Draft execution-attribution and workload-step-up amendments; route remaining tasks

- playbook-capability-contract_v0.2.md (proposed): adds the
  execution-attribution receipt field list (NK-WP-0040-T01).
- iam-profile_v0.4.md (proposed): adds the workload-requested step-up
  contract (acr_values, no-factor refusal, assurance.level to flex-auth)
  (NK-WP-0042-T01).
- Route the remaining externally-owned decisions (NK-WP-0040-T02 to
  audit-core/Railiance, NK-WP-0042-T02 to user-engine, NK-WP-0039-T04 to
  flex-auth/tenant-engine) and mark those workplans blocked.

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: sonnet
Assistant-Process: 321494@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2c8a5cd1-573e-4bae-ab2b-29bc6c8ed4e9

canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.4.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+---
+id: netkingdom-iam-profile-v0.4
+type: standard
+title: "NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.4"
+domain: netkingdom
+status: proposed
+owner: net-kingdom
+created: "2026-09-27"
+updated: "2026-09-27"
+scope: core-platform
+supersedes:
+  - canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md
+adr:
+  - docs/adr/ADR-0011-iam-profile-ownership-and-version-governance.md
+  - docs/adr/ADR-0016-mfa-user-preference-and-workload-step-up.md
+related:
+  - NK-WP-0042
+---
+
+# NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.4
+
+Everything in v0.3 stands unchanged except where this document says
+otherwise. v0.3 remains `accepted` and normative; this document adds the
+workload-requested step-up contract as a proposed amendment
+(`NK-WP-0042-T01`). It does not require any workload to request MFA;
+ADR-0016's default — MFA is a user preference — is unchanged, and the
+enrollment/recovery usability gate in ADR-0016 §4 still applies before any
+workload turns a requirement on.
+
+## Workload-Requested Step-Up (proposed)
+
+ADR-0016 lets a workload require AAL2 for all or part of its features
+instead of leaving MFA to user preference. This section defines the
+OIDC-level request and the no-factor refusal contract so every issuer
+implements the same interface. **key-cape owns the implementation**; this
+profile owns the interface, per NK-WP-0042-T01.
+
+### Requesting step-up
+
+- **Whole-client requirement.** A workload that requires AAL2 for all of
+  its sign-ins registers this at the client, unchanged from the existing
+  lightweight-mode client configuration (`mfaRequired` / P06 semantics).
+  This subsection does not change that path.
+- **Per-request step-up.** A workload that requires AAL2 only for a
+  protected feature sends `acr_values` on the authorization request,
+  containing one of the `assurance.level` values this profile already
+  defines: `aal2` or `aal3`. The issuer MUST treat a recognized
+  `assurance.level` value in `acr_values` as a request for that floor.
+- `max_age` MAY be combined with `acr_values` to also force a fresh
+  interactive login. `max_age` MUST NOT be used alone to request
+  strength: it bounds session age, not factor count. A request carrying
+  only `max_age` gets a fresh login at whatever assurance the user
+  already holds, not an implied AAL2.
+- A request MUST NOT use a provider-native `acr` value as a substitute for
+  the profile's `assurance.level` vocabulary. Provider-native `acr`/`amr`
+  claims remain informational (Assurance Evidence, v0.3).
+
+### No-factor refusal
+
+If the requested floor is `aal2` or higher and privacyIDEA (or the
+issuer's equivalent authoritative factor source) reports no active
+factor for the user, the issuer MUST NOT silently issue a token at a
+lower `assurance.level`. It MUST do one of:
+
+- **Inline enrollment detour:** present the enrollment flow itself and,
+  on completion, resume and complete the original authorization request;
+  or
+- **Explicit refusal:** fail the authorization request with an
+  OAuth-shaped error distinct from a generic `access_denied` (e.g.
+  `error=mfa_required`), so the requesting client can route the user to
+  enrollment itself.
+
+Silent issuance of `assurance.level: aal1` (or omission of `assurance`)
+in response to an `acr_values` request for `aal2`/`aal3` is nonconforming.
+This governs the machine contract only; which of the two options a given
+workload presents, and the exact enrollment/recovery UX, is
+`NK-WP-0042-T02`'s open agreement with user-engine (U06) and a pilot
+workload — this profile does not decide it.
+
+### Reaching flex-auth
+
+No new claim is introduced. The outcome is carried by the existing
+`assurance.level` claim on the issued token (Assurance Evidence, v0.3):
+a workload's per-request requirement is satisfied, refused, or detoured
+before a token is issued, and flex-auth continues to read the issued
+`assurance.level` exactly as the Identity To Authorization Contract table
+already specifies. flex-auth MUST NOT infer a "requested vs. granted"
+distinction from any other claim; there is only the token that was
+issued.
+
+### Non-goals
+
+- This does not lower the IAM Profile v0.3 floor: privileged, destructive,
+  platform-root, secret, credential-vending, and emergency flows still
+  require `aal2` or stronger regardless of workload opt-in (ADR-0016 §3).
+- This does not specify the enrollment/recovery user experience
+  (NK-WP-0042-T02) or which workloads turn step-up on (ADR-0016 §4).
+- This does not add a Keycloak-specific or privacyIDEA-specific
+  mechanism; `acr_values` is the profile-level, provider-neutral request.

