diff --git a/.custodian-brief.md b/.custodian-brief.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f8c418 --- /dev/null +++ b/.custodian-brief.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ + +# Custodian Brief — net-kingdom + +**Domain:** infotech +**Last synced:** 2026-10-06 18:41 UTC +**State Hub:** http://127.0.0.1:8000 *(adjust if running on a remote machine)* + +## Active Workstreams + +### Deployment-owned registration of the secrets-engine-openbao KeyCape client +Progress: 2/3 done | workplan_id: `1de95344-8a72-5797-93e5-6c1038c03b01` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Live registration rollout under the founder's go `94cff4cd` + +### Deliver password-reset mail from platform mailbox +Progress: 2/3 done | workplan_id: `53b7c429-e780-5dfe-9ad4-88dd0490ecb8` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Complete actual reset and personal login acceptance `0dd88024` + +### Implement deterministic posture and evidence feedback +Progress: 4/5 done | workplan_id: `9d7b04f9-3803-5613-b7a5-8bd606c77f5a` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Obtain audit-core freshness adoption `7d2029d2` + *(wait: audit-core tenancy.yaml must publish structured authoritative owner, observation/expiry and replacement-action metadata for WH-ENG-20260822-AUDIT-E2-03. Re-evaluate with explicit current as-of; later recovery prose does not renew E2.)* + +### Publish the NetKingdom emission-cadence security profile +Progress: 4/5 done | workplan_id: `04685f94-1991-5e62-80d2-5669913e99fc` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Bind and hand off the published contract `e3fbc8b8` + *(wait: Approval Engine and Qonto owner declarations now pass the published schema and supplied-inventory profile; local-identity incompatibility is retained. Requires actual sender cadence mappings, lifecycle delivery/readback/reconciliation and Kings Guard operational feed evidence.)* + +### Reconcile reef placement and security-zone canon dependencies +Progress: 3/6 done | workplan_id: `965ad365-6b81-50a1-a2a3-2d0c1fcce0b4` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! T02 — Extend provider declarations to reefs `5b35b646` + *(wait: Requires repo-manager acceptance of the reef provider carrier/schema, then railiance-infra authored ceilings, conditions and evidence in the authoritative reef declaration.)* +- ! T03 — Reconcile reef ceilings mechanically `e3f0bb0f` + *(wait: Mechanical join of reef ceilings to consumer V declarations waits on T02.)* +- ! T06 — Resolve the `DataClassification` mismatch `bf8b3e1d` + *(wait: Requires InfoTechCanon ruling on public disclosure classification versus synthetic provenance, then ops-warden authoritative dataclass_floor mapping and tests; no public-to-synthetic alias.)* + +### Enterprise Federation & SAML — Expanded-Mode Keycloak Identity Broker +Progress: 1/9 done | workplan_id: `1075448f-d533-5f9e-94b7-c3adfe151a07` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Admit the database consumer `2fe6f100` + *(wait: ADR-0009 adoption trigger absent; then railiance-platform/rapp-postgres must admit the database consumer and return backup/restore evidence.)* +- ! Package the broker deployment `32d1411b` + *(wait: ADR-0009 adoption trigger and named package/runtime owner absent; requires T02 database admission and governed OpenBao/ESO role plus immutable issuer assignment.)* +- ! Integrate an upstream identity provider `6697a994` + *(wait: Named tenant/upstream IdP owner/federation need absent; requires admitted broker and owner-reviewed tenant-scoped claim mappings plus actual login evidence.)* +- ! Define federated assurance `d845380d` + *(wait: Adoption trigger absent; requires per-IdP assurance trust mapping and reviewed privileged step-up delivery from issuer/package and access-engine owners.)* +- ! Verify IAM conformance and coexistence `9cb7fd93` + *(wait: Requires admitted live broker, canonical tenant issuer selection and dedicated test-client conformance/coexistence evidence; adoption trigger absent.)* +- ! Enforce tenant and platform boundaries `38998c68` + *(wait: Requires tenant-engine tier/issuer ownership and access-engine boundary/freshness enforcement evidence after adoption trigger and broker admission.)* +- ! Prove recovery and audit delivery `e5f44ddc` + *(wait: Requires admitted database/broker, named recovery and audit owners, off-host restore and observed audit/break-glass receipts; adoption trigger absent.)* +- … and 1 more open tasks + +### Let workloads require MFA for all or part of their features +Progress: 1/2 done | workplan_id: `3f702215-704b-5788-8ca0-b8b9ba2dd3f8` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Agree the user-facing step-up and enrollment journey `4e51585d` + *(wait: Agree the MFA-required user experience with user-engine and one pilot workload; must be accepted from a user's perspective.)* + +### Cut over NetKingdom identity to railiance01 and retire CoulombCore +Progress: 7/8 done | workplan_id: `d76ddccc-00c8-548a-b141-2cd660fa38da` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! T08 - Final deletion and closure `42a3b4c0` + *(wait: Explicit approval, rollback retention window expiry and one successful railiance01 restore/restart drill before destructive CoulombCore cleanup.)* + +### Define an execution-attribution receipt for Railiance runs +Progress: 1/2 done | workplan_id: `e2533f3a-aa43-59b3-bff3-8e64b6149487` + +**Open tasks:** +- ! Agree the evidence holder and schema with audit-core and Railiance `963120c1` + *(wait: Requires audit-core/Railiance owner agreement on emitter, evidence holder and receipt fields before local schema/validator implementation; then actual emission/readback and invalid attribution/clock/unknown-case evidence.)* + +--- +## MCP Orientation (when available) + +If the state-hub MCP server is reachable, call: +`get_domain_summary("infotech")` +This provides richer cross-domain context. +If the MCP call fails, use this file as your orientation source. diff --git a/.forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml b/.forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 9ccd6e7..0000000 --- a/.forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -name: Build and Publish bounded-executor - -# Fleet image-publish pattern: build from a tarball of the pushed commit, -# never from a workstation tree. Executor tests run in identity-journeys.yaml -# on the same paths; do not pin a digest in rapp-bounded-executor if that job -# failed (NK-WP-0056-T13). Build context is the repository root. - -on: - push: - branches: [main] - paths: - - "bounded-executor/**" - - "tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py" - - "canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json" - - "sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py" - - ".forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml" - workflow_dispatch: - -env: - REGISTRY: forgejo.coulomb.social - IMAGE_NAME: coulomb/bounded-executor - DOCKER_HOST: tcp://127.0.0.1:2375 - -jobs: - build-and-push: - runs-on: container-build - steps: - - name: Build and push image - env: - REGISTRY_USER: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }} - REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }} - run: | - set -eu - REF="${GITHUB_SHA:-main}" - SHORT="${REF:0:7}" - mkdir -p buildctx "${HOME}/bin" - wget -qO /tmp/repo.tar.gz \ - "https://forgejo.coulomb.social/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/archive/${SHORT}.tar.gz" - tar xzf /tmp/repo.tar.gz -C buildctx --strip-components=1 - wget -qO- https://download.docker.com/linux/static/stable/x86_64/docker-27.3.1.tgz \ - | tar xz --strip-components=1 -C "${HOME}/bin" docker/docker - export PATH="${HOME}/bin:${PATH}" - echo "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" | docker login "${REGISTRY}" -u "${REGISTRY_USER}" --password-stdin - IMAGE="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}" - docker build -f buildctx/bounded-executor/Containerfile \ - -t "${IMAGE}:latest" -t "${IMAGE}:main-${SHORT}" \ - buildctx - docker push "${IMAGE}:latest" - docker push "${IMAGE}:main-${SHORT}" - echo "pushed ${IMAGE}:latest and ${IMAGE}:main-${SHORT}" - - - name: Report immutable digest - run: | - set -eu - export PATH="${HOME}/bin:${PATH}" - IMAGE="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}" - SHORT="${GITHUB_SHA:0:7}" - docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' "${IMAGE}:main-${SHORT}" diff --git a/.forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml b/.forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml index 228d05d..0e7a4eb 100644 --- a/.forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml +++ b/.forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Identity provider journey acceptance on: push: branches: [main] - paths: ["identity-provisioner/**", "sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/**", "bounded-executor/**", "tools/bounded-execution-admission/**", "examples/bounded-execution-admission/**", ".forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml"] + paths: ["identity-provisioner/**", ".forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml"] workflow_dispatch: jobs: provider: @@ -18,14 +18,3 @@ jobs: tar xzf identity-source.tar.gz -C identity-source --strip-components=1 cd identity-source PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=identity-provisioner python3 -m unittest discover -s identity-provisioner/tests -v - - name: Run synthetic MFA journey runner tests (NK-WP-0056-T05) - run: | - set -eu - cd identity-source/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey - PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest test_journey test_lane -v - - name: Run bounded executor tests (NK-WP-0056-T11..T13) - run: | - set -eu - cd identity-source - python3 -m pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes -r bounded-executor/requirements.txt - PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s bounded-executor/tests -v diff --git a/.generated-work-records.json b/.generated-work-records.json deleted file mode 100644 index c66fce2..0000000 --- a/.generated-work-records.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"version":1,"repo_slug":"net-kingdom"} diff --git a/.generated-work-records.mk b/.generated-work-records.mk deleted file mode 100644 index 73e2e28..0000000 --- a/.generated-work-records.mk +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -# Explicit opt-in recipe; no environment files or external make includes. -CUSTODIAN_SOURCE ?= /home/worsch/the-custodian -GENERATED_REPO_SLUG ?= net-kingdom -.PHONY: generated-work-records generated-work-records-check -generated-work-records: - python3 tools/coordination-frame/staged.py --repo . - python3 "$(CUSTODIAN_SOURCE)/scripts/generate_staged_work_records.py" --repo . --repo-slug "$(GENERATED_REPO_SLUG)" -generated-work-records-check: - python3 tools/coordination-frame/staged.py --repo . --check - python3 "$(CUSTODIAN_SOURCE)/scripts/generate_staged_work_records.py" --repo . --repo-slug "$(GENERATED_REPO_SLUG)" --check diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index d7d6c6b..9a1075d 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -189,6 +189,3 @@ cython_debug/ # Patch backups written by scripts/patch-*.py — git history is the real backup *.bak-* - -# Generated workstation orientation; keep local, regenerate from State Hub. -/.custodian-brief.md diff --git a/.sops.yaml b/.sops.yaml index 4df122b..17b644f 100644 --- a/.sops.yaml +++ b/.sops.yaml @@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ # Any file under a secrets/ directory (at any depth) is encrypted with the operator age key. # Same age keypair as railiance-infra — one key per operator across all repos. # +# Key fingerprint: age1aq8twfd78wvpra0had8cezcnj96tj4q0068edrz5jez8d6xwmflqdepsh4 # Public key stored in: keys/age.pub # -# To replace encrypted content: make sops-edit FILE=secrets/.yaml INPUT=/.yaml -# To encrypt a private untracked file: make sops-encrypt FILE=secrets/.yaml -# Attended private recovery: make sops-decrypt FILE=secrets/.yaml OUTPUT=/ -# Run through the custody unlock helper; never decrypt into a transcript. -# To rotate the data key only: make sops-rotate FILE=secrets/.yaml -# Recipient changes require a separately reviewed custody migration; rotate does not apply this config. +# To edit an encrypted file: sops secrets/ +# To encrypt a new file: sops --encrypt --in-place secrets/ +# To decrypt to stdout (inspect): sops -d secrets/ +# To add a recipient: update .sops.yaml + sops --rotate --in-place secrets/ creation_rules: - path_regex: secrets/.*$ diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index d413c94..b13f7ec 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -229,39 +229,6 @@ To create a new workplan: the session close protocol. Ask the operator only if the CLI or API is unavailable. -### Task refinement after substantial work (required) - -Established by operator instruction on 2026-10-16; decision -`d90b2f1f-cdaf-43b1-99e7-71afb43672bb`. - -At each substantive checkpoint and before session close, compare the completed -work and new knowledge with the current task structure. If substantial work was -completed while the workplan's task granularity stayed unchanged, **add completed -task records for those evidenced outcomes and refine the remaining tasks**. -A long progress note inside the same broad open task does not satisfy this rule. - -- Give each substantial completed deliverable a task with its actual outcome, - completion date, evidence and limits. Retrospective recording is allowed; do - not invent completion dates, deliveries, native acceptance or approvals. -- Split remaining work into independently manageable deliverables with an owner, - next action, completion criteria and real dependencies. Use `todo` for work - that can start; use `wait` only with a concrete prerequisite and unblock condition. -- Preserve existing task IDs, Hub UUIDs and history. When narrowing an umbrella - task, explain the split and map moved scope to the new task IDs. Do not mark - the umbrella done unless its retained scope is complete; preserve externally - referenced acceptance gates until their dependencies are satisfied. -- Keep task counts honest: extracting completed scope must not count the same - outcome twice or imply an effort-based completion percentage. Distinguish - source/fixture proof, actual operational proof and owner acceptance. -- Record new risks and out-of-scope findings as explicit disposition/handoff - tasks or linked live work records; do not silently expand authorization. - -Make these changes in the repository source, commit/push, run the repository's -required projection sync, and verify the actual projected task counts, statuses -and dependencies. Progress events supplement the task structure; they do not -replace it. A checkpoint report must show both substantive outcomes and newly -refined remaining work when this rule is triggered. - ## NetKingdom situational knowledge pilot @@ -283,20 +250,3 @@ do not silently download or execute a replacement. This pilot adds situational knowledge, not authority, live readiness or a change to this repository's owner contracts. Work: `emergent-security/EMERGENT-WP-0002`. - - -## Security quickstart for agents (Claude Code, Codex, Grok) - -1. **Find the tool:** `make security-tools` lists every security tool, the question it answers, how to run - it and whether an agent may run it (`tools/security-tools.json` is the machine-readable form). - Tool availability is not permission. -2. **Know the rules:** `SECURITY-COMPANION.md` section 7 ("If you are an agent"). -3. **Credentials:** `warden route find "" --json`. Never ask for, print or store a secret value. -4. **Accounts and accountable automation:** `canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md`, rules - SI-14 (agents) and SI-15 (prepare, admit, execute, verify, retain). -5. **Your effective authority is everything your tools can reach** (SEC-DSM DSM-AGENT-008). Live changes, - private keys and production credentials belong to the person: prepare and test on synthetic fixtures, - and give them the exact command to run. -6. **Leave a trail:** commits get assistant trailers from the hook; log State Hub progress with your agent - name and session. - diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md index cb8e80a..54657a6 100644 --- a/CLAUDE.md +++ b/CLAUDE.md @@ -32,20 +32,3 @@ do not silently download or execute a replacement. This pilot adds situational knowledge, not authority, live readiness or a change to this repository's owner contracts. Work: `emergent-security/EMERGENT-WP-0002`. - - -## Security quickstart for agents (Claude Code, Codex, Grok) - -1. **Find the tool:** `make security-tools` lists every security tool, the question it answers, how to run - it and whether an agent may run it (`tools/security-tools.json` is the machine-readable form). - Tool availability is not permission. -2. **Know the rules:** `SECURITY-COMPANION.md` section 7 ("If you are an agent"). -3. **Credentials:** `warden route find "" --json`. Never ask for, print or store a secret value. -4. **Accounts and accountable automation:** `canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md`, rules - SI-14 (agents) and SI-15 (prepare, admit, execute, verify, retain). -5. **Your effective authority is everything your tools can reach** (SEC-DSM DSM-AGENT-008). Live changes, - private keys and production credentials belong to the person: prepare and test on synthetic fixtures, - and give them the exact command to run. -6. **Leave a trail:** commits get assistant trailers from the hook; log State Hub progress with your agent - name and session. - diff --git a/CONFIG.md b/CONFIG.md index ba08777..1e0567c 100644 --- a/CONFIG.md +++ b/CONFIG.md @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ If yes to any of the above, don't add it here. | CP-NK-004 | KeyCape OIDC hostname | `kc.coulomb.social` | `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ingress.yaml`, `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml`, `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh` | | CP-NK-005 | Authelia login portal hostname | `auth.coulomb.social` | `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/ingress.yaml`, `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml` | | CP-NK-006 | LLDAP admin web UI hostname | `lldap.coulomb.social` | `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/ingress.yaml` | -| CP-NK-007 | Ecosystem coordination frame | `f = 1h` | `coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json` (owner source) | --- @@ -145,18 +144,3 @@ to the parent domain (`coulomb.social`) so the cookie is valid across both is IP-restricted by the `lldap-admin-allowlist` Traefik Middleware (VPN/office CIDRs only). The LDAP port (3890) is cluster-internal only and never exposed via Ingress. - - -## CP-NK-007 — Ecosystem coordination frame - -**Owner:** coordination-engine. **Initial setting:** `frame_seconds: 3600`. -Founder decision 2026-10-15: pace long-term coordination in hourly rather than -daily frames. This is an operator-selected pace, not a topology-derived value. -The canonical file is `coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json`; -NetKingdom keeps no independent editable copy. - -Cadence adopters derive heartbeat f, receiver wait 2f and effective deadline -3f (including Audit Core's existing 1.5 grace). Change f once, then run -`tools/coordination-frame/render.py --write` and `--check`. Generated owner -artifacts carry the source digest. Runtime owners deploy reviewed artifacts; -source regeneration is not deployment or estate-wide timer adoption. diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 7fdeab5..7af282b 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -50,42 +50,52 @@ hooks-test: ## Test that the pre-commit hook blocks plaintext secrets @rm -rf sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets/_hooktest # ── SOPS / age ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── -sops-setup: ## Validate the registered public age recipient; never install a private key - @python3 sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py setup +sops-setup: ## Legacy dev-local setup: copy age key to SOPS default path + @mkdir -p ~/.config/sops/age + @if [[ -f ~/.config/age/key.txt ]]; then \ + cp -n ~/.config/age/key.txt ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt || true; \ + chmod 600 ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt; \ + echo "✔ SOPS key ready at ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt"; \ + elif [[ -f ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt ]]; then \ + echo "✔ SOPS key already present at ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt"; \ + else \ + echo "ERROR: age key not found at ~/.config/age/key.txt"; \ + echo " Generate one with: age-keygen -o ~/.config/age/key.txt"; \ + exit 1; \ + fi -# Raw values prevent both Make-function evaluation and shell interpolation. -unexport FILE INPUT OUTPUT COMMAND OPERATOR_AGE_PUBKEY -sops-edit sops-encrypt sops-decrypt sops-rotate: export NK_SOPS_FILE := $(value FILE) -sops-edit: export NK_SOPS_INPUT := $(value INPUT) -sops-decrypt: export NK_SOPS_OUTPUT := $(value OUTPUT) +sops-edit: ## Edit an encrypted file with SOPS: make sops-edit FILE=secrets/foo.yaml + @[[ -n "$(FILE)" ]] || (echo "Usage: make sops-edit FILE=secrets/path/to/file.yaml"; exit 1) + sops $(FILE) -sops-edit: ## Replace encrypted content from private INPUT outside Git; explicit custody required - @python3 sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py edit +sops-encrypt: ## Encrypt a file in place: make sops-encrypt FILE=secrets/foo.yaml + @[[ -n "$(FILE)" ]] || (echo "Usage: make sops-encrypt FILE=secrets/path/to/file.yaml"; exit 1) + sops --encrypt --in-place $(FILE) + @echo "✔ Encrypted $(FILE)" -sops-encrypt: ## Encrypt private, untracked FILE in place with the registered public recipient - @python3 sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py encrypt +sops-decrypt: ## Decrypt a file to stdout (never writes plaintext to disk): make sops-decrypt FILE=secrets/foo.yaml + @[[ -n "$(FILE)" ]] || (echo "Usage: make sops-decrypt FILE=secrets/path/to/file.yaml"; exit 1) + sops -d $(FILE) -sops-decrypt: ## Decrypt age-only JSON/YAML to new private OUTPUT outside Git; explicit custody required - @python3 sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py decrypt +sops-rotate: ## Rotate SOPS recipients after updating .sops.yaml: make sops-rotate FILE=secrets/foo.yaml + @[[ -n "$(FILE)" ]] || (echo "Usage: make sops-rotate FILE=secrets/path/to/file.yaml"; exit 1) + sops --rotate --in-place $(FILE) + @echo "✔ Recipients rotated for $(FILE)" -sops-rotate: ## Rotate the SOPS data key; recipient changes require a separate reviewed procedure - @python3 sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py rotate - -sops-custody-check sops-custody-shell sops-custody-run: export NK_CUSTODY_RECIPIENT := $(value OPERATOR_AGE_PUBKEY) -sops-custody-run: export NK_CUSTODY_COMMAND := $(value COMMAND) - -sops-custody-check: ## Validate a custody age key without keeping it on disk +sops-custody-check: ## Validate a custody age key against keys/age.pub without keeping it on disk @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient "$$NK_CUSTODY_RECIPIENT" --check-only + --expected-recipient "$(OPERATOR_AGE_PUBKEY)" \ + --check-only sops-custody-shell: ## Open a shell with a temporary SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE from custody material @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient "$$NK_CUSTODY_RECIPIENT" + --expected-recipient "$(OPERATOR_AGE_PUBKEY)" -sops-custody-run: ## Run COMMAND inside the temporary custody handoff - @[[ -n "$$NK_CUSTODY_COMMAND" ]] || (echo "Usage: make sops-custody-run COMMAND=''"; exit 1) - @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient "$$NK_CUSTODY_RECIPIENT" -- bash -lc "$$NK_CUSTODY_COMMAND" +sops-custody-run: ## Run COMMAND with a temporary custody age key: make sops-custody-run COMMAND='make -C ../inter-hub recovery-drill' + @[[ -n "$(COMMAND)" ]] || (echo "Usage: make sops-custody-run COMMAND='make -C ../inter-hub recovery-drill'"; exit 1) + @COMMAND='$(COMMAND)' bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ + --expected-recipient "$(OPERATOR_AGE_PUBKEY)" \ + -- bash -lc "$$COMMAND" check-secrets: ## Fail if any file under secrets/ is not SOPS-encrypted @echo "Checking for unencrypted files under secrets/..." @@ -100,7 +110,7 @@ check-secrets: ## Fail if any file under secrets/ is not SOPS-encrypted done < <(git ls-files --others --cached 'secrets' 2>/dev/null | grep -v '/$$'); \ if [[ "$$bad" -ne 0 ]]; then \ echo ""; \ - echo "ERROR: Unencrypted file detected. For private untracked input: make sops-encrypt FILE=; tracked plaintext requires incident review."; \ + echo "ERROR: Unencrypted secret(s) detected. Encrypt with: sops --encrypt --in-place "; \ exit 1; \ fi; \ echo "✔ All secrets/ files appear SOPS-encrypted" @@ -113,16 +123,18 @@ creds-init: sops-setup hooks ## One-time setup: verify prerequisites, configure @command -v kubectl >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && echo "✔ kubectl found" \ || echo "WARN: kubectl not found (required for creds-apply/verify)" + @test -f ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt \ + || (echo "ERROR: age key not found — run 'make sops-setup' after placing your key at ~/.config/age/key.txt"; exit 1) @echo "" @echo "✔ creds-init complete. Next: make creds-generate" -creds-generate: ## Generate private service files for public-recipient encryption +creds-generate: ## Generate all service secrets and print KeePassXC entry guide @command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "ERROR: openssl not found"; exit 1) cd sso-mfa/bootstrap && bash gen-secrets.sh @sed -i "s|^generated_at: .*|generated_at: $$(date -Iseconds)|" sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-state.yaml @echo "" @echo "State: generated_at updated in sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-state.yaml" - @echo "Next : encrypt to the registered public recipient; never copy values into transcripts." + @echo "Next : enter values into KeePassXC, then set keepass_confirmed: true" @echo " Run 'make creds-bundle' to create an encrypted offsite backup." creds-bundle: ## Age-encrypt the ops bundle for offsite storage @@ -139,25 +151,33 @@ creds-bundle: ## Age-encrypt the ops bundle for offsite storage creds-apply: ## Apply all create-secrets.sh scripts to the cluster in dependency order bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh -creds-verify: ## Observe current Secret presence without rewriting native acceptance +creds-verify: ## Check all expected K8s secrets exist and update creds-state.yaml bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh creds-status: ## Print human-readable credential state from creds-state.yaml bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh -creds-rotate: export SECRET := $(SECRET) creds-rotate: ## Guided rotation for one secret: make creds-rotate SECRET= - @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh + @[[ -n "$(SECRET)" ]] \ + || (echo "Usage: make creds-rotate SECRET="; \ + echo ""; \ + echo "Known secrets:"; \ + echo " PI_SECRET_KEY PI_PEPPER PI_DB_PASSWORD LLDAP_JWT_SECRET"; \ + echo " LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET"; \ + echo " AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY"; \ + echo " BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD"; \ + exit 1) + SECRET=$(SECRET) bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh ## ── Agent-driven credential lifecycle (NK-WP-0005) ────────────────────────── -creds-agent-init: ## Attended bootstrap using the public recipient and encrypted recovery handoff +creds-agent-init: ## Fully automated credential bootstrap — generates, encrypts, injects, delivers emergency bundle @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh creds-agent-status: ## Show current v2 bootstrap state (agent mode) @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh --v2 -creds-emergency-reprint: ## Print the non-secret recovery guide; no keys or passwords are read +creds-emergency-reprint: ## Re-deliver emergency bundle (if lost/stolen — reprints, rotates nothing) @bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh --reprint openbao-init-unseal: ## SOPS-held OpenBao init/unseal (NET-WP-0020 T2; requires sops-held-automation model selected) @@ -197,35 +217,6 @@ posture-feedback-test: ## Run deterministic posture-feedback tests custody-record-test: ## Run custody-record schema/validator tests (NK-WP-0045-T03) python3 -m pytest tools/custody-record/tests -service-identity-test: ## Run service-identity schema/validator tests (NK-WP-0054-T03) - python3 -m pytest tools/service-identity/tests - -service-identity-check: ## Evaluate the checked-in service identity declarations (read-only, offline) - python3 tools/service-identity/validate.py tools/service-identity/declarations/*.yaml - -bounded-execution-admission-test: ## Run bounded-execution admission validator tests (NK-WP-0056-T01) - python3 -m pytest tools/bounded-execution-admission/tests - -bounded-execution-admission-check: ## Validate the example admissions (read-only, offline) - python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py validate examples/bounded-execution-admission/*.yaml - -bounded-executor-test: ## Bounded executor RBAC and declaration tests; the pilot admission inside its declared grants (NK-WP-0056-T03) - python3 -m pytest sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor bounded-executor/tests tests/test_executor_lanes.py - python3 tools/service-identity/validate.py tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml \ - --admissions examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml - -bind-split-test: ## LLDAP bind-split helper tests on a throwaway pinned LLDAP (NK-WP-0054-T05; needs docker) - uv run --with pytest --with ldap3 --with pyyaml python -m pytest sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_bind_split.py sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_identity_provisioner_reconcile.py - -rotation-lanes-test: ## Run rotation-lane register tests (NK-WP-0055-T15) - python3 -m pytest tools/rotation-lanes/tests - -rotation-lanes-check: ## Check every known credential has a rotation lane (read-only, offline) - python3 tools/rotation-lanes/check.py - -security-tools: ## List the security tools, what each answers, and whether an agent may run it - python3 tools/security_tools.py - posture-feedback-reference: ## Emit the proposal-only reference report at its fixed example time python3 tools/posture-feedback/posture_feedback.py \ --as-of 2026-08-23T12:00:00Z \ @@ -243,7 +234,7 @@ security-bootstrap-console-test: ## Run automated tests for bootstrap console UI security-bootstrap-scripts-syntax: ## Shell syntax check for bootstrap scripts bash -n sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh bash -n sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh - bash -n sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh + bash -n sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh || true # may have env assumptions @echo "✔ bootstrap scripts syntax OK" security-bootstrap-validate-keycape-client: ## Validate KeyCape OpenBao client definition+deployment (T08) @@ -306,11 +297,13 @@ security-bootstrap-lifecycle-guide: ## Print the practical T05 operator flow gui security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run-template: ## Print non-secret NET-WP-0017-T06 onboarding dry-run evidence JSON template (use to start T06 evidence after running the lifecycle flow) python3 tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py onboarding-dry-run-template -security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run: ## Retired: see docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md - @bash sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh +security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run: ## Run the T06 non-root dry-run orchestrator (see sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh and NET-WP-0019). Usage: make ... SUBJECT=foo EMAIL=foo@ex.com DISPLAY="Foo" + @cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap && \ + ./dry-run-nonroot-user.sh $(or $(SUBJECT),t06-dryrun) $(or $(EMAIL),t06-dryrun@coulomb.social) "$(or $(DISPLAY),T06 Dry Run User)" --actor user --scope none -security-bootstrap-lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users: ## Retired: see docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md - @bash sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh +security-bootstrap-lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users: ## Clean up dry-run/test users by pattern (NET-WP-0019 T04). Usage: make ... PATTERN=t06-* + @cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap && \ + ./dry-run-nonroot-user.sh --cleanup-only "$(or $(PATTERN),t06-*)" security-bootstrap-validate-custody-roster: ## Validate and verify the signed local custody roster python3 tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py \ @@ -388,14 +381,13 @@ security-bootstrap-ui: security-bootstrap-metadata-init ## Serve local custody a --host "$(SECURITY_BOOTSTRAP_HOST)" \ --port "$(SECURITY_BOOTSTRAP_PORT)" -.PHONY: runbooks-validate bind-split-test rotation-lanes-test rotation-lanes-check help hooks hooks-test sops-setup sops-edit sops-encrypt sops-decrypt sops-rotate \ +.PHONY: runbooks-validate help hooks hooks-test sops-setup sops-edit sops-encrypt sops-decrypt sops-rotate \ check-secrets creds-init creds-generate creds-bundle creds-apply creds-verify \ creds-status creds-rotate \ creds-agent-init creds-agent-status creds-emergency-reprint \ openbao-init-unseal openbao-init-unseal-dry-run \ iam-profile-conformance-test playbook-contract-test posture-feedback-test \ - custody-record-test service-identity-test service-identity-check security-tools \ - bounded-execution-admission-test bounded-execution-admission-check bounded-executor-test \ + custody-record-test \ emission-cadence-profile-test \ posture-feedback-reference security-scenario-compose-lightweight \ security-bootstrap-console-test security-bootstrap-scripts-syntax \ @@ -424,16 +416,3 @@ security-bootstrap-ui: security-bootstrap-metadata-init ## Serve local custody a security-bootstrap-metadata-init security-bootstrap-ui \ security-bootstrap-console-test security-bootstrap-scripts-syntax \ security-bootstrap-validate-keycape-client - -# CUST-WP-0079-T05: staged-source generation; hook uses the isolated recipe. -.PHONY: generated-work-records generated-work-records-check -generated-work-records: - $(MAKE) --no-print-directory -f .generated-work-records.mk generated-work-records -generated-work-records-check: - $(MAKE) --no-print-directory -f .generated-work-records.mk generated-work-records-check - -.PHONY: coordination-frame-staged coordination-frame-staged-check -coordination-frame-staged: - python3 tools/coordination-frame/staged.py --repo . -coordination-frame-staged-check: - python3 tools/coordination-frame/staged.py --repo . --check diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index ae1ab5c..5926182 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ The dynamic, self-optimizing security platform is the long-term direction in - **[SECURITY-COMPANION.md](SECURITY-COMPANION.md) — start here.** The working form of the security layer model: what to declare, what binds you, what you may never claim about evidence, and the two things the estate cannot do yet -- [Security layer model](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md) — the +- [Security layer model](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md) — the statute the companion serves (accepted 2026-08-29): how the security estate is layered (Taxonomy / Tooling / Engines / Staff) and what each layer may own - [Security scenario composition](canon/standards/security-scenario-composition_v0.1.md) diff --git a/SCOPE.md b/SCOPE.md index 5bf1f19..ab073b4 100644 --- a/SCOPE.md +++ b/SCOPE.md @@ -227,38 +227,3 @@ keywords: [meta-orchestration, railiance, responsibility, capability, trust-stat `tools/playbook-capability-contract/`, `tools/security-scenario-composer/`, `tools/tenancy-posture/`, and `tools/posture-feedback/` - Work state: `.custodian-brief.md` and `workplans/` - - -## Repository maintenance reuse - -The tracked `.generated-work-records.json` adopts the Custodian staged-source -adapter for WORK-RECORDS.md. `make generated-work-records` uses the existing -State Hub renderer through `.generated-work-records.mk`; the shared pre-commit -hook runs this isolated recipe only for opted-in repositories. The corresponding -`make generated-work-records-check` is read-only. Canonical repository identity -is explicit and does not depend on the checkout directory. - -Unstaged source changes are preserved; conflicts and unstaged generated-file -changes stop the commit. For `git commit --only`, generate first and include -WORK-RECORDS.md with the selected source paths. Existing generated-only guards -and exact-scope secret scans remain in place. This is repository maintenance, -not a runtime service, authorization decision, deployment or publication. -Other index generators and hub-derived briefs retain their owner boundaries. - -## Coordination receiver generation — 2026-10-19 - -The shared opt-in commit recipe now compiles the local proposed Approval Engine -receiver from staged NetKingdom/coordination-engine/approval-engine sources, -then renders WORK-RECORDS. Dedicated Make generation/check targets preserve -unstaged authored work and refuse receiver conflicts or alternate-index writes. -Only the local receiver is staged; sibling sources and runtime registries are -untouched. Missing owner source checkouts fail closed. Multi-owner binding -publication and actual receiver activation retain their existing owner gates. - - -## Local orientation brief - -`.custodian-brief.md` is a generated local orientation snapshot. It remains on -disk for offline use and is root-ignored rather than versioned. Regenerate it -with the State Hub brief renderer; workplans and other authored repository -records remain authoritative. Brief refreshes must not create Git commits. diff --git a/SECURITY-COMPANION.md b/SECURITY-COMPANION.md index 1d27d88..2a2240d 100644 --- a/SECURITY-COMPANION.md +++ b/SECURITY-COMPANION.md @@ -1,26 +1,23 @@ --- -id: netkingdom-security-companion-v0.3 +id: netkingdom-security-companion-v0.2 type: standard-companion -title: "NetKingdom Security — Working Companion v0.3" +title: "NetKingdom Security — Working Companion v0.2" domain: netkingdom status: accepted -version: "0.3" -companion_to: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md -derived: true -derived_from: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md -canonical_source_digest: sha256:3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b +version: "0.2" +companion_to: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md owner: gate-house publication_owner: net-kingdom created: "2026-08-29" -updated: "2026-10-11" +updated: "2026-08-29" review_interval: 3m -standard_token: security-companion_v0.3 +standard_token: security-companion_v0.2 --- # NetKingdom Security — Working Companion **Start here.** This is the operative form of -[`canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md`](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md) +[`canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md`](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md) (accepted): the same rules, without the change log or the review history. The statute governs where the two disagree. **A disagreement is a finding** — @@ -59,13 +56,6 @@ layer: Staff # Taxonomy | Tooling | Engine | Staff role: null # Engines only: PDP | PIP | Evidence | Lifecycle ``` -The four layer tokens are closed and compared without ASCII case sensitivity. -INTENT frontmatter is authoritative; a sidecar is derived, and disagreement is a -finding. Declaration keys/values must not pin a standard or companion version; -prose citations record provenance. Every checker run names the standard it -validated against and its explicit scope, including a single-repository scope. -Stance maps, claim declarations and emission guarantees are distinct records. - Working references, both offered estate-wide: `ops-warden`'s `layer.yaml`, `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py`, `tests/test_layer_conformance.py`; `kings-guard`'s adaptation of the same for a repository with no Tooling @@ -167,13 +157,6 @@ evidence. The mechanically checkable overlay is it imports the InfoTechCanon contract assigned by `GH-DEC-2026-004` and remains proposed pending owner-instance validation. -Marked sources publish an inventory per event class with the declared emission -guarantee; evidence-source markings distinguish yes, no and unassessed. Where a -load-bearing guarantee is not itself completeness, explicitly state that -completeness is not claimed. Load-bearing guarantees state controls, not their -sufficiency; neither detection nor the archive proves completeness. A failure-path release -exception is not admitted by this standard. - Otherwise evidence is **attributive**: seek atomicity, and if you trade it away deliberately, declare the trade and never describe the trail as complete. @@ -236,5 +219,5 @@ Stated so nobody plans around a capability that does not exist: --- -**Statute:** [`canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md`](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md) — accepted through memo version 2 at 2026-10-10T23:23:53Z. +**Statute:** [`canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md`](canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md) — accepted 2026-08-29. **Owner:** `gate-house`. **Guidance on getting things done:** `ops-warden`. diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md index 10b538e..dec9c6e 100644 --- a/WORK-RECORDS.md +++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md @@ -12,48 +12,36 @@ | workplan | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-14 | finished | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-14.md | | workplan | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-23 | finished | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-23.md | | workplan | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03 | finished | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-03.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-10 | finished | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-10.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11 | finished | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-16 | finished | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-16.md | | workplan | NET-WP-0020 | finished | — | workplans/NET-WP-0020-openbao-unseal-custody-and-ssh-automation.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0009 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0009-netkingdom-security-pattern-tutorials.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0011 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0011-enterprise-federation-saml.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0021 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0021-activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0022 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0022 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0023 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0024 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0025 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0026 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0027 | backlog | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0027 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0028 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0028-canon-publication-and-grouping-semantics.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0029 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0029-scope-and-intent-reconciliation.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0030 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0030-deterministic-security-scenario-composition.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0031 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0031 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0032 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0032-openbao-operator-loopback-callback.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0033 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0033-keycape-secret-exposure-rotation.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0034 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0034-verification-that-verifies.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0035 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0035 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0036 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0036-restore-user-portal-client-registration.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0037 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0037-vergabe-company-welcome.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0038 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0038-tenant-scoped-identity-lifecycle.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0039 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0039-flex-auth-access-engine-coordinate-intake.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0040 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0040 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0041 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0041-onboarding-journey-usability.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0042 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0042 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0043 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0043-cadence-assessment-and-operating-guidance.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0044 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0044-runbook-packs-for-runbook-tutorials.md | | workplan | NK-WP-0045 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0045-root-grant-custody-record.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0046 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0047 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0048 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0049 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0050 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0051 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0052 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0052-wave2-resource-right-sizing.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0053 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0054 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0055 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md | -| workplan | NK-WP-0056 | proposed | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0046 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md | +| workplan | NK-WP-0047 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md | | task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-07-02-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-02.md | | task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-07-02-T02 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-02.md | | task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-14-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-14.md | @@ -61,15 +49,6 @@ | task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-14-T03 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-14.md | | task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-23-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-23.md | | task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-03.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-10-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-10.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T03 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T04 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T05 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T06 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md | -| task | NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-16-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-16.md | | task | NET-WP-0020-T01 | done | — | workplans/NET-WP-0020-openbao-unseal-custody-and-ssh-automation.md | | task | NET-WP-0020-T02 | done | — | workplans/NET-WP-0020-openbao-unseal-custody-and-ssh-automation.md | | task | NET-WP-0020-T03 | done | — | workplans/NET-WP-0020-openbao-unseal-custody-and-ssh-automation.md | @@ -102,7 +81,7 @@ | task | NK-WP-0022-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | | task | NK-WP-0022-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | | task | NK-WP-0022-T07 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | -| task | NK-WP-0022-T08 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | +| task | NK-WP-0022-T08 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md | | task | NK-WP-0023-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md | | task | NK-WP-0023-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md | | task | NK-WP-0023-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md | @@ -123,11 +102,11 @@ | task | NK-WP-0026-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md | | task | NK-WP-0026-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0026-flex-auth-caller-identity-rollout.md | | task | NK-WP-0027-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | -| task | NK-WP-0027-T02 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | -| task | NK-WP-0027-T03 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | +| task | NK-WP-0027-T02 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | +| task | NK-WP-0027-T03 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | | task | NK-WP-0027-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | | task | NK-WP-0027-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | -| task | NK-WP-0027-T06 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | +| task | NK-WP-0027-T06 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md | | task | NK-WP-0028-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0028-canon-publication-and-grouping-semantics.md | | task | NK-WP-0028-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0028-canon-publication-and-grouping-semantics.md | | task | NK-WP-0028-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0028-canon-publication-and-grouping-semantics.md | @@ -144,7 +123,7 @@ | task | NK-WP-0031-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | | task | NK-WP-0031-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | | task | NK-WP-0031-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | -| task | NK-WP-0031-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | +| task | NK-WP-0031-T04 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | | task | NK-WP-0031-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md | | task | NK-WP-0032-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0032-openbao-operator-loopback-callback.md | | task | NK-WP-0032-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0032-openbao-operator-loopback-callback.md | @@ -164,8 +143,6 @@ | task | NK-WP-0035-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | | task | NK-WP-0035-T04 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | | task | NK-WP-0035-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | -| task | NK-WP-0035-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | -| task | NK-WP-0035-T07 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md | | task | NK-WP-0036-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0036-restore-user-portal-client-registration.md | | task | NK-WP-0036-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0036-restore-user-portal-client-registration.md | | task | NK-WP-0036-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0036-restore-user-portal-client-registration.md | @@ -186,7 +163,7 @@ | task | NK-WP-0041-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0041-onboarding-journey-usability.md | | task | NK-WP-0041-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0041-onboarding-journey-usability.md | | task | NK-WP-0042-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md | -| task | NK-WP-0042-T02 | cancel | — | workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md | +| task | NK-WP-0042-T02 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md | | task | NK-WP-0043-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0043-cadence-assessment-and-operating-guidance.md | | task | NK-WP-0043-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0043-cadence-assessment-and-operating-guidance.md | | task | NK-WP-0043-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0043-cadence-assessment-and-operating-guidance.md | @@ -205,168 +182,11 @@ | task | NK-WP-0045-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0045-root-grant-custody-record.md | | task | NK-WP-0046-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md | | task | NK-WP-0046-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md | -| task | NK-WP-0046-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md | +| task | NK-WP-0046-T03 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md | | task | NK-WP-0047-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md | | task | NK-WP-0047-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md | -| task | NK-WP-0047-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T06 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T07 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T08 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T09 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T10 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T11 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T12 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T13 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T14 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T15 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T16 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T17 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T18 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T19 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T20 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T21 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T22 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T23 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T24 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T25 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T26 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T27 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T28 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T29 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T30 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T31 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T32 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T33 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T34 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T35 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T36 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T37 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T38 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T39 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T40 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T41 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T42 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T43 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0048-T44 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T07 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T08 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T09 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T10 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T11 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T12 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T13 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T14 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T15 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T16 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T17 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T18 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T19 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T20 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T21 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T22 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T23 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T24 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T25 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T26 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T27 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T28 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T29 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T30 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T31 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T32 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T33 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T34 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T35 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T36 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T37 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T38 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T39 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T40 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T41 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T42 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T43 | cancel | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0049-T44 | cancel | — | workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md | -| task | NK-WP-0050-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md | -| task | NK-WP-0050-T02 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md | -| task | NK-WP-0050-T03 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md | -| task | NK-WP-0051-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| task | NK-WP-0051-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| task | NK-WP-0051-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| task | NK-WP-0051-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| task | NK-WP-0051-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| task | NK-WP-0051-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md | -| task | NK-WP-0052-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0052-wave2-resource-right-sizing.md | -| task | NK-WP-0053-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md | -| task | NK-WP-0053-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md | -| task | NK-WP-0053-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md | -| task | NK-WP-0053-T04 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T02 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T03 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T04 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T05 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T07 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T08 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T09 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T10 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T11 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T12 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md | -| task | NK-WP-0054-T13 | done | — | 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workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T13 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T14 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T15 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T16 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T17 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T18 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T19 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T20 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | -| task | NK-WP-0056-T21 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md | +| task | NK-WP-0047-T03 | wait | — | workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md | | intake | NK-IN-0001 | closed | blue | docs/intakes/activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md | | intake | NK-IN-0002 | closed | blue | docs/intakes/activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md | | intake | NET-IN-0001 | open | — | intakes/intakes.md | | intake | NET-IN-0002 | open | — | intakes/intakes.md | -| intake | NET-IN-0003 | open | — | intakes/intakes.md | -| intake | NET-IN-0004 | open | — | intakes/intakes.md | diff --git a/bounded-executor/Containerfile b/bounded-executor/Containerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 92528e8..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/Containerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -# Bounded executor image (NK-WP-0056-T13). Build context: the repository root. -# docker build -f bounded-executor/Containerfile . -# lldap_set_password comes from the same pinned LLDAP image production runs, so OPAQUE matches. -FROM docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d AS lldap -FROM python:3.12-slim@sha256:d764629ce0ddd8c71fd371e9901efb324a95789d2315a47db7e4d27e78f1b0e9 -RUN useradd --create-home --uid 10001 executor -WORKDIR /app -COPY --from=lldap /app/lldap_set_password /app/lldap_set_password -COPY bounded-executor/requirements.txt /app/bounded-executor/requirements.txt -RUN python -m pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes -r /app/bounded-executor/requirements.txt -# The executed files keep their repository paths: admissions pin them by path and sha256. -COPY canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json /app/canon/schemas/ -COPY tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py /app/tools/bounded-execution-admission/ -COPY sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py /app/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/ -COPY bounded-executor/executor.py bounded-executor/operations.py bounded-executor/clients.py bounded-executor/cli.py /app/bounded-executor/ -USER 10001:10001 -ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -ENTRYPOINT ["python", "/app/bounded-executor/cli.py"] diff --git a/bounded-executor/README.md b/bounded-executor/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6bad9ab..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -# Bounded executor (NK-WP-0056) - -Runs one founder-approved Bounded Execution Admission (`canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md`) -exactly once. Founder decision 6d1adce9: net-kingdom writes the executor; `rapp-bounded-executor` deploys it as one -Job per admission in `sso`. - -`executor.py` is the core runner (T11): - -- **preflight, no effect:** - - the admission is valid (BEA-1..14); - - the executed files match their pins; - - the trust states hold; - - every operation and check is known; - - the window is open and longer than the wall-time budget; - - the approval-engine approval binds this admission's digest, names this executor as actor and was approved - only by listed HUMAN approvers at aal2. The name-to-subject map is configured; no guessing. -- **consume once:** `request_digest` = admission digest, `decision_id` = run id. An unclear outcome is resolved by - reading the approval back, never by a second consume. -- **custody:** emit `execution.run.started` to audit-core. If the event can't be stored, the run stops. -- **steps:** in plan order, one consumer at a time. Checks run after every mutating step, after their settle time. - The kill switch and the budget are checked between steps. -- **failure:** - - A failed check, an exhausted budget or the kill switch reverts in reverse order. - - Each revert must pass its own checks. - - A clean revert may retry within `attempts`. - - An outcome that can't be determined stops without guessing. - - A failed revert stops and alerts. -- **receipt:** one `execution.attribution.receipt` per run, with PDP `not-evaluated` in the pilot. It never holds a - value that an operation handled. - -Operations, checks, the approval carrier, the trust oracle, the audit sink, alerts and clocks are injected. - -`operations.py` (T12) holds the pilot's real operations: - -- OpenBao KV v2 with CAS; -- LLDAP self-rotation; -- ExternalSecret force-sync and its status; -- rollout restart, where a rollout that never becomes ready is a definite failure and is reverted; -- the synthetic journey check. - -An operation signals a known-bad outcome with `definite_failure`, and the runner reverts. Any other error stops -without guessing. - -`synthetic_pilot.py` runs a rotation and a deliberate revert on the T08 stack plus OpenBao: -`uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py`. - -`cli.py --journey-only` (T10) is a read-only run with no admission. It uses the journey-read role only (CCR-2026-0059), -runs the synthetic journey once and prints its value-free receipt. Exit codes: `0` pass, `1` fail closed, `4` refused. -`synthetic_journey_only.py` proves it on the T08 stack: it passes when healthy and fails closed on a broken bind. - -`cli.py` (T13) is the Job's entry point: one admission, one approval id, a non-secret config. Exit codes: `0` -completed, `3` reverted, `4` refused before any effect, `5` stopped, unknown or failed revert, `6` consumed but not in -custody. `Containerfile` builds the image, which `.forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml` publishes by digest. - -Deployment is in `rapp-bounded-executor`, which pins the digest and renders one ConfigMap and Job per admission -(`make run`, founder-run). That package also holds the ServiceAccount and Role, copied from -`sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml`, and the executor's egress-only NetworkPolicy. The receiving side in `sso` is -`allow-bounded-executor-to-*` in `sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-sso.yaml`. - -```bash -python3 -m pytest bounded-executor/tests # or: make bounded-executor-test -``` diff --git a/bounded-executor/cli.py b/bounded-executor/cli.py deleted file mode 100644 index 8f87fb4..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/cli.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,340 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Run one admission (NK-WP-0056-T13): the entry point of the rapp-bounded-executor Job. - - python3 bounded-executor/cli.py --admission FILE --approval-id ID --config FILE [--result FILE] - -The config (JSON, non-secret) names endpoints, token files and the pilot's targets: - - executor_identity, runtime_principal, tenant, environment, approver_subjects{name: subject_id}, - trust_satisfied[...] trust states the operator attests for this run (recorded) - approval_engine{url, token_file, ca_file?} - audit_core{url, token_file, ca_file?} - openbao{addr, k8s_role, jwt_file, ca_file?} bind write role (CCR-2026-0058); jwt_file: audience-openbao token - lldap{url, ca_file?, set_password: "/app/lldap_set_password"} - kubernetes{namespace, external_secret, deployment} - bind{kv, user}, journey{kv, k8s_role, config{...}} journey read role (CCR-2026-0059): one login per lane - -Exit codes: 0 completed, 3 reverted, 4 refused before any effect, 5 stopped / unknown / revert failed / budget, -6 consumed but not in custody. The result printed is value-free. - - python3 bounded-executor/cli.py --journey-only --config FILE [--result FILE] - - python3 bounded-executor/cli.py --request --admission FILE --config FILE [--result FILE] - -Request (NK-WP-0056-T18): file the approval for one admission as the executor itself (approval-engine requires -binding.actor == the token's sub). Binding: action bounded-execution, actor = executor_identity, principal = the -first listed approver's subject, target {admission_id, admission_digest}, validity = the admission window, -human_control on, required_count = number of listed approvers. Prints the approval id; consumes nothing. -With informed_decision{url, token_file} configured (T21), the approval is then presented to the founder: one memo -through informed-decision's present_existing intake, carrying the admission YAML. Exit codes: 0 requested (and -presented, if configured), 4 refused, 7 requested but the memo was not accepted (resubmitting is idempotent). - -approval_engine.client{token_url, client_id, k8s_role, kv, host?} selects the executor's own KeyCape client -(SecurityCaseType oidc-service-client, case nk-bind-executor-approval): the client secret is read once through its -own OpenBao lane (k8s_role, field CLIENT_SECRET), that login is revoked at once, and every approval call exchanges a -fresh token for exactly its scope. approval_engine.token_file remains for fixtures. - -Journey-only (NK-WP-0056-T10): read-only, no admission. Logs in with the journey role only (journey.k8s_role, the -openbao-audience token), runs the synthetic journey once and prints its value-free receipt. No write role, no -Kubernetes or directory client, no approval or audit call. Needs only openbao{addr, jwt_file, ca_file?} and -journey{kv, k8s_role, config}. Exit codes: 0 pass, 1 journey failed (fail closed), 4 refused before the journey. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import importlib.util -import json -import pathlib -import sys - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def _load(name): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, HERE / f"{name}.py") - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - sys.modules[name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -X = _load("executor") -OPS = _load("operations") -C = _load("clients") -EXIT = {"completed": 0, "reverted": 3, "refused": 4} - - -def approval_carrier(cfg: dict, logins: list): - """The approval-engine client: the executor's own KeyCape client when configured, else a token file.""" - ae, o = cfg["approval_engine"], cfg["openbao"] - if "client" not in ae: - return C.ApprovalEngine(ae["url"], ae["token_file"], ae.get("ca_file")) - c = ae["client"] - lane = OPS.OpenBao(o["addr"], k8s_role=c["k8s_role"], jwt_file=o["jwt_file"], ca_file=o.get("ca_file")) - logins.append(lane) - data, _ = lane.read(c["kv"]) - lane.revoke_self() # one read; the role's token is not kept for the run - if set(data) != {"CLIENT_SECRET"} or not isinstance(data["CLIENT_SECRET"], str) or not data["CLIENT_SECRET"]: - raise OPS.OperationError("approval client kv shape") - secret = data["CLIENT_SECRET"] - tokens = C.KeyCapeClientCredentials(c["token_url"], c["client_id"], lambda: secret, host=c.get("host"), - ca_file=c.get("ca_file")) - return C.ApprovalEngine(ae["url"], token_provider=tokens.token, ca_file=ae.get("ca_file")) - - -def distinct_roles(cfg: dict) -> None: - roles = [cfg["openbao"].get("k8s_role"), cfg.get("journey", {}).get("k8s_role"), - cfg.get("approval_engine", {}).get("client", {}).get("k8s_role")] - roles = [r for r in roles if r] - if len(roles) != len(set(roles)): - raise ValueError("every lane must use its own OpenBao role") - - -def build(cfg: dict, logins: list): - """`logins` collects every OpenBao client as soon as it exists, so the caller revokes them all, even when a - later step of setup fails.""" - o = cfg["openbao"] - if cfg["journey"]["k8s_role"] == o["k8s_role"]: - raise ValueError("the journey read and the bind write must use separate roles") - distinct_roles(cfg) - - OPS.wait_reachable(o["addr"], ca_file=o.get("ca_file")) # new pod: NetworkPolicy may not be applied yet - - def login(role: str): - client = OPS.OpenBao(o["addr"], k8s_role=role, jwt_file=o["jwt_file"], ca_file=o.get("ca_file")) - logins.append(client) - return client - - bao = login(o["k8s_role"]) - journey_bao = login(cfg["journey"]["k8s_role"]) - directory = OPS.Directory(cfg["lldap"]["url"], [cfg["lldap"].get("set_password", "/app/lldap_set_password")], - ca_file=cfg["lldap"].get("ca_file")) - kube = OPS.Kube() - k = cfg["kubernetes"] - operations, checks = OPS.pilot_registry( - bao=bao, journey_bao=journey_bao, directory=directory, delivery=OPS.KubeDelivery(kube, k["namespace"], k["external_secret"]), - restart=OPS.KubeRestart(kube, k["namespace"], k["deployment"]), bind_kv=cfg["bind"]["kv"], - bind_user=cfg["bind"]["user"], journey_kv=cfg["journey"]["kv"], journey_config=cfg["journey"]["config"]) - trusted = set(cfg.get("trust_satisfied", [])) - - def alert(kind: str, info: dict) -> None: - print(json.dumps({"alert": kind, **info}), file=sys.stderr, flush=True) - - deps = X.Deps(carrier=approval_carrier(cfg, logins), - operations=operations, checks=checks, trust=lambda state: state in trusted, - audit=C.AuditCore(cfg["audit_core"]["url"], cfg["audit_core"]["token_file"], - cfg["audit_core"].get("ca_file")), - alert=alert) - config = X.Config(executor_identity=cfg["executor_identity"], runtime_principal=cfg["runtime_principal"], - tenant=cfg["tenant"], environment=cfg["environment"], - approver_subjects=dict(cfg["approver_subjects"])) - return config, deps - - -def request_binding(doc: dict, cfg: dict) -> tuple[dict, dict, int]: - """The approval binding for one admission. Refuses an invalid admission, another executor, an unmapped - approver or a closed window, before anything is sent.""" - report = X.bea.evaluate(doc, json.loads(X.bea.SCHEMA.read_text())) - if not report["valid"]: - raise ValueError("admission invalid") - spec = doc["spec"] - if spec["executor"]["identity"] != cfg["executor_identity"]: - raise ValueError("admission names another executor") - approvers = spec["approval"]["approvers"] - principal = cfg["approver_subjects"][approvers[0]] - closes = X.dt.datetime.fromisoformat(spec["window"]["not_after"].replace("Z", "+00:00")) - if X.dt.datetime.now(X.dt.UTC) >= closes: - raise ValueError("admission window closed") - binding = {"action": X.ACTION, "actor": cfg["executor_identity"], "principal": principal, - "purpose": f"{spec['id']}: {spec['title']}"[:200], - "target": {"admission_id": spec["id"], "admission_digest": X.bea.admission_digest(doc)}} - validity = {"not_before": spec["window"]["not_before"], "expires_at": spec["window"]["not_after"]} - return binding, validity, len(approvers) - - -MEMO_CLASS = "bounded-execution" -REVIEW_GROUP = "net-kingdom-admins" - - -def admission_memo(doc: dict, admission_text: str, binding: dict, approval: dict) -> dict: - """The informed-decision intake envelope that presents this executor-filed approval (present_existing profile, - informed-decision docs/decision-services-alignment-answer.md S1). The packet carries the admission YAML itself; - required highlights point at the scope ceiling, the window and budget, and the revert. The intent restates the - approval's binding without the actor (informed-decision takes the actor from its registry).""" - spec = doc["spec"] - approval_id = approval["id"] - memo_id = (spec["id"].lower() + "-" + approval_id.split("-")[0])[:63] - item = memo_id + "-admission" - digest = "sha256:" + X.hashlib.sha256(admission_text.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() - ceiling = "; ".join(f"{c['mode']} {c['scope']}" for c in spec["scope_ceiling"]) - budget = spec["budget"] - - def highlight(n, severity, section, note): - return {"id": f"{memo_id}-h{n}", "item_id": item, "severity": severity, "required_ack": True, - "locator": {"kind": "admission", "admission_id": spec["id"], "section": section}, "note": note} - - return { - "kind": "informed-decision.memo-intake", - "version": 1, - "idempotency_key": f"nk-bind-executor.{approval_id}", - "memo_class": MEMO_CLASS, - "review_group": REVIEW_GROUP, - "drafted_by": "net-kingdom bounded executor (service:nk-bind-executor)", - "approval_intent": {k: binding[k] for k in ("action", "principal", "purpose", "target")}, - "memo": { - "id": memo_id, - "version": 1, - "question": f"Admit {spec['id']}: {spec['title']}?"[:400], - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": (f"Bounded Execution Admission {spec['id']} (risk {spec['risk_class']}). " - f"Executor {spec['executor']['identity']} may act once, inside " - f"{spec['window']['not_before']} .. {spec['window']['not_after']}, within: {ceiling}. " - f"Budget {budget['wall_time_seconds']} s, {budget['attempts']} attempt(s). " - f"Purpose: {spec['purpose']}")[:20000], - "binding": { - "justification": None, - "principal": {"display_name": f"Named reviewer in {REVIEW_GROUP}", "id": "pending-human-session", - "identifiers": [], "kind": "person", "role": "approver"}, - "target": {"environment": "prod", "id": spec["id"], "kind": "bounded-execution-admission", - "label": spec["title"][:200], "requires_new_bind": False}, - "terms": None, - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [{"item_id": item, "label": f"Admission {spec['id']} (YAML)", "hash": digest}], - "highlights": [ - highlight(1, "critical", "scope_ceiling", - "Approving lets the executor act once, unattended, within exactly this scope ceiling: " - + ceiling), - highlight(2, "warning", "window_budget", - f"Window {spec['window']['not_before']} .. {spec['window']['not_after']}; budget " - f"{budget['wall_time_seconds']} s, {budget['attempts']} attempt(s); the executor stops " - "and reverts when a check fails or the budget is exhausted."), - highlight(3, "warning", "plan_revert", - "Each mutating step names its own checks and revert; read the plan before approving."), - ], - "locale": "en", - "approval_id": approval_id, - "approval_binding_digest": approval["binding"]["digest"], - "sealed": False, - }, - "packet": [{"item_id": item, "media_type": "text/plain", "content": admission_text}], - } - - -def run_request(admission_path: str, cfg: dict) -> tuple[dict, int]: - logins: list = [] - try: - doc = X.bea.load(pathlib.Path(admission_path)) - binding, validity, required = request_binding(doc, cfg) - distinct_roles(cfg) - OPS.wait_reachable(cfg["openbao"]["addr"], ca_file=cfg["openbao"].get("ca_file")) - created = approval_carrier(cfg, logins).create(binding, validity, required) - got = created.get("binding") or {} - if (got.get("actor") != binding["actor"] or got.get("target") != binding["target"] - or created.get("status") != "requested" or not created.get("id")): - raise ValueError("created approval does not match the request") - result = {"mode": "request", "outcome": "requested", "approval_id": created["id"], - "binding_digest": got.get("digest"), "admission_id": binding["target"]["admission_id"], - "admission_digest": binding["target"]["admission_digest"], "required_count": required, - "effects": "approval requested"} - code = 0 - if "informed_decision" in cfg: # present it to the founder (T21); the approval stays usable either way - idd = cfg["informed_decision"] - envelope = admission_memo(doc, pathlib.Path(admission_path).read_text(), binding, created) - try: - receipt = C.InformedDecision(idd["url"], idd["token_file"], idd.get("ca_file")).submit(envelope) - result.update(outcome="presented", memo_id=receipt["memo_id"], - effects="approval requested; memo submitted to informed-decision") - except Exception as error: # the approval exists; the memo can be resubmitted with the same key - result.update(outcome="requested_not_presented", memo_id=envelope["memo"]["id"], - reason="memo:" + type(error).__name__) - code = 7 - except Exception as error: # nothing was consumed; at most an unapproved request exists - result = {"mode": "request", "outcome": "refused", "reason": "request:" + type(error).__name__} - code = 4 - finally: - for client in logins: - client.revoke_self() - return result, code - - -def journey_only(cfg: dict, logins: list) -> dict: - o, j = cfg["openbao"], cfg["journey"] - OPS.wait_reachable(o["addr"], ca_file=o.get("ca_file")) # new pod: NetworkPolicy may not be applied yet - client = OPS.OpenBao(o["addr"], k8s_role=j["k8s_role"], jwt_file=o["jwt_file"], ca_file=o.get("ca_file")) - logins.append(client) - receipt = OPS.journey_from_kv(client, j["kv"], j["config"]) - return {"mode": "journey-only", "outcome": "pass" if receipt["result"] == "pass" else "fail", - "effects": False, "journey": receipt} - - -def run_journey_only(cfg: dict) -> tuple[dict, int]: - logins: list = [] - try: - result = journey_only(cfg, logins) - code = 0 if result["outcome"] == "pass" else 1 - except Exception as error: # nothing was changed: the journey only reads and signs in - result = {"mode": "journey-only", "outcome": "refused", "reason": "setup:" + type(error).__name__, - "effects": False} - code = 4 - finally: - for client in logins: - client.revoke_self() - return result, code - - -def exit_code(result: dict) -> int: - if result.get("reason") in ("receipt_not_in_custody", "audit_unavailable") and result["outcome"] != "refused": - return 6 - return EXIT.get(result["outcome"], 5) - - -def main(argv=None) -> int: - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument("--journey-only", action="store_true", help="read-only journey run, no admission (T10)") - parser.add_argument("--request", action="store_true", help="file the approval for --admission (T18)") - parser.add_argument("--admission") - parser.add_argument("--approval-id") - parser.add_argument("--config", required=True) - parser.add_argument("--result", help="also write the result here") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - if args.request: - if args.journey_only or args.approval_id or not args.admission: - parser.error("--request takes --admission and --config only") - result, code = run_request(args.admission, json.loads(pathlib.Path(args.config).read_text())) - _emit(result, args.result) - return code - if args.journey_only == bool(args.admission or args.approval_id): - parser.error("give either --journey-only, or --admission with --approval-id") - if not args.journey_only and not (args.admission and args.approval_id): - parser.error("--admission and --approval-id go together") - cfg = json.loads(pathlib.Path(args.config).read_text()) - if args.journey_only: - result, code = run_journey_only(cfg) - _emit(result, args.result) - return code - admission = X.bea.load(pathlib.Path(args.admission)) - logins: list = [] - try: - config, deps = build(cfg, logins) - result = X.Run(admission, args.approval_id, config, deps).execute() - except Exception as error: # setup failed before preflight: nothing was consumed - result = {"outcome": "refused", "reason": "setup:" + type(error).__name__, "run_id": None, "effects": False} - finally: - for client in logins: - client.revoke_self() - _emit(result, args.result) - return exit_code(result) - - -def _emit(result: dict, path: str | None) -> None: - text = json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - if path: - pathlib.Path(path).write_text(text + "\n") - print(text) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/bounded-executor/clients.py b/bounded-executor/clients.py deleted file mode 100644 index 78b7e6e..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/clients.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,179 +0,0 @@ -"""Clients for the executor's owners (NK-WP-0056-T13): approval-engine (carrier) and audit-core (sink). - -Stdlib HTTP only. Bearer tokens are read from files at call time (projected or ESO-delivered), never logged. -Errors carry status codes only, never response bodies. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import base64 -import json -import pathlib -import ssl -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request - - -class ClientError(Exception): - pass - - -class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs): # credentials never follow a redirect - return None - - -def _opener(ca_file: str | None): - context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=ca_file) if ca_file else ssl.create_default_context() - return urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), _NoRedirect(), - urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context)).open - - -class KeyCapeClientCredentials: - """client_credentials exchange at KeyCape (src/internal/server/oidc/token.go: client_secret_basic, every - requested scope must be allowed for the client). A fresh token per call and scope; nothing is cached or logged, - as secrets-engine's approval consumer does. `secret` is a callable so the value stays in its owner's frame. - - `host` sends the public Host (and X-Forwarded-*) when the token URL is the in-cluster service, the way the - synthetic journey reaches KeyCape (sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py host_map).""" - - def __init__(self, token_url: str, client_id: str, secret, *, host: str | None = None, - ca_file: str | None = None, timeout: float = 15): - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(token_url) - if parsed.scheme not in ("https", "http") or not parsed.netloc or parsed.query or parsed.fragment: - raise ClientError("token url") - if not callable(secret): - raise ClientError("secret provider") - self.token_url, self.client_id, self.secret, self.host = token_url, client_id, secret, host - self.open = _opener(ca_file) - self.timeout = timeout - - def token(self, scope: str) -> str: - if not scope or " " in scope: - raise ClientError("one scope per token") - basic = base64.b64encode((urllib.parse.quote(self.client_id, safe="") + ":" - + urllib.parse.quote(self.secret(), safe="")).encode()).decode() - headers = {"Authorization": "Basic " + basic, "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - "Accept": "application/json"} - if self.host: - headers.update({"Host": self.host, "X-Forwarded-Host": self.host, "X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"}) - body = urllib.parse.urlencode({"grant_type": "client_credentials", "scope": scope}).encode() - request = urllib.request.Request(self.token_url, method="POST", headers=headers, data=body) - try: - with self.