feat(orchestration): compose KeyCape C1 and C2b

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a02929-244b-7391-b933-c04010e8eedb

Makefile

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ BOOTSTRAP_CLEANUP_EVIDENCE ?= /tmp/netkingdom-bootstrap-cleanup/evidence.json
 LIFECYCLE_FLOW_EVIDENCE ?= /tmp/netkingdom-lifecycle-flow/evidence.json
 ONBOARDING_DRY_RUN_EVIDENCE ?= /tmp/netkingdom-onboarding-dry-run/evidence.json
 RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_PATH ?= ../railiance-platform
+KEY_CAPE_PATH ?= ../key-cape
 CUSTODY_ROSTER ?= .local/custody-roster.json
 CUSTODY_ROSTER_SIGNATURE ?= .local/custody-roster.json.sig
 CUSTODY_ROSTER_ALLOWED_SIGNERS ?= .local/custody-roster.allowed_signers
@@ -199,6 +200,12 @@ security-scenario-compose-c0: ## Compose the plan-only C0 local-identity referen
 	  --scenario examples/security-scenarios/c0-local-identity.yaml \
 	  capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.local-identity.yaml
 
+security-scenario-compose-lightweight: ## Compose plan-only KeyCape C1+C2b from owner declarations
+	python3 tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py \
+	  --scenario examples/security-scenarios/c1-c2b-key-cape.yaml \
+	  $(KEY_CAPE_PATH)/capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.lightweight-sso.yaml \
+	  $(KEY_CAPE_PATH)/capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority.yaml
+
 posture-feedback-test: ## Run deterministic posture-feedback tests
 	python3 -m pytest tools/posture-feedback/tests tools/tenancy-posture/test_validate.py
 
@@ -369,7 +376,7 @@ security-bootstrap-ui: security-bootstrap-metadata-init ## Serve local custody a
         creds-agent-init creds-agent-status creds-emergency-reprint \
         openbao-init-unseal openbao-init-unseal-dry-run \
         iam-profile-conformance-test playbook-contract-test posture-feedback-test \
-        posture-feedback-reference \
+        posture-feedback-reference security-scenario-compose-lightweight \
         security-bootstrap-console-test security-bootstrap-scripts-syntax \
         security-bootstrap-console security-bootstrap-king-kit \
         security-bootstrap-validate-kit security-bootstrap-validate-t02 \

SCOPE.md

@@ -120,10 +120,9 @@ Current open work as of 2026-08-23 is either externally blocked, date-gated, or
 explicit backlog: reef carrier/public-classification decisions in NK-WP-0027,
 the NK-WP-0022 retirement gate, security tutorials in NK-WP-0009, and
 enterprise federation in NK-WP-0011. NK-WP-0030 has delivered the local C0
-scenario-composition slice and waits for externally owned C1/C2 provider
+and externally declared KeyCape C1+C2b plan-only composition slices. NK-WP-0031
-declarations before the lightweight SSO scenario can compose. NK-WP-0031 has
+has delivered the local proposal-only feedback evaluator and waits for
-delivered the local proposal-only feedback evaluator and waits for authoritative
+authoritative freshness adoption by `audit-core`.
-freshness adoption by `audit-core`.
 
 ---
 

examples/security-scenarios/c1-c2b-key-cape.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+id: scenario:c1-c2b-key-cape-reference
+authority: platform
+initial_trust:
+  - cluster_trust
+  - runtime_secret_trust
+requires:
+  capabilities:
+    - c1.lightweight-sso
+    - c2b.token-authority
+providers:
+  c1.lightweight-sso: key-cape.lightweight-sso
+  c2b.token-authority: key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority

history/2026-08-23-key-cape-c1-c2b-composition.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# KeyCape C1 and C2b composition evidence
+
+Date: 2026-08-23
+Workplan: NK-WP-0030
+Mode: plan-only
+
+KeyCape published provider-owned Playbook Capability Contract v0.1
+declarations for `key-cape.lightweight-sso` and
+`key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority`. The implementation content originates
+at KeyCape revision `efce3e9`; its file-first workplan and State Hub identifiers
+were reconciled by revision `34fadae`. NetKingdom received the handoff in State
+Hub message `1d5f5f15-d137-4c11-8386-c8cc58c17bb8`.
+
+Both owner declarations passed NetKingdom's canonical playbook capability
+validator. The reference request in
+`examples/security-scenarios/c1-c2b-key-cape.yaml` then composed successfully
+with:
+
+- initial trust: `cluster_trust`, `runtime_secret_trust`;
+- step 1: `key-cape.lightweight-sso` provides C1 and establishes
+  `runtime_identity_trust`;
+- step 2: `key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority` provides C2b after consuming
+  that identity trust;
+- final trust: `cluster_trust`, `runtime_secret_trust`, and
+  `runtime_identity_trust`; and
+- composition digest:
+  `sha256:cd7aeba3c83c83e2de7bc9a64d2dd9922f4f39a4de81c41760f9f9a431a820a6`.
+
+The plan retains KeyCape, railiance-platform, and privacyIDEA ownership exactly
+as declared. It sets `execution.mode: plan-only` and
+`execution.permitted: false`; no provider entry point was invoked. C2a built-in
+factors are not part of the scenario, and neither NetKingdom nor KeyCape claims
+them through this composition.

history/2026-08-23-scope-intent-gap-assessment.md

@@ -142,9 +142,12 @@ NK-WP-0030 subsequently implemented the first bounded G1 increment: proposed
 Security Scenario Composition v0.1 canon, a fail-closed plan-only composer, and
 a real C0 local-identity declaration and reference scenario. This establishes
 deterministic provider pins, trust ordering, responsibility mapping, and
-readiness handoff without executing provider actions. G1 remains open for the
+readiness handoff without executing provider actions. KeyCape subsequently
-lightweight SSO path until the KeyCape/Railiance owners publish conformant C1
+published conformant owner declarations for C1 and C2b. NetKingdom's checked-in
-and C2 declarations.
+reference now composes them in trust order and preserves their responsibility
+map without claiming C2a. G1 remains open beyond this bounded increment because
+the composer neither executes the provider entry points nor closes their
+readiness obligations into verified turn-key state.
 