canon/standards/playbook-capability-contract_v0.2.md

@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+---
+id: netkingdom-playbook-capability-contract
+type: standard
+title: "NetKingdom Playbook Capability Contract v0.2"
+domain: netkingdom
+status: proposed
+version: "0.2"
+created: "2026-09-27"
+updated: "2026-09-27"
+scope: meta-orchestration
+supersedes:
+  - canon/standards/playbook-capability-contract_v0.1.md
+adr:
+  - docs/adr/ADR-0012-playbook-capability-contract-ownership.md
+schema:
+  - canon/schemas/playbook-capability-declaration_v0.1.schema.json
+related:
+  - NK-WP-0040
+  - history/2026-09-23-railiance-clock-identity-and-layer-review.md
+---
+
+# NetKingdom Playbook Capability Contract v0.2
+
+Everything in v0.1 stands unchanged except where this document says
+otherwise. v0.1 remains `accepted` and governs declaration conformance;
+this document adds the execution-attribution receipt as a proposed
+amendment. It becomes conformance-checked only once
+`NK-WP-0040-T02` lands the schema, evidence-holder agreement with
+audit-core and Railiance, and the corresponding validator addition.
+Until then, no declaration is required to emit a receipt.
+
+## Purpose
+
+The Playbook Capability Contract is the declared interface between
+NetKingdom meta-orchestration and Railiance execution playbooks.
+
+It lets a playbook state:
+
+- which capability it provisions;
+- which parameters it exposes, including defaults, constraints, and
+  security sensitivity;
+- which resources and responsibilities it claims;
+- which trust states it requires or satisfies;
+- how it is published into a catalog;
+- the execution-attribution receipt one run of it emits.
+
+NetKingdom consumes declarations to select playbooks, choose safe
+parameter overrides, sequence trust states, and build a responsibility
+map. Railiance owns the playbooks and execution mechanics.
+
+## Ownership
+
+NetKingdom owns this contract. Railiance publishes conformant
+declarations. Execution stays in Railiance. See ADR-0012.
+
+## File Convention
+
+Declaration files SHOULD live in the publishing repo at:
+
+```text
+capabilities/playbooks/<declaration-id>.yaml
+```
+
+Each file describes one playbook or one stable playbook entry point. A
+playbook with materially different modes may publish multiple
+declarations if those modes provide different capabilities or expose
+different security-sensitive parameters.
+
+## Top-Level Shape
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: netkingdom.io/playbook-capability/v0.1
+kind: PlaybookCapabilityDeclaration
+metadata:
+  id: railiance-infra.bootstrap-host
+  name: Railiance S1 host bootstrap
+  owner: railiance-infra
+  repo: railiance-infra
+  domain: railiance
+  contract_version: "0.1"
+spec:
+  playbook: {}
+  capabilities: []
+  parameters: []
+  responsibilities: []
+  trust: {}
+  catalog: {}
+```
+
+## Capability Vocabulary
+
+`spec.capabilities[].id` MUST be one of the controlled vocabulary values
+below. Capability ids are stable comparison keys.
+
+| Capability id | Tier | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `s1.os-baseline` | S1 | Host provisioning, OS convergence, hardening, and substrate access baseline |
+| `s1.secret-bootstrap` | S1 | Bootstrap secret material, SOPS/age handling, emergency material placement |
+| `s2.cluster-runtime` | S2 | Kubernetes runtime, ingress, networking, admission, and cluster access |
+| `s3.platform-services` | S3 | Databases, caches, object storage, brokers, and shared platform services |
+| `c0.bootstrap-identity` | C0 | Local/bootstrap identity before runtime IAM exists |
+| `c1.lightweight-sso` | C1 | key-cape lightweight SSO profile implementation |
+| `c2a.light-2fa` | C2a | Lightweight built-in second factor such as TOTP/WebAuthn |
