All
+are read-only decision queries; nothing in the cluster was mutated.
+
+| Probe | Run from | Credential | Result |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| valid | `user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px` | the pod's own projected token, audience `flex-auth` | **HTTP 200**, `decision:d9aef25f08e17b84`, `effect: allow`, `reason: self_service`, `matched_rule: self_service`, `policy_version: v1` |
+| missing token | `user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px` | no `Authorization` header | **HTTP 401** `unauthenticated` |
+| wrong system | `user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px` | valid user-engine token, body asserting `resource.system: tenant-engine` | **HTTP 403** `forbidden` |
+| wrong system (network path) | `tenant-engine-6c6dcbddbb-4v26w` | tenant-engine's own projected token, against the *user-engine* PDP | connection refused — NetworkPolicy denies the cross-service path before flex-auth sees it |
+
+Note on the wrong-system probe, because it differs from what flex-auth reported.
+flex-auth's `tenancy.yaml` states "a token bound to the other protected system
+returns 403". net-kingdom could not reproduce that literal case: the
+tenant-engine pod cannot reach the user-engine PDP at all (Errno 111), so the
+403 never arises on that path. What *is* reproducible, and is the same
+substitution attack, is a caller authenticated as one system asserting another
+system in the request body — ADR-0004's stated threat, "a caller could represent
+another protected system" — and that returns 403. The estate position is
+therefore stronger than claimed (two independent layers refuse it), but the
+claimed evidence is not the evidence that exists. Recorded rather than smoothed.
+
+**Manifest drift, found and closed.** `sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml`
+still pinned `sha256:e3b5f65b…` — the digest T01 warned must not be applied —
+while the cluster ran `c501aeb2…`. Anyone re-applying the repo's own manifest
+would have rolled the portal back to an image that does not read the token file,
+against a PDP now in `enforce`: every authorization call would 401 and the portal
+would fail closed. The manifest is now pinned to the deployed digest and
+`kubectl diff -f sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml` is **empty, exit 0** —
+declared state and live state agree.
+
+**Observation routed to flex-auth, not a blocker.** A syntactically invalid
+bearer token returns **HTTP 503 `caller authentication unavailable`**, not 401.
+ADR-0004 reserves 503 for TokenReview *unavailability* and puts invalid tokens
+with the 401 class. It fails closed either way, so there is no bypass, but a
+malformed credential is being reported as a flex-auth outage — which will
+mislead whoever reads the first page of an incident.