diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md
index e623a14..6a27ce3 100644
--- a/WORK-RECORDS.md
+++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@
 | task | NK-WP-0049-T38 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0049-T39 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0049-T40 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0049-T41 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0050-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0050-T02 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0050-T03 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md |
diff --git a/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md b/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md
index 0645d68..cb36547 100644
--- a/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md
+++ b/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ current production password validity, MFA or audit continuity.
 | Task / owner lane | Positive check | Negative check | Safe evidence |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | T16 / LLDAP | Preserved user/group/membership identities; existing-user bind/login | Wrong password rejected | Image/target IDs, aggregate comparisons and booleans |
-| T17 / Authelia | Native storage decryption; same signing identity/client configs; isolated authentication | Wrong credentials or unregistered client refused | Public key thumbprint, test outcome, notification suppression |
+| T17 / Authelia | Original config validates; storage key opens store; issuer JWKS equals archived key; `keycape` client verifier accepts KeyCape's archived secret; existing-user first factor against restored LLDAP | Wrong password and wrong client secret refused; no grant issued | Public key thumbprint, outcomes, file-notifier only (stage prepared in T41) |
 | T19 / privacyIDEA MFA | Existing retained token decrypts internally and actual existing-token MFA succeeds | Wrong enckey and invalid code refused in disposable copies | Token material never exported; bounded outcomes only |
 | T20 / privacyIDEA audit | Verify historical signatures; create and verify one isolated entry with original key | Mismatched public key/tampered disposable record rejected | Signature counts, continuity result, cleanup |
 | T18 / KeyCape | Same issuer/JWKS, registry/policy/receipt continuity; named current consumer authenticates | Wrong secret and denied scope rejected | Public fingerprints, owner-selected test IDs and outcomes |
diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
index 88fc61e..c8e5c39 100644
--- a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
+++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ status: active
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: netkingdom
 created: "2026-10-12"
-updated: "2026-10-17"
+updated: "2026-10-24"
 flavor: implementation
 depends_on: []
 state_hub_workstream_id: "17d315f0-829e-57c7-85cc-3a7914152804"
@@ -508,8 +508,8 @@ id: NK-WP-0049-T17
 status: wait
 priority: high
 assignee: codex
-depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T15, NK-WP-0049-T16]
-blocking_reason: "LLDAP recovery T16 passed; await the exact isolated Authelia adapter/procedure and private authentication-flow inputs from T15."
+depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T15, NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T41]
+blocking_reason: "LLDAP recovery T16 passed. Await the T41 adapter (prepared and fixture-tested), then a founder-attended run with the age key and an existing-user password."
 state_hub_task_id: "b47f9975-d6d7-5bb8-93ce-886deb1dfa70"
 ```
 
@@ -525,6 +525,25 @@ positive/negative results using the restored directory. Disable outbound
 notifications and verify cleanup. Archive integrity/RSA parsing alone are not
 native Authelia acceptance.
 
+2026-10-24 redraft, after design review with the founder. KeyCape's source
+(`key-cape/src/internal`, `config/dev-config.yaml`) confirms the human-login chain:
+KeyCape delegates first factor to Authelia as upstream OIDC with the `keycape`
+client secret, Authelia binds against LLDAP, and KeyCape adds MFA through
+privacyIDEA. The durable Authelia state that matters is in the Secret and config:
+the OIDC issuer key, HMAC secret, `keycape` client verifier, storage encryption key
+and LDAP bind password. The SQLite store holds little under `one_factor`, so
+storage decryption is a cheap check here, not the main proof. T17 acceptance is:
+(1) the original configuration validates with the original secrets, notifier
+switched to a tmpfs file notifier; (2) the storage encryption key opens the
+restored store; (3) the issuer JWKS public key equals the archived issuer key;
+(4) the restored `keycape` client verifier accepts KeyCape's archived client
+secret and refuses a wrong one, at the token endpoint, with no grant issued;
+(5) first-factor login through Authelia against the restored LLDAP succeeds for
+an existing user, a wrong password is refused. The full KeyCape→Authelia→LLDAP→
+privacyIDEA human-login chain is not part of T17. T18's selected consumer
+(SECRETS-WP-0015-T04) is a workload login and does not pass through Authelia;
+a human-login consumer acceptance would need its own selection and admission.
+
 ## Prove retained privacyIDEA token decryption and existing-token MFA
 
 ```task
@@ -1448,6 +1467,46 @@ attempt readiness, T18 actual recovery/consumer acceptance and T19 retained-fact
 MFA remain open. No actual archive, private key, Secret object, token exchange,
 OpenBao login, rotation, production action or owner assent was exercised.
 
+## Prepare and fixture-test the isolated Authelia restore stage
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0049-T41
+status: progress
+priority: high
+assignee: claude-code
+depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T29]
+```
+
+**Accountable worker:** claude-code; the founder retains the actual private
+recovery inputs and runs the T17 stage.
+
+Add `isolated-authelia.py` and `run-isolated-authelia.sh` to
+`tools/bootstrap-recovery/`, the Authelia counterpart of T29. Design, from the
+2026-10-24 review:
+
+- Topology: the anchor-namespace pattern already used by the KeyCape session.
+  Restored LLDAP is the `--network none` anchor; Authelia and the probe client
+  join `container:<anchor>` and talk over loopback only. No new network.
+- Reuse without edits: import helpers from `isolated-lldap.py` and the other
+  existing modules. Do not modify `isolated-lldap.py` or the KeyCape files;
+  they are in the pinned source-hash list of the T38/T40 attempt.
+- Inputs: the verified transfer receipt, the age key via
+  `sops-custody-unlock.sh`, an existing-user password by private prompt.
+  Original Authelia secrets and the `keycape` client secret come from the
+  archive, never from argv, environment listings or files outside tmpfs.
+- Confinement: LDAP URL rewritten to loopback, SMTP notifier replaced by a
+  tmpfs file notifier, `authelia-smtp` not imported. Containment inspection
+  before private import; container and tmpfs cleanup verified on every exit.
+- Checks: the five T17 acceptance items. Receipt records booleans, counts, the
+  issuer key thumbprint and image IDs only.
+
+**Done when:** unit tests cover config assembly (original secrets kept, notifier
+and LDAP rewritten, path escape refused, missing secret refused), and an opt-in
+synthetic-fixture test (`NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_AUTHELIA_TEST=1`) passes on the pinned
+local images with disposable credentials only. The packet in
+`docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md` names the stage and its exact command.
+This prepares T17; it is not T17 acceptance and touches no production service.
+
 ## Accept remaining recovery and caller evidence and close the G08 handoff
 
 ```task