NK-WP-0049-T33: independent attempt receipt verifier, retained location and ACME reissue step

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 696317@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: bab9e511-0915-45b3-926a-2fab552edff6

docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md

@@ -568,19 +568,44 @@ hidden key prompt.
    deny `openbao:admin`). A pass shows founder authority for this one attempt. It
    is not native acceptance and not single use. The NK49 execution keeps single-use
    consumption and cleanup.
-3. **TLS/trust input per T35 disposition** (founder decision
-   `9f9d0d88-837a-433c-8a11-d30b633b0073`). Under reissue, record the public chain
-   with railiance-cluster `tools/public-tls-metadata.py` at attempt time and compare
-   it to the admission. Under original recovery, use only the custody path that
-   RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T03/T04 delivers. No self-signed substitute is allowed. The TLS
-   key stays in the owner's own terminal.
+3. **TLS/trust input: ACME reissue** (founder decision
+   `9f9d0d88-837a-433c-8a11-d30b633b0073`, resolved 2026-10-21 = A). The
+   `kc.coulomb.social` TLS identity is reissued through `letsencrypt-prod` ACME
+   HTTP-01 and chains to ISRG Root X1 (trust sha256 `22b557a2…43d1`). The original
+   key is not required, and no self-signed substitute is allowed.
+   **Before the real attempt**, the owner (railiance-cluster) rehearses the same
+   issuance against Let's Encrypt staging. This protects the duplicate-certificate
+   limit of 5 per week. At attempt time, record the public chain with
+   railiance-cluster `tools/public-tls-metadata.py` and check SAN
+   `kc.coulomb.social` plus the ISRG Root X1 chain. Abort if HTTP-01 cannot
+   complete or the chain differs. The TLS key stays in the owner's own terminal.
 4. **Existing six-argument launcher** `tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh`
    with the reviewed admission digest. Its T34 source closure and abort/cleanup
    behaviour are unchanged. The private manifest is derived and the archive
    registration is compared to the selector inside custody only.
 
-Still open before T33 can close: T35 owner metadata (RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T02) and
-the founder disposition; the execution deadline, safe receipt location and
-independent receipt verifier fixed in the packet; the anchor installed on the
-attempt host. Public observations are in
+5. **Safe receipt and independent verification.** The launcher prints
+   `Safe receipt: <tmpdir>/recovery.json`. Before anyone copies it, verify it
+   from a separate shell against a clean checkout at the reviewed commit:
+   ```sh
+   python3 -I tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py \
+     --receipt <tmpdir>/recovery.json \
+     --transfer-receipt <verified transfer receipt> \
+     --source-root <clean checkout>/tools/bootstrap-recovery \
+     --not-after <admission window end, ISO 8601 with offset>
+   ```
+   The admission window, at most 24 h and signed by the founder, is the execution
+   deadline. Retain the receipt only on exit 0 (`verified`), and keep it at
+   `docs/evidence/<date>-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/recovery.json` together with the
+   verifier output. On exit 1, keep it out of Git and report the findings. Do not
+   repair it by hand. The verifier refuses secret-shaped content, open cleanup
+   obligations, daemon uncertainty, any claim of consumer reconnect or human MFA,
+   a ciphertext that differs from the transfer receipt, and source that differs
+   from the checkout. A pass is not consumer continuity (T18), retained-factor MFA
+   (T19) or owner acceptance.
+
+Still open before T33 can close (2026-10-23): the anchor installed on the attempt
+host (SECRETS-WP-0015-T04, founder- and root-owned) and the owner's Let's Encrypt
+staging rehearsal from step 3. T35, T36 and T39 are done. The deadline, receipt
+location and verifier are fixed above. Public observations are in
 `docs/evidence/2026-10-21-nk49-t33-readiness/readiness-observation.json`.