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@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ The dynamic, self-optimizing security platform is the long-term direction in
## Orientation
- [SCOPE.md](SCOPE.md) — what this repo owns, current state, and when it is relevant
- **[SECURITY-COMPANION.md](SECURITY-COMPANION.md) — start here.** The working
form of the security layer model: what to declare, what binds you, what you may
never claim about evidence, and the two things the estate cannot do yet
- [Security layer model](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md) — the
statute the companion serves (accepted 2026-08-29): how the security estate is
layered (Taxonomy / Tooling / Engines / Staff) and what each layer may own
- [Security layer model](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md) — how the
security estate is layered (Taxonomy / Tooling / Engines / Staff) and what each
layer may own
- [Agent companion](canon/standards/security-layer-model-companion_v0.1.md) — the
operative two-page form of that standard: what to declare, what binds you, what
you may never claim
- [Security scenario composition](canon/standards/security-scenario-composition_v0.1.md)
— deterministic, plan-only capability and trust composition
- [Posture feedback](canon/standards/posture-feedback_v0.1.md) — deterministic,

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---
id: netkingdom-security-companion-v0.2
type: standard-companion
title: "NetKingdom Security — Working Companion v0.2"
domain: netkingdom
status: accepted
version: "0.2"
companion_to: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
owner: gate-house
publication_owner: net-kingdom
created: "2026-08-29"
updated: "2026-08-29"
review_interval: 3m
standard_token: security-companion_v0.2
---
# NetKingdom Security — Working Companion
**Start here.** This is the operative form of
[`canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md`](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md)
(accepted): the same rules, without the change log or the review history.
The statute governs where the two disagree. **A disagreement is a finding**
report it to `gate-house` rather than working around it.
For *how to get something done* in NetKingdom — which lane, which credential,
which route — ask `ops-warden`. This document says what the rules are;
`ops-warden` stewards the paths through them.
---
## 1. The four layers
| Layer | You are this if you produce | Deterministic |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Taxonomy** | terms, semantic contracts, standards | n/a |
| **Tooling** | state and persistence | yes |
| **Engine** | a deterministic API for one modeled concept | yes |
| **Staff** | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | **no** |
One test decides it: **given the same authoritative inputs, do you always return
the same result?** If your core function is inference or judgment you are Staff,
however much of your work happens at runtime.
Engines carry a role — **PDP** (decides; `access-engine` only), **PIP**
(supplies facts as claims), **Evidence** (`audit-core`), **Lifecycle** (an API
over Tooling it owns). A new engine is a PIP unless the statute is amended.
## 2. Declare your layer
In your `INTENT.md` frontmatter, plus prose in your own voice in the body. A
layer someone else stated about you is not a declaration.
```yaml
layer: Staff # Taxonomy | Tooling | Engine | Staff
role: null # Engines only: PDP | PIP | Evidence | Lifecycle
```
Working references, both offered estate-wide: `ops-warden`'s `layer.yaml`,
`scripts/check_layer_conformance.py`, `tests/test_layer_conformance.py`;
`kings-guard`'s adaptation of the same for a repository with no Tooling
contacts at all.
**Contest the proposed layer if it is wrong.** Three repositories have returned
corrections that changed the standard; one talked us out of an exception we had
offered. A correction is worth more than a label.
## 3. The rules that bind everyone
1. **One decision point.** `access-engine` renders authorization decisions. No
other repository, in any layer, renders or caches one.
2. **Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding.** A registry,
cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs decided early.
3. **Doctrine arrives as a claim.** Anything changing an outcome — authority
ceiling, zone stance, posture, maturity level — reaches the decision as a
request claim or a versioned policy rule. Never a side channel.
4. **Adaptive systems may only tighten.** Reduce, step up, request containment;
never manufacture authority.
5. **Staff never touches Tooling directly.** Act through Engine APIs. See §4.
6. **Every allow has a lifetime** — a TTL, or a binding to a session or
obligation that ends.
## 4. If you touch Tooling
"Tooling" means a system catalogued as Tooling in statute §4 — today `key-cape`
and `OpenBao`. Uncatalogued infrastructure (State Hub, `llm-connect`) is outside
the rule, but **list it anyway** so your conformance check is total. That
carve-out sunsets: an uncatalogued store another layer *reads* must, within two
review intervals, be catalogued or declared a gap.
| Shape | When | You must |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Read-only diagnostic** | no engine exposes the read | declare it; no writes; it is a gap to close |
| **Conduit** | you run the *owner's* tool under the *caller's* identity | present no credential of your own, widen nothing, stay reconstructable as the caller |
| **Declared gap** | you must contact Tooling and no engine exposes it | declare `capability`, `intended_owner`, `blocked_on`, `review` — machine-readably |
A conduit presenting its own token is not a conduit. A declared gap is **tracked
non-conformance** — but declaring beats hiding, and it is never scored below
silence.
