diff --git a/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md deleted file mode 100644 index 1e96d0f..0000000 --- a/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1041 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: netkingdom-tenancy-posture -type: standard -title: "NetKingdom Tenancy Posture v0.1" -domain: netkingdom -status: proposed -version: "0.1" -created: "2026-08-17" -updated: "2026-08-17" -scope: multi-tenancy-security-framework -revision: "draft-7" -adr: - - docs/adr/ADR-0006-recursive-multi-tenant-identity-authorization.md - - docs/adr/ADR-0013-tenant-onboarding-grouping-taxonomy.md - - docs/adr/ADR-0014-tenant-capability-roles-and-tenant-engine-ownership.md -related: - - canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md - - canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md - - docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md ---- - -# NetKingdom Tenancy Posture v0.1 — Five Axes, Graduated Levels, Declared Conformance - -## Status - -**Proposed, draft-7.** Relocated from `the-custodian/canon/architecture` on -2026-08-17: multi-tenancy is part of the IT-security framework NetKingdom -provides, so this framework belongs in NetKingdom canon beside the IAM Profile -and the tenant-engine boundary contract, not in the work-factory canon. - -- **draft-1** proposed a single model with fixed characteristics. Rejected: it - could not describe a repo that is not there yet. -- **draft-2** reframed to graduated levels per axis. Externally corroborated - (§16), but four of its statements were wrong and one thing it needed was - missing. -- **draft-3** applied those corrections, added the retention axis, and - recorded an adoption stance. -- **draft-4** closed the two gaps draft-3 left open: `R4` had no mechanism - beyond waiting, and the noisy-neighbour evidence artifact asserted something - shared infrastructure cannot provide. -- **draft-5** relocated to NetKingdom and renamed the dimensions from *planes* - to *axes*, because the word was already taken (§0). -- **draft-6** applied `tenant-engine`'s review: five changes, including an - axis that did not fit its data shape. -- **draft-7** applies `audit-core`, `railiance-platform` and `flex-auth`. - Eleven further changes, two of them corrections to statements this document - made as fact about other repos. **Every posture I guessed was too generous, - on every repo that has now self-reported.** - -**Reviewed by four of six. The score so far:** four repos found three live -defects in their own code by reading the ladders — `tenant-engine`'s unfiltered -event accessor, `audit-core`'s unfiltered read path, `flex-auth`'s -unauthenticated `/v1/check` — and `railiance-platform` found `apps-pg` running -with no backup configured at all while writing its §10.2 disclosure. The -document changed eleven times and no repo was told it was wrong. - -Every correction so far was found by research or by relocation, not by review. - -Informed by five external research digests in `research/2026-08-17-adr008-*`, -which carry full citations for every external claim made here. - -Reviewed by nobody yet. §19 lists what each owner is being asked to accept. - -## 0. Terminology: axes, not planes - -`docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md` — accepted, 2026-07-23 — -already uses **plane** for a trust and deployment layer: the *bootstrap plane*, -the *platform control plane*, and *tenant planes*. That meaning is established, -ratified, and owned by this repo. - -Drafts 1–4 of this document, written elsewhere, used **plane** for something -different: an independent dimension of concern. Two incompatible senses of one -word inside one canon is exactly the concept-ownership collision the estate has -been careful about elsewhere, and the newcomer yields. - -This framework therefore describes five **axes**. They are orthogonal to -NetKingdom's planes, not a subdivision of them: - -- A **plane** is *where* something runs and what trust it carries — bootstrap, - platform control, tenant. -- An **axis** is *which property* of tenancy is being described — identity, - authorization, enforcement, placement, retention. - -A workload in the tenant plane has a position on all five axes. A platform -control plane service does too. The two vocabularies compose and neither -replaces the other. - -The rename is also an improvement. A posture vector is literally a point in -five-dimensional space, and "axis" says that where "plane" did not. - -## 1. Context - -Drafts 1–4 opened by claiming the estate "has never written down what it is -building". Relocation proved that wrong, and the correction is worth keeping -visible: `docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md` has described the -trust model, the tenant model and a capability progression since 2026-07-23. -The accurate claim is narrower — **what was missing is a way to say how far a -given service has got, and to hold several answers at once.** Seven documents -cover slices of the subject and none of them does that: - -| Document | Covers | Status | -|---|---|---| -| `iam-profile_v0.3` (NetKingdom) | Tenant identifier shape, `tenant_roles` claim, staleness rules | Ratified | -| `tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1` (NetKingdom) | Who owns tenant records, roles, plan assignment | Ratified | -| `business-app-service-contract_v0.1` §1 (Custodian) | Business apps: instance-per-client, tenant-keyed data | Ratified | -| `rapp-postgres` ADR-0001 | Consumer + tenant isolation in PostgreSQL | Proposed, governs one repo | -| `rapp-postgres` ADR-0002 | Per-consumer retention and the erasure horizon | Proposed, governs one repo | -| `shared-platform-relational-storage_v0.1` | The stacked-boundary gap | Routed 2026-08-10, **still unratified** | -| `platform-identity-security-architecture` (NetKingdom) | Trust model, planes, tenant model, capability progression | Accepted 2026-07-23 | - -This document is downstream of that architecture and must not restate it. It -answers one question the architecture leaves open: given the model, **where is -this particular service today, and how would anyone know?** - -Four failures follow. - -**The gap was diagnosed once and the fix stalled.** The v0.1 draft was written -to fill this hole and has sat unratified in neither canon directory. §20 -attaches a ratification path so this one does not join it. - -**Placement is owned by nobody.** `user-engine-pg` and `target-revenue-pg` are -dedicated; `apps-pg`, `net-kingdom-pg`, `platform-pg`, `state-hub-db` and -`forgejo-db` are shared. Both live, neither written down. `tenant-engine` -raised this with `railiance-platform` on 2026-08-16; unanswered. - -**Two contradictory defaults are already ratified.** Business apps get -instance-per-client; platform services pool. Nothing says which shape a new -service takes, and no definition separates the categories. - -**There is no honest way to describe a repo that is not there yet.** The estate -absorbs repos with weak or absent tenant separation. Today such a repo is -simply non-conformant, leaving it two bad options: misrepresent its posture, or -stay outside the framework. - -## 2. What this document is - -**A framework, not a model.