NK-WP-0055-T13: king-path drill passed; post-event review record

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 4515@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 0bf96127-6e04-41be-bfda-d11717c3f354

docs/crisis-custody-list.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ circular dependency and is recorded as a gap, not as custody.
 | 1 | **`railiance-backup` age private key** (recipient `age1zvry…50syr3tsz`). Not the custodian key (item 1b) | Decrypts the identity backup bundle and the break-glass copy on Storage Share (`net-kingdom-kingpath-*.tar.age`) | Founder, password safe (stored as `railiance-backup.key`) | Yes, offline | Identity stages 2026-10-24; king-path verify drill 2026-10-27 (the helper refused the custodian key three times before the correct key was entered, as designed) | `TO CONFIRM`: number of copies, who else could recover if the founder cannot |
 | 1b | **Custodian age private key** (recipient `age1aq8t…qdepsh4`, `keys/age.pub` and `.sops.yaml`). Not the backup key | Decrypts the repository's SOPS custody files and greenfield bootstrap bundles (`docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md`) | Founder, password safe (stored as the custodian age private key) | Yes, offline | `TO CONFIRM` last proven use | Labels in the safe should name the recipient prefix so the two keys cannot be confused |
 | 2 | Storage Share `Backup` account app password | Downloads the protected ciphertext without OpenBao or SSO | Founder, independent custody `TO CONFIRM` | Yes, provider is outside the platform | Fresh retrieval 2026-10-24 | One provider copy only; residual risk accepted until 2027-01-31 (G1, NK-WP-0053) |
-| 3 | OpenBao unseal shares (2 of 3 required in the restore drill) | Unseals a restored or production OpenBao; with the shares, `generate-root` mints a root token for break-glass (ceremony in `railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md`; production loopback listener 8210 live since 2026-10-28) | Founder as `platform-root` holds all three shares (single-holder custody: accepted exception, hub decision `37464824`, 2026-10-27), in the founder's replicated browser password safe under the `kingpath.credentials` pseudo-URL entry (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Yes: the safe is independent of NetKingdom SSO and OpenBao; it depends on the browser vendor's sync account and its own factor | Original shares used in the isolated restore RPF-WP-0064-T07, 2026-10-24 | Single holder = single point of loss (reviewed at NK-WP-0055-T09). The founder holds the initial root token offline (2026-10-27); its validity is checked in the king-path drill (NK-WP-0055-T13) against an isolated restored OpenBao, never production |
+| 3 | OpenBao unseal shares (2 of 3 required in the restore drill) | Unseals a restored or production OpenBao; with the shares, `generate-root` mints a root token for break-glass (ceremony in `railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md`; production loopback listener 8210 live since 2026-10-28) | Founder as `platform-root` holds all three shares (single-holder custody: accepted exception, hub decision `37464824`, 2026-10-27), in the founder's replicated browser password safe under the `kingpath.credentials` pseudo-URL entry (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Yes: the safe is independent of NetKingdom SSO and OpenBao; it depends on the browser vendor's sync account and its own factor | Original shares used in the isolated restore RPF-WP-0064-T07, 2026-10-24 | Single holder = single point of loss (reviewed at NK-WP-0055-T09). The founder holds the initial root token offline; the king-path drill (2026-10-28) found it **valid** as of the 2026-10-14 snapshot (root policy, no TTL, orphan). Revoke on production or keep escrowed: founder decision pending |
 | 4 | `platform-root` / king account and factors | Final authority; break-glass | Independently held password safe or offline packet (Standard §4; custody doc) | **No if used through KeyCape**: its login and OTP are validated by the services being recovered | OTP validated against restored privacyIDEA 2026-10-24 (isolated) | `TO CONFIRM` the offline path that works with SSO down (OpenBao shares, item 3) and record it |
 | 5 | Founder admission signing key (SSH ed25519, principal `bernd`, fingerprint `SHA256:NekDABfw8K8IBYznjREg7jPpcK/BzCgO1pH1ebT/FXM`) | Signs restore and drill admissions for the OpenBao isolated restore (namespace `railiance-openbao-restore-attempt`) and secrets-engine admissions | Private key: founder workstation `~/.ssh/gexec_approver_ed25519` (passphrase-protected; signed the T40, `-02` and `-03` admissions); founder decision 2026-10-28: also keep it in the password safe under the kingpath entry, **not** in the Storage Share bundle, so the backup age key alone cannot admit a restore. Public anchor (non-secret, needed on any recovery workstation): `/etc/railiance-openbao-restore/allowed_signers` and `/etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers`, one line each: `bernd namespaces="railiance-openbao-restore-attempt" ssh-ed25519 ssh-ed25519` ; the secrets-engine file uses namespace `secrets-engine-recovery-attempt` | Yes, offline | Signed the T40 admission 2026-10-23 | Store the private key in the safe; re-create both anchor files from this row on a recovery workstation. The file name says `gexec_approver`, but the key's role is admission signing |
 | 6 | `admin` password and OTP token | Day-to-day platform administration and, per intent, recovery operation | Founder; OTP enrolled 2026-10-24 | **No**: login and token checks need KeyCape, LLDAP and privacyIDEA | Token not yet in any restored backup; first restore proof after the 2026-10-25 03:45 UTC capture | Same account as the directory bind used by Authelia and privacyIDEA until the split in NK-WP-0054-T05 |