There is deliberately **no "operator of third-party Tooling" shape**. Someone
must run OpenBao, and that stays a declared gap whose review keeps returning,
because a clean operator shape would turn a tracked gap into a permanent
allowance.
## 5. If you cause side effects (you are PEP-shaped)
Being PEP-shaped does not change your layer. `ops-warden` issuing a certificate
and `ops-mason` opening a route are both Staff and both PEP-shaped.
1. **No side effect without a decision record** naming the request it was
rendered for — **or** your declared stance permits proceeding and **you record
the application of that stance in its place.** A fail-open result is metadata,
never silence.
2. **Do not replay a verdict outside its own binding and lifetime.** Within them
it is the decision being used as issued. The test is mechanical: replay is
permitted iff the canonical request digest matches and the lifetime holds.
Caching a DENY is permitted where the refusal is recorded against the request
refused and the cache lifetime is declared.
3. **Publish your unreachable-engine stance map** — total, per zone or
equivalent, no implicit default, no per-call discretion. **Publish it at a
path named in your layer declaration, and register it in statute §13.1** — a
map only you can read is not published. The published map MUST equal shipped
behaviour; assert that with a test. Reference: `ops-warden`
`ADR-0009` + `pep-stance.yaml`.
4. **Stay reconstructable**, within the bound in §6.
If `access-engine` is reachable but degraded, the fallback is the engine's. If it
is unreachable, the behaviour is necessarily yours — which is why it is declared
in advance rather than decided in the moment.
## 6. What you may never claim about evidence
An append-only archive with a verified chain proves records were **not altered or
truncated after arrival**. It proves nothing about an event never sent.
- ✗ "the audit record proves it happened"
- ✗ "there is no record, so it did not happen"
- ✓ "the archive proves the records it holds were not altered or truncated after arrival"
Which control covers which threat:
| Threat | Covered by |
| --- | --- |
| Accidental omission (crash between mutation and emit) | atomic emission via a **local** outbox — **prevented** |
| Adversarial omission (a compromised source suppresses) | cadence and reconciliation — **detected after the fact** |
| Adversarial omission at a compromised source | **nothing prevents it.** Known residual |
If a control's soundness depends on an event being present, that evidence is
**load-bearing**: emission must be atomic with the state change, queued locally,
and you **MUST** declare an expected cadence. For rare load-bearing events —
revocations, denials, containment — rate monitoring cannot work, so the required
form is **reconciliation or a heartbeat**: a positive claim that can itself go
missing.
Otherwise evidence is **attributive**: seek atomicity, and if you trade it away
deliberately, declare the trade and never describe the trail as complete.
## 7. If you are an agent
Same layer as your human colleagues, different blast radius:
1. **No standing credential.** Authority is per task, time-bounded, attributable
to the principal you act for.
2. **Tool use is a conduit or an Engine API.** There is no third route. **Tool
availability is not permission** — a callable tool means the operation exists,
not that you may invoke it.
3. **Your memory is not a state plane.** Memory, tool-call traces, and prompt
caches must not become state another layer depends on unless catalogued.
4. **Every action is reconstructable as the caller's action.**
Session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model selection
— are `glas-harness`'s, not this standard's. Rule 2 is the seam between them, and
neither side is sufficient alone.
## 8. Conformance: four states
| State | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| **Conforming** | no Tooling contact, or only declared diagnostic/conduit shapes |
| **Blocked-clean** | the capability does not exist because no engine exposes it, and you make no Tooling contact |
| **Declared gap** | a declared Tooling contact — tracked non-conformance |
| **Undeclared violation** | anything else |
**Blocked-clean is not worse than conforming.** Declining a shortcut and leaving
a capability at zero is compliance at cost, and will never be ranked below a
repository that quietly opened a client and said nothing.
## 9. If you operate workloads (Railiance)
Operations belong to **Railiance** (`railiance-master`), not to NetKingdom. A
workload is a managed running deployable, operated through four axes:
`railiance-*` ownership, `rail-*` execution contract, `rapp-*` managed package,
`reef-*` substrate. `rein-*` is **not** a fifth axis — reins are `glas-harness`
agent-harness backends.
What holds for any Railiance consumer of NetKingdom security: decisions come from
`access-engine` and nowhere else; approvals are objects in `approval-engine`
consumed as claims; credentials come from `secrets-engine` **after** a decision;
evidence goes to `audit-core` under §6's bound; anything causing a protected side
effect is PEP-shaped and owes §5.