** It specifies no single correct implementation. It -supplies terminology (§3, §4), a declaration (§5), a conformance rule (§6), -methodology (§12), and evidence definitions (§13). - -A service is conformant when its declared posture is accurate and its -trajectory recorded. A service is non-conformant when it claims a level it -cannot evidence — regardless of how high or low that level is. - -## 3. Five orthogonal axes - -"Is this multi-tenant?" is treated as one question. It is five, and they are -independent: - -| Axis | Question | Vocabulary owner | -|---|---|---| -| **Identity (I)** | How is a tenant named and validated? | `tenant-engine` / IAM Profile | -| **Authorization (A)** | How is a request bound to the tenants it may act for? | `flex-auth` | -| **Enforcement (E)** | Where, mechanically, is the tenant boundary enforced? | This framework | -| **Placement (P)** | Which substrate holds a tenant's data? | `railiance-platform` | -| **Retention (R)** | How long does data persist, and how is it erased? | The storage platform; policy by the consumer | - -Conflation produces errors today. `rapp-postgres`'s `PostgresConsumer` carries -`tenantIsolation: consumer-service-boundary` — an **E**-axis fact in a -**P**-axis artifact, reading as though storage enforces something it does not. -The "dedicated versus shared" argument mixes P (capacity, blast radius) with E -(correctness). - -The axes are separated *precisely so each may sit at a different level*. - -**Decision 3.1:** every document, declaration and plan tier that says -"isolation" MUST name which axis it means. - -**Decision 3.2:** the axes couple at their tops and the couplings MUST be -stated where they apply, not used to argue the axes are one: - -- `E4` is reachable only at `P3` or above. -- `R`'s erasure horizon is bounded below by `P` — on shared substrate, a - consumer's horizon is the instance maximum (§4.5). -- `R4` by key destruction is bounded by the **key boundary**, which is an - E-axis property. Shredding a single tenant's data requires the application - to encrypt under a per-tenant key before writing; the storage platform cannot - supply it. **Reaching the top of the retention ladder is not a retention - project.** - -**Decision 3.3 — scope.** The P and R ladders describe a service's **primary -datastore**. Caches, search indices, message queues and background jobs are -named leak surfaces in the external baselines and are assessed separately, not -covered by a posture vector. Saying so is honest; implying the vector covers -them would not be. - -## 4. Graduated levels - -Each axis carries an ordered ladder. Higher is stronger, not better: the right -level is the one a service can evidence and its risk warrants. - -### 4.1 Identity (I) - -| Level | State | -|---|---| -| **I0** | No tenant concept. Data not attributable to a tenant. | -| **I1** | A local tenant notion exists but is not canonical, **or** the tenant is taken from the request rather than from a verified token. | -| **I2** | Canonical identifiers, bound at the identity provider and carried as a verified claim, **and verified by this service on its own inbound calls**. | -| **I3** | I2 plus capability roles honoured, with live `tenant-engine` re-query for privileged, destructive, credential-vending or `aal2`-class decisions. | - -I1 now explicitly absorbs request-supplied tenant identifiers. "Never trust -client-supplied tenant IDs without validation" is a named anti-pattern; a -service reading the tenant from a header is at I1 however canonical the string. - -**An axis is assessed on a service's own inbound surface, never on its -authority over the concept.** `tenant-engine` is the source of existence for -tenant records and is nonetheless at I1, because it takes the acting identity -from the request body rather than from a verified token. Draft-5 conflated -these by naming the authority inside the I2 definition, which made the level -describing canonical identity unclaimable by the service that provides it. -Corrected on tenant-engine's review — a reader would otherwise assume the -authority must be at I2 by definition. - -`business-app-service-contract` §2.1 sets app-local accounts as the v1 baseline -for business apps — a sanctioned low level with recorded triggers for moving -up. That is the pattern this framework generalises. - -### 4.2 Authorization (A) - -| Level | State | -|---|---| -| **A0** | No authorization, or tenant context not carried. | -| **A1** | Ad-hoc checks scattered through handlers. | -| **A2** | A single local authorization boundary; tenant context bound once, centrally. | -| **A3** | Decisions delegated to `flex-auth` as PDP, with live re-query where the IAM Profile requires it. | -| **A4** | A3 over a **standard** PDP interface (OpenID AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0), so the decision point is swappable and the enforcement point is not coupled to one engine's request shape. | - -**This ladder describes enforcement points.** A decision point cannot occupy -A3 — "delegated to `flex-auth`" is not something `flex-auth` can do. A service -that *is* a PDP declares **two numbers**: its own inbound level, and the -maximum it enables for consumers. `flex-auth` reads `A0, enables A3` — accurate, -and considerably more alarming than `A3`, which is the point. Raised by -`flex-auth`, whose absence from the §5 worked examples was this surfacing -implicitly. - -A4 is new. The specification reached Final in January 2026 and Keycloak shipped -experimental support in May; the argument for it is **interoperability** — a -swappable decision point and an enforcement point not coupled to one engine's -request shape. - -*Correction from flex-auth's review:* earlier drafts also justified A4 as -ending the copying of action strings between repos. **It does not.** AuthZEN -standardises the envelope — subject, action, resource, context, endpoint — and -deliberately does not standardise the action vocabulary or the policy language. -At A4, `tenant.guardrail.set` still has to be agreed and still gets copied. -Those are two problems with different fixes, and the cheaper one is not A4: -`flex-auth`'s registry already carries action definitions per system and could -serve them read-only. The vocabulary argument is withdrawn. - -**Internal service-to-service calls are in scope for this axis.** "Skipping -tenant validation for internal services" is a named anti-pattern and our estate -is mostly internal calls. - -*Correction from flex-auth's review:* earlier drafts asserted that `flex-auth` -calls `tenant-engine` synchronously on the authorization path. **That is not -true.** The adapter is built and complete and has no non-test caller, so the -IAM Profile's live re-query exists and is unwired — which is also why -`flex-auth` cannot reach I3. Built-and-unwired is the worst of the three states -because it reads as capability. - -The requirement, narrowed on their proposal because the original was too strong -to be met and would have made `tenant-engine` a hard availability dependency of -every decision in the estate: - -> Tenant context MUST be carried on every internal hop and MUST NOT be -> re-derived from a service identity. It MUST be revalidated against -> `tenant-engine` at least once per request chain — at the service that holds -> or mutates the tenant's data, or before a privileged, destructive, -> credential-vending or `aal2`-class decision, whichever comes first. A hop -> that neither holds tenant data nor makes such a decision may carry the -> context without revalidating it. - -**And carrying tenant context is worthless without an authenticated hop to -carry it over.