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response: - data = json.loads(response.read(1 << 16)) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - error.close() - raise ClientError(f"token {error.code}") from None - token = data.get("access_token") - if (not isinstance(token, str) or not token or len(token) > 16384 or any(c.isspace() for c in token) - or str(data.get("token_type", "")).lower() != "bearer" - or not isinstance(data.get("expires_in"), int) or not 0 < data["expires_in"] <= 900): - raise ClientError("token response") - return token - - -class _Http: - def __init__(self, base: str, token_file: str | None = None, ca_file: str | None = None, timeout: float = 15, - token_provider=None): - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base) - if parsed.scheme not in ("https", "http") or not parsed.netloc or parsed.query or parsed.fragment: - raise ClientError("base url") - if (token_file is None) == (token_provider is None): - raise ClientError("exactly one of token_file and token_provider") - self.base = base.rstrip("/") - self.token_file = token_file - self.token_provider = token_provider - self.open = _opener(ca_file) - self.timeout = timeout - - def bearer(self, scope: str | None) -> str: - if self.token_provider is not None: - return self.token_provider(scope) - return pathlib.Path(self.token_file).read_text().strip() - - def call(self, method: str, path: str, body: dict | None = None, headers: dict | None = None, - scope: str | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict]: - head = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + self.bearer(scope), - "Accept": "application/json", **(headers or {})} - data = None - if body is not None: - head["Content-Type"] = "application/json" - data = json.dumps(body).encode() - request = urllib.request.Request(self.base + path, method=method, headers=head, data=data) - try: - with self.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response: - raw = response.read(1 << 20) - return response.status, (json.loads(raw) if raw else {}) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - error.close() - raise ClientError(f"{method} {error.code}") from None - - -class ApprovalEngine: - """POST /v1/approvals, GET /v1/approvals/{id} and POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume (approval-engine api.py). - Each call asks for exactly the scope it needs (approval:create, approval:read, approval:consume).""" - - def __init__(self, base: str, token_file: str | None = None, ca_file: str | None = None, token_provider=None): - self.http = _Http(base, token_file, ca_file, token_provider=token_provider) - - def create(self, binding: dict, validity: dict, required_count: int) -> dict: - """File the approval request as the actor itself. human_control is always on and pdp_path off (pilot).""" - status, data = self.http.call("POST", "/v1/approvals", { - "binding": binding, "validity": validity, "required_count": required_count, - "human_control": True, "pdp_path": False}, scope="approval:create") - if status != 201: - raise ClientError(f"create {status}") - return data - - @staticmethod - def _path(approval_id: str) -> str: - if not approval_id or "/" in approval_id or len(approval_id) > 128: - raise ClientError("approval id") - return "/v1/approvals/" + urllib.parse.quote(approval_id, safe="") - - def get(self, approval_id: str) -> dict: - return self.http.call("GET", self._path(approval_id), scope="approval:read")[1] - - def consume(self, approval_id: str, request_digest: str, decision_id: str) -> dict: - return self.http.call("POST", self._path(approval_id) + "/consume", - {"request_digest": request_digest, "decision_id": decision_id}, - scope="approval:consume")[1] - - -class InformedDecision: - """POST /v1/memos on informed-decision's private workload listener (informed-decision INFD-WP-0010, - present_existing). The bearer is the executor's projected ServiceAccount token, audience informed-decision-intake; - informed-decision checks it with TokenReview and joins it to service:nk-bind-executor in its registry.""" - - def __init__(self, base: str, token_file: str, ca_file: str | None = None): - self.http = _Http(base, token_file, ca_file) - - def submit(self, envelope: dict) -> dict: - status, receipt = self.http.call("POST", "/v1/memos", envelope) - memo = envelope["memo"] - if status not in (200, 201) or receipt.get("memo_id") != memo["id"] \ - or receipt.get("approval_id") != memo["approval_id"] \ - or receipt.get("approval_binding_digest") != memo["approval_binding_digest"]: - raise ClientError(f"memo receipt {status}") - return receipt - - -class AuditCore: - """POST /v1/events with Idempotency-Key = event id (audit-core docs/event-envelope.md).""" - - def __init__(self, base: str, token_file: str, ca_file: str | None = None): - self.http = _Http(base, token_file, ca_file) - - def emit(self, event: dict) -> None: - """audit-core answers 202 for a first accept and 200 for an idempotent duplicate (AUDIT-WP-0018-T02 tests). - 409 means the run id was reused with a different body: a defect, never retried.""" - try: - status, _ = self.http.call("POST", "/v1/events", event, {"Idempotency-Key": event["id"]}) - except ClientError as error: - if str(error).endswith(" 409"): - raise ClientError("audit conflict 409: run id reused with a different body") from None - raise - if status not in (200, 201, 202): - raise ClientError(f"audit {status}") diff --git a/bounded-executor/executor.py b/bounded-executor/executor.py deleted file mode 100644 index 98c749b..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/executor.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,368 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Bounded executor: core runner (NK-WP-0056-T11). - -Runs one Bounded Execution Admission (canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md) exactly once: - - preflight (no effect) the admission is valid (BEA-1..14); the executed source matches its pins; the - trust states hold; every operation and check is known; the approval carried by - approval-engine binds this admission's digest, names this executor as actor, was - approved by listed HUMAN approvers at aal2, is unconsumed, and the window is open - consume once, with request_digest = admission digest and decision_id = run id; an - unclear outcome is resolved by reading the approval back, never by consuming again - started `execution.run.started` to the audit sink; no custody, no run - steps in plan order, one consumer at a time; checks after each mutating step, after - their settle time; the kill switch and the budget are checked between steps - failure a failed check, an exhausted budget or the kill switch runs the revert steps of - the mutated steps in the admission's declared order (or stops, as it says), each - proving the restored state with its own checks; an error of unknown outcome stops - without guessing; a failed revert stops and alerts - receipt one `execution.attribution.receipt` per run (PDP `not-evaluated` in the pilot) - -Every effect goes through an injected interface: Carrier, operation and check callables, TrustOracle, -AuditSink, Alert, clocks. The runner never prints, logs or stores a value an operation handles. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import dataclasses -import datetime as dt -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import pathlib -import time -import uuid -from typing import Callable, Protocol - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = HERE.parent -_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("bea_validate", REPO / "tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py") -bea = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec) -_spec.loader.exec_module(bea) - -ACTION = "bounded-execution" -STARTED = "execution.run.started" -RECEIPT = "execution.attribution.receipt" - - -class Refused(Exception): - """Refused before any effect.""" - - -class Unknown(Exception): - """An operation's outcome is unknown: stop, do not guess, do not revert blindly.""" - - -class StepFailed(Exception): - """A definite, known-bad outcome (e.g. a rollout that never became ready): handled like a failed check. - Operations outside this module may instead set `definite_failure = True` on their exception class.""" - definite_failure = True - - -class Carrier(Protocol): - def get(self, approval_id: str) -> dict: ... - def consume(self, approval_id: str, request_digest: str, decision_id: str) -> dict: ... - - -class AuditSink(Protocol): - def emit(self, event: dict) -> None: ... - - -Operation = Callable[[dict, "Context"], None] # (step, context) -> None, raises Unknown on unclear outcome -Check = Callable[[dict, "Context"], bool] # (check, context) -> passed - - -@dataclasses.dataclass -class Config: - executor_identity: str # must equal spec.executor.identity and the approval's actor - runtime_principal: str # e.g. system:serviceaccount:sso:nk-bind-executor - tenant: str - environment: str - approver_subjects: dict[str, str] # admission approver name -> carrier subject_id (no guessing) - source_root: pathlib.Path = REPO - clock_source: str = "system-utc" - - -@dataclasses.dataclass -class Context: - """What operations and checks may see. Values they fetch stay inside them.""" - run_id: str - admission_id: str - started_monotonic: float - data: dict = dataclasses.field(default_factory=dict) # operation-private state (e.g. versions), never emitted - - -@dataclasses.dataclass -class Deps: - carrier: Carrier - operations: dict[str, Operation] - checks: dict[str, Check] - trust: Callable[[str], bool] - audit: AuditSink - alert: Callable[[str, dict], None] - should_stop: Callable[[], bool] = lambda: False - wall: Callable[[], dt.datetime] = lambda: dt.datetime.now(dt.UTC) - monotonic: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic - sleep: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep - - -def iso(t: dt.datetime) -> str: - return t.astimezone(dt.UTC).isoformat(timespec="seconds").replace("+00:00", "Z") - - -class Run: - def __init__(self, admission: dict, approval_id: str, config: Config, deps: Deps, schema: dict | None = None): - self.doc = admission - self.spec = admission.get("spec", {}) - self.approval_id = approval_id - self.cfg = config - self.d = deps - self.schema = schema or json.loads(bea.SCHEMA.read_text()) - self.run_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) - self.steps: list[dict] = [] - self.approver_subject: str | None = None - self.consumed_at: str | None = None - self.start_wall: dt.datetime | None = None - self.start_mono: float | None = None - - # ------------------------------------------------------------------ preflight (no effect) - def preflight(self) -> None: - report = bea.evaluate(self.doc, self.schema) - if not report["valid"]: - raise Refused("admission_invalid:" + ",".join(sorted({f["rule"] for f in report["findings"]}))) - spec = self.spec - if spec["executor"]["identity"] != self.cfg.executor_identity: - raise Refused("not_this_executor") - for pinned in spec["plan"]["source"]["files"]: - path = self.cfg.source_root / pinned["path"] - if not path.is_file() or hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != pinned["sha256"]: - raise Refused("source_drift") - for state in spec["trust_requires"]: - if not self.d.trust(state): - raise Refused("trust_not_satisfied:" + state) - for step in spec["plan"]["steps"] + spec["plan"].get("revert_steps", []): - if step["operation"] not in self.d.operations: - raise Refused("unknown_operation") - for check in spec["checks"]: - if check["id"] not in self.d.checks: - raise Refused("unknown_check") - self._check_window() - self._check_approval(self.d.carrier.get(self.approval_id), consumed_ok=False) - - def _check_window(self) -> None: - now = self.d.wall() - start, end = (bea.parse_time(self.spec["window"][k]) for k in ("not_before", "not_after")) - if not start <= now < end: - raise Refused("outside_window") - if now + dt.timedelta(seconds=self.spec["budget"]["wall_time_seconds"]) > end: - raise Refused("window_shorter_than_budget") # a run must not spill past its admission - - def _check_approval(self, approval: dict, consumed_ok: bool) -> None: - spec = self.spec - binding = approval.get("binding") or {} - target = binding.get("target") or {} - if (binding.get("action") != ACTION or binding.get("actor") != self.cfg.executor_identity - or target.get("admission_id") != spec["id"] - or target.get("admission_digest") != bea.admission_digest(self.doc) - or binding.get("human_control") is not True): - raise Refused("approval_binding") - status = approval.get("status") - if status != "approved" and not (consumed_ok and status == "consumed"): - raise Refused("approval_status") - if not consumed_ok and approval.get("consumption"): - raise Refused("approval_already_consumed") - allowed = {self.cfg.approver_subjects.get(name) for name in spec["approval"]["approvers"]} - {None} - entries = approval.get("entries") or [] - if not entries: - raise Refused("approval_no_entries") - for entry in entries: # aal2 is recorded, not enforced, by approval-engine today: check every entry - if (entry.get("subject_id") not in allowed or str(entry.get("principal_type", "")).lower() != "human" - or entry.get("assurance") != "aal2" or entry.get("subject_id") == self.cfg.executor_identity): - raise Refused("approval_entry") - self.approver_subject = entries[0]["subject_id"] - window_end = bea.parse_time(spec["window"]["not_after"]) - expires = (approval.get("validity") or {}).get("expires_at") - if expires and bea.parse_time(expires) < window_end: - raise Refused("approval_expires_before_window_end") - - # ------------------------------------------------------------------ consume (the one irreversible act) - def consume(self) -> None: - self._check_window() # again, right before the one irreversible act - digest = bea.admission_digest(self.doc) - try: - response = self.d.carrier.consume(self.approval_id, digest, self.run_id) - except Exception: - response = None # unclear outcome: read back, never consume twice - if response is not None: - if (response.get("status") != "consumed" or response.get("request_digest") != digest - or response.get("decision_id") != self.run_id or response.get("idempotent") is not False): - raise Refused("consume_response") - self.consumed_at = response.get("consumed_at") - approval = self.d.carrier.get(self.approval_id) - self._check_approval(approval, consumed_ok=True) - consumption = approval.get("consumption") or {} - if approval.get("status") != "consumed" or consumption.get("request_digest") != digest \ - or consumption.get("decision_id") != self.run_id: - raise Refused("consume_not_confirmed") - self.consumed_at = consumption.get("consumed_at", self.consumed_at) - - # ------------------------------------------------------------------ execution - def _budget_left(self) -> float: - return self.spec["budget"]["wall_time_seconds"] - (self.d.monotonic() - self.start_mono) - - def _record(self, step: dict, kind: str, outcome: str, checks: list[dict] | None = None, - error: BaseException | None = None) -> None: - entry = {"id": step["id"], "kind": kind, "operation": step["operation"], "target": step["target"], - "consumer": step["consumer"], "outcome": outcome, "checks": checks or []} - if error is not None: - entry["error_type"] = type(error).__name__ # the type only: messages can carry values - self.steps.append(entry) - - def _run_checks(self, ids: list[str], ctx: Context) -> tuple[bool, list[dict]]: - results = [] - for cid in ids: - check = next(c for c in self.spec["checks"] if c["id"] == cid) - settle = check.get("settle_seconds", 0) - if settle: - if self._budget_left() < settle + check["timeout_seconds"]: - results.append({"id": cid, "result": "budget"}) - return False, results - self.d.sleep(settle) - began = self.d.monotonic() - try: - passed = bool(self.d.checks[cid](check, ctx)) - except Exception: - passed = False - if self.d.monotonic() - began > check["timeout_seconds"]: - passed = False - results.append({"id": cid, "result": "pass" if passed else "fail"}) - if not passed: - return False, results - return True, results - - def _revert(self, done: list[dict], ctx: Context) -> bool: - """Undo the mutated steps. Revert steps run in the order the admission declares them (the author knows - the recovery order: data before delivery before restart), limited to those whose forward step ran. - Each must pass its own checks; an irreversible step that ran makes the revert fail.""" - mutated = [s for s in done if s["mutates"]] - if any(s.get("irreversible") for s in mutated): - return False - wanted = {s["revert"] for s in mutated} - for revert in self.spec["plan"].get("revert_steps", []): - if revert["id"] not in wanted: - continue - try: - self.d.operations[revert["operation"]](revert, ctx) - except Exception as error: - self._record(revert, "revert", "error", error=error) - return False - ok, results = self._run_checks(revert.get("checks_after", []), ctx) - self._record(revert, "revert", "done" if ok else "check_failed", results) - if not ok: - return False - return True - - def _attempt(self, ctx: Context) -> str: - """One pass over the plan. Returns completed | reverted | revert_failed | stopped | unknown | budget.""" - policy = self.spec["stop_and_revert"] - done: list[dict] = [] - for step in self.spec["plan"]["steps"]: - if self.d.should_stop() or self._budget_left() <= 0: - reason = "stopped" if self.d.should_stop() else "budget" - action = policy["on_budget_exhausted"] if reason == "budget" else "revert" - if action == "revert" and done: - return reason if self._revert(done, ctx) else "revert_failed" - return reason - try: - self.d.operations[step["operation"]](step, ctx) - except Exception as error: - if getattr(error, "definite_failure", False) and step["mutates"]: - # known-bad state: treat like a failed check, the step counts as done for the revert - done.append(step) - self._record(step, "step", "failed", error=error) - if policy["on_check_failure"] == "revert": - return "reverted" if self._revert(done, ctx) else "revert_failed" - return "stopped" - self._record(step, "step", "unknown", error=error) # outcome not established: stop - return "unknown" - done.append(step) - ok, results = self._run_checks(step.get("checks_after", []), ctx) if step["mutates"] else (True, []) - self._record(step, "step", "done" if ok else "check_failed", results) - if not ok: - if policy["on_check_failure"] == "revert": - return "reverted" if self._revert(done, ctx) else "revert_failed" - return "stopped" - return "completed" - - # ------------------------------------------------------------------ evidence - def _event(self, kind: str, body: dict, occurred_at: dt.datetime) -> dict: - """audit-core's ingest envelope (docs/event-envelope.md): all eight fields, offset-qualified time.""" - return {"id": f"run:{self.run_id}:{'started' if kind == STARTED else 'receipt'}", "type": kind, - "correlation_id": self.run_id, "subject": f"admission:{self.spec['id']}", - "source": "net-kingdom.bounded-executor", "tenant": self.cfg.tenant, - "occurred_at": occurred_at.astimezone(dt.UTC).isoformat(timespec="seconds"), "data": body} - - def _receipt(self, outcome: str, attempts: int) -> dict: - end = self.d.wall() - return self._event(RECEIPT, occurred_at=end, body={ - "run_id": self.run_id, - "initiator": {"sub": self.approver_subject, "role": "approver"}, - "executing_workload": self.cfg.executor_identity, - "runtime_principal": self.cfg.runtime_principal, - "tenant": self.cfg.tenant, "environment": self.cfg.environment, - "source_commit": self.spec["plan"]["source"]["commit"], - "artifact_digest": self.spec["plan_digest"], - "target": f"admission:{self.spec['id']}", "action": ACTION, - "decision_refs": [ - {"label": "admission", "ref": self.spec["id"]}, - {"label": "admission_digest", "ref": bea.admission_digest(self.doc)}, - {"label": "approval", "ref": self.approval_id}, - ], - "pdp": "not-evaluated", - "time_interval": {"start": iso(self.start_wall), "end": iso(end), "clock_source": self.cfg.clock_source}, - "outcome": outcome, - "reverted": any(s["kind"] == "revert" for s in self.steps), - "attempts": attempts, - "budget": {"limit": {"wall_time_seconds": self.spec["budget"]["wall_time_seconds"], - "attempts": self.spec["budget"]["attempts"]}, - "used": {"wall_time_seconds": round(self.d.monotonic() - self.start_mono, 3), - "attempts": attempts}}, - "steps": self.steps, - }) - - # ------------------------------------------------------------------ the run - def execute(self) -> dict: - try: - self.preflight() - except Refused as refusal: - return {"outcome": "refused", "reason": str(refusal), "run_id": None, "effects": False} - self.start_wall, self.start_mono = self.d.wall(), self.d.monotonic() - try: - self.consume() - except Refused as refusal: # consumed or not, nothing else may happen now - self.d.alert("consume_unconfirmed", {"admission": self.spec["id"], "run_id": self.run_id}) - return {"outcome": "refused", "reason": str(refusal), "run_id": self.run_id, "effects": "consume-only"} - try: - self.d.audit.emit(self._event(STARTED, {"run_id": self.run_id, "admission": self.spec["id"], - "approval": self.approval_id, "consumed_at": self.consumed_at, - "executing_workload": self.cfg.executor_identity}, - occurred_at=self.d.wall())) - except Exception: - self.d.alert("started_not_in_custody", {"admission": self.spec["id"], "run_id": self.run_id}) - return {"outcome": "stopped", "reason": "audit_unavailable", "run_id": self.run_id, "effects": "consume-only"} - ctx = Context(self.run_id, self.spec["id"], self.start_mono) - attempts, outcome = 0, "budget" - while attempts < self.spec["budget"]["attempts"]: - attempts += 1 - outcome = self._attempt(ctx) - if outcome != "reverted" or self._budget_left() <= 0: - break # only a clean revert may be retried, and only within budget - if outcome in ("unknown", "revert_failed"): - self.d.alert(outcome, {"admission": self.spec["id"], "run_id": self.run_id}) - receipt = self._receipt(outcome, attempts) - try: - self.d.audit.emit(receipt) - except Exception: - self.d.alert("receipt_not_in_custody", {"admission": self.spec["id"], "run_id": self.run_id}) - return {"outcome": outcome, "reason": "receipt_not_in_custody", "run_id": self.run_id, "receipt": receipt} - return {"outcome": outcome, "run_id": self.run_id, "receipt": receipt} diff --git a/bounded-executor/operations.py b/bounded-executor/operations.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2148c47..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/operations.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,395 +0,0 @@ -"""Pilot operations and checks for the bounded executor (NK-WP-0056-T12). - -The T06 pilot rotates one directory bind (svc-authelia) under one admission: - - openbao.kv.write-next-version read version N, write a fresh value as N+1 with cas=N - openbao.kv.write-previous-value-as-next-version revert: write the previous value as the next version (CAS) - lldap.user.change-own-password-from-kv set the bind's LLDAP password to the current KV value, - signing in as the bind with a value it still accepts - (self-rotation, founder decision 3d0c8f86); forward and revert - eso.force-sync ask the delivery to re-project the value (ExternalSecret) - k8s.rollout-restart restart the consumer and wait for the rollout - -Checks: kv-advanced, bind-signs-in, eso-synced, synthetic-journey. - -Values live only in Context.data (memory) and in the requests that carry them; nothing here prints, logs or -returns a value. Every adapter is stdlib HTTP so the image needs no client libraries. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import datetime as dt -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import pathlib -import secrets -import ssl -import subprocess -import time -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -from typing import Callable - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = HERE.parent -_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("journey", REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py") -journey = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec) -_spec.loader.exec_module(journey) - -FIELD = "LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD" - - -class OperationError(Exception): - """A definite failure: the operation did not take effect.""" - - -class RolloutFailed(Exception): - """The restart was issued but the consumer never became ready: a definite, known-bad outcome that the - executor reverts (executor.StepFailed semantics).""" - definite_failure = True - - -def _opener(ca_file: str | None): - context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=ca_file) if ca_file else ssl.create_default_context() - return urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context)) - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# OpenBao KV v2 -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def wait_reachable(addr: str, *, timeout: float = 30, interval: float = 1, ca_file: str | None = None, - opener=None, clock=time.monotonic, sleep=time.sleep) -> float: - """Wait until OpenBao answers on the network, before the first login. k3s applies NetworkPolicy to a new pod a - moment after it starts, and connections in that window are refused (seen live 2026-10-31: refused at 0 s, - open at 3 s). Polls the unauthenticated sys/health. Any HTTP answer, including 429/473/503, counts as reachable; - only connection errors are retried. Returns the seconds waited; raises Unreachable after `timeout`.""" - open_ = opener or _opener(ca_file).open - start = clock() - while True: - request = urllib.request.Request(addr.rstrip("/") + "/v1/sys/health", method="GET") - try: - with open_(request, timeout=5): - return clock() - start - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - error.close() - return clock() - start - except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError): - if clock() - start >= timeout: - raise Unreachable("openbao not reachable") from None - sleep(interval) - - -class Unreachable(Exception): - pass - - -class OpenBao: - def __init__(self, addr: str, *, token: str | None = None, k8s_role: str | None = None, - jwt_file: str | None = None, k8s_mount: str = "kubernetes", ca_file: str | None = None, - timeout: float = 15): - self.addr = addr.rstrip("/") - self.open = _opener(ca_file).open - self.timeout = timeout - self.token = token - self.login_args = None if token is not None else (k8s_mount, k8s_role, jwt_file) - self.renew_at = None # monotonic time after which the next call logs in again - if self.token is None: - self._login() - - RENEW_MARGIN = 120 # seconds before the lease ends - - def _login(self) -> None: - """Kubernetes-auth login. The role's tokens live 15m and a run's budget may be longer, so the client logs - in again before the lease ends (and revokes the old token). The projected JWT is re-read every time: - kubelet rotates it.""" - mount, role, jwt_file = self.login_args - jwt = pathlib.Path(jwt_file).read_text().strip() - auth = self._call("POST", f"/v1/auth/{mount}/login", {"role": role, "jwt": jwt}, auth=False)["auth"] - old, self.token = self.token, auth["client_token"] - lease = int(auth.get("lease_duration") or 0) - self.renew_at = time.monotonic() + max(lease - self.RENEW_MARGIN, lease / 2) if lease else None - if old is not None: - self._revoke(old) - - def _call(self, method: str, path: str, body: dict | None = None, auth: bool = True) -> dict: - if auth and self.login_args and self.renew_at is not None and time.monotonic() >= self.renew_at: - self._login() - headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} - if auth: - headers["X-Vault-Token"] = self.token - request = urllib.request.Request(self.addr + path, method=method, headers=headers, - data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None) - try: - with self.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response: - raw = response.read() - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - error.close() - raise OperationError(f"openbao {method} {error.code}") from None - return json.loads(raw) if raw else {} - - @staticmethod - def _api(kv_path: str) -> str: - mount, _, rest = kv_path.partition("/") - return f"/v1/{mount}/data/{rest}" - - def read(self, kv_path: str) -> tuple[dict, int]: - body = self._call("GET", self._api(kv_path))["data"] - return body["data"], int(body["metadata"]["version"]) - - def write(self, kv_path: str, data: dict, cas: int) -> int: - return int(self._call("POST", self._api(kv_path), {"options": {"cas": cas}, "data": data})["data"]["version"]) - - def revoke_self(self) -> None: - if self.token is not None: - self._revoke(self.token) - - def _revoke(self, token: str) -> None: - request = urllib.request.Request(self.addr + "/v1/auth/token/revoke-self", method="POST", data=b"{}", - headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Vault-Token": token}) - try: - with self.open(request, timeout=self.timeout): - pass - except Exception: - pass - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# LLDAP -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class Directory: - """Sign-in over LLDAP's HTTP API; password changes through the pinned image's lldap_set_password (OPAQUE).""" - - def __init__(self, base_url: str, set_password_command: list[str], *, ca_file: str | None = None, - tool_base_url: str | None = None, timeout: float = 15): - self.base = base_url.rstrip("/") - self.tool_base = (tool_base_url or base_url).rstrip("/") - self.command = set_password_command - self.open = _opener(ca_file).open - self.timeout = timeout - - def login(self, user: str, password: str) -> str | None: - request = urllib.request.Request(self.base + "/auth/simple/login", method="POST", - headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, - data=json.dumps({"username": user, "password": password}).encode()) - try: - with self.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response: - return json.load(response).get("token") - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - error.close() - return None - - def set_own_password(self, token: str, user: str, password: str) -> None: - done = subprocess.run([*self.command, "--base-url", self.tool_base, "--token", token, "--username", user], - env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin"), "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD": password}, - capture_output=True, timeout=60, check=False) - if done.returncode: - raise OperationError("lldap_set_password refused") - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Kubernetes (stdlib client, in-cluster ServiceAccount) -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class Kube: - def __init__(self, api: str = "https://kubernetes.default.svc", - token_file: str = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", - ca_file: str | None = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt", timeout: float = 15): - self.api = api.rstrip("/") - self.token_file = token_file - self.open = _opener(ca_file).open - self.timeout = timeout - - def _call(self, method: str, path: str, body: dict | None = None) -> dict: - headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + pathlib.Path(self.token_file).read_text().strip(), - "Accept": "application/json"} - data = None - if body is not None: - headers["Content-Type"] = "application/merge-patch+json" - data = json.dumps(body).encode() - request = urllib.request.Request(self.api + path, method=method, headers=headers, data=data) - try: - with self.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response: - return json.load(response) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - error.close() - raise OperationError(f"kube {method} {error.code}") from None - - def get(self, path: str) -> dict: - return self._call("GET", path) - - def patch(self, path: str, body: dict) -> dict: - return self._call("PATCH", path, body) - - -def now_utc() -> dt.datetime: - return dt.datetime.now(dt.UTC).replace(microsecond=0) - - -class KubeDelivery: - """eso.force-sync and its eso-synced check, through the ExternalSecret API (no Secret read).""" - - def __init__(self, kube: Kube, namespace: str, external_secret: str, clock: Callable[[], dt.datetime] = now_utc): - self.kube, self.clock = kube, clock - self.path = f"/apis/external-secrets.io/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/externalsecrets/{external_secret}" - - def force_sync(self) -> dt.datetime: - at = self.clock() - self.kube.patch(self.path, {"metadata": {"annotations": {"force-sync": str(int(at.timestamp()))}}}) - return at - - def synced(self, since: dt.datetime) -> bool: - status = self.kube.get(self.path).get("status", {}) - ready = any(c.get("type") == "Ready" and c.get("status") == "True" for c in status.get("conditions", [])) - refreshed = status.get("refreshTime") - return ready and bool(refreshed) and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(refreshed.replace("Z", "+00:00")) >= since - - -class KubeRestart: - """k8s.rollout-restart: patch the restartedAt annotation, then wait until the rollout is complete.""" - - def __init__(self, kube: Kube, namespace: str, deployment: str, timeout: float = 300, poll: float = 3, - clock: Callable[[], dt.datetime] = now_utc, sleep: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep, - monotonic: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic): - self.kube, self.timeout, self.poll, self.clock, self.sleep, self.monotonic = kube, timeout, poll, clock, sleep, monotonic - self.path = f"/apis/apps/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/deployments/{deployment}" - - def restart(self) -> None: - stamp = self.clock().isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z") - self.kube.patch(self.path, {"spec": {"template": {"metadata": {"annotations": { - "kubectl.kubernetes.io/restartedAt": stamp}}}}}) - deadline = self.monotonic() + self.timeout - while self.monotonic() < deadline: - d = self.kube.get(self.path) - spec, status = d.get("spec", {}), d.get("status", {}) - want = spec.get("replicas", 1) - if (status.get("observedGeneration", 0) >= d.get("metadata", {}).get("generation", 0) - and status.get("updatedReplicas") == want and status.get("availableReplicas") == want - and status.get("replicas") == want and not status.get("unavailableReplicas")): - return - self.sleep(self.poll) - raise RolloutFailed("rollout did not complete") # known-bad: the runner reverts - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# The pilot registry -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def pilot_registry(*, bao: OpenBao, journey_bao: OpenBao, directory: Directory, delivery, restart, bind_kv: str, - bind_user: str, journey_kv: str, journey_config, journey_state: dict | None = None): - """Return (operations, checks) for the bind-rotation admission. `bao` holds only the bind write role - (CCR-2026-0058); `journey_bao` only the journey read role (CCR-2026-0059): one role per lane. `delivery` has force_sync()/synced(since); - `restart` has restart(). Values stay in ctx.data. `journey_state` carries the last one-time-code time step - across runs (privacyIDEA accepts each 30 s step once).""" - shared = journey_state if journey_state is not None else {} - - def kv_target(step: dict) -> str: - target = step["target"] - if not target.startswith("openbao:") or target[len("openbao:"):] != bind_kv: - raise OperationError("target outside the configured bind") - return bind_kv - - def generate(step, ctx): - path = kv_target(step) - data, version = bao.read(path) - if set(data) != {FIELD}: - raise OperationError("kv shape") - fresh = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) - ctx.data.update(previous=data[FIELD], fresh=fresh) - ctx.data["expect"] = (bao.write(path, {FIELD: fresh}, cas=version), "fresh") - - def restore_kv(step, ctx): - path = kv_target(step) - _, version = bao.read(path) - ctx.data["expect"] = (bao.write(path, {FIELD: ctx.data["previous"]}, cas=version), "previous") - - def change_own_password(step, ctx): - if step["target"] != "lldap:" + bind_user: - raise OperationError("target outside the configured bind") - want = bao.read(bind_kv)[0][FIELD] - if directory.login(bind_user, want): - return # already in effect - for known in (ctx.data.get("previous"), ctx.data.get("fresh")): - if known and known != want: - token = directory.login(bind_user, known) - if token: - directory.set_own_password(token, bind_user, want) - if not directory.login(bind_user, want): - raise OperationError("password change not effective") - return - raise OperationError("no known value signs in as the bind") - - def force_sync(step, ctx): - ctx.data["delivered_at"] = delivery.force_sync() - - def rollout_restart(step, ctx): - restart.restart() - - def check_kv_advanced(check, ctx): - version, which = ctx.data["expect"] - data, current = bao.read(bind_kv) - return current == version and data.get(FIELD) == ctx.data[which] - - def check_bind_signs_in(check, ctx): - return directory.login(bind_user, bao.read(bind_kv)[0][FIELD]) is not None - - def check_eso_synced(check, ctx): - deadline = time.monotonic() + check["timeout_seconds"] * 0.8 - while True: - if delivery.synced(ctx.data["delivered_at"]): - return True - if time.monotonic() > deadline: - return False - time.sleep(2) - - def check_journey(check, ctx): - receipt = journey_from_kv(journey_bao, journey_kv, journey_config, shared) - ctx.data.setdefault("journeys", []).append({k: receipt.get(k) for k in ("result", "failed_step", "reason")}) - return receipt["result"] == "pass" - - operations = { - "openbao.kv.write-next-version": generate, - "openbao.kv.write-previous-value-as-next-version": restore_kv, - "lldap.user.change-own-password-from-kv": change_own_password, - "eso.force-sync": force_sync, - "k8s.rollout-restart": rollout_restart, - } - checks = {"kv-advanced": check_kv_advanced, "bind-signs-in": check_bind_signs_in, - "eso-synced": check_eso_synced, "synthetic-journey": check_journey} - return operations, checks - - -def journey_from_kv(journey_bao: OpenBao, journey_kv: str, journey_config, state: dict | None = None) -> dict: - """Read the synthetic identity through the journey role and run the journey once. Shared by the admission check - (`synthetic-journey`) and the journey-only run (NK-WP-0056-T10). The values stay in this frame; the returned - receipt is the journey runner's value-free receipt. `state` carries the last one-time-code time step, because - privacyIDEA accepts each 30 s step only once.""" - state = state if state is not None else {} - creds, _ = journey_bao.read(journey_kv) - if set(creds) != {"PASSWORD", "TOTP_SEED"}: - raise OperationError("journey kv shape") - cfg = _load_config(journey_config() if callable(journey_config) else journey_config) - last = state.get("journey_step") - receipt = journey.run_journey(cfg, creds["PASSWORD"], journey.decode_seed(creds["TOTP_SEED"]), - min_time_step=None if last is None else last + 1) - if receipt.get("otp_time_step") is not None: - state["journey_step"] = receipt["otp_time_step"] - return receipt - - -def _load_config(config: dict) -> dict: - import tempfile - fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json", prefix="journey-") - try: - with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as out: - json.dump(config, out) - return journey.load_config(path) - finally: - os.unlink(path) diff --git a/bounded-executor/requirements.in b/bounded-executor/requirements.in deleted file mode 100644 index d23db9e..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/requirements.in +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -jsonschema>=4.23,<5 -PyYAML>=6,<7 diff --git a/bounded-executor/requirements.txt b/bounded-executor/requirements.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 7600850..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/requirements.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,233 +0,0 @@ -# This file was autogenerated by uv via the following command: -# uv pip compile requirements.in --generate-hashes --python-version 3.12 --python-platform x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -o requirements.txt -attrs==26.1.0 \ - --hash=sha256:c647aa4a12dfbad9333ca4e71fe62ddc36f4e63b2d260a37a8b83d2f043ac309 \ - --hash=sha256:d03ceb89cb322a8fd706d4fb91940737b6642aa36998fe130a9bc96c985eff32 - # via - # jsonschema - # referencing -jsonschema==4.26.0 \ - --hash=sha256:0c26707e2efad8aa1bfc5b7ce170f3fccc2e4918ff85989ba9ffa9facb2be326 \ - --hash=sha256:d489f15263b8d200f8387e64b4c3a75f06629559fb73deb8fdfb525f2dab50ce - # via -r requirements.in -jsonschema-specifications==2025.9.1 \ - --hash=sha256:98802fee3a11ee76ecaca44429fda8a41bff98b00a0f2838151b113f210cc6fe \ - --hash=sha256:b540987f239e745613c7a9176f3edb72b832a4ac465cf02712288397832b5e8d - # via jsonschema -pyyaml==6.0.3 \ - --hash=sha256:00c4bdeba853cc34e7dd471f16b4114f4162dc03e6b7afcc2128711f0eca823c \ - --hash=sha256:0150219816b6a1fa26fb4699fb7daa9caf09eb1999f3b70fb6e786805e80375a \ - --hash=sha256:02893d100e99e03eda1c8fd5c441d8c60103fd175728e23e431db1b589cf5ab3 \ - --hash=sha256:02ea2dfa234451bbb8772601d7b8e426c2bfa197136796224e50e35a78777956 \ - --hash=sha256:0f29edc409a6392443abf94b9cf89ce99889a1dd5376d94316ae5145dfedd5d6 \ - --hash=sha256:10892704fc220243f5305762e276552a0395f7beb4dbf9b14ec8fd43b57f126c \ - --hash=sha256:16249ee61e95f858e83976573de0f5b2893b3677ba71c9dd36b9cf8be9ac6d65 \ - --hash=sha256:1d37d57ad971609cf3c53ba6a7e365e40660e3be0e5175fa9f2365a379d6095a \ - --hash=sha256:1ebe39cb5fc479422b83de611d14e2c0d3bb2a18bbcb01f229ab3cfbd8fee7a0 \ - --hash=sha256:214ed4befebe12df36bcc8bc2b64b396ca31be9304b8f59e25c11cf94a4c033b \ - --hash=sha256:2283a07e2c21a2aa78d9c4442724ec1eb15f5e42a723b99cb3d822d48f5f7ad1 \ - --hash=sha256:22ba7cfcad58ef3ecddc7ed1db3409af68d023b7f940da23c6c2a1890976eda6 \ - --hash=sha256:27c0abcb4a5dac13684a37f76e701e054692a9b2d3064b70f5e4eb54810553d7 \ - --hash=sha256:28c8d926f98f432f88adc23edf2e6d4921ac26fb084b028c733d01868d19007e \ - --hash=sha256:2e71d11abed7344e42a8849600193d15b6def118602c4c176f748e4583246007 \ - --hash=sha256:34d5fcd24b8445fadc33f9cf348c1047101756fd760b4dacb5c3e99755703310 \ - --hash=sha256:37503bfbfc9d2c40b344d06b2199cf0e96e97957ab1c1b546fd4f87e53e5d3e4 \ - --hash=sha256:3c5677e12444c15717b902a5798264fa7909e41153cdf9ef7ad571b704a63dd9 \ - --hash=sha256:3ff07ec89bae51176c0549bc4c63aa6202991da2d9a6129d7aef7f1407d3f295 \ - --hash=sha256:41715c910c881bc081f1e8872880d3c650acf13dfa8214bad49ed4cede7c34ea \ - --hash=sha256:418cf3f2111bc80e0933b2cd8cd04f286338bb88bdc7bc8e6dd775ebde60b5e0 \ - --hash=sha256:44edc647873928551a01e7a563d7452ccdebee747728c1080d881d68af7b997e \ - --hash=sha256:4a2e8cebe2ff6ab7d1050ecd59c25d4c8bd7e6f400f5f82b96557ac0abafd0ac \ - --hash=sha256:4ad1906908f2f5ae4e5a8ddfce73c320c2a1429ec52eafd27138b7f1cbe341c9 \ - --hash=sha256:501a031947e3a9025ed4405a168e6ef5ae3126c59f90ce0cd6f2bfc477be31b7 \ - --hash=sha256:5190d403f121660ce8d1d2c1bb2ef1bd05b5f68533fc5c2ea899bd15f4399b35 \ - --hash=sha256:5498cd1645aa724a7c71c8f378eb29ebe23da2fc0d7a08071d89469bf1d2defb \ - --hash=sha256:5cf4e27da7e3fbed4d6c3d8e797387aaad68102272f8f9752883bc32d61cb87b \ - --hash=sha256:5e0b74767e5f8c593e8c9b5912019159ed0533c70051e9cce3e8b6aa699fcd69 \ - --hash=sha256:5ed875a24292240029e4483f9d4a4b8a1ae08843b9c54f43fcc11e404532a8a5 \ - --hash=sha256:5fcd34e47f6e0b794d17de1b4ff496c00986e1c83f7ab2fb8fcfe9616ff7477b \ - --hash=sha256:5fdec68f91a0c6739b380c83b951e2c72ac0197ace422360e6d5a959d8d97b2c \ - --hash=sha256:6344df0d5755a2c9a276d4473ae6b90647e216ab4757f8426893b5dd2ac3f369 \ - --hash=sha256:64386e5e707d03a7e172c0701abfb7e10f0fb753ee1d773128192742712a98fd \ - --hash=sha256:652cb6edd41e718550aad172851962662ff2681490a8a711af6a4d288dd96824 \ - --hash=sha256:66291b10affd76d76f54fad28e22e51719ef9ba22b29e1d7d03d6777a9174198 \ - --hash=sha256:66e1674c3ef6f541c35191caae2d429b967b99e02040f5ba928632d9a7f0f065 \ - --hash=sha256:6adc77889b628398debc7b65c073bcb99c4a0237b248cacaf3fe8a557563ef6c \ - --hash=sha256:79005a0d97d5ddabfeeea4cf676af11e647e41d81c9a7722a193022accdb6b7c \ - --hash=sha256:7c6610def4f163542a622a73fb39f534f8c101d690126992300bf3207eab9764 \ - --hash=sha256:7f047e29dcae44602496db43be01ad42fc6f1cc0d8cd6c83d342306c32270196 \ - --hash=sha256:8098f252adfa6c80ab48096053f512f2321f0b998f98150cea9bd23d83e1467b \ - --hash=sha256:850774a7879607d3a6f50d36d04f00ee69e7fc816450e5f7e58d7f17f1ae5c00 \ - --hash=sha256:8d1fab6bb153a416f9aeb4b8763bc0f22a5586065f86f7664fc23339fc1c1fac \ - --hash=sha256:8da9669d359f02c0b91ccc01cac4a67f16afec0dac22c2ad09f46bee0697eba8 \ - --hash=sha256:8dc52c23056b9ddd46818a57b78404882310fb473d63f17b07d5c40421e47f8e \ - --hash=sha256:9149cad251584d5fb4981be1ecde53a1ca46c891a79788c0df828d2f166bda28 \ - --hash=sha256:93dda82c9c22deb0a405ea4dc5f2d0cda384168e466364dec6255b293923b2f3 \ - --hash=sha256:96b533f0e99f6579b3d4d4995707cf36df9100d67e0c8303a0c55b27b5f99bc5 \ - --hash=sha256:9c57bb8c96f6d1808c030b1687b9b5fb476abaa47f0db9c0101f5e9f394e97f4 \ - --hash=sha256:9c7708761fccb9397fe64bbc0395abcae8c4bf7b0eac081e12b809bf47700d0b \ - --hash=sha256:9f3bfb4965eb874431221a3ff3fdcddc7e74e3b07799e0e84ca4a0f867d449bf \ - --hash=sha256:a33284e20b78bd4a18c8c2282d549d10bc8408a2a7ff57653c0cf0b9be0afce5 \ - --hash=sha256:a80cb027f6b349846a3bf6d73b5e95e782175e52f22108cfa17876aaeff93702 \ - --hash=sha256:b30236e45cf30d2b8e7b3e85881719e98507abed1011bf463a8fa23e9c3e98a8 \ - --hash=sha256:b3bc83488de33889877a0f2543ade9f70c67d66d9ebb4ac959502e12de895788 \ - --hash=sha256:b865addae83924361678b652338317d1bd7e79b1f4596f96b96c77a5a34b34da \ - --hash=sha256:b8bb0864c5a28024fac8a632c443c87c5aa6f215c0b126c449ae1a150412f31d \ - --hash=sha256:ba1cc08a7ccde2d2ec775841541641e4548226580ab850948cbfda66a1befcdc \ - --hash=sha256:bdb2c67c6c1390b63c6ff89f210c8fd09d9a1217a465701eac7316313c915e4c \ - --hash=sha256:c1ff362665ae507275af2853520967820d9124984e0f7466736aea23d8611fba \ - --hash=sha256:c2514fceb77bc5e7a2f7adfaa1feb2fb311607c9cb518dbc378688ec73d8292f \ - --hash=sha256:c3355370a2c156cffb25e876646f149d5d68f5e0a3ce86a5084dd0b64a994917 \ - --hash=sha256:c458b6d084f9b935061bc36216e8a69a7e293a2f1e68bf956dcd9e6cbcd143f5 \ - --hash=sha256:d0eae10f8159e8fdad514efdc92d74fd8d682c933a6dd088030f3834bc8e6b26 \ - --hash=sha256:d76623373421df22fb4cf8817020cbb7ef15c725b9d5e45f17e189bfc384190f \ - --hash=sha256:ebc55a14a21cb14062aa4162f906cd962b28e2e9ea38f9b4391244cd8de4ae0b \ - --hash=sha256:eda16858a3cab07b80edaf74336ece1f986ba330fdb8ee0d6c0d68fe82bc96be \ - --hash=sha256:ee2922902c45ae8ccada2c5b501ab86c36525b883eff4255313a253a3160861c \ - --hash=sha256:efd7b85f94a6f21e4932043973a7ba2613b059c4a000551892ac9f1d11f5baf3 \ - --hash=sha256:f7057c9a337546edc7973c0d3ba84ddcdf0daa14533c2065749c9075001090e6 \ - --hash=sha256:fa160448684b4e94d80416c0fa4aac48967a969efe22931448d853ada8baf926 \ - --hash=sha256:fc09d0aa354569bc501d4e787133afc08552722d3ab34836a80547331bb5d4a0 - # via -r requirements.in -referencing==0.37.0 \ - --hash=sha256:381329a9f99628c9069361716891d34ad94af76e461dcb0335825aecc7692231 \ - --hash=sha256:44aefc3142c5b842538163acb373e24cce6632bd54bdb01b21ad5863489f50d8 - # via - # jsonschema - # jsonschema-specifications -rpds-py==2026.9.1 \ - --hash=sha256:00ba2d8c7dd4ee537978ddf4b3fbd712bef2d8751603f7f3146b3f4287768e25 \ - --hash=sha256:01445c8d194aa032a08e944f16567672da1c62dbdbefd8b6d0693032e290cf68 \ - --hash=sha256:028ad274ea951dac64491b5d1e65712a4aeabfdbdb9fccf797b57bd899b0c495 \ - --hash=sha256:0483515261947e4e8b8e1375bf7463e7eb6ccfb3d86e7b554d90cd5285f20f32 \ - --hash=sha256:068c37bba854ec2fe42f7365c640af11dd9895890ccbf2df5070d0c059bd7f96 \ - --hash=sha256:074a4d198bc34d9a8ea425114fc3ded6d11ec01f6a314a8db67454a5152d8834 \ - --hash=sha256:07deecbfce94c78473018bc7d10b337cc651d12df87a1eb2cb3e4024bc9c33d0 \ - --hash=sha256:08dae4a4095150a7c4545a1fb40b98e1ab1744fbc2770d92c977b9dadaa49ab6 \ - --hash=sha256:0da298fb372dc192610a4b9ecbc68a0cd8b675bbbd1fc519d01b41cfd658333e \ - --hash=sha256:0f045bb053c9057720d72c56dffe30dffdc05997b2897a827b9325f0ab6623fa \ - --hash=sha256:10e208f2425d973938afcd56e28a7c4be32e27b6a60b5d381f49fb9d8acf9759 \ - --hash=sha256:136a1c3fe4402b7008bc81cb62ee538481795b61a7e83df88dff3b3f02b726ff \ - --hash=sha256:159a7aab5c5e8b112c8830f54717ce56da1252ebdbb526f5be2df2309280b9e7 \ - --hash=sha256:172e47169583f46ce118cbec68e6795d0da0f4606b488b6434f8276bca0a058c \ - --hash=sha256:1c2d1f6da5128eabf34e963d7163a818846075a52568250d006c4c953b40f903 \ - --hash=sha256:1d55198263bb51f557550c6ed2e6d1cb6a6fed6eb5c9120b741c5926bef8a45d \ - --hash=sha256:1d77b649e6f7cdf12ca5c2a98dad0ad37f9ea9b6f960408a92f0cb12bb3d04d9 \ - --hash=sha256:1e8d4d79d828299bf44a55db22a9388ab967b49d17132c88eab0f4360b48da8e \ - --hash=sha256:22ffd29a63d71fb1b81552c21f2c2b734949b7ac751a9be70675a939a900839b \ - --hash=sha256:2693b2728bbcc48d09a981a356954b0c47c53ff25b545856f28a889ea619f69a \ - --hash=sha256:270bdcdaac5d5b6f73c5e22e7e135c7f2a50e789f71d9e241d5be8d90026e19a \ - --hash=sha256:2711d29b653b3bce48a63d18b9c6b53274669e6d6c4094dddeb4d9a0e45128b2 \ - --hash=sha256:2c16ab111bc27c646ba8aa005d0527754edc538ebb636f0b1bf8e244b48d1945 \ - --hash=sha256:306ee1850d8105b5baf977e78d45fcadd12c1a54678d614c9baf217708446e91 \ - --hash=sha256:3231c4c0e521dafa5be0c9f114ee2c2ad46650836f2d72caa86801950c3e7044 \ - --hash=sha256:3890a6aa36e6baa53d5258a2a25d3ef8b37ad165a6ab27a892d7c3e3a432cd69 \ - --hash=sha256:3a72c11530d71abfb66c8d7696a2f86c43e63fca8b948f1a784ac490f4ec688e \ - --hash=sha256:3b5a6f40f0a1486b4b36c888123afc67acdbd9f33235927acf5ff295429a0ba3 \ - --hash=sha256:3c91c210ae7645626c608400e3519b4a642f837cce09ca830db3beb2e9f274d4 \ - --hash=sha256:3cd182d7291d29b92c521a0069d9c01ba6193628a9a105531d11b40a6d731a33 \ - --hash=sha256:3e524c7874ac72884d28e16dd5b8d839fd09e0fe76b020d3fbca23212a7b8c52 \ - --hash=sha256:3e93b2cd69a9830be33e03945cd7cda940a0a8bfcfbff41d6144f0cb0d3d8bd9 \ - --hash=sha256:3edae8c5ddfdb6985d49ae9d150516e5076888879022f91a26c2de9276ce0bdb \ - --hash=sha256:3f0e9ac28fc067d4d34b88ae43c48e9489455c97fee9633d851f7eeed5a05d35 \ - --hash=sha256:42e75466f83cd43f6026c81eab74246efb2bdadafb307b85700632d06c68f299 \ - --hash=sha256:44b32a7c4f0da3d28af31c259e38ddcff096f855e205ed0671d02fcf44f1ea1c \ - 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--hash=sha256:fe5ad0664ec772b02c45859041aa17655709cced7a31005817fbbbd988c25567 - # via - # jsonschema - # referencing -typing-extensions==4.16.0 \ - --hash=sha256:481caa481374e813c1b176ada14e97f1f67a4539ce9cfeb3f350d78d6370c2e8 \ - --hash=sha256:dc983d19a509c94dba722ee6abd33940f7c05a89e243c47e907eb4db6f1a43e5 - # via referencing diff --git a/bounded-executor/synthetic_journey_only.py b/bounded-executor/synthetic_journey_only.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2e4aa51..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/synthetic_journey_only.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -# /// script -# dependencies = ["PyYAML>=6,<7", "jsonschema>=4,<5"] -# /// -"""Journey-only run on the T08 synthetic stack: passes when healthy, fails closed on a broken bind (NK-WP-0056-T10). - -The same code path the Job runs with `cli.py --journey-only` (`operations.journey_from_kv`). The difference is the -login: here a dev-OpenBao token that holds only the journey-read policy, instead of Kubernetes auth. Scenarios: - - healthy the journey passes - broken bind svc-authelia's password is changed in LLDAP while Authelia keeps the old one (a half-done - rotation). The journey must fail closed at authelia_first_factor. - restored the password is set back and the journey passes again - lane boundary the journey token cannot read the svc-authelia bind - -Run: uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_journey_only.py [--report FILE]. Exit 0 when every expectation is met. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import json -import pathlib -import secrets -import sys -import tempfile - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE)) -import synthetic_pilot as P # noqa: E402 (loads executor, operations and the T08 stack) - -OPS, stack_mod = P.OPS, P.stack_mod - - -def summary(receipt: dict) -> dict: - return {k: receipt.get(k) for k in ("result", "failed_step", "reason")} - - -def main(argv=None) -> int: - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument("--report") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - report = {"schema": "netkingdom.bounded-executor.synthetic-journey-only/v1", - "started_at": OPS.now_utc().isoformat(), "images": {"openbao": P.OPENBAO_IMAGE}, - "code_path": "operations.journey_from_kv (cli.py --journey-only)", "results": []} - ok = False - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="nk56-journey-only-") as tmp: - stack = stack_mod.Stack(pathlib.Path(tmp), pi_cache_timeout=120) - bao = None - secrets_in_report = [] - try: - stack.up() - bao = P.OpenBaoDev(stack.network, stack.tag) - write_token, journey_token = bao.setup(stack.pw["svc-authelia"], stack.pw[stack_mod.USER], stack.seed) - secrets_in_report = [stack.pw["svc-authelia"], stack.pw[stack_mod.USER], write_token, journey_token, bao.root] - journey_bao = OPS.OpenBao(bao.addr, token=journey_token) - state: dict = {} - - def run(): - return OPS.journey_from_kv(journey_bao, P.JOURNEY_KV, stack.journey_config(), state) - - healthy = run() - report["results"].append({"scenario": "healthy", "expected": "pass", "journey": summary(healthy), - "met": healthy["result"] == "pass"}) - - stack.set_password(stack.lldap_token(), "svc-authelia", secrets.token_urlsafe(24)) - broken = run() - report["results"].append({"scenario": "broken bind (svc-authelia)", - "expected": "fail at authelia_first_factor", "journey": summary(broken), - "met": broken["result"] == "fail" - and broken["failed_step"] == "authelia_first_factor"}) - - stack.set_password(stack.lldap_token(), "svc-authelia", stack.pw["svc-authelia"]) - restored = run() - report["results"].append({"scenario": "restored", "expected": "pass", "journey": summary(restored), - "met": restored["result"] == "pass"}) - - try: - journey_bao.read(P.BIND_KV) - denied = False - except OPS.OperationError: - denied = True - report["results"].append({"scenario": "lane boundary", "expected": "journey token cannot read the bind", - "met": denied}) - journey_bao.revoke_self() - ok = all(r["met"] for r in report["results"]) - except Exception as error: # report the type only: messages could carry context - report["error"] = type(error).__name__ - finally: - if bao: - bao.remove() - stack.down() - text = json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True) - report["no_values_in_report"] = not any(s and s in text for s in secrets_in_report) - report["all_met"] = ok and report["no_values_in_report"] - report["finished_at"] = OPS.now_utc().isoformat() - out = json.dumps(report, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - if args.report: - pathlib.Path(args.report).write_text(out + "\n") - print(out) - return 0 if report["all_met"] else 1 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py b/bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py deleted file mode 100644 index 8515d13..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,283 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -# /// script -# dependencies = ["PyYAML>=6,<7", "jsonschema>=4,<5"] -# /// -"""Synthetic pilot: the executor rotates the svc-authelia bind on the T08 stack (NK-WP-0056-T12). - -Agent-runnable, local Docker only, generated values, everything removed afterwards. Starts the T08 identity -stack (LLDAP, privacyIDEA, Authelia, KeyCape on the pinned images) and an OpenBao dev server on the platform's -pinned 2.5.4 image (KV v2 at `platform`, `cas_required` on the bind). The executor gets its own token with -exactly CCR-2026-0058's policy file plus a journey-read policy, never the root token. - -Not on this stack: approval-engine (an in-process carrier with its consume semantics stands in), audit-core -(an in-memory sink), and Kubernetes. Stand-ins replace the ExternalSecret delivery (re-project the KV value -into Authelia's configuration) and the rollout (restart the Authelia container). The real Kubernetes adapters -(operations.KubeDelivery, KubeRestart) are covered by unit tests and exercised live in T06. - -Runs: - rotation one admission, the bind rotates; afterwards the old value is refused and the journey passes - revert a second admission whose first delivery projects a wrong value while reporting success: - Authelia does not become ready after the restart (definite failure), the executor reverts in - declared order, the previous value is back and the journey passes again - -Writes a value-free report. Exit 0 when both runs end as expected. -Run: uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py [--report FILE] -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import copy -import datetime as dt -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import pathlib -import secrets -import sys -import tempfile - -import yaml - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = HERE.parent - - -def _load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - sys.modules[name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -X = _load("executor", HERE / "executor.py") -OPS = _load("operations", HERE / "operations.py") -stack_mod = _load("stack", REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py") -bea = X.bea - -OPENBAO_IMAGE = "quay.io/openbao/openbao@sha256:436eaf9778cad75507ff70ea26ace30dcbe15606e619ac3823495663d7f7c115" # 2.5.4 -BIND_KV = "platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia" -JOURNEY_KV = "platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey" -POLICY_FILE = REPO.parent / "railiance-platform/openbao/policies/net-kingdom-bind-executor-svc-authelia-write.hcl" -JOURNEY_POLICY = 'path "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey" { capabilities = ["read"] }\n' -EXECUTOR = "service:nk-bind-executor" -APPROVER_SUB = "synthetic-admin-sub" - - -class OpenBaoDev: - def __init__(self, network: str, tag: str): - self.name = f"nk56-executor-{tag}-openbao" - self.root = secrets.token_hex(16) - stack_mod.docker("run", "--detach", "--pull=never", "--name", self.name, "--network", network, - "--publish", "127.0.0.1::8200", "--cap-add", "IPC_LOCK", "--env", "BAO_DEV_ROOT_TOKEN_ID", - OPENBAO_IMAGE, "server", "-dev", "-dev-listen-address=0.0.0.0:8200", - env={"BAO_DEV_ROOT_TOKEN_ID": self.root}) - self.addr = f"http://127.0.0.1:{stack_mod.port(self.name, 8200)}" - stack_mod.wait_http(self.addr + "/v1/sys/health", "openbao") - self.admin = OPS.OpenBao(self.addr, token=self.root) - - def call(self, method, path, body=None): - return self.admin._call(method, path, body) - - def setup(self, bind_value: str, journey_password: str, seed: bytes) -> str: - self.call("POST", "/v1/sys/mounts/platform", {"type": "kv", "options": {"version": "2"}}) - self.admin.write(BIND_KV, {OPS.FIELD: bind_value}, cas=0) - self.call("POST", "/v1/platform/metadata/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia", {"cas_required": True}) - self.admin.write(JOURNEY_KV, {"PASSWORD": journey_password, - "TOTP_SEED": base64.b32encode(seed).decode()}, cas=0) - self.call("PUT", "/v1/sys/policies/acl/bind-executor-write", {"policy": POLICY_FILE.read_text()}) - self.call("PUT", "/v1/sys/policies/acl/journey-read", {"policy": JOURNEY_POLICY}) - tokens = [] - for policy in ("bind-executor-write", "journey-read"): # one token per lane, as the live roles - tokens.append(self.call("POST", "/v1/auth/token/create", {"policies": [policy], "no_default_policy": True, - "ttl": "15m"})["auth"]["client_token"]) - return tuple(tokens) - - def remove(self): - stack_mod.docker("rm", "--force", self.name, check=False) - - -class Delivery: - """Stand-in for the ExternalSecret: projects the KV value into Authelia's configuration file.""" - - def __init__(self, stack, bao_admin): - self.stack, self.bao, self.corrupt = stack, bao_admin, 0 # number of next deliveries to corrupt - - def force_sync(self) -> dt.datetime: - at = OPS.now_utc() - value = self.bao.read(BIND_KV)[0][OPS.FIELD] - if self.corrupt: - self.corrupt -= 1 - value = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) # a one-off wrong projection that still reports success - path = self.stack.workdir / "authelia.yml" - config = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - config["authentication_backend"]["ldap"]["password"] = value - path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(config)) # same inode: the bind mount sees it - self.synced_at = OPS.now_utc() - return at - - def synced(self, since: dt.datetime) -> bool: - return getattr(self, "synced_at", None) is not None and self.synced_at >= since - - -class Restart: - """Stand-in for the rollout: restart the Authelia container and wait for it to answer.""" - - def __init__(self, stack): - self.stack = stack - - def restart(self): - stack_mod.docker("restart", self.stack.names["authelia"]) - # docker assigns a new ephemeral host port on restart (an artifact of this stand-in) - self.stack.ports["authelia"] = stack_mod.port(self.stack.names["authelia"], 9091) - try: - stack_mod.wait_http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.stack.ports['authelia']}/api/health", "authelia", - {"Host": "auth.journey.test", "X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"}, attempts=60) - except stack_mod.SetupError: - raise OPS.RolloutFailed("authelia did not become ready") from None - - -class MemoryCarrier: - """approval-engine's approval object and consume semantics, in memory.""" - - def __init__(self): - self.approvals = {} - - def approve(self, approval_id, admission): - spec = admission["spec"] - self.approvals[approval_id] = { - "id": approval_id, "status": "approved", - "binding": {"action": "bounded-execution", "actor": EXECUTOR, "principal": "admin", "purpose": spec["purpose"], - "target": {"admission_id": spec["id"], "admission_digest": bea.admission_digest(admission)}, - "human_control": True, "pdp_path": False}, - "validity": {"not_before": spec["window"]["not_before"], "expires_at": spec["window"]["not_after"]}, - "entries": [{"subject_id": APPROVER_SUB, "assurance": "aal2", "principal_type": "human", - "approved_at": OPS.now_utc().isoformat()}]} - - def get(self, approval_id): - return copy.deepcopy(self.approvals[approval_id]) - - def consume(self, approval_id, request_digest, decision_id): - a = self.approvals[approval_id] - if a["status"] != "approved": - raise RuntimeError("409") - a["status"] = "consumed" - a["consumption"] = {"request_digest": request_digest, "decision_id": decision_id, - "consumed_at": OPS.now_utc().isoformat()} - return {"approval_id": approval_id, "status": "consumed", "request_digest": request_digest, - "decision_id": decision_id, "consumed_at": a["consumption"]["consumed_at"], "idempotent": False} - - -def admission(admission_id: str, attempts: int) -> dict: - """The pilot example, pinned to the current files, with a window around now.""" - doc = bea.load(REPO / "examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml") - spec = doc["spec"] - spec["id"] = admission_id - now = dt.datetime.now(dt.UTC).replace(microsecond=0) - spec["window"] = {"not_before": (now - dt.timedelta(minutes=5)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"), - "not_after": (now + dt.timedelta(hours=2)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")} - spec["budget"]["attempts"] = attempts - files = [] - for f in spec["plan"]["source"]["files"]: - files.append({"path": f["path"], "sha256": hashlib.sha256((REPO / f["path"]).read_bytes()).hexdigest()}) - spec["plan"]["source"]["files"] = files - pins = {f["path"]: f["sha256"] for f in files} - for c in spec["checks"]: - c["sha256"] = pins[c["ref"]] - spec["plan_digest"] = bea.plan_digest(doc) - report = bea.evaluate(doc, json.loads(bea.SCHEMA.read_text())) - if not report["valid"]: - raise SystemExit(f"synthetic admission invalid: {report['findings']}") - return doc - - -def lldap_command(): - return ["docker", "run", "--rm", "--pull=never", "--network", "host", "--env", "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD", - "--entrypoint", "/app/lldap_set_password", stack_mod.LLDAP_IMAGE] - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument("--report") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - report = {"schema": "netkingdom.bounded-executor.synthetic-pilot/v1", - "started_at": OPS.now_utc().isoformat(), "images": {"openbao": OPENBAO_IMAGE}, - "policy_file_sha256": hashlib.sha256(POLICY_FILE.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), "runs": []} - ok = False - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="nk56-executor-") as tmp: - stack = stack_mod.Stack(pathlib.Path(tmp), pi_cache_timeout=120) - bao = None - try: - stack.up() - bao = OpenBaoDev(stack.network, stack.tag) - executor_token, journey_token = bao.setup(stack.pw["svc-authelia"], stack.pw[stack_mod.USER], stack.seed) - executor_bao = OPS.OpenBao(bao.addr, token=executor_token) - journey_bao = OPS.OpenBao(bao.addr, token=journey_token) - directory = OPS.Directory(stack.lldap, lldap_command()) - delivery = Delivery(stack, bao.admin) - journey_state = {} - operations, checks = OPS.pilot_registry( - bao=executor_bao, journey_bao=journey_bao, directory=directory, delivery=delivery, restart=Restart(stack), - bind_kv=BIND_KV, bind_user="svc-authelia", journey_kv=JOURNEY_KV, - journey_config=stack.journey_config, journey_state=journey_state) - carrier, events, alerts = MemoryCarrier(), [], [] - audit = type("Sink", (), {"emit": lambda _s, e: events.append(e)})() - cfg = X.Config(executor_identity=EXECUTOR, runtime_principal="synthetic:executor-token", - tenant="tenant:platform", environment="TEST", approver_subjects={"admin": APPROVER_SUB}) - deps = X.Deps(carrier=carrier, operations=operations, checks=checks, trust=lambda s: True, - audit=audit, alert=lambda kind, info: alerts.append(kind)) - - def run(admission_id, attempts, corrupt): - doc = admission(admission_id, attempts) - approval = "apr-" + admission_id - carrier.approve(approval, doc) - before_value, before_version = bao.admin.read(BIND_KV) - delivery.corrupt = 1 if corrupt else 0 - result = X.Run(doc, approval, cfg, deps).execute() - delivery.corrupt = 0 - after_value, after_version = bao.admin.read(BIND_KV) - changed = after_value != before_value - old_refused = directory.login("svc-authelia", before_value[OPS.FIELD]) is None - new_works = directory.login("svc-authelia", after_value[OPS.FIELD]) is not None - receipt = result.get("receipt", {}).get("data", {}) - return {"admission": admission_id, "outcome": result["outcome"], "reason": result.get("reason"), - "kv_version": [before_version, after_version], "kv_value_changed": changed, - "previous_value_refused_by_lldap": old_refused, "current_kv_value_signs_in": new_works, - "steps": [(s["id"], s["kind"], s["outcome"], [c["result"] for c in s.get("checks", [])], - s.get("error_type")) - for s in receipt.get("steps", [])], - "reverted": receipt.get("reverted"), "pdp": receipt.get("pdp"), - "events": [e["type"] for e in events if e["correlation_id"] == result.get("run_id")]} - - rotation = run("BEA-2026-9001", 1, corrupt=False) - rotation["met"] = (rotation["outcome"] == "completed" and rotation["kv_value_changed"] - and rotation["previous_value_refused_by_lldap"] and rotation["current_kv_value_signs_in"]) - report["runs"].append(rotation) - revert = run("BEA-2026-9002", 1, corrupt=True) - revert["met"] = (revert["outcome"] == "reverted" and not revert["kv_value_changed"] - and revert["current_kv_value_signs_in"] - and any(s[0] == "restart" and s[2] in ("check_failed", "failed") for s in revert["steps"]) - and all(s[2] == "done" for s in revert["steps"] if s[1] == "revert")) - report["runs"].append(revert) - report["alerts"] = alerts - secrets_in_report = [stack.pw["svc-authelia"], executor_token, journey_token, bao.root] - text = json.dumps(report) - report["no_values_in_report"] = not any(v in text for v in secrets_in_report) - ok = rotation["met"] and revert["met"] and report["no_values_in_report"] - finally: - if bao: - bao.remove() - stack.down() - report["all_met"] = ok - report["finished_at"] = OPS.now_utc().isoformat() - text = json.dumps(report, indent=2, default=str) - if args.report: - pathlib.Path(args.report).write_text(text + "\n") - print(text) - return 0 if ok else 1 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/bounded-executor/tests/test_approval_request.py b/bounded-executor/tests/test_approval_request.py deleted file mode 100644 index 060073c..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/tests/test_approval_request.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,322 +0,0 @@ -"""The executor's own approval client and request phase (NK-WP-0056-T18). One fake server plays OpenBao, KeyCape and -approval-engine; no live service.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import base64 -import contextlib -import copy -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import pathlib -import sys -import tempfile -import threading -import unittest -import urllib.parse -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer - -import yaml - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, HERE.parent / f"{name}.py") - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - sys.modules[name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -CLI = load("cli") -C, OPS, X = CLI.C, CLI.OPS, CLI.X -ADMISSION = X.REPO / "examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml" -SECRET = "synthetic-client-secret/with:specials" -CLIENT_KV = "platform/workloads/keycape/nk-bind-executor-approval" -APPROVAL_ROLE = "keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-bounded-executor-workload-kv-read" - - -class World: - def __init__(self): - self.requests = [] # (method, path, headers, body) - self.revoked = [] - self.token_status = 200 - self.token_body = None - self.create_status = 201 - self.create_override = {} - self.kv = {"CLIENT_SECRET": SECRET} - self.memos = [] - self.memo_status = 201 - - -def serve(w: World): - class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def _send(self, code, body, headers=None): - raw = json.dumps(body).encode() - self.send_response(code) - for k, v in (headers or {}).items(): - self.send_header(k, v) - self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") - self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw))) - self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(raw) - - def _body(self): - return self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)) - - def do_GET(self): - w.requests.append(("GET", self.path, dict(self.headers), None)) - if self.path == "/v1/sys/health": - return self._send(200, {"initialized": True}) - if self.path == "/v1/platform/data/workloads/keycape/nk-bind-executor-approval": - return self._send(200, {"data": {"data": w.kv, "metadata": {"version": 1}}}) - self._send(404, {}) - - def do_POST(self): - raw = self._body() - w.requests.append(("POST", self.path, dict(self.headers), raw)) - if self.path == "/v1/auth/kubernetes/login": - role = json.loads(raw)["role"] - return self._send(200, {"auth": {"client_token": f"tok-{role}", "lease_duration": 900}}) - if self.path == "/v1/auth/token/revoke-self": - w.revoked.append(self.headers.get("X-Vault-Token")) - return self._send(204, {}) - if self.path == "/token": - if w.token_status == 302: - return self._send(302, {}, {"Location": "http://elsewhere.invalid/token"}) - if w.token_status != 200: - return self._send(w.token_status, {"error": "invalid_scope"}) - scope = urllib.parse.parse_qs(raw.decode())["scope"][0] - return self._send(200, w.token_body or {"access_token": "at-" + scope.replace(":", "-"), - "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_in": 900}) - if self.path == "/v1/memos": - env = json.loads(raw) - w.memos.append((dict(self.headers), env)) - if w.memo_status != 201: - return self._send(w.memo_status, {"error": "approval_not_requested"}) - m = env["memo"] - return self._send(201, {"memo_id": m["id"], "approval_id": m["approval_id"], - "approval_binding_digest": m["approval_binding_digest"]}) - if self.path == "/v1/approvals": - body = json.loads(raw) - created = {"id": "apr-1", "status": "requested", - "binding": {**body["binding"], "digest": "sha256:" + "ab" * 32, "human_control": True}, - "validity": body["validity"], **w.create_override} - return self._send(w.create_status, created) - self._send(404, {}) - - def log_message(self, *a): - return - - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), H) - threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, kwargs={"poll_interval": 0.02}, daemon=True).start() - return server - - -class Base(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.w = World() - self.server = serve(self.w) - self.addCleanup(self.server.shutdown) - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - self.root = pathlib.Path(tmp.name) - (self.root / "jwt").write_text("synthetic-openbao-audience-jwt\n") - self.addr = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.server.server_port}" - - def cfg(self, **approval_client): - return { - "executor_identity": "service:nk-bind-executor", - "approver_subjects": {"admin": "uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local"}, - "openbao": {"addr": self.addr, "k8s_role": "net-kingdom-bind-executor-svc-authelia-write", - "jwt_file": str(self.root / "jwt")}, - "journey": {"kv": "x", "k8s_role": "net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read", "config": {}}, - "approval_engine": {"url": self.addr, "client": { - "token_url": self.addr + "/token", "client_id": "nk-bind-executor-approval", - "k8s_role": APPROVAL_ROLE, "kv": CLIENT_KV, "host": "kc.coulomb.social", **approval_client}}, - } - - def calls(self, path): - return [r for r in self.w.requests if r[1] == path] - - -class KeyCapeExchange(Base): - def client(self): - return C.KeyCapeClientCredentials(self.addr + "/token", "nk-bind-executor-approval", lambda: SECRET, - host="kc.coulomb.social") - - def test_client_secret_basic_one_scope_public_host(self): - self.assertEqual(self.client().token("approval:create"), "at-approval-create") - _, _, headers, raw = self.calls("/token")[0] - user, _, password = base64.b64decode(headers["Authorization"].split()[1]).decode().partition(":") - self.assertEqual((urllib.parse.unquote(user), urllib.parse.unquote(password)), - ("nk-bind-executor-approval", SECRET)) - self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.parse_qs(raw.decode()), - {"grant_type": ["client_credentials"], "scope": ["approval:create"]}) - self.assertEqual((headers["Host"], headers["X-Forwarded-Proto"]), ("kc.coulomb.social", "https")) - - def test_refusals(self): - with self.assertRaises(C.ClientError): - self.client().token("approval:read approval:create") # one scope per token - self.w.token_status = 400 - with self.assertRaisesRegex(C.ClientError, "token 400"): - self.client().token("approval:read") - self.w.token_status = 302 # credentials never follow a redirect - with self.assertRaises(C.ClientError): - self.client().token("approval:read") - self.w.token_status = 200 - for body in ({"access_token": "a", "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_in": 3600}, - {"access_token": "a", "token_type": "mac", "expires_in": 900}, - {"access_token": "a b", "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_in": 900}): - self.w.token_body = body - with self.subTest(body=body), self.assertRaisesRegex(C.ClientError, "token response"): - self.client().token("approval:read") - - -class ScopesPerCall(Base): - def test_each_approval_call_asks_for_exactly_its_scope(self): - seen = [] - ae = C.ApprovalEngine(self.addr, token_provider=lambda scope: seen.append(scope) or "t") - ae.create({"action": "a"}, {}, 1) - with contextlib.suppress(C.ClientError): - ae.get("apr-1") - with contextlib.suppress(C.ClientError): - ae.consume("apr-1", "sha256:" + "0" * 64, "run-1") - self.assertEqual(seen, ["approval:create", "approval:read", "approval:consume"]) - body = json.loads(self.calls("/v1/approvals")[0][3]) - self.assertEqual((body["human_control"], body["pdp_path"], body["required_count"]), (True, False, 1)) - - def test_exactly_one_token_source(self): - with self.assertRaises(C.ClientError): - C.ApprovalEngine(self.addr) - with self.assertRaises(C.ClientError): - C.ApprovalEngine(self.addr, token_file="/x", token_provider=lambda s: "t") - - -INFD = pathlib.Path("/home/worsch/informed-decision") - - -class PresentToFounder(Base): - """T21: after creating the approval the executor presents it through informed-decision (present_existing).""" - - def run_cli(self, cfg): - (self.root / "cfg.json").write_text(json.dumps(cfg)) - (self.root / "intake-token").write_text("synthetic-intake-token\n") - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()) as out: - code = CLI.main(["--request", "--admission", str(ADMISSION), "--config", str(self.root / "cfg.json")]) - return code, json.loads(out.getvalue()), out.getvalue() - - def cfg(self, **kw): - return {**super().cfg(), "informed_decision": {"url": self.addr, - "token_file": str(self.root / "intake-token")}} - - def test_files_then_presents_with_the_admission_as_packet(self): - code, result, text = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"]), (0, "presented")) - headers, env = self.w.memos[0] - self.assertEqual(headers["Authorization"], "Bearer synthetic-intake-token") - self.assertEqual(env["memo"]["approval_id"], "apr-1") - self.assertEqual(env["memo"]["approval_binding_digest"], "sha256:" + "ab" * 32) - self.assertEqual(env["packet"][0]["content"], ADMISSION.read_text()) - body = json.loads(self.calls("/v1/approvals")[0][3]) - self.assertEqual(env["approval_intent"], {k: body["binding"][k] for k in ("action", "principal", "purpose", "target")}) - self.assertNotIn("actor", env["approval_intent"]) - self.assertEqual(result["memo_id"], env["memo"]["id"]) - self.assertNotIn(SECRET, text) - - def test_refused_memo_keeps_the_approval_and_exits_7(self): - self.w.memo_status = 409 - code, result, _ = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"], result["approval_id"]), (7, "requested_not_presented", "apr-1")) - - def test_envelope_passes_informed_decisions_own_validator(self): - if not (INFD / "informed_decision" / "intake.py").exists(): - self.skipTest("informed-decision checkout absent") - sys.path.insert(0, str(INFD)) - try: - from informed_decision import intake - finally: - sys.path.remove(str(INFD)) - doc = X.bea.load(ADMISSION) - binding, _, _ = CLI.request_binding(doc, super().cfg()) - approval = {"id": "0f1e2d3c-4b5a-4968-8776-655443322110", "binding": {**binding, "digest": "sha256:" + "b" * 64}} - env = CLI.admission_memo(doc, ADMISSION.read_text(), binding, approval) - grant = intake.SubmitterGrant("nk-bind-executor", frozenset({"bounded-execution"}), - frozenset({"net-kingdom-admins"})) - profile = intake.PresentExisting("service:nk-bind-executor", frozenset({"bounded-execution"})) - validated = intake.validate_submission(env, submitter_id="nk-bind-executor", grant=grant, - present_existing=profile) - self.assertEqual(validated.memo.id, env["memo"]["id"]) - - -class RequestPhase(Base): - def run_cli(self, cfg, admission=ADMISSION): - (self.root / "cfg.json").write_text(json.dumps(cfg)) - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()) as out: - code = CLI.main(["--request", "--admission", str(admission), "--config", str(self.root / "cfg.json")]) - return code, json.loads(out.getvalue()), out.getvalue() - - def admission_with(self, mutate): - doc = yaml.safe_load(ADMISSION.read_text()) - mutate(doc["spec"]) - path = self.root / "admission.yaml" - path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(doc, sort_keys=False)) - return path - - def test_files_the_approval_as_the_executor(self): - code, result, text = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"], result["approval_id"]), (0, "requested", "apr-1")) - doc = X.bea.load(ADMISSION) - body = json.loads(self.calls("/v1/approvals")[0][3]) - self.assertEqual(body["binding"], { - "action": "bounded-execution", "actor": "service:nk-bind-executor", - "principal": "uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local", - "purpose": f"{doc['spec']['id']}: {doc['spec']['title']}"[:200], - "target": {"admission_id": doc["spec"]["id"], "admission_digest": X.bea.admission_digest(doc)}}) - self.assertEqual(body["validity"], {"not_before": doc["spec"]["window"]["not_before"], - "expires_at": doc["spec"]["window"]["not_after"]}) - self.assertEqual((body["human_control"], body["pdp_path"], body["required_count"]), (True, False, 1)) - # the approval token was exchanged for exactly approval:create, with the bearer from KeyCape - self.assertEqual(self.calls("/v1/approvals")[0][2]["Authorization"], "Bearer at-approval-create") - # the approval lane logged in once, read the secret and was revoked; no other lane logged in - logins = [json.loads(r[3])["role"] for r in self.calls("/v1/auth/kubernetes/login")] - self.assertEqual(logins, [APPROVAL_ROLE]) - self.assertIn("tok-" + APPROVAL_ROLE, self.w.revoked) - self.assertNotIn(SECRET, text) - - def test_refused_before_anything_is_sent(self): - cases = { - "another executor": (self.cfg(), self.admission_with( - lambda s: s["executor"].update(identity="service:other"))), - "unmapped approver": ({**self.cfg(), "approver_subjects": {}}, ADMISSION), - "closed window": (self.cfg(), self.admission_with(lambda s: s["window"].update( - not_before="2026-01-01T09:00:00Z", not_after="2026-01-01T11:00:00Z"))), - "shared role": (self.cfg(k8s_role="net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read"), ADMISSION), - } - for label, (cfg, admission) in cases.items(): - self.w.requests.clear() - with self.subTest(label): - code, result, _ = self.run_cli(cfg, admission) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"]), (4, "refused")) - self.assertEqual([r for r in self.w.requests if r[1] != "/v1/sys/health"], []) - - def test_refused_when_the_created_approval_differs(self): - for override in ({"status": "approved"}, {"binding": {"actor": "service:other"}}): - self.w.create_override = override - with self.subTest(override=override): - code, result, _ = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"]), (4, "refused")) - - def test_bad_client_kv_shape_is_refused_and_revoked(self): - self.w.kv = {"CLIENT_SECRET": SECRET, "EXTRA": "x"} - code, result, text = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["reason"]), (4, "request:OperationError")) - self.assertIn("tok-" + APPROVAL_ROLE, self.w.revoked) - self.assertEqual(self.calls("/v1/approvals"), []) - self.assertNotIn(SECRET, text) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/bounded-executor/tests/test_clients.py b/bounded-executor/tests/test_clients.py deleted file mode 100644 index 81002e9..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/tests/test_clients.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -"""approval-engine and audit-core clients, and the CLI's setup failure path (NK-WP-0056-T13). Fakes only.