docs/evidence/2026-10-28-king-path-drill.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# King-path drill — post-event review record (NK-WP-0055-T13)
+
+Value-free record. No token, share, key or OTP appears here or in any linked receipt.
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| When | 2026-10-27/28 (UTC), founder workstation |
+| Who | Founder (operator and authorizer); claude-code prepared commands and verified receipts |
+| Why | Drill: prove that the final authority can act with SSO, KeyCape and OpenBao logins unavailable |
+| Production touched | Only by the separate, earlier rollout of the loopback `generate-root` listener (RAPP-OPENBAO-WP-0003-T02). The drill itself ran on an isolated, networkless restore. |
+
+## Part 1: break-glass material from Storage Share
+
+`kingpath-offsite.py --verify` fetched `net-kingdom-kingpath-20261027T223050Z-8c9d48421f1b.tar.age`
+from the Storage Share `Backup` account. ETag, size and digest matched the upload receipt. An unrelated
+key was refused, and the content decrypted in memory only. `admin-kubeconfig` (kubeconfig shape) and
+`tunnel-ssh-key` (SSH private key header) were intact. The custody helper refused the custodian age key
+until the `railiance-backup` key was entered, as designed. Crisis list item 1 was then split so the two
+keys cannot be confused again.
+
+## Part 2: OpenBao break-glass on an isolated restore (RPF-WP-0064-T10)
+
+- **Run:** attempt `RPF-WP-0064-T10-20261027-01`, admission `sha256:741fa571…ce7a`, adapter `3727f8b`,
+  snapshot `openbao-raft-snapshot-rpf-wp-0015-t03-reboot-20261014-01-20261014t181053z.snap.age`
+  (plaintext `a6312444…590b`).
+- **Result:** `drilled` (`break_glass_drill_complete`) in 101 s. The receipt
+  `sha256:e4591346e99b23e405f1cb69f6f5158dbdb7b5d69b2d1d7709c563a74cc18397` stays outside Git and was
+  independently verified (`PASS`) from a clean clone.
+- **Held initial root token:** valid as of the snapshot. It carries `root` policy, no TTL, no expiry,
+  and is an orphan token.
+- **Fresh `generate-root`:** the shares were re-entered and the OTP decode worked. The generated token
+  carried `root`, the read-only `sys/auth` action succeeded, `revoke-self` returned 204, and the
+  follow-up lookup returned 403.
+- **Cancel:** a started attempt was cancelled cleanly.
+- **Teardown:** the container was removed and verified absent, no volumes were created, the memfds were
+  closed, and the readback credential was revoked.
+
+## Findings and follow-ups
+
+1. **A standing, non-expiring root token very likely exists on production.** It was valid at the
+   2026-10-14 snapshot and has not been revoked since. The architecture asks that the initial root token
+   be revoked, or escrowed as break-glass material. The `generate-root` path now works on production and
+   is drilled, so it can replace that token. Founder decision needed: revoke it on production, or keep it
+   escrowed and record why.
+2. **Production read-only SSO-down walk:** still to run (RPF-WP-0064-T10 runbook).
+3. **Admission signing key:** it is `~/.ssh/gexec_approver_ed25519`. It needs a copy in the password safe
+   under the kingpath entry (crisis list item 5).
+4. **Not drilled:** using the restored kubeconfig and SSH key against the cluster. Provider console
+   access is not drilled either.