** `flex-auth` found this in itself: it carries tenant context -faithfully and cannot distinguish "user-engine asking on behalf of tenant X" -from "any pod asking on behalf of tenant X". - -### 4.3 Enforcement (E) - -| Level | Mechanism | -|---|---| -| **E0** | None. Data not tenant-keyed; separation incidental or absent. | -| **E1** | Data tenant-keyed, filtering applied per query at call sites. | -| **E2** | Filtering centralised at a single service-side choke point binding authenticated identity to permitted tenants. | -| **E3** | E2 **plus** platform-assisted filtering: row-level security keyed on a tenant GUC set transaction-locally, or an equivalent enforced data-access layer. | -| **E4** | Structural: the credential a workload holds cannot address another tenant's data at all. Requires per-tenant credentials and per-tenant substrate. | - -**Correction from draft-2.** Draft-2 described E3 as something "the application -cannot trivially route around". That is false and it was this document -overclaiming in exactly the way §6 prohibits. Any session can re-issue `SET` on -a custom GUC, so an attacker with SQL execution can reset the tenant and read -across the boundary. What E3 buys is precise, and the ladder must say so: - -| Threat | E1 | E2 | E3 | E4 | -|---|:--:|:--:|:--:|:--:| -| A developer forgets a tenant predicate | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | -| A new code path bypasses the choke point | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | -| SQL injection reaching the connection | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | -| The application process is compromised | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | - -E3 is a strong control against **accident** — the common case, and the one that -causes real breaches — and no control at all against **compromise**. Only E4 -holds against both, because the credential itself cannot address another -tenant's data. - -**Correction: E3 layers on E2, it does not replace it.** External practice -treats application-layer and database-layer filtering as complementary. A -service that dropped its choke point on reaching E3 would be *worse* off, since -E3 fails open under injection. Claiming E3 therefore requires the E2 evidence -artifact as well. - -**Correction: the GUC is set transaction-locally.** Draft-2 said "at pool -checkout", which is session scope and the wrong instrument. Under a pooler in -statement mode, `SET` leaks between clients and returns other tenants' rows — -a failure that appears only under production concurrency and produces no error. -Use `SET LOCAL` inside an explicit transaction. - -**Platform enforcement is a platform obligation.** Reaching E3 requires the -storage platform to *offer* the mechanism: provisioned policies, a documented -GUC contract, and a probe. Where a consumer wants E3 and the platform has not -supplied it, the gap is the platform's. §19.6 asks `rapp-postgres` to define -that contract, which must carry `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` on every tenant -table (without it the table owner bypasses policies silently, and ADR-0001 -already established that our migration role owns the tables it creates), no -`BYPASSRLS` on leased roles, `SECURITY INVOKER` for ordinary logic, and an -`EXPLAIN` comparison because RLS disables functional indexes built on -non-leakproof functions. - -**Not all data is tenant-keyed, and the ladder must not pretend otherwise.** A -registry whose rows *are* the tenants has no per-tenant predicate to scope a -policy by; enforcing one would break the service's function rather than secure -it. `tenant-engine`'s `tenants` table is the worked example — `key-cape` -enumerates it at token issuance and `flex-auth` queries it live, both of which -are cross-tenant reads by design. - -A service with mixed data shapes declares **E-level plus a registry -exception**: the level its tenant-keyed tables hold, and a named list of tables -excluded because they are registries rather than tenant data. The exception is -part of the claim and is reviewable; an unnamed exception is an overclaim. -Without this, mixed-shape services either overclaim or stay at E2 permanently, -and `tenant-engine` declined to claim E3 on precisely that reasoning. - -**Default expectation** for a new platform service: E2 at first serve, E3 -recorded as target. Services whose cross-tenant exposure would be a reportable -breach SHOULD target E3 or above. - -### 4.4 Placement (P) - -| Level | Shape | Live occupants | -|---|---|---| -| **P0** | Shares a database with another consumer. | None sanctioned; the state absorbed repos arrive in. | -| **P1** | Database per consumer, shared cluster. | `audit-core` on `platform-pg`; `tenant-engine` (target, TEN-WP-0009 — still on SQLite) | -| **P2** | Dedicated cluster per consumer. | `user-engine-pg`, `target-revenue-pg` | -| **P3** | Dedicated cluster per tenant. | Business apps per `business-app-service-contract` §1.2 | -| **P4** | P3 plus separate region or jurisdiction. | None | - -Enforcement and placement are independent axes. Plotted together, with where -each service actually sits — parenthesised entries are targets or defaults -rather than current positions, and `—` marks a cell the coupling in §3.2 makes -unreachable: - -| E \ P | P0 | P1 | P2 | P3 | P4 | -|---|---|---|---|---|---| -| **E4** | — | — | — | (business app) | | -| **E3** | | (target) | | | | -| **E2** | (tenant-engine) | audit-core | | | | -| **E1** | (absorbed repo) | | | | | -| **E0** | | | | | | - -**P0 → P1 → P2 is movement along the horizontal axis only.** Those steps buy -consumer isolation, capacity predictability, independent retention and a -smaller operational blast radius. They do not raise the tenant boundary by one -step. Only P3 makes E4 reachable. This is the most misusable fact in the -framework and §11 governs how it may be described. - -**Decision 4.4.1:** P1 is the default for platform services; P3 for -client-facing business apps, as already ratified. A service unsure which it is -must resolve that first (§19.4). - -**Decision 4.4.2 — placement scopes to data substrate.** Identity-provider -placement (realm-per-tenant versus Organizations) is the same silo/pool -decision on a different substrate, is live in our estate, and is undecided. -Realm-per-tenant carries a stated ceiling around 5–20 tenants, far below our -target. Recorded here as a parallel question (§19.7), not folded into P. - -### 4.5 Retention and erasure (R) - -New in draft-3. Implemented abstractly by the storage platform for any dataset; -policy is built on top of that interface by the consumer or its governance -layer. Reference implementation: `rapp-postgres` ADR-0002. - -| Level | State | -|---|---| -| **R0** | No retention or deletion position. Data kept indefinitely by default; no deletion path exists. | -| **R1** | Platform default retention applies (N=30 days). The consumer has declared no requirement. | -| **R2** | Retention declared as N days per dataset; the **erasure horizon** is published, and the consumer makes no promise shorter than it. | -| **R3** | Policy-driven deletion: the consumer or its governance layer declares what is due, the platform sweeps whole datasets on that instruction and evidences each run. | -| **R4** | Verified erasure: data proven unrecoverable across live storage, backups and derived copies, by one of the two routes below. | - -**R4 has two routes and a service MUST name which one it uses.