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import importlib.util -import json -import pathlib -import sys -import tempfile -import threading -import unittest -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, HERE.parent / f"{name}.py") - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - sys.modules[name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -C = load("clients") -CLI = load("cli") - - -class Fake: - def __init__(self): - self.requests = [] - self.status = 200 - - -def serve(fake): - class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def handle_one(self, method): - raw = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or 0)) - self.server_fake.requests.append((method, self.path, dict(self.headers), json.loads(raw) if raw else None)) - body = json.dumps({"id": "apr-1", "status": "approved"} if method == "GET" else - {"status": "consumed", "idempotent": False}).encode() - self.send_response(self.server_fake.status) - self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") - self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) - self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(body) - - def do_GET(self): - self.handle_one("GET") - - def do_POST(self): - self.handle_one("POST") - - def log_message(self, *a): - return - - H.server_fake = fake - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), H) - threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, kwargs={"poll_interval": 0.02}, daemon=True).start() - return server - - -class ClientTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.fake = Fake() - self.server = serve(self.fake) - self.addCleanup(self.server.shutdown) - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - self.token = pathlib.Path(tmp.name) / "token" - self.token.write_text("synthetic-bearer\n") - self.base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.server.server_port}" - - def test_approval_engine_get_and_consume(self): - ae = C.ApprovalEngine(self.base, str(self.token)) - self.assertEqual(ae.get("apr-1")["status"], "approved") - ae.consume("apr-1", "sha256:" + "a" * 64, "run-1") - (_, p1, h1, _), (_, p2, _, b2) = self.fake.requests - self.assertEqual((p1, p2), ("/v1/approvals/apr-1", "/v1/approvals/apr-1/consume")) - self.assertEqual(h1["Authorization"], "Bearer synthetic-bearer") - self.assertEqual(b2, {"request_digest": "sha256:" + "a" * 64, "decision_id": "run-1"}) - - def test_approval_id_cannot_escape_the_path(self): - ae = C.ApprovalEngine(self.base, str(self.token)) - for bad in ("../admin", "", "a/b"): - with self.subTest(bad=bad), self.assertRaises(C.ClientError): - ae.get(bad) - self.assertEqual(self.fake.requests, []) - - def test_audit_core_idempotency_key_equals_event_id(self): - event = {"id": "run:r1:started", "type": "execution.run.started", "source": "s", "subject": "x", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", "correlation_id": "r1", "occurred_at": "2026-11-03T09:30:00+00:00", - "data": {"a": 1}} - C.AuditCore(self.base, str(self.token)).emit(event) - ((method, path, headers, body),) = self.fake.requests - self.assertEqual((method, path, headers["Idempotency-Key"]), ("POST", "/v1/events", "run:r1:started")) - self.assertEqual(body, event) - - def test_errors_carry_status_only(self): - self.fake.status = 403 - with self.assertRaises(C.ClientError) as caught: - C.ApprovalEngine(self.base, str(self.token)).get("apr-1") - self.assertEqual(str(caught.exception), "GET 403") - - -class AuditStatuses(unittest.TestCase): - """audit-core: 202 first accept, 200 duplicate, 409 reused run id (audit-core AUDIT-WP-0018-T02, 2026-10-31).""" - - def emit_with(self, status): - fake = Fake() - fake.status = status - server = serve(fake) - self.addCleanup(server.shutdown) - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - token = pathlib.Path(tmp.name) / "token" - token.write_text("synthetic-bearer\n") - C.AuditCore(f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}", str(token)).emit({"id": "run:r:started"}) - - def test_202_and_200_are_stored(self): - self.emit_with(202) - self.emit_with(200) - - def test_409_is_a_distinct_defect(self): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(C.ClientError, "conflict 409"): - self.emit_with(409) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(C.ClientError, "500"): - self.emit_with(500) - - -class CliTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_exit_codes(self): - self.assertEqual(CLI.exit_code({"outcome": "completed"}), 0) - self.assertEqual(CLI.exit_code({"outcome": "reverted"}), 3) - self.assertEqual(CLI.exit_code({"outcome": "refused", "reason": "approval_entry"}), 4) - self.assertEqual(CLI.exit_code({"outcome": "revert_failed"}), 5) - self.assertEqual(CLI.exit_code({"outcome": "stopped", "reason": "audit_unavailable"}), 6) - self.assertEqual(CLI.exit_code({"outcome": "completed", "reason": "receipt_not_in_custody"}), 6) - - def test_setup_failure_refuses_before_any_effect(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: - root = pathlib.Path(tmp) - (root / "jwt").write_text("synthetic-jwt") - cfg = {"openbao": {"addr": "http://127.0.0.1:9", "k8s_role": "r", "jwt_file": str(root / "jwt")}} - (root / "cfg.json").write_text(json.dumps(cfg)) - admission = CLI.X.REPO / "examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml" - import contextlib, io - wait = CLI.OPS.wait_reachable - self.addCleanup(setattr, CLI.OPS, "wait_reachable", wait) - CLI.OPS.wait_reachable = lambda addr, **kw: wait(addr, **{**kw, "timeout": 0.2, "interval": 0.1}) - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()) as out: - code = CLI.main(["--admission", str(admission), "--approval-id", "apr-1", "--config", str(root / "cfg.json")]) - self.assertEqual(code, 4) - self.assertEqual(json.loads(out.getvalue())["reason"].split(":")[0], "setup") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/bounded-executor/tests/test_executor.py b/bounded-executor/tests/test_executor.py deleted file mode 100644 index 763c8e9..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/tests/test_executor.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,405 +0,0 @@ -"""Core runner tests (NK-WP-0056-T11). Fakes only: carrier, operations, checks, trust, audit, clocks.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import copy -import datetime as dt -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import pathlib -import sys -import tempfile -import unittest - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("executor", HERE.parent / "executor.py") -X = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -sys.modules["executor"] = X # dataclasses resolve deferred annotations through sys.modules -spec.loader.exec_module(X) -bea = X.bea - -PILOT = bea.load(X.REPO / "examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml") -ADMIN_SUB = "kc-sub-0f3a" # opaque KeyCape subject of the human approver `admin` -NOW = dt.datetime(2026, 11, 3, 9, 30, tzinfo=dt.UTC) -SECRET = "synthetic-bind-value-never-emitted" - - -class Clock: - def __init__(self): - self.t = 0.0 - self.sleeps = [] - - def monotonic(self): - return self.t - - def sleep(self, s): - self.sleeps.append(s) - self.t += s - - -class FakeCarrier: - """approval-engine's object and consume semantics (store.Approval.as_dict, Engine.consume).""" - - def __init__(self, admission, **over): - self.approval = { - "id": "apr-1", "status": "approved", - "binding": {"action": "bounded-execution", "actor": admission["spec"]["executor"]["identity"], - "principal": "admin", "purpose": admission["spec"]["purpose"], - "target": {"admission_id": admission["spec"]["id"], - "admission_digest": bea.admission_digest(admission)}, - "human_control": True, "pdp_path": False}, - "validity": {"not_before": admission["spec"]["window"]["not_before"], - "expires_at": admission["spec"]["window"]["not_after"]}, - "entries": [{"subject_id": ADMIN_SUB, "assurance": "aal2", "principal_type": "human", - "approved_at": "2026-11-03T08:55:00Z"}], - } - for k, v in over.items(): - self.approval[k] = v - self.consumes = 0 - self.raise_on_consume = False - self.consume_lands = True - - def get(self, approval_id): - return copy.deepcopy(self.approval) - - def consume(self, approval_id, request_digest, decision_id): - self.consumes += 1 - if self.consume_lands: - if self.approval["status"] == "consumed": - same = self.approval["consumption"]["request_digest"] == request_digest - if not same: - raise RuntimeError("409") - return {"approval_id": approval_id, "status": "consumed", "request_digest": request_digest, - "decision_id": self.approval["consumption"].get("decision_id"), - "consumed_at": "x", "idempotent": True} - self.approval["status"] = "consumed" - self.approval["consumption"] = {"request_digest": request_digest, "decision_id": decision_id, - "consumed_at": "2026-11-03T09:30:00Z"} - if self.raise_on_consume: - raise TimeoutError("connection reset") - return {"approval_id": approval_id, "status": "consumed", "request_digest": request_digest, - "decision_id": decision_id, "consumed_at": "2026-11-03T09:30:00Z", "idempotent": False} - - -class World: - def __init__(self, admission, clock): - self.calls = [] - self.fail_check = {} # check id -> number of times to fail - self.raise_op = set() # operation names that raise - self.unknown_op = set() - self.slow_op = 0.0 - self.events = [] - self.alerts = [] - self.audit_down = False - self.stop_after = None - self.clock = clock - self.carrier = FakeCarrier(admission) - self.trust_ok = True - - def op(self, step, ctx): - if step["operation"] in self.unknown_op: - raise X.Unknown() - if step["id"] in self.raise_op: - raise RuntimeError("boom") - ctx.data["value"] = SECRET # operations may hold values; the runner must never emit them - self.calls.append(step["id"]) - self.clock.t += self.slow_op - - def check(self, check, ctx): - self.calls.append("check:" + check["id"]) - left = self.fail_check.get(check["id"], 0) - if left: - self.fail_check[check["id"]] = left - 1 - return False - return True - - def emit(self, event): - if self.audit_down: - raise ConnectionError() - self.events.append(event) - - def should_stop(self): - return self.stop_after is not None and len([c for c in self.calls if not c.startswith("check:")]) >= self.stop_after - - def deps(self, admission): - ops = {s["operation"]: self.op for s in admission["spec"]["plan"]["steps"] + admission["spec"]["plan"]["revert_steps"]} - checks = {c["id"]: self.check for c in admission["spec"]["checks"]} - audit = type("A", (), {"emit": lambda _s, e: self.emit(e)})() - return X.Deps(carrier=self.carrier, operations=ops, checks=checks, trust=lambda s: self.trust_ok, - audit=audit, alert=lambda kind, info: self.alerts.append(kind), - should_stop=self.should_stop, wall=lambda: NOW, - monotonic=self.clock.monotonic, sleep=self.clock.sleep) - - -def synthetic_admission(root: pathlib.Path, mutate=None) -> dict: - """The pilot example, with its pinned files replaced by temporary ones and the digest recomputed.""" - doc = copy.deepcopy(PILOT) - files = [] - for f in doc["spec"]["plan"]["source"]["files"]: - path = root / f["path"] - path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - path.write_text("synthetic " + f["path"]) - files.append({"path": f["path"], "sha256": hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()}) - doc["spec"]["plan"]["source"]["files"] = files - by_path = {f["path"]: f["sha256"] for f in files} - for c in doc["spec"]["checks"]: - c["sha256"] = by_path[c["ref"]] - if mutate: - mutate(doc["spec"]) - doc["spec"]["plan_digest"] = bea.plan_digest(doc) - return doc - - -class Base(unittest.TestCase): - mutate = None - - def setUp(self): - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - self.root = pathlib.Path(tmp.name) - self.doc = synthetic_admission(self.root, self.mutate) - self.clock = Clock() - self.w = World(self.doc, self.clock) - self.cfg = X.Config(executor_identity="service:nk-bind-executor", - runtime_principal="system:serviceaccount:sso:nk-bind-executor", - tenant="tenant:platform", environment="PRODUCTION", - approver_subjects={"admin": ADMIN_SUB}, source_root=self.root) - - def run_it(self, doc=None): - doc = doc or self.doc - return X.Run(doc, "apr-1", self.cfg, self.w.deps(doc)).execute() - - def ops(self): - return [c for c in self.w.calls if not c.startswith("check:")] - - def assert_no_effect(self, result, reason): - self.assertEqual((result["outcome"], result["reason"]), ("refused", reason)) - self.assertEqual(self.w.carrier.consumes, 0) - self.assertEqual(self.w.calls, []) - self.assertEqual(self.w.events, []) - - -class HappyPathTests(Base): - def test_completes_with_started_and_receipt(self): - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "completed", result) - self.assertEqual(self.w.carrier.consumes, 1) - self.assertEqual(self.ops(), ["generate", "set-directory", "deliver", "restart"]) - self.assertEqual([e["type"] for e in self.w.events], [X.STARTED, X.RECEIPT]) - started, receipt = self.w.events - self.assertEqual(started["id"], f"run:{result['run_id']}:started") - for event in self.w.events: # audit-core: eight truthy fields, offset-qualified occurred_at - for key in ("id", "type", "source", "subject", "tenant", "correlation_id", "occurred_at", "data"): - self.assertTrue(event[key], key) - self.assertEqual(dt.datetime.fromisoformat(event["occurred_at"]).utcoffset(), dt.timedelta(0)) - data = receipt["data"] - self.assertEqual(data["pdp"], "not-evaluated") - self.assertEqual({r["label"] for r in data["decision_refs"]}, {"admission", "admission_digest", "approval"}) - self.assertEqual(data["initiator"]["sub"], ADMIN_SUB) - self.assertEqual(data["artifact_digest"], self.doc["spec"]["plan_digest"]) - self.assertFalse(data["reverted"]) - self.assertNotIn(SECRET, json.dumps(self.w.events)) - - def test_consumed_with_admission_digest_and_run_id(self): - result = self.run_it() - consumption = self.w.carrier.approval["consumption"] - self.assertEqual(consumption["request_digest"], bea.admission_digest(self.doc)) - self.assertEqual(consumption["decision_id"], result["run_id"]) - - -class RefusalTests(Base): - def test_invalid_admission(self): - doc = copy.deepcopy(self.doc) - doc["spec"]["plan"]["steps"][0]["operation"] = "tampered" - self.w = World(doc, self.clock) - self.assertEqual(self.run_it(doc)["reason"], "admission_invalid:BEA-2") - self.assertEqual(self.w.carrier.consumes, 0) - - def test_refusals_before_any_effect(self): - cases = { - "not_this_executor": lambda: setattr(self.cfg, "executor_identity", "service:other"), - "source_drift": lambda: (self.root / "bounded-executor/operations.py").write_text("changed"), - "trust_not_satisfied:runtime_secret_trust": lambda: setattr(self.w, "trust_ok", False), - "approval_binding": lambda: self.w.carrier.approval["binding"]["target"].update(admission_digest="sha256:" + "0" * 64), - "approval_status": lambda: self.w.carrier.approval.update(status="requested"), - "approval_entry": lambda: self.w.carrier.approval["entries"][0].update(assurance="aal1"), - "approval_expires_before_window_end": lambda: self.w.carrier.approval["validity"].update(expires_at="2026-11-03T10:00:00Z"), - } - for reason, mutate in cases.items(): - with self.subTest(reason=reason): - self.setUp() - mutate() - self.assert_no_effect(self.run_it(), reason) - - def test_approval_by_someone_not_listed_or_not_human(self): - for entry in ({"subject_id": "kc-sub-other", "assurance": "aal2", "principal_type": "human"}, - {"subject_id": ADMIN_SUB, "assurance": "aal2", "principal_type": "service"}): - with self.subTest(entry=entry): - self.setUp() - self.w.carrier.approval["entries"] = [entry] - self.assert_no_effect(self.run_it(), "approval_entry") - - def test_actor_must_be_this_executor(self): - self.w.carrier.approval["binding"]["actor"] = "service:someone-else" - self.assert_no_effect(self.run_it(), "approval_binding") - - def test_outside_window(self): - self.w.deps = (lambda orig: (lambda doc: (lambda d: (setattr(d, "wall", lambda: NOW + dt.timedelta(hours=3)), d)[1])(orig(doc))))(self.w.deps) - self.assert_no_effect(self.run_it(), "outside_window") - - def test_window_too_short_for_the_budget(self): - late = dt.datetime(2026, 11, 3, 10, 50, tzinfo=dt.UTC) # 10 min left, budget 20 min - orig = self.w.deps - self.w.deps = lambda doc: (lambda d: (setattr(d, "wall", lambda: late), d)[1])(orig(doc)) - self.assert_no_effect(self.run_it(), "window_shorter_than_budget") - - def test_already_consumed_is_never_reused(self): - self.w.carrier.approval["status"] = "consumed" - self.w.carrier.approval["consumption"] = {"request_digest": bea.admission_digest(self.doc), "decision_id": "earlier-run"} - self.assert_no_effect(self.run_it(), "approval_status") - - def test_unknown_operation(self): - d = self.w.deps(self.doc) - d.operations.pop("eso.force-sync") - result = X.Run(self.doc, "apr-1", self.cfg, d).execute() - self.assert_no_effect(result, "unknown_operation") - - -class ConsumeTests(Base): - def test_unclear_consume_resolved_by_reading_back(self): - self.w.carrier.raise_on_consume = True # consume landed, response lost - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "completed") - self.assertEqual(self.w.carrier.consumes, 1) # never consumed twice - - def test_unclear_consume_that_did_not_land_stops(self): - self.w.carrier.raise_on_consume = True - self.w.carrier.consume_lands = False - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual((result["outcome"], result["reason"]), ("refused", "consume_not_confirmed")) - self.assertEqual((self.w.calls, self.w.events), ([], [])) - self.assertIn("consume_unconfirmed", self.w.alerts) - - def test_idempotent_consume_is_not_a_fresh_run(self): - original = self.w.carrier.consume - self.w.carrier.consume = lambda a, d, r: dict(original(a, d, r), idempotent=True) - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["reason"], "consume_response") - self.assertEqual(self.w.calls, []) - - def test_no_custody_no_run(self): - self.w.audit_down = True - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual((result["outcome"], result["reason"]), ("stopped", "audit_unavailable")) - self.assertEqual(self.w.calls, []) - self.assertIn("started_not_in_custody", self.w.alerts) - - -class FailureTests(Base): - def test_failed_check_reverts_in_reverse_and_verifies(self): - self.doc = synthetic_admission(self.root, lambda s: s["budget"].update(attempts=1)) - self.w = World(self.doc, self.clock) - self.w.fail_check["eso-synced"] = 1 - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "reverted", result) - # declared recovery order, only for steps that ran (restart did not run, so no restart-again) - self.assertEqual(self.ops(), ["generate", "set-directory", "deliver", "restore-kv", "restore-directory", "redeliver"]) - data = result["receipt"]["data"] - self.assertTrue(data["reverted"]) - reverts = [x for x in data["steps"] if x["kind"] == "revert"] - self.assertEqual([x["checks"][0]["id"] for x in reverts], ["kv-advanced", "bind-signs-in", "eso-synced"]) - self.assertTrue(all(x["outcome"] == "done" for x in reverts)) - self.assertEqual(data["attempts"], 1) - - def test_clean_revert_may_retry_within_attempts(self): - self.doc = synthetic_admission(self.root, lambda s: s["budget"].update(attempts=2)) - self.w = World(self.doc, self.clock) - self.w.fail_check["synthetic-journey"] = 1 - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "completed") - self.assertEqual(result["receipt"]["data"]["attempts"], 2) - self.assertTrue(result["receipt"]["data"]["reverted"]) - - def test_revert_whose_check_fails_counts_as_failed(self): - self.doc = synthetic_admission(self.root, lambda s: s["budget"].update(attempts=1)) - self.w = World(self.doc, self.clock) - self.w.fail_check["eso-synced"] = 1 - self.w.fail_check["kv-advanced"] = 0 - original = self.w.check - calls = {"kv": 0} - def check(c, ctx): # kv-advanced passes forward, fails on the revert - if c["id"] == "kv-advanced": - calls["kv"] += 1 - if calls["kv"] == 2: - self.w.calls.append("check:kv-advanced") - return False - return original(c, ctx) - self.w.check = check - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "revert_failed") - self.assertNotIn("restore-directory", self.ops()) # stop at the failed revert - - def test_failed_revert_stops_and_alerts(self): - self.w.fail_check["eso-synced"] = 1 - self.w.raise_op = {"restore-directory"} - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "revert_failed") - self.assertIn("revert_failed", self.w.alerts) - self.assertNotIn("redeliver", self.ops()) # stop at the failed revert, do not continue blindly - - def test_unknown_outcome_stops_without_revert(self): - self.w.unknown_op = {"eso.force-sync"} - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "unknown") - self.assertEqual(self.ops(), ["generate", "set-directory"]) - self.assertFalse(result["receipt"]["data"]["reverted"]) - self.assertIn("unknown", self.w.alerts) - - def test_definite_failure_reverts_like_a_failed_check(self): - self.doc = synthetic_admission(self.root, lambda s: s["budget"].update(attempts=1)) - self.w = World(self.doc, self.clock) - original = self.w.op - def op(step, ctx): - if step["id"] == "restart": - self.w.calls.append("restart") - raise X.StepFailed("never became ready") - return original(step, ctx) - self.w.op = op - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "reverted") - self.assertEqual(self.ops(), ["generate", "set-directory", "deliver", "restart", - "restore-kv", "restore-directory", "redeliver", "restart-again"]) - restart = next(s for s in result["receipt"]["data"]["steps"] if s["id"] == "restart") - self.assertEqual((restart["outcome"], restart["error_type"]), ("failed", "StepFailed")) - - def test_budget_exhausted_reverts(self): - self.w.slow_op = 700.0 # wall_time_seconds is 1200 - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "budget") - self.assertTrue(result["receipt"]["data"]["reverted"]) - - def test_kill_switch_reverts(self): - self.w.stop_after = 2 - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "stopped") - self.assertIn("restore-kv", self.ops()) - self.assertNotIn("deliver", self.ops()) - - def test_settle_time_is_waited_and_counted(self): - self.doc = synthetic_admission(self.root, lambda s: s["checks"][3].update(settle_seconds=125)) - self.w = World(self.doc, self.clock) - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "completed") - self.assertIn(125, self.clock.sleeps) - - def test_receipt_custody_failure_is_reported(self): - original = self.w.emit - self.w.emit = lambda e: (original(e) if e["type"] == X.STARTED else (_ for _ in ()).throw(ConnectionError())) - result = self.run_it() - self.assertEqual(result["reason"], "receipt_not_in_custody") - self.assertIn("receipt_not_in_custody", self.w.alerts) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/bounded-executor/tests/test_openbao_lanes.py b/bounded-executor/tests/test_openbao_lanes.py deleted file mode 100644 index db0a471..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/tests/test_openbao_lanes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,246 +0,0 @@ -"""One OpenBao login per lane, renewal before the lease ends, revocation on every path (NK-WP-0056-T10). Fakes only.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import contextlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import pathlib -import sys -import tempfile -import threading -import time -import unittest -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, HERE.parent / f"{name}.py") - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - sys.modules[name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -CLI = load("cli") -OPS = sys.modules["operations"] - - -class Bao: - def __init__(self, lease=900): - self.lease = lease - self.logins, self.revoked, self.reads = [], [], [] - self.n = 0 - - -def serve(bao: Bao): - class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def _send(self, body): - raw = json.dumps(body).encode() - self.send_response(200) - self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") - self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw))) - self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(raw) - - def do_POST(self): - body = json.loads(self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)) or b"{}") - if self.path == "/v1/auth/kubernetes/login": - bao.n += 1 - bao.logins.append((body["role"], body["jwt"])) - return self._send({"auth": {"client_token": f"tok-{body['role']}-{bao.n}", - "lease_duration": bao.lease}}) - if self.path == "/v1/auth/token/revoke-self": - bao.revoked.append(self.headers.get("X-Vault-Token")) - return self._send({}) - self._send({}) - - def do_GET(self): - bao.reads.append((self.path, self.headers.get("X-Vault-Token"))) - self._send({"data": {"data": {"PASSWORD": "p", "TOTP_SEED": "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ"}, "metadata": {"version": 3}}}) - - def log_message(self, *a): - return - - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), H) - threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, kwargs={"poll_interval": 0.02}, daemon=True).start() - return server - - -class Base(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.bao = Bao() - self.server = serve(self.bao) - self.addCleanup(self.server.shutdown) - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - self.root = pathlib.Path(tmp.name) - (self.root / "jwt").write_text("synthetic-openbao-audience-jwt\n") - self.addr = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.server.server_port}" - - -class CliLanes(Base): - def run_cli(self, cfg): - (self.root / "cfg.json").write_text(json.dumps(cfg)) - admission = CLI.X.REPO / "examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml" - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()) as out: - code = CLI.main(["--admission", str(admission), "--approval-id", "apr-1", - "--config", str(self.root / "cfg.json")]) - return code, json.loads(out.getvalue()) - - def cfg(self, journey_role="journey-read"): - # lldap is missing on purpose: setup fails after both logins - return {"openbao": {"addr": self.addr, "k8s_role": "bind-write", "jwt_file": str(self.root / "jwt")}, - "journey": {"kv": "x", "k8s_role": journey_role, "config": {}}} - - def test_two_lanes_two_logins_both_revoked_when_setup_fails(self): - code, result = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["reason"]), (4, "setup:KeyError")) - self.assertEqual([role for role, _ in self.bao.logins], ["bind-write", "journey-read"]) - self.assertEqual(sorted(self.bao.revoked), ["tok-bind-write-1", "tok-journey-read-2"]) - - def test_one_role_for_both_lanes_is_refused_before_any_login(self): - code, result = self.run_cli(self.cfg(journey_role="bind-write")) - self.assertEqual((code, result["reason"]), (4, "setup:ValueError")) - self.assertEqual(self.bao.logins, []) - - -class JourneyOnly(Base): - SEED = "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ" - - def setUp(self): - super().setUp() - self.calls = [] - original = (OPS.journey.run_journey, OPS._load_config) - self.addCleanup(lambda: (setattr(OPS.journey, "run_journey", original[0]), - setattr(OPS, "_load_config", original[1]))) - OPS._load_config = lambda cfg: cfg - self.result = "pass" - - def run_journey(cfg, password, seed, min_time_step=None): - self.calls.append(cfg) - return {"result": self.result, "failed_step": None if self.result == "pass" else "authelia_first_factor", - "reason": None, "otp_time_step": 1} - OPS.journey.run_journey = run_journey - - def cfg(self, **journey): - # write role, approval-engine, audit-core, lldap and kubernetes are absent on purpose: not needed - return {"openbao": {"addr": self.addr, "k8s_role": "bind-write", "jwt_file": str(self.root / "jwt")}, - "journey": {"kv": "platform/workloads/x", "k8s_role": "journey-read", "config": {"c": 1}, **journey}} - - def run_cli(self, cfg, *extra): - (self.root / "cfg.json").write_text(json.dumps(cfg)) - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()) as out: - code = CLI.main(["--journey-only", "--config", str(self.root / "cfg.json"), *extra]) - return code, json.loads(out.getvalue()) - - def test_pass_logs_in_with_the_journey_role_only_and_revokes(self): - code, result = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"], result["effects"]), (0, "pass", False)) - self.assertEqual([role for role, _ in self.bao.logins], ["journey-read"]) - self.assertEqual(self.bao.revoked, ["tok-journey-read-1"]) - self.assertEqual(self.calls, [{"c": 1}]) - self.assertNotIn(self.SEED, json.dumps(result)) - - def test_failed_journey_fails_closed_with_exit_1(self): - self.result = "fail" - code, result = self.run_cli(self.cfg()) - self.assertEqual((code, result["outcome"], result["journey"]["failed_step"]), (1, "fail", "authelia_first_factor")) - - def test_incomplete_config_is_refused_before_any_login(self): - cfg = self.cfg() - del cfg["journey"]["k8s_role"] - code, result = self.run_cli(cfg) - self.assertEqual((code, result["reason"]), (4, "setup:KeyError")) - self.assertEqual(self.bao.logins, []) - - def test_admission_arguments_conflict_with_journey_only(self): - with self.assertRaises(SystemExit), contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - self.run_cli(self.cfg(), "--approval-id", "apr-1") - - -class WaitReachable(unittest.TestCase): - """k3s applies NetworkPolicy to a new pod a moment late: early connections are refused (live, 2026-10-31).""" - - def fake(self, outcomes): - self.now, self.slept, calls = 0.0, [], list(outcomes) - - def open_(request, timeout): - outcome = calls.pop(0) - if isinstance(outcome, BaseException): - raise outcome - return contextlib.nullcontext() - - def sleep(seconds): - self.slept.append(seconds) - self.now += seconds - return dict(opener=open_, clock=lambda: self.now, sleep=sleep) - - def test_refused_then_reachable(self): - refused = OPS.urllib.error.URLError(ConnectionRefusedError()) - waited = OPS.wait_reachable("http://bao:8200", **self.fake([refused, refused, "ok"])) - self.assertEqual((waited, self.slept), (2.0, [1, 1])) - - def test_any_http_answer_is_reachable(self): - sealed = OPS.urllib.error.HTTPError("http://bao/v1/sys/health", 503, "sealed", {}, io.BytesIO(b"")) - self.assertEqual(OPS.wait_reachable("http://bao:8200", **self.fake([sealed])), 0.0) - - def test_gives_up_after_the_timeout(self): - refused = OPS.urllib.error.URLError(ConnectionRefusedError()) - with self.assertRaises(OPS.Unreachable): - OPS.wait_reachable("http://bao:8200", timeout=3, **self.fake([refused] * 10)) - self.assertEqual(self.slept, [1, 1, 1]) - - -class Renewal(Base): - def test_logs_in_again_before_the_lease_ends_and_revokes_the_old_token(self): - self.bao.lease = 1 # renew_at = max(1 - margin, 0.5 s) - client = OPS.OpenBao(self.addr, k8s_role="journey-read", jwt_file=str(self.root / "jwt")) - client.read("platform/workloads/x") - time.sleep(0.6) - client.read("platform/workloads/x") - self.assertEqual(len(self.bao.logins), 2) - self.assertEqual(self.bao.revoked, ["tok-journey-read-1"]) - self.assertEqual([tok for _, tok in self.bao.reads], ["tok-journey-read-1", "tok-journey-read-2"]) - - def test_a_long_lease_is_not_renewed(self): - client = OPS.OpenBao(self.addr, k8s_role="r", jwt_file=str(self.root / "jwt")) - client.read("platform/workloads/x") - client.read("platform/workloads/x") - self.assertEqual(len(self.bao.logins), 1) - - def test_a_given_token_never_logs_in(self): - client = OPS.OpenBao(self.addr, token="static") - client.read("platform/workloads/x") - client.revoke_self() - self.assertEqual((self.bao.logins, self.bao.revoked), ([], ["static"])) - - -class JourneyUsesItsOwnLane(unittest.TestCase): - def test_journey_check_reads_only_through_the_journey_client(self): - class Recorder: - def __init__(self, name): - self.name, self.reads = name, [] - - def read(self, path): - self.reads.append(path) - return {"PASSWORD": "p", "TOTP_SEED": "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ"}, 1 - - write, read = Recorder("write"), Recorder("read") - _, checks = OPS.pilot_registry(bao=write, journey_bao=read, directory=None, delivery=None, restart=None, - bind_kv="b", bind_user="svc-authelia", journey_kv="j", journey_config={}) - original = (OPS.journey.run_journey, OPS._load_config) - OPS.journey.run_journey = lambda cfg, pw, seed, min_time_step=None: {"result": "pass"} - OPS._load_config = lambda cfg: cfg - try: - self.assertTrue(checks["synthetic-journey"]({}, type("Ctx", (), {"data": {}})())) - finally: - OPS.journey.run_journey, OPS._load_config = original - self.assertEqual((write.reads, read.reads), ([], ["j"])) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/bounded-executor/tests/test_operations.py b/bounded-executor/tests/test_operations.py deleted file mode 100644 index 64f783f..0000000 --- a/bounded-executor/tests/test_operations.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,133 +0,0 @@ -"""Kubernetes adapters of the pilot operations against a fake API server (NK-WP-0056-T12). No cluster.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import datetime as dt -import importlib.util -import json -import pathlib -import sys -import tempfile -import threading -import unittest -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("operations", HERE.parent / "operations.py") -OPS = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -sys.modules["operations"] = OPS -spec.loader.exec_module(OPS) - -ES = "/apis/external-secrets.io/v1/namespaces/sso/externalsecrets/authelia-secrets" -DEP = "/apis/apps/v1/namespaces/sso/deployments/authelia" -T0 = dt.datetime(2026, 11, 3, 9, 30, tzinfo=dt.UTC) - - -class Api: - def __init__(self): - self.patches = [] - self.auth = [] - self.es_status = {"conditions": [{"type": "Ready", "status": "True"}], "refreshTime": "2026-11-03T09:29:00Z"} - self.dep = {"metadata": {"generation": 5}, "spec": {"replicas": 1}, - "status": {"observedGeneration": 5, "replicas": 1, "updatedReplicas": 1, "availableReplicas": 1}} - self.gets_until_ready = 0 - self.forbidden = False - - -def serve(api: Api): - class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def _send(self, code, body): - raw = json.dumps(body).encode() - self.send_response(code) - self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") - self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw))) - self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(raw) - - def do_GET(self): - api.auth.append(self.headers.get("Authorization")) - if api.forbidden: - return self._send(403, {"kind": "Status"}) - if self.path == ES: - return self._send(200, {"status": api.es_status}) - if self.path == DEP: - if api.gets_until_ready > 0: - api.gets_until_ready -= 1 - return self._send(200, {**api.dep, "status": {**api.dep["status"], "updatedReplicas": 0, - "unavailableReplicas": 1}}) - return self._send(200, api.dep) - self._send(404, {}) - - def do_PATCH(self): - api.patches.append((self.path, self.headers.get("Content-Type"), - json.loads(self.rfile.read(int(self.headers["Content-Length"]))))) - if api.forbidden: - return self._send(403, {"kind": "Status"}) - if self.path == DEP: - api.dep["metadata"]["generation"] += 1 - api.dep["status"]["observedGeneration"] = api.dep["metadata"]["generation"] - self._send(200, {}) - - def log_message(self, *a): - return - - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler) - threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, kwargs={"poll_interval": 0.02}, daemon=True).start() - return server - - -class KubeTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.api = Api() - self.server = serve(self.api) - self.addCleanup(self.server.shutdown) - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - token = pathlib.Path(tmp.name) / "token" - token.write_text("synthetic-sa-token\n") - self.kube = OPS.Kube(api=f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.server.server_port}", token_file=str(token), ca_file=None) - - def test_force_sync_patches_only_the_annotation(self): - delivery = OPS.KubeDelivery(self.kube, "sso", "authelia-secrets", clock=lambda: T0) - self.assertEqual(delivery.force_sync(), T0) - ((path, ctype, body),) = self.api.patches - self.assertEqual((path, ctype), (ES, "application/merge-patch+json")) - self.assertEqual(body, {"metadata": {"annotations": {"force-sync": str(int(T0.timestamp()))}}}) - self.assertEqual(self.api.auth, []) # no read before the patch - - def test_synced_needs_ready_and_a_refresh_after_the_sync(self): - delivery = OPS.KubeDelivery(self.kube, "sso", "authelia-secrets") - self.assertFalse(delivery.synced(T0)) # refreshed before T0 - self.api.es_status["refreshTime"] = "2026-11-03T09:30:05Z" - self.assertTrue(delivery.synced(T0)) - self.api.es_status["conditions"][0]["status"] = "False" - self.assertFalse(delivery.synced(T0)) - - def test_restart_patches_restarted_at_and_waits_for_the_rollout(self): - self.api.gets_until_ready = 2 - restart = OPS.KubeRestart(self.kube, "sso", "authelia", timeout=10, poll=0.01, clock=lambda: T0) - restart.restart() - ((path, _, body),) = self.api.patches - self.assertEqual(path, DEP) - self.assertEqual(body["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"]["kubectl.kubernetes.io/restartedAt"], - "2026-11-03T09:30:00Z") - self.assertEqual(self.api.gets_until_ready, 0) - - def test_rollout_that_never_becomes_ready_is_a_definite_failure(self): - self.api.gets_until_ready = 10 ** 6 - ticks = iter(range(10 ** 6)) - restart = OPS.KubeRestart(self.kube, "sso", "authelia", timeout=5, poll=0, monotonic=lambda: next(ticks), - sleep=lambda s: None) - with self.assertRaises(OPS.RolloutFailed) as caught: - restart.restart() - self.assertTrue(caught.exception.definite_failure) - - def test_forbidden_is_an_operation_error_and_sends_the_bearer(self): - self.api.forbidden = True - with self.assertRaises(OPS.OperationError): - OPS.KubeDelivery(self.kube, "sso", "authelia-secrets").synced(T0) - self.assertEqual(self.api.auth, ["Bearer synthetic-sa-token"]) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json b/canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json deleted file mode 100644 index fefd2c3..0000000 --- a/canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,582 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", - "$id": "https://netkingdom.io/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json", - "title": "NetKingdom Bounded Execution Admission v0.1", - "description": "An immutable request that a person admits, by digest, for one bounded executor run. Structure only; the semantic rules (BEA-1..BEA-14) are in tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py and the standard.", - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "apiVersion", - "kind", - "spec" - ], - "properties": { - "apiVersion": { - "const": "netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1" - }, - "kind": { - "const": "BoundedExecutionAdmission" - }, - "spec": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "title", - "purpose", - "risk_class", - "window", - "approval", - "executor", - "scope_ceiling", - "blast_radius", - "trust_requires", - "plan", - "plan_digest", - "checks", - "stop_and_revert", - "budget", - "consumption", - "receipt", - "not_authorized" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^BEA-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4}$" - }, - "title": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "purpose": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "work_ref": { - "type": "string" - }, - "risk_class": { - "enum": [ - "low", - "medium", - "high" - ] - }, - "window": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "not_before", - "not_after" - ], - "properties": { - "not_before": { - "type": "string", - "format": "date-time" - }, - "not_after": { - "type": "string", - "format": "date-time" - } - } - }, - "approval": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "approvers", - "principal_type", - "assurance", - "carriers" - ], - "properties": { - "approvers": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "principal_type": { - "const": "HUMAN" - }, - "assurance": { - "const": "aal2" - }, - "carriers": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "enum": [ - "approval-engine", - "founder-ssh-signature" - ] - } - } - } - }, - "executor": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "identity", - "principal_type", - "runtime" - ], - "properties": { - "identity": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "principal_type": { - "enum": [ - "WORKLOAD", - "AGENT", - "SERVICE", - "HUMAN" - ] - }, - "runtime": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "harness_launched": { - "type": "boolean" - } - } - }, - "scope_ceiling": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/grant" - } - }, - "blast_radius": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "unit", - "consumers", - "max_concurrent" - ], - "properties": { - "unit": { - "enum": [ - "consumer", - "account", - "host", - "tenant" - ] - }, - "consumers": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - } - }, - "max_concurrent": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 1 - } - } - }, - "trust_requires": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "description": "Playbook Capability Contract trust states the executor must find satisfied before the first step.", - "items": { - "enum": [ - "bare_host_trust", - "cluster_trust", - "bootstrap_secret_trust", - "bootstrap_identity_trust", - "runtime_secret_trust", - "runtime_identity_trust", - "runtime_authorization_trust", - "tenant_onboarding_trust" - ] - } - }, - "plan": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "source", - "steps" - ], - "properties": { - "source": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "repo", - "commit", - "files" - ], - "properties": { - "repo": { - "type": "string" - }, - "commit": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$" - }, - "files": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/pinned_file" - } - } - } - }, - "steps": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/step" - } - }, - "revert_steps": { - "type": "array", - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/step" - } - } - } - }, - "plan_digest": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$" - }, - "checks": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/check" - } - }, - "stop_and_revert": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "on_check_failure", - "on_budget_exhausted", - "on_unknown", - "on_revert_failure" - ], - "properties": { - "on_check_failure": { - "enum": [ - "revert", - "stop" - ] - }, - "on_budget_exhausted": { - "enum": [ - "revert", - "stop" - ] - }, - "on_unknown": { - "const": "stop" - }, - "on_revert_failure": { - "const": "stop-and-alert" - }, - "alert": { - "type": "string" - } - } - }, - "budget": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "wall_time_seconds", - "attempts", - "cost" - ], - "properties": { - "wall_time_seconds": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 1 - }, - "attempts": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 1 - }, - "cost": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "compute_cpu_seconds", - "egress_bytes", - "currency", - "amount" - ], - "properties": { - "compute_cpu_seconds": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 0 - }, - "egress_bytes": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 0 - }, - "currency": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[A-Z]{3}$" - }, - "amount": { - "type": "number", - "minimum": 0 - } - } - } - } - }, - "consumption": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "single_use", - "consume_before_first_step" - ], - "properties": { - "single_use": { - "const": true - }, - "consume_before_first_step": { - "const": true - } - } - }, - "receipt": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "schema", - "emit_to", - "retain" - ], - "properties": { - "schema": { - "const": "netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt" - }, - "emit_to": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "retain": { - "const": "by-hash-no-secret-values" - }, - "independent_verifier": { - "type": "string" - } - } - }, - "not_authorized": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - } - } - } - } - }, - "$defs": { - "grant": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "mode", - "scope", - "environments" - ], - "properties": { - "mode": { - "enum": [ - "USE", - "OBSERVE", - "OPERATE", - "ADMINISTER", - "GOVERN", - "CONSTRUCT", - "SOVEREIGN" - ] - }, - "scope": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*(/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*)*$" - }, - "environments": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "enum": [ - "DEVELOPMENT", - "TEST", - "STAGING", - "PRODUCTION", - "RECOVERY" - ] - } - } - } - }, - "pinned_file": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "path", - "sha256" - ], - "properties": { - "path": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "sha256": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" - } - } - }, - "step": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "operation", - "target", - "consumer", - "class", - "mutates", - "requires" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$" - }, - "operation": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "target": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "consumer": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "class": { - "enum": [ - "delegable", - "root-class", - "human-intrinsic" - ] - }, - "mutates": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "requires": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/grant_need" - }, - "checks_after": { - "type": "array", - "items": { - "type": "string" - }, - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "revert": { - "type": "string" - }, - "irreversible": { - "type": "boolean" - } - } - }, - "grant_need": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "mode", - "scope" - ], - "properties": { - "mode": { - "enum": [ - "USE", - "OBSERVE", - "OPERATE", - "ADMINISTER", - "GOVERN", - "CONSTRUCT", - "SOVEREIGN" - ] - }, - "scope": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*(/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*)*$" - } - } - }, - "check": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "description", - "ref", - "sha256", - "timeout_seconds", - "expect" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$" - }, - "description": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "ref": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "sha256": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" - }, - "timeout_seconds": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 1 - }, - "settle_seconds": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 0 - }, - "expect": { - "const": "pass" - } - } - } - } -} diff --git a/canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json b/canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3575d8a..0000000 --- a/canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,454 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", - "$id": "https://netkingdom.local/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json", - "title": "NetKingdom SecurityCaseType v0.1", - "description": "Structure of security-case-types//type.yaml (canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md). Semantic rules (rollback coverage, template placeholders, secret-shaped values, acceptance by risk class) are enforced by tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py.", - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "apiVersion", - "kind", - "spec" - ], - "properties": { - "apiVersion": { - "const": "netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1" - }, - "kind": { - "const": "SecurityCaseType" - }, - "spec": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "version", - "status", - "title", - "purpose", - "parameters", - "composition", - "materialization", - "follow_through", - "verification", - "rollback", - "acceptance" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$" - }, - "version": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+$" - }, - "status": { - "enum": [ - "draft", - "proposed", - "acknowledged", - "implemented", - "deprecated", - "retired" - ] - }, - "title": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "purpose": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "parameters": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/parameter" - } - }, - "composition": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/composition" - }, - "materialization": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/materialization" - } - }, - "follow_through": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/step" - } - }, - "verification": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 2, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/check" - } - }, - "rollback": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/rollback" - } - }, - "acceptance": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "accepted_by", - "risk_class" - ], - "properties": { - "accepted_by": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "enum": [ - "owner", - "founder" - ] - } - }, - "risk_class": { - "enum": [ - "low", - "medium", - "high" - ] - } - } - }, - "history": { - "type": "array", - "items": { - "type": "object" - } - }, - "execution_descriptors": { - "type": "object", - "maxProperties": 128, - "propertyNames": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$", - "not": { - "pattern": "[^a-z0-9-]" - } - }, - "additionalProperties": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$", - "minLength": 71, - "maxLength": 71 - }, - "description": "Optional exact owner machine-descriptor byte digests keyed by declared follow-through step. A pin alone is not owner acknowledgment, execution authority or native evidence." - } - } - } - }, - "$defs": { - "parameter": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "name", - "type", - "case_settable", - "sensitivity", - "description" - ], - "properties": { - "name": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$" - }, - "type": { - "enum": [ - "string", - "integer", - "number", - "boolean", - "array", - "object" - ] - }, - "case_settable": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "required": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "default": {}, - "sensitivity": { - "enum": [ - "public", - "operational", - "security_sensitive", - "secret_reference" - ] - }, - "constraints": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "properties": { - "pattern": { - "type": "string" - }, - "enum": { - "type": "array" - }, - "min_items": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 0 - }, - "unique": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "required_when": { - "type": "string" - } - } - }, - "description": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - } - } - }, - "composition": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "authority", - "initial_trust", - "capabilities", - "providers" - ], - "properties": { - "authority": { - "enum": [ - "platform", - "netkingdom", - "tenant" - ] - }, - "initial_trust": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "type": "string" - } - }, - "capabilities": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "type": "string" - } - }, - "providers": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - } - }, - "parameter_bindings": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": { - "type": "string" - } - } - } - }, - "materialization": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "kind", - "template" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "kind": { - "enum": [ - "openbao_policy", - "openbao_role", - "kv_path", - "catalog_entry" - ] - }, - "template": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "description": { - "type": "string" - }, - "when": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]* (==|!=) [A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+$" - }, - "body": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1, - "description": "The rendered object's content over case parameters: a policy's rules or a role's bindings. Required for openbao_policy and openbao_role; literal braces are doubled." - } - }, - "allOf": [ - { - "if": { - "properties": { - "kind": { - "enum": [ - "openbao_policy", - "openbao_role" - ] - } - }, - "required": [ - "kind" - ] - }, - "then": { - "required": [ - "body" - ] - } - } - ] - }, - "step": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "auth", - "entry_point", - "id", - "owner", - "value_handling", - "warden_executes" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "owner": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "entry_point": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "auth": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "warden_executes": { - "type": "boolean", - "description": "ops-warden invokes the owner's declared entry point through the caller proxy, under the caller's identity; ops-warden holds no credential for it (ops-warden ADR-0002)." - }, - "attended": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "attended_justification": { - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "type": "string" - }, - "when": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]* (==|!=) [A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+$" - }, - "lane": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$", - "description": "ops-warden catalog lane that resolves this step; required when warden_executes or attended" - }, - "value_handling": { - "enum": [ - "none", - "generated_in_custody" - ] - }, - "ready_check": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1, - "description": "status-only gate checked before the next step; never reads a value" - } - } - }, - "check": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "check", - "expect", - "reads_secret_value" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "check": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "expect": { - "enum": [ - "allow", - "present", - "deny" - ] - }, - "reads_secret_value": { - "const": false - }, - "when": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]* (==|!=) [A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+$" - } - } - }, - "rollback": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "reverses", - "action" - ], - "properties": { - "reverses": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "action": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1 - }, - "when": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]* (==|!=) [A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+$" - } - } - } - } -} diff --git a/canon/schemas/security-case_v0.1.schema.json b/canon/schemas/security-case_v0.1.schema.json deleted file mode 100644 index a71370b..0000000 --- a/canon/schemas/security-case_v0.1.schema.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", - "$id": "https://netkingdom.local/schemas/security-case_v0.1.schema.json", - "title": "NetKingdom SecurityCase v0.1", - "description": "Structure of a security case file (canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md section 4). Parameter values are checked against the referenced type by tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py.", - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": ["apiVersion", "kind", "spec"], - "properties": { - "apiVersion": {"const": "netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1"}, - "kind": {"const": "SecurityCase"}, - "spec": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": ["id", "type", "status", "owner", "parameters"], - "properties": { - "id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"}, - "type": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*@\\d+\\.\\d+$"}, - "status": {"enum": ["proposed", "accepted", "materialized", "live", "retired"]}, - "owner": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": ["repo", "person"], - "properties": { - "repo": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1}, - "person": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1} - } - }, - "parameters": {"type": "object"}, - "acceptance": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": ["at", "record", "by"], - "properties": { - "at": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1}, - "record": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1}, - "by": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "items": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": ["role", "name"], - "properties": { - "role": {"enum": ["owner", "founder"]}, - "name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1} - } - } - } - } - }, - "receipts": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "object"}} - } - } - } -} diff --git a/canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json b/canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json deleted file mode 100644 index edd868e..0000000 --- a/canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,496 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", - "$id": "https://policy.coulomb.social/schemas/service-identity/v0.1", - "title": "NetKingdom service identity declaration v0.1", - "description": "One service declares every account it holds (NetKingdom Service Identity and Privilege v0.1, draft-3: an estate profile of SecurityCanon). Accounts carry an imported principal_type and authority grants written MODE @ SCOPE with activation and environment. Holds no credential and no secret-shaped value. Facts a declarer cannot establish are 'unknown', never guessed.", - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "schema_version", - "service", - "owner", - "declared_at", - "attestation", - "complete", - "identities" - ], - "properties": { - "schema_version": { - "const": "0.1" - }, - "service": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,40}$" - }, - "owner": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 200 - }, - "declared_at": { - "type": "string", - "format": "date" - }, - "attestation": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "authored_by", - "basis", - "owner_confirmed" - ], - "properties": { - "authored_by": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 2, - "maxLength": 100 - }, - "basis": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "maxItems": 40, - "items": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 200 - } - }, - "owner_confirmed": { - "type": "boolean" - } - } - }, - "complete": { - "type": "boolean", - "description": "True only when the owner asserts that every identity the service holds is listed." - }, - "identities": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "maxItems": 200, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/identity" - } - }, - "exceptions": { - "type": "array", - "maxItems": 100, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/exception" - } - } - }, - "$defs": { - "name": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,127}$" - }, - "unknownable": { - "description": "A fact that may be unknown rather than guessed." - }, - "consumer": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "name", - "kind" - ], - "properties": { - "name": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1, - "maxLength": 100 - }, - "kind": { - "enum": [ - "person", - "service" - ] - } - } - }, - "identity": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "name", - "principal_type", - "purpose", - "grants", - "interactive_login", - "second_factor", - "custody", - "consumers", - "owner", - "rotation", - "status" - ], - "properties": { - "name": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/name" - }, - "principal_type": { - "enum": [ - "HUMAN", - "WORKLOAD", - "SERVICE", - "AGENT", - "CONTROLLER", - "DEVICE", - "unknown" - ], - "description": "Imported from InfoTechCanon via SecurityCanon. 'unknown' is a declarer's placeholder." - }, - "conventions": { - "type": "array", - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "enum": [ - "bind", - "service-admin", - "executor" - ] - }, - "description": "Estate naming conventions for recurring grant shapes (standard section 2). More than one is itself a finding." - }, - "purpose": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 300 - }, - "grants": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "maxItems": 20, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/grant" - } - }, - "federated_role": { - "type": "boolean", - "description": "A role mapping federated principals to authority; holds no credential." - }, - "assurance_claim_bound": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "interactive_login": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "second_factor": { - "enum": [ - "required", - "not_enforced", - "not_supported", - "not_applicable", - "unknown" - ] - }, - "custody": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "enum": [ - "offline-key", - "personal-safe", - "openbao-lease", - "delivered-secret", - "none", - "unknown" - ] - }, - "description": "Every place the credential lives. One credential in two places is two entries." - }, - "consumers": { - "type": "array", - "maxItems": 50, - "items": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/consumer" - } - }, - "owner": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 200 - }, - "rotation": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "path", - "coupling" - ], - "properties": { - "path": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 300 - }, - "coupling": { - "type": "array", - "maxItems": 20, - "items": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1, - "maxLength": 100 - } - } - } - }, - "status": { - "enum": [ - "active", - "legacy", - "planned" - ] - }, - "disposition": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "action", - "owner", - "date" - ], - "properties": { - "action": { - "enum": [ - "retire", - "accept", - "defer" - ] - }, - "owner": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 200 - }, - "date": { - "type": "string", - "format": "date" - } - } - }, - "recovery": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "needed", - "works_with_sso_down", - "in_crisis_list" - ], - "properties": { - "needed": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "works_with_sso_down": { - "enum": [ - true, - false, - "unknown" - ] - }, - "in_crisis_list": { - "type": "boolean" - } - } - }, - "agent": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "mode", - "presents_principal_type", - "max_token_ttl_seconds", - "boundary_policy" - ], - "properties": { - "mode": { - "enum": [ - "autonomous", - "delegated", - "unknown" - ] - }, - "presents_principal_type": { - "enum": [ - "agent", - "service", - "human", - "unknown" - ] - }, - "max_token_ttl_seconds": { - "type": "integer", - "minimum": 1, - "maximum": 86400 - }, - "boundary_policy": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 200 - } - } - }, - "executor_subject": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1, - "maxLength": 120, - "description": "For a credential held by a bounded executor (NK-WP-0056): the subject the executor presents in its admissions (spec.executor.identity). Grants of all identities with the same subject form the executor's declared authority." - } - }, - "allOf": [ - { - "if": { - "properties": { - "status": { - "const": "legacy" - } - }, - "required": [ - "status" - ] - }, - "then": { - "required": [ - "disposition" - ] - } - }, - { - "if": { - "properties": { - "principal_type": { - "const": "AGENT" - } - }, - "required": [ - "principal_type" - ] - }, - "then": { - "required": [ - "agent" - ] - } - } - ] - }, - "exception": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "id", - "rules", - "identity", - "reason", - "owner", - "expires", - "compensating_control", - "elimination_path" - ], - "properties": { - "id": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^SI-X[0-9]{1,3}$" - }, - "rules": { - "type": "array", - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "type": "string", - "pattern": "^(SI-(1[0-5]|[1-9])|NAMING)$" - } - }, - "identity": { - "$ref": "#/$defs/name" - }, - "reason": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 10, - "maxLength": 400 - }, - "owner": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 3, - "maxLength": 200 - }, - "expires": { - "type": "string", - "format": "date" - }, - "compensating_control": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 10, - "maxLength": 400 - }, - "elimination_path": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 10, - "maxLength": 400, - "description": "What change ends the exception (DSM-EXC-004)." - } - } - }, - "grant": { - "type": "object", - "additionalProperties": false, - "required": [ - "mode", - "scope" - ], - "description": "MODE @ SCOPE with SecurityCanon dimensions. 'unknown' is a declarer's placeholder, not a canon mode.", - "properties": { - "mode": { - "enum": [ - "USE", - "OBSERVE", - "OPERATE", - "ADMINISTER", - "GOVERN", - "CONSTRUCT", - "SOVEREIGN", - "unknown" - ] - }, - "scope": { - "type": "string", - "minLength": 1, - "maxLength": 120 - }, - "activation": { - "enum": [ - "STANDING", - "JUST_IN_TIME", - "SCHEDULED", - "APPROVED", - "INCIDENT", - "BREAK_GLASS", - "RECOVERY" - ] - }, - "environments": { - "type": "array", - "uniqueItems": true, - "items": { - "enum": [ - "DEVELOPMENT", - "TEST", - "STAGING", - "PRODUCTION", - "RECOVERY" - ] - } - }, - "read_only": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "note": { - "type": "string", - "maxLength": 200 - } - } - } - } -} diff --git a/canon/standards/audit-correlation_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/audit-correlation_v0.1.md deleted file mode 100644 index a2bbf43..0000000 --- a/canon/standards/audit-correlation_v0.1.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-STD-AUDIT-CORRELATION -title: "Audit Correlation Contract" -version: "0.1" -status: accepted -owner: net-kingdom -created: "2026-10-27" -work: NK-WP-0055-T11 ---- - -# Audit Correlation Contract v0.1 - -## Purpose - -This contract defines one correlation id that links the audit records of a single unit of work across all of these: - -- identity issuance; -- the authorization decision; -- secret access; -- workload enforcement. - -Without it, the architecture's onboarding audit-readiness step (`docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md`, step 7) -cannot be tested. - -Owners: - -- **NetKingdom** owns this contract. -- **audit-core** owns the `correlation_id` envelope field (AUDIT-WP-0017-T05). -- **Each emitting service** owns its own propagation. - -## Rules - -**AC-1. Format.** `correlation_id` is the 32-character lowercase hex trace id of -[W3C Trace Context](https://www.w3.org/TR/trace-context/). An all-zero id is invalid. The value is opaque and carries no -personal data, tenant name or secret. Receivers may store other ids of up to 128 characters, but those do not satisfy this -contract. - -**AC-2. Transport.** On HTTP, the id travels in the standard `traceparent` header. The `correlation_id` is the trace-id -part of that header. There is no custom header. For non-HTTP calls (LDAP, internal queues), the emitting service records -the id it received on its inbound HTTP leg. - -**AC-3. Not a token claim.** The id is never placed in an access token, ID token or other credential. A token outlives a -unit of work, so a claim would wrongly link unrelated requests. - -**AC-4. Who sets it.** - -- The **originator of the unit of work** sets the id: the workload or the user-facing application, at the start of the - request it is serving. -- Every downstream component copies the inbound id unchanged into its audit record and into its own outbound calls. -- A component that receives no valid `traceparent` starts a new trace. It records that fact as - `correlation_origin: generated`; propagated ids are recorded as `correlation_origin: propagated`. -- `parent_event_id` is optional, and is used only when one record directly causes another. - -**AC-5. Trust.** The id is a claim made by the caller and nothing more: - -- It never influences an authentication, authorization or secret decision. -- It is not evidence of who acted. The record's authenticated subject is that evidence. -- Where a decision record is signed (access-engine FLEX-WP-0024), the signature covers the id, so the record cannot be - relinked afterwards. - -**AC-6. Per emitter.** - -| Emitter | Where it reads the id | Owner task | -|---|---|---| -| Workload / application | Generates the id, or takes it from its own inbound request | each workload owner | -| KeyCape | Inbound `traceparent` on the token and authorize endpoints | key-cape (via NK-WP-0055-T11) | -| access-engine | Inbound `traceparent` on the check APIs; copied into the decision record | FLEX-WP-0031-T11 | -| OpenBao | Audits the `traceparent` request header in plain text via `sys/config/auditing/request-headers` (`hmac: false`) and maps it on shipping | RPF-WP-0066-T02 | -| Authelia, LLDAP, privacyIDEA | Inbound `traceparent` where the service exposes it; otherwise `correlation_origin: generated` | NK-WP-0055-T11 identity intake | -| Kubernetes API audit | Not part of the chain. It keeps its own `auditID`, and k3s does not carry the id | RCLUSTER-WP-0021 | - -**AC-7. End-to-end test.** The tenant onboarding completion test (NK-WP-0055-T12) passes only when a single -`correlation_id` set by a test workload can be found in audit-core in all of these records: - -- the KeyCape issuance record; -- the access-engine decision record; -- the OpenBao audit record; -- the workload enforcement record. - -The test uses synthetic subjects only. - -## Open for owners - -- audit-core: confirm the `correlation_origin` field name and the validation for the new sources (AUDIT-WP-0017-T05). -- railiance-platform: confirm that the OpenBao version in use supports audited request headers (RPF-WP-0066-T01). -- key-cape: accept the propagation task. diff --git a/canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md deleted file mode 100644 index 27817e1..0000000 --- a/canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,254 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: netkingdom-bounded-execution-admission-v0.1 -type: standard -title: "NetKingdom Bounded Execution Admission v0.1" -domain: netkingdom -status: proposed -version: "0.1" -owner: net-kingdom -created: "2026-10-31" -updated: "2026-10-31" -last_reviewed: "2026-10-31" -review_interval: 3m -scope: accountable-automation -schema: - - canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json -validator: - - tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py -examples: - - examples/bounded-execution-admission/ -related: - - canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/playbook-capability-contract_v0.2.md - - workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md - - workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md ---- - -# NetKingdom Bounded Execution Admission v0.1 - -## 0. Status - -Proposed (NK-WP-0056-T01). Nothing here is enforced by a running service yet. The executor runtime -is T02/T03, budget and kill-switch enforcement is T07, and the first live use is the T06 pilot. A -document that passes the validator is a well-formed **request**. It is an **admission** only together -with a carrier record that a person approved (section 5). - -## 1. Purpose - -SI-15 names the golden path *prepare → admit → execute → verify → retain*, and allows "a bounded -executor under the admission" at step 3. This standard defines what that admission is. The founder -approves, at `aal2`: - -- an exact plan, by digest; -- a validity window; -- a scope ceiling in SI `MODE @ SCOPE` terms; -- a blast-radius rule; -- a stop-and-revert policy tied to named machine checks; -- a risk class; -- an expense budget. - -The executor consumes the admission once. Top-level decisions and guardrails stay with the person, -and execution below them is delegated, bounded and reconstructable. - -Out of scope: who runs the executor (T02), how a carrier stores approvals (Approval Engine owns that), -and the receipt's emission and custody (NK-WP-0040-T02). - -## 2. Vocabulary - -| Term | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| Admission request | The immutable document defined here (`BoundedExecutionAdmission`), identified by `spec.id` and by its digest | -| Carrier | The system that records a person's approval of one request and its single consumption: Approval Engine, or a founder SSH signature (NK-WP-0049 practice) | -| Admission | A request plus a carrier record that passes BEA-C1..C7 | -| Executor | The non-human identity that runs the plan: a `WORKLOAD`, `SERVICE` or harness-launched `AGENT` (SI-14) | -| Step class | `delegable` (the executor may run it under an admission), `root-class` (the founder admits each run; high risk only), `human-intrinsic` (never in an admission: for example a person's own password) | -| Check | A named, source-pinned machine check that must pass after a mutating step | -| Consumer | The unit the blast radius counts: a service whose behaviour a step can change | - -## 3. The admission request - -A YAML or JSON document validated by `canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json`: - -| Field | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| `spec.id`, `title`, `purpose`, `work_ref` | Identity and intent. `id` is `BEA-YYYY-NNNN` | -| `risk_class` | `low`, `medium` or `high`. Bounds the window, the attempts, the ceiling and the step classes | -| `window.not_before` / `not_after` | When the admission can be consumed. At most 72 h (low), 24 h (medium) or 4 h (high) | -| `approval` | Who may approve (`approvers`, `HUMAN`, `aal2`) and through which carriers | -| `executor` | The executing identity, its principal type and runtime | -| `scope_ceiling` | Grants `{mode, scope, environments}` that bound every step. Scopes are `/`-separated paths, and a grant covers its own scope and anything below it | -| `blast_radius` | `unit`, the `consumers` the plan may touch, and `max_concurrent` | -| `trust_requires` | Playbook Capability Contract trust states the executor must find satisfied before the first step | -| `plan.source` | Repository, commit, and the sha256 of every file the run executes or checks with | -| `plan.steps`, `plan.revert_steps` | Ordered steps: `operation`, `target`, `consumer`, `class`, `mutates`, `requires` (the grant it needs), `checks_after`, `revert` or `irreversible` | -| `plan_digest` | `sha256:` over the canonical JSON of `plan` (sorted keys, no whitespace, UTF-8) | -| `checks` | Named checks: `ref` (a pinned file), `sha256`, `timeout_seconds`, optional `settle_seconds`, `expect: pass` | -| `stop_and_revert` | `on_check_failure` and `on_budget_exhausted` (`revert` or `stop`); `on_unknown: stop`; `on_revert_failure: stop-and-alert` | -| `budget` | `wall_time_seconds`, `attempts`, and `cost` (CPU seconds, egress bytes, currency, amount) | -| `consumption` | `single_use: true`, `consume_before_first_step: true` | -| `receipt` | The NK-WP-0040 execution-attribution receipt, where it goes, and that it is retained by hash with no secret values | -| `not_authorized` | What this admission explicitly does not cover | - -`settle_seconds` exists because of the T08 finding: privacyIDEA's resolver cache hides a broken bind -for up to 120 s, so a check run sooner proves nothing. - -## 4. Rules (validator: `validate`) - -| Rule | Requirement | -| --- | --- | -| BEA-1 | The document matches the schema (`HUMAN` approvers at `aal2`, single use, `on_unknown: stop`) | -| BEA-2 | `plan_digest` equals the digest of `plan`: the person admits exactly this plan | -| BEA-3 | The window is positive and no longer than the risk class allows | -| BEA-4 | The executor is not `HUMAN` and not an approver. An `AGENT` must be harness-launched (SI-14) | -| BEA-5 | No `SOVEREIGN` or `GOVERN` in the ceiling. No `CONSTRUCT` in `PRODUCTION`. `ADMINISTER` needs `max_concurrent: 1`; at a whole-service scope (no `/`) it needs `high` risk and only `root-class` steps | -| BEA-6 | Least privilege: every step and revert step is covered by a ceiling grant of the same mode, and every ceiling grant covers at least one step | -| BEA-7 | No `human-intrinsic` step. A `root-class` step needs `high` risk | -| BEA-8 | Every step's consumer is in the blast radius. `medium` and `high` risk change one consumer at a time | -| BEA-9 | Every mutating step names checks, revert steps included: a revert must prove the restored state with its own checks. Every check is used and pinned: its `ref` and `sha256` appear in `plan.source.files` | -| BEA-10 | Every mutating step has a revert step, or is `irreversible` at `high` risk. Revert steps mutate and do not nest. Step ids are unique. The executor runs revert steps in their declared order (the recovery order: data, then delivery, then restart), limited to those whose forward step ran | -| BEA-11 | A revertable plan reverts on check failure. A plan with nothing to revert stops | -| BEA-12 | The wall time fits the window, the checks (timeouts plus settle times) fit the wall time, and attempts are at most 3 (1 at `high` risk) | -| BEA-13 | The executed source is pinned by file and commit | -| BEA-14 | No secret-shaped value anywhere in the document | - -Findings name the rule and a location, never a value. - -## 5. Carrier and consumption (validator: `check-approval`) - -A carrier record (`netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-approval/v0.1`) states the carrier, its approval -reference, the admission id and digest, the approver (name, principal type, assurance), the approval -time, and the consumptions. - -The **admission digest** is `sha256:` over the canonical JSON of the whole request, including -`plan_digest`. That digest is what a carrier binds. - -| Rule | Requirement | -| --- | --- | -| BEA-C1 | The carrier is one the request allows, and the record has the expected shape | -| BEA-C2 | The record names this admission's id and digest | -| BEA-C3 | The approver is a listed `HUMAN` approver and not the executor | -| BEA-C4 | The approval was made at `aal2` | -| BEA-C5 | The approval was made before the window closed | -| BEA-C6 | Consumed at most once | -| BEA-C7 | The consumption happened in the window, after approval, by the executor identity | - -**Approval Engine (preferred carrier).** Approval Engine already stores an approval that binds action, -actor, principal, purpose and target by digest, carries a validity window, and is consumed exactly -once (`POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume`), read back through `GET /v1/approvals/{id}`. The proposed -mapping, which is for agreement with Approval Engine and Access under T02, not decided here: - -- `action: bounded-execution`; -- `actor`: the executor identity; -- `principal`: the approver; -- `purpose`: `spec.purpose`; -- `target: {admission_id, admission_digest}`; -- validity equal to `window`; -- the executor consumes before its first step (`consume_before_first_step`). - -Approval Engine's own contract notes that `consume` does not check that the request digest is -equivalent to the decision. An independent mediator must therefore fetch the approval and compare -`target.admission_digest` itself. A `consumed: true` returned by the caller is not proof. - -**Founder SSH signature (transitional carrier).** This is the NK-WP-0049 practice: - -- the founder signs the canonical request with `ssh-keygen -Y sign`, namespace - `netkingdom-bounded-execution`; -- the signature is verified against the repository's `allowed_signers`; -- `aal2` is established by the signing key's custody, not by a token. - -Single use is then only as strong as the executor's own consumption ledger. That is acceptable for -the transition and is recorded as such in the receipt. - -## 6. Mapping - -**SI-15 golden path.** - -| Golden-path step | What it means here | -| --- | --- | -| Prepare | `plan.source` (source-reviewed, pinned files), tested on synthetic fixtures. For bind changes, NK-WP-0056-T08's synthetic stack | -| Admit | Carrier approval of the admission digest at `aal2` | -| Execute | The executor, inside `scope_ceiling`, `blast_radius`, `window` and `budget`, consuming once | -| Verify | The named checks during the run. Afterwards, an independent verifier checks the carrier record (BEA-C1..C7) and the receipt's source hashes | -| Retain | The receipt, kept by hash with no secret values | - -**Playbook Capability Contract.** `trust_requires` uses the contract's trust-state vocabulary. The -executor refuses to start unless each state is satisfied, using the readiness checks of the -capability declarations it runs. A step's `operation` should name a declared capability operation -once Railiance declarations exist for it. - -**Execution-attribution receipt (Playbook Capability Contract v0.2, NK-WP-0040).** One receipt per run: - -| Receipt field | Filled from | -| --- | --- | -| `initiator` | The carrier's approver (the founder). The person authorized the run; the executor ran it | -| `delegation` | Absent unless the approver acted through an agent | -| `executing_workload`, `runtime_principal` | `executor.identity`, `executor.runtime` | -| `run_id` | New per run | -| `source_commit` | `plan.source.commit` | -| `artifact_digest` | `plan_digest` | -| `target`, `action` | Per step | -| `decision_refs` | `spec.id`, the admission digest and the carrier's approval reference | -| `time_interval` | Measured | - -The receipt adds the outcome per step, check results, whether a revert ran, and the budget used. It -never holds a secret value. - -Founder decision 2026-10-31, agreed with audit-core (AUDIT-WP-0018): - -- When the executor consumes the admission, before its first step, it emits a separate - `execution.run.started` event, so a run that crashes before its receipt is still detectable. -- It then emits one `execution.attribution.receipt` per run: - - `target` and `action` at the admission level (`admission:`, `bounded-execution`); - - per-step detail in `steps[]`; - - `decision_refs` labelled `admission`, `admission_digest` and `approval`. -- Envelope ids are `run::started` and `run::receipt`. - -**Policy decision point.** access-engine's gate (FLEX-WP-0040) has two decisions: `start` before -consume, and `execute-step` after it. The T06 pilot runs without the gate: its receipt records the -gate as `not-evaluated` and claims no allow. Any further admission needs the gate, or an exception -the founder records (founder decision 2026-10-31). - -**Failure classes.** A failed check, or an operation that reports a definite failure (for example a rollout that never becomes ready), reverts per `on_check_failure`. An error whose outcome is not established stops (`on_unknown: stop`) without reverting. Receipts name the error type, never its message. - -**Credentials during a run.