+| `c2b.token-authority` | C2b | privacyIDEA or equivalent token authority |
+| `c3.runtime-secrets` | C3 | OpenBao or equivalent runtime secret authority |
+| `c4.fine-grained-authorization` | C4 | flex-auth and delegated PDP readiness |
+| `c5.enterprise-federation` | C5 | expanded-mode Keycloak, enterprise federation, or SAML brokering |
+| `c6.self-optimizing-audit` | C6 | audit feedback loops, drift surfacing, and continuous adaptation |
+
+The `S*` entries align to Railiance stack layers. The `C*` entries align
+to the NetKingdom capability progression. A declaration may list more
+than one capability only when the same playbook entry point truly
+provides each one.
+
+## Resource Kinds
+
+Every capability and responsibility claim references one or more
+resource kinds:
+
+| Resource kind | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `identities` | humans, service accounts, agents, groups, tenants, and assurance evidence |
+| `roles_scopes_policies` | roles, scopes, policy packages, protected-system registrations, decision records |
+| `secrets_credentials` | bootstrap material, runtime secrets, dynamic credentials, leases, credential rotations |
+| `infrastructure_resources` | hosts, runtime, networking, platform services, storage, and deployment substrate |
+
+## Parameter Declarations
+
+Each parameter entry has this shape:
+
+```yaml
+- name: swapfile_size_mb
+  type: integer
+  required: false
+  default: 4096
+  constraints:
+    minimum: 0
+    maximum: 65536
+  sensitivity: operational
+  tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable
+  description: Swap size applied by the bootstrap playbook.
+```
+
+Allowed `type` values:
+
+- `string`
+- `integer`
+- `number`
+- `boolean`
+- `array`
+- `object`
+
+Allowed `sensitivity` values:
+
+- `public` - safe to display and tune freely.
+- `operational` - affects behavior or sizing, not secret material.
+- `security_sensitive` - affects security posture and requires platform
+  review.
+- `secret_reference` - points to secret material but must not contain the
+  secret value itself.
+
+Allowed `tuning_authority` values:
+
+- `playbook_default` - NetKingdom should rely on the playbook default.
+- `netkingdom_tunable` - NetKingdom may override for a scenario.
+- `platform_only` - only platform-control-plane authority may override.
+- `tenant_tunable` - tenant-scoped scenario owners may override within
+  constraints.
+- `forbidden` - declaration exposes the value for audit only; callers may
+  not override it.
+
+Security-sensitive and secret-reference parameters MUST NOT be
+`tenant_tunable`. Secret-reference defaults must be references or paths,
+not plaintext secret values.
+
+For executable validation, a `secret_reference` value MUST be a non-whitespace
+URI such as `openbao://kv/platform/example` or
+`kubernetes://namespace/name#key`, or an explicit absolute/relative path
+beginning with `/`, `./`, or `../`. Bare strings are rejected because the
+composer cannot distinguish them from secret values.
+
+Supported constraints:
+
+| Constraint | Applies to | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `enum` | all scalar types | value must be one of the listed values |
+| `minimum` / `maximum` | integer, number | numeric bounds |
+| `min_items` / `max_items` | array | array length bounds |
+| `pattern` | string | regular expression the value must match |
+
+## Responsibility Claims
+
+Responsibility entries feed the responsibility map. They do not transfer
+execution ownership to NetKingdom.
+
+```yaml
+- resource_kind: infrastructure_resources
+  owner: railiance-infra
+  resources:
+    - server:target_hosts
+    - os-baseline
+  repo_owns: Provisioning, convergence, and verification mechanics.