** - -| Route | Mechanism | Cost | -|---|---|---| -| **Horizon-elapsed** | Wait out the published erasure horizon; the data ages out of every retained copy. | Available to everyone, proves little, and the wait is set by a co-resident's retention requirement rather than your own. | -| **Key-destroyed** | Encrypt per entity, then destroy the key. Retained copies survive but are unreadable. | Requires per-entity keys, strong encryption, and an auditable destruction record. Immediate. | - -**Decision 4.5.3 — key destruction is not sufficient on its own.** The -key-destroyed route requires that **no retained commitment reveals the erased -content**. Found by `audit-core`, and it is a general defect rather than a fact -about them: - -- A SHA-256 over a canonical record whose fields are low-entropy — event type, - actor, tenant, subject, timestamp — is a **confirmation oracle**. Anyone - holding the hash can guess the payload, hash the guess, and confirm a match. - Destroying the key does not make the content unrecoverable while that hash - survives. -- Shreddability is **not retrofittable** onto an integrity chain that commits - to cleartext. It has to be built as encrypt-then-hash at accept time, with the - chain committing to ciphertext. Retrofitting means rewriting the chain — the - exact thing a tamper-evident log exists to make detectable. - -So a service claiming R4 by key destruction must show that its retained -commitments — hashes, chains, indexes, search keys — do not reveal what was -erased. The remedies are an HMAC under a per-subject key that dies with the -key, or a per-record salt destroyed alongside it. **`audit-core` cannot reach -R4 under its current design and targets R2; a fleet R4 target must exempt it -explicitly.** - -**Regulatory standing of the key-destroyed route, stated carefully because -overclaiming here is worse than anywhere else in this framework.** Data -protection authorities have accepted key destruction as erasure where physical -deletion would be manifestly disproportionate, and the practice is recognised -under conditions — strong encryption, irreversible destruction, and an auditable -record of it. **The EDPB has not formally endorsed it as Article 17 erasure.** A -service reaching R4 by key destruction is making a defensible claim, not a -settled one, and must say so rather than reporting a clean "deleted". - -Three further properties. - -**The erasure horizon is the interval between deleting data and it ceasing to -be recoverable from anything the platform holds.** Deleting a row does not -remove it from yesterday's backup. With an N-day window, deleted data remains -recoverable for N days. That is the difference between "deleted" and "erased" -and the estate had never written it down. - -**On shared substrate, retention is not per-consumer.** Physical backup is -instance-wide — one WAL stream, one window — so the instance retention is -*derived* as the maximum across co-resident consumers, and every consumer's -horizon is that maximum. A consumer declaring 7 days beside one declaring 90 -gets 90. This is the retention analogue of ADR-0001's blast-radius disclosure: -state the coupling rather than imply an isolation that is not there. - -**Retention is therefore a placement trigger.** A consumer needing a horizon -shorter than the instance floor cannot have one at P1. It moves to P2 for a -reason with nothing to do with performance — which is exactly why it needs -recording, since nobody looks for a retention argument when reviewing -placement. - -Deletion splits mechanism from policy. The platform deletes whole **datasets** -on instruction and records an opaque policy reference it never interprets, so -every deletion traces to what authorised it. Rows are not a dataset: row expiry -is the consumer's own DML under its migration lease. Dropping a consumer's -whole database is an operator-gated offboarding step, never a scheduled one. - -## 5. The posture vector - -A service states one level per axis, plus a target, a date, and any placement -exceptions: - -```yaml -tenancy: - current: { I: 2, A: 3, E: 2, P: 1, R: 1 } - target: { I: 2, A: 3, E: 3, P: 1, R: 2 } - reviewed: "2026-08-17" - gap: - E: "Choke point exists and is tested; RLS not provisioned. Blocked on - rapp-postgres publishing the GUC contract. Target Q4." - R: "Retention declared; erasure horizon not yet published to consumers." -``` - -**Placement exceptions.** Draft-2 assigned one P level per service, which -cannot express the vertically partitioned model — most tenants pooled, some -dedicated — that §11's isolation tiers require. A tier requiring `P2` bought by -three tenants would put the service at two levels at once, forcing an over- or -under-claim. Placement is therefore declared as a default plus exceptions: - -```yaml - placement_exceptions: - - tenants: ["tenant:enterprise:*"] - P: 3 - reason: "isolation tier; see adaptive-pricing tier definition" -``` - -A service with exceptions must be able to say which tenants are on which -substrate. That mapping is a first-class artifact, not archaeology. - -**Decision 5.5 — a provider declares what it makes reachable, not where it -sits.** The five ladders describe a *consumer* of infrastructure. They describe -a *provider* of it badly, and `railiance-platform`'s review demonstrated how -badly: `apps-pg` is `I0 A0 E0` because a database has no tenant concept, -carries no tenant claim and applies no tenant predicate. Those zeros are -**structural, not weak** — the cluster is exactly as strong as its consumers -make it. - -The sharp case is OpenBao at `E0`. Literally correct, and actively misleading: -the mechanism in place is credential-scoped structural separation — `E4` -machinery — pointed at a *consumer* boundary rather than a tenant one. A reader -scanning a column of E values would rank it below a service doing per-query -filtering in application code, inverting the real security position. - -So a platform service additionally declares, per axis, **the maximum level it -makes reachable and what a consumer must do to reach it**. For `apps-pg`: `E4` -unreachable (shared credential per consumer, no per-tenant credential), `E3` -reachable once the GUC contract exists, `R2` blocked on a backup target. That is -the sentence a consumer actually needs, and no arrangement of the consumer -ladders produces it. - -A provider's own `P` is `n/a`, not a number. `apps-pg` *provides* `P1`; it is -not *at* `P1`, and writing `P: 1` there would later read as an isolation claim. - -Worked examples, self-reported where marked, and every guess so far has been -too generous: - -| Service | Current | Notes | -|---|---|---| -| `tenant-engine` | `I1 A2 E2 P— R0/R1` | **Self-reported on review**, correcting a more generous guess. I1: acting identity comes from the request body, not a verified token. A2: three read routes unauthorized. P—: still on SQLite, P1 is TEN-WP-0009's target. R: see §4.5 on the erasure/retention split. | -| `audit-core` | `I1 A2 E1 P1 R1→R2` | **Self-reported**, three axes below my guess. E1 because the read path applies no tenant filter at all — a defect found by reading the ladder. Bounded by deployment, not by code. | -| `flex-auth` | `I1 A0 E2 P n/a R n/a` | **Self-reported**, `enables A3` for consumers. A0: `/v1/check` authenticates no caller, so any workload with network reach can assert any subject and receive an authoritative allow. | -| `apps-pg` (provider) | `I0 A0 E0 P n/a R0` | **Self-reported.