** Write roles exist only during the admitted window: the platform creates -them when an admission is approved and deletes them after the receipt (CCR-2026-0058). A directory -bind rotates its own password, so no password-manager account is needed (founder decisions -2026-10-31). - -## 7. The bind split as admissions - -NK-WP-0056 tagged each step of the 2026-10-30 LLDAP bind split. The examples express them: - -| Runbook step | Class | Example | -| --- | --- | --- | -| 2, 4, 10 (verify) | delegable, read-only | `bind-split-read-only-verify.yaml`: low risk, `OBSERVE` only, nothing to revert | -| 3 create `svc-*` accounts | root-class | `bind-split-create-service-accounts.yaml`: high, whole-directory `ADMINISTER` (no narrower LLDAP grant, SI-X6), revert deletes what was created | -| 5–8 switch one consumer | delegable | `bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml`: medium, one consumer, a synthetic-journey check after the restart, a revert per step. This is the T06 pilot shape | -| 9 change LLDAP's super-admin | root-class | `bind-split-switch-super-admin.yaml`: high, one attempt, `settle_seconds: 125` on the journey check (privacyIDEA cache) | -| 10 `admin`'s own password; seal `ld-admin` | human-intrinsic | Refused: `tools/bounded-execution-admission/fixtures/invalid/human-intrinsic-step.yaml` (BEA-7) | - -The examples are illustrative. They pin real files at a real commit, but the executor and its -operations do not exist yet. - -## 8. Conformance - -```bash -make bounded-execution-admission-test # validator tests -make bounded-execution-admission-check # validate the examples -python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval -python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py digest -``` - -Agents may run these: they are offline and read-only. Writing an admission is preparation, and -approving one is the founder's act. - -## 9. Open items - -- T02: the carrier mapping with Approval Engine and Access (action name, actor and representation, - digest equivalence, consume scope for the executor), and the executor runtime owner. -- T03: the executor identity and its grants, matching the ceilings in the examples. -- T07: enforcement of budget and attempts at run time, the founder's kill switch, and aggregate - review through posture feedback (NK-WP-0031). -- NK-WP-0040-T02: receipt emission, custody and schema in audit-core. -- Recurring admissions (one approval for repeated runs of the same plan) are deliberately excluded - from v0.1: every admission is single use. diff --git a/canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md b/canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md index f98a0b8..9d7fc13 100644 --- a/canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md +++ b/canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Credential Management Standard — net-kingdom -**Version:** 0.2 **Status:** current with OpenBao runtime and secret-free handoff refinements **Supersedes:** v0.1 (retired with NK-WP-0004) +**Version:** 0.2 **Status:** current with OpenBao runtime refinement **Supersedes:** v0.1 (retired with NK-WP-0004) --- @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ control plane. ## 2. Trust Hierarchy ``` -age public recipient ────────► encrypts secrets.enc/ in git +age private key ─────────────► encrypts secrets.enc/ in git │ └──► ops bundle (encrypted snapshot of all secrets) └──► stored offsite; decrypt with age key @@ -49,36 +49,30 @@ authority once the platform control plane is alive. ## 3. Credential Lifecycle -### Phase 0 — Bootstrap (attended, public-recipient encryption) +### Phase 0 — Bootstrap (run once, agent-driven) -`make creds-agent-init` retains its compatibility name but runs in the operator's -attended terminal. It requires an independently registered `keys/age.pub`; it -never generates a root key or searches HOME for one. The operator separately -establishes custody of the matching private key before bootstrap. +``` +make creds-agent-init +``` -The workflow generates service files with private permissions, encrypts with the -public recipient, applies and verifies the scoped cluster setup, then creates a -fresh encrypted ops bundle. The recovery handoff displays its location and digest. -The operator stores that exact artifact off-host and verifies decryption in an -isolated recovery workspace before typing `STORED AND VERIFIED`. Only then does -bootstrap remove plaintext and mark completion. This acknowledgment is a human -statement; a separate native drill receipt is required to establish recovery. +This single command runs the full bootstrap end-to-end: +1. Verifies prerequisites (age, kubectl, openssl, cluster) +2. Generates or verifies the age keypair at `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` +3. Generates all service secrets via `gen-secrets.sh` +4. Encrypts them to `secrets.enc/` with age and commits +5. Injects them into the cluster via `creds-apply.sh` +6. Verifies all K8s Secrets exist +7. Waits for privacyIDEA to be Ready, then runs enckey bootstrap + admin creation +8. Applies KeyCape secrets (requires pi-admin) +9. Hands off runtime secret authority to OpenBao when the Railiance + platform layer is present and verified +10. Creates the ops bundle (age-encrypted snapshot) +11. Delivers the emergency bundle to the terminal for human storage + ← **only human touchpoint** +12. Shreds all plaintext and marks `bootstrap_complete: true` -For an encrypted resume with no plaintext service directory, invoke bootstrap -through `sops-custody-unlock.sh` from the operator terminal. Only the explicitly -supplied temporary `NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE` is used, and it must match the -registered public recipient before any cluster call. There is no ambient key -fallback. Use the owner-approved target and change scope; the helper supplies -custody material, not authorization. - -`bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh --dry-run` emits a non-mutating -plan without reading keys or state, contacting the cluster, or creating files. -A terminal check prevents accidental transcript-driven execution; it is not a -credential-isolation boundary or proof of the caller's identity. - -Historical `emergency_bundle_delivered` fields remain historical. New receipts -use `recovery_handoff_confirmed`, `recovery_handoff_bundle_sha256` and a timestamp; -an old true value cannot skip acknowledgment of a newly generated bundle. +The script resumes from where it left off if interrupted — each phase is +tracked in `creds-state.yaml`. ### Phase 1 — Normal operation @@ -105,42 +99,60 @@ See Section 6 for details. ### Phase 3 — Recovery Use the emergency bundle stored in your personal password manager. -See Section 4 — Emergency Recovery Handoff. +See Section 4 — Emergency Bundle. --- -## 4. Emergency Recovery Handoff +## 4. Emergency Bundle -The custodian age private key and platform-root account/factors stay in the -independently held password safe/offline custody packet. OpenBao init/unseal -material follows its separately selected custody ceremony; the lab SOPS-held -automation branch is outside the new workflow tests and retains its own gate. Service recovery files -travel in the age-encrypted ops bundle. The bundle must not contain its own -private decryption key. Current workload authority remains in OpenBao. +### Contents -`make creds-emergency-reprint` is now a **non-secret recovery guide**. It reads no -private key or service secret, writes no plaintext copy and cannot reconstruct -lost custody material. Legacy secret-export arguments are refused. Clearing a -terminal or shredding a temporary file cannot retract an existing transcript. +| Item | Purpose | +|------|---------| +| age private key | Decrypt any `secrets.enc/*.age` file from git | +| privacyIDEA admin password | Direct access to privacyIDEA if cluster/auth is down | +| LLDAP admin password | Direct LDAP directory access | +| PostgreSQL root password | Direct database access | +| break-glass user password | Emergency login if Authelia/KeyCape is down | +| ops bundle location + decrypt command | Point-in-time snapshot of all secrets | +| OpenBao unseal/recovery material, if used | Platform-control-plane break-glass only | -Recovery sequence: +### Delivery -1. Retrieve the separately held key and exact encrypted snapshot from their - independent custody locations. Check the non-secret digest/receipt. -2. Use the custody unlock helper in the approved isolated workspace. Decrypt to - private files, never stdout; verify required service files without printing - their contents. Consult `docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md`. -3. Execute the scoped service owner's recovery procedure with the approved - cluster/target. A historical snapshot can contain superseded credentials; - validate current authority and consumer acceptance before reuse. -4. Remove temporary keys and decrypted files, and retain only safe outcomes, - artifact identities and timestamps. Loss or suspected disclosure requires - the separate owner rotation/revocation process; guide output rotates nothing. +The emergency bundle is displayed once in the terminal at the end of +`make creds-agent-init`. The operator must copy it into their personal +password manager before pressing Enter to continue. -The 2026-10-12 source correction removes the old stdout handoff. It does not -retroactively revoke any root or password disclosed by earlier runs. Existing -founder-deferred exposure rotation remains in CUST-WP-0073-T05. Native acceptance -of the corrected workflow remains NK-WP-0049; source tests do not certify it. +The confirmation gate is a **deliberate security control** — bootstrap +does not complete until the human confirms receipt. + +### Re-delivery + +If the emergency bundle is lost or stolen: + +``` +make creds-emergency-reprint +``` + +This reprints the bundle from the current age key and secrets. +It does **not** rotate any secrets — if you suspect compromise, rotate +the affected secrets separately with `make creds-rotate`. + +### Storage recommendations + +Store the emergency bundle in one or more of: +- 1Password, Bitwarden, KeePassXC, or equivalent +- Encrypted offline storage +- Printed and physically secured (air-gapped scenarios) + +The agent does not care which — it only cares that you confirm receipt. + +### Recovery procedure + +1. Restore `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` from the emergency bundle +2. Clone net-kingdom repo +3. Run: `make creds-apply` — re-injects all secrets from `secrets.enc/` +4. Use break-glass passwords for direct service access if needed --- @@ -232,9 +244,7 @@ make creds-bundle Store the bundle offsite (cloud, external drive, second location). Decrypt: ``` -# In the approved isolated recovery workspace, with the custody helper: -age -d -i "$NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE" -o secrets.tar ops-bundle-.tar.age -# Inspect/extract privately under the owner procedure; never print file contents. +age -d -i ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt ops-bundle-.tar.age | tar xf - ``` --- @@ -246,21 +256,19 @@ The following are permanently prohibited: 1. **Committing `secrets/` (plaintext) to git** — the pre-commit hook blocks this; do not bypass with `--no-verify` -2. **Using a personal safe as runtime workload secret authority** — runtime - workload custody belongs to OpenBao. Independently held bootstrap/root - custody and offline recovery remain distinct from runtime workload delivery. +2. **Storing secrets in KeePassXC as the primary credential store** — KeePassXC + is for optional personal backup of the emergency bundle only -3. **Skipping the current encrypted-recovery handoff acknowledgment** — a - historical `emergency_bundle_delivered` value cannot certify a new bundle. - Completion requires the attended acknowledgment bound to its SHA256; native - recovery readiness still requires the separate drill receipt. +3. **Skipping the `emergency_bundle_delivered` confirmation gate** — even in + non-interactive or automated runs, the agent MUST NOT mark bootstrap + complete until the human confirms receipt. This gate exists to ensure + break-glass access is always available. 4. **Hardcoding secrets in manifests or ConfigMaps** — all service secrets must flow through K8s Secrets created by `create-secrets.sh` scripts -5. **Storing or printing the root key through automation** — the private key - belongs in independent custody. Only the explicit attended unlock supplies a - temporary key; no permanent HOME key discovery or generation in bootstrap. +5. **Storing the age private key in the repo** — the key lives outside the + repo at `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` 6. **Using OpenBao as a policy decision point** — OpenBao stores, leases, audits, and revokes secret material; identity comes from the IAM diff --git a/canon/standards/emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md index 8aaf409..077fd58 100644 --- a/canon/standards/emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md +++ b/canon/standards/emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md @@ -51,9 +51,7 @@ InfoTechCanon corrected its adoption brief: `972c0b6701d1693f` identified the The schema ID is an identifier; supply the file from the owner checkout, not a network download from that hostname. This profile remains proposed pending -operational source/observer acceptance. Approval Engine and Qonto owner -instances migrated and passed scoped validation on 2026-10-03; that source -validation does not establish deployed delivery or observation. The King's Guard draft is provenance, +owner-instance migration and validation. The King's Guard draft is provenance, not a fallback schema. ## 2. Ownership @@ -159,16 +157,3 @@ This profile can become accepted only when: checked with owner-authored class inventories; and - `kings-guard` has been given the canonical coordinates so its handover draft can become historical. - - -## Coordination-frame configuration — 2026-10-15 - -Source owners may derive their cadence timing from the ecosystem coordination -frame at `coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json`. The operator's -current frame is f=1h; the first adopter mapping is heartbeat f, receiver wait -2f, and effective missing-heartbeat deadline 3f after the receiver's 1.5 grace. -Namespaced frame provenance accompanies the derived numeric declaration values. -Changing the frame requires regenerating the source/receiver settings together -and separately deploying them through owner change control. It changes neither -source classification nor the heartbeat-plus-reconciliation requirement, and -a compiled configuration is not evidence of operating emission or observation. diff --git a/canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md deleted file mode 100644 index e2e38e5..0000000 --- a/canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,214 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: netkingdom-security-case-types-v0.1 -type: standard -title: "NetKingdom Security Case Types v0.1" -domain: netkingdom -status: accepted -version: "0.1" -owner: net-kingdom -created: "2026-10-08" -updated: "2026-10-08" -last_reviewed: "2026-10-08" -review_interval: 3m -scope: meta-orchestration -accepted: "2026-10-08" -accepted_by: founder -schema: - - canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json - - canon/schemas/security-case_v0.1.schema.json -validator: - - tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py -template: - - security-case-types/_template/ -related: - - canon/standards/playbook-capability-contract_v0.2.md - - canon/standards/security-scenario-composition_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md - - docs/security-bootstrap-use-cases.md ---- - -# NetKingdom Security Case Types v0.1 - -## 1. Purpose - -Most security work in the ecosystem repeats a small number of shapes: a browser -service that signs users in through NetKingdom, a service that authenticates -with its own credential, a workload that reads one KV path, an agent that needs -a short-lived SSH certificate. Until now each occurrence was built by hand: a -new helper script, a new custody path, a new founder checklist. That is slow, -and every hand-built instance can drift from the last one. - -This standard separates **designing a shape** from **using it**: - -- A **SecurityCaseType** is designed once, with ample documentation and tests, - and acknowledged as an informed-decision, because its shape is part of the - security architecture as a whole. -- A **SecurityCase** of an implemented type is light: the requester fills in the - type's parameters, the case is accepted, ops-mason arranges it, and ops-warden - carries it out on the authentication path the type provides. - -Making a new type is deliberately harder than making a new case. - -## 2. Terms - -| Term | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| **SecurityCaseType** | A reusable, versioned security pattern for one kind of use case. Defines parameters, composition, materialization, execution route, verification, rollback and threats. | -| **SecurityCase** | One instance of a type, with concrete parameter values, an owner and an acceptance record. | -| **KnownSecurityCase** | A SecurityCase whose type is `implemented` (section 5). Only known cases take the light path. | -| **Type acknowledgment** | The informed-decision that admits a type, or a new major version of a type. | -| **Case acceptance** | The record that the case's owner, and where the type requires it the founder, accepted this instance. | -| **Materialization** | ops-mason building the structure a case needs: OpenBao policies, roles and KV path structure (never values), and catalog entries. | -| **Follow-through** | ops-warden executing the case's declared entry points on the type's authentication path, and verifying it. | - -A SecurityCaseType is not a new orchestration engine. It is a NetKingdom-owned -**composition** of playbook capabilities that their owning repos declare under -the Playbook Capability Contract, plus the guarantees in section 3. Execution -stays with the declared entry points (ADR-0007, ADR-0012). - -## 3. What a SecurityCaseType must define - -A type is a directory `security-case-types//` in net-kingdom containing: - -1. **`type.yaml`** (machine-readable, schema `canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json`): - - `id`, `version`, `status` (section 5), `title`, `purpose` - - `parameters`: each with type, validation, allowed range and whether a case - may set it. Secret values are never parameters, only custody references. - - `composition`: required playbook capability ids with exact provider pins, - in the security-scenario-composition form (fail-closed ordering, explicit - initial trust, owner attribution) - - `materialization`: the OpenBao structure ops-mason creates per case, as - templates over the parameters: policy, role, KV path, catalog entry; - a policy, role or catalog entry templates its body (`body`), not only its - name, so that cases add values and never design - - `follow_through`: the ops-warden route for each step, `warden_executes`, - the auth method and the entry point; which steps need an attended human - login, if any, and why. Each step also names: - - `lane`: the reviewed ops-warden catalog lane that resolves it. This is - required for every step ops-warden executes or groups into an attended - session, and ops-warden refuses to plan a step whose lane is missing or - unreviewed. - - `value_handling`: `none`, or `generated_in_custody` for a secret that is - generated inside the broker and custody. A generated value never passes - through the run, its argv, stdout or receipts. - - optionally `ready_check`: a status-only gate that must hold before the - next step (for example, a delivery reporting Ready). It never reads a - value. - - `warden_executes: true` means exactly this: ops-warden invokes the owner's - declared entry point through its existing caller proxy, under the caller's - identity and the caller's own lane. It never means that ops-warden holds a - standing credential for the step; that would make it a broker (ops-warden - ADR-0002). *(Clarified 2026-10-09 from ops-warden's review, - WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 R1–R3.)* - - A step listed in the type's `execution_descriptors` is admissible to - ops-warden's case kernel whatever its `warden_executes` value, and the kernel - enforces the step's mode. For an `attended` step, "kernel-dispatched" means - the reviewed adapter runs only inside the attended human session (descriptor - actor `human`, the step's own lane, parent-session revocation per attempt), - never under an agent or a standing credential. The human session is the - authority, and the kernel is only the dispatcher. For an owner-path step - (neither `warden_executes` nor `attended`), the lane must resolve to the - owner's own delegated path, and ops-warden holds no owner credential. - `warden_executes` keeps its caller-proxy meaning above for unattended steps. - *(Clarified 2026-10-17 from the 1.3 owner reviews, NK-1.3-C2 and ops-warden - KERNEL-3.)* - - `verification`: the checks that prove a case is live (positive and - negative), runnable without reading a secret value - - `rollback`: the exact inverse of each step - - `acceptance`: who accepts a case (owner only, or owner and founder) and - what risk class this type carries -2. **`README.md`**: the threat model, what the type protects and from whom, - design alternatives considered, and known limits. -3. **Tests**: validation of `type.yaml`, a rendered example case, and the - composer's output for that case. A type with no runnable tests cannot be - acknowledged. -4. **Reference instances**: existing hand-built instances this type replaces - or adopts, so that the type is grounded in practice. - -## 4. What a SecurityCase must define - -A case is a file `security-cases/.yaml`, in the requesting owner's -repository or in net-kingdom when it has no other owner: - -- `type`: `@`, which must be `implemented` -- `parameters`: values for the type's parameters -- `owner`: the repository and person accountable for the case -- `acceptance`: who accepted it, when, and where (State Hub decision, or a - record in the owner's repository) -- `status`: `proposed` → `accepted` → `materialized` → `live` → `retired` - -Nothing else. Everything a case needs beyond its parameters belongs in its type. -If a case cannot be expressed in its type's parameters, it is not a case of that -type: either change the case or propose a new type version (section 6). - -## 5. Type lifecycle - -| Status | Meaning | Who moves it | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `draft` | being written; not usable | type author | -| `proposed` | complete per section 3, tests green, Decision Memo prepared | type author | -| `acknowledged` | admitted by informed-decision | the founder, through informed-decision | -| `implemented` | ops-mason can materialize it and ops-warden can follow through; one reference case is live and verified | net-kingdom, with ops-mason and ops-warden | -| `deprecated` | no new cases; existing cases keep running | net-kingdom | -| `retired` | no cases remain | net-kingdom | - -Only `implemented` types accept new cases. - -## 6. Changing a type - -- **Patch** (documentation, tests, a stricter validation): a normal reviewed - change; no decision. -- **Minor** (a new optional parameter, an extra verification step): a - reviewed change, recorded in the type's history; no new acknowledgment unless - the risk class changes. -- **Major** (a changed authentication path, materialization or trust - transition; a looser validation; a higher risk class): a new informed-decision, - as for a new type. Existing cases stay on their version until migrated. - -## 7. The light path for known cases - -For a case of an `implemented` type: - -1. The requester writes the case file and validates it against the type. -2. The accepter records acceptance (section 4). This is the only human step - unless the type's `acceptance` requires an attended login for a specific - step, which the type must justify. -3. ops-mason materializes it from the type's templates. Its executive-summary - gate collapses to the case acceptance, because the shape was decided when the - type was acknowledged. -4. ops-warden follows through on the type's route and runs the type's - verification. -5. The case moves to `live` with the verification receipt. - -No case-specific helper script is written. If one seems necessary, the type is -incomplete. - -## 8. Roles - -| Party | Responsibility | -| --- | --- | -| net-kingdom | owns this standard, the type directory, the schema and the composer; admits and retires types | -| ops-mason | materializes OpenBao structure for cases from type templates; proposes the type's materialization section | -| ops-warden | follows through on cases; owns the routing catalog entries a type defines; proposes the type's follow-through section | -| owning repositories (key-cape, railiance-platform, ...) | declare the playbook capabilities that types compose; own execution | -| informed-decision | presents the type's Decision Memo to the founder and records acknowledgment | -| requesters | write cases, own them, retire them | - -## 9. Boundaries - -- No secret value in a type, a case, a test or a receipt. -- This standard does not grant execution authority. Each step runs under its - owner's declared entry point and its own authentication. -- Existing hand-built instances keep working. They are adopted as cases when - their type is implemented, not rewritten in place. - -## 10. Open questions (carried after acceptance, 2026-10-08) - -- Where should case files live by default: with the requester, or centrally in - net-kingdom? -- Is the informed-decision Decision Memo for a type rendered from `type.yaml` - and `README.md`, or written separately? -- Which steps of the first types genuinely need an attended human login (for - example key-cape's live client configuration), and how is that minimised? diff --git a/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md b/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md index e92eb22..392b11c 100644 --- a/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md +++ b/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md @@ -3,23 +3,16 @@ id: netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.8 type: standard title: "NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.8" domain: netkingdom -status: accepted -revision: "accepted-1" -accepted_memo: "infd-20261010-security-layer-v08" -accepted_memo_version: 2 -accepted_disposition_id: "disp-43e051e9-b12f-4c34-b26e-40b85a96c2e8" -accepted_approval_id: "8432d0dc-adc0-42d0-9a5b-6b71ff492e15" -accepted_at: "2026-10-10T23:23:53Z" -accepted_source_sha256: "103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167" +status: proposed version: "0.8" supersedes: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md owner: gate-house publication_owner: net-kingdom created: "2026-08-28" -updated: "2026-10-11" -last_reviewed: "2026-10-10" +updated: "2026-09-09" +last_reviewed: "2026-09-09" review_interval: 3m -source_revision: "gate-house@4bd50bfcac850f34e5563ade61fc92103b062f4d; A9-A13 set v0.3 and A2 v1.1" +source_revision: "gate-house@516ed4e" standard_token: security-layer-model_v0.8 # "assented_by" records assent to a BOUNDARY, given at the version named. # It is not assent to the current text. Revision reviews are listed in §14. @@ -195,31 +188,6 @@ cannot be lost in a summary. | **Engines** | interfaces for a modeled concept | APIs, contracts | yes | | **Staff** | management, operations, change, controlling | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | **no** | -**The vocabulary is these four tokens, and it is closed:** - -``` -Taxonomy Tooling Engine Staff -``` - -A layer declaration (§11) carries exactly one of them. **Comparison is ASCII -case-insensitive** and a conformance run MUST fold case before comparing: two spellings -of `Engine` do not describe two boundaries, and a check that reports nine findings about -capital letters has made the one real disagreement unfindable. The spellings above are -canonical for new and changed declarations; a lowercase declaration is **conforming**, -not tolerated. - -A value outside the four is not conforming and does not name a tier this model has not -enumerated. A fifth layer arrives by amending this section, argued by a repository that -bears a cost under the four-layer cut — not by a repository declaring one. - -`Engines` appears in the table heading above for its plural reading; the token is -`Engine`, as §4's Layer column carries it. - -A **role** is not a layer. §3.3's Engine roles and §6.4's PEP shape describe what a -repository does within its layer, are carried in a separate `role:` key, and are not -governed by this vocabulary. Ruled in `GH-DEC-2026-012` R2 and again in -`GH-DEC-2026-017` §3. - ### 3.1 Taxonomy Cross-cutting language. Taxonomy repositories define terms and semantic @@ -319,49 +287,34 @@ assent to them sight-unseen. ## 4. Layer catalog -| Repository | Layer | Role | Owns | Evidence source | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `info-tech-canon` | Taxonomy | — | ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and terminology | unassessed | -| `net-kingdom` | Taxonomy | — | NetKingdom standards of record; publication | unassessed | -| `key-cape` | Tooling | — | packaged identity tooling; IAM profile; authentication | unassessed | -| `OpenBao` | Tooling | — | secret storage, leases, PKI, dynamic secret engines | unassessed | -| `user-engine` | Engine | PIP | users, accounts, memberships | unassessed | -| `tenant-engine` | Engine | PIP | tenant-as-an-entity facts | unassessed | -| `zone-engine` | Engine | PIP | zone identity and membership — offline reference conformance per its 2026-08-23 disposition | unassessed | -| `secrets-engine` | Engine | Lifecycle | credential abstraction, custody, lifecycle | unassessed | -| `audit-core` | Engine | Evidence | audit event custody, retention, integrity verification, export — explicitly not a decision point (§9.6) | no | -| `access-engine` | Engine | **PDP** | **the policy decision** — the only decision point (§6) | yes | -| `approval-engine` | Engine | PIP | the approval object — durable, authenticated, consumable, atomically supersedable (§9.4) | unassessed | -| `maturity-engine` | Engine | PIP | graded progression against declared criteria and evidence; the gap register; capability readiness (§9.5) | unassessed | -| `gate-house` | Staff | — | security doctrine, authority context, curriculum; **conformance review — through `maturity-engine` (§9.5)** | unassessed | -| `ops-mason` | Staff | PEP-shaped | building and tearing down access routes and perimeters | unassessed | -| `ops-warden` | Staff | PEP-shaped | operational access lanes, stewardship, runbooks; SSH certificate issuance — **declared-gap** (§9.1, §13) | unassessed | -| `kings-guard` | Staff | — | adaptive defence and judgment; observation of Staff-reachable sources — identity and secret observation **pending**; **proposes** containment, which it does not own (§9.2) | unassessed | -| `whitehat-security` | Staff | — | offensive validation | unassessed | - -**Evidence source is a marking, not a reading.** A repository is a source of evidence -where it **emits** events into the estate's evidence stream. Custody is disjoint from -emission: holding a record never discharges any emitter's guarantee, and `audit-core`'s -`Evidence` role is custody. The distinction is what `§9.6` rests on — an archive cannot -prove a record was never sent, which has content only because the archive and the -emitter are different parties. - -The column carries exactly `yes`, `no`, or `unassessed`: `access-engine` is -`yes`, `audit-core` is `no`, and all other rows remain `unassessed` until -assessed. `—` is not a value. The §11 check reports `unassessed` as -unassessed, never as conforming or as not a source (`GH-DEC-2026-024` §2). +| Repository | Layer | Role | Owns | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | +| `info-tech-canon` | Taxonomy | — | ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and terminology | +| `net-kingdom` | Taxonomy | — | NetKingdom standards of record; publication | +| `key-cape` | Tooling | — | packaged identity tooling; IAM profile; authentication | +| `OpenBao` | Tooling | — | secret storage, leases, PKI, dynamic secret engines | +| `user-engine` | Engine | PIP | users, accounts, memberships | +| `tenant-engine` | Engine | PIP | tenant-as-an-entity facts | +| `zone-engine` | Engine | PIP | zone identity and membership — offline reference conformance per its 2026-08-23 disposition | +| `secrets-engine` | Engine | Lifecycle | credential abstraction, custody, lifecycle | +| `audit-core` | Engine | Evidence | audit event custody, retention, integrity verification, export — explicitly not a decision point (§9.6) | +| `access-engine` | Engine | **PDP** | **the policy decision** — the only decision point (§6) | +| `approval-engine` | Engine | PIP | the approval object — durable, authenticated, consumable, atomically supersedable (§9.4) | +| `maturity-engine` | Engine | PIP | graded progression against declared criteria and evidence; the gap register; capability readiness (§9.5) | +| `gate-house` | Staff | — | security doctrine, authority context, curriculum; **conformance review — through `maturity-engine` (§9.5)** | +| `ops-mason` | Staff | PEP-shaped | building and tearing down access routes and perimeters | +| `ops-warden` | Staff | PEP-shaped | operational access lanes, stewardship, runbooks; SSH certificate issuance — **declared-gap** (§9.1, §13) | +| `kings-guard` | Staff | — | adaptive defence and judgment; observation of Staff-reachable sources — identity and secret observation **pending**; **proposes** containment, which it does not own (§9.2) | +| `whitehat-security` | Staff | — | offensive validation | An **actuation surface** — reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload — is catalogued nowhere because it does not exist. See §9.2: it is an Engine concept held at zero, not a Staff capability. -`access-engine` is the ruled repository name formerly carried by `flex-auth`; -both names denote the same authority across the governed rename. A13's -circulated coordinate was pending, not broken. The repository coordinate now -resolves at `access-engine`: `FLEX-WP-0020` records rename operation -`a15af186-6b98-47a4-9b53-79e131747d11` completed on 2026-09-30. -Runtime names remain `flex-auth` under `FLEX-DEC-2026-013`; rename execution -conditions and remaining separate owner gates live in that workplan, not here. +`access-engine` is the ruled name for the repository currently called +`flex-auth`; both denote the same authority until the governed rename completes. +Execution conditions for that rename are recorded in its migration decision, not +here. ## 5. The binding rule @@ -1229,65 +1182,15 @@ A layer stated *about* a repository by another repository is not a declaration. Review notes, catalog rows, and correspondence record an intent to adopt; only the repository's own file conforms. -**Declaration form.** Because prose cannot distinguish a declaration from a transcribed review, a declaration -MUST carry a machine-readable form: **a `layer:` key in the repository's own `INTENT.md` -frontmatter.** An equivalent declaration file MAY accompany it and is a **derived -artifact** under this section's derived-artifact rule: it MUST be marked as derived, MUST -name `INTENT.md` as what it derives from, and MUST agree with it. `INTENT.md` governs. - -This is not a preference between two files. This section already says a repository -declares its layer in its own `INTENT.md`; the alternative form was added to give the -declaration a machine-readable *form*, and was read as giving it a second *authority*. - -**A disagreement between the two forms is a finding in its own right** and MUST be -reported rather than resolved away by precedence. Precedence says which value is the -repository's answer; it does not say the disagreement did not happen. Where one -appearance is reachable by two routes, the record says which route. - -**A conformance run MUST state its scope.** This section's obligations attach to -estate-authored repositories **in §4**. A repository outside §4 may declare voluntarily -using this form, and a voluntary declaration is welcome; it is not a §4 obligation and a -run that grades it is over-scoped. A run over §4 and a run over every repository carrying -a declaration answer different questions, and a report that does not say which it did -cannot be acted on. **A run over a single repository is a permitted third scope:** it -names the repository and states whether that repository is in §4, and a run over a -repository outside §4 reports a voluntary result, not §4 conformance. - -**A layer declaration MUST NOT carry a standard version.** The declared layer is a -standing property of the repository and does not change when this standard is revised; a -version in the declaration makes every revision read as though it invalidated every -declaration. That is the confusion this standard's own `assented_by` note exists to -prevent: assent records assent to a **boundary**, given at the version named, and is not -assent to the current text. - -**The rule reaches content, not a key name.** The declaration, for this purpose, is every -key of the `INTENT.md` frontmatter and every key of a derived declaration file. No key or -value of either carries a version of this standard **or of its companion** — including a -version carried in a path or file name, such as a `standard:` key naming -`…security-layer-model_v0.7.md`. Comments, and the version of a declaration file's own -schema, are not versions of this standard and are not reached. *(r3)* **A version is -reached when it is carried as a pin:** in a key naming a version of this standard or its -companion, in a path or file name, or in the value of a key that identifies this standard -or its companion. A citation of an earlier revision in a record's prose, stating where a -rule came from, is provenance and is not reached. - -**The rule reaches the declaration only.** A stance map, claims map, or evidence -classification states a position on clause text, which is version-scoped as a layer is -not, and it SHOULD carry the version of the text it answers; this rule does not apply to -it and a conformance run MUST NOT apply it there. - -**Version-scoped state belongs to the conformance run.** Every run MUST state, in its -output, the version or commit of this standard it checked against and its scope. A checker -re-run on demand satisfies this by stating both on every run; no declaring repository is -required to emit a durable conformance record. Where a run's output is **retained or -relied upon**, the retained output is a derived artifact under this section's -derived-artifact rule, and the party retaining it carries the version or commit it was -derived at. - -If a future revision changes §3's vocabulary such that a declared token no longer denotes -the same layer, declarations do **not** silently retarget: that revision carries a -re-declaration round, run in this standard's authoring voice. A per-file version pin would -not have caused anyone to re-read anything. +**Declaration form.** Because prose cannot distinguish a declaration from a +transcribed review, a declaration MUST carry a machine-readable form: a `layer:` +key in the `INTENT.md` frontmatter, or an equivalent declaration file. Without +it this section asserts a property it cannot deliver — the defect this standard +has now corrected three times elsewhere. `ops-warden` has implemented a reference +form (`layer.yaml`, a conformance script, and a test covering the §5.2 +no-authority property) and offered it to the repositories that have yet to +declare. Raised by `audit-core`, which noted that `flex-auth`'s conforming +declaration is legible as one only by following its decision trail. Mechanically checkable: @@ -1300,11 +1203,8 @@ Mechanically checkable: surface; - no §4 capability is catalogued without an engine surface, a `pending` mark, or a `declared-gap` mark; -- every repository **marked in §4 as an evidence source** declares its - **emission guarantee** in its machine-readable layer declaration, **per event - class** — a single repository-level guarantee over a stream containing both - a high-volume and a rare class is an average, not a declaration, and will be - satisfied by rate monitoring that cannot see the rare event go missing; for a +- every repository catalogued in §4 as a source of evidence declares its + **emission guarantee** in its machine-readable layer declaration: for a **load-bearing** source, a local transactional outbox (§9.4), its declared cadence, and the detection surface the governing cadence profile requires for that class — under `net-kingdom`'s @@ -1312,9 +1212,7 @@ Mechanically checkable: MAY be covered by rate monitoring where the source has classified it as suitable, with a positive window and a positive minimum; a **rare** load-bearing class MUST NOT be, and MUST carry a heartbeat **and** - reconciliation, not either alone, and, where that guarantee is not itself - completeness, an explicit statement that completeness is not claimed; for an - **attributive** source, the trade it + reconciliation, not either alone; for an **attributive** source, the trade it makes and an explicit statement that completeness is not claimed. Which class an event falls in, and whether it is rare, is the source's published classification: a conformance run is supplied that inventory and MUST NOT @@ -1332,8 +1230,8 @@ A source that declares no emission guarantee is not conforming, and neither is one that declares load-bearing emission with rate monitoring alone where its event class is rare (§9.6). The declaration is what makes §9.6 checkable rather than reviewable; without it the section states an obligation whose satisfaction -cannot be observed, which is the §9.1 defect this standard has repeatedly -corrected; the instances are listed in §15. Drafted in `gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-emission-detection.md`, +cannot be observed, which is the §9.1 defect this standard has now corrected four +times. Drafted in `gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-emission-detection.md`, which `approval-engine`'s `cadence.yaml` implements as the reference instance. The check states no MUST/SHOULD split of its own: which evidence classes must declare cadence, and in which form, is the governing profile's to say (§17), and @@ -1341,21 +1239,6 @@ this item follows it rather than restating it. Raised by `audit-core` as the general form of `GH-IN-0001`, so the finding that produced `GH-WP-0002` cannot recur unnoticed. -**The completeness non-claim binds both arms.** Where the declared guarantee is -not itself completeness, the declaration carries an explicit statement that -completeness is not claimed. A load-bearing guarantee states the controls, not -their sufficiency. The outbox is atomicity at the source against crash and partial -failure. Heartbeat and reconciliation detect loss after the fact. Neither is a -proof that a record was never sent, and neither covers a compromised source -suppressing an event and its own count together. Completeness, where this standard -actually requires it, is emission atomic with the state change; the declaration -may say that, and it MUST NOT describe the detection surface or the archive as -that completeness. Ruled in `GH-DEC-2026-024` §1, from the bound on rule 13 and -from §9.6. - -No detectable or direction-limited failure-path release exception is added to -§9.6 or this check (`GH-DEC-2026-024` §3). - The example-validation check is the mechanical half of §12's derived-artifact rule; `approval-engine` reports it at fifteen lines. Its second clause is the non-obvious one: an example set that silently omits an optional field teaches @@ -1528,33 +1411,8 @@ follow-up. Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-006`. ## 14. Adoption -Status is **accepted**. The confirmed human acceptance of memo -`infd-20261010-security-layer-v08`, version 2, approval -`8432d0dc-adc0-42d0-9a5b-6b71ff492e15`, at 2026-10-10T23:23:53Z adopts the exact -proposed source SHA256 -`103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167`. -This version now governs; v0.7 remains unchanged as historical accepted text. -The acceptance metadata and this adoption notice are publication annotations, -not changes to the approved normative provisions. The bounded publication -receipt is `docs/security-layer-v0.8-acceptance.md`. Checker convergence remains -the separate post-flip GH-WP-0004-T11 obligation. - -**Publication preparation history, 2026-10-10.** A9–A13 (A11 r2, A12 r3) and -`GH-DEC-2026-024`'s A2/A10 corrections are assembled into this proposed -cut. This source preparation neither ratifies the standard nor closes -`GH-DEC-2026-019`'s hold by itself. Condition 2 is satisfied by audit-core's -returned 2026-09-23 §11 review (GH-WP-0004-T07); condition 3 by the four -declarations/dated gaps (T08). Condition 1 is source-complete: GateHouse T09 records and dispositions the -applied fresh A11 r2/A12 r3 technical returns from kings-guard, -approval-engine and railiance-master on 2026-10-10, all against amendment-set -SHA256 9b454b83c9aeed08ba13dba4d812f5ae6b4293ced9e43088d64cc3cc00b1459d. -Prior-revision assent was not carried over. Those receipts are technical -returns to the exact amendments, not founder acceptance or a review of -every final-cut adaptation. Gate-house retains authoring -disposition and net-kingdom publication; the named founder acceptance act -was separately supplied by the confirmed human memo acceptance above. T11 checker -convergence is now due after this flip, rather than being inferred complete. - +Status is **proposed**. v0.7 remains **accepted** and in force until this version +is accepted in its place; it is not patched. Two things that acceptance does and does not mean, kept apart because `ops-warden` asked for the distinction: @@ -1564,7 +1422,7 @@ Two things that acceptance does and does not mean, kept apart because | **Boundary assent** | given by the four repositories below, at the version named in each record, and undisturbed since | | **Revision review** | v0.7's changes were each the adopted remedy of a v0.6 finding. All fifteen v0.6 findings were subsequently audited against the v0.7 body — not against its change log — and confirmed dispositioned (`gate-house/docs/conformance/2026-09-06-v06-findings-audit.md`) | | **Reviewed as text** | v0.8's circulated round returned findings from `access-engine`, `approval-engine`, `ops-warden`, and `net-kingdom`, and every finding is dispositioned in `gate-house/docs/conformance/2026-09-06-v08-assent-round.md`. Nine corrections landed in this text during circulation (§15 items 12–20) and one request was declined with its reasons in §6.4 | -| **Not claimed** | No clean-bill review of every section is claimed. `kings-guard`'s §9.5 criteria-grounding and §12 step-four review is not claimed here. `audit-core` returned its §11 review on 2026-09-23; its findings are dispositioned by GH-DEC-2026-024 and incorporated in this proposed cut. `approval-engine` named the sections it did not read in the earlier circulation; A11 r2/A12 r3 returns concern those exact amendments, not all sections. | +| **Not claimed** | `kings-guard` and `audit-core` have not returned a text review; the sections each was asked to attack — §9.5's criteria-grounding clause and §12's step-four paragraph for the first, §11's emission-guarantee wording for the second — carry no assent from the repository best placed to test them. `approval-engine` named the sections it did **not** read (§1–§4, §7, §8, §9.1–§9.2, §9.5–§9.6, §9.8, §10, §18, §20) rather than let a three-finding review read as a clean bill | **Ten of this version's twelve changes as cut were requested by another @@ -1612,20 +1470,6 @@ basis. Declaration requests are open as intakes in each. ## 15. Change log -**2026-10-10 source finalization of the held proposed cut:** A9 closes the -layer tokens and ASCII case comparison (§3); A10 adds assessed evidence-source -marking (§4) and per-class emission inventory (§11); A11 r2 makes INTENT -frontmatter authoritative, sidecars derived and disagreements findings, and -admits the explicit single-repository scope (§11); A12 r3 bans declaration -pins while preserving prose provenance and requires version/scope in each run -(§11). A13's coordinate note follows the governed completed rename while -preserving `flex-auth` runtime names (§4). GH-DEC-2026-024 adds the explicit -load-bearing completeness non-claim and preserves the rejection of a -failure-path exception; no other section's authority is expanded. -Sources: gate-house/docs/amendments/v0.8-section-11-declaration-amendments.md -v0.3; gate-house/docs/amendments/v0.8-amendment-set.md v1.1; GH-DEC-2026-019, -020, 021 and 024. The older numbered change list below remains history. - v0.7 → v0.8: 1. **§9.7.3 corrected** — the PEP MUST consume before the protected side effect. diff --git a/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.9.md b/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.9.md deleted file mode 100644 index d5edf46..0000000 --- a/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.9.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2284 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.9 -type: standard -title: "NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.9" -domain: netkingdom -status: proposed -revision: "proposed-1" -version: "0.9" -supersedes: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md -owner: gate-house -publication_owner: net-kingdom -created: "2026-08-28" -updated: "2026-10-22" -last_reviewed: "2026-10-10" -review_interval: 3m -source_revision: "GH-DEC-2026-025; GH-WP-0004-T06-r1" -accepted_predecessor_sha256: "3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b" -bounded_doctrine_approval_id: "d90c899b-f25c-4e66-a003-808ee5b1324f" -bounded_doctrine_proposal_sha256: "08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a" -standard_token: security-layer-model_v0.9 -# "assented_by" records assent to a BOUNDARY, given at the version named. -# It is not assent to the current text. Revision reviews are listed in §14. -assented_by: - - "flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001" - - "kings-guard KG-DEC-2026-001" - - "ops-warden ADR-0010" - - "audit-core AUDIT-IN-0001, and v0.4 review with three findings" - - "flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-002 (v0.4, §9.3 contested)" - - "kings-guard v0.4 review, four findings" - - "ops-warden 2026-08-29 v0.4 review, three findings" - - "kings-guard v0.6 review, four findings; KG-DEC-2026-002 (§9.5 boundary)" - - "ops-warden v0.6 review, two findings" - - "access-engine FLEX-DEC-2026-003 (v0.6), five findings and two answers" - - "audit-core v0.6 review, three findings" -related: - - canon/standards/security-zones_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md - - gate-house/decisions/decisions.md - - net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md - - gate-house/history/2026-08-28-security-layer-model-and-gate-house-recut.md ---- - -# NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.9 - -## 1. Purpose - -This standard states how NetKingdom's IT-security estate is layered, and what -each layer may and may not do. It answers one question: - -> **Given a repository, which layer is it in, and what does that permit it to -> own?** - -The layers are distinguished by **determinism** and by **the kind of artifact -the layer produces**, not by technical tier, deployment topology, or team. - -It is not an org chart, not a network model, not a deployment topology, and not -a dependency graph. It does not assign work, and it does not replace any -repository's boundary contract; it constrains what such a contract may claim. - -**What changed in v0.8.** v0.7 was accepted, and eight rulings were made against -it in the eight days that followed. Each was correctly kept out of the accepted -text; together they are a version. - -Three correct a rule that was unsafe or unfalsifiable as written. §9.7.3 stated -that the action precedes consumption, which leaves the compare-and-swap able to -prevent only the second *record* and never the second *side effect* — single -consumption was theatre. §9.5's boundary with posture rested on volatility, which -describes the two categories without partitioning them. §6.4 let `unknown` -resolve permissively, which makes being unclassifiable a privilege escalation -requiring no credential. - -Three close a gap between rules already made. §6.4 gains validation by owning -layer and the rule that correspondence between two artifacts is established by -identity rather than translation. §11 gains an emission-guarantee declaration, so -`GH-IN-0001` cannot recur unnoticed. §13.1 gains three rows, a scoping axis, a -coverage figure, and an honest statement of what it cannot answer. - -Nine more corrections landed during circulation, listed as §15 items 12–20 and -dispositioned in `gate-house/docs/conformance/2026-09-06-v08-assent-round.md`. The -load-bearing one is §6.4 obligation 1: a PEP must be able to *attribute* a -decision to `access-engine`, and no digest comparison does that. Fail-closed -protects against a decision point that is absent, not against one that lies. - -One is a defect of the same kind this standard has now corrected repeatedly: §17 -stated that emission-cadence ownership was unassigned and unassented after it had -been assigned and both owners had accepted. And §11 and §12 gain the general form -of the failure that produced it — six instances in one week, across four -repositories, of a repository acting on a derived summary rather than the -authoritative body. Four were self-reported and one was committed by the -repository proposing the rule, which is the argument that the publishing shape -makes the error the default rather than that four repositories were careless. - -§15 records the change list. Section numbers are unchanged: the estate cites them. - -**What changed in v0.7.** v0.6 announced a rule it never wrote: §1 and §15 said -the standard separates human and agent principals inside Staff, and §3.4 was -byte-identical to v0.5. `kings-guard` found it and put it correctly — *a rule -stated about a standard in its own change log is not a rule*, which is §11's own -principle turned on the standard. §3.4 is now written. - -The rest are collisions between rules written for the clean case: §6.4's first -obligation forbade what its third obligation blesses, and its second forbade the -session-bound allow §9.7.1 permits. §9.4's atomicity was described as closing a -threat it does not close. §19 graded the document it lived in. And §20 records -the interaction boundary with Railiance operations, on definitions from -`railiance-master` rather than inference. §15 records the change list. - -**What changed in v0.6.** An independent assessment against industry practice -(`net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md`) found the model -sound as a layering constitution and incomplete as a *self-healing* one: cognition, -authority, and execution are specified, but the two verbs that close a healing -loop — observe in production and actuate through a deterministic surface — are -pending, and one is unstaffed. It also found the Engine layer untyped, so that -"we need an engine for X" drifts toward "X now decides", and the enforcement -point unnamed. - -v0.6 types the engines (§3.3), names the enforcement point (§6.4), replaces the -containment assignment with an actuation surface held at zero (§9.2), separates -human and agent principals inside Staff (§3.4), puts time into the model (§9.7), -requires the Taxonomy artifacts that make §6.2 compileable rather than -reviewable (§17), and composes the sibling standards it had only cited (§18). -Section numbers below §14 are unchanged: the estate cites them. - -**What changed in v0.5.** All four reviewing repositories returned findings on -v0.4, and one contested a rule. §9.3 was wrong: it collapsed *engine reachable -but degraded* with *engine not reachable at all*, and the second case has no -evaluator in the path to express anything. §9.1 collapsed *no route exists* with -*route exists under a declared gap*, which would have forced a false "pending" -onto a production capability. §11 claimed mechanical checkability for a rule -that cannot be checked in prose. §13 filed two opposite conformance states in one -table and recorded proposed owners as owners. §9.6 needed the load-bearing -distinction it implied but never drew. §15 records the change list. - -**What changed in v0.4.** `audit-core` assented to the approval evidence half -and corrected the rationale twice. v0.3 rested §9.4 on that repository's INTENT -principle 6, which is an aspiration; the shipped bound in its `docs/integrity.md` -is weaker and conditional. More consequentially, no append-only archive can prove -**omission at source** — a suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact — which -is now stated as an estate-wide doctrine constraint (§9.6) rather than left -implicit. `audit-core` was also referenced as an owner in v0.3 without appearing -in the §4 catalog at all; it is catalogued here, as an Engine, on its own -declaration. §15 records the change list. - -**What changed in v0.3.** Two engines were seeded to own concepts v0.2 recorded -as unowned: `approval-engine` takes the approval object that §13 left homeless, -and `maturity-engine` takes graded progression — closing a §9.1 defect in -gate-house's own catalog claim, which asserted conformance review with no engine -to act through. §15 records the change list. v0.3 is **proposed**: the two new -engines are seeded by owner direction and have no other side to assent yet, and -the evidence half of the approval split needs `audit-core`'s assent. - -**What changed in v0.2.** v0.1 was assented to by all three repositories whose -boundaries moved, and each returned a finding. v0.1 had one lane for a Staff -repository that legitimately touches Tooling — read-only diagnostics — which is -narrower than the estate as it actually stands, and a rule with no lane for a -real sanctioned case is satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap. -v0.1 also catalogued a capability (§4, containment) that §5 forbade discharging, -and applied its reconstructability test to engines but not to the doctrine -gate-house feeds them. §15 records the full change list. - -## 2. Authority and conformance - -| Fact or rule | Authority | -| --- | --- | -| The layers, their definitions, and the rules between them | This standard, owned by gate-house | -| Which layer a given repository is in | This standard, §4 catalog | -| What a repository owns within its layer | That repository's `INTENT.md` and boundary contract | -| Whether a specific request is permitted | `access-engine` — never this standard | -| Whether a Tooling contact is sanctioned | The declaring repository, under the shapes in §5, reviewable by gate-house | -| Security doctrine and invariants | gate-house | -| Publication | net-kingdom canon | -| Whether an invariant is *watched in practice* | the observing repository's own report — never this standard, and never §12's diagram | - -A repository conforms when its `INTENT.md` declares its layer, its claims fall -within that layer's permissions (§3), and its Tooling contacts take one of the -sanctioned shapes in §5 or are declared as gaps under §5.3. - -**No estate argument may cite observation that has not happened.** §12 lists -`kings-guard` against the loop's fourth step, and that repository has reported -that it has never observed a real event. Until it reports otherwise, no -assessment, review, or decision in this estate may treat an invariant as being -watched in practice on the strength of the diagram. Lifted here from §12 so it -cannot be lost in a summary. - -## 3. The layers - -| Layer | Character | Produces | Deterministic | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| **Taxonomy** | cross-cutting language | terms, semantic contracts, standards | n/a — describes | -| **Tooling** | infrastructure and state | data structures, persistence | yes | -| **Engines** | interfaces for a modeled concept | APIs, contracts | yes | -| **Staff** | management, operations, change, controlling | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | **no** | - -**The vocabulary is these four tokens, and it is closed:** - -``` -Taxonomy Tooling Engine Staff -``` - -A layer declaration (§11) carries exactly one of them. **Comparison is ASCII -case-insensitive** and a conformance run MUST fold case before comparing: two spellings -of `Engine` do not describe two boundaries, and a check that reports nine findings about -capital letters has made the one real disagreement unfindable. The spellings above are -canonical for new and changed declarations; a lowercase declaration is **conforming**, -not tolerated. - -A value outside the four is not conforming and does not name a tier this model has not -enumerated. A fifth layer arrives by amending this section, argued by a repository that -bears a cost under the four-layer cut — not by a repository declaring one. - -`Engines` appears in the table heading above for its plural reading; the token is -`Engine`, as §4's Layer column carries it. - -A **role** is not a layer. §3.3's Engine roles and §6.4's PEP shape describe what a -repository does within its layer, are carried in a separate `role:` key, and are not -governed by this vocabulary. Ruled in `GH-DEC-2026-012` R2 and again in -`GH-DEC-2026-017` §3. - -### 3.1 Taxonomy - -Cross-cutting language. Taxonomy repositories define terms and semantic -contracts so the other layers interoperate without integration by -interpretation. They own no runtime position and no state any layer depends on. - -`info-tech-canon` holds ecosystem-wide semantic contracts. NetKingdom-specific -security architecture — including this standard — is net-kingdom canon's. - -### 3.2 Tooling - -Deterministic infrastructure: data structures, persistence, and the consistent, -performant, scalable keeping of state. Much of it is third-party. - -### 3.3 Engines - -An engine is a tool of automation for one capability — a user, a tenant, a -zone, a secret, an access rule. It encapsulates that capability in a -consistent, often simpler interface than doing the work by hand. Its defining -property is that **the same authoritative input state yields the same -result**. That determinism is where the estate's deterministic guarantees -live. It reduces failure modes and makes the work more reliable and more -efficient. Accepted in gate-house ADR-015 (2026-10-22). - -The canon states the domain. The engine implements the capability. Tooling -holds the records. Several engines may use one store, each for a different -capability. An engine does not hold the records, and being an engine does not -make it the store's only client. - -An engine enables its capability. It is not, by being an engine, an -access-control mechanism. Restricting who may act is `access-engine`'s domain -(§6). `access-engine` is an engine because deciding is its capability, not -because the engine layer restricts. - -A repository whose core function is inference or judgment fails the -determinism test by construction and is Staff, however much of its work -happens at runtime. - -One library has three manifestations. The library performs the capability. -The CLI runs that library in a process. A service is the same process kept -running for one scoped environment. At start, the process is injected with -the credential for that one environment. The credential enables the capability -and is not returned to the caller. A kept-running process is required only -when a scoped environment needs a standing manifestation. A one-task -environment uses the CLI. - -An operator is a Staff actor who starts or calls an engine. Authentication -establishes who the operator is. Permission to use one named instance, or a -named set of instances, is an access rule rendered by `access-engine`. That -use-privilege does not confer the injected credential. The engine does not -decide the permission and does not become a gate on the store. - -An operator allowed to delegate may assign a task to another operator who -holds a use-privilege the delegator does not hold. Delegation assigns the -work. It transfers neither the use-privilege nor the injected credential. The -delegate must already hold the use-privilege. Operators stay flexible and are -expected to be reliable in what they choose and assign. That reliability does -not add a restriction inside the engine. - -**Engines are typed.** "Engine" is one layer but four roles, and collapsing them -hides different failure modes. Every §4 Engine row carries a role: - -| Role | Meaning | Outage means | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **PDP** | renders the authorization decision — `access-engine`, and only it (§6) | consumer residue (§9.3) | -| **PIP** | supplies facts a decision consumes as claims — user, tenant, zone, approval, maturity | input degradation, engine's own fallback (§9.3) | -| **Evidence** | records what happened and proves integrity of what it holds — `audit-core` | MUST NOT block the operation being recorded — a default, not a property; see below | -| **Lifecycle** | a deterministic capability over a Tooling store — `secrets-engine`. The store may serve other engines. | that engine's failure semantics | - -The roles are why *"we need an engine for X"* does not mean *"X now decides"*. -A new engine is a PIP unless this standard is amended to say otherwise, and §6 -means it can never be a second PDP. - -The Evidence row's outage rule is an estate **trade**, not a property of -evidence engines. Choosing availability there means accepting that a compromised -source can suppress a record and that detection is the answer (§9.6). The -opposite shape — *do not proceed unless an independent custodian already holds -the record* — is the only one that puts evidence outside the actor's blast -radius **before** the act. The estate has not needed it, so it is not ruled out -by a table cell: an operation whose control genuinely requires independent -recording before effect is a declared exception, raised when needed. Raised by -`audit-core` against its own row. - -The industry vocabulary is deliberately mirrored here — PDP, PIP, PEP as in -NIST ZTA and XACML — because it is how the estate talks to the outside and how a -PEP is stopped from quietly becoming a PDP. The determinism cut in §3 stays -primary where the two disagree. - -### 3.4 Staff - -Interactive and non-deterministic. Staff is the management layer: operations, -change, innovation, and controlling. It works through agentic capability — -assistants and autonomous agents — and its artifacts are specifications, -decisions, workplans, and tasks. - -Staff repositories MUST NOT hold state that another layer depends on at -runtime, and MUST NOT render or cache any decision an Engine is responsible for. - -Acting at runtime does not make a repository an Engine. Being agentic makes it -Staff, and §5 governs how it acts. - -**Carried tension — deterministic presentation evidence.** `informed-decision` -retains its ruled `Staff` / `PEP-shaped` classification (`GH-DEC-2026-012` R1, -`GH-DEC-2026-017` §3). Its deterministic presentation and retention of evidence -for `audit-core` do not fit this section's non-determinism description and -prohibition on runtime-dependent state. This standard records that tension -explicitly; it does not reinterpret those requirements as already satisfied. -Its §4 row admits it to the conformance scope, not to a claim of conformance. - -A conformance report concerning this repository MUST state the §3.4 tension -as unresolved and MUST NOT report the repository as wholly conforming solely -because its layer declaration agrees or its pin detector passes. This is a -repository-specific disposition, not a fifth layer or an exemption allowing -other Staff repositories to hold Engine decision state. - -The existing boundaries remain binding: `informed-decision` MUST NOT render -or cache an authorization verdict, hold approval current-state, decide -approval validity or consume approvals. Its presentation claim MUST NOT be -an input to the authorization decision it presents for; `view_hash` MUST NOT -replace the approval-engine binding digest. The evidence copy MUST have the -independent path required by `GH-DEC-2026-012` R2 limit 3. Emission guarantees -remain owed under §9.6 and §11, per declared event class. This carried tension -grants no permission to omit or downgrade load-bearing evidence, bypass an -Engine, or continue an operation where a mandatory local evidence record -cannot be made. The §3.4 tension remains visible until a later argued model -revision resolves it; recording the tension is the answer to `INFD-IN-0007`, -not a claim that the tension has disappeared. - -**Two principals, one layer.** Humans and agents are both non-deterministic and -both Staff, so they share the layer's permissions. They do not share blast -radius. Four rules bind the agent principal specifically: - -1. **No standing credential.** An agent holds no long-lived credential of its - own. Authority is issued per task, time-bounded under §9.7, and attributable - to the principal on whose behalf it acts. -2. **Tool use is a conduit or an Engine API.** An agent acts through §5.2 — the - owner's tool under the caller's identity, presenting no authority of its own - — or through an engine. There is no third route. Tool availability is not - permission: a callable tool means the operation exists, not that this actor - may invoke it. -3. **Agent memory is not a state plane.** Agent memory, tool-call traces, and - prompt caches are the agent's own. They MUST NOT become state another layer - depends on at runtime unless catalogued as Tooling in §4, which subjects them - to §5 like anything else, and to §5's sunset. -4. **Every agent action is reconstructable as the caller's action**, bounded by - §9.6 — the archive shows the actions it received, not that it received all of - them. - -Session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model -selection — are **not** governed here. They belong to `glas-harness` and its -`rein-*` backends (§20). This standard governs what an agent may be authorized -to do; `glas-harness` governs how an agent session is conducted. Rule 2 is the -seam between them, and neither side may treat its own half as sufficient. - -v0.6 claimed these rules in its change log and did not write them. Found by -`kings-guard`, which is the repository they bind hardest and which offered to -assent to them sight-unseen. - -## 4. Layer catalog - -| Repository | Layer | Role | Owns | Evidence source | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `info-tech-canon` | Taxonomy | — | ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and terminology | unassessed | -| `net-kingdom` | Taxonomy | — | NetKingdom standards of record; publication | unassessed | -| `key-cape` | Tooling | — | packaged identity tooling; IAM profile; authentication | unassessed | -| `OpenBao` | Tooling | — | secret storage, leases, PKI, dynamic secret engines | unassessed | -| `user-engine` | Engine | PIP | users, accounts, memberships | unassessed | -| `tenant-engine` | Engine | PIP | tenant-as-an-entity facts | unassessed | -| `zone-engine` | Engine | PIP | zone identity and membership — offline reference conformance per its 2026-08-23 disposition | unassessed | -| `secrets-engine` | Engine | Lifecycle | credential abstraction, custody, lifecycle | unassessed | -| `audit-core` | Engine | Evidence | audit event custody, retention, integrity verification, export — explicitly not a decision point (§9.6) | no | -| `access-engine` | Engine | **PDP** | **the policy decision** — the only decision point (§6) | yes | -| `approval-engine` | Engine | PIP | the approval object — durable, authenticated, consumable, atomically supersedable (§9.4) | unassessed | -| `informed-decision` | Staff | PEP-shaped | human presentation and binding surface; presentation evidence emission; §3.4 carried tension; approval state remains approval-engine's | yes | -| `maturity-engine` | Engine | PIP | graded progression against declared criteria and evidence; the gap register; capability readiness (§9.5) | unassessed | -| `gate-house` | Staff | — | security doctrine, authority context, curriculum; **conformance review — through `maturity-engine` (§9.5)** | unassessed | -| `ops-mason` | Staff | PEP-shaped | building and tearing down access routes and perimeters | unassessed | -| `ops-warden` | Staff | PEP-shaped | operational access lanes, stewardship, runbooks; SSH certificate issuance — **declared-gap** (§9.1, §13) | unassessed | -| `kings-guard` | Staff | — | adaptive defence and judgment; observation of Staff-reachable sources — identity and secret observation **pending**; **proposes** containment, which it does not own (§9.2) | unassessed | -| `whitehat-security` | Staff | — | offensive validation | unassessed | - -**Evidence source is a marking, not a reading.** A repository is a source of evidence -where it **emits** events into the estate's evidence stream. Custody is disjoint from -emission: holding a record never discharges any emitter's guarantee, and `audit-core`'s -`Evidence` role is custody. The distinction is what `§9.6` rests on — an archive cannot -prove a record was never sent, which has content only because the archive and the -emitter are different parties. - -The column carries exactly `yes`, `no`, or `unassessed`: `access-engine` and -`informed-decision` are `yes`, `audit-core` is `no`, and all other rows remain -`unassessed` until assessed. `—` is not a value. The §11 check reports -`unassessed` as unassessed, never as conforming or as not a source -(`GH-DEC-2026-024` §2). Catalog membership and an evidence-source marking -identify the obligations to check; neither certifies that they are met. - -`informed-decision` publishes three load-bearing event classes: -`presentation` (volume), `disposition` (rare), and `stance-application` (rare). -The volume class permits rate monitoring with positive window and minimum, -together with reconciliation; the rare classes require heartbeat and -reconciliation, not rate monitoring alone. Its source declaration currently -records the emission guarantee as owed and not yet declarable. Until an -actual guarantee and its verification are returned by the source, a §11 run -MUST report it as owed/not declared, not as conforming or complete. Completing -those guarantees does not by itself resolve the separate §3.4 tension. - -An **actuation surface** — reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload -— is catalogued nowhere because it does not exist. See §9.2: it is an Engine -concept held at zero, not a Staff capability. - -`access-engine` is the ruled repository name formerly carried by `flex-auth`; -both names denote the same authority across the governed rename. A13's -circulated coordinate was pending, not broken. The repository coordinate now -resolves at `access-engine`: `FLEX-WP-0020` records rename operation -`a15af186-6b98-47a4-9b53-79e131747d11` completed on 2026-09-30. -Runtime names remain `flex-auth` under `FLEX-DEC-2026-013`; rename execution -conditions and remaining separate owner gates live in that workplan, not here. - -## 5. The binding rule - -> **Staff never touches Tooling directly. It acts only through Engine APIs.** - -A Staff repository MUST NOT hold a direct client for a Tooling-layer system — -no direct database connection, no direct OpenBao client, no direct cluster -mutation — outside the shapes below. This is the architectural form of *no -privilege from cognition*, and it is deliberately mechanically checkable. - -**Scope.** "Tooling-layer system" means a system catalogued as Tooling in §4. -Infrastructure the estate runs but has not catalogued — the State Hub, -`llm-connect`, and similar — is outside this rule, because a rule that silently -covered them would put every Staff repository in undeclared violation on -adoption day: they all write progress events. Such clients SHOULD be recorded -in the repository's declaration as non-Tooling for completeness of the check, -and the way to bring one under §5 is to catalogue it in §4, deliberately. - -Raised by `ops-warden`, which held clients for both and declined to resolve the -scope question on gate-house's behalf. - -**The carve-out sunsets.** It is a pressure valve, and a valve left open becomes -a second persistence plane under the Staff layer — which §3.4 forbids in spirit. -Three rules bound it: every non-Tooling client MUST be listed in the -repository's declaration; an uncatalogued store that another layer **reads** -MUST, within two review intervals, either be catalogued as Tooling in §4 or be -declared a gap under §5.3; and a Staff-owned event bus or memory store MUST NOT -become the estate's de facto state plane. Today's instances are the State Hub -and `llm-connect`; tomorrow's are agent memory, tool-call traces, and prompt -caches (§3.4). - -Three shapes are sanctioned. Everything else is a violation. - -### 5.1 Read-only diagnostic observation - -A Staff repository MAY read Tooling state for diagnostics where the owning -engine exposes no equivalent. It MUST be declared in the repository's -`INTENT.md`. It grants no write, and it is an engine gap to close, not a -standing arrangement. - -### 5.2 Conduit - -A Staff repository MAY run the **owner's** tool under the **caller's** identity, -supplying no authority of its own. The test is the supplied-authority property: -the conduit MUST NOT present its own credential, MUST NOT widen what the caller -could already do, and MUST be reconstructable as the caller's action in audit. - -A conduit that presents its own token is not a conduit; it is §5.3 or a -violation. This shape MUST be declared, and the no-authority property SHOULD be -covered by a test. - -The reconstructability requirement is an audit-dependent claim and is therefore -bounded by §9.6: the archive shows the conduit actions it received, not that it -received all of them. - -### 5.3 Declared engine gap - -Where a Staff repository must contact Tooling directly and no engine exposes the -capability, it MUST declare the contact rather than take an exemption. A -declared gap carries, machine-readably: - -| Field | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| `capability` | what the contact does | -| `intended_owner` | the engine that should own it | -| `blocked_on` | why it cannot move today | -| `review` | a date, not "when convenient" | - -A declared gap is **tracked non-conformance**, not conformance. It does not -expire on its own and it is not a licence to add more. It exists because a rule -offering no lane for a real sanctioned case gets satisfied by relabelling rather -than by closing the gap — and a tracked gap is visible, whereas a relabelled one -is not. - -Prior art: `ops-warden` runs equivalent machinery for delegated lanes (27 -catalog entries carrying `delegation:`, queryable via `warden route gaps`), and -has offered it as reusable. - -**No fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape.** It has been proposed, on -the argument that someone must operate `OpenBao` and every operational necessity -otherwise looks like a gap. Declined: §5.3 already sanctions the operation while -keeping it visible, and a clean "operator" shape would convert a tracked gap -into a permanent allowance — the relabelling failure this standard exists to -prevent. A permanent operational necessity is a declared gap whose review -interval keeps returning, which is the correct amount of friction. If the review -becomes ceremonial, that is an argument for closing the gap, not for renaming -it. - -## 6. One decision point - -`access-engine` is the only policy decision point in NetKingdom. No other -repository, in any layer, may render or cache authorization decisions. - -First ruled in `zone-engine/INTENT.md` §5 — *"flex-auth is the policy decision -point. It stays the only one."* The failure mode, from the same source: *"It -becomes a second decision point… it would arrive as a small convenience."* - -### 6.1 Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding - -A registry, cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs has -decided early. Provenance MUST remain reconstructable from the engine's decision -record. - -### 6.2 Doctrine reaches the decision as an input, or it is not applied - -This rule binds gate-house on the same terms. **An authority ceiling, mandate -constraint, or operating-mode restriction that determines an outcome MUST reach -the decision either as an input claim on the request or as a rule in the -versioned policy package**, so that its application is reconstructable from the -decision record. - -Doctrine that influences outcomes by any other route is a second decision point -wearing an author's hat. This is not a limit on gate-house's authorship; it is -what keeps that authorship auditable at decision time. - -### 6.3 No Staff repository may host a decision point - -A deterministic authority boundary inside a non-deterministic layer contradicts -the invariant the estate is built on. gate-house was re-cut on this ground. - -### 6.4 The enforcement point - -The standard has been precise about the decision and silent about the gate. A -decision that nothing refuses to proceed without is advice. - -A **PEP** is any runtime that causes a protected side effect. It is a *shape*, -not a repository: `ops-warden` issuing a certificate, `ops-mason` opening a -route, and any protected system acting on a verdict are all PEP-shaped. Being -PEP-shaped does not move a repository out of its layer. - -Five obligations, and they are normative: - -1. **No side effect without a decision record, or a recorded stance.** A PEP - MUST NOT perform the protected action unless it holds a decision from - `access-engine` identifying the request it was rendered for, **or** its - declared §9.3 stance for the applicable scope permits proceeding without one - **and the application of that stance is recorded in place of the decision**. - The second limb is stricter than silence, not looser: a fail-open result is - metadata, never an absent record. `ops-warden` `ca.py` writes the zone, the - failure mode, and a decision id present only where a decision was rendered. - - **Held is not attributed, and this obligation requires both.** The decision a - PEP holds MUST be *attributable to* `access-engine`, not merely present and - well-formed. Obligation 2's digest test establishes **which request** a - decision was rendered for; it establishes nothing about **who rendered it**, - and it cannot. Every input to that comparison is either sent by the caller or - published: the request material is what the PEP transmitted, and the policy - and registry digests are computable from a public repository. A responder - knowing a published package id and version reproduces all of it and returns a - well-formed allow, and each further digest published makes a forged envelope - look more authenticated rather than less. - - **Fail-closed protects against a decision point that is absent, not against - one that lies.** §9.3's whole apparatus — two failure cases, two owners, - published stance maps — addresses absence. An unreachable PDP denies; a - responder impersonating one allows. The asymmetry with obligation 5 is the - sharp form: §9.4 requires the approval object to have durable, authenticated - entries, so a PEP can validate the approval artifact's authenticity and - cannot yet validate the decision artifact's. Obligation 5 is written over - both halves of that pair and is today satisfiable for only one of them. - - This obligation is therefore **not discharged by a digest comparison**, and an - implementer MUST NOT read obligation 2's mechanical test as discharging it. - The channel is unauthenticated today — `flex-auth.decision-record.v1` carries - no signature and pins serve plain HTTP — so the obligation stands with a - declared gap in §13 rather than with a shipped mechanism, owner - `access-engine` (`FLEX-DEC-2026-010`, `FLEX-WP-0024`). The signature scheme is - the owner's under §17; the standard names the property, not the mechanism. A - declared gap is honest; an unstated assumption inside a test called mechanical - is not. Raised by `access-engine` against its own artifact, having recorded it - as its own defect before reviewing this text; put the same way independently by - `secrets-engine`, whose posture *"silently assumes the PDP is the PDP"*, and - carried forward by `approval-engine`, which observed that an approval whose - `pdp_digest` matches a **forged** decision matches perfectly. - - §16 had already recorded this observation one layer up, against this - standard's own publication path having no digest, freeze, or rollback - discipline. Applied to the artifact the standard regulates rather than to the - standard, it is this paragraph: the gap was visible from inside and was - recorded against the wrong artifact. - - v0.6's unqualified form made the shipped stance §9.3 sanctions into a - violation — the same defect as v0.5's §9.1, a rule written for the clean case - producing a false result on the adjacent case already sanctioned elsewhere. - Raised by `ops-warden`, which is the reference shape for limb two. - -2. **No recaching of the verdict beyond its own binding.** A stored verdict - replayed **outside the decision's stated binding and lifetime** is a second - decision point deciding early (§6.1). Within them it is the decision being - used as issued — a session-bound allow under §9.7.1 is used across later - requests by construction, and v0.6 forbade what §9.7.1 permits. - - The test is mechanical, not a matter of implementer judgement: replay is - permitted **iff the canonical request digest matches and the decision's - lifetime holds**. `access-engine` computes that digest over normalised - subject, action, resource, and context, and it is already in every decision - binding. A retry after a transport failure is therefore the same request; a - different resource is not. - - **Negative caching is permitted, narrowly.** A cached DENY cannot manufacture - authority — §8's asymmetry holds — and protects against retry storms. It is - permitted where the refusal is itself recorded against the request that was - refused (obligation 4), and where the cache lifetime is declared alongside - the stance map. A stale deny is an availability failure and will be - misdiagnosed as a policy one, so it must be visible as what it is. Ruled - explicitly because it is the first thing an implementer under load reaches - for. Raised by `access-engine`. - -3. **A declared unreachable-engine stance** (§9.3): total, per zone or - equivalent scope, no implicit default, no per-call discretion, published - rather than held in code comments or in a dataclass default. `ops-warden` - `ADR-0009` and its `pep-stance.yaml` are the reference shape. - - The published map MUST equal the shipped behaviour, and that equality MUST be - asserted by a test. A published map free to drift from the code is worse than - none, because it invites reliance it cannot support. Raised by `ops-warden`, - which found its own map unpublished while being cited as the reference for - this obligation. - - The test was a `SHOULD` through v0.8's circulation, which left the strongest - obligation in this section with the weakest verification: a paragraph arguing - that drift is worse than no publication, whose only detector of drift was - optional, sanctioning the failure exactly where the argument says it is worst. - Promotion costs nothing — §13.1's `Shape` column already records such a test - for four of five rows. Raised by `access-engine`. - - **`unknown` is not a zone and MUST resolve to `fail_closed`.** §9.3 permits - trading availability for openness *per zone* — knowingly, for a named scope, - at a declared cost. That trade requires knowing the zone. Where the scope is - unknown it cannot have been made for this request, so resolving `unknown` - permissively does not extend a considered decision; it invents the most - permissive one available. - - An unreachable engine and an unclassified subject are different failure - cases. The first is a known request in a degraded system, and the trade is - genuinely available for it. The second is not: `unknown` is the cheapest - state for an attacker to induce — an unregistered workload, a malformed - label, a resource created before classification, a race against registry - propagation — and a permissive `unknown` makes being unclassifiable a - privilege escalation requiring no credential. §8's asymmetry forbids that - wherever it appears. Zone stances are untouched by this rule. - - **A map MUST enumerate its axis, and an `unknown` cell MUST NOT be what makes - it total.** Totality satisfied by a catch-all is satisfied *vacuously*: every - scope the author never enumerated lands in `unknown`, fails closed, and nobody - ever learns which those were. The map is then total by having a default rather - than by covering its axis, and the drift test above passes by exercising the - catch-all instead of the axis. `access-engine` recognised the shape because it - published it — a policy package shipped with no tenant rule at all while 29 - fixtures passed, because every fixture carried the same tenant - (`FLEX-DEC-2026-008`). A suite that never varies an input cannot report on it, - however many assertions pass; a stance map with a catch-all cannot report which - scopes were never enumerated, however green its test. - - **`unknown` and `absent` are one runtime behaviour and two meanings, and the - record MUST distinguish them.** A scope value the map classifies as `unknown` - and a scope value the map does not enumerate at all both fail closed — - `absent` for a stronger reason than `unknown`, since it is the branch reached - by discovering that the author's model of their own axis was wrong, and §8's - asymmetry forbids being more permissive on surprise. But an `unknown` hit is - normal operation under a considered stance, while an `absent` hit is evidence - that this obligation is violated. An `absent` hit MUST therefore be - distinguishable in the record from an `unknown` hit, and MUST surface as a - conformance failure rather than be absorbed by the catch-all. This answers the - question §16 opened at the v0.8 cut, and closes it. Raised by `access-engine`. - - **Classification coverage is published alongside the stance, and does not - soften it.