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584738bd9f Security Layer Model v0.4 — audit-core assent and its corrections
audit-core assented to the approval evidence half with conditions and
corrected the rationale twice. Both corrections were against wording this
standard had taken from that repository's INTENT rather than its contract.

- §4 catalogues audit-core as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 named it
  as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without listing it — a §11 defect in the standard
  itself, which audit-core raised.
- §9.4 rationale rewritten to cite docs/integrity.md rather than INTENT
  principle 6: an in-database chain detects a rewritten payload only if the
  attacker does not recompute the suffix, which a database owner can, and even
  with external attestation the store is not WORM or object lock. tamper
  evidence is conditional on live preconditions.
- §9.4 gained emission atomicity as approval-engine's obligation, and the
  prohibition on audit-core exposing an approval-validity query — a boundary
  audit-core stated unprompted, applying §6.1 to itself.
- §9.6 added, estate-wide: evidence proves alteration and truncation, not
  omission at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact and
  verification reports intact. "The audit record proves it happened" is unsound
  and is replaced with the sound form.
- §13 gained two gaps: stronger approval custody (unassigned — deciding whether
  approvals need archival custody distinct from other sources is doctrine work
  not yet done) and emission atomicity (approval-engine).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
2026-08-28 22:54:50 +02:00
90cc64f728 Security Layer Model v0.3 — assign approvals and maturity
v0.2 recorded the approval object as the one open architectural hole, and
carried a latent instance of its own §9.1 rule: gate-house was catalogued as
owning conformance review with no engine to act through. Two engines were
seeded to close both.

- §9.4: the approval object goes to approval-engine — not Staff (§3.4 forbids
  the runtime state), not access-engine (an evaluator owning what it evaluates
  is self-dealing), not audit-core (append-only is the opposite property).
  access-engine consumes approvals as input claims under §6.2; audit-core takes
  the tamper-evident evidence. Operative state and evidence record are separate
  artifacts with separate owners.
- §9.5: graded progression goes to maturity-engine. gate-house judges and
  proposes; maturity-engine computes and remembers. Carries the guardrail that
  a level may never gate a decision directly — under §6.1 that would be a
  second decision point by the graded back door.
- §4 catalog gained both engines; §13 register updated.

Status proposed: the new engines are seeded by owner direction with no other
side to assent yet, and the approval evidence half needs audit-core's assent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
2026-08-28 22:34:58 +02:00