Split OpenBao admin identity tasks
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5 changed files with 292 additions and 23 deletions
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@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ initial-root-token taint clears after the exposed OpenBao root token is
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revoked. Downstream work remains visibly tainted until derived access paths
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are reviewed and the compromise response is explicitly recorded complete.
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**2026-05-26:** Split Admin Identity Integration into development-owned
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configuration and operator-owned integration work. The `openbao-admin` KeyCape
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client is now code-defined in `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh`, while
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the UI action cards only ask the operator to apply live KeyCape config,
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configure OpenBao with a protected token prompt, and verify MFA-backed login.
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**2026-05-24:** Stepped back from ad hoc secret rollout and added the
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custodian age-key bootstrap model to the control surface. The UI now records
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the custodian public age recipient, a derived fingerprint, and a non-secret
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