 NK-WP-0031 subsequently implemented the first bounded G2 increment: proposed
 Posture Feedback v0.1 canon and a deterministic evaluator that turns explicit

tools/security-scenario-composer/README.md

@@ -17,6 +17,20 @@ python3 tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py \
   capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.local-identity.yaml
 ```
 
+Compose the KeyCape C1 plus C2b reference from its authoritative sibling
+declarations:
+
+```bash
+python3 tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py \
+  --scenario examples/security-scenarios/c1-c2b-key-cape.yaml \
+  ../key-cape/capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.lightweight-sso.yaml \
+  ../key-cape/capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority.yaml
+```
+
+The scenario pins both provider ids. NetKingdom does not copy or reinterpret
+their execution authority; the emitted plan retains `execution.permitted:
+false` and routes readiness to the declaration owners.
+
 Run tests:
 
 ```bash

tools/security-scenario-composer/tests/test_security_scenario_composer.py

@@ -264,3 +264,44 @@ def test_checked_in_c0_scenario_composes():
         "c0.bootstrap-identity": "net-kingdom.local-identity"
     }
     assert plan["execution_steps"][0]["repo"] == "net-kingdom"
+
+
+def test_checked_in_key_cape_scenario_sequences_c1_before_c2b(tmp_path):
+    repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+    scenario_path = repo_root / "examples/security-scenarios/c1-c2b-key-cape.yaml"
+    c1_data = declaration_data(
+        "key-cape.lightweight-sso",
+        "c1.lightweight-sso",
+        "C1",
+        requires=["cluster_trust", "runtime_secret_trust"],
+        satisfies=["runtime_identity_trust"],
+    )
+    c1_data["metadata"]["owner"] = "key-cape"
+    c1_data["metadata"]["repo"] = "key-cape"
+    c2b_data = declaration_data(
+        "key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority",
+        "c2b.token-authority",
+        "C2b",
+        requires=["runtime_identity_trust", "runtime_secret_trust"],
+        satisfies=["runtime_identity_trust"],
+    )
+    c2b_data["metadata"]["owner"] = "key-cape"
+    c2b_data["metadata"]["repo"] = "key-cape"
+    declarations = [
+        declaration(tmp_path, c2b_data, "c2b.yaml"),
+        declaration(tmp_path, c1_data, "c1.yaml"),
+    ]
+
+    request = composer.contract.load_yaml(scenario_path)
+    issues, plan = composer.compose_scenario(declarations, request)
+
+    assert messages(issues) == []
+    assert plan["capability_providers"] == {
+        "c1.lightweight-sso": "key-cape.lightweight-sso",
+        "c2b.token-authority": "key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority",
+    }
+    assert [step["declaration_id"] for step in plan["execution_steps"]] == [
+        "key-cape.lightweight-sso",
+        "key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority",
+    ]
+    assert plan["execution"]["permitted"] is False

workplans/NK-WP-0030-deterministic-security-scenario-composition.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Implement deterministic security scenario composition"
 domain: infotech
 repo: net-kingdom
-status: blocked
+status: finished
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: netkingdom
 planning_priority: P1
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ executing the CLI entry point.
 
 ```task
 id: NK-WP-0030-T04
-status: wait
+status: done
 priority: high
 state_hub_task_id: "41fd145d-7a37-5c65-ae72-142ac6d49144"
 ```
@@ -80,6 +80,15 @@ authority in NetKingdom. The complete lightweight SSO scenario remains blocked
 until those declarations exist and pass the canonical composer. Routed to
 `key-cape` in State Hub message `64d247e4-9170-4d18-b7ed-d8b071282104`.
 
+KeyCape published the authoritative C1 and C2b declarations at revision
+`34fadae` and notified NetKingdom in State Hub message
+`1d5f5f15-d137-4c11-8386-c8cc58c17bb8`. Both pass the canonical declaration
+validator. `examples/security-scenarios/c1-c2b-key-cape.yaml` pins the exact
+providers, sequences C1 before C2b through `runtime_identity_trust`, and emits
+plan digest
+`sha256:cd7aeba3c83c83e2de7bc9a64d2dd9922f4f39a4de81c41760f9f9a431a820a6`
+with execution forbidden. C2a remains outside the scenario and is not implied.
+
 ## Verify the fail-closed and reference paths
 
 ```task
@@ -89,11 +98,11 @@ priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "7db26092-35c4-52c6-9a3e-3f24bc3e26c7"
 ```
 
-Added ten composer tests and five regression tests for the legacy declaration
+Added eleven composer tests and five regression tests for the legacy declaration
 validator/demo selector, including secret-reference syntax enforcement.
 Exact selection, ambiguity refusal, bad pins, override boundaries, duplicate
 ids, dependency ordering, unresolved trust, responsibility/readiness mapping,
-and the checked-in C0 composition pass. The complete relevant repository suite
+and the checked-in C0 and KeyCape C1+C2b compositions pass. The current root
-passes 70 tests; the isolated local-identity suite passes 142 tests. JSON/YAML
+repository suite passes 88 tests; the isolated local-identity suite passes 142
-parsing, Python compilation, the reference CLI, and `git diff --check` also
+tests. JSON/YAML parsing, Python compilation, both reference CLI paths, and
-pass.
+`git diff --check` also pass.