** A row reading `unknown` → `fail_closed` while most of that - consumer's targets resolve to no scope at all is conformant and materially - misleading: a reader cannot distinguish a strict consumer from an unclassified - one, and the map becomes accurate about itself while inaccurate about its - effect — §11's published-map-equals-shipped-behaviour rule one level up. - §13.1 therefore records a dated coverage figure beside each stance. - - Coverage is disclosure, **not** a transitional licence. `ops-warden` asked - whether this obligation could name a dated, published transitional - `unknown: fail_open` converting on coverage rather than on calendar, having - measured zero of three signing targets and three of twenty-one routing lanes - resolved to a zone: adopting the cell today would fail closed on essentially - every certificate it issues whenever `access-engine` is unreachable, including - the continuity path an operator needs in order to repair that unreachability. - **Declined.** A sanctioned transitional `fail_open` is indistinguishable at - runtime from the stance this rule forbids, and would make the rule optional at - exactly the moment of adoption — the only moment it costs anything. §11's - declared-gap mark already expresses *"correct rule, adoption not yet - affordable"* without inverting the rule's effect, and `ops-warden` proposed - that outcome as its own second preference. The deadlock it names is real, and - is closed by classifying continuity paths into a scope whose stance is open: - that is classification work, not a reason to hold the axis open. A stricter - stance is equally not a licence to manufacture the membership that makes it - survivable — where a scope is unknown because another repository has published - no workload-identity declaration, the consumer MUST NOT infer one. - - **A published map MUST name the axis it scopes over**, and state its - relationship to security zone: either a mapping, or an explicit declaration - that none exists yet and why. *"Per zone or equivalent scope"* permits axes - that cannot be aggregated, and the register cannot then answer *"what is the - estate's stance for a `z2`-protected workload"* — the question an inventory - exists to answer. Forcing every consumer onto zones is the wrong repair where - zone membership is not yet available as a claim: asserting a zone one cannot - know is a fiction, and a fiction in a runtime-read, test-pinned file is worse - than an honest incommensurability. §13.1 therefore records the axes and - states that cross-axis aggregation is unavailable. - - Raised by `access-engine` on the first occasion §13.1 held enough rows to - diverge, and explicitly not as a request that either consumer change its - stance — a PDP does not set a consumer's stance. Settled in - `GH-DEC-2026-009`. - -4. **Reconstructability**, bounded by §9.6. - -5. **Validation by owning layer.** Where a PEP's decision to act rests on more - than one artifact, each artifact MUST be validated against the layer that - owns its data, and a PIP MUST NOT republish the PDP's decision. A PEP MUST - NOT accept the approval fact from the decision artifact, nor the decision - from the approval artifact. - - A composed object bundling both is not forbidden as an artifact, but it is - post-decision by construction: it cannot be served from a pre-decision call, - and it needs a named issuer and lifecycle owner before anyone may rely on it. - - The live instance is the `GH-DEC-2026-003` consumption path: the - approval-claim carries the approval fact (binding digest, validity window, - consumption state, freshness, issuer) and the `DecisionEnvelope` carries the - decision (exact `CheckRequest` match, policy package and version pin). Two - digests may cover the same proposed action without being compared to each - other; they answer different questions at different layers, and collapsing - them is a layer violation in the shape of a refactor. - - **Correspondence is established by identity, not by translation.** Where two - artifacts use different vocabularies for the same request, the consumer - compares a digest one layer computed and the other recorded. It MUST NOT - recompute one layer's binding from the other's vocabulary, and no - cross-engine mapping is published for it to use: a mapping can be wrong in a - way that still produces a confident answer, it fails open, and it would be a - third authority on what a request *is*. - - **An evidence-bearing input may be excluded from a correspondence digest, but - never from the replay identity.** These are two digests over one request and - they are deliberately different. A correspondence digest answers *"is this the - action the approval was granted for"* and must exclude the evidence, or it - cannot be computed before the evidence exists. A replay identity answers *"is - this the same request"* and MUST cover every input the decision depends on, - evidence included — two requests differing only in which approval was - presented decide differently, one allowing and one denying, so collapsing them - would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a request - carrying none. That is a fail-open hole reached by a refactor that looks like - simplification, which is why the property is stated rather than left to be - rediscovered. The shape recurs wherever evidence travels inside a hashed - request. Raised by `access-engine`, which nearly took the unsafe simplification - and reported the near miss. - - **A consumer of a summary predicate trusts the issuer's evaluation of - everything folded into it.** Where the split reduces what a PEP verifies - independently — as `valid_now` does for an approver threshold the claim - deliberately does not expose — the compensating property is - reconstructability at the issuer under §9.6, not a second check at the - consumer. That is detection, not prevention, and it belongs in the same - register as §9.6's other residual. - - Raised by `approval-engine`, and by `access-engine` twice against its own - interest — once on its proposed artifact and once on a gap it declined to - close locally. Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-005` and `GH-DEC-2026-008`. - -Every PEP-shaped consumer MUST publish its stance map at a path named in its -layer declaration, and those maps MUST be inventoried in the §13.1 register -until `maturity-engine` can hold them. §9.3 is otherwise a ruling with no -register behind it, and *"`z0`–`z2` and unknown fail open"* becomes the estate's -real policy without anyone having compiled it into a versioned package. - -v0.6 named a register that did not exist — a requirement whose register is -missing is a capability catalogued without a surface, by §9.1's own logic. -Raised independently by `ops-warden` and `access-engine`; §13.1 now exists, and -its first inventory has one row, which is itself the finding. - -Raised by the 2026-08-29 independent assessment: NIST ZTA splits decide from -enforce, and this standard had only the first half. - -## 7. Relationship to the Active Secrets Management Canon - -```text -Staff interactive, non-deterministic ≈ Cognitive Plane -Engines deterministic APIs ≈ Authority Plane -Tooling deterministic state ≈ Execution Plane -Taxonomy cross-cutting language -``` - -*Cognition proposes. Authority disposes. Infrastructure executes.* is therefore -NetKingdom's layering rule, not only its security maxim. §5 and §6 are that -principle applied to repositories rather than to requests. - -## 8. Vocabulary demarcations - -| Term | Belongs to | Not | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **access lane** | ops-warden, ops-mason (Staff) — how a worker reaches a host | the decision whether they may | -| **access rule** | access-engine (Engine) — whether an actor may act | the route by which they arrive | -| **control plane** | Engine layer | a Staff repository's self-description | -| **doctrine** | gate-house | a lane owner's runbook | -| **runbook** | the Staff repository stewarding the lane | a substitute for doctrine | -| **posture** | kings-guard publishes; gate-house defines its authority meaning; access-engine renders it | a privilege source | -| **validating a fact** | the consumer checking an artifact against its issuer | **re-issuing it** — serving another layer's conclusion as your own output is deciding early (§6.1), whatever the field is named | - -Posture carries an asymmetry that MUST hold: adaptive systems may reduce -authority, require step-up, or request containment. They MUST NOT -probabilistically manufacture additional authority. - -The asymmetry is what bounds the damage when observation is incomplete (§9.6): -suppressed evidence can only prevent a tightening that should have happened, never -engineer a loosening. That is an argument for keeping it absolute rather than -situational. - -## 9. Capability assignment - -### 9.1 The catalog may not assign what the rules forbid discharging - -A Staff repository MUST NOT be catalogued in §4 as owning a capability it cannot -discharge under these rules. Two marks distinguish the two ways that happens, and -they are not interchangeable: - -| Mark | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| **pending** | No route exists. No engine exposes the capability, the repository makes no Tooling contact, and the capability is **zero** — not degraded. | -| **declared-gap** | A route exists through a §5.3 declared gap. The capability **works** and is tracked, with an intended owner and a review date in §13. | - -v0.4 had only `pending`, which forced a false choice. `ops-warden` holds -production-verified SSH certificate issuance through a declared OpenBao contact; -marking it `pending` would have told readers the repository does not do the one -thing it demonstrably does daily, while leaving it unmarked left §4 disagreeing -with §13. Neither is acceptable, and the defect was in this section rather than -in the catalog. - -`pending` was written for `kings-guard`'s containment — no route, capability -zero — and remains correct there. `declared-gap` is the case §5.3 was added to -sanction. Raised by `ops-warden`. - -Both marks apply per capability, not per repository. A repository may hold one -capability outright, another under a declared gap, and a third pending. - -### 9.2 Actuation does not exist, and containment is not Staff's to own - -Self-healing needs four verbs: observe, evaluate, decide, actuate. Observation is -`kings-guard` and is unstaffed (§12). Evaluation is `maturity-engine` and is -seeded. Decision is `access-engine` and works. **Actuation has no surface at -all**, and a model with no actuation surface describes a diagnosis machine -rather than a healing one. - -v0.5 marked containment `pending` against `kings-guard`, which was the right -mark on the wrong repository. Containment is not a Staff capability that happens -to lack a route: **reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload** are -authority-changing operations, and under §6 an authority-changing operation is -rendered by an Engine and enforced by a PEP (§6.4). A Staff repository proposes -containment; it never performs it. - -The **actuation surface** is therefore an Engine concept — likely a small -surface on `access-engine` together with runtime PEPs — carrying the same -reconstructability rules as any other decision: a containment action is a -decision record, not a side channel. - -It is **unowned and held at zero**. `access-engine` is recorded in §13 as a -*proposed* owner and has explicitly not reviewed it (`FLEX-DEC-2026-002`). No -repository may be catalogued as owning containment until the surface exists — -§9.1 applied to the estate's most operationally tempting gap, and the standard's -own medicine. - -Until then `kings-guard` proposes and judges, its containment claim stays at -zero rather than degraded, and no argument may assume the estate can contain -anything automatically. - -### 9.3 Degraded mode: two failure cases, two owners - -v0.4 collapsed two failures into one rule. They have different owners because -one has an evaluator in the path and the other does not. - -**Input degradation — the engine's.** Where `access-engine` is reachable but -cannot reach its own inputs, the deterministic *fail to reduced authority* -default belongs to the engine. This keeps the decision at the decision point and -keeps the fallback deterministic, which a Staff-layer fallback could never be. - -**Engine unreachable — necessarily the consumer's.** Where `access-engine` is -not reachable at all, it applies nothing, because it is not running. Whatever -happens next is the consumer's behaviour by construction: fail-open is not -expressible by a policy decision point, since there is no evaluator in the path -to express it. A standard that assigns this to the engine assigns it to nobody. - -The consumer's residue is bounded rather than free. A protected system MUST -declare its unreachable-engine stance ahead of time, per zone or equivalent -scope, and that stance MUST be auditable and total — no implicit default, no -per-call discretion. `ops-warden` `ADR-0009` already satisfies this: a total -per-zone map, open for `z0`–`z2` and unknown, closed for `z3-critical`, -replacing the global `policy.enabled` / `policy.fail_closed` switches it -superseded. - -**Unchanged: engine-unavailable is not grounds for a Staff break-glass path.** -The distinction is whether an engine is there to ask. A bypass around a -*reachable* engine is a second decision point, and an incident is when an -attacker most wants that shortcut. A consumer choosing its declared behaviour -when there is no engine to ask is not a bypass; it is the only thing left. - -Contested by `flex-auth` (`FLEX-DEC-2026-002`), which has held since 2026-08-19 -that fail-open is not expressible by a PDP, and which noted v0.4 collided with -shipped behaviour in a repository that had assented to this standard. - -### 9.4 Approvals are an engine concept, not a Staff or audit concern - -The approval object — durable, authenticated entries, distinct-approver -counting, atomic supersession, single consumption, revocation without holder -cooperation — is owned by `approval-engine`. - -It is not Staff's: §3.4 forbids Staff holding state another layer depends on at -runtime. It is not the decision point's: an evaluator that owns the object it -evaluates is self-dealing. It is not the audit fabric's: an approval needs -mutable, in-path, current-state semantics, and an append-only archive is built -for the opposite property. - -`access-engine` consumes approvals as **input claims** under §6.2 and never -mutates them. Every issuance, use, supersession, and revocation is emitted to -`audit-core`: the operative state and the evidence record are different -artifacts with different owners. - -The evidence guarantee is bounded, and the bound is `audit-core`'s -`docs/integrity.md`, not its INTENT principle 6. An in-database hash chain -detects a rewritten payload only if the attacker does not also recompute the -suffix — which a database owner can. Detection against that class requires the -external chain-head attestation, and even with it the store is not WORM, object -lock, or archival custody. `tamper_evidence` is therefore conditional on live -preconditions, not a property of the store at rest, and approval events receive -exactly the guarantee every other source receives. - -**Emission atomicity is `approval-engine`'s obligation.** An approval MUST NOT be -issued, consumed, superseded, or revoked without the corresponding event being -durably queued in the same transaction. - -**The queue MUST be local.** The durable queue MUST live in `approval-engine`'s -own transactional store, and **no synchronous dependency on `audit-core` may sit -inside the state-change transaction**. With a genuine local outbox, fail-closed -triggers only when `approval-engine`'s own store is unavailable — where the -change could not have been recorded anyway — and an `audit-core` outage does not -block a revocation. Satisfying the requirement by emitting synchronously to -`audit-core` inside the transaction is also atomic, and turns an audit outage -into an inability to revoke: the operation least tolerable to block during an -incident, and the same coupling this section rejects for reads. Raised by -`audit-core`. -`audit-core` reports what it received and does not imply it is everything that -happened; without atomic emission the evidence half is silently incomplete and -nothing detects the gap. This is a condition of `audit-core`'s assent -(`AUDIT-IN-0001`) and belongs in `approval-engine`'s contract before the evidence -half is treated as load-bearing. - -`audit-core` MUST NOT expose an approval-validity query. Records, yes; a verdict -on whether an approval is still valid, never — a consumer branching on that -answer would route an authorization decision through the audit fabric, which is -what this section exists to prevent. Callers needing current state ask -`approval-engine`. - -### 9.5 Graded progression is an engine concept - -Maturity — how far a subject has progressed against declared criteria and -submitted evidence — is owned by `maturity-engine`. Given the same criteria and -the same evidence it MUST return the same level; that determinism is what makes -it an Engine rather than an opinion. - -The division with Staff: **gate-house judges and proposes; maturity-engine -computes and remembers.** Interpretation is inference and stays Staff. A -criterion that cannot be evaluated by rule is not yet a criterion. - -This closes a defect in v0.2's own catalog: `gate-house` was assigned -conformance review with no engine to act through, which is exactly the §9.1 -problem raised against the containment claim. Staff acts only through Engine -APIs, including gate-house. - -**A maturity level MUST NOT be compiled into registry content.** Until -`access-engine`'s decision provenance carries a registry-snapshot digest — a gap -it self-declared in §13 — a level reaching a decision through the registry is not -reconstructable from the decision record. Levels arrive as request claims or as -versioned policy rules. Same constraint, and same reason, as zone stance. - -**A maturity level MUST NOT gate a decision directly.** Under §6.1, compiled -data that determines an outcome is still deciding. If a level determines whether -an action is permitted, it MUST reach `access-engine` as an input claim or a -versioned policy rule under §6.2, never by a consumer branching on a fetched -level. - -**The boundary with posture is recomputability, not volatility.** Given the same -criteria and the same evidence, recompute. If you MUST get the same answer, it is -maturity and it belongs in an engine. If you CANNOT promise the same answer, it is -posture and it belongs in Staff. - -This is not a new rule — it is the determinism clause above, pointed at the one -boundary where it had not been pointed. This section already states the maturity -half: a criterion that cannot be evaluated by rule is not yet a criterion. The -posture half is its mirror and completes the pair: **a judgment that CAN be -evaluated by rule is not posture — it is a criterion sitting in the wrong -repository.** Together they partition rather than describe, which a "fast-moving -versus slow-moving" line cannot: volatility is an observation about how a value -has behaved, and every case it does not obviously cover becomes an argument at -exactly the boundary §6 exists to keep out of argument. - -**A criterion MUST bottom out in evidence about the subject, not in another -party's conclusion about the subject.** A recorded judgment may be evidence *that -the judgment was made* — a fact with an issuer and a timestamp. It MUST NOT be -evidence *that the thing judged is so*. Without this the test is satisfiable by -the inference it exists to exclude: *"level 2 iff the reviewer marked the control -adequate"* recomputes identically every time and has placed an opinion inside an -engine wearing a rule's clothes. For human-attested controls, grade on the -attestation event's existence, freshness, and issuer — never on its verdict. - -Three consequences follow. **The migration direction is permanent**: anything -called posture that proves recomputable becomes a criterion in `maturity-engine`; -anything in `maturity-engine` that needs judgment is not yet a criterion and -returns to Staff. **Two authorities cannot grade the same subject property**, -because a property is either recomputable or it is not, and that does not depend -on which repository claims it. **Capability readiness MUST NOT be an input to -posture** — readiness is deterministic and posture is not, so feeding one into the -other would make posture partly recomputable and blur the boundary from the Staff -side. - -**A limit, stated rather than implied.** *"The same evidence"* is not yet well -defined in this estate. Until §17's request-claim and gap-record schemas exist, -two parties can disagree about whether they hold the same evidence, and -recomputability is a thought experiment rather than a check. This makes §17 -load-bearing for this rule. A boundary that is correct but not yet mechanically -checkable is better than one that is checkable and wrong; a reader is entitled to -know which they are holding. - -Raised by `kings-guard` against the volatility line `gate-house` had proposed, and -against its own convenience — the readiness constraint is one it volunteered. -Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-007`. - -Approvals and maturity are deliberate opposites — a closed binary state machine -against an open graded ladder — and neither engine may drift toward the other. - -### 9.6 Evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source - -An append-only archive with a verified hash chain proves that records were not -**altered or truncated after arrival**. It cannot prove that a record was never -sent. Against a compromised or buggy source, a suppressed event leaves the chain -perfectly intact and verification reports intact. - -This bound is estate-wide. Statements of the form *"the audit record proves it -happened"* are unsound; the sound form is *"the archive proves the records it -holds were not altered or truncated after arrival"*. Its mirror is equally -unsound: **absence of a record is not evidence of non-occurrence**, and no -control may read it as such. - -**Load-bearing versus attributive evidence.** The atomicity obligation attaches -to the first, not to both: - -| Kind | Test | Obligation | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **Load-bearing** | a control's soundness depends on the event being present or absent — an approval revocation, a containment action, a denial | emission MUST be atomic with the state change (§9.4) | -| **Attributive** | the event supports forensic reconstruction and attribution, and no control branches on its presence | atomicity SHOULD be sought; where it is deliberately traded away, the trade MUST be declared and completeness MUST NOT be claimed | - -Where a repository deliberately makes emission non-atomic — `ops-warden`'s -`# audit must not block signing` is the estate's live example, chosen so that an -audit-store failure cannot remove production host access — the trade is -legitimate for attributive evidence, MUST be declared where the trail is -documented, and MUST NOT be described in terms that imply completeness. The -availability argument is real in both directions: making it atomic gives the -estate's operational access lane a new dependency on its own evidence store. - -**Consequence for adaptive systems.** Suppression does not degrade observation -neutrally, it biases it optimistic, and silently: an event never emitted is never -evaluated, so no finding is raised and the last posture stands. A confidence -score computed from the richness of the record in hand cannot express doubt about -the completeness of the stream — a well-formed observation from a 90%-suppressed -stream scores high. That is this section's failure reproduced one layer up, in -the consumer. - -Two things follow. - -**Which control covers which threat.** v0.6 read as though emission atomicity -closed this section's opening sentence. It does not, and the decomposition is -owed to the reader: - -| Threat | Covered by | When | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **Accidental omission** — process dies between mutation and emit | emission atomicity, local outbox (§9.4) | prevented | -| **Adversarial omission** — a compromised source declines to insert, deletes before drain, or drains to nowhere | cadence and reconciliation | **detected, after the fact** | -| Adversarial omission at a compromised source | — | **nothing in this model prevents it** | - -The outbox sits inside the blast radius of the component whose compromise this -section posits, so it makes emission atomic against crash and partial failure -and nothing more. That residual is real and is stated rather than implied. -Raised by `audit-core`, correcting a remedy it had itself proposed. - -1. **The §8 asymmetry bounds the damage, and this is its clearest payoff.** - Because an adaptive system may only reduce authority and never manufacture it, - suppression can only prevent a tightening that should have happened. It cannot - be used to engineer a loosening. The harm is a missed reduction, not an - invented privilege — which is an argument for keeping the asymmetry absolute. -2. **Silence is a signal, and for load-bearing evidence it is the only control - in its class.** A source of **attributive** evidence SHOULD declare an - expected emission cadence; a source of **load-bearing** evidence **MUST**. - A drop below the declared rate is a finding in its own right — the stream - observed, not only its contents — and needs no Tooling contact, because the - source publishes its own stream. - - **Rate monitoring is the wrong form for rare events**, and rare is exactly - where the stakes are highest: the most valuable event to suppress is the - negative one, and revocations, denials, and containment actions are - infrequent by nature. A source emitting a handful of revocations a month has - no rate to drop below, and suppression is indistinguishable from a quiet - month. For **low-volume load-bearing classes** the required form is therefore - **positive reconciliation or a heartbeat**: compare the source's own state - transitions against the evidence engine's event count per class and treat - divergence as a finding, or assert *nothing to report* as a signed positive - claim that can itself go missing. Rate monitoring never produces a claim that - can be missing; a heartbeat does. `GH-WP-0002-T04` is the reference instance. - Raised by `audit-core`. - -Raised by `audit-core` against its own principle; extended by `kings-guard` from -its own evaluator and confidence model. - -### 9.7 Decisions have a lifetime - -A single decision point deciding on stale claims is a single decision point -deciding wrongly. The model has had no temporal law, and the approval race in -§16 was its first symptom. - -1. **Every allow has an explicit lifetime** — a TTL, or a binding to a session - or obligation that ends. An allow with no stated end is a standing grant, and - standing grants are what this estate exists to remove. -2. **Revocation and supersession have a visibility deadline**, and its shape - differs by role. A **PEP** has one boundary and MUST state one deadline. A - **PDP** MUST state a deadline **per input class**, because a decision is a - join over sources with unrelated refresh behaviour — approval-claim freshness, - registry snapshot cadence, policy package activation, directory ETag. A single - number at a PDP is either a fiction or the worst case, and the worst case is - the slowest and least visible input. "Eventually" is not a stance; an unstated - deadline is an unbounded replay window. - - A consequence worth naming: a stated deadline for a fact carried by a - registry snapshot is unfalsifiable while decision provenance holds no snapshot - digest, since nobody can determine afterwards which snapshot a decision read. - The deadline and the digest are one gap seen from two sides, which promotes - `access-engine`'s self-declared provenance gap (§13) from housekeeping to a - conformance prerequisite. Raised by `access-engine` against its own backlog. -3. **Consumption is a state change, never an inference.** An approval is - consumed by a mutation in `approval-engine` (§9.4). It MUST NOT be inferred - from the existence of a decision record: a decision record proves an intent - to act, not an act. - - **The PEP MUST obtain a successful consume before the protected side - effect.** Holding a claim with `valid_now: true`, or an ALLOW rendered - against that claim, is not authority to act; the consume is. In-flight - duplicate ALLOWs are expected and the CAS serializes use — a later - `CheckRequest` sees `valid_now: false` and cannot mint a new ALLOW against - the same object. - - v0.7 stated the opposite order. Acting first leaves the CAS able to prevent - only the second *record*, never the second *side effect*, which makes single - consumption theatre. This is a protocol correction and not a retraction of - the forensic claim: consumption is still never inferred from a decision. - - An approval authorizes one **attempt**, not one success. There is no - unconsume and no reserve/release; a consumed approval spent on a failed - action is spent. Reversibility would reopen replay, which is the failure the - mutation exists to close. - - **The correspondence is a digest, and it is the PDP's to define.** A consumer - on this path MUST verify that the approval's recorded PDP digest equals the - digest the PDP publishes **for the request with the approval evidence - excluded** — `binding.approval_binding_digest` in `access-engine` — and MUST - NOT use a claim that carries no such digest. Recomputing the approval engine's - native binding from a `CheckRequest` is not a permitted fallback: it requires - translating between two vocabularies, no mapping is published, and a wrong - translation fails open by silently accepting a claim approved for something - else. Without this, `valid_now: true` plus an ALLOW establishes *approved* and - *permitted* but never *approved for this request*. - - **The comparison cannot be against the full request digest.** Where a claim - travels inside the hashed request — the dual-control pattern — embedding it - changes the digest of the request carrying it, so a digest recorded at issue - can never equal the final one. That is a hash cycle and the resolution is - forced, not chosen: the recorded digest is necessarily of the underlying - action before any claim was embedded. A standard that mandates the naive - comparison mandates a check that can never pass, and a fail-closed consumer - then denies the action permanently. - - **The exclusion rule is the PDP's to publish, and until it does the path is - incomplete rather than complete.** A consumer MUST NOT guess which fields are - excluded: a digest computed under an assumed rule produces a confident wrong - answer, and comparing two digests derived under different rules fails open - toward accepting a claim bound to a different request — the same failure - direction as an invented vocabulary mapping, reached by another road. - - Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-008`, amended on an implementability defect found by - `secrets-engine` and reported independently by `access-engine` and - `approval-engine` within hours of the ruling. - - Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-003`; the protocol is - `gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-consumption.md`. -4. **Three failure modes are named, and each needs an owner**: an allow rendered - then never consumed; a double consumption by racing callers; consumption - after the authorized action has already failed. Neither engine closes these - alone. Recorded in §16 and `GH-WP-0002-T06`. - -### 9.8 Partition is not one-dimensional - -§9.3 handles *engine unreachable*. A real estate spends most of its incident -time in the band between reachable and gone: partial PIP reachability, clock -skew across a decision and its enforcement, and two consumers with different -declared stances seeing different worlds at the same moment. - -Two rules hold today, and the rest is open (§16). A PEP MUST resolve its own -stance from its declared map without consulting another consumer — divergent -views are expected and are not a coordination problem to be solved at enforcement -time. And where clock skew could extend a lifetime under §9.7, the shorter -reading governs. - -## 10. Changing layer - -A repository's layer is not permanent. `zone-engine` changed layer in practice -when its runtime hypothesis was falsified. - -A layer change MUST be recorded as a decision, MUST update the repository's -`INTENT.md`, and MUST obtain assent from the repositories whose boundaries move. -A repository MUST NOT acquire a new layer's permissions by gradual practice. - -"No gradual practice" needs a check rather than a sentence. A layer change MUST -carry six artifacts, written from the `zone-engine` case that the procedure -should have been derived from in the first place: - -| Artifact | Why | -| --- | --- | -| before/after `INTENT.md` | the declaration is the conformance surface (§11) | -| client inventory | what the repository holds against Tooling, before and after | -| gap inventory | which §5.3 gaps close, open, or transfer | -| assent list | every repository whose boundary moves | -| state-migration decision | what happens to live state and to consumers reading it | -| permission freeze | no new permissions of the target layer are exercised until the cut completes | - -The freeze is the one that makes the rule checkable: a repository mid-change -holds its old permissions, not the union of both. - -## 11. Conformance - -Conformance has four states, and the distinction between the last two is the -point: - -| State | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| **Conforming** | no Tooling contact, or only §5.1/§5.2 shapes, declared | -| **Blocked-clean** | the capability does not exist because no engine exposes it, and the repository makes **no** Tooling contact — §9.1 `pending`, and not a non-conformance | -| **Declared gap** | a §5.3 contact with owner, blocker, and review date — tracked non-conformance | -| **Undeclared violation** | anything else — a finding | - -**Blocked-clean is not a lesser state than conforming.** A repository that -declined a break-glass path and left a capability at zero has complied at cost; -a repository that quietly opened a direct client and declared nothing has not. -Any downstream scoring — `maturity-engine` included (§9.5) — MUST NOT rank the -first below the second. Raised by `kings-guard`, whose three gaps are all of -this kind and which would otherwise have been graded down three times for -having taken the standard seriously. - -**Who must declare.** A repository the estate authors declares its layer in its -own `INTENT.md`. For a component the estate catalogues but does not author — -third-party or vendored, such as `OpenBao` — the §4 catalog row **is** the -declaration, and no `INTENT.md` obligation attaches. A rule that assigns an -obligation the holder cannot discharge is the §9.1 defect applied to conformance -rather than capability. - -A layer stated *about* a repository by another repository is not a declaration. -Review notes, catalog rows, and correspondence record an intent to adopt; only -the repository's own file conforms. - -**Declaration form.** Because prose cannot distinguish a declaration from a transcribed review, a declaration -MUST carry a machine-readable form: **a `layer:` key in the repository's own `INTENT.md` -frontmatter.** An equivalent declaration file MAY accompany it and is a **derived -artifact** under this section's derived-artifact rule: it MUST be marked as derived, MUST -name `INTENT.md` as what it derives from, and MUST agree with it. `INTENT.md` governs. - -This is not a preference between two files. This section already says a repository -declares its layer in its own `INTENT.md`; the alternative form was added to give the -declaration a machine-readable *form*, and was read as giving it a second *authority*. - -**A disagreement between the two forms is a finding in its own right** and MUST be -reported rather than resolved away by precedence. Precedence says which value is the -repository's answer; it does not say the disagreement did not happen. Where one -appearance is reachable by two routes, the record says which route. - -**A conformance run MUST state its scope.** This section's obligations attach to -estate-authored repositories **in §4**. A repository outside §4 may declare voluntarily -using this form, and a voluntary declaration is welcome; it is not a §4 obligation and a -run that grades it is over-scoped. A run over §4 and a run over every repository carrying -a declaration answer different questions, and a report that does not say which it did -cannot be acted on. **A run over a single repository is a permitted third scope:** it -names the repository and states whether that repository is in §4, and a run over a -repository outside §4 reports a voluntary result, not §4 conformance. - -**A layer declaration MUST NOT carry a standard version.** The declared layer is a -standing property of the repository and does not change when this standard is revised; a -version in the declaration makes every revision read as though it invalidated every -declaration. That is the confusion this standard's own `assented_by` note exists to -prevent: assent records assent to a **boundary**, given at the version named, and is not -assent to the current text. - -**The rule reaches content, not a key name.** The declaration, for this purpose, is every -key of the `INTENT.md` frontmatter and every key of a derived declaration file. No key or -value of either carries a version of this standard **or of its companion** — including a -version carried in a path or file name, such as a `standard:` key naming -`…security-layer-model_v0.7.md`. Comments, and the version of a declaration file's own -schema, are not versions of this standard and are not reached. *(r3)* **A version is -reached when it is carried as a pin:** in a key naming a version of this standard or its -companion, in a path or file name, or in the value of a key that identifies this standard -or its companion. A citation of an earlier revision in a record's prose, stating where a -rule came from, is provenance and is not reached. - -**The rule reaches the declaration only.** A stance map, claims map, or evidence -classification states a position on clause text, which is version-scoped as a layer is -not, and it SHOULD carry the version of the text it answers; this rule does not apply to -it and a conformance run MUST NOT apply it there. - -**Version-scoped state belongs to the conformance run.** Every run MUST state, in its -output, the version or commit of this standard it checked against and its scope. A checker -re-run on demand satisfies this by stating both on every run; no declaring repository is -required to emit a durable conformance record. Where a run's output is **retained or -relied upon**, the retained output is a derived artifact under this section's -derived-artifact rule, and the party retaining it carries the version or commit it was -derived at. - -If a future revision changes §3's vocabulary such that a declared token no longer denotes -the same layer, declarations do **not** silently retarget: that revision carries a -re-declaration round, run in this standard's authoring voice. A per-file version pin would -not have caused anyone to re-read anything. - -Mechanically checkable: - -- every estate-authored repository in §4 carries a machine-readable layer - declaration; -- every direct Tooling client in a Staff repository maps to a declared §5.1, - §5.2, or §5.3 entry, and non-Tooling clients are recorded so the check is - total; -- no repository other than `access-engine` exposes an authorization decision - surface; -- no §4 capability is catalogued without an engine surface, a `pending` mark, or - a `declared-gap` mark; -- every repository **marked in §4 as an evidence source** declares its - **emission guarantee** in its machine-readable layer declaration, **per event - class** — a single repository-level guarantee over a stream containing both - a high-volume and a rare class is an average, not a declaration, and will be - satisfied by rate monitoring that cannot see the rare event go missing; for a - **load-bearing** source, a local transactional outbox (§9.4), its declared - cadence, and the detection surface the governing cadence profile requires for - that class — under `net-kingdom`'s - `emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md`, a **volume** load-bearing class - MAY be covered by rate monitoring where the source has classified it as - suitable, with a positive window and a positive minimum; a **rare** - load-bearing class MUST NOT be, and MUST carry a heartbeat **and** - reconciliation, not either alone, and, where that guarantee is not itself - completeness, an explicit statement that completeness is not claimed; for an - **attributive** source, the trade it - makes and an explicit statement that completeness is not claimed. Which class - an event falls in, and whether it is rare, is the source's published - classification: a conformance run is supplied that inventory and MUST NOT - infer it from an event name, payload, or observed rate, or the check becomes - circular; -- every published example, fixture, or sample document validates against the - schema it exemplifies, and where a field is optional but load-bearing, the - examples cover both its presence and its absence rather than leaving one shape - to be inferred from the other; -- every derived artifact — a summary, example, change log, or review record that - restates a normative body — is marked as derived, names the artifact it - derives from, and carries the version or commit it was derived at. - -A source that declares no emission guarantee is not conforming, and neither is -one that declares load-bearing emission with rate monitoring alone where its -event class is rare (§9.6). The declaration is what makes §9.6 checkable rather -than reviewable; without it the section states an obligation whose satisfaction -cannot be observed, which is the §9.1 defect this standard has repeatedly -corrected; the instances are listed in §15. Drafted in `gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-emission-detection.md`, -which `approval-engine`'s `cadence.yaml` implements as the reference instance. -The check states no MUST/SHOULD split of its own: which evidence classes must -declare cadence, and in which form, is the governing profile's to say (§17), and -this item follows it rather than restating it. -Raised by `audit-core` as the general form of `GH-IN-0001`, so the finding that -produced `GH-WP-0002` cannot recur unnoticed. - -**The completeness non-claim binds both arms.** Where the declared guarantee is -not itself completeness, the declaration carries an explicit statement that -completeness is not claimed. A load-bearing guarantee states the controls, not -their sufficiency. The outbox is atomicity at the source against crash and partial -failure. Heartbeat and reconciliation detect loss after the fact. Neither is a -proof that a record was never sent, and neither covers a compromised source -suppressing an event and its own count together. Completeness, where this standard -actually requires it, is emission atomic with the state change; the declaration -may say that, and it MUST NOT describe the detection surface or the archive as -that completeness. Ruled in `GH-DEC-2026-024` §1, from the bound on rule 13 and -from §9.6. - -No detectable or direction-limited failure-path release exception is added to -§9.6 or this check (`GH-DEC-2026-024` §3). - -The example-validation check is the mechanical half of §12's derived-artifact -rule; `approval-engine` reports it at fifteen lines. Its second clause is the -non-obvious one: an example set that silently omits an optional field teaches -every reader that the field does not exist. - -Requires review: whether claims stay inside layer permissions; whether compiled -or cached data has become an early decision (§6.1); whether doctrine is reaching -decisions as declared inputs (§6.2); whether the §8 vocabulary is used correctly. - -## 12. The conformance loop - -Doctrine no engine implements is fiction. The loop is normative, not -aspirational: - -```text -gate-house asserts an invariant - → the engines implement it, or declare a gap - → whitehat-security tries to break it - → kings-guard observes it in operation - → findings return to gate-house as doctrine change -``` - -A finding that a rule is unsatisfiable is a **success** of this loop, not a -failure of the reporting repository. Four of this standard's five versions exist -because a reviewing repository used it. - -**A derived artifact is not evidence of what the body says.** A repository acting -on another repository's contract, schema, or standard MUST read the authoritative -artifact. Where a derivative exists — a summary, example, change log, or review -record — it MUST be marked as derived, name the artifact it derives from, and -carry the version or commit it was derived at. A **dated review record** MUST -carry an explicit marker that it states status as of that date and not current -state. Where a derivative is unmarked, treat it as stale. - -This is not a counsel of care. The estate produced six instances in a single -week, across four repositories: a validator built against a fixture rather than -its prose; a revisit trigger sourced from a dated alignment table; a change log -read for section text; a dual-control policy rule written against an assumed -claim shape, under which every live destroy would have denied; a fixture -declaring a contract version while omitting fields published since; and a -published example set contradicting its own schema. Four were self-reported, and -one was committed by the repository arguing for this rule. Diligence prevented -none of them, and a control that depends on repositories volunteering corrections -is not a control. - -The obligation on the publishing side is §11's marking and example-validation -checks. The limit is worth stating: the mechanical half catches example-versus- -schema drift, and the convention half makes prose staleness visible without -detecting it. A marked derivative can still be wrong; claiming otherwise would be -this same defect one layer up. Proposed by `approval-engine`, which asked to own -none of it. - -**Step four is currently aspiration.** `kings-guard` has disclosed that it has -never observed anything in operation: the pilot is specified and scaffolded, every -input is a hand-built fixture, and no test has met a real event. Until it reports -otherwise, no argument in this estate may assume an invariant is being watched in -practice because §12 lists a repository against that step. - -## 13. Open gaps - -Two different things are recorded here, and they are opposite conformance states -(§11). A **declared contact** means the repository touches Tooling because no -engine exposes the capability. An **unowned capability** means no route exists -and the repository makes no contact at all. Reading them as one list would grade -restraint as though it were non-conformance. - -An `intended owner` is a **proposal to** the named repository, not an assignment -**onto** it. §2 keeps ownership in the repository's own `INTENT.md`, so the -register distinguishes proposed from assented. - -| Gap | State | Declared by | Owner | Owner status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| SSH-CA signing write (`VaultCA`, `bao kv put`) | declared-contact | ops-warden | secrets-engine | proposed | -| Authentication / assurance evidence | unowned-capability | kings-guard | identity layer + audit-core | **access-engine declined** | -| Secret-use evidence | unowned-capability | kings-guard | secrets-engine | proposed | -| Actuation / containment surface | unowned-capability | **gate-house (estate-wide)** | access-engine + runtime engines | proposed | -| Identity and secret observation | unowned-capability | kings-guard | as above | proposed | -| Stance-map register had no implementation | declared-contact | ops-warden, access-engine | gate-house | resolved in §13.1 | -| Registry-snapshot digest in decision provenance | declared-contact | flex-auth | flex-auth | self-declared | -| Decision-record authenticity — a PEP cannot attribute a decision to `access-engine` (§6.4 obligation 1); unsigned envelope, plain-HTTP pins | declared-contact | flex-auth | flex-auth | self-declared (`FLEX-DEC-2026-010`, `FLEX-WP-0024`) | -| Human principal's tenant is unresolvable from the directory, so a client registration supplies it (`GH-DEC-2026-013`) | declared-contact | key-cape | directory adapter — unnamed | proposed | -| Approval storage and lifecycle | — | flex-auth | approval-engine | assigned (§9.4) | -| Approval evidence | — | gate-house | audit-core | **assented** (`AUDIT-IN-0001`) | -| Approval evidence custody stronger than the shipped bound — WORM, object lock, transparency log | unowned-capability | audit-core | — | unassigned | -| Emission atomicity for approval state changes | — | audit-core | approval-engine | assigned (§9.4) | -| Non-atomic audit emission on the SSH signing lane | declared-contact | ops-warden | ops-warden | self-declared, attributive (§9.6) | - -The actuation row is no longer attributed to `kings-guard`. §9.2 ruled that -containment is not a Staff capability lacking a route, so `kings-guard` is not -its declarer: the gap is estate-wide and blocks every repository's ability to -act. Raised by `kings-guard`, which asked not to carry a row for a capability -the standard had just ruled was never theirs. - -`access-engine` declined authentication and assurance evidence -(`FLEX-DEC-2026-002`): it consumes assurance claims as input and never redefines -them, so evidence of authentication belongs to the identity layer and -`audit-core`. It owns evidence of the decision, which it already emits. The -containment surface is recorded as proposed and remains `pending` under §9.2. - -Whether approvals warrant custody stronger than every other source is doctrine -work not yet done; until it is, approval evidence carries the same guarantee as -any other source and §9.6 bounds what may be claimed from it. - -**What is normative here, and what is a snapshot.** Three rules are part of this -standard and survive wherever the register lives: - -1. the two marks — `pending` and `declared-gap` (§9.1); -2. the owner-status rule — a proposed owner is not an assigned one (§2); -3. the scoring rule — `blocked-clean` MUST NOT rank below conforming (§11). - -**The table above is a snapshot, not statute.** It moves into `maturity-engine` -as soon as that engine can store state, and the `state` and owner-status columns -MUST survive the migration. A standard that is also a backlog keeps attracting -findings that belong in the register, and its review interval is far slower than -the register's real rate of change. - -### 13.1 PEP stance-map register - -Every PEP-shaped consumer publishes an unreachable-engine stance map (§6.4, -obligation 3). This is the inventory until `maturity-engine` can hold it. - -| Consumer | Stance map | Axis | Coverage | Shape | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `ops-warden` | `ops-warden/pep-stance.yaml` | security zone | signing targets 0/3 resolved; routing lanes 3/21 resolved (2026-09-09, self-measured) | total per zone; open `z0`–`z2`, closed `z3-critical`; test asserts the published map equals the shipped default (`ADR-0009`). **`unknown` → `fail_open` is non-conformant under §6.4 obligation 3 as of this version**; route `WARDEN-WP-0040` | -| `user-engine` | `user-engine/pep-stance.yaml` | security zone | not reported | total per zone; `fail_closed` for `z0`–`z3`, unknown, and not-applicable; test asserts the published map equals `user_engine.pep_stance` | -| `tenant-engine` | `tenant-engine/pep-stance.yaml` | security zone | not reported | total; `fail_closed` for unset, unreachable, non-allow, unknown; test asserts the file equals shipped behaviour | -| `secrets-engine` | `secrets-engine/pep-stance.yaml` | catalog stage — interim, pending zone membership as a claim | not reported | total over stage plus unknown; no implicit default; runtime-read; pinned to `SHIPPED_STANCE` by test | -| `ops-mason` | — | — | — | **not published — non-conformant under §6.4 obligation 3**; catalogued PEP-shaped in §4; no route recorded | - -**Two rows are marked, and the marking is the point.** `ops-warden`'s cell is -wrongly valued in a published map; `ops-mason` has published no map at all, which -is the plainer violation of the same obligation and read as a bare statement of -fact through v0.8's circulation. A reader scanning for the bold marks would have -found one row and concluded the other four were fine. That is §11's marking -obligation applied to this standard's own register, and it was returned to -`gate-house` unchanged by `access-engine`, which had received the same argument -about a stale row of its own. - -**Coverage is reported by the consumer and is not inferred here.** A blank is -"not reported", never "complete": the register does not compute another -repository's classification coverage, and a stance with no coverage figure beside -it says less than it appears to. §6.4 obligation 3 states why the figure belongs -next to the stance, and why it does not soften it. - -**Cross-axis aggregation is unavailable.** Three maps scope by security zone and -one by catalog stage, which §6.4 permits as an equivalent scope. The register -therefore cannot answer *"what is the estate's stance for a `z2`-protected -workload"* for every consumer, and it states that rather than implying it can. -The convergence path is zone membership reaching the decision as a claim, after -which a stage-scoped map converges onto zones without either side inventing a -mapping. - -**The register earned itself at two rows.** `access-engine` said in the v0.6 -round that it was the repository positioned to notice when the aggregate of -consumer stances diverges from the policy packages, and recorded that the claim -was sound while one row could not diverge from anything. The second row produced -two findings on first inspection: two conformant maps taking opposite stances on -`unknown`, and two incommensurable axes. Both are settled in `GH-DEC-2026-009`. - -This register moves to `maturity-engine` when — and not before — that engine -publishes a committed, versioned export of §13 and §13.1 readable without a live -query, generated rather than hand-edited, and regenerable so drift between the -export and its computed state is detectable. A standard of record must stay -legible in git, at a version, to a reader with no cluster access, including one -auditing the estate precisely because they do not trust its running systems; a -pointer to a live engine is an instruction to run software, not a register. -`maturity-engine` holds both registers as queryable data already (`MAT-WP-0001`), -so what remains is publication — the migration's precondition, not its -follow-up. Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-006`. - -## 14. Adoption - -Status is **proposed**. Accepted v0.8 at SHA256 -`3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b` remains -operative and immutable. This successor source assembles GH-DEC-2026-025's -approved bounded §3.4 and §4 candidate, and, separately, the §3.3 engine -wording of accepted gate-house ADR-015. The bounded-doctrine pin covers the -staff-evidence candidate only. ADR-015 does not adopt this revision. - -Confirmed founder acceptance of memo -`infd-20261011-staff-evidence-tension`, version1, approval -`d90c899b-f25c-4e66-a003-808ee5b1324f`, at2026-10-11T01:46:25Z is the bounded -doctrine disposition, not acceptance of this whole revision. Source-owner -reception/assembly completes the Gate House handoff; standard adoption and -subsequent PolicyNexus delivery remain pending under NET-IN-0004. The current -companion and serving/checker pins remain on accepted v0.8. No deployment, -credential or runtime-conformance permission follows from this source. - -The Staff/deterministic-evidence tension stays unresolved; per-event emission -guarantees stay owed until independently returned and verified. INFD-IN-0007 -awaits the accepted standard's voice; finished INFD-WP-0005/0007 retain their -historical receipts. Neither stale layer metadata nor native delivered rows -reopens those plans or proves whole-class completeness. - -### Historical v0.8 adoption and review record - -Status is **accepted**. The confirmed human acceptance of memo -`infd-20261010-security-layer-v08`, version 2, approval -`8432d0dc-adc0-42d0-9a5b-6b71ff492e15`, at 2026-10-10T23:23:53Z adopts the exact -proposed source SHA256 -`103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167`. -v0.8 governs; v0.7 remains unchanged as historical accepted text. -The acceptance metadata and this adoption notice are publication annotations, -not changes to the approved normative provisions. The bounded publication -receipt is `docs/security-layer-v0.8-acceptance.md`. Checker convergence remains -the separate post-flip GH-WP-0004-T11 obligation. - -**Publication preparation history, 2026-10-10.** A9–A13 (A11 r2, A12 r3) and -`GH-DEC-2026-024`'s A2/A10 corrections are assembled into this proposed -cut. This source preparation neither ratifies the standard nor closes -`GH-DEC-2026-019`'s hold by itself. Condition 2 is satisfied by audit-core's -returned 2026-09-23 §11 review (GH-WP-0004-T07); condition 3 by the four -declarations/dated gaps (T08). Condition 1 is source-complete: GateHouse T09 records and dispositions the -applied fresh A11 r2/A12 r3 technical returns from kings-guard, -approval-engine and railiance-master on 2026-10-10, all against amendment-set -SHA256 9b454b83c9aeed08ba13dba4d812f5ae6b4293ced9e43088d64cc3cc00b1459d. -Prior-revision assent was not carried over. Those receipts are technical -returns to the exact amendments, not founder acceptance or a review of -every final-cut adaptation. Gate-house retains authoring -disposition and net-kingdom publication; the named founder acceptance act -was separately supplied by the confirmed human memo acceptance above. T11 checker -convergence is now due after this flip, rather than being inferred complete. - - -Two things that acceptance does and does not mean, kept apart because -`ops-warden` asked for the distinction: - -| | | -| --- | --- | -| **Boundary assent** | given by the four repositories below, at the version named in each record, and undisturbed since | -| **Revision review** | v0.7's changes were each the adopted remedy of a v0.6 finding. All fifteen v0.6 findings were subsequently audited against the v0.7 body — not against its change log — and confirmed dispositioned (`gate-house/docs/conformance/2026-09-06-v06-findings-audit.md`) | -| **Reviewed as text** | v0.8's circulated round returned findings from `access-engine`, `approval-engine`, `ops-warden`, and `net-kingdom`, and every finding is dispositioned in `gate-house/docs/conformance/2026-09-06-v08-assent-round.md`. Nine corrections landed in this text during circulation (§15 items 12–20) and one request was declined with its reasons in §6.4 | -| **Not claimed** | No clean-bill review of every section is claimed. `kings-guard`'s §9.5 criteria-grounding and §12 step-four review is not claimed here. `audit-core` returned its §11 review on 2026-09-23; its findings are dispositioned by GH-DEC-2026-024 and incorporated in this proposed cut. `approval-engine` named the sections it did not read in the earlier circulation; A11 r2/A12 r3 returns concern those exact amendments, not all sections. | - - -**Ten of this version's twelve changes as cut were requested by another -repository**, seven of them by a repository arguing against its own interest or -reporting its own error. There are two exceptions, not one: §17's ownership -correction, which `gate-house` found by auditing its own accepted text, and item -2b, which `access-engine` flagged as a near miss it was explicitly *not* asking to -have written down. The count was stated as ten of eleven until `approval-engine` -observed that item 2b's numbering left a reader unable to tell whether it was a -change or a sub-clause — and that the ambiguity moved both halves of a ratio §14 -calls the argument rather than the background. The nine corrections applied during -circulation (items 12–20) were all requested by another repository. That ratio is the reason the standard is -circulated rather than accepted on the owner's decision as v0.7 was: this version -imposes costs on named repositories — `ops-warden` acquires a non-conformant -stance cell, `approval-engine` acquires an issue-time obligation — and a cost -imposed without a review round is the kind of rule §12 exists to catch late. - -Findings against this text are §12's normal business. Two are anticipated and -would be welcome: whether §6.4's `unknown` ruling is too broad for a genuinely -low-consequence unclassified scope, and whether a maturity criterion exists that -cannot be expressed without dereferencing a judgment. Both are written into the -reversal clauses of their decision records as the falsifiers that would revert -them. - -| Repository | Record | Outcome | -| --- | --- | --- | -| flex-auth | `FLEX-DEC-2026-001` | assent to all three items; one self-declared non-conformance; two rename conditions | -| kings-guard | `KG-DEC-2026-001` | assent; declined the offered §5 relaxation; raised §9.1 | -| ops-warden | `ADR-0010` | assent to all three; veto not exercised; offered the §5.3 amendment | -| audit-core | `AUDIT-IN-0001` | assent to the evidence half with conditions; corrected the rationale twice; raised §9.6 | - -Adoption for a repository means its `INTENT.md` declares its layer, its -ownership claims fall inside that layer, its Tooling contacts are declared under -§5, and any shared boundary has been assented to by the other side. - -**Adoption status as of 2026-08-29: seven of sixteen** estate-authored §4 -repositories have declared in their own voice — `gate-house`, `flex-auth`, -`kings-guard`, `ops-warden`, `audit-core`, `approval-engine`, `maturity-engine`. -The remaining nine — `info-tech-canon`, `net-kingdom`, `key-cape`, -`user-engine`, `tenant-engine`, `zone-engine`, `secrets-engine`, `ops-mason`, -`whitehat-security` — carry a layering review note authored by `gate-house` and -have not answered it. Those notes state a layer but do not constitute a -declaration, and this standard does not claim estate-wide adoption on their -basis. Declaration requests are open as intakes in each. - -## 15. Change log - -**2026-10-22 §3.3 engine amendment:** Accepted gate-house ADR-015 replaces the -§3.3 opening and the Lifecycle role. An engine enables one capability. Tooling -holds the records. Several engines may use one store. An engine is not an -access-control mechanism by being an engine. Library, CLI, and service are -manifestations of one implementation. Operator use is an access-engine rule -and does not confer the credential injected at start. Delegation assigns work -and transfers neither privilege. Accepted v0.8 is not patched. The §4 catalog -is unchanged. This entry does not adopt the revision. - -**2026-10-11 proposed successor assembly:** GH-DEC-2026-025's exact approved -candidate adds the carried Staff/deterministic-presentation-evidence tension in -§3.4, the informed-decision Staff/PEP-shaped evidence-source=yes row, explicit -catalogue non-conformance limits and volume/rare per-event guarantees owed in §4. -The existing Staff prohibitions remain. No other normative section changes. -Frontmatter, title and §14 distinguish this proposed source from immutable -accepted v0.8; historical adoption/reviews below are provenance only. Exact -handoff and human receipt are pinned in the adjacent source-owner review. - -**2026-10-10 source finalization of the held proposed cut:** A9 closes the -layer tokens and ASCII case comparison (§3); A10 adds assessed evidence-source -marking (§4) and per-class emission inventory (§11); A11 r2 makes INTENT -frontmatter authoritative, sidecars derived and disagreements findings, and -admits the explicit single-repository scope (§11); A12 r3 bans declaration -pins while preserving prose provenance and requires version/scope in each run -(§11). A13's coordinate note follows the governed completed rename while -preserving `flex-auth` runtime names (§4). GH-DEC-2026-024 adds the explicit -load-bearing completeness non-claim and preserves the rejection of a -failure-path exception; no other section's authority is expanded. -Sources: gate-house/docs/amendments/v0.8-section-11-declaration-amendments.md -v0.3; gate-house/docs/amendments/v0.8-amendment-set.md v1.1; GH-DEC-2026-019, -020, 021 and 024. The older numbered change list below remains history. - -v0.7 → v0.8: - -1. **§9.7.3 corrected** — the PEP MUST consume before the protected side effect. - v0.7's stated order left the CAS able to prevent only the second record, never - the second side effect. Protocol correction, not a retraction of the forensic - claim (`GH-DEC-2026-003`). -2. **§9.7.3 gains the binding correspondence** — the approval's recorded PDP - digest MUST equal the digest the PDP publishes for the request with the - approval evidence excluded, and a claim without one is unusable on that path. - No cross-engine vocabulary mapping is published: a translation can be - confidently wrong and fails open, where a digest is identity. The comparison - is against an exclusion-scoped digest because a claim travelling inside a - hashed request cannot name the digest of the request containing it — a hash - cycle, found by `secrets-engine` and reported independently by two engines - within hours of the ruling, which as first written mandated a check that could - never pass (`GH-DEC-2026-008`, raised by `access-engine`, which declined to - close it locally). -2b. **A change in its own right, not a sub-clause of 2** — the label is retained - rather than renumbered so that references written against this list do not - silently repoint. §14's tally counts it. **§6.4 obligation 5 gains the - replay-identity property** — an evidence-bearing - input may be excluded from a correspondence digest but never from the replay - identity, because two requests differing only in which approval was presented - decide differently. Flagged by `access-engine` as a near miss rather than a - request. -3. **§6.4 obligation 5 added** — validation by owning layer, and correspondence - by identity rather than translation. A PIP MUST NOT republish the PDP's - decision. Carries the consequence that a consumer of a summary predicate - trusts the issuer's evaluation of what is folded into it, with - reconstructability at the issuer as the compensating property - (`GH-DEC-2026-005`). -4. **§6.4 obligation 3 — `unknown` is not a zone** and MUST resolve to - `fail_closed`; and every published map MUST name its scoping axis and its - relation to zone. `ops-warden`'s `unknown` cell becomes non-conformant, and - the register records it as such (`GH-DEC-2026-009`, raised by `access-engine` - on two conformant maps that disagree). -5. **§9.5 gains the posture boundary** — recomputability, not volatility, with - the clause that a criterion MUST bottom out in evidence about the subject - rather than another party's conclusion about it. Three consequences, including - that capability readiness MUST NOT be an input to posture. The limit is stated: - *"the same evidence"* is undefined until §17 (`GH-DEC-2026-007`, raised by - `kings-guard` against the line this standard's owner had proposed). -6. **§11 gains the emission-guarantee declaration**, so a source catalogued as - evidence declares what its emission actually guarantees rather than - reintroducing `GH-IN-0001` silently. The check defers the form to the - governing profile instead of restating it: as first cut it required a - heartbeat *or* reconciliation of every load-bearing source, which both - over- and under-stated - `emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md` — it withheld from a volume class - the rate monitoring the profile permits, and accepted for a rare class either - control alone where the profile requires both. It also contradicted its own - following paragraph. Corrected by `net-kingdom` on review of the ownership - §17 assigns it (`NK-WP-0035`). -7. **§11 and §12 gain the derived-artifact rules** — examples validate against - the schema they exemplify and cover both shapes of an optional load-bearing - field; derivatives are marked with source and derivation version; dated review - records are marked as status-as-of-date. Six instances in one week across four - repositories (proposed by `approval-engine`). -8. **§8 gains a demarcation** — validating a fact is not re-issuing it. -9. **§13.1 gains three rows, an axis column, and two statements of limit** — that - cross-axis aggregation is unavailable, and that the migration to - `maturity-engine` waits on a published export (`GH-DEC-2026-006`). -10. **§17 corrected** — emission-cadence ownership is assigned, not proposed, and - both owners have accepted (`GH-DEC-2026-004`). -11. **§16 reconciled** against the decision log; two questions closed, one opened - on whether an absent scope differs from an unknown one. - -Applied during circulation, after the round returned findings against this text -(`gate-house/docs/conformance/2026-09-06-v08-assent-round.md`). The version stayed -`proposed` throughout, so these are corrections to an uncut standard rather than -amendments to an accepted one: - -12. **§6.4 obligation 1 gains attribution** — a decision MUST be attributable to - `access-engine`, and obligation 2's mechanical digest test does not discharge - that. Fail-closed protects against a decision point that is absent, not - against one that lies, and obligation 5 was written over a pair of artifacts - whose authenticity only one half of could be validated. Carried as a declared - §13 gap with `access-engine` as owner rather than as a shipped mechanism - (raised by `access-engine` against its own unsigned envelope, having recorded - it as `FLEX-DEC-2026-010` before reviewing this text). -13. **§6.4 obligation 3's drift test promoted `SHOULD` → `MUST`** — the strongest - obligation in the section had the weakest verification, in a paragraph arguing - that drift is worse than no publication. Already met by four of five §13.1 - rows (raised by `access-engine`). -14. **§6.4 obligation 3 forbids totality by catch-all**, and requires an `absent` - scope to be distinguishable in the record from an `unknown` one and to surface - as a conformance failure. This closes the question item 11 opened (raised by - `access-engine`, from its own 29-fixture tenant defect). -15. **§6.4 obligation 3 and §13.1 gain classification coverage** — published - beside the stance, because `unknown` → `fail_closed` over a population that is - entirely unclassified is conformant and misleading. A transitional - `unknown: fail_open` was asked for and **declined**: it is indistinguishable at - runtime from the stance the rule forbids (requested by `ops-warden`, which - proposed the declared-gap outcome as its own second preference and measured the - coverage figure now in the register). -16. **§13.1 marks `ops-mason`** — an unpublished map is a plainer violation of - obligation 3 than a wrongly-valued cell in a published one, and was stated as - bare fact while the other was bolded (raised by `access-engine`, returning - `gate-house`'s own §11 marking argument unchanged). -17. **§14's tally corrected and §15 item 2b clarified** — 2b is a change in its own - right and is the second item not requested by another repository, so the ratio - is ten of twelve with two exceptions (raised by `approval-engine`). -18. **§6.4's count sentence corrected** — it announced four obligations and listed - five, leaving a defensible reading under which an implementer omits the one - governing how an approval is compared to a decision (raised by - `approval-engine`). -19. **§17's artifact count and closing status corrected** — v0.8's item 10 reached - the emission-cadence paragraph and not the count sentence, which still called - ownership of the decision-record schema unsettled after `access-engine` took it - on (raised by `approval-engine`). -20. **§19 gains a stub** — the heading gap was explained in a §16 bullet, where a - reader checking whether an edit had dropped a section does not look (raised by - `approval-engine`). - -v0.1 → v0.2: - -1. **§5 restructured** into three sanctioned shapes. Added §5.2 conduit - (ops-warden's question, ruled) and §5.3 declared engine gap (ops-warden's - amendment, accepted). -2. **§6.2 added** — doctrine must reach the decision as an input claim or a - versioned policy rule (flex-auth's boundary drawn back, accepted). -3. **§9 added** — the catalog may not assign a capability the rules forbid - discharging; containment marked pending; degraded-mode fallback ruled into - the engine (kings-guard's finding). -4. **§11 restructured** — conformance now has three states, distinguishing a - tracked gap from an undeclared violation. -5. **§12 made normative**, with the explicit statement that an - unsatisfiability finding is a success of the loop. -6. **§13 added** — open gaps register, including the unowned approval storage - and lifecycle capability. -7. §4 catalog gained the pending mark and ops-warden's SSH certificate lane. - -v0.2 → v0.3: - -1. **§9.4 added** — approvals assigned to `approval-engine`, with the operative - state and the evidence record separated between it and `audit-core`. -2. **§9.5 added** — graded progression assigned to `maturity-engine`, closing - the §9.1 defect in gate-house's own conformance-review claim, and carrying - the guardrail that a level may never gate a decision directly. -3. §4 catalog gained both engines; gate-house's conformance-review claim now - names the engine it acts through. -4. §13 register updated: the approval hole is assigned, two new entries added. - -v0.6 → v0.7, from four reviews: - -1. **§3.4 is written.** v0.6 announced the human/agent principal separation in - §1 and §15 and left §3.4 byte-identical to v0.5 — a silent edit failure. A - rule stated about a standard in its own change log is not a rule. Found by - `kings-guard`. The same failure had also dropped two §16 entries, restored - here. -2. **§6.4 obligation 1 rewritten** — it forbade what obligation 3 blesses. A PEP - may proceed under its declared §9.3 stance provided the application of that - stance is *recorded in place of* the decision. Stricter than v0.6 where it - counts: a fail-open result is metadata, never silence. Raised by `ops-warden`. -3. **§6.4 obligation 2 rewritten** — it forbade the session-bound allow §9.7.1 - permits. Scoped to replay outside the decision's own binding and lifetime, - with the canonical request digest as the mechanical test, and negative - caching ruled permitted where the refusal is recorded and the cache lifetime - declared. Raised by `access-engine`. -4. **§6.4 obligation 3** gained the requirement that the published stance map - equal shipped behaviour, asserted by test. **§13.1** now exists as the - register §6.4 mandated and v0.6 did not implement. -5. **§9.6 gained a threat decomposition** — atomicity prevents accidental - omission; cadence and reconciliation detect the adversarial case after the - fact; nothing prevents it at a compromised source. Raised by `audit-core` - against its own proposed remedy. -6. **§9.6 cadence is now MUST for load-bearing sources**, with positive - reconciliation or a heartbeat as the required form for low-volume classes, - because rate monitoring fails exactly where the stakes are highest. -7. **§9.7.2 splits by role** — a PDP states a deadline per input class, a PEP one - at its boundary. Promotes `access-engine`'s provenance gap to a conformance - prerequisite. -8. **§3.3's Evidence row** is stated as an estate trade rather than a property, - leaving independent-recording-before-effect raisable as a declared exception. -9. **§17** moves the decision-record schema to `access-engine`, which argued it - against its own interest; `kings-guard` drafts the emission-cadence schema. -10. **§13** no longer attributes the actuation gap to `kings-guard`; it is - estate-wide. **§19 removed** — a verdict inside a standard grades the - document it lives in. **§17/§18** demoted from H1 to H2. -11. **§20 added** — the Railiance interaction boundary, on `railiance-master`'s - definitions, including that `rein-*` is not a fifth axis. - -v0.5 → v0.6, from the independent assessment of 2026-08-29: - -1. **§3.3 types the engines** — PDP, PIP, Evidence, Lifecycle, with a role - column in §4. A new engine is a PIP unless this standard says otherwise, so - "we need an engine for X" cannot drift into "X now decides". -2. **§6.4 names the enforcement point** — a PEP shape with four obligations: no - side effect without a decision record, no local recaching of the verdict, a - declared unreachable-engine stance, reconstructability. The standard had the - decision and not the gate. -3. **§9.2 replaced** — containment was marked pending against the wrong - repository. Actuation is an Engine concept, unowned, held at zero; Staff - proposes containment and never performs it. -4. **§3.4 separates the two Staff principals** — human and agent share the layer - but not blast radius: no standing credential, conduit or engine API only, - agent memory is not a state plane, every action reconstructable as the - caller's. -5. **§9.7 puts time into the model** — explicit lifetimes, revocation visibility - deadlines, consumption as a state change never inferred, and the three race - modes named. **§9.8** states what holds under partition and leaves the rest - open. -6. **§17 requires the Taxonomy artifacts** — claim, decision-record, gap-record, - and emission-cadence schemas — without which §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but - not compileable. Ownership proposed, not assigned. -7. **§18 composes the sibling standards** — how zone stance, tenancy posture, - and a credential lifecycle event each enter a decision as a claim. They were - cited in frontmatter and nowhere in the rules. -8. **§5 gained a sunset** on the uncatalogued-infrastructure carve-out, and - §5.3 **declines** a proposed fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape: - it would convert a tracked gap into a permanent allowance. -9. **§10 gained the six artifacts** a layer change must carry, written from the - `zone-engine` case, including a permission freeze during the cut. -10. **§2 lifts the observation rule** — no estate argument may cite observation - that has not happened. **§13** separates its three normative rules from the - table, which is now a snapshot due to move into `maturity-engine`. -11. **§16** the approval custody question is **decided: no**, rather than left - open. **§19** records the fitness verdict, including that the estate can - propose and decide but cannot yet watch or act. - -v0.4 → v0.5, all from review findings: - -1. **§9.1 split into two marks** — `pending` (no route, capability zero) and - `declared-gap` (route exists under §5.3, capability works and is tracked). - v0.4's single mark would have forced a false `pending` onto ops-warden's - production SSH issuance. Raised by `ops-warden`. -2. **§9.3 rewritten** — input degradation is the engine's; engine-unreachability - is necessarily the consumer's, bounded by a declared, auditable, total stance. - Contested by `flex-auth`: fail-open is not expressible by a PDP, and v0.4 - collided with `ops-warden` `ADR-0009`. -3. **§5 gained a scope rule** — "Tooling-layer system" means a §4 Tooling row; - uncatalogued infrastructure is outside §5 and recorded rather than policed. - Without it every Staff repository was in undeclared violation for writing - progress events. Raised by `ops-warden`. -4. **§9.4 requires a local outbox** — no synchronous dependency on `audit-core` - inside the state-change transaction, so an audit outage cannot block a - revocation. Raised by `audit-core`. -5. **§9.5 forbids compiling maturity levels into registry content** until - decision provenance carries a registry-snapshot digest. Raised by `flex-auth`. -6. **§9.6 gained the load-bearing / attributive distinction**, the mirror rule - that absence is not evidence of non-occurrence, the optimistic-bias - consequence for adaptive systems, and silence-as-signal. Raised by - `kings-guard` on top of `audit-core`'s original. -7. **§11 gained a fourth state** — blocked-clean, which MUST NOT rank below - conforming — and a machine-readable declaration form. Raised by `kings-guard` - and `audit-core`. -8. **§13 gained state and owner-status columns** — declared-contact versus - unowned-capability, proposed versus assented owner. `access-engine`'s - decline of authentication evidence is recorded. Raised by `kings-guard` and - `flex-auth`. -9. **§8** records the asymmetry's payoff under incomplete observation; **§12** - records that its fourth step is unstaffed; **§14** corrects the adoption - arithmetic and the status contradiction. - -Amended in place while `proposed`, 2026-08-28: §11 gained the who-must-declare -rule after a conformance sweep found the standard required an `INTENT.md` -declaration from `OpenBao`, which the estate does not author; and §14 gained the -honest adoption count. - -v0.3 → v0.4: - -1. **§4 catalog gained `audit-core`** as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 - named it as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without cataloguing it — a §11 defect in - the standard itself, raised by `audit-core`. -2. **§9.4 evidence rationale rewritten** to cite `audit-core`'s shipped - `docs/integrity.md` bound rather than its INTENT principle 6, and to state - that `tamper_evidence` is conditional on live preconditions. -3. **§9.4 gained emission atomicity** as `approval-engine`'s obligation, and the - prohibition on `audit-core` exposing an approval-validity query. -4. **§9.6 added** — evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at - source. Estate-wide; the sound and unsound forms of the claim are stated. -5. **§13** — evidence half recorded as assented with conditions; two new gaps: - stronger approval custody (unassigned) and emission atomicity - (`approval-engine`). - -## 16. Open questions - -- ~~Whether approvals warrant archival custody stronger than every other audit - source.~~ **Decided (§13): no.** Approval evidence carries the same bound as - every other source. The acute risk for approvals is *omission* — a suppressed - revocation — and archival custody does not address omission at all; emission - atomicity with a local outbox (§9.4) and a detection surface - (`GH-WP-0002-T04`) do. Leaving it open while calling the evidence half - load-bearing created a promise the archive cannot cash. If a future - requirement genuinely needs WORM or a transparency log, that is a different - store with a different owner, raised then. -- Whether SSH certificate issuance evidence is load-bearing or attributive - (§9.6). Ruled attributive here on the argument that no control branches on the - presence of a signing record; `ops-warden` asked for the ruling and the trade - is genuinely two-sided, so it is flagged rather than settled. -- ~~Who marks an approval consumed, and at what point relative to the decision - (§9.4).~~ **Decided (§9.7.3): the PEP, by compare-and-swap, before the - protected side effect.** The PDP never mutates and Staff never consumes. The - three failure modes have owners in - `gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-consumption.md`; there is no unconsume. - `GH-DEC-2026-003`, and `GH-DEC-2026-008` for the binding correspondence. -- Whether other §4 repositories are missing layer declarations; `audit-core` - flagged its own absence and asked whether the catalog needs the same - correction elsewhere. -- ~~Whether the gap register migrates from this standard into `maturity-engine` - once that engine exists, leaving the standard to state the rules only.~~ - **Decided (§13.1): yes, conditioned on a published export.** The engine holds - both registers as data; the migration waits on a committed, versioned export - readable without a live query, because a standard must stay legible in git to a - reader with no cluster access. `GH-DEC-2026-006`. -- ~~Whether §6.4's `unknown` ruling should extend to other total-map scopes that - are absent rather than unknown.