+  netkingdom_orchestrates: Whether this substrate capability is selected, and which security posture is required.
+```
+
+`owner` names the repo or provider that holds execution ownership.
+`repo_owns` explains the implementation responsibility.
+`netkingdom_orchestrates` explains the meta-orchestration responsibility.
+
+## Trust States And Readiness
+
+Declarations use the trust-state vocabulary from the platform
+architecture:
+
+- `bare_host_trust`
+- `cluster_trust`
+- `bootstrap_secret_trust`
+- `bootstrap_identity_trust`
+- `runtime_secret_trust`
+- `runtime_identity_trust`
+- `runtime_authorization_trust`
+- `tenant_onboarding_trust`
+
+Each declaration lists states it requires and states it satisfies:
+
+```yaml
+trust:
+  requires:
+    - state: bare_host_trust
+      readiness_checks: []
+  satisfies:
+    - state: bootstrap_secret_trust
+      readiness_checks:
+        - id: sops-age-material-present
+          description: SOPS/age material is present for bootstrap secrets.
+          evidence: ansible role sops_agent converged successfully
+```
+
+Readiness checks are evidence obligations. The declaration names the
+check; the Railiance playbook or verification tooling performs it.
+
+## Catalog And Consumption Model
+
+A catalog is an index of declarations. For v0.1, the catalog mechanism is
+file-based:
+
+1. Railiance repos publish declarations under
+   `capabilities/playbooks/*.yaml`.
+2. NetKingdom or a future catalog job discovers those files from known
+   orchestrated repos.
+3. The validator checks each declaration against this contract.
+4. A scenario states required capability ids and parameter overrides.
+5. NetKingdom selects declarations that provide the required
+   capabilities.
+6. NetKingdom applies only allowed parameter overrides, rejecting
+   out-of-range, tenant-forbidden, or security-unsafe overrides.
+7. NetKingdom composes the responsibility and trust-state claims into a
+   scenario responsibility map and readiness sequence.
+
+The declaration is not an execution plan. It is the interface that lets a
+separate playbook runner execute safely.
+
+## Scenario Shape
+
+The validator supports a small scenario file for single-provider conformance
+demos:
+
+```yaml
+id: scenario:s1-host-bootstrap-reference
+authority: platform
+requires:
+  capabilities:
+    - s1.os-baseline
+parameter_overrides:
+  railiance-infra.bootstrap-host:
+    target_hosts:
+      - railiance01
+    swapfile_size_mb: 8192
+```
+
+Allowed scenario authorities are `platform`, `netkingdom`, and `tenant`.
+Tenant authority cannot override `platform_only`,
+`security_sensitive`, or `secret_reference` parameters.
+
+The demo composer refuses ambiguous providers and overrides aimed at unselected
+declarations. Deterministic multi-provider selection, explicit provider pins,
+trust sequencing, responsibility maps, and owner-routed readiness handoffs are
+defined by `security-scenario-composition_v0.1.md` and implemented by
+`tools/security-scenario-composer/`. Use that contract for operational planning;
+the demo path does not authorize or execute playbooks.
+
+## Execution Attribution Receipt (proposed)
+
+Raised by the railiance-clock identity review
+(`history/2026-09-23-railiance-clock-identity-and-layer-review.md`,
+Ruling 1). IAM Profile v0.3 defines who acts. This contract's
+responsibility claims define what is selected and who is responsible.
+Neither defines the record that ties **one execution** to its actor
+chain, artifact, and result. This section is that record's field list.
+It is a proposal: it does not obligate any declaration to emit a receipt
+until conformance is enforced per `NK-WP-0040-T02`.
+
+A receipt is a single, non-secret, structured record describing one
+completed (or failed) execution of a declared capability. It never