** Zeros are structural. `R0` here means no backup configured at all — found while writing the §10.2 disclosure. | -| A newly absorbed repo | `I1 A1 E1 P0 R0` | Conformant **if declared**, with a recorded path. | - -**Decision 5.1:** the posture vector is declared in the repo, not in the hub, -consistent with local-files-are-source-of-truth. - -**Decision 5.2 — declare per path, quote the minimum.** A service whose -mutations are authorized and whose reads are not is at the reads' level. The -quoted number is the minimum across paths; the per-path detail is declared -beside it. - -Draft-6 required only the minimum, on `tenant-engine`'s review. `audit-core` -then showed why that is insufficient on its own: a bare minimum destroys -signal, because `E3`-write/`E1`-read declares identically to `E1`/`E1`. Bare -per-path invites "our write path is E3", which is the sentence §6 exists to -stop. Both, related explicitly, is the rule. - -Two services found this shape in themselves within a day of each other — -`tenant-engine` (writes authorized, three read routes not) and `audit-core` -(write path tenant-filtered, read path not filtered at all). Most services -enforce harder on write than read, so this is the common case, not the corner. - -**Decision 5.3 — `n/a` is a level, and it is conformant.** `P0` presupposes a -database and `R0` presupposes retained data. A service holding nothing at rest -— `flex-auth` runs with its registry and policy baked read-only into the image -and no decision log persisted — is neither. Without an admissible `n/a`, a -missing rung **forces** the fabrication §6 prohibits, which is precisely what -draft-1 was rejected for. `n/a` is declared with a stated reason. - -**Decision 5.4 — the vector lives at `tenancy.yaml` in the repo root.** -Draft-6 said "in the repo" and not where or in what shape, which left §12's -guard needing per-repo archaeology. `flex-auth` adopted `tenancy.yaml` -speculatively; adopted here as the convention. The schema carries `current`, -`target`, `reviewed`, `gap`, `placement_exceptions`, `service_class` (§8.3), -per-path detail (§5.2), and — for a service that is one — the provider -declaration (§5.5). - -## 6. Conformance is accuracy, not altitude - -> **A service is conformant when its declared posture is accurate, its target -> is recorded, and it does not claim a level it cannot evidence. It is -> non-conformant when it overclaims — at any altitude.** - -- Declaring `E0` is conformant. Concealing `E0` is not. -- A repo may be absorbed at any posture. It may not be absorbed silently. -- No service is blocked from the estate for being low on a ladder. Services MAY - be blocked from *specific work* — serving a tenant grouping, holding a data - class, carrying a plan tier — by requirements expressed as minimum levels. -- Downgrading is permitted and must be declared. A regression found by guarding - is a defect; a regression declared in advance is a decision. -- **A low level may be permanent by design, and the declaration must be able to - say so.** `flex-auth` is `I1` and always will be: a decision point evaluates - the claims it is handed, and verifying its own inputs would make it the - identity provider its scope refuses to be. A `target` equal to `current` with - a reason is a settled position, not a stalled trajectory, and §12's guard - must not nag it as though it were one. - -Without the axis separation, "not rigorous about tenant separation" is one -verdict a repo passes or fails. With it, the same repo is `I1 A1 E1 P0 R0` with -a path — a plan, not an indictment. - -## 7. Portability across placement levels - -Movement between P levels must be operational, not a rebuild: - -- Connect by injected credential only — no cluster, host, namespace or database - name in source. -- Own a whole database, never tables inside someone else's. -- Idempotent schema creation. -- No cross-database joins or co-location assumptions. - -**Decision 7.1:** mandatory at P1 and above. At P3, SHOULD rather than MUST — a -per-client instance that never moves is not misconformant for naming its own -database. - -## 8. Placement triggers - -Recorded at provisioning time: noisy neighbour on a latency-critical path; a -compliance or residency requirement; a plan tier requiring a higher minimum; an -erasure horizon that no longer fits (§4.5); connection or memory ceiling -reached. - -**Decision 8.1:** triggers MUST be *monitored*, not merely recorded. A trigger -in a YAML comment nobody re-reads is documentation, not control. - -**Decision 8.2:** placement policy ownership is proposed to -`railiance-platform`, **co-signed by `adaptive-pricing`**. Tenancy model -selection is a commercial decision as much as a technical one; an -operations-shaped repo should not hold it alone. - -### 8.3 Service class — a placement input, never a priority - -A latency-critical consumer and a batch consumer can share an instance today -with nothing distinguishing them. `tenant-engine` sits on `flex-auth`'s -synchronous authorization path and chose a 5s statement timeout for that -reason; `audit-core`, co-resident, is not latency-critical. Nothing prioritises -between them. - -**The framework does not add a QoS axis, because the platform cannot enforce -one.** Community PostgreSQL has no resource governor: no per-role CPU or I/O -priority, no resource queues, no workload classes. Those exist in EDB's -enterprise variant, in Greenplum, and in SQL Server — not in what we run. A -declared priority level would therefore be an unenforced claim sitting in a -declaration, which is precisely what retiring `tenantIsolation` was about. An -axis implies graduation and enforcement; this has neither. - -**Decision 8.3.1 — co-residents are equal.** On shared substrate no consumer's -query yields to another's. A consumer whose latency requirement cannot survive -an unprioritised neighbour must escalate to `P2`. That is the honest mechanism -and it is the only one we have. - -**Decision 8.3.2 — service class is declared anyway**, as a category rather -than a level: `latency-critical`, `interactive`, or `batch`. It buys three -things, none of which is priority: - -- **A placement input.** Mixing `latency-critical` with `batch` on one instance - is a recognised mismatch. It may still be the right call — it is right today - — but it should be a decision, not an accident of who was provisioned when. -- **A trigger.** A `latency-critical` consumer acquiring a `batch` co-resident - is a recorded placement trigger under §8, on the same footing as noisy - neighbour. -- **An acceptance criterion for evidence.** The noisy-neighbour artifact in §13 - asks whether measured degradation is *acceptable*; without a declared class - that word has no referent. Degradation tolerable for `batch` may be an - outage for `latency-critical`. - -**Decision 8.3.3 — class mixture must be visible.** The platform reports which -classes are co-resident. An unenforceable risk that nobody can see is strictly -worse than one that is stated. - -The known escalation short of P2 is gateway-level prioritisation — ordering -submissions in a connection proxy by the requesting tenant's current -consumption. It is real, it is where the industry puts this when it must, and -it is new infrastructure we do not run. Recorded as the option, not adopted. - -## 9. Credentials as a tenancy control - -Short-lived leased credentials re-read at connection checkout, with -overlap-first rotation, bound the residual risk at every E level below E4: a -leaked credential expires rather than persisting. Stronger than the industry -norm of a long-lived per-service secret. - -**Decision 9.1:** static long-lived database credentials are not a sanctioned -path for any service above E0. - -**Decision 9.2 — the rule extends to consumer-facing credentials.