~~ **Closed** during v0.8's circulation. It - extends, and the distinction is not a distinction in the stance: `absent` fails - closed too, for the stronger reason that it is the branch reached by discovering - the author's model of their own axis was wrong. The distinction is in the - record — an `absent` hit is a conformance failure and MUST be distinguishable - from an `unknown` hit, or obligation 3's totality requirement is satisfied - vacuously by a catch-all. §6.4 obligation 3; answered by `access-engine`, which - raised the question's real cost from its own 29-fixture tenant defect. -- Whether Tooling warrants subdivision between third-party and homegrown. -- How a future `role-engine` divides responsibility with `access-engine`. -- Whether declared gaps need an estate-wide register rather than per-repository - declarations; ops-warden's `warden route gaps` is candidate machinery. -- Whether non-security repositories adopt the same model. The determinism cut is - not security-specific; if non-security Staff also may not hold - runtime-dependent state, the estate gets one constitution rather than a - security ghetto. -- The rest of §9.8: split brain, partial PIP reachability, and clock skew beyond - the two rules stated. -- Publication integrity of the Taxonomy layer itself. This standard demands - reconstructability of decisions while its own publication path has no digest, - freeze, or rollback discipline. `access-engine` observed during v0.8's - circulation that the same observation applied to the artifact this standard - *regulates* is §6.4 obligation 1's attribution gap — the defect was visible from - inside and had been recorded against the wrong artifact. That half is now a - declared §13 gap; this entry is the half that remains open, and it is this - standard's own. -- The fitness verdict formerly at §19 now lives in - `net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md`. A grade - inside a standard of record becomes normative by adjacency and ages against the - text it grades. Raised by `access-engine`. Its two substantive points remain - live: observation in production is unstaffed (§12) and actuation has no surface - (§9.2). -- The **working companion** (`net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md`, v0.2, root of - the repository for onboarding) is the operative form of this statute. The statute governs on disagreement, and a - disagreement is a finding. The v0.1 gap `access-engine` found — publish - your stance map, but nowhere saying where, and no inventory obligation — is - fixed in v0.2 §5.3. -- How the Railiance operational axes meet this model beyond §20's first - statement, which is deliberately minimal. - ---- - -## 17. Taxonomy artifacts - -§6.2 says doctrine reaches a decision as an input claim or a versioned policy -rule. As prose that is a rule a reviewer can apply. As an interface it does not -exist, because nothing defines what a claim *is*. §11 calls itself mechanically -checkable while resting on that gap. - -Four artifacts are therefore required and versioned like any standard. **Two of -the four are not Taxonomy's**, and each is settled below rather than open: the -decision-record schema is `access-engine`'s, and the emission-cadence declaration -is split between `info-tech-canon` and `net-kingdom`. The table names all four -because §6.2 needs all four to exist, not because Taxonomy owns all four. - -| Artifact | Contents | -| --- | --- | -| **request-claim schema** | identity, tenant, zone stance, posture, approval, maturity, assurance — each with its issuer and freshness rule | -| ~~decision-record schema~~ | **moved to `access-engine`** — see below | -| **gap-record schema** | the §5.3 fields — `capability`, `intended_owner`, `blocked_on`, `review` — plus the §13 `state` and owner-status | -| **emission-cadence declaration** | the expected rate a source publishes, so silence is a finding (§9.6) | - -Until these exist, §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but not compileable, and every -engine invents its own claim shape at its own boundary. - -**The decision-record schema is not Taxonomy's.** A decision record is the PDP's -output artifact — the one thing in the estate only `access-engine` produces — and -§2 keeps ownership in the producing repository's own `INTENT.md`. Taxonomy -authoring the schema for an artifact only one engine emits would invert the -ownership rule this standard applies everywhere else. `access-engine` publishes -it as a contract; Taxonomy holds only the shared field vocabulary the claim -schema references. - -Raised by `access-engine` **against its own interest** — the same §2 argument it -used to decline authentication evidence, applied where it takes work on rather -than off. Symmetry of that kind is what makes the ownership rule credible. - -**The emission-cadence declaration has a drafter.** `kings-guard` is its only -consumer, cannot implement silence-as-signal without it, and has offered to draft -it against `qonto-assistant` and hand it to whichever Taxonomy repository takes -ownership — rather than inventing a local shape, which is the drift §17 exists to -prevent. Accepted as a draft; ownership still rests with Taxonomy. - -**Ownership of the emission-cadence declaration is assigned.** `info-tech-canon` -owns the versioned, ecosystem-wide `EmissionCadenceDeclaration` semantic contract -— generic forms, fields, vocabulary, validation semantics, compatibility, and -evolution. `net-kingdom` imports it and owns the NetKingdom security profile: -which evidence classes MUST or SHOULD declare cadence, the prohibition on rate -monitoring for rare load-bearing classes, and the heartbeat-plus-reconciliation -obligations that satisfy §9.6. Each source repository owns its declaration -instance and its emission behaviour; `kings-guard` owns stream evaluation and -silence findings, not the schema. - -The split was made by artifact so each has one owner: joint ownership would leave -version authority ambiguous, and giving the whole artifact to either repository -would conflate a reusable evidence contract with the security obligations of one -estate. Settled in `GH-DEC-2026-004`; both repositories accepted in their own -voice (`ITC-WP-0018`, publishing `ITC-EMISSION-CADENCE 0.1` in canon `0.7.0`; -`NK-WP-0035`, publishing `emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md`). The -`kings-guard` draft is frozen as assimilation provenance. - -**Exactly two artifacts are unsettled: the request-claim schema and the -gap-record schema.** Both sit between `info-tech-canon` and `net-kingdom` on the -same line, and neither has an owner in its own voice yet. The other two are -settled above — the decision-record schema is `access-engine`'s, and the -emission-cadence declaration is assigned and accepted by both its owners. §2 keeps -ownership in the owning repository's `INTENT.md`. - -This paragraph read *"the remaining three artifacts is still proposed"* while -settling one of the three in its own next clause, so a reader checking whether the -decision-record schema needed an owner found it listed among the unsettled — after -`access-engine` had taken it on against its own interest. Raised by -`approval-engine`; v0.8's item 10 corrected the emission-cadence paragraph and did -not reach this one. - -## 18. Composition with the sibling standards - -The related-standards list has been frontmatter and little else. If the -following sentences cannot be written, the list is decoration — so they are -written here rather than in the siblings. - -**Zone stance** (`security-zones_v0.1`). A zone answers which scrutiny a -workload has qualified for; membership is `zone-engine`'s. The *effect* of a -zone on a decision belongs in a versioned `access-engine` policy package, never -in registry content — that ruling is zone-engine's §5, and §6.1 is its -generalization. Zone stance therefore enters a decision as a **claim on the -request or a rule in the package**, and a decision that turned on a zone must -name the package version that read it. - -**Tenancy posture** (`tenancy-posture_v0.1`). Posture is a bounded security-state -input, published by its owner and never a privilege source (§8). It enters as a -**claim**, carries its own freshness, and the §8 asymmetry binds it: posture may -tighten a decision and may never loosen one. A posture too stale to trust is a -missing claim, and a missing claim is not permission. - -**Credential lifecycle** (`credential-management_v0.2`). Issuance, rotation, and -revocation are `secrets-engine`'s and `OpenBao`'s, downstream of a decision — a -credential is an artifact of authority, never its source. A lifecycle event -becomes an **input** to a later decision as a claim (this credential is current, -this lease is bound to this task), never a side channel that changes an outcome -without appearing in the decision record. Revocation visibility is bounded by -§9.7. - -Each of the three composes the same way, which is the point: **facts arrive as -claims, effects live in versioned policy, and anything that changes an outcome -appears in the decision record.** - ---- - -## 19. *(retired)* - -There is no §19. It held a maturity grade for `qonto-assistant`, removed because a -grade inside a standard of record becomes normative by adjacency — it is an -assessment, and assessments belong in `maturity-engine` and in dated review -records. The number is not reused, so references written against earlier versions -do not silently repoint. Retirement recorded in §16 and in -`gate-house/history/`; raised by `access-engine`, and the stub added because a -reader who sees §18 followed by §20 cannot otherwise tell whether an edit dropped -a section (raised by `approval-engine`). - -## 20. The Railiance interaction boundary - -Operations is not NetKingdom's. Workload operations are organized by -**Railiance**, whose framework repository is `railiance-master`, and NetKingdom -provides the security and approval framework those operations consume. This -section states the boundary as it stands today. It is expected to evolve, and it -is written here so that evolution is visible rather than inferred. - -Definitions are `railiance-master`'s and are restated, not authored, here. - -### 20.1 What Railiance organizes - -A **workload** is a managed running deployable. Human commands, credential -patterns, broker actions, approvals, and infrastructure resources that are not -themselves deployables **are not workloads** — which is why an approval object -(§9.4) is not a Railiance axis and never becomes one. - -Every workload is operated through four composable axes, each answering a -different question about the same workload: - -| Prefix | Axis | Question | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `railiance-*` | ownership | Who owns this capability? | -| `rail-*` | execution contract | How does this workload run? | -| `rapp-*` | managed package | What exactly is packaged and operated? | -| `reef-*` | substrate | Where is it bound, and as what operational reality? | - -`rein-*` is **not a fifth axis**. Reins are `glas-harness` agent-harness -backends; the name echoes `rail-*` analogically, not taxonomically. Agentic -session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model selection -— belong to `glas-harness`. When a rein is installed and operated as a managed -service it is a workload like any other, packaged and bound through the four -axes above. - -### 20.2 What holds today - -For any Railiance consumer of NetKingdom security, without exception: - -1. Authorization decisions come from `access-engine` and from nowhere else (§6). -2. Approvals are objects in `approval-engine`, consumed as claims (§9.4). -3. Credentials are materialized by `secrets-engine` **after** a decision, never - as a substitute for one. -4. Evidence goes to `audit-core` under the bound in §9.6. -5. Anything causing a protected side effect is **PEP-shaped** and owes the four - obligations in §6.4 — including a published unreachable-engine stance in the - §13.1 register. - -### 20.3 What is not settled - -The mapping between the axes and this model is deliberately thin, because -guessing it would be worse than admitting it: - -- A **`rapp-*`** is the most likely *resource* a decision is rendered about, but - nothing states its identity form in a request claim. -- A **`rail-*`** describes how a workload runs and is therefore where PEP shape - is most likely to live — but §6.4 obligations attach to repositories, and a - rail is a contract, so whether a rail can *carry* an obligation is unwritten. -- A **`reef-*`** answers where a workload is bound, which is adjacent to a - security zone (`security-zones_v0.1`) without being one. `zone-engine` records - that a reef capping availability for everything bound to it is a canon - composition problem. That composition is unwritten. -- The **`railiance-*` ownership axis** names who owns a capability, which is - adjacent to the principal a decision is rendered for. Adjacent is not equal, - and no rule connects them. -- **`glas-harness` and reins** hold tool policy and session semantics for agents, - while §3.4 rule 2 holds that an agent acts only through a conduit or an engine - API. Those two must compose, and neither side may treat its own half as - sufficient. That seam is the most consequential of the five, because it is - where "tool availability is not permission" is actually enforced or lost. - -### 20.4 How this boundary changes - -An interaction boundary between two frameworks is owned by neither alone. -Changes to §20 require assent from `railiance-master` for the axis definitions -and from `glas-harness` for the session and tool-policy seam, on the same terms -as any other boundary in this standard (§10). NetKingdom states what a consumer -owes; it does not define what a rail, rapp, reef, or rein *is*. diff --git a/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md deleted file mode 100644 index fecf292..0000000 --- a/canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,380 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: netkingdom-service-identity-privilege -type: standard -title: "NetKingdom Service Identity and Privilege v0.1" -domain: netkingdom -status: accepted -version: "0.1" -created: "2026-10-24" -updated: "2026-10-25" -scope: service-account-governance -revision: "v0.1" -owner: net-kingdom -last_reviewed: "2026-10-25" -review_interval: 3m -standard_token: service-identity-privilege_v0.1 -profiles: - - security-canon/infospace/standards/devops-secrets-management/SecurityCanonDevOpsSecretsManagementStandard.md - - security-canon/infospace/vocabulary/mode-of-authority/SecurityCanonModeOfAuthority.md -related: - - SECURITY-COMPANION.md - - canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md - - canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md - - canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/posture-feedback_v0.1.md - - docs/service-identity-inventory.md - - docs/crisis-custody-list.md ---- - -# NetKingdom Service Identity and Privilege v0.1 - -## 0. Status - -**Accepted, v0.1. Ratified by the founder on 2026-10-25.** The text is draft-4, unchanged by ratification: the -founder approved draft-3 in principle on 2026-10-24, both owner replies arrived the same day (security-canon and -railiance-platform; §10), and the corrections they produced were applied before ratification. Ratifying the -standard does not apply any exception's elimination path, change any live service, or make a declaration -owner-confirmed; each service owner still adopts it on their own schedule, and the declarations stay -`owner_confirmed: false` until they do. - -- **draft-1** (2026-10-24): thirteen rules, naming, five initial exceptions, seven open questions. -- **draft-2** (2026-10-24): the founder's review decided six points (§10), added the agent class and SI-14. -- **draft-3** (2026-10-24): realigned as NetKingdom's **estate profile of SecurityCanon**, after a comparison - with the canon showed that drafts 1 and 2 restated SEC-DSM rules and invented a taxonomy beside the canon's. - Classes are replaced by the imported `principal_type` and **authority grants** written `MODE @ SCOPE` with - the canon's dimensions. Break-glass is an *activation*, not a kind of identity. Every rule now names the SEC-DSM - rules it profiles and states only what NetKingdom adds. New: the estate identities in canon terms (§3) and - SI-15, accountable automation. All founder decisions and every rule id from draft-2 are kept. - -- **draft-4** (2026-10-24): applies the owner replies. security-canon confirmed all five mode readings and found - citation errors (§4, §8), now corrected; railiance-platform prepared the F-1 and `aal2` role changes (source only); - key-cape, glas-harness and state-hub assessed the agent-identity and attribution gaps (§10). No decision changed. - -The offline validator (`tools/service-identity`) implements draft-3 (principal type and grants, NK-WP-0054-T08). -The live health check (T04) does not exist yet. - -## 1. Purpose, scope and authority - -This standard says which accounts, with which authority, may exist inside the services that make up -NetKingdom, and how that is declared and checked. - -It is a **profile**, not a second rulebook. Per SecurityCanon SEC-ADR-001, the identity model belongs to -InfoTechCanon and security concept definitions to SecurityCanon; NetKingdom holds the security architecture and -standards of record for the estate. So this standard: - -- **imports** the vocabulary: `principal_type` as classified by SecurityCanon over the InfoTechCanon Principal - (the canon itself words its ownership two ways; open as SECURITY-IN-0001) and the Mode of Authority grant - notation with its dimensions (SecurityCanon, draft 0.2.0); -- **profiles** the DevOps Secrets Management Standard (`SEC-DSM` 1.0.0): it names the rules that apply to - NetKingdom accounts and, where NetKingdom is stricter, says so; -- **adds** only what is estate-specific: which identities exist, their names, the declarations, the link to - crisis custody, and how conformance is checked. - -Out of scope: tokens (IAM Profile v0.3), custody procedure (Credential Management v0.2), tenant isolation -(Tenancy Posture, Security Zones), and accounts a tenant creates inside its own workloads. - -## 2. Vocabulary (imported) - -**Principal type** (`principal_type`): `HUMAN`, `WORKLOAD`, `SERVICE`, `AGENT`, `CONTROLLER`, `DEVICE`. IAM -Profile v0.3 carries the same distinction in tokens in lower case. `Environment` is cited as a Mode of Authority -dimension without naming an owner, because the canon names two. - -**Authority grant:** `MODE @ SCOPE`, where the mode is one of `USE`, `OBSERVE`, `OPERATE`, `ADMINISTER`, -`GOVERN`, `CONSTRUCT`, `SOVEREIGN`. A grant may state `activation` (`STANDING`, `JUST_IN_TIME`, `SCHEDULED`, -`APPROVED`, `INCIDENT`, `BREAK_GLASS`, `RECOVERY`), `provenance`, `environment` (`DEVELOPMENT`, `TEST`, -`STAGING`, `PRODUCTION`, `RECOVERY`), `evidence` and `relation` (`DELEGATED`, `IMPERSONATED`). Modes classify the -*kind* of authority, not its amount. - -**Account** (NetKingdom term): an identity held in a service's own store, with or without a stored credential. -**Credential** and **standing authority** are used as in SEC-DSM §4. - -Estate conventions, which are names for recurring grant shapes and not new canon terms: - -| Convention | Canon expression | -| --- | --- | -| Bind account `svc-` | a `SERVICE` principal with `USE @ directory`, read-only operations, one consumer | -| Service-admin account `-admin` | an account held by a `HUMAN`, `ADMINISTER @ ` | -| Break-glass | any grant with `activation = BREAK_GLASS` | -| Agent | an `AGENT` principal with `relation = DELEGATED` and the person it acts for as `authority_context` | - -Draft-2's classes map as follows: `human` → `HUMAN`; `break-glass` → `activation = BREAK_GLASS`; `bind` and -`infrastructure` → `SERVICE` with the matching grant; `service-admin` → the convention above; `workload` → -`WORKLOAD` or `SERVICE`; `agent` → `AGENT`. - -## 3. The estate identities - -The founder's model, written in canon terms. This is what the declarations must express. - -| Account | Principal | Grants | Activation | Environment | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `platform-root` | `HUMAN` | `SOVEREIGN @ platform`; `CONSTRUCT @ platform` (build mode), a separate grant | `BREAK_GLASS` for `SOVEREIGN`; standing for `CONSTRUCT` | `SOVEREIGN`: `PRODUCTION`, and `RECOVERY` for restored environments; `CONSTRUCT`: `DEVELOPMENT` and `TEST` only, never `PRODUCTION` | -| `admin` | `HUMAN` | `OPERATE @ platform`; `OPERATE @ backup-system`; `ADMINISTER @ directory` through an admin group | `STANDING` | `PRODUCTION` | -| `tegwick` | `HUMAN` | `CONSTRUCT @ product` | `STANDING` | `DEVELOPMENT`, `TEST` | -| `ld-admin` | account held by a `HUMAN` | `ADMINISTER @ lldap` | `BREAK_GLASS` (sealed fallback) | `PRODUCTION` | -| `pi-admin` | account held by a `HUMAN` | `ADMINISTER @ privacyidea`; `GOVERN @ privacyidea` (its policy `pi-admin-all-rights` can set the policies that bound other admins) | `STANDING` (exception SI-X5: only a local admin exists) | `PRODUCTION` | -| `svc-authelia`, `svc-keycape`, `svc-privacyidea` | `SERVICE` | `USE @ directory`, read-only | `STANDING` | `PRODUCTION` | -| provisioner account | `SERVICE` | `ADMINISTER @ directory/people,groups`, narrowest working scope | `STANDING` | `PRODUCTION` | -| Claude Code, Codex, Grok sessions | `AGENT` | what the tools they can reach allow (SI-14) | per task | that of the person they act for | - -Per-service admin disposition (founder decision `9f0f7a87`, 2026-10-28, NK-WP-0054-T06). A service with no -local admin plane has no service-admin account; SI-4 applies where one exists. - -| Service | Service-admin account | Custody | Day-to-day administration | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| LLDAP | `ld-admin`, configured super-admin (introduction rehearsed in isolation first) | Founder's password safe; crisis list | `admin` through an admin group | -| privacyIDEA | `pi-admin` (exists; SI-X5) | Founder's replicated browser password safe; crisis item 7 | `pi-admin` until an attributed admin path exists | -| Authelia | none: administered only through reviewed configuration | not applicable | reviewed config change | -| KeyCape | none: client registry is configuration; `/platform/authentication-policy` needs role `platform-operator` at `aal2` | not applicable | `admin` with `platform-operator` | -| OpenBao | none locally: federated `platform-admin` role (`aal2`); root only through the `generate-root` ceremony | unseal shares, crisis item 3 | `admin` via `platform-admin` | -| PostgreSQL | CNPG `postgres` superuser | its cluster Secret, used only through railiance-platform | railiance-platform owner operations | - -`backup operator → OPERATE @ backup-system` and `developer → CONSTRUCT @ product` are the canon's own -translations, and match the founder's intent that `admin` operates backups and `tegwick` builds. - -Readings confirmed by security-canon on 2026-10-24 (its review, `docs/netkingdom-service-identity-review.md`): -`USE @ directory` for a bind, `SOVEREIGN` with `BREAK_GLASS` for `platform-root` (the canon's vocabulary card has the -same shape), `ADMINISTER` for a local admin (the canon's own example is "break-glass admin → ADMINISTER, -activation=BREAK_GLASS"), and `OPERATE @ backup-system` for `admin`. Notes: `SOVEREIGN @ platform` does not imply -sovereignty over realms nested inside it, so recovering OpenBao, LLDAP or the identity realm is its own scope. The -canon flags `GOVERN` plus `CONSTRUCT` on one actor as a finding, and is silent on `SOVEREIGN` plus `CONSTRUCT`; -the two grants are kept separate and split by environment. Whether break-glass use of production is -`PRODUCTION` or `RECOVERY` is open in the canon (SECURITY-IN-0002); the direct form is used here. - -## 4. Rules - -Each rule keeps its draft-2 id. **Canon** names the SEC-DSM rules it rests on, with their strength: *MUST* and -*MUST NOT* bind; *SHOULD* guides. **NetKingdom adds** states what is stricter or estate-specific. A NetKingdom -MUST that rests on a canon SHOULD is said to do so. security-canon checked these references on 2026-10-24 -(`docs/netkingdom-service-identity-review.md` in that repository). - -**SI-1 One account, one principal type, one purpose.** Canon: DSM-ID-004 (MUST: human and machine credentials are -distinguishable). DSM-AP-003 (shared production account) is an anti-pattern and is cited only as an illustration. -NetKingdom adds: an account presented by a `HUMAN` and by a `SERVICE` is non-conformant, whatever its privileges. - -**SI-2 People and services never share a credential.** Canon: DSM-ID-004 (MUST NOT: human credentials embedded in -automated workloads; SHOULD NOT: machine credentials used interactively). NetKingdom adds: the stronger "never -share", and that a human's password is not stored where a service reads it, including a Kubernetes Secret. - -**SI-3 Bind accounts.** Canon: DSM-ID-001 (SHOULD: each workload its own identifiable identity; MUST NOT: depend on -a shared generic credential where individual identity is practical) and DSM-AUTH-001 (MUST: least authority). -NetKingdom adds: the SHOULD becomes MUST, so each consuming service has its own bind account with read-only -`USE @ directory`; and "never used interactively" strengthens DSM-ID-004's SHOULD NOT. A service that must write gets -its own `SERVICE` account with the narrowest working `ADMINISTER` scope, never the service-admin account. - -**SI-4 One local admin per service.** Canon: DSM-AUTH-001 (MUST) supports limiting the grant to that one service. -NetKingdom adds: one local admin account per service, named `-admin`, whose grant is `ADMINISTER @ that -service` and, where the service has a single admin tier, `GOVERN @ that service`. Nothing in the canon requires the -single account or the naming. - -**SI-5 Attributed administration first.** Canon: DSM-AUDIT-003 (SHOULD: audit records identify the principal) and -the objective of reducing standing authority (SEC-DSM section 4.12, a statement of objective). NetKingdom adds, as a -MUST resting on those: day-to-day administration uses the administrator's own `HUMAN` account through group -membership. The local service-admin account is a sealed fallback listed in the crisis custody list. - -**SI-6 Break-glass is an activation.** Canon: DSM-HUM-003 (MUST: break-glass is exceptional, attributable, auditable, -time-bounded where practical); DSM-ROOT-001, -003, -004 (MUST); DSM-ROOT-002, -005 are SHOULD. NetKingdom adds: -`platform-root` holds `SOVEREIGN @ platform` with `activation = BREAK_GLASS` in production, held offline; it -authorizes and does not operate; it is never used for routine work, validation or as a drill's test subject; its -`CONSTRUCT` authority (build mode) is not available in `PRODUCTION`. DSM-ROOT-003 itself requires only that root -credentials not travel through ordinary application delivery. - -**SI-7 The developer identity.** Canon: DSM-AP-012 (an anti-pattern: developers routinely holding production -secrets) illustrates the risk; it is not a rule. NetKingdom adds, as its own MUST: `tegwick` holds `CONSTRUCT @ -product` in `DEVELOPMENT` and `TEST`, no production credential and no recovery custody item. - -**SI-8 Assurance.** NetKingdom rule, using IAM Profile v0.3 assurance claims. Every `HUMAN` account and every -service-admin account requires a second factor where the service can enforce one. A role that grants `ADMINISTER` or -higher MUST bind the assurance claim itself (for example `aal2` in an OpenBao role); relying on an upstream check -needs an exception. Decided 2026-10-24 for OpenBao `platform-admin`. - -**SI-9 Every place a credential lives is declared.** Canon: DSM-INV-001 (MUST: maintain an inventory of -security-significant persistent credentials); DSM-INV-002 (SHOULD: attributes; it has no location field) and -DSM-STORE-002 (SHOULD: minimize copies). NetKingdom adds: declaring every storage place, and that a person's -password safe MUST NOT hold a `SERVICE`, `WORKLOAD` or `AGENT` credential. - -**SI-10 Owner, rotation and coupling.** Canon: DSM-INV-003, DSM-ROT-001, DSM-ARCH-002 and DSM-TRANS-002 (MUST); -DSM-ROT-003 (MUST NOT consider rotation complete until adopted) is the basis of coupling. NetKingdom adds: -declaring the coupling. Static binds are governed residual secrets (exception SI-X2). - -**SI-11 Declared or it is a finding.** Canon: DSM-INV-006 (MUST treat a discovered, unowned production credential as -a finding); DSM-INV-005 and -007 are SHOULD. NetKingdom adds, stricter: every account that exists and is not -declared is `unknown`, and `unknown` is itself a conformance result. A legacy account has a disposition with owner -and date. - -**SI-12 Recovery identities are in the crisis custody list.** Canon: DSM-ROOT-001 and -004 (MUST). NetKingdom adds: -each recovery item answers "does it work with SSO and OpenBao down?", and an account that cannot be used while its -own service is down is never the only recovery path. - -**SI-13 Validation is operated by the operator identity.** NetKingdom rule. Restore drills and backup validation are -`OPERATE @ backup-system`, run by `admin` with `admin`'s own token as the test subject, and record which identity ran -each stage. - -**SI-14 Agents.** Canon: DSM-AGENT-001, -004, -006, -007, -008 (MUST or MUST NOT); DSM-AGENT-002, -003, -005 are -SHOULD; DSM-AP-016 and -017. DSM treats an agent as a kind of workload identity; mapping it to the `AGENT` principal -type is NetKingdom's reading. NetKingdom adds: an agent presents as `AGENT` with its mode (IAM Profile v0.3); its -tokens last at most 60 minutes (3600 seconds, decided 2026-10-24; DSM-AGENT-003 only says "short"); it is bounded by -a named boundary policy; and its **effective authority includes everything reachable through its tools** -(DSM-AGENT-008). **Scope:** the rule can be met in full only for sessions that a harness launches (glas-harness, -GLAS-WP-0018). An interactive Claude Code, Codex or Grok terminal stays at the person's tool-reachable authority -until a session contract exists, and declarations say so (§10). - -**SI-15 Accountable automation.** Canon: DSM-AUDIT-001 binds the secrets or capability authority and not every -action of an agent, and DSM-AUDIT-003 is a SHOULD; DSM-DX-002 (SHOULD: reusable integrations) is only the generic -basis for having a golden path. The reconstructability claim and the path below are NetKingdom's, resting on the -companion's section 7 ("every action is reconstructable as the caller's action"). Every state-changing action by an -`AGENT` or `WORKLOAD` is reconstructable: actor, on whose authority, run or session, operation, result and where the -evidence is kept. High-impact actions follow the NetKingdom golden path: - -1. **Prepare.** The agent writes source-reviewed tooling and tests it on synthetic fixtures. No live effect. -2. **Admit.** A person authorizes the exact action: a signed admission or a recorded decision. -3. **Execute.** The person, or a bounded executor under the admission, runs it, isolated where possible. -4. **Verify.** An independent verifier checks the receipt against the source it names. -5. **Retain.** The receipt is kept by hash, with no secret values. - -Evidence available today: commit trailers (`Assistant`, `Assistant-Session`, `Assistant-Process`), safe receipts -with source hashes, signed admissions, and State Hub progress events. Hub authorship is unauthenticated free text; the -design to attribute it is STATE-WP-0100 (§10). - -## 5. Naming - -| Convention | Pattern | Notes | -| --- | --- | --- | -| Bind account | `svc-` | one per consuming service; `svc--` if one needs several | -| Service-admin account | `-admin` | the short form belongs to one service: `pi-admin` (privacyIDEA), `ld-admin` (LLDAP only) | -| Break-glass | `platform-root` | the king credential | -| Human | the person's own login | `admin`, `tegwick` | -| Synthetic sign-in principal | `syn-` | proposed 2026-10-31 (NK-WP-0056-T09): a `SERVICE` that signs in like a person to prove a journey (password and MFA), with no groups or rights and credentials only in OpenBao; never `svc-` (bind accounts must not sign in, SI-3) | -| Workload, service, agent | the token subject form in use | for example `service:secrets-engine`; IAM Profile v0.3 governs the token | - -The name `admin` is the human platform administrator's name wherever it appears (decided 2026-10-24); no -service-admin account is called `admin`. A `svc-` or `-admin` name MUST NOT be used for a human account. A -federated role that holds no credential, such as an OpenBao role mapping a group to a policy, is not an account -and is not bound by this rule. - -## 6. Declaration - -Each service declares every account it holds: name, `principal_type`, purpose, grants (`MODE @ SCOPE` with -activation and environment), operations, where the credential lives, consumers, owner, rotation and coupling, -second-factor requirement, status (`active`, `legacy`, `planned`) and exceptions. The canon's ten questions are -the checklist for a complete entry: who is the actor, on whose authority, what mode, over what scope, which -operations, where the authority originates, how it is activated, which realm enforces it, who keeps the evidence, -and who can override enforcement. - -Declarations start in this repository (`tools/service-identity/declarations/`) and move to each service's -repository as its owner confirms them (decided 2026-10-24). A declaration holds no credential and no -secret-shaped value. - -## 7. Conformance and the health check - -Per account the result is `conformant`, `non-conformant`, `excepted`, `unknown` or `planned`. Unknown is a -finding, not a pass. These match the companion's conformance states: `excepted` is a declared gap, -`non-conformant` is an undeclared violation. - -The offline validator decides from a declaration alone: SI-1, SI-2, SI-3, SI-4, SI-6, SI-7, SI-8, SI-9, SI-11, -SI-12, SI-14 and naming; more than one service-admin account per service is an advisory. SI-5, SI-10, SI-13 and -SI-15 are process rules, checked by evidence rather than by declaration. Dates are explicit (`--as-of`). - -The health check (T04) is SEC-DSM's automated discovery (DSM-INV-004, a SHOULD) applied to accounts. It compares -declared against observed state from owner-provided read-only metadata and repository manifests. It MUST NOT read a -Secret; that rule is NetKingdom's and is compatible with DSM-AUDIT-002. -Its findings are proposals routed to the owner through Posture Feedback, with an evidence-freshness bound. It -changes nothing. - -## 8. Exceptions - -Exceptions follow DSM-EXC-001 to DSM-EXC-004: explicit, recorded (rule, account, reason, owner, compensating -control), expiring or revalidated. DSM-EXC-002 accepts an elimination path *or* a review trigger; NetKingdom requires -the **elimination path** (what change ends the exception), which is stricter and consistent with DSM-EXC-004. -DSM-EXC-001 binds violations of a canon MUST; an exception against a rule that is only NetKingdom's is NetKingdom's own. - -| Id | Rules | Account | Reason | Elimination path | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| SI-X2 | SI-10 | LDAP bind accounts | Static long-lived credential; LDAP has no lease | Governed residual secret (DSM-TRANS-002) until a federated directory lookup exists | -| SI-X3 | naming, SI-11 | `trigger-admin` (privacyIDEA) | Legacy account, consumers uninventoried | NK-WP-0049-T22 deleted the unreferenced Kubernetes copy (2026-10-27); revoking the privacyIDEA account stays under CUST-WP-0073-T05 / NK-WP-0055-T06 | -| SI-X5 | SI-4, SI-5 | privacyIDEA | Only a local administrator is supported | Upstream support for attributed administrators | -| SI-X6 | SI-3 | LLDAP `svc-provisioner` | LLDAP v0.6.2 has no group narrower than `lldap_admin` that can create users or add members (rehearsal 2026-10-28); own account and Secret, but super-admin rights | A narrower LLDAP role, or a provisioner that no longer creates users (founder decision 2026-10-28) | - -**Closed:** SI-X1 (LLDAP `admin` as human, super-admin and shared bind of four services) closed 2026-10-31: the -bind split ran live on 2026-10-30 (`verify --old-admin-retired` passed) and the restore drill on the first post-split -generation passed all five stages as `admin` (NK-WP-0054-T05, -[evidence](../../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json)). SI-X4 (OpenBao `netkingdom-platform-admin` bound the group claim only) closed 2026-10-27: the founder applied the -`aal2` binding (RPF-WP-0065-T04; receipts show `bound_claims` = `net-kingdom-admins` plus `/assurance/level: aal2`, and a -fresh MFA login verified). - -**Findings at adoption, not excepted:** F-1, the OpenBao coding-agent role binds `principal_type: service`, so the -agent presents as a service against IAM Profile v0.3 (SI-14). railiance-platform has prepared, in source only, -a transitional role that accepts both `service` and `agent`, plus an exception record with compensating controls, -the removal condition and a review date of 2026-12-31 (RPF-WP-0065). KeyCape must first emit `principal_type: agent` -(KEY-WP-0043), because flipping the role alone would lock the agent out. The account stays non-conformant until the -owner accepts that exception or the issuer and role change land. - -## 9. Relationship to other documents - -- **SecurityCanon:** vocabulary from Mode of Authority (draft 0.2.0); rules profiled from SEC-DSM 1.0.0. A - disagreement between this profile and the canon is a finding for the canon's owner, not a local override. -- **InfoTechCanon:** owns the identity model and `principal_type`. -- **Security Companion** (`SECURITY-COMPANION.md`, operative form of the security layer model): its §7 rules for - agents ("no standing credential", "tool availability is not permission", "every action is reconstructable as the - caller's action") are the basis of SI-14 and SI-15. Its four conformance states map to §7 here. -- **IAM Profile v0.3:** governs tokens, including the agent principal. KeyCape's confidential clients stay governed - by the profile plus a declaration (settled 2026-10-24). -- **Credential Management v0.2 §6** lists `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` as a three-way coupling; the inventory found five - consumers. SI-X1 was eliminated on 2026-10-31; that row is now out of date and is a follow-up of NK-WP-0054. -- **Crisis custody list** (`docs/crisis-custody-list.md`) is the recovery companion to SI-9 and SI-12, and the - enumeration of roots that DSM-ROOT-001 asks for. - -## 10. Decisions and open items - -**Approved by the founder, 2026-10-24, on review of draft-3:** the profile approach (§1, §2); `platform-root` as -`SOVEREIGN @ platform` with `BREAK_GLASS` activation in production and build-mode `CONSTRUCT @ platform` in -`DEVELOPMENT` and `TEST` only; `admin` as `OPERATE @ platform`, `OPERATE @ backup-system` and `ADMINISTER @ directory` -through an admin group (§3). Ratification as v0.1 follows the owner replies named in §0. - -**Decided by the founder, 2026-10-24:** - -1. OpenBao `platform-admin` binds the `aal2` claim itself (SI-8). The change is railiance-platform's. -2. The human administrator administers through a group on their own account (SI-5); service-admin accounts are - sealed fallbacks. -3. Declarations start here and move to each service repository as owners confirm them (§6). -4. Agents are a distinct principal with SI-14; their token ceiling is 60 minutes. -5. `ld-admin` is for LLDAP only; `admin` stays the human's name on every service. - -**Settled with draft-3 (not objected to in review):** KeyCape's confidential clients are governed by IAM Profile v0.3 plus a -declaration; the reserved-name rule applies to credential-holding accounts, not to federated roles. - -**Open in the estate, with the plan that eliminates each gap:** - -- **Hub authorship is unauthenticated.** Progress events and decisions carry a free-text `author`. For SI-15 they - need an attributable actor and session, as commits already have. -- **Agents act under the person's ambient authority.** There is no per-run agent identity yet (DSM-AGENT-002). Until - there is, each agent session's effective authority is the person's tool-reachable authority, and that is a - declared gap, not conformance. - -**Owner replies, 2026-10-24** (all documentary; none applied anything live): - -| Owner | Result | Plan | -| --- | --- | --- | -| security-canon | All five mode readings confirmed; citation errors found and corrected in §4, §8 | SECURITY-IN-0001 (ownership wording), SECURITY-IN-0002 (four canon questions) | -| railiance-platform | F-1 and `aal2` prepared in source, rollback written; nothing applied | RPF-WP-0065; the `aal2` live step is the founder's | -| key-cape | Agent tokens are feasible **with changes**, not today. Autonomous agents: `client_credentials` with a new agent client class (2 to 3 days). Delegated agents: RFC 8693 token exchange (1 to 1.5 weeks). Missing: `principal_type` `agent`, the `agent{id,mode}` claim, `act.sub`. Risks: revocation state is in memory; client registrations are static | KEY-WP-0043 | -| glas-harness | Per-session identity and attribution are feasible **only for sessions the harness launches**. Interactive terminals stay outside | GLAS-WP-0018 | -| state-hub | Option A recorded: `X-Actor-*` headers into an append-only attribution table, labelled `claimed`, `unattributed` or `legacy`; real authentication needs key-cape tokens (Option C). **Decided 2026-10-25:** Option A is phase 1 with no `hub_core` schema change; correlation by equal session and run id only (no commit verifier); phase 3 observes tokens and enforcement is a separate later decision; existing authors are not backfilled | STATE-WP-0100 | - -**Needs an amendment:** IAM Profile v0.3 asks for assurance evidence for "any delegated human authority" but defines no -nested claim for it. Delegated agent tokens need one; it belongs in the IAM Profile v0.4 amendments. - -**Open canon questions** (security-canon, SECURITY-IN-0002): whether break-glass use of production is `PRODUCTION` or -`RECOVERY`; whether one actor may hold `SOVEREIGN` and `CONSTRUCT` separated by environment; whether a sealed offline -credential is a `HUMAN` principal or a credential held by a human; and the ownership wording of `principal_type` and -`Environment`. - -**To be rehearsed in isolation, not decided:** introducing `ld-admin` as the configured super-admin and demoting -`admin` (T06); the provisioner's narrowest scope (T05); whether a bind account can be kept from signing in -interactively (SI-3). - -## 11. Adoption - -Structure first, tooling second. Ratify the vocabulary and rules (the declarations and validator already follow -draft-3); confirm the declarations with their owners; run the health check read-only (T04) and publish the -first report; then eliminate the exceptions one by one, starting with SI-X1 (T05). No exception is closed by -writing a declaration. Each is closed by the live change and an evidence run. diff --git a/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md b/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md index 7792c45..88f1cfd 100644 --- a/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md +++ b/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ version: "0.1" created: "2026-08-17" updated: "2026-08-23" scope: multi-tenancy-security-framework -revision: "draft-15" +revision: "draft-14" owner: net-kingdom last_reviewed: "2026-08-23" review_interval: 6m diff --git a/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml b/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index f1603a9..0000000 --- a/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,117 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/playbook-capability/v0.1 -kind: PlaybookCapabilityDeclaration -metadata: - id: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration - name: KeyCape OIDC client registration (live registry) - owner: net-kingdom - repo: net-kingdom - domain: infotech - contract_version: "0.1" - source_links: - - label: Entry point - path: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py - - label: Tests - path: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_client.py - - label: SecurityCaseType - path: security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml -spec: - playbook: - path: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py - type: cli-sequence - invocation: keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --expected-uid --expected-resource-version - description: >- - Add or remove exactly one client in the live KeyCape client registry - without exporting secret values: contained kubectl, cluster and issuer - pins, byte-preserving merge, compare-and-swap, read-back. Replaces the - per-client helpers beside it. Field rules follow key-cape's canonical model - (KEY-WP-0028). Modes: inspect, dry-run, apply; operations add and remove. - capabilities: - - id: c1.lightweight-sso - tier: C1 - resource_kinds: - - identities - - roles_scopes_policies - description: Register one OIDC relying party with the running lightweight issuer. - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: operational - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in the registry. - - name: display_name - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[^\n\r]{1,80}$ - sensitivity: public - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Human-readable client name shown at sign-in. - - name: redirect_uris - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^https://[^*\s,]+(,https://[^*\s,]+)*$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Comma-separated exact redirect URIs; wildcards are never accepted. - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^openid(,(profile|email|groups))*$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Comma-separated scopes the client may request; openid first. - - name: client_type - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^(confidential|public)$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: confidential (server-side, holds a secret) or public (PKCE only). - - name: mfa_required - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^(true|false)$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Pin MFA on this client instead of relying on the provider default. - responsibilities: - - resource_kind: identities - owner: net-kingdom - resources: - - oidc:static-clients - repo_owns: Live registry change for exactly this client, its idempotency and removal; field rules are key-cape's canonical model. - netkingdom_orchestrates: Supply the case's validated, non-secret client fields. - - resource_kind: roles_scopes_policies - owner: key-cape - resources: - - iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists - repo_owns: Enforce exact redirect URIs, allowed scopes and the MFA pin at authorization time. - netkingdom_orchestrates: Choose scopes and MFA posture per SecurityCaseType. - trust: - requires: - - state: runtime_secret_trust - readiness_checks: [] - - state: runtime_identity_trust - readiness_checks: [] - satisfies: - - state: tenant_onboarding_trust - readiness_checks: - - id: client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect - description: The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI. - evidence: GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error. - - id: client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect - description: The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client. - evidence: GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error. - catalog: - publish: capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml - maturity: implemented - consumers: - - netkingdom-security-scenario-composer - - netkingdom-security-case-types diff --git a/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.yaml b/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index e737e3f..0000000 --- a/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/playbook-capability/v0.1 -kind: PlaybookCapabilityDeclaration -metadata: - id: net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration - name: KeyCape confidential service client registration (live registry) - owner: net-kingdom - repo: net-kingdom - domain: infotech - contract_version: "0.1" - source_links: - - label: Entry point - path: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py - - label: Tests - path: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_client.py - - label: SecurityCaseType - path: security-case-types/oidc-service-client/type.yaml -spec: - playbook: - path: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py - type: cli-sequence - invocation: keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --expected-uid --expected-resource-version - description: >- - Add or remove exactly one client_credentials service client in the live - KeyCape client registry, with the same safeguards as browser clients: - contained kubectl, cluster and issuer pins, byte-preserving merge, - compare-and-swap, KeyCape check-config, read-back, and no secret values. - Field rules are key-cape's (src/internal/config/validate.go): confidential, - env secretRef, serviceSubject and tenant required, no redirect URIs, token - lifetime 1m-1h. Replaces per-client scripts such as approval-clients-rollout.py. - capabilities: - - id: c1.lightweight-sso - tier: C1 - resource_kinds: - - identities - - roles_scopes_policies - description: Register one confidential service client with the running lightweight issuer. - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: operational - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in the registry. - - name: display_name - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[^\n\r]{1,80}$ - sensitivity: public - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Human-readable client name. - - name: audience - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: The single resource server the tokens are for (aud). - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*:[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]*:[a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Comma-separated resource scopes of the audience; no OIDC identity scopes. - - name: service_subject - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^service:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: The sub KeyCape puts into the client's tokens. - - name: tenant - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^tenant:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: The registration-bound tenant claim. - - name: roles - type: string - required: false - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$ - sensitivity: operational - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Comma-separated roles carried in the token. - - name: token_lifetime - type: string - required: true - constraints: - pattern: ^(5|10|15)m$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - tuning_authority: netkingdom_tunable - description: Access-token lifetime; at most 15m (stricter than KeyCape's 1h ceiling). - responsibilities: - - resource_kind: identities - owner: net-kingdom - resources: - - oidc:static-clients - repo_owns: Live registry change for exactly this client, its idempotency and removal; field rules are key-cape's canonical model. - netkingdom_orchestrates: Supply the case's validated, non-secret client fields. - - resource_kind: roles_scopes_policies - owner: key-cape - resources: - - iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists - repo_owns: Issue client_credentials tokens only for the registered scopes, audience, subject and tenant; refuse excess scopes. - netkingdom_orchestrates: Choose audience, scopes, subject and lifetime per SecurityCaseType. - trust: - requires: - - state: runtime_secret_trust - readiness_checks: [] - - state: runtime_identity_trust - readiness_checks: [] - satisfies: - - state: tenant_onboarding_trust - readiness_checks: - - id: service-token-claims - description: A client_credentials exchange for each allowed scope returns a token with the registered sub, aud, tenant and lifetime. - evidence: The consuming service's own exchange, reported as claims only (no secret or token value). - - id: service-token-refuses-excess-scope - description: A client_credentials exchange for a scope outside allowed_scopes is refused. - evidence: KeyCape returns invalid_scope. - catalog: - publish: capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.yaml - maturity: implemented - consumers: - - netkingdom-security-scenario-composer - - netkingdom-security-case-types diff --git a/docs/NetkingdomRuntimeArchitecture.md b/docs/NetkingdomRuntimeArchitecture.md index f8c59b7..e624efe 100644 --- a/docs/NetkingdomRuntimeArchitecture.md +++ b/docs/NetkingdomRuntimeArchitecture.md @@ -1,14 +1,5 @@ # NetKingdom Runtime Architecture -> Lifecycle update, 2026-10-14: the lifecycle tooling descriptions below are a -> historical snapshot, not current execution instructions. Account creation, -> pattern deletion and inferred-claims verification in the old 0019 helpers are -> retired. Their secret handling and success assertions are not accepted evidence -> of current safety or readiness. Use the [current owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) -> and actual native receipts. Ordinary lifecycle delivery has since advanced in -> NK-WP-0025/NK-WP-0038; independent recovery and other IAM callers remain open. - - **Status:** draft (initial capture for NET-WP-0018-T02) **Date:** 2026-06-03 **Context:** Documents the *as-deployed* runtime after the first successful bootstrap (0015-0017) + T06-adjacent polish (0019). Not an idealized future architecture. Specific enough to guide a scratch rebuild or rehearsal without rediscovering integration details. Incorporates pragmatic audit paths and known UE integration points/gaps per the persisted assessment. diff --git a/docs/adr/ADR-0018-access-engine-core-as-production-pdp.md b/docs/adr/ADR-0018-access-engine-core-as-production-pdp.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9f65de0..0000000 --- a/docs/adr/ADR-0018-access-engine-core-as-production-pdp.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-ADR-0018 -type: architecture-decision-record -title: "The access-engine Core Is the Production PDP; Topaz Is Deferred" -status: accepted -owner: net-kingdom -revision: "1" -decided: "2026-10-27" -last_reviewed: "2026-10-27" -review_interval: 12m -amends: [NK-ADR-0006] ---- - -# ADR-0018 - access-engine Core as Production PDP - -**Status:** Accepted by Bernd Worsch on 2026-10-27, as hub decision `37464824-a939-415f-8a7a-5f81cbf498c8` -(NK-WP-0055-T10). -**Date:** 2026-10-27 -**Decider:** Bernd Worsch - -## Context - -ADR-0006 and `docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md` name Topaz as the first delegated policy decision point -(PDP) behind flex-auth, now access-engine. In practice Topaz exists only as an adapter shape (FLEX-WP-0004), and nothing -deploys it. Every live decision comes from the access-engine Go core. - -The core already provides: - -- tenant scope; -- relationship facts and inherited access; -- check, list-allowed and explain; -- caller authentication. - -The core was shaped to Topaz's policy-plus-directory model from the start. The production readiness ledger (NK-WP-0055-T01) -lists the Topaz runtime as an open area. - -## Decision - -- The access-engine Go core is the production PDP. A delegated Topaz runtime is not required for production readiness, and - that readiness area is an accepted exception. -- The PDP readiness checks still apply, but they are now run against the core: - - health; - - data freshness; - - policy load status; - - fail-closed behaviour, verified per consumer through each consumer's `pep-stance.yaml`. -- The policy import gap that Topaz bundles would have closed moves to NK-WP-0055-T14. Either policies load without an image - rebuild, or rebuild-and-deploy is accepted as the import path. -- Topaz is no longer an expected audit source (NK-WP-0055-T11). -- Topaz is deferred, not rejected. ADR-0006's rule still holds for any future delegated PDP: it evaluates policy, and it - never becomes the canonical policy model, the identity provider or the control plane. - -## Revisit when - -- a tenant needs per-object sharing, or relationship data outgrows the core's relationship facts; -- the number of tenants or the depth of group nesting makes core evaluation a bottleneck; -- policy changes become too frequent for the T14 import path; -- the production declaration (NK-WP-0055-T09) reviews its accepted exceptions. - -## Consequences - -- There is one less runtime to operate, back up, audit and drill. -- Authorization availability is coupled to access-engine. HA is out of scope by the same decision. -- Reversibility is high: adding Topaz later extends the system rather than rebuilding it. -- Where `docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md` describes Topaz as the first delegated PDP, read it with this - amendment. diff --git a/docs/architecture/net-kingdom_v0.1.md b/docs/architecture/net-kingdom_v0.1.md index add1a74..123862f 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/net-kingdom_v0.1.md +++ b/docs/architecture/net-kingdom_v0.1.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: net-kingdom-architecture title: "NetKingdom architecture" status: proposed owner: net-kingdom -revision: "draft-4" +revision: "draft-3" version: "0.1" last_reviewed: "2026-08-31" review_interval: 6m diff --git a/docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md b/docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md index 8a3ab68..d6808e1 100644 --- a/docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md +++ b/docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Attended procedure inventory — 2026-09-05 baseline, reviewed 2026-10-15 +# Attended procedure inventory — 2026-09-05 Reviewed all 32 shell scripts under `sso-mfa/k8s/` for NK-WP-0034-T03. Exercise status: unknown unless the row states otherwise. Existing deployment @@ -11,41 +11,42 @@ runbook or a dedicated procedure. Missing runbooks are listed separately. | Script (under `sso-mfa/k8s/`) | Runbook | Exercise status | | --- | --- | --- | | `authelia/create-secrets.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/README.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | -| `keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | retired 2026-10-15 before token/cluster access; Platform governed owner operation replaces the root-token pod prompt | -| `keycape/create-pi-token.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | retired; current factor reader is Platform-owned RPF-WP-0040; historical Secret/provider revocation remains open | +| `keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | unknown | +| `keycape/create-pi-token.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | unknown | | `keycape/create-secrets.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | -| `keycape/patch-openbao-client.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | retired 2026-10-15; use reviewed guarded registration/rollout adapters | -| `keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | retired; no personal-admin token refresh or live acceptance claimed | -| `keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh` | None found | retired 2026-10-15; raw registry replacement/output removed | +| `keycape/patch-openbao-client.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | unknown | +| `keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md) | unknown | +| `keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh` | None found | unknown | | `keycape/verify-openbao-client.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | -| `lldap/bootstrap-users.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md), [OPERATOR-GROUPS.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md) | source + isolated native fixture verified 2026-10-14; estate exercise still unknown; [procedure](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md) | -| `lldap/break-glass.sh` | [platform-root-custody.md](../docs/platform-root-custody.md) | retired 2026-10-14; [owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) | +| `lldap/bootstrap-users.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md), [OPERATOR-GROUPS.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md) | unknown | +| `lldap/break-glass.sh` | [platform-root-custody.md](../docs/platform-root-custody.md) | unknown | | `lldap/create-secrets.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | -| `lldap/create-user.sh` | [OPERATOR-GROUPS.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | retired 2026-10-14; [owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) | -| `lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh` | [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | retired 2026-10-14; [owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) | -| `lldap/manage-group-members.sh` | [OPERATOR-GROUPS.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md) | source + isolated native fixture verified 2026-10-14; estate exercise still unknown; [procedure](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md) | +| `lldap/create-user.sh` | [OPERATOR-GROUPS.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | +| `lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh` | [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | +| `lldap/manage-group-members.sh` | [OPERATOR-GROUPS.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md) | unknown | | `postgresql/create-secrets.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/README.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | | `privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md) | unknown | -| `privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh` | [privacyIDEA repair contract](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md#configuration-preserving-realm-repair) | source repaired: literal private files, preview/explicit apply, configuration preservation; live acceptance pending | -| `privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh` | [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | source repaired: explicit admitted private JWT, scoped read-only counts; live diagnostic delivery not admitted by this repair | +| `privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh` | [keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md](../docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md) | unknown | +| `privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh` | [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | | `privacyidea/create-secrets.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md), [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md) | unknown | -| `privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md) | source/isolated native recovery adapter verified 2026-10-13; current estate recovery remains NK-WP-0049-T03 | -| `privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` | [keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md](../docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md) | historical check 2026-09-23 with predecessor unproven; current core exercised 2026-10-14 on disposable PI/LLDAP, full production procedure unexercised | -| `privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh` | [privacyIDEA repair contract](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md#configuration-preserving-realm-repair), [verify-t06.md](../docs/verify-t06.md) | source repaired: attended in-memory input and propagated functional proof; live acceptance pending | -| `privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh` | [keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md](keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md) | core exercised 2026-10-14 on disposable PI/LLDAP; production unexercised | -| `user-engine/verify-operability.sh` | None found | retired 2026-10-15; use rapp-user-engine verification; no stale manifest rollback | -| `verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh` | None found | read-only source review; tracing disabled and private staging 2026-10-15; no new native exercise claim | +| `privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md) | unknown | +| `privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` | [keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md](../docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md) | attempted by Bernd Worsch 2026-08-27; no completed PASS receipt | +| `privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh` | [smooth-bootstrap-guide.md](../docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md), [keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md](../docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md), [verify-t06.md](../docs/verify-t06.md) | unknown | +| `privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh` | None found | unknown | +| `user-engine/verify-operability.sh` | None found | unknown | +| `verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh` | None found | unknown | | `verify-t02.sh` | [README.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/README.md) | unknown | | `verify-t03.sh` | [DR-RUNBOOK.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md) | unknown | | `verify-t04.sh` | [DR-RUNBOOK.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md) | unknown | | `verify-t05.sh` | [DR-RUNBOOK.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md) | unknown | | `verify-t06.sh` | [verify-t06.md](../docs/verify-t06.md) | unexercised on provider; HTTP simulation passed | -| `verify-t07.sh` | [DR-RUNBOOK.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md) | source + isolated native fixture verified 2026-10-14; estate exercise still unknown; [procedure](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md) | +| `verify-t07.sh` | [DR-RUNBOOK.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md) | unknown | | `verify-t08.sh` | [DR-RUNBOOK.md](../sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md) | unknown | ## Scripts without a matching runbook - `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh` — header usage is available, but a runbook with prerequisites, verification and exercise history was not found in the reviewed runbook set. +- `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh` — header usage is available, but a runbook with prerequisites, verification and exercise history was not found in the reviewed runbook set. - `sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh` — header usage is available, but a runbook with prerequisites, verification and exercise history was not found in the reviewed runbook set. - `sso-mfa/k8s/verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh` — header usage is available, but a runbook with prerequisites, verification and exercise history was not found in the reviewed runbook set. @@ -57,31 +58,3 @@ header now says unexercised to successful completion. Existing incident authority/window requirements still apply; this documentation review does not authorize that attended cutover. The changed helper must be included in the revision recorded by the operator. - -## Bootstrap/root-output caller review — 2026-10-15 - -The original 32-shell-script snapshot above is historical and does not cover the -subsequently added Python adapters or bootstrap/Make callers. The current exact -scope, source digests and per-entrypoint dispositions are recorded in -[the caller source inventory](evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/caller-source-inventory.json). -It enumerates all current non-test shell/Python files under bootstrap and k8s, -plus Make, the console, legacy delivery copier and isolated transport checker. -Enumeration is complete for that declared scope; it is not a claim that every -helper has current production acceptance or that no future defect can exist. - -| Caller group | Current source boundary | Native acceptance | -| --- | --- | --- | -| Generate/encrypt/decrypt/bundle | Public recipient for encryption; explicit private temporary key for decryption; private files; fresh no-overwrite bundle output; no age private key in bundle; no plaintext tar intermediate | Disposable actual age checks; exact off-host artifact/current coverage pending | -| SOPS setup/read/edit/encrypt/rotate/unlock | Existing private-input and recipient checks; no automatic permanent HOME key installation | Existing source/disposable receipts; independent recovery pending | -| Component create/apply/rotation | Literal private input, create-or-match or explicit named field update; no credential argv; contained errors; unknown writes require reconciliation | Current multi-consumer recovery/revocation remains owner work | -| Bootstrap orchestration | Attended entry; no automatic erase/regeneration of retained service custody; failed OpenBao verification stops before final cleanup; encrypted handoff is not proof of recovery | No production bootstrap executed in this review | -| Lab OpenBao init/unseal | Explicit lab model, admitted kubeconfig and exact cluster UID; private no-overwrite init receipt; shares stdin only; no automatic post-init root configuration | Captured fake-cluster transport tests only; historical lab receipt does not cover new revision | -| Legacy User Engine delivery copier | Retired; scoped email ESO delivery remains authoritative; audit delivery replacement needs owner custody path; existing Secrets untouched | No provider token copied, rotated or revoked | -| Legacy registry patchers/root prompt | Retired; raw Python registry patch output disabled; guarded owner adapters remain available | Existing registry/clients unchanged | -| Secret presence diagnostic | Current scoped factor Secret replaces old personal-token expectation; historical applied/native state never rewritten from presence | Presence only | -| Dependency/client verification | No tracing of decoded config; private staging; suppressed provider response/port-forward diagnostics | No new native acceptance claimed | -| Legacy managed workload rollback | Retired; current rapp-user-engine release/verification contract is authoritative | No workload rollback or reapply performed | - -The [recovery ceremony](bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md) records exact outstanding -owner evidence. Retired callers are not evidence of provider revocation. A -successful local backup job is not evidence of an off-host matching key/data set. diff --git a/docs/attended-procedure-standard.md b/docs/attended-procedure-standard.md index 85b0688..76c2f47 100644 --- a/docs/attended-procedure-standard.md +++ b/docs/attended-procedure-standard.md @@ -17,11 +17,9 @@ The first execution, on 2026-08-27, found four defects: 2. `GET /user/` parsed as a dict when privacyIDEA returns a list — an `AttributeError` outside the `except` clause, so the run died as a traceback rather than a receipt. -3. Missing resolver tuning (`TIMEOUT`, `CACHE_TIMEOUT`, `SIZELIMIT`) was - historically attributed to whole-object replacement. Correction, 2026-10-14: - native privacyIDEA 3.12.2 preserves omitted fields; sending explicit defaults - can overwrite custom tuning. The maintained cutover helper updates only the - bind password and verifies preservation. See the current resolver runbook. +3. Resolver writes omitting `TIMEOUT`, `CACHE_TIMEOUT`, `SIZELIMIT` — a resolver + write replaces the whole object, so each run silently un-repaired a resolver + an operator had just fixed by hand. 4. No way to declare an unavailable predecessor — the prompt could not be left empty, so an operator had to type a placeholder, which also fails the bind and was recorded as a **passing** denial proof. diff --git a/docs/audit-core-intake-identity-providers.md b/docs/audit-core-intake-identity-providers.md deleted file mode 100644 index 70c0321..0000000 --- a/docs/audit-core-intake-identity-providers.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,450 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: "audit-core intake packages: Authelia, LLDAP, privacyIDEA" -status: draft -owner: net-kingdom -work: NK-WP-0055-T11 -answers: audit-core AUDIT-WP-0017-T04 (three of the four identity providers; KeyCape is separate) -contract: canon/standards/audit-correlation_v0.1.md (accepted) -created: "2026-10-27" ---- - -# audit-core intake packages: Authelia, LLDAP, privacyIDEA (draft) - -This document gives audit-core the intake package for each of the three identity providers that NetKingdom deploys: - -- Authelia (`sso-mfa/k8s/authelia`); -- LLDAP (`sso-mfa/k8s/lldap`); -- privacyIDEA (`sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea`). - -It follows the common package in audit-core `AUDIT-WP-0017` ("Common intake package for every new sender") and -the wire contract in audit-core `docs/event-envelope.md`. KeyCape's package belongs to key-cape and is not covered here. - -**Status.** Draft for audit-core review. It plans work only: - -- it activates no sender; -- it mints no credential; -- it makes no live change. - -**How each claim is marked:** - -- **[repo]**: read from this repository's manifests. -- **[upstream]**: from upstream product behaviour as we know it. Not yet verified against the pinned image. -- **[estimate]**: a volume figure that must be measured before audit-core sets thresholds. -- **[unknown]**: an open question. - -## 1. Choices that apply to all three providers - -**Separate sources.** Each provider gets its own `source`, as AUDIT-WP-0017-T04 asks, so that silence in one of them -can be detected: - -- `netkingdom.authelia` -- `netkingdom.lldap` -- `netkingdom.privacyidea` - -**Owner.** The owning repo for all three sources is `net-kingdom`. ADR-0015 moves runtime packaging to `rapp-*` -repositories. If that move happens, the source name stays the same and only the owning repo changes. - -**Tenant policy.** All three providers are platform-scoped: there is a single realm and directory, `dc=netkingdom,dc=local`. -- The envelope requires `tenant` to be a non-empty value. -- Proposal: use the fixed value `platform` for every event, and give the sender credential only `platform` as a permitted tenant. -- [unknown] Is `platform` the spelling audit-core uses for platform-scoped sources? If not, use audit-core's spelling. - -**Shipper.** One small collector per provider: the *intake shipper*. -- It runs in the provider's namespace, either as a sidecar or as a CronJob. -- Each shipper has its own sender credential. -- It normalises native records into the envelope and posts them to `POST /v1/events`. -- On retry it reuses the same `id`, so delivery is idempotent. - -**Envelope mapping:** - -| Envelope field | Mapping rule | -|---|---| -| `id` and `Idempotency-Key` | A deterministic hash of the provider name and a stable native key (defined per provider below). Retries and re-reads after a restart produce the same id. | -| `type` | One value from the provider's action list below. The receiver stores it as `action`. | -| `subject` | The affected object as a **pseudonymous** reference, e.g. `user:`, `group:` or `token:`. Never a raw username or email address. | -| `occurred_at` | The provider's native event time as RFC 3339 with an explicit `Z`. All three providers run in UTC. | -| `correlation_id` | The 32-hex trace id (AC-1) if a valid `traceparent` was seen. Otherwise a newly generated trace id, with `data.correlation_origin: generated` (AC-4). | -| `data` | Holds the outcome, the actor (pseudonymised), the native record id, `correlation_origin`, and the fields listed per provider. | - -**Placement of `actor` and `outcome`.** The receiver fixes `actor=null` and `outcome=recorded` at ingest. The real -actor and outcome therefore go inside `data`: - -- `data.outcome` is one of `success`, `failure` or `refused`. -- `data.actor` is the acting principal. - -**Pseudonymisation of personal data.** The rules are the same for all three providers. - -- **Usernames, emails and display names:** - - Replace them with a keyed pseudonym before sending: HMAC-SHA256 truncated to 32 hex characters. - - The key is a NetKingdom-held value in OpenBao and is never sent to audit-core. - - This keeps records from the three providers joinable on the same user without exposing the name. - - Raw names must never appear in `subject` or `id`. - - [unknown] Whether audit-core prefers its own per-subject encrypted personal payload (`docs/erasure-and-audit.md`) - instead. If so, the raw name may travel in that payload, and our pseudonym becomes only the join key. -- **Synthetic, test and break-glass accounts:** Service and break-glass account names (`admin`, the KeyCape bind - user, `identity-provisioner`) are operational identifiers, not personal data. They may be sent in clear. This is - what lets break-glass use stand out. -- **Client IP addresses:** Personal data. Send them as a truncated prefix (IPv4 /24, IPv6 /48) plus a keyed - pseudonym of the full address. Ban and regulation events need the full-address pseudonym for correlation. - [unknown] Whether security operations need the clear IP for 30 days. That would need an owner decision under a - separate retention period. -- **Never sent:** - - passwords and password attempts; - - OTP values; - - session cookies; - - JWTs; - - OIDC codes and tokens; - - client secrets; - - enrollment seeds and QR payloads; - - LDAP bind credentials. - - The receiver's `secret_policy` is the backstop for these, not the control. - -**Credential.** One sender credential per source: - -- it is minted through the attended OpenBao path that `warden route find "audit-core sender credential"` points to; -- it is delivered to the shipper as a mounted file; -- audit-core never holds or prints it; -- `may_read` is false. - -**Retention.** The default applies: a 30-day query window plus archive. privacyIDEA records are the exception -(section 4.5). - -**Heartbeat.** Each shipper emits `type: source.heartbeat` every 15 minutes, even when there are no events. The -heartbeat's `data` carries: -- the shipper's cursor (last native id or log offset); -- the count of records read and sent since the last heartbeat. - -A heartbeat with a stalled cursor while the provider is serving traffic is the completeness signal (audit-core -`docs/stream-completeness.md`). - -## 2. Authelia: `netkingdom.authelia` - -### 2.1 Registration - -| Item | Value | -|---|---| -| Deployment | Namespace `sso`, Deployment `authelia`, selector `app.kubernetes.io/name=authelia`, 1 replica [repo] | -| Image | `authelia/authelia` 4.39.28, pinned by digest [repo] | -| Emitting identity | A shipper ServiceAccount `audit-shipper-authelia` in `sso`. Proposed; it does not exist yet. | -| Role | First-factor login (Authelia checks the password against LLDAP), forward-auth for `activity`/`temporal`, and the OIDC upstream for client `keycape` [repo] | -| Exposure | Behind the Traefik Ingress at `auth.coulomb.social` and `login.coulomb.social` [repo] | - -### 2.2 Where the events are - -**1. Structured logs.** -- `log.level: info`. No `log.format` is set, so output is text [repo]. -- Proposal: set `log.format: json`. The schema is unchanged, and this is a small config change. -- At info level, Authelia logs these events [upstream]: - - unsuccessful first-factor and second-factor attempts, with the username and remote IP; - - regulation bans; - - authorization denials; - - OIDC authorize and token errors. -- Successful logins are not reliably logged at info [upstream]. - -**2. The `authentication_logs` table in Authelia storage.** -- Storage here is SQLite at `/var/authelia/data/db.sqlite3` on the `authelia` PVC [repo]. -- Each row records [upstream]: - - one first-factor or second-factor attempt, success or failure; - - username, `auth_type`, `remote_ip`, `request_uri` and `request_method`; - - a monotonic `id`. -- Since 4.38, the `banned_user` and `banned_ip` tables also exist [upstream]. -- This is the **authoritative** source for login outcomes. Logs supplement it for OIDC and authorization events. - -### 2.3 Collection - -Recommended: a **sidecar** in the `authelia` pod with two read-only inputs. - -**(a) The SQLite file, read-only:** -- The sidecar polls `authentication_logs` and the ban tables by `id`, with a cursor kept on a small shipper PVC. -- SQLite's WAL mode allows a concurrent read-only reader [upstream]. -- The sidecar opens the database with `mode=ro` and never writes to it. - -**(b) The container stdout, with `log.format: json`:** -- The sidecar reads it through a shared `emptyDir` log file. This needs a `--log.file_path` setting [upstream]. -- Alternative: a node-level collector, if railiance-cluster provides one. [unknown] - -**Native key for `id`:** -- Table rows: `authelia|authentication_logs|`. -- Log lines: `authelia|log|`. - -**Constraint.** Storage is a single-writer SQLite file on an RWO PVC, so the sidecar must run in the same pod. -[unknown] Whether a planned move of Authelia storage to PostgreSQL would replace (a) with a DB reader. - -### 2.4 Correlation - -- Browser traffic arrives through Traefik. Today Authelia neither reads nor logs a `traceparent`, and it does not - propagate one [upstream]. -- When KeyCape redirects the user to Authelia, that is a browser navigation, so any trace context is lost. -- **Default:** `correlation_origin: generated`. The shipper creates one trace id per record. -- **Improvement, needs work by railiance-cluster:** - - Enable the Traefik access log in JSON with the `traceparent` request header kept. Header names only; never `Cookie` or `Authorization`. - - Join on time, router and client IP to recover propagated ids for OIDC back-channel calls from KeyCape: `/api/oidc/token` and `/api/oidc/userinfo`. - - Only server-to-server calls can carry an inbound `traceparent`. - - [unknown] Whether Traefik tracing or header logging is enabled on railiance01. -- **Same login, two records:** The OIDC `authorize` → `token` exchange is the hop KeyCape shares with Authelia. - - The KeyCape issuance record holds the propagated id. - - The Authelia record for the same login can carry it only if KeyCape sends `traceparent` on the token call **and** Traefik logs it. - -### 2.5 Action list (scope rows) - -| `type` | From | `data` beyond the common fields | -|---|---|---| -| `auth.first_factor.success` / `.failure` | `authentication_logs` (1FA) | `auth_method: password`, `request_host`, `ip_prefix`, `ip_pseudonym` | -| `auth.second_factor.success` / `.failure` | `authentication_logs` (2FA rows; TOTP/WebAuthn/Duo if ever enabled) | `auth_type` | -| `regulation.user_banned` | Ban table or log | `ban_until`, `failed_count` | -| `regulation.ip_banned` | Ban table (4.38+) | `ban_until` | -| `regulation.ban_lifted` | Ban table `revoked` / expiry | `by` (admin or expiry) | -| `access.denied` | Log, authz deny | `request_host` (e.g. `activity.coulomb.social`), `rule` | -| `oidc.authorize.success` / `.failure` | Log | `client_id` (`keycape`), `scopes`, `error` | -| `oidc.token.issued` / `.failure` | Log | `client_id`, `grant_type`. **No token values.** | -| `oidc.consent.granted` | Log (implicit consent today) | `client_id` | -| `identity.reset_password.requested` / `.completed` | Log, notifier | (Password reset is via LLDAP/Authelia. [unknown] Whether it is enabled.) | -| `source.heartbeat` | Shipper | cursor, counts | - -### 2.6 Volume, cadence and retention - -- **Volume** [estimate]: a few hundred authentication rows per day across operators, demo users and probes. Peak - under 5 events/s, except during a brute-force attempt. -- **Brute force:** Regulation caps each username at 5 failures per 2 minutes. IP-spread attacks are not capped. - Proposed shipper rate limit: 50 events/s, with overflow counted in the heartbeat. Overflow is never silently dropped. -- **Heartbeat:** every 15 minutes. -- **Allowed silence:** 30 minutes of shipper silence. Gaps between authentication events are normal at night. -- **Retention:** default. [unknown] Whether 90 days is wanted for ban events. - -## 3. LLDAP: `netkingdom.lldap` - -### 3.1 Registration - -| Item | Value | -|---|---| -| Deployment | Namespace `sso`, Deployment `lldap`, 1 replica. Ports: LDAP 3890, HTTP/GraphQL 17170 [repo] | -| Image | `lldap/lldap:stable`. **Not pinned** [repo]. Pinning it is a prerequisite for a stable log format. | -| Storage | Default SQLite on the `lldap` PVC. No `LLDAP_DATABASE_URL` is set [repo]. | -| Emitting identity | Shipper ServiceAccount `audit-shipper-lldap` in `sso` (proposed) | -| LDAP clients | Authelia and KeyCape bind as `uid=admin` [repo, Authelia config]. Admin automation: `lldap_admin.py`, `identity-provisioner-reconcile.py`, `break-glass.sh` [repo] | - -### 3.2 Where the events are - -- **Logs.** LLDAP has no audit table. Its only audit surface is the `tracing` log on stdout [upstream]. -- **At default verbosity, LLDAP logs [upstream]:** - - LDAP bind attempts with the bind DN and success or failure; - - GraphQL mutations, i.e. admin changes: - - create, update and delete user; - - create and delete group; - - add and remove a member; - - password change through the OPAQUE flow. -- **Field coverage at default verbosity** [unknown]: - - Which fields appear without `verbose=true` must be verified against the pinned image. - - `verbose=true` logs too much, including search filters that contain usernames. -- **Logins to the web UI** (`/auth/opaque/login/*`, `/auth/simple/login`) are logged with the username [upstream]. - -### 3.3 Collection - -- Recommended: a log **sidecar**, or a node log collector, reading the `lldap` container's stdout. -- **Parsing:** - - LLDAP logs are text spans, not JSON [upstream]. - - The shipper keeps a strict per-version parser and an allowlist of message patterns. - - A line it does not recognise is counted in the heartbeat and never guessed. -- **Native key for `id`:** `lldap|||`. This stays stable - when the shipper re-reads after its own restart. [unknown] Whether the collector exposes a stable offset. If not, - use a sha256 of pod uid, timestamp and raw line. -- **Cross-check through admin tooling:** - - The repo's admin tools (`lldap_admin.py`, `manage-group-members.sh`, `create-user.sh`) could emit their own - events, as the actor's view of the change. - - Proposal: not in this first package. Rely on the server log so that changes made outside the tools are captured too. - -### 3.4 Correlation - -- **LDAP (3890):** There are no headers, so `correlation_origin: generated` always (AC-2). The calling component - (Authelia or KeyCape) records its own inbound id. LLDAP records only its own. -- **HTTP/GraphQL (17170)** is behind Traefik (`ingress.yaml`). LLDAP does not log `traceparent` [upstream]. The same - Traefik access-log join as for Authelia could recover it for admin API calls. [unknown] -- **Joining LDAP records:** A bind from Authelia happens within milliseconds of an Authelia `auth.first_factor.