**How the axes map onto the layer model is not settled** — see statute §20.3. Do
not assume a mapping; raising the question is welcome.
## 10. Two things the estate cannot do yet
Stated so nobody plans around a capability that does not exist:
- **Nothing is observed in production.** `kings-guard` has reported it has never
seen a real event. Do not cite "observed in operation" as evidence.
- **Nothing can be contained automatically.** There is no actuation surface — no
API to reduce authority, require step-up, or isolate a workload. The capability
is at zero, not degraded, and it is nobody's gap to close alone.
---
**Statute:** [`canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md`](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md) — accepted 2026-08-29.
**Owner:** `gate-house`. **Guidance on getting things done:** `ops-warden`.

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@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
---
id: netkingdom-security-layer-model-companion-v0.1
type: standard-companion
title: "NetKingdom Security Layer Model — Agent Companion v0.1"
domain: netkingdom
status: proposed
version: "0.1"
companion_to: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md
owner: gate-house
publication_owner: net-kingdom
created: "2026-08-29"
updated: "2026-08-29"
review_interval: 3m
standard_token: security-layer-model-companion_v0.1
---
# Security Layer Model — Agent Companion
**This is the operative form of `security-layer-model_v0.6.md`.** Same rules, no
change log, no review history. The statute governs where the two disagree; if you
find a disagreement, report it — that is a finding, not a formatting problem.
Read this if you are an agent or an operator working in a NetKingdom repository,
or if your repository has been asked to declare its layer.
---
## 1. The four layers
| Layer | You are this if you produce | Deterministic |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Taxonomy** | terms, semantic contracts, standards | n/a |
| **Tooling** | state and persistence | yes |
| **Engine** | a deterministic API for one modeled concept | yes |
| **Staff** | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | **no** |
One test decides it: **given the same authoritative inputs, do you always return
the same result?** If your core function is inference or judgment, you are Staff
— however much of your work happens at runtime.
Engines carry a role: **PDP** (decides — `access-engine` only), **PIP**
(supplies facts as claims), **Evidence** (`audit-core`), **Lifecycle** (an API
over Tooling it owns). A new engine is a PIP unless the statute says otherwise.
## 2. Declare your layer
Put this in your `INTENT.md` frontmatter. A layer someone else stated about you
is not a declaration.
```yaml
layer: Staff # Taxonomy | Tooling | Engine | Staff
role: null # Engines only: PDP | PIP | Evidence | Lifecycle
```
Then state it in prose, in your own voice, in the body. Contest the proposed
layer if it is wrong — a correction is worth more than a label.
Reference implementation of the machine-readable form: `ops-warden`'s
`layer.yaml`, `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py`, and
`tests/test_layer_conformance.py`.
## 3. The rules that bind everyone
1. **One decision point.** `access-engine` renders authorization decisions. No
other repository, in any layer, renders or caches one.
2. **Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding.** A registry,
cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs has decided
early.
3. **Doctrine arrives as a claim.** Anything that changes an outcome — an
authority ceiling, a zone stance, a posture, a maturity level — reaches the
decision as a request claim or a versioned policy rule, never by a side
channel.
4. **Adaptive systems may only tighten.** Reduce authority, require step-up,
request containment — never manufacture authority.
5. **Staff never touches Tooling directly.** It acts through Engine APIs. See §4.
6. **Every allow has a lifetime.** A TTL, or a binding to a session or
obligation that ends.
## 4. If you touch Tooling
"Tooling" means a system catalogued as Tooling in the statute's §4 — today
`key-cape` and `OpenBao`. Uncatalogued infrastructure (the State Hub,
`llm-connect`) is outside this rule, but list it anyway so your check is total.
Three sanctioned shapes. Anything else is a violation:
| Shape | When | You must |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Read-only diagnostic** | no engine exposes the read | declare it; no writes; treat it as a gap to close |
| **Conduit** | you run the *owner's* tool under the *caller's* identity | present no credential of your own, widen nothing, stay reconstructable as the caller |
| **Declared gap** | you must contact Tooling and no engine exposes it | declare `capability`, `intended_owner`, `blocked_on`, `review` — machine-readably |
A conduit that presents its own token is not a conduit. A declared gap is
**tracked non-conformance**, not conformance — but declaring it is always better
than hiding it, and it will never be scored below silence.
## 5. If you cause side effects (you are PEP-shaped)
Being PEP-shaped does not change your layer. `ops-warden` issuing a certificate
and `ops-mason` opening a route are both Staff and both PEP-shaped.