** Draft-6 -named database access only. `audit-core` pointed out that its *ingest* -credentials are static long-lived bearer tokens, rotated by publishing a second -alongside the first — and that the argument applies with **more** force to the -credential that actually carries the tenant claim than to the one that reaches -the database behind it. Read as an accidental omission; it was. Consumer-facing -credentials are named in. Where a service cannot yet meet this, it is a stated -gap rather than a silent exclusion. - -## 10. Blast radius must be published - -**Decision 10.1:** every platform holding consumer data MUST publish, in -concrete terms, what a leaked runtime credential can and cannot reach at the -levels it operates. `rapp-postgres` ADR-0001 §5 is the reference. Where the -model cannot provide a guarantee, the platform says so and names the -escalation. - -**Decision 10.2 — quotas are disclosed, not discovered.** The same obligation -extends from what a leaked credential can reach to what the platform will -refuse to do for you. Every consumer MUST be told, at provisioning, the -throttles and quotas enforced against it — connection limits, statement -timeouts, idle-transaction timeouts — and told again when they change. A -consumer learning its statement timeout by hitting it in production is a -disclosure failure, not a consumer bug. This is how `tenant-engine` was -provisioned, by good practice rather than by rule; the rule now exists. - -## 11. Commercial expression - -- **11.1** Plan tiers are expressed *internally* as minimum levels. A tier may - require `E3 P2 R2`; it need not print that anywhere customer-facing. -- **11.2** Marketing and product language is free. No requirement to expose - level labels or this document. "Dedicated infrastructure", "isolated - tenancy", "private instance" all remain available. -- **11.3** The constraint is on **evidence, not vocabulary**. A customer-facing - isolation, availability or retention claim must map to a minimum level the - delivering service actually holds, recorded once when the tier is defined. - The review is internal and happens at tier definition — not per campaign. -- **11.4** Two hard lines, because these reach contracts and compliance - questionnaires: - - A claim that another tenant **cannot** reach the customer's data requires - **E4**. - - A claim that deleted data **is gone** requires **R4**, or an erasure - horizon disclosed alongside it. Where R4 is reached by key destruction, the - claim is defensible but not settled law (§4.5) — it may be made, and it may - not be made in language that implies a regulator has blessed it. - -## 12. Methodology — analyze, establish, improve, guard - -**Analyze.** Assess a repo against the ladders; produce `tenancy.current` with -reasoning recorded. Applies to new and absorbed services alike. - -**Establish.** Declare the target and gap. The target is set by data class, -tenant groupings served and plan tiers carried — not by ambition. - -**Improve.** Move one axis at a time. Raising P while leaving E untouched is -the characteristic misstep. - -**Guard.** Verify continuously that the declared posture holds — **against the -service's own declaration**, not a universal maximum. Nobody must prove every -service is at E4; the check is that none is below what it declared. - -Regression found by guarding is a defect; regression declared in advance is a -decision. The estate has been bitten twice by silent pin rollbacks producing -ordinary-looking 403s and 404s rather than errors. Posture regression looks the -same — an RLS context leak returns correct-looking rows for the wrong tenant. -Guarding must be designed for invisible failure, not for crashes. - -## 13. Evidence per level - -**Decision 13.1:** a level is claimed only with its evidence artifact present. -This turns §6's accuracy rule from an honour system into a check. - -**Decision 13.1a — the floor needs no artifact, only a reason.** Found -independently by `audit-core` and `flex-auth`: the table below defines -artifacts from `I2`, `A2`, `E1`, `P1`, `R2` upward and none below, so a literal -13.1 made the lowest rungs unclaimable — including §5's own worked example of a -conformant absorbed repo, `I1 A1 E1 P0 R0`, which could not satisfy it on any -axis. A rule that forbids the declaration §6 exists to permit is a defect in -the rule. - -At or below the "no control" rung of an axis, a declaration requires a **stated -reason**, not an artifact. Evidence is what stops you overclaiming, and there is -nothing to overclaim at the bottom of a ladder. - -**Decision 13.4 — an artifact must assert something achievable.** Draft-3's -noisy-neighbour evidence required proof that a saturating consumer "does not -breach" another's allowance. Shared infrastructure cannot provide that; the -risk is inherent and cannot be wholly removed. An artifact that can only fail, -or that passes by being run gently enough, is an overclaim wearing the costume -of evidence. Where a property cannot be guaranteed, the artifact measures and -records it instead. - -**Decision 13.2 — evidence is of two kinds, and conflating them is an -overclaim.** *Mechanical* evidence is a structural assertion a machine can make -and belongs in CI. *Adversarial* evidence is semantic, requires setting up -separate tenant contexts and comparing responses, and carries a review date -rather than a green build. Cross-tenant findings are the category external -testing practice identifies as needing human review. **A passing CI run is not -E2 evidence.** - -| Level | Evidence | Kind | -|---|---|---| -| **I2** | Identifiers validated against the vocabulary; rejection test for a malformed id; binding shown to come from a verified token | Mechanical | -| **I3** | Live re-query demonstrated on an `aal2`-class path; cached-claim path shown unused there | Mechanical | -| **A2** | Choke point identified; test that an unbound request is refused | Mechanical | -| **A3** | Live decision with a denial observed at the endpoint, not only at the decision surface | Mechanical | -| **A4** | Decision served over the standard interface; a second PDP substituted without PEP change, **with the decision differences between the two recorded** — substitution proves interface portability, not decision equivalence | Mechanical | -| **E1** | Every tenant-owned table carries the tenant key | Mechanical | -| **E2** | Choke point identified; identity bound to tenant A demonstrably cannot read tenant B | **Adversarial**, with a review date | -| **E3** | `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` on every tenant table; no `BYPASSRLS` on leased roles; probe that a session without the GUC reads nothing; probe that a wrong GUC reads nothing; `EXPLAIN` comparison | Mechanical | -| **E4** | Per-tenant credential demonstrated unable to connect to another tenant's substrate | Mechanical | -| **P1–P4** | Provisioning declaration plus the platform's isolation probes | Mechanical | -| **P1–P2 (noisy neighbour)** | A recorded baseline of per-consumer resource usage; a