+embeds bearer credentials — tokens, secret values, or role response
+bodies. Unknown attribution is recorded as an explicit `unknown`, never
+inferred from path strings, repository ownership, or convenience
+defaults.
+
+### Fields
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `initiator.iss` / `initiator.sub` | Issuer and subject of the initiating actor, from its IAM Profile token |
+| `delegation` | The delegation reference (`actor_sub` / `act.sub`) when the initiator acted through a delegating agent; absent, not `unknown`, when there was no delegation |
+| `executing_workload` | The authoritative workload binding (Tenancy Posture `workload_identity`, proposed) that ran the playbook |
+| `runtime_principal` | The runtime credential's principal identity (e.g. service account, agent runtime identity) that executed it, distinct from the workload binding |
+| `tenant` | The tenant the execution acted for |
+| `environment` | The environment the execution ran in |
+| `run_id` | A stable, unique identifier for this one execution |
+| `source_commit` | The source commit of the executed playbook or declaration |
+| `artifact_digest` | The content digest of the executed artifact (image, package, or script) |
+| `target` | The inventory reference of what the execution acted on |
+| `action` | The action taken against the target |
+| `decision_refs` | Decision and approval record identifiers that authorized the execution, where one was required |
+| `time_interval.start` / `time_interval.end` | The attributed start and end of the execution |
+| `time_interval.clock_source` | The clock the interval was measured against |
+| `time_interval.bound` | The interval's precision bound, when one exists (e.g. clock skew tolerance); absent when no bound is established, never fabricated |
+
+### Emission and custody (open)
+
+Who emits the receipt, who holds it as evidence, and how a consumer
+validates one are not decided by this section. `NK-WP-0040-T02` routes
+that decision to audit-core (candidate evidence holder, per the security
+layer model's Evidence role) and Railiance (candidate emitter, since it
+executes). The receipt schema under `canon/schemas/` and its validator
+land together with that agreement, not before it.
+
+### Non-goals
+
+- This is not an authorization decision record. `decision_refs` points at
+  one; it does not restate it.
+- This is not a substitute for the Playbook Capability Contract's
+  responsibility claims or trust-state readiness checks, which describe
+  what a declaration is allowed to do, not what one run of it did.
+- This does not create a fourth IAM principal type. `executing_workload`
+  and `runtime_principal` name existing principals and bindings; they do
+  not grant anything by themselves (railiance-clock review, Ruling 1).
+
+## Conformance
+
+A declaration conforms when it passes:
+
+```text
+tools/playbook-capability-contract/playbook_contract_validator.py
+```
+
+The validator checks:
+
+- top-level API version and kind;
+- required metadata;
+- controlled capability ids and tiers;
+- resource-kind vocabulary;
+- parameter type/default/constraint/sensitivity/tuning rules;
+- responsibility claims;
+- trust-state and readiness-check shape;
+- catalog publication metadata;
+- optional scenario selection and parameter override compatibility.
+
+The execution-attribution receipt above is not yet enforced by this
+validator; see `NK-WP-0040-T02`.
+
+## Reference Adoption
+
+The reference declaration for v0.1 is in:
+
+```text
+../railiance-infra/capabilities/playbooks/railiance-infra.bootstrap-host.yaml
+```
+
+It describes the existing Railiance S1 Ansible bootstrap playbook and can
+be selected by the sample scenario in:
+
+```text
+examples/playbook-capability-contract/scenario-s1-host-bootstrap.yaml
+```