1. **No side effect without a decision record** naming the request it was
rendered for.
2. **Never cache the verdict.** Caching an input claim under its own freshness
rule is fine; caching the answer is a second decision point.
3. **Publish your unreachable-engine stance** — total, per zone or equivalent,
no implicit default, no per-call discretion. Reference shape: `ops-warden`
`ADR-0009`.
4. **Stay reconstructable**, within the bound in §6.
If `access-engine` is reachable but degraded, the fallback is the engine's. If it
is unreachable, the behaviour is necessarily yours — which is why it must be
declared in advance rather than decided in the moment.
## 6. What you may never claim about evidence
An append-only archive with a verified chain proves records were **not altered
or truncated after arrival**. It proves nothing about an event never sent.
- ✗ "the audit record proves it happened"
- ✗ "there is no record, so it did not happen"
- ✓ "the archive proves the records it holds were not altered or truncated after arrival"
The event an adversary most wants missing is the negative one — a revocation, a
denial, a containment action. If a control's soundness depends on an event being
present, that evidence is **load-bearing** and its emission must be atomic with
the state change, queued locally. Otherwise it is **attributive**: seek
atomicity, and if you trade it away deliberately, declare the trade and never
describe the trail as complete.
If you emit adaptive-relevant events, publish an expected cadence. A drop below
it is a finding. Silence is a signal.
## 7. If you are an agent
Same layer as your human colleagues, different blast radius:
1. **No standing credential.** Authority is per task, time-bounded, attributable.
2. **Tool use is a conduit or an Engine API.** There is no third route.
3. **Your memory is not a state plane.** Memory, tool-call traces, and prompt
caches must not become state another layer depends on unless catalogued.
4. **Every action is reconstructable as the caller's action.**
Tool availability is not permission. A tool being callable says the operation
exists, not that you may invoke it.
## 8. Conformance: four states
| State | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| **Conforming** | no Tooling contact, or only declared diagnostic/conduit shapes |
| **Blocked-clean** | the capability does not exist because no engine exposes it, and you make no Tooling contact |
| **Declared gap** | a declared §5.3 contact — tracked non-conformance |
| **Undeclared violation** | anything else |
**Blocked-clean is not worse than conforming.** Declining a shortcut and leaving
a capability at zero is compliance at cost. It will never be ranked below a
repository that quietly opened a client and said nothing.
## 9. Consuming NetKingdom security from outside
Operations is **HelixForge's** responsibility — its reef, rail, rapp, and rein
concepts — and NetKingdom provides the security and approval framework those
operations consume.
**That interface is not specified yet.** What holds today is only what holds for
any consumer: authorization decisions come from `access-engine`, approvals are
objects in `approval-engine` consumed as claims, credentials are materialized by
`secrets-engine` after a decision, and evidence goes to `audit-core` under the
bound in §6. A HelixForge component that causes a protected side effect is
PEP-shaped and §5 applies to it.
What is **not** settled: how a reef, rail, rapp, or rein maps onto the layer
model — whether they are subjects a decision is rendered about, principals that
request, PEP-shaped consumers, or none of these. Until that is written, do not
assume a mapping. Raising it is welcome.
## 10. Two things the estate cannot do yet
Stated so nobody plans around a capability that does not exist:
- **Nothing is observed in production.** `kings-guard` has reported that it has
never seen a real event. Do not cite "observed in operation" as evidence.
- **Nothing can be contained automatically.** There is no actuation surface —
no API to reduce authority, require step-up, or isolate a workload. The
capability is at zero, not degraded.
---
**Statute:** `canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md`.
**Owner:** gate-house. **Report a disagreement between this and the statute as a
finding.**

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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.6
type: standard
title: "NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.6"
domain: netkingdom
status: superseded
status: proposed
version: "0.6"
supersedes: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.5.md
owner: gate-house
@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ last_reviewed: "2026-08-28"
review_interval: 3m
source_revision: "gate-house@516ed4e"
standard_token: security-layer-model_v0.6
superseded_by: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
assented_by:
- "flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001"
- "kings-guard KG-DEC-2026-001"
@ -34,12 +33,6 @@ related:
# NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.6
> **Superseded 2026-08-29 by [v0.7](security-layer-model_v0.7.md).** This version
> announced a human/agent principal separation in its change log and never wrote
> it into §3.4 — a silent edit failure found by `kings-guard`. Its §6.4 also
> forbade both the fail-open stance §9.3 sanctions and the session-bound allow
> §9.7.1 permits. Do not cite §3.4 or §6.4 from this version.
## 1. Purpose
This standard states how NetKingdom's IT-security estate is layered, and what

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