run in which one consumer saturates its declared allowance; evidence that the governance controls **bind** (the greedy consumer is held at its limits) and that the degradation co-residents experience is **measured, recorded and judged acceptable against each one's declared service class** (§8.3); the aggregate headroom at time of measurement | **Adversarial**, load-generated, with a review date | -| **R2** | Declared retention rendered; erasure horizon published and reported in the operator surface | Mechanical | -| **R3** | Sweep evidence records: timestamp, dataset, identifiers removed, authorising policy reference | Mechanical | -| **R4** | Erasure demonstrated across live data, backups and derived copies within the horizon | **Adversarial** | - -**Decision 13.3:** the E2, E3 and noisy-neighbour artifacts do not exist -anywhere in the estate today. `rapp-postgres` runs 15 adversarial probes, all -against the *consumer* boundary, none against the tenant boundary inside a -consumer. Externally, what this framework calls a tenant boundary failure is -**Broken Object Level Authorization** — OWASP API1, top of the API Security Top -10 since that list launched, and the most commonly exploited API vulnerability -in published assessments. We have no coverage for the highest-ranked risk in -our class of system. §19.3 seeks an owner. - -## 14. Adoption stance — structure, not tooling - -**Decision 14.1:** external research is design input. This estate adopts -published standards and structural patterns; it does not adopt tooling unless -that tooling is an established industry standard with broad application. -Everything else is built ground-up, so it can be optimised and refactored as -the estate sees fit. - -| Class | Stance | -|---|---| -| Security baselines (OWASP Multi-Tenant Security Cheat Sheet, API Security Top 10) | Adopt as the external reference our ladders answer to | -| Standards bodies (OpenID AuthZEN 1.0) | Adopt — this is what A4 is | -| Reference taxonomies (Azure tenancy models, AWS SaaS Lens, cell architecture) | Adopt as structure | -| Engine behaviour (PostgreSQL RLS mechanics) | Facts, not tooling | -| Third-party analyzers and test frameworks | **Do not adopt.** Take their rule taxonomies as checklists for probes we write ourselves | - -The practical effect is small and good: `rapp-postgres` already owns a -ground-up probe harness — bash and psql, no dependency tree — that found four -real defects in its own provisioning SQL. The evidence artifacts in §13 become -new probes in a tool we control. One idea worth reimplementing from the -external survey is **policy-diff classification**: labelling a change to an -enforcement policy as safe or breaking *before* it lands. - -## 15. Alternatives considered - -**One fixed model with a single set of characteristics** (draft-1). *Rejected:* -cannot describe a repo that is not there yet, forcing absorbed repos to -misrepresent their posture or stay outside. A framework that can only describe -its own end state is not a framework. - -**A maturity model with a single overall level.** *Rejected:* collapses the -axis separation. A service strong on identity and weak on enforcement has a -specific, actionable gap; one composite score hides it and invites averaging. - -**Prohibiting row-level security** (draft-2's inherited position). *Rejected in -draft-2, refined in draft-3:* RLS is a real rung against the common threat. The -error was never RLS — it was describing E3 in E4's language. - -**Schema-per-consumer in one database.** *Rejected:* `pg_catalog` is readable -per-database, so every co-resident enumerates every other's table and column -names regardless of grants. Retained as a describable state, never a target. - -**Mandating E4 for everyone.** *Rejected:* the tenant taxonomy includes -`consumer` (private individuals) and `family`. A cluster per private individual -is economically impossible; the taxonomy is itself evidence pooling is -required. - -**Per-consumer physical backup retention.** *Rejected:* CNPG retention is a -property of the instance's WAL archive. There is no mechanism, and claiming it -would be a fabricated guarantee. Hence the derived maximum in §4.5. - -**Platform-scheduled row expiry.** *Rejected:* requires the platform to hold -DML authority over consumer schemas and interpret consumer data semantics, both -forbidden by ADR-0001. The consumer's migration lease is the correct -instrument. - -**Leaving each repo to its own model.** *Rejected:* the status quo, which -produced two contradictory ratified defaults and an unowned placement question. - -## 16. Held against outside practice - -**The graduated reframe is corroborated, not invented here.** Microsoft's -tenancy-model guidance states it almost verbatim: *"Instead of viewing -isolation as a discrete property, consider it a spectrum. You can deploy -components of your architecture that are more isolated or less isolated than -other components in the same architecture."* The same guidance derives our E↔P -coupling independently — shared deployment means enforcement lives in -application code; dedicated deployment means it is structural. - -**Stronger than typical.** Most multi-tenancy literature models one boundary, -tenant-to-tenant. This estate has **two stacked boundaries**: platform-service -to platform-service, and tenant to tenant inside a consumer. Naming them -separately and refusing to enforce both with one mechanism is uncommon and -correct. Graduated per-axis levels also beat the silo/pool/bridge trichotomy, -which is approximately our P axis with the other four missing — which is why -it cannot express "pooled infrastructure, structurally enforced boundary". - -**Weaker than typical.** The pool model's standard mitigation is a *verified* -enforcement layer every service is demonstrably routed through. We have the -concept and none of the verification (§13.3). - -**Adopted without naming it.** Short-lived leased credentials re-read at -checkout beat the long-lived-secret norm. §9 promotes it to a tenancy control. - -**Still unexplored.** Neither P nor R describes a **cell** — a slice of -infrastructure with a *fixed maximum size*, sized so one cell's failure is -survivable and cell count scales linearly. `platform-pg` is, in these terms, an -uncapped cell: §17 computes a ceiling and nothing enforces it (§19.8). - -Sources: the four research digests in `research/2026-08-17-adr008-*`, which -carry full citations for every claim in this section. - -## 17. Scaling demands - -Measured against the live `platform-pg` specification, not estimated. - -``` -instances: 1 (no HA; single-node rail) -max_connections: 100 -memory limit: 1Gi -per consumer: 14 connections (12 runtime + 2 migration) -``` - -**Connection ceiling: roughly six consumers — and this is the aggregate -noisy-neighbour bound, not a capacity statistic.** Seven consumers request 98 -of 100 before CNPG's instance manager, metrics exporter and reserved slots. -Every one of them is politely inside its declared 14-connection allowance; the -instance still fails. - -That distinction matters because our governance addresses the wrong shape. -Per-consumer `connection_limit`, `statement_timeout` and -`idle_in_transaction_session_timeout` guard well against **one greedy -consumer**. They do nothing about **the aggregate of many modest ones**, which -is the second and less intuitive noisy-neighbour failure and the one this -number describes. Two consumers are provisioned. We are at roughly a third of -the bound, and the third request will not feel like a scaling event. - -**Memory likely binds first.