workplans/NK-WP-0039-flex-auth-access-engine-coordinate-intake.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Take in the flex-auth to access-engine repository-coordinate rename"
 domain: infotech
 repo: net-kingdom
-status: active
+status: blocked
 flavor: implementation
 owner: claude-code
 topic_slug: netkingdom
@@ -114,11 +114,18 @@ nothing else moved.
 
 ```task
 id: NK-WP-0039-T04
-status: todo
+status: wait
 priority: high
 state_hub_task_id: "2541f523-e433-5900-b119-5825f0e71ef3"
 ```
 
+**Waiting 2026-09-27.** Routed the retire-vs-reconcile question to flex-auth
+(`2c637dc9-14ad-4815-aeb4-43254d01280c`) and tenant-engine
+(`9fc740da-1966-4d39-a28a-79fd4870edb1`). NetKingdom will act on whichever
+answer comes back (retire and point to their authoritative declarations, or
+keep a narrower reference); it should not pre-empt their decision by
+deleting or editing the file first.
+
 A read-only `kubectl diff` of `sso-mfa/k8s/tenant-engine/runtime.yaml`
 against railiance01 on 2026-09-23 showed live ahead of the file beyond the
 digests. flex-auth runs with `--caller-auth-mode enforce` and caller

workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Define an execution-attribution receipt for Railiance runs"
 domain: infotech
 repo: net-kingdom
-status: ready
+status: blocked
 flavor: planning
 owner: claude-code
 topic_slug: netkingdom
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ execution** to its actor chain, artifact and result.
 
 ```task
 id: NK-WP-0040-T01
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "9d02685a-a3d9-5b9f-b09e-aef1f196a97f"
 ```
@@ -46,11 +46,20 @@ fields:
 The receipt must never embed bearer credentials. Unknown attribution is kept
 explicit, not inferred. Start from the field list in railiance-clock's review.
 
+**Done 2026-09-27.** Drafted as
+`canon/standards/playbook-capability-contract_v0.2.md` (status `proposed`,
+supersedes v0.1, which stays `accepted` and normative until this is
+accepted). It adds an "Execution Attribution Receipt (proposed)" section
+with every field above, explicit non-goals (no fourth IAM principal type,
+not a decision record, not a substitute for responsibility claims), and the
+never-embed-credentials / no-inferred-attribution rules. Emission, custody,
+schema, and validator are explicitly left to T02.
+
 ## Agree the evidence holder and schema with audit-core and Railiance
 
 ```task
 id: NK-WP-0040-T02
-status: todo
+status: wait
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "963120c1-7c72-5806-942b-6f49e4c66e54"
 ```
@@ -59,3 +68,10 @@ audit-core holds evidence (layer model §3.3, Evidence role). Railiance
 executes and emits. Agree who emits, who holds and how the receipt is
 validated. Add a schema under `canon/schemas/` and a validator beside the
 existing playbook-capability tooling.
+
+**Waiting 2026-09-27.** Routed to audit-core (evidence-holder/schema
+agreement) and Railiance (emitter confirmation) via State Hub messages
+`48eb1101-a577-40c0-bbaa-39df02198155` and
+`4f1c67bc-8de2-483f-bcac-dbdf107ce95a`. NetKingdom adds the schema and
+validator once both reply; nothing here can be finished unilaterally
+without pre-empting their agreement.

workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Let workloads require MFA for all or part of their features"
 domain: infotech
 repo: net-kingdom
-status: backlog
+status: blocked
 flavor: planning
 owner: claude-code
 topic_slug: netkingdom
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ applies first.
 
 ```task
 id: NK-WP-0042-T01
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "d66a6347-b714-5cca-aeb5-7121328f4dec"
 ```
@@ -40,11 +40,23 @@ Specify:
 
 Record it as an IAM Profile amendment. key-cape owns the implementation.
 
+**Done 2026-09-27.** Drafted as `canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.4.md`
+(status `proposed`, supersedes v0.3, which stays `accepted` and normative
+until this is accepted). The new "Workload-Requested Step-Up (proposed)"
+section specifies `acr_values` carrying an `assurance.level` value
+(`aal2`/`aal3`) as the step-up request, `max_age` as an optional additive
+freshness request that must never stand in for strength alone, the two
+conforming no-factor refusal shapes (inline enrollment detour or an
+explicit `error=mfa_required`-class refusal, never silent AAL1), and that
+flex-auth keeps reading the issued `assurance.level` with no new claim.
+The exact enrollment/recovery UX is left to T02, which this section names
+explicitly.
+
 ## Agree the user-facing step-up and enrollment journey
 
 ```task
 id: NK-WP-0042-T02
-status: todo
+status: wait
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "4e51585d-2b57-56d4-84c1-314041d26bcf"
 ```
@@ -54,3 +66,9 @@ user sees when a feature needs MFA and they have none. That includes the
 enrollment detour, the return to the feature, and recovery. It must be
 accepted from a user's perspective before any workload turns the requirement
 on.
+
+**Waiting 2026-09-27.** Routed to user-engine via State Hub message
+`892fd489-113d-4108-8048-727f4b0ed048`, referencing the T01 contract and
+asking for a proposed pilot workload and U06 touchpoints. This is a
+UX/product agreement across two repos and a pilot workload owner; NetKingdom
+cannot decide it unilaterally.