** 100 backends against 1Gi is ~10MB per backend. -Connection exhaustion errors clearly; memory pressure OOM-kills and degrades -every co-resident at once. - -**E3 and pooling.** *Corrected from draft-2, which had this backwards.* -Transaction-scoped context (`SET LOCAL` inside an explicit transaction) is what -makes E3 **safe** under a pooler. Statement-level pooling is what breaks it, -serving other tenants' rows under concurrency with no error. E3 constrains -which pooling mode is available, not whether pooling is available. - -**Retention consumes the volume.** WAL accumulates with the window, and §4.5 -makes the window the maximum across consumers. A consumer declaring a long -retention extends everyone's horizon *and* everyone's storage draw against a -20Gi volume. - -**Restore time couples all consumers.** Physical backup is instance-wide, so a -consumer's RTO is a function of *total* instance size, not its own. - -**No P1 tenant has HA.** `instances: 1` means a tier promising uptime cannot be -satisfied at P1 as built — an availability floor belongs in §11's -minimum-level vocabulary alongside isolation. - -## 18. Consequences - -- The estate gains one vocabulary and a way to be honest about partial - adoption. -- Absorbed repos get a described state and a path instead of a failing grade. -- `tenantIsolation` in `PostgresConsumer` is revealed as a mislabelled field. -- The verification problem becomes tractable: guard against declaration. -- Draft-2's RLS prohibition is reversed and its E3 description corrected; - `rapp-postgres` acquires an obligation to define and offer the mechanism. -- Adding a consumer with long retention **silently extends everyone's erasure - horizon**. This must reach the consumer review checklist, not only this - document. -- A service selling an isolation tier must maintain a tenant→substrate mapping - it does not have today. -- Nothing here changes a running system. - -## 19. Open questions - -1. **`tenantIsolation` field** — `rapp-postgres`: rename to name its axis and - carry a level (`tenancy.E: 2`), or move it out of the storage declaration. -2. **Placement ownership** — `railiance-platform` with `adaptive-pricing`: - accept the ladder, triggers and the §8.1 monitoring obligation; appoint a - recorded placement owner per workload. -3. **E2, E3 and noisy-neighbour evidence** — **owned as of 2026-08-17** by - `whitehat-security` (WHITEHAT-WP-0001), an independent adversarial evidence - facility seeded for this purpose. `audit-core` and `tenant-engine` were - right to decline it as fleet-scope work; the answer was a home of its own - rather than a volunteer. - - **Owned by NetKingdom** — corrected 2026-08-17; an earlier revision of this - section proposed otherwise on independence grounds and was overruled. - Offensive security is security work and belongs with the repo that owns - security. The facility is framed offensively rather than as a conformance - checker: it is pointed at infrastructure we choose, our own estate among - them, and conformance testing is one use of a general capability. - - The residual tension is recorded rather than resolved: NetKingdom owns this - framework *and* the facility that tests conformance to it, so those findings - are NetKingdom assessing NetKingdom. The mitigation is that findings leave - for `risk-nexus`, under `the-custodian`, rather than being closed in place. - Proportionate, not perfect. Revisit if conformance findings start getting - quietly closed. - - Two consequences land back here. **Cadence is now a security parameter, not - a schedule** — for any control whose guarantee is detection rather than - prevention, the interval between probe runs *is* the exposure window, and - `rapp-postgres` ADR-0003 leaves that number to the facility. And **a passing - suite is not proof of isolation**; it is proof that the attacks attempted - did not work. §13's evidence artifacts should be read with that distinction, - because a green run recorded as "E2 verified" would be exactly the overclaim - §6 prohibits. -4. **Business app vs platform service** — Custodian canon: a classification - rule. Candidate: reuse `repo-classification-standard_v1.0`. -5. **Tier → minimum level mapping** — `adaptive-pricing` and `tenant-engine`: - required only for tiers making isolation, availability or retention claims. -6. **The E3 mechanism** — `rapp-postgres`: publish the GUC contract with the - `FORCE`/`BYPASSRLS`/`SECURITY INVOKER`/`EXPLAIN` requirements in §4.3. -7. **Identity-provider placement** — owner of `key-cape`: realm-per-tenant or - Organizations? Realm-per-tenant's ~5–20 tenant ceiling is below our target. -8. **Cell sizing** — reframed from "should we adopt cells" to **"what is - `platform-pg`'s declared maximum size, and what is the overflow target?"** - The connection ceiling forces this whether or not we adopt the vocabulary. -9. **Retention floor and ceiling** — should `backupRetentionDays` have a - platform minimum (so a consumer asking for 1 day gets a validation error - rather than a quiet disappointment) and a maximum (so nobody exhausts the - volume)? -10. **Engine neutrality** — the P ladder rests on a PostgreSQL property. - State it engine-specifically and say so, or abstract it and risk a - non-Postgres implementation that silently differs? -11. **Erasure versus audit** — `audit-core`: crypto-shredding a tenant's audit - records destroys the evidence the service exists to hold, and ADR-0001 §2 - deliberately built the role model so history could not be rewritten. The - usual resolution separates the *fact* of an event, retained, from its - *personal payload*, encrypted per subject and shreddable. Raised because a - naive "R4 everywhere" target would instruct the audit service to destroy - its own evidence. The answer is `audit-core`'s, not this framework's. -12. **Quality of service** — **resolved 2026-08-17.** Co-residents are equal; - a declared *service class* informs placement but never grants priority. - See §8.3. The question asked whether to add a QoS dimension; the answer is - no, and the reason is that we could not enforce one. - -**Routed elsewhere, deliberately.** The tenant identifier -`tenant::` embeds headcount bands (`small`, `medium`, `large`) -that change as a tenant grows, contradicting the consensus that identifiers -should not encode mutable attributes. That is a critique of ADR-0013, not of -this framework, and belongs to `tenant-engine` and NetKingdom canon. Folding it -in here would overreach. - -## 20. Ratification path - -1. Reviewed by `tenant-engine`, `flex-auth`, `rapp-postgres`, - `railiance-platform` and `adaptive-pricing` against §19. -2. Each publishes its own posture vector (§5) as part of review. **The - framework is validated by whether it can describe them accurately** — if a - repo cannot express itself in these five ladders, the ladders are wrong and - this document changes, not the repo. -3. On acceptance, **supersedes** the routing of - `rapp-postgres/docs/canon-drafts/shared-platform-relational-storage_v0.1-draft.md`, - whose §§3–8 are absorbed here. That draft is withdrawn rather than left - pending. -4. On acceptance, `rapp-postgres` ADR-0001 and ADR-0002 move to `accepted` and - are annotated as the PostgreSQL implementation of the E, P and R ladders.