*` - record for the same user pseudonym. audit-core may record a `parent_event_id` link only if the shipper can make it - deterministically. Proposal: do not; a time-and-pseudonym join is analysis, not correlation. - -### 3.5 Action list - -| `type` | Notes | -|---|---| -| `ldap.bind.success` / `.failure` | `bind_dn` (service DN in clear; a user DN is pseudonymised), `client_ip_prefix`. Failures are the main signal. | -| `ldap.bind.service` | Optional. A successful bind by the `uid=admin` service account, which is expected high-volume noise. Proposal: count these in the heartbeat instead of sending one event per bind. | -| `user.created` / `user.updated` / `user.deleted` | `actor` (admin principal), changed attribute **names** only | -| `user.password_changed` | `actor`, `self` true/false. No password material. | -| `group.created` / `group.deleted` | `group` cn in clear (group names are operational) | -| `group.member_added` / `group.member_removed` | `group`, member pseudonym, `actor` | -| `admin.login.success` / `.failure` | Web UI or API login | -| `source.heartbeat` | Includes `service_bind_count` and `unparsed_line_count` | - -### 3.6 Volume, cadence and retention - -- **Volume** [estimate]: - - Service binds: from hundreds up to a few thousand per day. They follow Authelia logins and KeyCape lookups, and - appear only as counts. - - Events actually sent: under 200 per day. - - Admin changes: a handful per week, with bursts during reconciliation runs (`identity-provisioner-reconcile.py`). -- **Peak:** under 5 events/s. -- **Heartbeat:** every 15 minutes. -- **Allowed silence:** 30 minutes. -- **Retention:** default. Group-membership changes are authorization-relevant. [unknown] Whether audit-core should - keep them for longer. - -## 4. privacyIDEA: `netkingdom.privacyidea` - -### 4.1 Registration - -| Item | Value | -|---|---| -| Deployment | Namespace `mfa`, Deployment `privacyidea`, 1 replica [repo] | -| Image | `ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker:3.12.2` [repo] | -| Database | PostgreSQL cluster `net-kingdom-pg`, namespace `databases`. Audit uses the default SQL audit module [repo, README; `PI_AUDIT_MODULE` not set, so the default `sqlaudit` applies, upstream] | -| Audit signing | `PI_AUDIT_KEY_PRIVATE` / `PI_AUDIT_KEY_PUBLIC` at `/etc/privacyidea/{private,public}.pem`, from Secret `privacyidea-auditkeys` [repo] | -| Callers | KeyCape (MFA challenge on `/authorize/callback`), NetKingdom admin scripts (`pi_api.py`, `check-user-mfa-state.sh`, onboarding guard) [repo] | -| Emitting identity | Shipper ServiceAccount `audit-shipper-privacyidea`, with a **read-only** PostgreSQL role on the audit table only (proposed) | - -### 4.2 Where the events are - -**The table.** The signed audit table `pidea_audit` in PostgreSQL [upstream schema, 3.x]. Each request writes one -row with these columns: - -- `id`, `date`, `startdate`, `duration` -- `action` (e.g. `POST /validate/check`), `success`, `action_detail`, `info` -- `serial`, `token_type` -- `user`, `realm`, `resolver`, `administrator` -- `client` (IP), `privacyidea_server` -- `policies`, `container_serial` -- `signature` - -**The signature.** Each row is signed with the audit private key. - -**Proof of the signed history (NK-WP-0049-T20, 2026-10-16):** -- All 279,209 stored rows verified against the retained original audit key pair. None were unsigned, invalid or legacy. -- After restore, a new entry was signed with the preserved identity. -- Tampered rows and a wrong key were refused. - -**Consequence.** The audit key pair is a retained identity: -- It must never be regenerated to repair anything (`KEY-RECOVERY.md`). -- The public key is the verification anchor that audit-core needs. - -**The application log** at `/var/log/privacyidea/privacyidea.log` (`PI_LOGLEVEL=20`) [repo] duplicates part of this -and is not signed. Out of scope. - -### 4.3 Collection: database export with the signature preserved - -**Export method.** An exporter (CronJob or sidecar) reads the table: - -- `SELECT ... FROM pidea_audit WHERE id > :cursor ORDER BY id LIMIT 500` -- It runs under a dedicated read-only role. -- The cursor is kept on the shipper side and echoed in the heartbeat. - -**What each row becomes:** -- `id` = sha256 of `privacyidea|pidea_audit||`. - - The signature is included so that a restored database with re-used ids cannot collide silently with earlier events. - - [unknown] Whether a restore can roll ids back. T20 restored into an isolated target, not production. -- `data.native` holds **every signed column, unchanged**, plus `signature`. -- `data.native_signature_alg` holds the privacyIDEA version and audit module. -- `data.verification_key_fingerprint` holds the SHA-256 of the public key. - -**Personal data in the signed row.** The `user`, `client`, `administrator` and `info` columns can contain usernames and IPs. - -- Pseudonymising them in `data.native` would break the signature. -- **Proposed resolution:** send them in audit-core's per-subject encrypted personal payload, if one exists (`docs/erasure-and-audit.md`), so the row stays verifiable. -- Use pseudonymous copies in the plain `data`, `subject` and `actor` fields. -- **Owner decision needed:** if audit-core cannot hold an encrypted personal payload, we must choose one of: - - (a) keep raw columns in the signed payload and accept them under audit-core's PII handling; or - - (b) send only pseudonymised fields plus the signature and the row hash. Verification would then be possible only - against the source database while it is retained. - -**Verification by audit-core** (proposal): -- Store the public key once as source metadata. -- The shipper verifies each row before sending. A failed row is sent as `type: audit.signature_invalid` with the row - id and never dropped. -- audit-core can re-verify a sample. -- [unknown] Whether privacyIDEA's signed-string format is stable across 3.12.x. Pin the exporter to the image version. - -**Not used: privacyIDEA's logger or container audit module** (`PI_AUDIT_MODULE` set to a logger-based module) [upstream]. -- It would stream audit records to a log handler. -- Its records are **not signed** and would bypass the T20 continuity property. -- Rejected as the primary path; possibly useful later as a low-latency mirror. - -### 4.4 Correlation - -- privacyIDEA 3.12 neither records nor propagates `traceparent` [upstream]. `pidea_audit` has no column for it. -- Default: `correlation_origin: generated`. -- **Improvement:** KeyCape's MFA call (`/validate/check`) is server-to-server. If KeyCape sends `traceparent` and the - privacyIDEA Ingress/Traefik access log records it, the shipper can join on these fields: - - `startdate`; - - `client` (KeyCape pod IP); - - `serial` / `user`. - - The join recovers the propagated id. This is the same dependency on railiance-cluster as for Authelia. [unknown] -- **Cluster-internal calls:** If KeyCape calls privacyIDEA by cluster-internal Service address, the call bypasses - Traefik. Then only a privacyIDEA-side WSGI middleware could log the header. That is an upstream or plugin change. - [unknown] Which address KeyCape uses in production. - -### 4.5 Action list - -The `type` is derived from `action`, the HTTP method plus endpoint: - -| `type` | Native `action` | Notes | -|---|---|---| -| `mfa.challenge.success` / `.failure` | `POST /validate/check`, `/validate/samlcheck` | `serial`, `token_type`, user pseudonym, `realm` | -| `mfa.challenge.triggered` | `POST /validate/triggerchallenge` | | -| `token.enrolled` / `token.enrollment_confirmed` | `POST /token/init` (2-step) | No seed or QR material; `info` is checked for secret-shaped values | -| `token.deleted` / `.disabled` / `.enabled` / `.revoked` / `.reset` / `.unassigned` | `DELETE /token/`, `POST /token/disable` etc. | `administrator` in `actor` | -| `token.resync` / `.setpin` | `POST /token/resync`, `/token/setpin` | | -| `policy.changed` / `policy.deleted` | `POST/DELETE /policy/*` | Admin | -| `config.changed` | `POST /system/*`, `/resolver/*`, `/realm/*`, `/caconnector/*` | Admin | -| `admin.auth.success` / `.failure` | `POST /auth` | Includes the bootstrap-admin and script logins | -| `audit.read` | `GET /audit/` | Who read the audit log | -| `audit.signature_invalid` | Exporter | Never dropped | -| `privacyidea.other` | Any other `action` | Counted and sent, so the action list can be refined | -| `source.heartbeat` | Exporter | Cursor, `max(id)`, `rows_behind` | - -### 4.6 Volume, cadence and retention - -- **Volume** [estimate]: - - Average: about 1,300 rows per day. That is 279,209 rows over about 210 days, from deployment on 2026-03-19 to the T20 count on 2026-10-16. - - The rows are probably dominated by automation: MFA-state checks, the guard, probes. - - [unknown] The split between automated calls and human logins. Measure it per `action` before setting thresholds. -- **Peak:** under 10 rows/s. -- **Backfill:** Exporting the historical rows is a one-off backfill of about 280k rows. - - Proposal: run it in batches under 50 events/s. - - The cursor starts at `id=0`. - - [unknown] Whether audit-core wants the history or only the rows from activation onwards. -- **Heartbeat:** every 15 minutes, with `rows_behind`. -- **Allowed silence:** 30 minutes. The automated checks make zero rows over several hours anomalous. -- **Retention.** A longer retention is requested. - - MFA token lifecycle and admin policy changes are the evidence behind privileged-access claims (SI-X4, aal2). - - Proposal: the default 30-day query window plus an archive that keeps signed rows for at least 1 year. - - The source database stays authoritative. [unknown] Its retention and rotation are not configured in the repo today. - -## 5. Prerequisites and owner asks - -| # | Item | Owner | -|---|---|---| -| P1 | Pin the `lldap/lldap` image to a digest | net-kingdom (or the `rapp-*` owner after ADR-0015) | -| P2 | Set Authelia `log.format: json` and a file path the sidecar can read | net-kingdom | -| P3 | Read-only PostgreSQL role for `pidea_audit` | rapp-postgres / railiance-platform with net-kingdom | -| P4 | Pseudonymisation key in OpenBao, and a sender credential for each source | net-kingdom via the attended OpenBao path (`warden route`) | -| P5 | Traefik JSON access log with `traceparent` kept (no cookies or auth headers) | railiance-cluster | -| P6 | `tenant` value for platform-scoped sources; `correlation_origin` field placement (AUDIT-WP-0017-T05); per-subject encrypted personal payload for signed privacyIDEA rows; whether to backfill privacyIDEA history; longer retention for privacyIDEA | audit-core | -| P7 | KeyCape sends `traceparent` on its back-channel calls to Authelia and privacyIDEA | key-cape | - -## 6. Unknowns to verify before overlays are prepared - -1. **Log content.** Exact Authelia 4.39.28 and LLDAP log messages and fields at info level. Capture them on synthetic - accounts in a non-production instance. -2. **Concurrent SQLite reads.** Whether Authelia's SQLite storage tolerates a concurrent read-only reader on the RWO PVC - without lock contention. The alternative is to move Authelia storage to PostgreSQL. -3. **Signed-string format.** The privacyIDEA signed-string format and its stability across patch releases. - Exporter-side verification depends on it. -4. **Ingress path and logging.** Whether KeyCape reaches Authelia and privacyIDEA through Traefik or through cluster - Services, and whether Traefik logs request headers on railiance01. -5. **Traffic split and volume.** The real distribution per action and the human-versus-automation split. Every volume - figure above is an estimate. -6. **Password reset.** Whether Authelia password reset is enabled. The notifier is configured, but the reset policy is - not set explicitly in `configmap.yaml`. -7. **Deployed config.** Whether the deployed configuration still matches the repo manifests. ADR-0015 migration and - live drift are not checked in this draft. diff --git a/docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md b/docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6abbee5..0000000 --- a/docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,611 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0049 recovery ceremony and closure packet - -Status: the actual full off-host identity bundle was independently retrieved and -recovered with the human-held age key. Daily backup/retention and hourly health -timers are active. Full native service authentication, token decryption, audit -continuity and current/legacy caller acceptance remain open for NK-WP-0049. -Approved execution is recorded in decisions40bfae40 and5edd5203; this document -records their scope and evidence. - -**Outage quick start:** [Storage Share disaster recovery guide](disaster-recovery-storage-share.md). -The guide and standalone tools ZIP were published and read back on 2026-10-16. -The operator independently retrieved the protected bundle without OpenBao/SSO -and passed the full archive/native PostgreSQL check. T23/T26 are done; see -[the accepted publication and drill record](storage-share-recovery-publication.md). -The [isolated service restore packet](identity-service-restore-packet.md) -contains the draft native-service sequence and remaining T15 admission inputs. -Its actual LLDAP stage passed on 2026-10-16: native existing-user bind, wrong -credential refusal, stable directory/attribute rows, isolation and cleanup. -T16 is done; Authelia/KeyCape/MFA/audit continuity remains separate acceptance. - -## What has been established - -On 2026-10-15 the operator identified Scaleway and Storage Share as the off-host -backup providers. This identifies destinations, not the exact recovery artifact, -its freshness, its file coverage or independently held decryption key. Platform's -current backup contracts distinguish Scaleway database/full archives from the -Nextcloud secondary copy. An upload-only share is not a retrieval identity. - -Read-only primary-cluster metadata is retained under -`docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/`. LLDAP, Authelia, KeyCape, -privacyIDEA, identity-provisioner and User Engine each have one Ready replica. -The three SQLite/key backup CronJobs report successful October 15 invocations. -Their current commands target local PVCs; neither an external export nor complete -off-host key/database coverage is established by those observations. The -privacyIDEA command mentions its encryption key, but not its audit key pair. -This command inspection is a coverage question, not proof that no other backup -exists. The personal-token and trigger-admin Secrets still exist. Neither their -validity nor provider-side revocation has been tested. A scan of 34 current -Deployment/StatefulSet/DaemonSet/CronJob/Pod resources in sso, mfa and user-engine -found no references to those two old Secrets; it still found the expected audit -delivery reference in User Engine. Other namespaces, historic jobs, external -consumers and issued provider credentials are outside that scan. - -## Assemble the exact owner packet before execution - -Record only safe references and checksums. Keep credentials in their current -owner custody and pass the decryption key through attended temporary unlock. - -| Required owner input | Acceptance | -| --- | --- | -| Off-host artifact | Provider, account/folder or object/version, backup timestamp, ciphertext SHA256 and independent retrieval receipt; do not substitute a new local export for the existing off-host backup. | -| Independent key | Human confirms matching custody outside the servers and OpenBao. A successful decrypt using only the OpenBao escrow key does not prove independent recovery. Never send the key in chat. | -| Required assets | Exact manifest of matching service env/config files, LLDAP and Authelia data, privacyIDEA database plus original encryption/audit keys, and KeyCape registry/signing material. Resolve assets held through other current owner lanes explicitly. | -| Recovery environment | Named disposable target, pinned images available independently of the failed production registry, no production ingress, no production identity/client execution, bounded egress, private storage and exact cleanup scope. | -| Native proof | Owner-specific database integrity, identity/group counts, decryption of retained token material, audit signature continuity, issuer/client/signing configuration preservation and admitted login/MFA checks. Distinguish an isolated restore from current production credential validity. | -| Current consumer source | Reconcile the deployed revisions with the repaired caller/provider source. The October 14 reserved platform-group fix must be deployed and independently checked before claiming live enforcement. | -| Legacy credential disposition | IAM owner identifies the exact historical personal-token/trigger principals, actual consumers and revocation method before any deletion. Deleting a Secret does not revoke an issued provider credential. | - -The operator supplied the independently held `railiance-backup` age key only to -the attended local custody helper. The actual off-host PI ciphertext decrypted -and restored successfully; the agent received no private key material. The full -identity asset manifest remains unfulfilled. The backup lane recipient and -bootstrap `keys/age.pub` must not be assumed to be the same. -Do not draft a blanket restore or grant approval while full coverage is unknown. -Once fixed, bind the source revisions, target identities, allowed operations, -recovery/cleanup sequence and maintenance window to the reviewed live packet. -Existing eligibility or another client's approval is not this ceremony's grant. - -## Execute in stages - -1. Use the existing Platform/provider recovery lane to retrieve the identified - ciphertext, verify its object/version and digest, and retain a safe transfer - receipt. Do not request or expose the provider credential to the agent. -2. The human unlocks the independently held age key in the existing custody - helper. Validate it against the registered public recipient. No permanent - key is installed in HOME, generated as a replacement, or copied into a bundle. -3. Run the local transport/coverage check below. It contacts no cluster, keeps - plaintext in a private temporary directory outside Git, refuses unsafe - archives/private age keys, tests an unrelated disposable wrong key, reads the - restored files back and removes that staging. It emits a closed non-secret - receipt. This is one prerequisite, not whole-service recovery acceptance. -4. Under the exact separately reviewed owner ceremony, restore the matching - service data/key/config sets into the disposable environment and perform the - native checks above. Never run the full production bootstrap to test source - repairs. Unknown writes stop for reconciliation rather than automatic retry. -5. Verify cleanup, preserve the original ciphertext and independent custody, - and reconcile current callers/legacy credentials through their owners. - Retain exact source/object/image/actor/time and positive/negative receipts. -6. Close T02/T03 only after the recorded remaining requirements are satisfied. - Update the workplan first, run `statehub fix-consistency --repo net-kingdom`, - and verify the Hub projection. A transport fixture or generated evidence - worksheet cannot mark this plan finished. - -## Prepared local transport check - -The human invokes this through the existing attended custody helper after the -exact artifact and required-file list are agreed. `NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE` -is the temporary private file provided inside that envelope. The tool never -reads an ambient HOME key. The receipt destination must be new. - -```bash -python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py \ - --bundle /private/recovery/fetched-ops-bundle.tar.age \ - --bundle-sha256 \ - --required-file lldap/secrets.env \ - --required-file privacyidea/secrets.env \ - --required-file privacyidea/pi.enc \ - --required-file privacyidea/private.pem \ - --required-file privacyidea/public.pem \ - --receipt /private/recovery/new-transport-receipt.json -``` - -This example file list is not an accepted whole-stack manifest. Add every -agreed service file supported by the closed transport profile; database copies -and other archive formats use their native owner restore tools. A successful -receipt explicitly leaves independent custody, current service validity and -native consumer recovery unproven. Off-host retrieval lineage and human custody -confirmation must accompany it; the tool cannot infer where a local input came -from. A failed check publishes no acceptance receipt. - -## Rotation boundaries - -CUST-WP-0073-T05 remains founder-deferred under decision -`1591daa1-6e85-4dfd-aadd-5a9fe1ef47fa`. This work does not reopen that rotation, -replace signing keys, change directory passwords or erase old backup keys. -Existing historical exposure, provider revocation and coordinated rotation -requirements stay explicit in their live owner records. If completion needs a -protected native operation, prepare that exact operation and obtain its scoped -disposition; never treat a source repair or successful backup job as permission. - -## Knowledge/source scope - -Emergent Security 0.2.6, package digest -`8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`: -start/root cards withheld, orientation only. Current SECURITY-COMPANION, -Platform backup/custody procedures, owner runtime contracts and the workplan -were reviewed as sources. No execution authority is derived from the cards. - - -## Off-host inventory return — 2026-10-15 - -Both bounded metadata inventories completed. Storage Share's inspected -`Backup/railiance-backups` scope includes the current privacyIDEA database -ciphertext and the October14 OpenBao snapshot. It did not reveal a matching -bootstrap/identity-file bundle in the inspected folders. Scaleway's inspected -`railiance-platform-pg-backup/platform-pg/` tree contains database backup trees -and an application archive subtree, with no identity-file bundle in this bounded -scope. Other accounts/buckets/prefixes are unassessed. See -[the discovery summary](evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/offsite-discovery-summary.json). -No object contents or age keys were read; the operator envelope exited0 and -self-revoked. Existing scoped backup credentials were reused without changes; -the Scaleway bootstrap API key was not used. - -The operator subsequently reported the hidden-terminal check passed and the -temporary key file was removed. The later actual database drill also passed; -the private key was not provided to the agent. - -## Prepared bounded privacyIDEA database drill — 2026-10-16 - -The identified existing off-host ciphertext was downloaded through the same -attended Platform Backup-account procedure. The before/GET/after strong-ETag -binding and exact byte count passed. Ciphertext SHA256: -`cc81da442755928171d2c51bce93eda7de4392a0a1aa9d0ffb83a25ba34e5ead`. -See `privacyidea-transfer-r1.json` in the October15 evidence folder. The owner -envelope exited0 and self-revoked; no age key or plaintext was read by the fetch. -Ciphertext is retained in the fresh private `/tmp/nk49-offhost-j9dzl0ge/` directory. - -The following exact human command performs only an isolated local database -drill. It checks the transfer receipt/digest before opening the temporary key, -checks the backup recipient, refuses an unrelated wrong key, decrypts to private -temporary storage and restores into disposable PostgreSQL. Image -`postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70` -is already cached locally (pg_restore16.14). There is no image pull, network, -published port, host data mount, production connection or IAM/client execution. -Database storage is a bounded temporary memory filesystem. Only fixed aggregate -counts for `token`, `resolver`, and `realm` leave the database. The container, -volumes and temporary plaintext are removed and cleanup is checked. The original -ciphertext remains for reproducibility. This proves database recovery only; -token decryption, audit signature continuity and full identity service recovery -require matching key/config files and further native owner checks. - -Executed successfully on 2026-10-16 (local time). The command is retained for -provenance; its r1 receipt now exists and must not be overwritten or rerun merely -to repeat evidence. Run future reviewed drills with a new receipt. Paste the key -only into the hidden prompt, then share the success/error line or safe JSON -receipt. The receipt destination must be new; do not overwrite a failed receipt. - -```bash -cd /home/worsch/net-kingdom -bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py \ - --transfer-receipt docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-transfer-r1.json \ - --receipt docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json -``` - -Source verification:23 focused checks passed, including a real local Docker -custom-format dump, age encryption, temporary fixture-key unlock, wrong-key -refusal, native restore/readback and cleanup. Those tests use synthetic data and -fresh fixture keys. They are not evidence of actual backup decryption. If the -real drill fails, review its closed receipt; do not expose PostgreSQL/age stderr -or dump contents in chat. T02/T03 remain open. - -## Actual database recovery result — 2026-10-16 - -The operator reported success and the actual receipt was reviewed against the -exact checker source, pinned image and fetched ciphertext SHA256. The retained -ciphertext digest was independently rechecked. Decryption, unrelated wrong-key -refusal, native PostgreSQL restore, fixed aggregate readback and container/plaintext -cleanup all passed. The restored database has five tokens, two resolvers and -two realms. The local Docker inventory contains no remaining NK49 containers. -Evidence: `privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json` and `database-drill-review.json` -in the October15 evidence directory. No production connection occurred. - -This proves recovery of the selected database using the operator's independently -held key. It does not prove the recoverability of token plaintext, old audit -signatures, directory accounts, issuer keys or a full identity environment. - -## Missing coverage prepared at the operator's request - -The operator confirmed there is no known full identity bundle and requested -preparation of the missing coverage. The machine-readable proposal is -[`identity-backup-profile.json`](../tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json). -The read-only preparer checked the primary cluster UID, four current Deployment -UIDs/readiness/observed generations, five Bound PVC UIDs and the complete current -Secret/ConfigMap reference sets. It captured names and identities only; it did -not read Secret values or execute in pods. Its exact result is -`identity-backup-preparation-r1.json`. Fourteen tests cover foreign/stale targets, -new unreviewed dependencies, projected Secrets and private-value suppression. - -| Component | Required new coverage | Required recovery proof | -| --- | --- | --- | -| LLDAP | Consistent `users.db` snapshot, remaining durable data and current credentials/configuration | User, group and membership preservation; existing-user authentication | -| Authelia | Consistent storage DB, original encryption/OIDC/session keys and current configuration | Storage decryption, signing identity and isolated authentication | -| privacyIDEA | Original enckey plus matching audit pair, configuration/scripts and a linked native database dump | Existing token decryption/MFA, old audit signature verification and new isolated audit entry | -| KeyCape | Current registry/config and signing key, policy/receipts, every referenced credential's recovery or independent reissue disposition | Issuer/JWKS identity, registry/policy continuity and positive/negative consumer acceptance | - -The proposed primary prefix is -`platform-pg/application-archives/net-kingdom/`; the proposed secondary folder is -`Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/`. These are **not admitted**. -Platform's current generic application archive adapter only admits -`coulomb-social` and `email-connect`, and their publisher custody profiles are -application-bound. A new NetKingdom profile and scoped publisher require owner -admission; existing credentials must not be borrowed. The operator's Scaleway -bootstrap API key is unnecessary for preparation. - -The initial goal is one verified generation, with a measured encrypted size and -fresh provider quota/upload-overlap checks. A proposed 512 MiB ceiling is a -refusal bound, not evidence that the data fits the secondary budget. Seven daily -and two weekly points remain a later measured proposal. No retention deletion -or recurring schedule was installed. Capture must preserve original keys and -use SQLite online-backup/PostgreSQL logical snapshots, record each capture -interval and refuse changed source identities/configuration. It must not claim -global atomicity or substitute a fresh export for the already recovered old dump. - -The source implementation below supersedes the earlier adapter-preparation gap. -The Scaleway primary/Storage Share secondary proposal above is deferred: the -initial rollout implements Storage Share only. Neither destination has yet -received a full identity bundle. Owner admission and actual recovery remain open. - - -## Implemented identity backup packet — 2026-10-16 - -The new capture, sealing, upload/readback, independent retrieval, archive/native -PostgreSQL verification, separate retention and node installer are implemented -under `tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-*.py`, `capture-identity.py`, -`retrieve-identity.py`, `verify-identity*.py` and `install-identity-backup.py`. -Source profile: `identity-backup-profile.json`. No production keys were collected, -no new credential grants were made and no timers were installed in this source -checkpoint. Decision `40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f` remains pending. - -The exact new owner requests are: - -- [CCR-2026-0048 publisher](../../railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0048-net-kingdom-backup-publisher.yaml): a read/create share for only `Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/`, delivered through a dedicated 15-minute, audience/namespace/SA-bound ESO reader. -- [CCR-2026-0049 retention](../../railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0049-net-kingdom-backup-retention.yaml): a separate read/delete share for that same folder and separate process. Compromise of this credential can delete points in the folder; it must not be given to the publisher process. - -Both require Platform, NetKingdom and Backup-share owner review. Only the scoped -share tokens enter exact new workload KV paths and ESO-managed Secrets. Neither -the operator account password nor the age private key is delivered to the job. -The setup helper refuses proposed/unapproved or hash-mismatched CCRs. Native -positive and wrong-SA/namespace/audience probes must prove the admitted reader -boundary, followed by equality to the exact ESO delivery; temporary readers are -revoked. These are new grants, so prior approval to prepare the missing coverage -does not count as completed credential-owner admission. - -The initial provider is Storage Share only. Ciphertext and safe receipt are -created once under a unique generation name, read back using strong ETags and -checked by size/SHA256. A 512 MiB refusal ceiling and two GiB fresh provider -headroom apply; unsupported public-share quota fails closed. Public DAV behavior -and permission denials are checked with disposable public-recipient fixture -ciphertext before accepting the grants. No Scaleway credential or another -workload publisher is reused. Nextcloud documents the public-share DAV interface -in its [official WebDAV guide](https://docs.nextcloud.com/server/25/user_manual/en/files/access_webdav.html). - -Two temporary helper Pods mount only reviewed PVCs read-only, have no service -account token, use pinned images, private tmpfs scratch and deny-all network -policies, then are deleted with exact UID preconditions. Kubernetes network -allows combine, so `identity-isolation.py` first prepares two guarded patches to -exclude the capture label from the existing namespace-wide DNS allows. Every -peer/port and ordinary service selector match is preserved. Plans bind the -current cluster/policy UIDs, resource versions and full original specs, and -refuse an existing pod using the capture label. Capture refuses any remaining -matching allow policy, source drift or unknown helper cleanup outcome. - -Capture uses native SQLite online backups and a fresh native PostgreSQL dump; -all required current Secrets/configuration and original key pairs are sealed -with the public recipient. The manifest and plaintext hashes are inside the -ciphertext. privacyIDEA service logs, historical LLDAP/Authelia/PI `backups/` -subtrees and Authelia notification.txt are omitted; the audit database is in the -linked PostgreSQL dump, and the full KeyCape policy/receipt tree is preserved. -There is no claim of a globally atomic multi-service snapshot. Drift/partial -cleanup stops future runs and requires exact owner reconciliation. - -### Ordered live rollout after exact packet approval - -1. Record all required owner reviews in CCR-2026-0048/0049 and bind their exact file hashes. Run `identity-credential-setup.py publisher|retention --ccr-sha256 HASH --receipt PRIVATE_NEW_PATH` through the attended Platform-admin owner conduit. Never inspect private helper output or copy operator credentials into the runtime. Verify actual provider permissions, initial CAS-only KV publication, exact policy/role, agent high-risk denials and revoked fixture readers. -2. Apply only `identity-custody.json`; wait for its two SecretStores/ExternalSecrets to be Ready. Run `verify-identity-delivery.py publisher|retention --ccr-sha256 HASH --kubeconfig REVIEWED_PATH --receipt PRIVATE_NEW_PATH` through that same owner conduit. Resolve any native denial before accepting delivery; do not set confirmed-claim flags from fixtures. -3. Generate a fresh `identity-isolation.py plan --kubeconfig REVIEWED_PATH --receipt PRIVATE_PLAN`; review it, server-dry-run it, then `apply --plan PRIVATE_PLAN --plan-sha256 HASH` using the same explicit kubeconfig and a fresh receipt. Each patch tests UID/resourceVersion/spec. Regenerate stale plans rather than weakening the guards. Confirm the cluster's network policy enforcement through its owning layer. -4. Render `install-identity-backup.py render --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f --receipt PRIVATE_PACKET`. Transfer only the reviewed runtime files in that packet plus the packet to the admitted node. As root on railiance01, run installer `install --packet PRIVATE_PACKET --packet-sha256 HASH --receipt PRIVATE_NEW_PATH`. Installation verifies exact cluster/source hashes and unit syntax; timers remain disabled. Execute the packet's exact `first_capture_command`. All output receipts/state and encrypted copies stay under root-private `/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup`. -5. Retrieve the successful generation's safe off-site receipt from that private state, then run attended `retrieve-identity.py --source-receipt PRIVATE_NODE_RECEIPT --receipt PRIVATE_INDEPENDENT_TRANSFER` with the independently authorized Backup account via Platform custody. It re-downloads and binds the ciphertext by ETag/size/hash. The receipt names the new private local ciphertext path. A published index alone is not independent retrieval proof. -6. The human independently verifies the downloaded bundle using the hidden-key command below. Review the actual receipt and exact source/artifact/hash. Copy only this safe receipt to private node state; activate with `install-identity-backup.py activate --accepted-receipt PRIVATE_ACTUAL_RECOVERY --receipt PRIVATE_NEW_PATH`. Activation binds the actual artifact to its local successful off-site receipt, pins that generation, checks health and enables the timers. -7. Confirm both active timers, last success, retained protection and safe Hub progress. Full NK49 native identity/caller and legacy-credential acceptance remains separately open. - -All actions accept source/target guards; flags do not create authority. The -installer runs as the already admitted node owner. If installation or a grant -partly fails, stop and reconcile its safe receipt/exact resources before retry. -Do not rotate keys, change existing service credentials or remove older backups -as an implicit repair. For rollback, disable the two exact new timers first, -retain the verified ciphertext and restore receipt, then have the owners revoke -only these newly issued shares/roles and remove their delivery resources after -confirming no consumer remains. Never delete existing unrelated backup jobs. - -### Independent full archive verification and bootstrap connection - -The key is entered only in the operator's hidden terminal, using the independently -held backup key already checked against this public recipient: - -```bash -sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py \ - --transfer-receipt /PRIVATE/independent-transfer.json \ - --receipt /PRIVATE/new-full-archive-recovery.json -``` - -With the reviewed sibling `railiance-bootstrap` checkout, the equivalent handoff -is `bash ../railiance-bootstrap/bin/railiance identity-recovery` with the same -transfer/receipt arguments, run inside that hidden-key wrapper. Its -[bootstrap sequence](../../railiance-bootstrap/docs/identity-recovery.md) links -independent custody and isolated verification to replacement-host/layer handoff. -The wrapper delegates to this verifier and never imports into production. - -The complete manifest, SQLite integrity, original RSA pairs, wrong-key refusal, -native isolated PostgreSQL restore and verified cleanup are the archive gate for -recurring backups. A successful archive gate does not prove existing-token -plaintext/MFA, historical/new audit signatures, existing-user login or issuer -consumer flows. Those require separately reviewed isolated service acceptance -before T03 and NK49 can close. The verifier deletes its plaintext; it is not a -production importer. - -Today's attended retrieval helper requires healthy OpenBao. For total custody -loss, independently held provider access and a separately reviewed offline -retrieval receipt procedure are still required; that offline adapter is not -implemented. No bare-VM unattended restore is claimed. The backup public key is -not interchangeable with the separate bootstrap encryption recipient. - -### Recurrence, retention and health - -After the first actual archive gate, the prepared root unit runs daily at -03:45 UTC with up to five minutes jitter. Retention runs in separate processes -before/after capture, protecting newest, seven distinct daily points, two -distinct weekly points and the independently recovered pinned generation. -Unknown/unindexed objects are never candidates. Both pinned and newest points -are re-downloaded and hashed before any expiry; each candidate is checked and -deleted conditionally by ETag. Partial/unknown expiry stops subsequent expiry -until reconciled. A matching guarded local-cache prune preserves protected -points and leaves unknown/failed runs for owner inspection. There is no claim -that 10 GiB is sufficient indefinitely: measured quota/headroom is checked each -run and an excess refuses new capture rather than deleting a protected point. - -An hourly node health check reports missing/older-than-25-hour backups or partial -failure to State Hub, with durable local nonsecret outbox/replay. This host-local -check cannot detect or report a dead host; external outage monitoring remains a -separate gap. The daily backup RPO is explicit and distinct from the one-hour -ecosystem coordination frame. Timers are currently disabled/uninstalled. - -Find this functionality through the owning registry entry -`capability.security.bootstrap-recovery` (keywords backup, restore, -disaster-recovery, age) federated by reuse-surface, related to -`capability.railiance.bootstrap-sequencing`. Maturity remains D3/A2/C1/R0; -source fixtures and discoverability do not assert live production acceptance. - - -## Live admission update — 2026-10-16 - -The operator approved the exact packet in decision -`40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f`. The first owner login succeeded but -Nextcloud returned publisher permission21 for requested5. Setup refused before -publishing any new KV value. Official Nextcloud link-share normalization adds -permission16 (re-sharing) to read-enabled public links when outgoing federation -is enabled. The operator then explicitly approved folder-only publisher21 -(read/create/re-share) and retention25 (read/delete/re-share), recorded in -`5edd5203-fae7-461b-8775-5d22b7873971`. The two CCRs and setup guards now require -that additional explicit approval. Neither credential gains update rights, -other-folder or account administration. New-share metadata and failed-attempt -receipts are retained in the October16 live evidence folder. This supersedes -the initial no-re-sharing provider assumption; it does not infer a native test -pass from approval. - -Node preflight also verified that `railiance01` is an SSH alias whose actual -hostname is `239.62.205.92.host.secureserver.net`. Runtime/installer now require -that exact hostname, the reviewed machine-ID hash and the original cluster UID, -plus root. No server hostname or machine identity was changed.52 focused -checks passed including the real synthetic encrypted/native PG fixture after -this guard repair. Unapproved-CCR negative tests use proposed fixtures even -when the actual owner requests have been approved. - -Both exact guarded DNS-selector patches passed server-dry-run and were applied. -The node has active k3s with network-policy rules present. The source-bound -runtime release was installed and unit validation completed; both timers remain -disabled. Provider admission/readback and actual full capture remain pending; -no periodic capture/expiry is enabled by installation alone. One subsequent -OIDC attempt timed out before owner-command handoff; it did not run mutations, -and its possible session revocation was unconfirmed. Only the contained owner -login lane is retried, without switching to root or inspecting captured bytes. - - -The native publisher fixture subsequently proved read/create, denied overwrite -and delete, and exact fixture cleanup. Its malformed parent path was rejected -withHTTP400. The checker now records that separately and also requires a valid -outside-account-folder request to fail authentication; accepting a malformed -path rejection alone would not establish authorization confinement.16 provider -checks pass after this correction. A fresh metadata capture plan confirms zero -allow policies matching helper Pods. The next owner login timed out before -handoff; no corrected provider probe or KV/ESO publication ran in that attempt. -The installed runtime's timers remain disabled while attended admission resumes. - - -## First full bundle created — 2026-10-16 - -Both exact roles passed native login, effective single-policy/900-second lifetime, -metadata/sibling/old-escrow/token-create denials, wrong-SA/namespace/audience -rejection, ESO value equality and temporary-reader revocation. Both ExternalSecrets -are Ready and KV versions are1. The operator session self-revoked. CCR-0048/0049 -are applied with actual bound-claim evidence; the provider-only request5/9 -assumption has been superseded by separately approved21/25. - -ESO adds known no-transformation defaults (`conversionStrategy: Default`, -`decodingStrategy: None`, `metadataPolicy: None`) to its spec. The delivery guard -now accepts only those defaults while rejecting extra sources or altered -conversion/property/version/reader bindings. The disabled node units were -replaced with exact previous-packet/content guards, timers verified disabled and -inactive, and preserved rollback bytes; source release -`758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf` -is installed. 56 focused checks passed, including native synthetic full-archive -PostgreSQL recovery. The task-only disabled-upgrade source and packet are in the -live evidence folder; this is not permission for an unchecked active-job upgrade. - -Actual first capture completed under the approved node owner, with all required -source identity guards and native data snapshots. Both temporary helpers and -private plaintext were cleaned. The exact new encrypted artifact is: - -- Name: `net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age` -- Folder: Storage Share `Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/` -- Bytes:109738344 -- Ciphertext SHA256:`7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30` -- Status: unique publication and fresh downloaded readback verified; safe index published last. - -Private node receipts live under `/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/runs/` for that -artifact. No age private key was used in capture/upload. The first independent -owner retrieval and human hidden-key archive proof follow; both timers remain -disabled until the actual proof is reviewed. Full directory/issuer/MFA/token and -audit-continuity acceptance remains distinct from archive recovery. - - -## Actual independent full recovery and activation — 2026-10-16 - -The attended Backup-account download succeeded and its owner session self-revoked. -The independently fetched 109738344-byte ciphertext was rehashed locally against -the exact published digest. The operator then ran the hidden-key ceremony through -`railiance-bootstrap/bin/railiance identity-recovery`. The original independent -backup key matched the declared recipient; an unrelated key was refused; all 36 -manifest files/hashes, original key pairs and SQLite integrity checked; the native -networkless disposable PostgreSQL 16.14 restore read back 5 tokens/2 resolvers/2 realms. -The checker source SHA256 and exact artifact/digest were reviewed, plaintext and -container cleanup passed, and no NK49 Docker containers remain. The agent -received no age private key or restored secret values. - -Safe evidence: `independent-owner-transfer.json`, `actual-full-archive-recovery.json` -and `actual-full-recovery-review.json` in the October16 live evidence directory. -This proves actual archive/file/native-database recovery, with full-service -authentication/token decryption/audit-continuity fields explicitly false. - -The accepted receipt was copied as root-private state and bound to the exact -successful node off-site receipt. The approved installer activation succeeded; -both timers are enabled and active. Next backup:2026-10-17T03:47:39Z (05:47CEST, -including the configured jitter). Next hourly health run:2026-10-16T08:00:00Z -(10:00CEST). The actual health unit completed with Result=success/ExecMainStatus=0. -A live retention preview listed the recovered artifact as protected, selected no -expiry candidates and deleted nothing; unknown objects remain untouched. No -capture/retention failure marker or pending event outbox remains. Runtime cadence -is daily 03:45 UTC plus up to 5 minutes jitter, hourly health and 25-hour freshness; -the recorded next times are observations, not permanent calendar values. - -`activation-result.json` and `activation-review.json` record the actual state. -The verified first generation stays pinned until a separately reviewed owner -change. Both archive creation/retrieval/recovery and the backup job setup are now -complete. NK49 remains active because broader native service/caller and legacy -custody acceptance are separate open closure criteria. - - -The installed hardened systemd backup service was then run once end to end. -`Result=success` and `ExecMainStatus=0` cover pre-retention, scheduled capture, -fresh upload/download verification and post-retention. It produced a second -verified generation, `net-kingdom-identity-20261016T073927Z-1224cb9362f8.tar.age`, -SHA256 `2b88375c378aac52fbd82f2bfa21fbbd9af61d8f88abdad2ed3f997dc9993b9c`. -Actual retention kept both the independently recovered first point and the newer -point, selected/deleted nothing and removed no local generations. Helpers and -plaintext were cleaned; failure markers and event outbox remain empty. This -validates the actual hardened recurring-job path, beyond a direct CLI capture. -Evidence: `recurring-job-review.json`. No further validation captures are needed -before the next scheduled run absent a new failure or source change. - - -## Native token-material and audit acceptance — 2026-10-16 - -The independently retrieved identity generation passed native privacyIDEA checks -on the fixed isolated local engine: all five retained token materials were read -internally using the original enckey; unrelated-key results differed for all five. -All 279,209 stored historical signatures verified, with zero unsigned/invalid -rows. A new isolated entry verified with the preserved identity; tampering and -an unrelated public key were refused. Container/plaintext cleanup passed. -T20/T31 are done. Safe evidence and source/ciphertext/target bindings are in -`evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.json`. -This accepts internal readback and stored-row signature continuity. Existing-token -MFA, Authelia and KeyCape authentication remain separate; event completeness is -not claimed. The published Storage Share kit remains its recorded version. - -## KeyCape original attempt assembly (NK-WP-0049-T33) — 2026-10-21 - -This is the attended order for the original KeyCape attempt. It is preparation and -authorizes nothing. T18 owns the actual run. Abort at any non-zero step, before the -hidden key prompt. - -1. **Founder attempt admission (surviving offline authorization).** The founder - signs a `secrets-engine.recovery-attempt-admission.v1` document with namespace - `secrets-engine-recovery-attempt`, case `secrets15-nk49-readiness`, a window of - at most 24 h, issuer `https://kc.coulomb.social`, and the exact hashes below - (secrets-engine `docs/founder-admission.md`; approved in principle by hub decision - `d1ab097d-cc79-4612-9c17-bb9b364081ac`, not yet signed). The verifier anchor - `/etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers` (root-owned, runtime-unwritable) - must exist on the attempt host. It is absent on the workstation today. -2. **Selector preflight with admission. This step is required.** From a secrets-engine checkout at - `0f44fbeea18147e65f379632621f2f29ded5f310` (or a replacement the owner names): - ```sh - python3 -I tools/check-keycape-recovery-selector.py \ - --selector docs/keycape-recovery-selector.json \ - --source-sha256 sha256:c0ade429edf452ad17f05d690b7ebef091db7f1a42b5ac350f1e40955c8586c0 \ - --admission - ``` - Proceed only with exit 0 and status `founder_admitted_attempt_not_native_acceptance`. - The selector bytes must hash to - `sha256:02077af3c18b24f5e4a85992a3d4d0df51a8e458de1e48b48f7eb5f482257012`. The - NK49 admission's consumer block must equal the selector's eight fields - (`secrets-engine-openbao`, `KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET`, - audience `secrets-engine-openbao`, scope `openbao:login`, subject - `service:secrets-engine`, tenant `tenant:platform`, roles `secrets-engine`, - deny `openbao:admin`). A pass shows founder authority for this one attempt. It - is not native acceptance and not single use. The NK49 execution keeps single-use - consumption and cleanup. -3. **TLS/trust input: ACME reissue** (founder decision - `9f9d0d88-837a-433c-8a11-d30b633b0073`, resolved 2026-10-21 = A). The - `kc.coulomb.social` TLS identity is reissued through `letsencrypt-prod` ACME - HTTP-01 and chains to ISRG Root X1 (trust sha256 `22b557a2…43d1`). The original - key is not required, and no self-signed substitute is allowed. - **Before the real attempt**, the owner (railiance-cluster) rehearses the same - issuance against Let's Encrypt staging. This protects the duplicate-certificate - limit of 5 per week. At attempt time, record the public chain with - railiance-cluster `tools/public-tls-metadata.py` and check SAN - `kc.coulomb.social` plus the ISRG Root X1 chain. Abort if HTTP-01 cannot - complete or the chain differs. The TLS key stays in the owner's own terminal. -4. **Existing six-argument launcher** `tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh` - with the reviewed admission digest. Its T34 source closure and abort/cleanup - behaviour are unchanged. The private manifest is derived and the archive - registration is compared to the selector inside custody only. - -5. **Safe receipt and independent verification.** The launcher prints - `Safe receipt: /recovery.json`. Before anyone copies it, verify it - from a separate shell against a clean checkout at the reviewed commit: - ```sh - python3 -I tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py \ - --receipt /recovery.json \ - --transfer-receipt \ - --source-root /tools/bootstrap-recovery \ - --not-after - ``` - The admission window, at most 24 h and signed by the founder, is the execution - deadline. Retain the receipt only on exit 0 (`verified`), and keep it at - `docs/evidence/-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/recovery.json` together with the - verifier output. On exit 1, keep it out of Git and report the findings. Do not - repair it by hand. The verifier refuses secret-shaped content, open cleanup - obligations, daemon uncertainty, any claim of consumer reconnect or human MFA, - a ciphertext that differs from the transfer receipt, and source that differs - from the checkout. A pass is not consumer continuity (T18), retained-factor MFA - (T19) or owner acceptance. - -Still open before T33 can close (2026-10-23): the anchor installed on the attempt -host (SECRETS-WP-0015-T04, founder- and root-owned) and the owner's Let's Encrypt -staging rehearsal from step 3. T35, T36 and T39 are done. The deadline, receipt -location and verifier are fixed above. Public observations are in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-21-nk49-t33-readiness/readiness-observation.json`. diff --git a/docs/crisis-custody-list.md b/docs/crisis-custody-list.md deleted file mode 100644 index ba5f0ad..0000000 --- a/docs/crisis-custody-list.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -# Crisis custody list - -NK-WP-0054-T07. Drafted 2026-10-24 from repository documents and the founder's statements -that day. **This list holds no secret value, ever.** It names what unlocks recovery, who -holds it, where, and whether using it needs the very services being recovered. Anything -the repository cannot establish is marked `TO CONFIRM`; the founder confirms each one. - -It belongs with the backup documentation: -[disaster recovery guide](disaster-recovery-storage-share.md), -[identity restore drill](identity-restore-drill.md) and -[Credential Management Standard §4](../canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md). -That standard names the custody categories. This list makes them concrete. - -## The one rule - -For every row, answer: **does using this item work when SSO and OpenBao are down?** -A recovery path that is satisfied only by logging in to something being restored is a -circular dependency and is recorded as a gap, not as custody. - -## Roles used below - -| Role | Identity | Used for | -| --- | --- | --- | -| Crisis operator | `admin` | Runs recovery and routine validation (founder intent, 2026-10-24) | -| Authorizer | `platform-root` / king credential | Break-glass authority from offline custody; nothing routine | -| Developer | `tegwick` | Builds and tests tooling; holds no recovery keys | - -## Items - -| # | Item | Unlocks | Holder and location | Works with SSO and OpenBao down? | Last proven use | Gap or action | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| 1 | **`railiance-backup` age private key** (recipient `age1zvry…50syr3tsz`). Not the custodian key (item 1b) | Decrypts the identity backup bundle and the break-glass copy on Storage Share (`net-kingdom-kingpath-*.tar.age`) | Two copies: founder's password safe (stored as `railiance-backup.key`) and a copy held by a named trusted person, who can recover if the founder cannot (founder, 2026-10-28) | Yes, offline | Identity stages 2026-10-24; king-path verify drill 2026-10-27 (the helper refused the custodian key three times before the correct key was entered, as designed) | Successor copy is not drill-proven; prove it once with `kingpath-offsite.py --verify` run by or with the successor | -| 1b | **Custodian age private key** (recipient `age1aq8t…qdepsh4`, `keys/age.pub` and `.sops.yaml`). Not the backup key | Decrypts the repository's SOPS custody files and greenfield bootstrap bundles (`docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md`) | Founder, password safe (stored as the custodian age private key) | Yes, offline | 2026-10, bootstrap/SOPS work (founder, 2026-10-28; not yet receipt-proven: run `make sops-custody-check`) | Labels in the safe should name the recipient prefix so the two keys cannot be confused | -| 2 | Storage Share `Backup` account app password | Downloads the protected ciphertext without OpenBao or SSO | Founder, in the independent password safe (founder, 2026-10-28) | Yes, provider is outside the platform | Fresh retrieval 2026-10-24 | One provider copy only; residual risk accepted until 2027-01-31 (G1, NK-WP-0053) | -| 3 | OpenBao unseal shares (2 of 3 required in the restore drill) | Unseals a restored or production OpenBao; with the shares, `generate-root` mints a root token for break-glass (ceremony in `railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md`; production loopback listener 8210 live since 2026-10-28) | Founder as `platform-root` holds all three shares (single-holder custody: accepted exception, hub decision `37464824`, 2026-10-27), in the founder's replicated browser password safe under the `kingpath.credentials` pseudo-URL entry (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Yes: the safe is independent of NetKingdom SSO and OpenBao; it depends on the browser vendor's sync account and its own factor | Original shares used in the isolated restore RPF-WP-0064-T07, 2026-10-24 | Single holder = single point of loss (reviewed at NK-WP-0055-T09). The founder holds the initial root token offline; the king-path drill (2026-10-28) found it **valid** as of the 2026-10-14 snapshot (root policy, no TTL, orphan). Founder decision `7ce684ec` (2026-10-28): stays escrowed during builder mode, revoked at production entry (NK-WP-0055-T16) | -| 4 | `platform-root` / king account and factors | Final authority; break-glass | Independently held password safe (kingpath entry) | **No if used through KeyCape**. The king path with SSO down is offline material instead: unseal shares (item 3) plus the `generate-root` ceremony on the loopback listener, the admin kubeconfig and static tunnel key (item 9, also on Storage Share), the Host Europe console, and the admission signing key (item 5) | OTP validated against restored privacyIDEA 2026-10-24 (isolated). King path drilled 2026-10-28: Storage Share restore of item 9, `generate-root` on an isolated restore, read-only production SSO-down walk ([record](evidence/2026-10-28-king-path-drill.md)) | Not drilled: using the restored item-9 material against the cluster, and the Host Europe console. Both belong in the recurring drill (NK-WP-0053) | -| 5 | Founder admission signing key (SSH ed25519, principal `bernd`, fingerprint `SHA256:NekDABfw8K8IBYznjREg7jPpcK/BzCgO1pH1ebT/FXM`) | Signs restore and drill admissions for the OpenBao isolated restore (namespace `railiance-openbao-restore-attempt`) and secrets-engine admissions | Private key: founder workstation `~/.ssh/gexec_approver_ed25519` (passphrase-protected; signed the T40, `-02` and `-03` admissions); founder decision 2026-10-28: also keep it in the password safe under the kingpath entry, **not** in the Storage Share bundle, so the backup age key alone cannot admit a restore. Public anchor (non-secret, needed on any recovery workstation): `/etc/railiance-openbao-restore/allowed_signers` and `/etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers`, one line each: `bernd namespaces="railiance-openbao-restore-attempt" ssh-ed25519 ssh-ed25519` ; the secrets-engine file uses namespace `secrets-engine-recovery-attempt` | Yes, offline | Signed the T40 admission 2026-10-23 | Private key stored in the password safe kingpath entry (founder, 2026-10-28). Re-create both anchor files from this row on a recovery workstation. The file name says `gexec_approver`, but the key's role is admission signing | -| 6 | `admin` password and OTP token | Day-to-day platform administration and, per intent, recovery operation | Founder; OTP enrolled 2026-10-24 | **No**: login and token checks need KeyCape, LLDAP and privacyIDEA | Token not yet in any restored backup; first restore proof after the 2026-10-25 03:45 UTC capture | Same account as the directory bind used by Authelia and privacyIDEA until the split in NK-WP-0054-T05 | -| 7 | `pi-admin` credentials (privacyIDEA internal admin) | Token repair and re-enrolment | Founder's replicated browser password safe (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Custody yes (replicated, independent of SSO); use needs a running privacyIDEA | Not yet drilled | Add a pi-admin check to the drill (NK-WP-0053-T04) | -| 8 | ~~Ops bundle (`make creds-bundle`)~~ **Retired 2026-10-27** (founder decision) | — | — | — | Never drilled; none existed on the workstation | Superseded by the daily identity backup, which carries the current service secrets. `make creds-bundle` packs only greenfield `creds-generate` output and stays a greenfield bootstrap step | -| 9 | Operator access to the production host or cluster for a real restore | Applying a restore to production | Cluster: ops-bridge tunnel `k3s-api-railiance01` (SSH as `tegwick` to `92.205.62.239` with a static key file, local port 16444) plus the attended admin kubeconfig `~/.kube/config-railiance01` (client certificate), today on the founder workstation only. Host: Host Europe provider interface with console and rescue access to railiance01 (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Yes: static key, client certificate and provider console need neither KeyCape nor OpenBao. **No** for ops-warden SSH certificates (warden's backend is OpenBao) | Cluster path used 2026-10-27 | Off-workstation copy uploaded and read back 2026-10-27: `Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/net-kingdom-kingpath-20261027T223050Z-8c9d48421f1b.tar.age` (10440 bytes, sha256 `8c9d4842…7dd4aa`, items `admin-kubeconfig`, `tunnel-ssh-key`, recipient `railiance-backup`; receipt on the founder workstation). Restore drilled 2026-10-27: fetched from Storage Share, unrelated key refused, decrypted in memory, both items intact (`kingpath-offsite.py --verify`). Using the restored material against the cluster is not drilled. Re-run `kingpath-offsite.py` whenever the kubeconfig or key changes. Open: runs as `tegwick` under an agent-labelled actor; provider console never drilled | - -## Non-secret recovery assets - -These need no custody but must be reachable: the published recovery kit on Storage Share -(guide, tools ZIP, checksum; verify the checksum against a trusted copy), the pinned -container images, and a trusted checkout of this repository. TLS for `kc.coulomb.social` -has no custody: it is reissued through ACME and needs working public DNS and HTTP-01. - -## Maintenance - -- Review at every restore drill (NK-WP-0053), and record the date each item was last - proven. An item never proven stays marked as such. -- Loss or suspected exposure of any item goes to its owner's rotation and revocation - process (Standard §6); this list rotates nothing. -- A machine-readable, non-secret record with a freshness check, modelled on - `tools/custody-record`, is proposed in NK-WP-0054-T07. Until then this document is the list. diff --git a/docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md b/docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md deleted file mode 100644 index 14b99d8..0000000 --- a/docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -# NetKingdom disaster recovery — start here - -Updated 2026-10-27. Owner: NetKingdom with Railiance Platform and the individual -identity service owners. This guide covers the identity backup, not whole-host, -OpenBao, Forgejo, User Engine or application recovery. - -## If the identity services are down - -1. Use a trusted recovery workstation. Obtain Storage Share access independently - from your password safe/offline custody, and the independently held - `railiance-backup` age private key (crisis list item 1; **not** the custodian - age key, item 1b, which only opens the repository's SOPS files). Never paste either into chat or a ticket. - The private key must match this **public** recipient: - `age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz`. - The provider password and encryption key are separate requirements. -2. Open using the independent provider - account, not NetKingdom SSO. In the Backup account, navigate to - `railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/`. Recovery documentation and a small - versioned recovery-tools ZIP are placed beside the encrypted archives. - Keep a copy of this guide and ZIP outside Storage Share as well. -3. Choose an intact recovery generation. The full identity filename starts - `net-kingdom-identity-` and ends `.tar.age`. A `privacyidea_db-*.dump.age` - database-only backup cannot replace the matching service keys and configs. - Each generation has a `.receipt.json` index. Preserve the original objects. -4. Check timestamp, size and SHA256 against a separately trusted receipt. The - index is useful metadata, not a signed independent trust anchor. For the - first actually recovered, protected generation the trusted values are: - - - Artifact: `net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age` - - Bytes: `109738344` - - SHA256: `7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30` - - Strong ETag at publication: `"28ec1f7014e492de4c40e1ae75502f08"` - - This is a known good fallback, not a claim that it is the latest backup. - For a newer generation, reconcile its index with the independently retained - publisher receipt before constructing a new download input. Never edit a - receipt just to make a failed integrity check pass. ETag changes require - owner reconciliation even if the filename is unchanged. -5. On Linux with Python 3, unpack the recovery-tools ZIP into a private working - directory and enter it. Verify its `SHA256SUMS` against a trusted repository - copy or independently held kit digest before executing code. A checksum - stored only alongside the download detects damage, not a malicious provider. - Alternatively use an independently available trusted net-kingdom checkout. - - ```bash - python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py \ - --source-receipt docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json \ - --auth account --receipt /tmp/nk49-outage-transfer.json - ``` - - In your own terminal, enter the independently held **Backup** account app - password at the hidden prompt. The fixed account name is `Backup`. - If your independently held credential is a read-capable public share token - for this exact identity folder, use `--auth folder-share` instead. An - upload-only token, another account's password or a share for the backup root - is insufficient for this command. A 401/403/404 stops; do not widen permissions - or substitute another token silently. Download performs only HEAD/GET against - the fixed provider, rejects redirects/proxies, and verifies ETag/size/hash. - Failure removes its incomplete local download. Success leaves ciphertext - in a private `/tmp/nk49-identity-fetched-*` directory named in the receipt. -6. Verify and decrypt through the existing hidden key helper. Requirements: - `age`, `age-keygen`, `openssl`, Python 3 and Docker; the following PostgreSQL - image must already be present on the recovery host: - `postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70`. - Stage and verify this image before a drill. The tools ZIP contains no images. - Allow enough private disk and RAM for a roughly 110 MB ciphertext, a bounded - 512 MiB archive and the disposable PostgreSQL container (2 GiB memory limit). - - ```bash - bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- \ - python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py \ - --transfer-receipt /tmp/nk49-outage-transfer.json \ - --receipt /tmp/nk49-outage-archive-recovery.json - ``` - - Use new receipt names on every run. The helper removes its temporary private - key on exit. The verifier checks the encrypted manifest and all file hashes, - original key pairs, SQLite integrity, wrong-key refusal and an isolated - PostgreSQL restore. It removes decrypted staging and the disposable database. - It deliberately does not install restored secrets or alter production. -7. Preserve the sanitized receipts and original ciphertext. Remove your local - downloaded ciphertext directory when no longer needed. If the verifier fails, - stop and check the bounded receipt with the service owner; do not regenerate - encryption/signing keys, reset user passwords or delete the provider backup. - -## What the backup contains - -| Component | Recovery material | -| --- | --- | -| LLDAP | Native SQLite snapshot, remaining durable data, deployment and referenced secrets | -| Authelia | Native SQLite snapshot, encryption/session/OIDC material, current configuration and referenced secrets | -| KeyCape | Original signing/configuration material, client configuration, authentication policies and receipts | -| privacyIDEA | Fresh PostgreSQL dump, original encryption key, matching original audit RSA key pair, current configuration and required durable files | - -The encrypted manifest records exact files and capture intervals. This is not -a global atomic snapshot of all services. Historical backups and selected -notification/log files are excluded as documented by the capture profile. -The backup contains sensitive service credentials; only ciphertext belongs on -ordinary persistent recovery media. The age private key is never in the bundle. - -## Restoring working services - -**Archive recovery passed on 2026-10-16. Isolated restored-service recovery passed -for LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA (MFA and audit), KeyCape (issuer side) and OpenBao -by 2026-10-24, and was owner-accepted in builder mode on 2026-10-27 (NK-WP-0049).** -A joint restore with a live consumer login is still a pre-production drill -(NK-WP-0055-T02/T03). The archive verifier deletes its plaintext and is not a -service importer. Follow `docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md` and the -[identity restore drill](identity-restore-drill.md) for a service drill. - -Restore the exact matching data/config/original keys into an isolated recovery -environment first. Keep production ingress, public DNS, notifications, external -provider writes and real consumer traffic disconnected. Establish directory and -database readiness; prove LLDAP existing-user authentication; then privacyIDEA -retained-token MFA/audit continuity, Authelia storage/OIDC, and KeyCape/current -consumer continuity according to their actual dependencies. Existing user/MFA -inputs stay in operator custody. Public issuer identity must be preserved while -test traffic is routed privately; do not change production DNS for a drill. - -Only after owner acceptance of native positive/negative tests should the owners -approve a production cutover, including target identity, rollback, DNS/ingress, -current consumers, credential dispositions and monitoring. This guide does not -authorize a production restore or automatic credential rotation. - -## Reaching the platform when SSO and OpenBao are down - -The normal admin paths need the services being recovered: KeyCape OIDC with -privacyIDEA MFA for OpenBao and portals, and ops-warden SSH certificates, which -are signed by OpenBao. With those down, only paths built on offline material work: - -- **Cluster:** the attended admin kubeconfig (`~/.kube/config-railiance01`, - client certificate) through the `k3s-api-railiance01` tunnel, which uses a - static SSH key. Today both are on the founder workstation only. -- **OpenBao:** unseal with the shares (crisis list item 3). If an admin token is - needed while OIDC is down, the shares mint a short-lived root token with the - `generate-root` ceremony in `railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md` ("Break-glass: - OpenBao with SSO down"). On production it runs against the loopback-only - listener `127.0.0.1:8210`, reached with `kubectl port-forward` (live since - 2026-10-28, RAPP-OPENBAO-WP-0003). Revoke the token afterwards. -- **Host:** console and rescue access through the Host Europe provider - interface, which is independent of the platform. -- **Workstation lost:** an age-encrypted copy of the cluster break-glass - material is kept on the Storage Share `Backup` account under - `railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/` (`tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py`, - NK-WP-0055-T13); decrypting it needs only crisis list items 1 and 2. - -Every use is a break-glass event: record what was done and why for review. -Item-level custody and open gaps are in the crisis custody list; drilling this -path is NK-WP-0055-T13. - -## Who and what unlocks recovery - -The [crisis custody list](crisis-custody-list.md) names every item that unlocks recovery, who holds -it and whether it still works with SSO and OpenBao down. It holds no secret values. - -## Schedule, protection and limits - -Daily capture is scheduled at 03:45 UTC with up to five minutes jitter. Hourly -host-local checks flag a backup older than 25 hours. Retention protects the -independently recovered pinned generation, newest generation, seven distinct -daily and two weekly points; unknown/unindexed objects are not auto-deleted. - -At this revision the full identity backup has one provider copy on Storage Share. -Existing Scaleway database backups do not establish a second full identity copy. -Host-local health cannot report a dead host. Full service login/MFA/audit proofs, -an independently executed outage-path retrieval drill, a second provider copy -and external host-loss monitoring must not be assumed from an upload or this -guide. Track remaining drills in NK-WP-0053 and production readiness in -NK-WP-0055; current task state lives in the repository and may be newer than -this offline guide. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 71d1483..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -{ - "owner_source_commit": "f6856cdb53c051e35c984bad927395b7e8a8e5e0", - "orientation": { - "package_version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "start_source_status": "withheld; source changed", - "source_review": "AGENTS/INTENT/SECURITY-COMPANION and relevant actual validator/acknowledgment/workplan reviewed; no guidance or authority inferred" - }, - "tests_passed": 43, - "default11_type_status": "acknowledged", - "explicit12_type_status": "acknowledged", - "both_ordinary_admission_refused": true, - "actual_original_and_staged11_cli_render_bytes_identical": true, - "default11_render_digest": "sha256:e64b56e4590b57b858303fcda1a474693e3dd821bc83df26646fe78fc345498a", - "version12_preparation_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "canonical11_files": { - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md": "c01ec1a3f058eab9e6c461e898166d496adb8542ea46f9e198ced4de83b997ef", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/build_intake.py": "d214019a10801e14d7986474ff83370482116df6a0fdde6ecb255d75645b3b04", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json": "a0ab9c57c71359b9ed31b9d6b04fd464db3e41bb6fe6f39bc6ac0b85556765e0", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/packet.md": "452ea42168ddef64dc5498ba30ae63ff2ff47a3919f55e22f6379d668ea76c28", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml": "41cc5bb4842209f5f86830d1e8b4b010c6ef06a050c4160faae06a1dfcd9b6e9", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml": "96c8dcd4b4182893b3a005137b880c0a80d4aa07a2668b29964e1db33605e050", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party.py": "7670ad0e415ca9941255bbc111b91fb5c9c3ae41851096d53d85fe7ba1d8660f", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party_contract.py": "ed30cd00ae22c32fbe2184443a2a8a7775ea5c231d1dd8070f230d547051f4e0", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml": "f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c" - }, - "historical_accepted11_case_sha256": "bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d", - "acknowledged12_files": { - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md": "4c82d9517d423ada75e680a05b0ecc6dfa0bf9f877a92b68f3ab93c1a86e405e", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/acknowledgment.json": "2dcc220febf125a17b3769f7014f18b63979d7121e0f7056a2b0d8b1ae6031b0", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml": "8d6457248415daa6fc509da4e838aae0b66d7808e9da8e00f4b85a1e7faed10d", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml": "1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py": "4a958eb2d0b90c1ffd08300d3299e4c31c827dcd7fb3cb4c22df91cc29986124", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml": "9e60ff569fb0d860a2bbde7bbb0991a54d4b0688f62b56df0fa5d161fd624578" - }, - "provider_declaration_inputs": { - "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml": "cd81e02c283d514492b7a99062c9ede59a7ae124736de1270a121bf0a96a984e" - }, - "ordinary_admission_or_type_implemented_or_case_accepted_or_native_completed": false, - "native_or_credentials_accessed": false, - "formal_net_owner_review": false, - "NK_WP_0048_T06_remains_wait": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-authoring-receipt.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-authoring-receipt.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3161c31..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-authoring-receipt.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"memo_id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", "version": 1, "register_event_id": "66d85468-6cd9-4a40-8c35-febc152758c0", "revision_event_id": null, "publication_event_id": "cbe4a05f-c7ab-4770-8e6e-8b537b165f7e", "review_event_id": "5be59cf9-a207-43aa-9fe2-131dc1e53538", "review_memo_id": "review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd", "queue_status": "pending", "queue_detail": "queued", "workspace_url": "https://decisions.coulomb.social/decisions/infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1?version=1", "outcome_review": {"intake_state": "not_submitted", "memo_id": "review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd", "stale": false}, "human_dispositions": 0} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-outcome.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-outcome.json deleted file mode 100644 index 34256f5..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-outcome.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"memo_id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", "review": {"intake_state": "ready", "memo_id": "review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd", "path": "/review?memo_id=review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd", "stale": false}, "disposition_count": 1, "dispositions": [{"id": null, "approval_id": null, "submission_state": "confirmed", "disposition": {"actor": {"kind": "person", "sub": "uid=platform-root,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local"}, "approval_id": "8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765", "at": "2026-10-11T06:47:39Z", "id": "disp-315d54ad-20f1-40e6-862c-6c7d2e8f0ea8", "memo_id": "review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd", "memo_version": 1, "note": null, "presentation_id": "pres-5a52f932-8c65-46cc-8054-0264f47f934a", "reasons": [], "verb": "accept"}, "approved_at": "2026-10-11T06:47:39+00:00", "decided_at": null}]} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/recording-validation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/recording-validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 80e6060..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/recording-validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "acknowledged_type_sha256": "9e60ff569fb0d860a2bbde7bbb0991a54d4b0688f62b56df0fa5d161fd624578", - "only_type_status_semantic_delta": true, - "full_package_validator_pass": true, - "independent_acknowledged_package_tests_passed": 22, - "closed_schema_checks_pass": true, - "explicit_version_root_loads_exact12": true, - "default11_type_and_case_byte_unchanged": true, - "canonical_case12_proposed_no_acceptance": true, - "ordinary_admission_refused": true, - "full_render_regeneration_identical": true, - "full_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "execution_permitted": false, - "packet_bound_files_mutated": false, - "genuine_native_human_source_accept_confirmed": true, - "human_approval_id": "8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765", - "new_native_action_by_worker": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 50741d0..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -# v0.7 immutable publication preservation — 2026-10-11 - -This archive retains exact previously served revision HTML and its original -canonical Markdown. It changes no decision, normative rule or v0.7 source bytes. -The page source commit is ce198fc2905687ea90a2892346b6860281ac87f8; the original -MD SHA-256 is 8155e7b123be1e84377d8278525b1bad8961007b6bb8ff012dd01ba24ff8065b, -and served HTML SHA-256 is 7d7a38a8c3b9fff65b46280fcd5723eff77dc9d0784f871bb35f718bc4e8c0e7. -Current canon MD remains byte-identical. The original MD was independently -extracted from that clean Git commit and compared with current canon. - -A clean v0.8 publication build re-rendered v0.7 using new repository HEAD -provenance and therefore changed the immutable page. That failed comparison is -preserved in provenance.json. Earlier local checks had not compared the actual -served bytes. PolicyNexus now explicitly freezes this same-current content -revision, while the canonical v0.7 route may show its superseded notice and -current clean source provenance. Publication manifest pins exact archive hashes; -source/page/provenance mismatch or a changed current MD under revision 0.7 fails -closed, as does a conflicting existing output page. Nothing is hand-edited into -the served HTML. This is local preparation; publication/live verification remains -separate and no serving result is claimed here. - -Validation: all 33 PolicyNexus unit checks pass, including new same-current -freeze/new HEAD and source-change refusal regressions. Both new cases fail -against the original helper. An actual 73-document clean build from exact HEAD -exports plus reviewed archive inputs preserves the served7d7a38a8 HTML byte for -byte, retains original ce198fc2 source provenance, shows canonical superseded -notice with current0e17d95 provenance, and serves a separate accepted v0.8 page. -An existing conflicting10a7f7f7 output is rejected without replacing it. See -validation.json for exact hashes, exported inputs and limits. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/provenance.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/provenance.json deleted file mode 100644 index c88184d..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/provenance.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "source_revision": "ce198fc2905687ea90a2892346b6860281ac87f8", - "original_source_path": "canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md", - "source_digest": "8155e7b123be1e84377d8278525b1bad8961007b6bb8ff012dd01ba24ff8065b", - "served_page_url": "https://policy.coulomb.social/standards/security-layer-model/v0.7/revisions/0.7/index.html", - "served_page_digest": "7d7a38a8c3b9fff65b46280fcd5723eff77dc9d0784f871bb35f718bc4e8c0e7", - "capture_file": "/tmp/security-layer-v07-served-immutable.html", - "current_owner_source_exactly_matches_original_commit": true, - "previous_failed_clean_build_page_digest": "10a7f7f721f90a903bb4dc4aa7613536207be2fd71a29460a86d3159b8c8eecd", - "failure": "Current-source HEAD provenance re-render changed already-served immutable HTML although MD unchanged; existing source tests missed external served bytes.", - "repair": "NetKingdom retains exact served bytes plus original MD; publication pins both; helper permits same-current only with exact MD equality and preserves all existing conflict checks", - "source_decision_changed": false, - "deployed": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/security-layer-model-v0.7.html b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/security-layer-model-v0.7.html deleted file mode 100644 index eadc612..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/security-layer-model-v0.7.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,461 +0,0 @@ - - - - -NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7 - -
netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.7 accepted gate-house reviewed 2026-08-28generated from canonical source — do not edit

NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7

Source: net-kingdom · canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md · ce198fc2905687ea90a2892346b6860281ac87f8

Review due: 2026-11-28

01Purpose

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This standard states how NetKingdom's IT-security estate is layered, and what each layer may and may not do. It answers one question:

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Given a repository, which layer is it in, and what does that permit it to own?

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The layers are distinguished by determinism and by the kind of artifact the layer produces, not by technical tier, deployment topology, or team.

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It is not an org chart, not a network model, not a deployment topology, and not a dependency graph. It does not assign work, and it does not replace any repository's boundary contract; it constrains what such a contract may claim.

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What changed in v0.7. v0.6 announced a rule it never wrote: §1 and §15 said the standard separates human and agent principals inside Staff, and §3.4 was byte-identical to v0.5. kings-guard found it and put it correctly — a rule stated about a standard in its own change log is not a rule, which is §11's own principle turned on the standard. §3.4 is now written.

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The rest are collisions between rules written for the clean case: §6.4's first obligation forbade what its third obligation blesses, and its second forbade the session-bound allow §9.7.1 permits. §9.4's atomicity was described as closing a threat it does not close. §19 graded the document it lived in. And §20 records the interaction boundary with Railiance operations, on definitions from railiance-master rather than inference. §15 records the change list.

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What changed in v0.6. An independent assessment against industry practice (net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md) found the model sound as a layering constitution and incomplete as a self-healing one: cognition, authority, and execution are specified, but the two verbs that close a healing loop — observe in production and actuate through a deterministic surface — are pending, and one is unstaffed. It also found the Engine layer untyped, so that "we need an engine for X" drifts toward "X now decides", and the enforcement point unnamed.

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v0.6 types the engines (§3.3), names the enforcement point (§6.4), replaces the containment assignment with an actuation surface held at zero (§9.2), separates human and agent principals inside Staff (§3.4), puts time into the model (§9.7), requires the Taxonomy artifacts that make §6.2 compileable rather than reviewable (§17), and composes the sibling standards it had only cited (§18). Section numbers below §14 are unchanged: the estate cites them.

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What changed in v0.5. All four reviewing repositories returned findings on v0.4, and one contested a rule. §9.3 was wrong: it collapsed engine reachable but degraded with engine not reachable at all, and the second case has no evaluator in the path to express anything. §9.1 collapsed no route exists with route exists under a declared gap, which would have forced a false "pending" onto a production capability. §11 claimed mechanical checkability for a rule that cannot be checked in prose. §13 filed two opposite conformance states in one table and recorded proposed owners as owners. §9.6 needed the load-bearing distinction it implied but never drew. §15 records the change list.

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What changed in v0.4. audit-core assented to the approval evidence half and corrected the rationale twice. v0.3 rested §9.4 on that repository's INTENT principle 6, which is an aspiration; the shipped bound in its docs/integrity.md is weaker and conditional. More consequentially, no append-only archive can prove omission at source — a suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact — which is now stated as an estate-wide doctrine constraint (§9.6) rather than left implicit. audit-core was also referenced as an owner in v0.3 without appearing in the §4 catalog at all; it is catalogued here, as an Engine, on its own declaration. §15 records the change list.

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What changed in v0.3. Two engines were seeded to own concepts v0.2 recorded as unowned: approval-engine takes the approval object that §13 left homeless, and maturity-engine takes graded progression — closing a §9.1 defect in gate-house's own catalog claim, which asserted conformance review with no engine to act through. §15 records the change list. v0.3 is proposed: the two new engines are seeded by owner direction and have no other side to assent yet, and the evidence half of the approval split needs audit-core's assent.

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What changed in v0.2. v0.1 was assented to by all three repositories whose boundaries moved, and each returned a finding. v0.1 had one lane for a Staff repository that legitimately touches Tooling — read-only diagnostics — which is narrower than the estate as it actually stands, and a rule with no lane for a real sanctioned case is satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap. v0.1 also catalogued a capability (§4, containment) that §5 forbade discharging, and applied its reconstructability test to engines but not to the doctrine gate-house feeds them. §15 records the full change list.

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-

02Authority and conformance

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Fact or ruleAuthority
The layers, their definitions, and the rules between themThis standard, owned by gate-house
Which layer a given repository is inThis standard, §4 catalog
What a repository owns within its layerThat repository's INTENT.md and boundary contract
Whether a specific request is permittedaccess-engine — never this standard
Whether a Tooling contact is sanctionedThe declaring repository, under the shapes in §5, reviewable by gate-house
Security doctrine and invariantsgate-house
Publicationnet-kingdom canon
Whether an invariant is watched in practicethe observing repository's own report — never this standard, and never §12's diagram
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A repository conforms when its INTENT.md declares its layer, its claims fall within that layer's permissions (§3), and its Tooling contacts take one of the sanctioned shapes in §5 or are declared as gaps under §5.3.

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No estate argument may cite observation that has not happened. §12 lists kings-guard against the loop's fourth step, and that repository has reported that it has never observed a real event. Until it reports otherwise, no assessment, review, or decision in this estate may treat an invariant as being watched in practice on the strength of the diagram. Lifted here from §12 so it cannot be lost in a summary.

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03The layers

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LayerCharacterProducesDeterministic
Taxonomycross-cutting languageterms, semantic contracts, standardsn/a — describes
Toolinginfrastructure and statedata structures, persistenceyes
Enginesinterfaces for a modeled conceptAPIs, contractsyes
Staffmanagement, operations, change, controllingspecifications, decisions, workplans, tasksno
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3.1 Taxonomy

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Cross-cutting language. Taxonomy repositories define terms and semantic contracts so the other layers interoperate without integration by interpretation. They own no runtime position and no state any layer depends on.

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info-tech-canon holds ecosystem-wide semantic contracts. NetKingdom-specific security architecture — including this standard — is net-kingdom canon's.

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3.2 Tooling

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Deterministic infrastructure: data structures, persistence, and the consistent, performant, scalable keeping of state. Much of it is third-party.

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3.3 Engines

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Deterministic APIs for a modeled concept — a user, a tenant, a zone, a secret, an access rule. An engine's defining property is that the same authoritative input state yields the same result. Engines are where the estate's deterministic guarantees live, and therefore where every enforcement boundary MUST sit.

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A repository whose core function is inference or judgment fails this test by construction and is Staff, however much of its work happens at runtime.

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Engines are typed. "Engine" is one layer but four roles, and collapsing them hides different failure modes. Every §4 Engine row carries a role:

-
RoleMeaningOutage means
PDPrenders the authorization decision — access-engine, and only it (§6)consumer residue (§9.3)
PIPsupplies facts a decision consumes as claims — user, tenant, zone, approval, maturityinput degradation, engine's own fallback (§9.3)
Evidencerecords what happened and proves integrity of what it holds — audit-coreMUST NOT block the operation being recorded — a default, not a property; see below
Lifecyclea deterministic API over Tooling it owns — secrets-enginethe owning engine's failure semantics
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The roles are why "we need an engine for X" does not mean "X now decides". A new engine is a PIP unless this standard is amended to say otherwise, and §6 means it can never be a second PDP.

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The Evidence row's outage rule is an estate trade, not a property of evidence engines. Choosing availability there means accepting that a compromised source can suppress a record and that detection is the answer (§9.6). The opposite shape — do not proceed unless an independent custodian already holds the record — is the only one that puts evidence outside the actor's blast radius before the act. The estate has not needed it, so it is not ruled out by a table cell: an operation whose control genuinely requires independent recording before effect is a declared exception, raised when needed. Raised by audit-core against its own row.

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The industry vocabulary is deliberately mirrored here — PDP, PIP, PEP as in NIST ZTA and XACML — because it is how the estate talks to the outside and how a PEP is stopped from quietly becoming a PDP. The determinism cut in §3 stays primary where the two disagree.

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3.4 Staff

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Interactive and non-deterministic. Staff is the management layer: operations, change, innovation, and controlling. It works through agentic capability — assistants and autonomous agents — and its artifacts are specifications, decisions, workplans, and tasks.

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Staff repositories MUST NOT hold state that another layer depends on at runtime, and MUST NOT render or cache any decision an Engine is responsible for.

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Acting at runtime does not make a repository an Engine. Being agentic makes it Staff, and §5 governs how it acts.

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Two principals, one layer. Humans and agents are both non-deterministic and both Staff, so they share the layer's permissions. They do not share blast radius. Four rules bind the agent principal specifically:

-
  1. No standing credential. An agent holds no long-lived credential of its own. Authority is issued per task, time-bounded under §9.7, and attributable to the principal on whose behalf it acts.
  2. Tool use is a conduit or an Engine API. An agent acts through §5.2 — the owner's tool under the caller's identity, presenting no authority of its own — or through an engine. There is no third route. Tool availability is not permission: a callable tool means the operation exists, not that this actor may invoke it.
  3. Agent memory is not a state plane. Agent memory, tool-call traces, and prompt caches are the agent's own. They MUST NOT become state another layer depends on at runtime unless catalogued as Tooling in §4, which subjects them to §5 like anything else, and to §5's sunset.
  4. Every agent action is reconstructable as the caller's action, bounded by §9.6 — the archive shows the actions it received, not that it received all of them.
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Session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model selection — are not governed here. They belong to glas-harness and its rein-* backends (§20). This standard governs what an agent may be authorized to do; glas-harness governs how an agent session is conducted. Rule 2 is the seam between them, and neither side may treat its own half as sufficient.

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v0.6 claimed these rules in its change log and did not write them. Found by kings-guard, which is the repository they bind hardest and which offered to assent to them sight-unseen.

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-

04Layer catalog

-
RepositoryLayerRoleOwns
info-tech-canonTaxonomy—ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and terminology
net-kingdomTaxonomy—NetKingdom standards of record; publication
key-capeTooling—packaged identity tooling; IAM profile; authentication
OpenBaoTooling—secret storage, leases, PKI, dynamic secret engines
user-engineEnginePIPusers, accounts, memberships
tenant-engineEnginePIPtenant-as-an-entity facts
zone-engineEnginePIPzone identity and membership — offline reference conformance per its 2026-08-23 disposition
secrets-engineEngineLifecyclecredential abstraction, custody, lifecycle
audit-coreEngineEvidenceaudit event custody, retention, integrity verification, export — explicitly not a decision point (§9.6)
access-engineEnginePDPthe policy decision — the only decision point (§6)
approval-engineEnginePIPthe approval object — durable, authenticated, consumable, atomically supersedable (§9.4)
maturity-engineEnginePIPgraded progression against declared criteria and evidence; the gap register; capability readiness (§9.5)
gate-houseStaff—security doctrine, authority context, curriculum; conformance review — through maturity-engine (§9.5)
ops-masonStaffPEP-shapedbuilding and tearing down access routes and perimeters
ops-wardenStaffPEP-shapedoperational access lanes, stewardship, runbooks; SSH certificate issuance — declared-gap (§9.1, §13)
kings-guardStaff—adaptive defence and judgment; observation of Staff-reachable sources — identity and secret observation pending; proposes containment, which it does not own (§9.2)
whitehat-securityStaff—offensive validation
-

An actuation surface — reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload — is catalogued nowhere because it does not exist. See §9.2: it is an Engine concept held at zero, not a Staff capability.

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access-engine is the ruled name for the repository currently called flex-auth; both denote the same authority until the governed rename completes. Execution conditions for that rename are recorded in its migration decision, not here.

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-

05The binding rule

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Staff never touches Tooling directly. It acts only through Engine APIs.

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A Staff repository MUST NOT hold a direct client for a Tooling-layer system — no direct database connection, no direct OpenBao client, no direct cluster mutation — outside the shapes below. This is the architectural form of no privilege from cognition, and it is deliberately mechanically checkable.

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Scope. "Tooling-layer system" means a system catalogued as Tooling in §4. Infrastructure the estate runs but has not catalogued — the State Hub, llm-connect, and similar — is outside this rule, because a rule that silently covered them would put every Staff repository in undeclared violation on adoption day: they all write progress events. Such clients SHOULD be recorded in the repository's declaration as non-Tooling for completeness of the check, and the way to bring one under §5 is to catalogue it in §4, deliberately.

-

Raised by ops-warden, which held clients for both and declined to resolve the scope question on gate-house's behalf.

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The carve-out sunsets. It is a pressure valve, and a valve left open becomes a second persistence plane under the Staff layer — which §3.4 forbids in spirit. Three rules bound it: every non-Tooling client MUST be listed in the repository's declaration; an uncatalogued store that another layer reads MUST, within two review intervals, either be catalogued as Tooling in §4 or be declared a gap under §5.3; and a Staff-owned event bus or memory store MUST NOT become the estate's de facto state plane. Today's instances are the State Hub and llm-connect; tomorrow's are agent memory, tool-call traces, and prompt caches (§3.4).

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Three shapes are sanctioned. Everything else is a violation.

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5.1 Read-only diagnostic observation

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A Staff repository MAY read Tooling state for diagnostics where the owning engine exposes no equivalent. It MUST be declared in the repository's INTENT.md. It grants no write, and it is an engine gap to close, not a standing arrangement.

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5.2 Conduit

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A Staff repository MAY run the owner's tool under the caller's identity, supplying no authority of its own. The test is the supplied-authority property: the conduit MUST NOT present its own credential, MUST NOT widen what the caller could already do, and MUST be reconstructable as the caller's action in audit.

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A conduit that presents its own token is not a conduit; it is §5.3 or a violation. This shape MUST be declared, and the no-authority property SHOULD be covered by a test.

-

The reconstructability requirement is an audit-dependent claim and is therefore bounded by §9.6: the archive shows the conduit actions it received, not that it received all of them.

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5.3 Declared engine gap

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Where a Staff repository must contact Tooling directly and no engine exposes the capability, it MUST declare the contact rather than take an exemption. A declared gap carries, machine-readably:

-
FieldMeaning
capabilitywhat the contact does
intended_ownerthe engine that should own it
blocked_onwhy it cannot move today
reviewa date, not "when convenient"
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A declared gap is tracked non-conformance, not conformance. It does not expire on its own and it is not a licence to add more. It exists because a rule offering no lane for a real sanctioned case gets satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap — and a tracked gap is visible, whereas a relabelled one is not.

-

Prior art: ops-warden runs equivalent machinery for delegated lanes (27 catalog entries carrying delegation:, queryable via warden route gaps), and has offered it as reusable.

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No fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape. It has been proposed, on the argument that someone must operate OpenBao and every operational necessity otherwise looks like a gap. Declined: §5.3 already sanctions the operation while keeping it visible, and a clean "operator" shape would convert a tracked gap into a permanent allowance — the relabelling failure this standard exists to prevent. A permanent operational necessity is a declared gap whose review interval keeps returning, which is the correct amount of friction. If the review becomes ceremonial, that is an argument for closing the gap, not for renaming it.

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-

06One decision point

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access-engine is the only policy decision point in NetKingdom. No other repository, in any layer, may render or cache authorization decisions.

-

First ruled in zone-engine/INTENT.md §5 — "flex-auth is the policy decision point. It stays the only one." The failure mode, from the same source: "It becomes a second decision point… it would arrive as a small convenience."

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6.1 Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding

-

A registry, cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs has decided early. Provenance MUST remain reconstructable from the engine's decision record.

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6.2 Doctrine reaches the decision as an input, or it is not applied

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This rule binds gate-house on the same terms. An authority ceiling, mandate constraint, or operating-mode restriction that determines an outcome MUST reach the decision either as an input claim on the request or as a rule in the versioned policy package, so that its application is reconstructable from the decision record.

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Doctrine that influences outcomes by any other route is a second decision point wearing an author's hat. This is not a limit on gate-house's authorship; it is what keeps that authorship auditable at decision time.

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6.3 No Staff repository may host a decision point

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A deterministic authority boundary inside a non-deterministic layer contradicts the invariant the estate is built on. gate-house was re-cut on this ground.

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6.4 The enforcement point

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The standard has been precise about the decision and silent about the gate. A decision that nothing refuses to proceed without is advice.

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A PEP is any runtime that causes a protected side effect. It is a shape, not a repository: ops-warden issuing a certificate, ops-mason opening a route, and any protected system acting on a verdict are all PEP-shaped. Being PEP-shaped does not move a repository out of its layer.

-

Four obligations, and they are normative:

-
  1. No side effect without a decision record, or a recorded stance. A PEP MUST NOT perform the protected action unless it holds a decision from access-engine identifying the request it was rendered for, or its declared §9.3 stance for the applicable scope permits proceeding without one and the application of that stance is recorded in place of the decision. The second limb is stricter than silence, not looser: a fail-open result is metadata, never an absent record. ops-warden ca.py writes the zone, the failure mode, and a decision id present only where a decision was rendered.
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v0.6's unqualified form made the shipped stance §9.3 sanctions into a violation — the same defect as v0.5's §9.1, a rule written for the clean case producing a false result on the adjacent case already sanctioned elsewhere. Raised by ops-warden, which is the reference shape for limb two.

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  1. No recaching of the verdict beyond its own binding. A stored verdict replayed outside the decision's stated binding and lifetime is a second decision point deciding early (§6.1). Within them it is the decision being used as issued — a session-bound allow under §9.7.1 is used across later requests by construction, and v0.6 forbade what §9.7.1 permits.
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The test is mechanical, not a matter of implementer judgement: replay is permitted iff the canonical request digest matches and the decision's lifetime holds. access-engine computes that digest over normalised subject, action, resource, and context, and it is already in every decision binding. A retry after a transport failure is therefore the same request; a different resource is not.

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Negative caching is permitted, narrowly. A cached DENY cannot manufacture authority — §8's asymmetry holds — and protects against retry storms. It is permitted where the refusal is itself recorded against the request that was refused (obligation 4), and where the cache lifetime is declared alongside the stance map. A stale deny is an availability failure and will be misdiagnosed as a policy one, so it must be visible as what it is. Ruled explicitly because it is the first thing an implementer under load reaches for. Raised by access-engine.

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  1. A declared unreachable-engine stance (§9.3): total, per zone or equivalent scope, no implicit default, no per-call discretion, published rather than held in code comments or in a dataclass default. ops-warden ADR-0009 and its pep-stance.yaml are the reference shape.
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The published map MUST equal the shipped behaviour, and that equality SHOULD be asserted by a test. A published map free to drift from the code is worse than none, because it invites reliance it cannot support. Raised by ops-warden, which found its own map unpublished while being cited as the reference for this obligation.

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  1. Reconstructability, bounded by §9.6.
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Every PEP-shaped consumer MUST publish its stance map at a path named in its layer declaration, and those maps MUST be inventoried in the §13.1 register until maturity-engine can hold them. §9.3 is otherwise a ruling with no register behind it, and "z0–z2 and unknown fail open" becomes the estate's real policy without anyone having compiled it into a versioned package.

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v0.6 named a register that did not exist — a requirement whose register is missing is a capability catalogued without a surface, by §9.1's own logic. Raised independently by ops-warden and access-engine; §13.1 now exists, and its first inventory has one row, which is itself the finding.

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Raised by the 2026-08-29 independent assessment: NIST ZTA splits decide from enforce, and this standard had only the first half.

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-

07Relationship to the Active Secrets Management Canon

-
Staff       interactive, non-deterministic   ≈  Cognitive Plane
-Engines     deterministic APIs               ≈  Authority Plane
-Tooling     deterministic state              ≈  Execution Plane
-Taxonomy    cross-cutting language
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Cognition proposes. Authority disposes. Infrastructure executes. is therefore NetKingdom's layering rule, not only its security maxim. §5 and §6 are that principle applied to repositories rather than to requests.

-
-

08Vocabulary demarcations

-
TermBelongs toNot
access laneops-warden, ops-mason (Staff) — how a worker reaches a hostthe decision whether they may
access ruleaccess-engine (Engine) — whether an actor may actthe route by which they arrive
control planeEngine layera Staff repository's self-description
doctrinegate-housea lane owner's runbook
runbookthe Staff repository stewarding the lanea substitute for doctrine
posturekings-guard publishes; gate-house defines its authority meaning; access-engine renders ita privilege source
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Posture carries an asymmetry that MUST hold: adaptive systems may reduce authority, require step-up, or request containment. They MUST NOT probabilistically manufacture additional authority.

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The asymmetry is what bounds the damage when observation is incomplete (§9.6): suppressed evidence can only prevent a tightening that should have happened, never engineer a loosening. That is an argument for keeping it absolute rather than situational.

-
-

09Capability assignment

-

9.1 The catalog may not assign what the rules forbid discharging

-

A Staff repository MUST NOT be catalogued in §4 as owning a capability it cannot discharge under these rules. Two marks distinguish the two ways that happens, and they are not interchangeable:

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MarkMeaning
pendingNo route exists. No engine exposes the capability, the repository makes no Tooling contact, and the capability is zero — not degraded.
declared-gapA route exists through a §5.3 declared gap. The capability works and is tracked, with an intended owner and a review date in §13.
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v0.4 had only pending, which forced a false choice. ops-warden holds production-verified SSH certificate issuance through a declared OpenBao contact; marking it pending would have told readers the repository does not do the one thing it demonstrably does daily, while leaving it unmarked left §4 disagreeing with §13. Neither is acceptable, and the defect was in this section rather than in the catalog.

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pending was written for kings-guard's containment — no route, capability zero — and remains correct there. declared-gap is the case §5.3 was added to sanction. Raised by ops-warden.

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Both marks apply per capability, not per repository. A repository may hold one capability outright, another under a declared gap, and a third pending.

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9.2 Actuation does not exist, and containment is not Staff's to own

-

Self-healing needs four verbs: observe, evaluate, decide, actuate. Observation is kings-guard and is unstaffed (§12). Evaluation is maturity-engine and is seeded. Decision is access-engine and works. Actuation has no surface at all, and a model with no actuation surface describes a diagnosis machine rather than a healing one.

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v0.5 marked containment pending against kings-guard, which was the right mark on the wrong repository. Containment is not a Staff capability that happens to lack a route: reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload are authority-changing operations, and under §6 an authority-changing operation is rendered by an Engine and enforced by a PEP (§6.4). A Staff repository proposes containment; it never performs it.

-

The actuation surface is therefore an Engine concept — likely a small surface on access-engine together with runtime PEPs — carrying the same reconstructability rules as any other decision: a containment action is a decision record, not a side channel.

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It is unowned and held at zero. access-engine is recorded in §13 as a proposed owner and has explicitly not reviewed it (FLEX-DEC-2026-002). No repository may be catalogued as owning containment until the surface exists — §9.1 applied to the estate's most operationally tempting gap, and the standard's own medicine.

-

Until then kings-guard proposes and judges, its containment claim stays at zero rather than degraded, and no argument may assume the estate can contain anything automatically.

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9.3 Degraded mode: two failure cases, two owners

-

v0.4 collapsed two failures into one rule. They have different owners because one has an evaluator in the path and the other does not.

-

Input degradation — the engine's. Where access-engine is reachable but cannot reach its own inputs, the deterministic fail to reduced authority default belongs to the engine. This keeps the decision at the decision point and keeps the fallback deterministic, which a Staff-layer fallback could never be.

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Engine unreachable — necessarily the consumer's. Where access-engine is not reachable at all, it applies nothing, because it is not running. Whatever happens next is the consumer's behaviour by construction: fail-open is not expressible by a policy decision point, since there is no evaluator in the path to express it. A standard that assigns this to the engine assigns it to nobody.

-

The consumer's residue is bounded rather than free. A protected system MUST declare its unreachable-engine stance ahead of time, per zone or equivalent scope, and that stance MUST be auditable and total — no implicit default, no per-call discretion. ops-warden ADR-0009 already satisfies this: a total per-zone map, open for z0–z2 and unknown, closed for z3-critical, replacing the global policy.enabled / policy.fail_closed switches it superseded.

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Unchanged: engine-unavailable is not grounds for a Staff break-glass path. The distinction is whether an engine is there to ask. A bypass around a reachable engine is a second decision point, and an incident is when an attacker most wants that shortcut. A consumer choosing its declared behaviour when there is no engine to ask is not a bypass; it is the only thing left.

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Contested by flex-auth (FLEX-DEC-2026-002), which has held since 2026-08-19 that fail-open is not expressible by a PDP, and which noted v0.4 collided with shipped behaviour in a repository that had assented to this standard.

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9.4 Approvals are an engine concept, not a Staff or audit concern

-

The approval object — durable, authenticated entries, distinct-approver counting, atomic supersession, single consumption, revocation without holder cooperation — is owned by approval-engine.

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It is not Staff's: §3.4 forbids Staff holding state another layer depends on at runtime. It is not the decision point's: an evaluator that owns the object it evaluates is self-dealing. It is not the audit fabric's: an approval needs mutable, in-path, current-state semantics, and an append-only archive is built for the opposite property.

-

access-engine consumes approvals as input claims under §6.2 and never mutates them. Every issuance, use, supersession, and revocation is emitted to audit-core: the operative state and the evidence record are different artifacts with different owners.

-

The evidence guarantee is bounded, and the bound is audit-core's docs/integrity.md, not its INTENT principle 6. An in-database hash chain detects a rewritten payload only if the attacker does not also recompute the suffix — which a database owner can. Detection against that class requires the external chain-head attestation, and even with it the store is not WORM, object lock, or archival custody. tamper_evidence is therefore conditional on live preconditions, not a property of the store at rest, and approval events receive exactly the guarantee every other source receives.

-

Emission atomicity is approval-engine's obligation. An approval MUST NOT be issued, consumed, superseded, or revoked without the corresponding event being durably queued in the same transaction.

-

The queue MUST be local. The durable queue MUST live in approval-engine's own transactional store, and no synchronous dependency on audit-core may sit inside the state-change transaction. With a genuine local outbox, fail-closed triggers only when approval-engine's own store is unavailable — where the change could not have been recorded anyway — and an audit-core outage does not block a revocation. Satisfying the requirement by emitting synchronously to audit-core inside the transaction is also atomic, and turns an audit outage into an inability to revoke: the operation least tolerable to block during an incident, and the same coupling this section rejects for reads. Raised by audit-core. audit-core reports what it received and does not imply it is everything that happened; without atomic emission the evidence half is silently incomplete and nothing detects the gap. This is a condition of audit-core's assent (AUDIT-IN-0001) and belongs in approval-engine's contract before the evidence half is treated as load-bearing.

-

audit-core MUST NOT expose an approval-validity query. Records, yes; a verdict on whether an approval is still valid, never — a consumer branching on that answer would route an authorization decision through the audit fabric, which is what this section exists to prevent. Callers needing current state ask approval-engine.

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9.5 Graded progression is an engine concept

-

Maturity — how far a subject has progressed against declared criteria and submitted evidence — is owned by maturity-engine. Given the same criteria and the same evidence it MUST return the same level; that determinism is what makes it an Engine rather than an opinion.

-

The division with Staff: gate-house judges and proposes; maturity-engine computes and remembers. Interpretation is inference and stays Staff. A criterion that cannot be evaluated by rule is not yet a criterion.

-

This closes a defect in v0.2's own catalog: gate-house was assigned conformance review with no engine to act through, which is exactly the §9.1 problem raised against the containment claim. Staff acts only through Engine APIs, including gate-house.

-

A maturity level MUST NOT be compiled into registry content. Until access-engine's decision provenance carries a registry-snapshot digest — a gap it self-declared in §13 — a level reaching a decision through the registry is not reconstructable from the decision record. Levels arrive as request claims or as versioned policy rules. Same constraint, and same reason, as zone stance.

-

A maturity level MUST NOT gate a decision directly. Under §6.1, compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding. If a level determines whether an action is permitted, it MUST reach access-engine as an input claim or a versioned policy rule under §6.2, never by a consumer branching on a fetched level.

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Approvals and maturity are deliberate opposites — a closed binary state machine against an open graded ladder — and neither engine may drift toward the other.

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9.6 Evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source

-

An append-only archive with a verified hash chain proves that records were not altered or truncated after arrival. It cannot prove that a record was never sent. Against a compromised or buggy source, a suppressed event leaves the chain perfectly intact and verification reports intact.

-

This bound is estate-wide. Statements of the form "the audit record proves it happened" are unsound; the sound form is "the archive proves the records it holds were not altered or truncated after arrival". Its mirror is equally unsound: absence of a record is not evidence of non-occurrence, and no control may read it as such.

-

Load-bearing versus attributive evidence. The atomicity obligation attaches to the first, not to both:

-
KindTestObligation
Load-bearinga control's soundness depends on the event being present or absent — an approval revocation, a containment action, a denialemission MUST be atomic with the state change (§9.4)
Attributivethe event supports forensic reconstruction and attribution, and no control branches on its presenceatomicity SHOULD be sought; where it is deliberately traded away, the trade MUST be declared and completeness MUST NOT be claimed
-

Where a repository deliberately makes emission non-atomic — ops-warden's # audit must not block signing is the estate's live example, chosen so that an audit-store failure cannot remove production host access — the trade is legitimate for attributive evidence, MUST be declared where the trail is documented, and MUST NOT be described in terms that imply completeness. The availability argument is real in both directions: making it atomic gives the estate's operational access lane a new dependency on its own evidence store.

-

Consequence for adaptive systems. Suppression does not degrade observation neutrally, it biases it optimistic, and silently: an event never emitted is never evaluated, so no finding is raised and the last posture stands. A confidence score computed from the richness of the record in hand cannot express doubt about the completeness of the stream — a well-formed observation from a 90%-suppressed stream scores high. That is this section's failure reproduced one layer up, in the consumer.

-

Two things follow.

-

Which control covers which threat. v0.6 read as though emission atomicity closed this section's opening sentence. It does not, and the decomposition is owed to the reader:

-
ThreatCovered byWhen
Accidental omission — process dies between mutation and emitemission atomicity, local outbox (§9.4)prevented
Adversarial omission — a compromised source declines to insert, deletes before drain, or drains to nowherecadence and reconciliationdetected, after the fact
Adversarial omission at a compromised source—nothing in this model prevents it
-

The outbox sits inside the blast radius of the component whose compromise this section posits, so it makes emission atomic against crash and partial failure and nothing more. That residual is real and is stated rather than implied. Raised by audit-core, correcting a remedy it had itself proposed.

-
  1. The §8 asymmetry bounds the damage, and this is its clearest payoff. Because an adaptive system may only reduce authority and never manufacture it, suppression can only prevent a tightening that should have happened. It cannot be used to engineer a loosening. The harm is a missed reduction, not an invented privilege — which is an argument for keeping the asymmetry absolute.
  2. Silence is a signal, and for load-bearing evidence it is the only control in its class. A source of attributive evidence SHOULD declare an expected emission cadence; a source of load-bearing evidence MUST. A drop below the declared rate is a finding in its own right — the stream observed, not only its contents — and needs no Tooling contact, because the source publishes its own stream.
-

Rate monitoring is the wrong form for rare events, and rare is exactly where the stakes are highest: the most valuable event to suppress is the negative one, and revocations, denials, and containment actions are infrequent by nature. A source emitting a handful of revocations a month has no rate to drop below, and suppression is indistinguishable from a quiet month. For low-volume load-bearing classes the required form is therefore positive reconciliation or a heartbeat: compare the source's own state transitions against the evidence engine's event count per class and treat divergence as a finding, or assert nothing to report as a signed positive claim that can itself go missing. Rate monitoring never produces a claim that can be missing; a heartbeat does. GH-WP-0002-T04 is the reference instance. Raised by audit-core.

-

Raised by audit-core against its own principle; extended by kings-guard from its own evaluator and confidence model.

-

9.7 Decisions have a lifetime

-

A single decision point deciding on stale claims is a single decision point deciding wrongly. The model has had no temporal law, and the approval race in §16 was its first symptom.

-
  1. Every allow has an explicit lifetime — a TTL, or a binding to a session or obligation that ends. An allow with no stated end is a standing grant, and standing grants are what this estate exists to remove.
  2. Revocation and supersession have a visibility deadline, and its shape differs by role. A PEP has one boundary and MUST state one deadline. A PDP MUST state a deadline per input class, because a decision is a join over sources with unrelated refresh behaviour — approval-claim freshness, registry snapshot cadence, policy package activation, directory ETag. A single number at a PDP is either a fiction or the worst case, and the worst case is the slowest and least visible input. "Eventually" is not a stance; an unstated deadline is an unbounded replay window.
-

A consequence worth naming: a stated deadline for a fact carried by a registry snapshot is unfalsifiable while decision provenance holds no snapshot digest, since nobody can determine afterwards which snapshot a decision read. The deadline and the digest are one gap seen from two sides, which promotes access-engine's self-declared provenance gap (§13) from housekeeping to a conformance prerequisite. Raised by access-engine against its own backlog.

-
  1. Consumption is a state change, never an inference. An approval is consumed by a mutation in approval-engine (§9.4). It MUST NOT be inferred from the existence of a decision record — the decision precedes the action and the action precedes consumption, so a decision record proves an intent to act, not an act.
  2. Three failure modes are named, and each needs an owner: an allow rendered then never consumed; a double consumption by racing callers; consumption after the authorized action has already failed. Neither engine closes these alone. Recorded in §16 and GH-WP-0002-T06.
-

9.8 Partition is not one-dimensional

-

§9.3 handles engine unreachable. A real estate spends most of its incident time in the band between reachable and gone: partial PIP reachability, clock skew across a decision and its enforcement, and two consumers with different declared stances seeing different worlds at the same moment.

-

Two rules hold today, and the rest is open (§16). A PEP MUST resolve its own stance from its declared map without consulting another consumer — divergent views are expected and are not a coordination problem to be solved at enforcement time. And where clock skew could extend a lifetime under §9.7, the shorter reading governs.

-
-

10Changing layer

-

A repository's layer is not permanent. zone-engine changed layer in practice when its runtime hypothesis was falsified.

-

A layer change MUST be recorded as a decision, MUST update the repository's INTENT.md, and MUST obtain assent from the repositories whose boundaries move. A repository MUST NOT acquire a new layer's permissions by gradual practice.

-

"No gradual practice" needs a check rather than a sentence. A layer change MUST carry six artifacts, written from the zone-engine case that the procedure should have been derived from in the first place:

-
ArtifactWhy
before/after INTENT.mdthe declaration is the conformance surface (§11)
client inventorywhat the repository holds against Tooling, before and after
gap inventorywhich §5.3 gaps close, open, or transfer
assent listevery repository whose boundary moves
state-migration decisionwhat happens to live state and to consumers reading it
permission freezeno new permissions of the target layer are exercised until the cut completes
-

The freeze is the one that makes the rule checkable: a repository mid-change holds its old permissions, not the union of both.

-
-

11Conformance

-

Conformance has four states, and the distinction between the last two is the point:

-
StateMeaning
Conformingno Tooling contact, or only §5.1/§5.2 shapes, declared
Blocked-cleanthe capability does not exist because no engine exposes it, and the repository makes no Tooling contact — §9.1 pending, and not a non-conformance
Declared gapa §5.3 contact with owner, blocker, and review date — tracked non-conformance
Undeclared violationanything else — a finding
-

Blocked-clean is not a lesser state than conforming. A repository that declined a break-glass path and left a capability at zero has complied at cost; a repository that quietly opened a direct client and declared nothing has not. Any downstream scoring — maturity-engine included (§9.5) — MUST NOT rank the first below the second. Raised by kings-guard, whose three gaps are all of this kind and which would otherwise have been graded down three times for having taken the standard seriously.

-

Who must declare. A repository the estate authors declares its layer in its own INTENT.md. For a component the estate catalogues but does not author — third-party or vendored, such as OpenBao — the §4 catalog row is the declaration, and no INTENT.md obligation attaches. A rule that assigns an obligation the holder cannot discharge is the §9.1 defect applied to conformance rather than capability.

-

A layer stated about a repository by another repository is not a declaration. Review notes, catalog rows, and correspondence record an intent to adopt; only the repository's own file conforms.

-

Declaration form. Because prose cannot distinguish a declaration from a transcribed review, a declaration MUST carry a machine-readable form: a layer: key in the INTENT.md frontmatter, or an equivalent declaration file. Without it this section asserts a property it cannot deliver — the defect this standard has now corrected three times elsewhere. ops-warden has implemented a reference form (layer.yaml, a conformance script, and a test covering the §5.2 no-authority property) and offered it to the repositories that have yet to declare. Raised by audit-core, which noted that flex-auth's conforming declaration is legible as one only by following its decision trail.

-

Mechanically checkable:

-
  • every estate-authored repository in §4 carries a machine-readable layer declaration;
  • every direct Tooling client in a Staff repository maps to a declared §5.1, §5.2, or §5.3 entry, and non-Tooling clients are recorded so the check is total;
  • no repository other than access-engine exposes an authorization decision surface;
  • no §4 capability is catalogued without an engine surface, a pending mark, or a declared-gap mark.
-

Requires review: whether claims stay inside layer permissions; whether compiled or cached data has become an early decision (§6.1); whether doctrine is reaching decisions as declared inputs (§6.2); whether the §8 vocabulary is used correctly.

-
-

12The conformance loop

-

Doctrine no engine implements is fiction. The loop is normative, not aspirational:

-
gate-house asserts an invariant
-      → the engines implement it, or declare a gap
-      → whitehat-security tries to break it
-      → kings-guard observes it in operation
-      → findings return to gate-house as doctrine change
-

A finding that a rule is unsatisfiable is a success of this loop, not a failure of the reporting repository. Four of this standard's five versions exist because a reviewing repository used it.

-

Step four is currently aspiration. kings-guard has disclosed that it has never observed anything in operation: the pilot is specified and scaffolded, every input is a hand-built fixture, and no test has met a real event. Until it reports otherwise, no argument in this estate may assume an invariant is being watched in practice because §12 lists a repository against that step.

-
-

13Open gaps

-

Two different things are recorded here, and they are opposite conformance states (§11). A declared contact means the repository touches Tooling because no engine exposes the capability. An unowned capability means no route exists and the repository makes no contact at all. Reading them as one list would grade restraint as though it were non-conformance.

-

An intended owner is a proposal to the named repository, not an assignment onto it. §2 keeps ownership in the repository's own INTENT.md, so the register distinguishes proposed from assented.

-
GapStateDeclared byOwnerOwner status
SSH-CA signing write (VaultCA, bao kv put)declared-contactops-wardensecrets-engineproposed
Authentication / assurance evidenceunowned-capabilitykings-guardidentity layer + audit-coreaccess-engine declined
Secret-use evidenceunowned-capabilitykings-guardsecrets-engineproposed
Actuation / containment surfaceunowned-capabilitygate-house (estate-wide)access-engine + runtime enginesproposed
Identity and secret observationunowned-capabilitykings-guardas aboveproposed
Stance-map register had no implementationdeclared-contactops-warden, access-enginegate-houseresolved in §13.1
Registry-snapshot digest in decision provenancedeclared-contactflex-authflex-authself-declared
Approval storage and lifecycle—flex-authapproval-engineassigned (§9.4)
Approval evidence—gate-houseaudit-coreassented (AUDIT-IN-0001)
Approval evidence custody stronger than the shipped bound — WORM, object lock, transparency logunowned-capabilityaudit-core—unassigned
Emission atomicity for approval state changes—audit-coreapproval-engineassigned (§9.4)
Non-atomic audit emission on the SSH signing lanedeclared-contactops-wardenops-wardenself-declared, attributive (§9.6)
-

The actuation row is no longer attributed to kings-guard. §9.2 ruled that containment is not a Staff capability lacking a route, so kings-guard is not its declarer: the gap is estate-wide and blocks every repository's ability to act. Raised by kings-guard, which asked not to carry a row for a capability the standard had just ruled was never theirs.

-

access-engine declined authentication and assurance evidence (FLEX-DEC-2026-002): it consumes assurance claims as input and never redefines them, so evidence of authentication belongs to the identity layer and audit-core. It owns evidence of the decision, which it already emits. The containment surface is recorded as proposed and remains pending under §9.2.

-

Whether approvals warrant custody stronger than every other source is doctrine work not yet done; until it is, approval evidence carries the same guarantee as any other source and §9.6 bounds what may be claimed from it.

-

What is normative here, and what is a snapshot. Three rules are part of this standard and survive wherever the register lives:

-
  1. the two marks — pending and declared-gap (§9.1);
  2. the owner-status rule — a proposed owner is not an assigned one (§2);
  3. the scoring rule — blocked-clean MUST NOT rank below conforming (§11).
-

The table above is a snapshot, not statute. It moves into maturity-engine as soon as that engine can store state, and the state and owner-status columns MUST survive the migration. A standard that is also a backlog keeps attracting findings that belong in the register, and its review interval is far slower than the register's real rate of change.

-

13.1 PEP stance-map register

-

Every PEP-shaped consumer publishes an unreachable-engine stance map (§6.4, obligation 3). This is the inventory until maturity-engine can hold it.

-
ConsumerStance mapShape
ops-wardenops-warden/pep-stance.yamltotal per-zone; open z0–z2 and unknown, closed z3-critical; test asserts the published map equals the shipped default (ADR-0009)
ops-mason—not published; catalogued PEP-shaped in §4
-

One row is the finding. The aggregate of consumer stances is the estate's real authorization behaviour, and it is currently one published map and one absence. access-engine has noted it is the repository positioned to notice when that aggregate diverges from what the policy packages say — which it cannot do while the register is nearly empty.

-
-

14Adoption

-

Status is accepted, on the owner's decision of 2026-08-29.

-

Two things that acceptance does and does not mean, kept apart because ops-warden asked for the distinction:

-
Boundary assentgiven by the four repositories below, at the version named in each record, and undisturbed since
Revision revieweach of the four reviewed v0.6 and returned findings; every change in v0.7 is the adopted remedy of a finding they raised
Not claimedno repository has reviewed v0.7 as text. The first revision review will confirm or correct it
-

Accepting a standard nobody has re-read is a deliberate call: the estate learns more from using it than from another round of prose refinement, and the changes in v0.7 were requested rather than invented. Findings against the accepted text remain welcome and are §12's normal business, not an exception.

-
RepositoryRecordOutcome
flex-authFLEX-DEC-2026-001assent to all three items; one self-declared non-conformance; two rename conditions
kings-guardKG-DEC-2026-001assent; declined the offered §5 relaxation; raised §9.1
ops-wardenADR-0010assent to all three; veto not exercised; offered the §5.3 amendment
audit-coreAUDIT-IN-0001assent to the evidence half with conditions; corrected the rationale twice; raised §9.6
-

Adoption for a repository means its INTENT.md declares its layer, its ownership claims fall inside that layer, its Tooling contacts are declared under §5, and any shared boundary has been assented to by the other side.

-

Adoption status as of 2026-08-29: seven of sixteen estate-authored §4 repositories have declared in their own voice — gate-house, flex-auth, kings-guard, ops-warden, audit-core, approval-engine, maturity-engine. The remaining nine — info-tech-canon, net-kingdom, key-cape, user-engine, tenant-engine, zone-engine, secrets-engine, ops-mason, whitehat-security — carry a layering review note authored by gate-house and have not answered it. Those notes state a layer but do not constitute a declaration, and this standard does not claim estate-wide adoption on their basis. Declaration requests are open as intakes in each.

-
-

15Change log

-

v0.1 → v0.2:

-
  1. §5 restructured into three sanctioned shapes. Added §5.2 conduit (ops-warden's question, ruled) and §5.3 declared engine gap (ops-warden's amendment, accepted).
  2. §6.2 added — doctrine must reach the decision as an input claim or a versioned policy rule (flex-auth's boundary drawn back, accepted).
  3. §9 added — the catalog may not assign a capability the rules forbid discharging; containment marked pending; degraded-mode fallback ruled into the engine (kings-guard's finding).
  4. §11 restructured — conformance now has three states, distinguishing a tracked gap from an undeclared violation.
  5. §12 made normative, with the explicit statement that an unsatisfiability finding is a success of the loop.
  6. §13 added — open gaps register, including the unowned approval storage and lifecycle capability.
  7. §4 catalog gained the pending mark and ops-warden's SSH certificate lane.
-

v0.2 → v0.3:

-
  1. §9.4 added — approvals assigned to approval-engine, with the operative state and the evidence record separated between it and audit-core.
  2. §9.5 added — graded progression assigned to maturity-engine, closing the §9.1 defect in gate-house's own conformance-review claim, and carrying the guardrail that a level may never gate a decision directly.
  3. §4 catalog gained both engines; gate-house's conformance-review claim now names the engine it acts through.
  4. §13 register updated: the approval hole is assigned, two new entries added.
-

v0.6 → v0.7, from four reviews:

-
  1. §3.4 is written. v0.6 announced the human/agent principal separation in §1 and §15 and left §3.4 byte-identical to v0.5 — a silent edit failure. A rule stated about a standard in its own change log is not a rule. Found by kings-guard. The same failure had also dropped two §16 entries, restored here.
  2. §6.4 obligation 1 rewritten — it forbade what obligation 3 blesses. A PEP may proceed under its declared §9.3 stance provided the application of that stance is recorded in place of the decision. Stricter than v0.6 where it counts: a fail-open result is metadata, never silence. Raised by ops-warden.
  3. §6.4 obligation 2 rewritten — it forbade the session-bound allow §9.7.1 permits. Scoped to replay outside the decision's own binding and lifetime, with the canonical request digest as the mechanical test, and negative caching ruled permitted where the refusal is recorded and the cache lifetime declared. Raised by access-engine.
  4. §6.4 obligation 3 gained the requirement that the published stance map equal shipped behaviour, asserted by test. §13.1 now exists as the register §6.4 mandated and v0.6 did not implement.
  5. §9.6 gained a threat decomposition — atomicity prevents accidental omission; cadence and reconciliation detect the adversarial case after the fact; nothing prevents it at a compromised source. Raised by audit-core against its own proposed remedy.
  6. §9.6 cadence is now MUST for load-bearing sources, with positive reconciliation or a heartbeat as the required form for low-volume classes, because rate monitoring fails exactly where the stakes are highest.
  7. §9.7.2 splits by role — a PDP states a deadline per input class, a PEP one at its boundary. Promotes access-engine's provenance gap to a conformance prerequisite.
  8. §3.3's Evidence row is stated as an estate trade rather than a property, leaving independent-recording-before-effect raisable as a declared exception.
  9. §17 moves the decision-record schema to access-engine, which argued it against its own interest; kings-guard drafts the emission-cadence schema.
  10. §13 no longer attributes the actuation gap to kings-guard; it is estate-wide. §19 removed — a verdict inside a standard grades the document it lives in. §17/§18 demoted from H1 to H2.
  11. §20 added — the Railiance interaction boundary, on railiance-master's definitions, including that rein-* is not a fifth axis.
-

v0.5 → v0.6, from the independent assessment of 2026-08-29:

-
  1. §3.3 types the engines — PDP, PIP, Evidence, Lifecycle, with a role column in §4. A new engine is a PIP unless this standard says otherwise, so "we need an engine for X" cannot drift into "X now decides".
  2. §6.4 names the enforcement point — a PEP shape with four obligations: no side effect without a decision record, no local recaching of the verdict, a declared unreachable-engine stance, reconstructability. The standard had the decision and not the gate.
  3. §9.2 replaced — containment was marked pending against the wrong repository. Actuation is an Engine concept, unowned, held at zero; Staff proposes containment and never performs it.
  4. §3.4 separates the two Staff principals — human and agent share the layer but not blast radius: no standing credential, conduit or engine API only, agent memory is not a state plane, every action reconstructable as the caller's.
  5. §9.7 puts time into the model — explicit lifetimes, revocation visibility deadlines, consumption as a state change never inferred, and the three race modes named. §9.8 states what holds under partition and leaves the rest open.
  6. §17 requires the Taxonomy artifacts — claim, decision-record, gap-record, and emission-cadence schemas — without which §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but not compileable. Ownership proposed, not assigned.
  7. §18 composes the sibling standards — how zone stance, tenancy posture, and a credential lifecycle event each enter a decision as a claim. They were cited in frontmatter and nowhere in the rules.
  8. §5 gained a sunset on the uncatalogued-infrastructure carve-out, and §5.3 declines a proposed fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape: it would convert a tracked gap into a permanent allowance.
  9. §10 gained the six artifacts a layer change must carry, written from the zone-engine case, including a permission freeze during the cut.
  10. §2 lifts the observation rule — no estate argument may cite observation that has not happened. §13 separates its three normative rules from the table, which is now a snapshot due to move into maturity-engine.
  11. §16 the approval custody question is decided: no, rather than left open. §19 records the fitness verdict, including that the estate can propose and decide but cannot yet watch or act.
-

v0.4 → v0.5, all from review findings:

-
  1. §9.1 split into two marks — pending (no route, capability zero) and declared-gap (route exists under §5.3, capability works and is tracked). v0.4's single mark would have forced a false pending onto ops-warden's production SSH issuance. Raised by ops-warden.
  2. §9.3 rewritten — input degradation is the engine's; engine-unreachability is necessarily the consumer's, bounded by a declared, auditable, total stance. Contested by flex-auth: fail-open is not expressible by a PDP, and v0.4 collided with ops-warden ADR-0009.
  3. §5 gained a scope rule — "Tooling-layer system" means a §4 Tooling row; uncatalogued infrastructure is outside §5 and recorded rather than policed. Without it every Staff repository was in undeclared violation for writing progress events. Raised by ops-warden.
  4. §9.4 requires a local outbox — no synchronous dependency on audit-core inside the state-change transaction, so an audit outage cannot block a revocation. Raised by audit-core.
  5. §9.5 forbids compiling maturity levels into registry content until decision provenance carries a registry-snapshot digest. Raised by flex-auth.
  6. §9.6 gained the load-bearing / attributive distinction, the mirror rule that absence is not evidence of non-occurrence, the optimistic-bias consequence for adaptive systems, and silence-as-signal. Raised by kings-guard on top of audit-core's original.
  7. §11 gained a fourth state — blocked-clean, which MUST NOT rank below conforming — and a machine-readable declaration form. Raised by kings-guard and audit-core.
  8. §13 gained state and owner-status columns — declared-contact versus unowned-capability, proposed versus assented owner. access-engine's decline of authentication evidence is recorded. Raised by kings-guard and flex-auth.
  9. §8 records the asymmetry's payoff under incomplete observation; §12 records that its fourth step is unstaffed; §14 corrects the adoption arithmetic and the status contradiction.
-

Amended in place while proposed, 2026-08-28: §11 gained the who-must-declare rule after a conformance sweep found the standard required an INTENT.md declaration from OpenBao, which the estate does not author; and §14 gained the honest adoption count.

-

v0.3 → v0.4:

-
  1. §4 catalog gained audit-core as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 named it as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without cataloguing it — a §11 defect in the standard itself, raised by audit-core.
  2. §9.4 evidence rationale rewritten to cite audit-core's shipped docs/integrity.md bound rather than its INTENT principle 6, and to state that tamper_evidence is conditional on live preconditions.
  3. §9.4 gained emission atomicity as approval-engine's obligation, and the prohibition on audit-core exposing an approval-validity query.
  4. §9.6 added — evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source. Estate-wide; the sound and unsound forms of the claim are stated.
  5. §13 — evidence half recorded as assented with conditions; two new gaps: stronger approval custody (unassigned) and emission atomicity (approval-engine).
-
-

16Open questions

-
  • ~~Whether approvals warrant archival custody stronger than every other audit source.~~ Decided (§13): no. Approval evidence carries the same bound as every other source. The acute risk for approvals is omission — a suppressed revocation — and archival custody does not address omission at all; emission atomicity with a local outbox (§9.4) and a detection surface (GH-WP-0002-T04) do. Leaving it open while calling the evidence half load-bearing created a promise the archive cannot cash. If a future requirement genuinely needs WORM or a transparency log, that is a different store with a different owner, raised then.
  • Whether SSH certificate issuance evidence is load-bearing or attributive (§9.6). Ruled attributive here on the argument that no control branches on the presence of a signing record; ops-warden asked for the ruling and the trade is genuinely two-sided, so it is flagged rather than settled.
  • Who marks an approval consumed, and at what point relative to the decision (§9.4). flex-auth notes the decision precedes the action and the action precedes consumption, so an allow rendered against an approval then never consumed, or consumed twice by a racing caller, is a gap neither engine closes alone. Needed before FLEX-WP-0017 T05.
  • Whether other §4 repositories are missing layer declarations; audit-core flagged its own absence and asked whether the catalog needs the same correction elsewhere.
  • Whether the gap register migrates from this standard into maturity-engine once that engine exists, leaving the standard to state the rules only.
  • Whether Tooling warrants subdivision between third-party and homegrown.
  • How a future role-engine divides responsibility with access-engine.
  • Whether declared gaps need an estate-wide register rather than per-repository declarations; ops-warden's warden route gaps is candidate machinery.
  • Whether non-security repositories adopt the same model. The determinism cut is not security-specific; if non-security Staff also may not hold runtime-dependent state, the estate gets one constitution rather than a security ghetto.
  • The rest of §9.8: split brain, partial PIP reachability, and clock skew beyond the two rules stated.
  • Publication integrity of the Taxonomy layer itself. This standard demands reconstructability of decisions while its own publication path has no digest, freeze, or rollback discipline.
  • The fitness verdict formerly at §19 now lives in net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md. A grade inside a standard of record becomes normative by adjacency and ages against the text it grades. Raised by access-engine. Its two substantive points remain live: observation in production is unstaffed (§12) and actuation has no surface (§9.2).
  • The working companion (net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md, v0.2, root of the repository for onboarding) is the operative form of this statute. The statute governs on disagreement, and a disagreement is a finding. The v0.1 gap access-engine found — publish your stance map, but nowhere saying where, and no inventory obligation — is fixed in v0.2 §5.3.
  • How the Railiance operational axes meet this model beyond §20's first statement, which is deliberately minimal.
-
-

17Taxonomy artifacts

-

§6.2 says doctrine reaches a decision as an input claim or a versioned policy rule. As prose that is a rule a reviewer can apply. As an interface it does not exist, because nothing defines what a claim is. §11 calls itself mechanically checkable while resting on that gap.

-

Four artifacts are therefore required, owned by Taxonomy and versioned like any standard:

-
ArtifactContents
request-claim schemaidentity, tenant, zone stance, posture, approval, maturity, assurance — each with its issuer and freshness rule
~~decision-record schema~~moved to access-engine — see below
gap-record schemathe §5.3 fields — capability, intended_owner, blocked_on, review — plus the §13 state and owner-status
emission-cadence declarationthe expected rate a source publishes, so silence is a finding (§9.6)
-

Until these exist, §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but not compileable, and every engine invents its own claim shape at its own boundary.

-

The decision-record schema is not Taxonomy's. A decision record is the PDP's output artifact — the one thing in the estate only access-engine produces — and §2 keeps ownership in the producing repository's own INTENT.md. Taxonomy authoring the schema for an artifact only one engine emits would invert the ownership rule this standard applies everywhere else. access-engine publishes it as a contract; Taxonomy holds only the shared field vocabulary the claim schema references.

-

Raised by access-engine against its own interest — the same §2 argument it used to decline authentication evidence, applied where it takes work on rather than off. Symmetry of that kind is what makes the ownership rule credible.

-

The emission-cadence declaration has a drafter. kings-guard is its only consumer, cannot implement silence-as-signal without it, and has offered to draft it against qonto-assistant and hand it to whichever Taxonomy repository takes ownership — rather than inventing a local shape, which is the drift §17 exists to prevent. Accepted as a draft; ownership still rests with Taxonomy.

-

Ownership is proposed, not assigned. info-tech-canon holds ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and net-kingdom holds NetKingdom standards of record; the split between them for these four artifacts is theirs to draw, and §2 keeps ownership in the owning repository's INTENT.md. Neither has assented.

-
-

18Composition with the sibling standards

-

The related-standards list has been frontmatter and little else. If the following sentences cannot be written, the list is decoration — so they are written here rather than in the siblings.

-

Zone stance (security-zones_v0.1). A zone answers which scrutiny a workload has qualified for; membership is zone-engine's. The effect of a zone on a decision belongs in a versioned access-engine policy package, never in registry content — that ruling is zone-engine's §5, and §6.1 is its generalization. Zone stance therefore enters a decision as a claim on the request or a rule in the package, and a decision that turned on a zone must name the package version that read it.

-

Tenancy posture (tenancy-posture_v0.1). Posture is a bounded security-state input, published by its owner and never a privilege source (§8). It enters as a claim, carries its own freshness, and the §8 asymmetry binds it: posture may tighten a decision and may never loosen one. A posture too stale to trust is a missing claim, and a missing claim is not permission.

-

Credential lifecycle (credential-management_v0.2). Issuance, rotation, and revocation are secrets-engine's and OpenBao's, downstream of a decision — a credential is an artifact of authority, never its source. A lifecycle event becomes an input to a later decision as a claim (this credential is current, this lease is bound to this task), never a side channel that changes an outcome without appearing in the decision record. Revocation visibility is bounded by §9.7.

-

Each of the three composes the same way, which is the point: facts arrive as claims, effects live in versioned policy, and anything that changes an outcome appears in the decision record.

-
-

20The Railiance interaction boundary

-

Operations is not NetKingdom's. Workload operations are organized by Railiance, whose framework repository is railiance-master, and NetKingdom provides the security and approval framework those operations consume. This section states the boundary as it stands today. It is expected to evolve, and it is written here so that evolution is visible rather than inferred.

-

Definitions are railiance-master's and are restated, not authored, here.

-

20.1 What Railiance organizes

-

A workload is a managed running deployable. Human commands, credential patterns, broker actions, approvals, and infrastructure resources that are not themselves deployables are not workloads — which is why an approval object (§9.4) is not a Railiance axis and never becomes one.

-

Every workload is operated through four composable axes, each answering a different question about the same workload:

-
PrefixAxisQuestion
railiance-*ownershipWho owns this capability?
rail-*execution contractHow does this workload run?
rapp-*managed packageWhat exactly is packaged and operated?
reef-*substrateWhere is it bound, and as what operational reality?
-

rein-* is not a fifth axis. Reins are glas-harness agent-harness backends; the name echoes rail-* analogically, not taxonomically. Agentic session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model selection — belong to glas-harness. When a rein is installed and operated as a managed service it is a workload like any other, packaged and bound through the four axes above.

-

20.2 What holds today

-

For any Railiance consumer of NetKingdom security, without exception:

-
  1. Authorization decisions come from access-engine and from nowhere else (§6).
  2. Approvals are objects in approval-engine, consumed as claims (§9.4).
  3. Credentials are materialized by secrets-engine after a decision, never as a substitute for one.
  4. Evidence goes to audit-core under the bound in §9.6.
  5. Anything causing a protected side effect is PEP-shaped and owes the four obligations in §6.4 — including a published unreachable-engine stance in the §13.1 register.
-

20.3 What is not settled

-

The mapping between the axes and this model is deliberately thin, because guessing it would be worse than admitting it:

-
  • A rapp-* is the most likely resource a decision is rendered about, but nothing states its identity form in a request claim.
  • A rail-* describes how a workload runs and is therefore where PEP shape is most likely to live — but §6.4 obligations attach to repositories, and a rail is a contract, so whether a rail can carry an obligation is unwritten.
  • A reef-* answers where a workload is bound, which is adjacent to a security zone (security-zones_v0.1) without being one. zone-engine records that a reef capping availability for everything bound to it is a canon composition problem. That composition is unwritten.
  • The railiance-* ownership axis names who owns a capability, which is adjacent to the principal a decision is rendered for. Adjacent is not equal, and no rule connects them.
  • glas-harness and reins hold tool policy and session semantics for agents, while §3.4 rule 2 holds that an agent acts only through a conduit or an engine API. Those two must compose, and neither side may treat its own half as sufficient. That seam is the most consequential of the five, because it is where "tool availability is not permission" is actually enforced or lost.
-

20.4 How this boundary changes

-

An interaction boundary between two frameworks is owned by neither alone. Changes to §20 require assent from railiance-master for the axis definitions and from glas-harness for the session and tool-policy seam, on the same terms as any other boundary in this standard (§10). NetKingdom states what a consumer owes; it does not define what a rail, rapp, reef, or rein is.

-
netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.7 · · acceptednet-kingdom · canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md · ce198fc2905687ea90a2892346b6860281ac87f8
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/security-layer-model-v0.7.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/security-layer-model-v0.7.md deleted file mode 100644 index fdc231e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/security-layer-model-v0.7.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1396 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.7 -type: standard -title: "NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7" -domain: netkingdom -status: accepted -version: "0.7" -supersedes: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md -owner: gate-house -publication_owner: net-kingdom -created: "2026-08-28" -updated: "2026-08-28" -last_reviewed: "2026-08-28" -review_interval: 3m -source_revision: "gate-house@516ed4e" -standard_token: security-layer-model_v0.7 -# "assented_by" records assent to a BOUNDARY, given at the version named. -# It is not assent to the current text. Revision reviews are listed in §14. -assented_by: - - "flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001" - - "kings-guard KG-DEC-2026-001" - - "ops-warden ADR-0010" - - "audit-core AUDIT-IN-0001, and v0.4 review with three findings" - - "flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-002 (v0.4, §9.3 contested)" - - "kings-guard v0.4 review, four findings" - - "ops-warden 2026-08-29 v0.4 review, three findings" -related: - - canon/standards/security-zones_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md - - canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md - - gate-house/decisions/decisions.md - - net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md - - gate-house/history/2026-08-28-security-layer-model-and-gate-house-recut.md ---- - -# NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7 - -## 1. Purpose - -This standard states how NetKingdom's IT-security estate is layered, and what -each layer may and may not do. It answers one question: - -> **Given a repository, which layer is it in, and what does that permit it to -> own?** - -The layers are distinguished by **determinism** and by **the kind of artifact -the layer produces**, not by technical tier, deployment topology, or team. - -It is not an org chart, not a network model, not a deployment topology, and not -a dependency graph. It does not assign work, and it does not replace any -repository's boundary contract; it constrains what such a contract may claim. - -**What changed in v0.7.** v0.6 announced a rule it never wrote: §1 and §15 said -the standard separates human and agent principals inside Staff, and §3.4 was -byte-identical to v0.5. `kings-guard` found it and put it correctly — *a rule -stated about a standard in its own change log is not a rule*, which is §11's own -principle turned on the standard. §3.4 is now written. - -The rest are collisions between rules written for the clean case: §6.4's first -obligation forbade what its third obligation blesses, and its second forbade the -session-bound allow §9.7.1 permits. §9.4's atomicity was described as closing a -threat it does not close. §19 graded the document it lived in. And §20 records -the interaction boundary with Railiance operations, on definitions from -`railiance-master` rather than inference. §15 records the change list. - -**What changed in v0.6.** An independent assessment against industry practice -(`net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md`) found the model -sound as a layering constitution and incomplete as a *self-healing* one: cognition, -authority, and execution are specified, but the two verbs that close a healing -loop — observe in production and actuate through a deterministic surface — are -pending, and one is unstaffed. It also found the Engine layer untyped, so that -"we need an engine for X" drifts toward "X now decides", and the enforcement -point unnamed. - -v0.6 types the engines (§3.3), names the enforcement point (§6.4), replaces the -containment assignment with an actuation surface held at zero (§9.2), separates -human and agent principals inside Staff (§3.4), puts time into the model (§9.7), -requires the Taxonomy artifacts that make §6.2 compileable rather than -reviewable (§17), and composes the sibling standards it had only cited (§18). -Section numbers below §14 are unchanged: the estate cites them. - -**What changed in v0.5.** All four reviewing repositories returned findings on -v0.4, and one contested a rule. §9.3 was wrong: it collapsed *engine reachable -but degraded* with *engine not reachable at all*, and the second case has no -evaluator in the path to express anything. §9.1 collapsed *no route exists* with -*route exists under a declared gap*, which would have forced a false "pending" -onto a production capability. §11 claimed mechanical checkability for a rule -that cannot be checked in prose. §13 filed two opposite conformance states in one -table and recorded proposed owners as owners. §9.6 needed the load-bearing -distinction it implied but never drew. §15 records the change list. - -**What changed in v0.4.** `audit-core` assented to the approval evidence half -and corrected the rationale twice. v0.3 rested §9.4 on that repository's INTENT -principle 6, which is an aspiration; the shipped bound in its `docs/integrity.md` -is weaker and conditional. More consequentially, no append-only archive can prove -**omission at source** — a suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact — which -is now stated as an estate-wide doctrine constraint (§9.6) rather than left -implicit. `audit-core` was also referenced as an owner in v0.3 without appearing -in the §4 catalog at all; it is catalogued here, as an Engine, on its own -declaration. §15 records the change list. - -**What changed in v0.3.** Two engines were seeded to own concepts v0.2 recorded -as unowned: `approval-engine` takes the approval object that §13 left homeless, -and `maturity-engine` takes graded progression — closing a §9.1 defect in -gate-house's own catalog claim, which asserted conformance review with no engine -to act through. §15 records the change list. v0.3 is **proposed**: the two new -engines are seeded by owner direction and have no other side to assent yet, and -the evidence half of the approval split needs `audit-core`'s assent. - -**What changed in v0.2.** v0.1 was assented to by all three repositories whose -boundaries moved, and each returned a finding. v0.1 had one lane for a Staff -repository that legitimately touches Tooling — read-only diagnostics — which is -narrower than the estate as it actually stands, and a rule with no lane for a -real sanctioned case is satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap. -v0.1 also catalogued a capability (§4, containment) that §5 forbade discharging, -and applied its reconstructability test to engines but not to the doctrine -gate-house feeds them. §15 records the full change list. - -## 2. Authority and conformance - -| Fact or rule | Authority | -| --- | --- | -| The layers, their definitions, and the rules between them | This standard, owned by gate-house | -| Which layer a given repository is in | This standard, §4 catalog | -| What a repository owns within its layer | That repository's `INTENT.md` and boundary contract | -| Whether a specific request is permitted | `access-engine` — never this standard | -| Whether a Tooling contact is sanctioned | The declaring repository, under the shapes in §5, reviewable by gate-house | -| Security doctrine and invariants | gate-house | -| Publication | net-kingdom canon | -| Whether an invariant is *watched in practice* | the observing repository's own report — never this standard, and never §12's diagram | - -A repository conforms when its `INTENT.md` declares its layer, its claims fall -within that layer's permissions (§3), and its Tooling contacts take one of the -sanctioned shapes in §5 or are declared as gaps under §5.3. - -**No estate argument may cite observation that has not happened.** §12 lists -`kings-guard` against the loop's fourth step, and that repository has reported -that it has never observed a real event. Until it reports otherwise, no -assessment, review, or decision in this estate may treat an invariant as being -watched in practice on the strength of the diagram. Lifted here from §12 so it -cannot be lost in a summary. - -## 3. The layers - -| Layer | Character | Produces | Deterministic | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| **Taxonomy** | cross-cutting language | terms, semantic contracts, standards | n/a — describes | -| **Tooling** | infrastructure and state | data structures, persistence | yes | -| **Engines** | interfaces for a modeled concept | APIs, contracts | yes | -| **Staff** | management, operations, change, controlling | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | **no** | - -### 3.1 Taxonomy - -Cross-cutting language. Taxonomy repositories define terms and semantic -contracts so the other layers interoperate without integration by -interpretation. They own no runtime position and no state any layer depends on. - -`info-tech-canon` holds ecosystem-wide semantic contracts. NetKingdom-specific -security architecture — including this standard — is net-kingdom canon's. - -### 3.2 Tooling - -Deterministic infrastructure: data structures, persistence, and the consistent, -performant, scalable keeping of state. Much of it is third-party. - -### 3.3 Engines - -Deterministic APIs for a modeled concept — a user, a tenant, a zone, a secret, -an access rule. An engine's defining property is that **the same authoritative -input state yields the same result**. Engines are where the estate's -deterministic guarantees live, and therefore where every enforcement boundary -MUST sit. - -A repository whose core function is inference or judgment fails this test by -construction and is Staff, however much of its work happens at runtime. - -**Engines are typed.** "Engine" is one layer but four roles, and collapsing them -hides different failure modes. Every §4 Engine row carries a role: - -| Role | Meaning | Outage means | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **PDP** | renders the authorization decision — `access-engine`, and only it (§6) | consumer residue (§9.3) | -| **PIP** | supplies facts a decision consumes as claims — user, tenant, zone, approval, maturity | input degradation, engine's own fallback (§9.3) | -| **Evidence** | records what happened and proves integrity of what it holds — `audit-core` | MUST NOT block the operation being recorded — a default, not a property; see below | -| **Lifecycle** | a deterministic API over Tooling it owns — `secrets-engine` | the owning engine's failure semantics | - -The roles are why *"we need an engine for X"* does not mean *"X now decides"*. -A new engine is a PIP unless this standard is amended to say otherwise, and §6 -means it can never be a second PDP. - -The Evidence row's outage rule is an estate **trade**, not a property of -evidence engines. Choosing availability there means accepting that a compromised -source can suppress a record and that detection is the answer (§9.6). The -opposite shape — *do not proceed unless an independent custodian already holds -the record* — is the only one that puts evidence outside the actor's blast -radius **before** the act. The estate has not needed it, so it is not ruled out -by a table cell: an operation whose control genuinely requires independent -recording before effect is a declared exception, raised when needed. Raised by -`audit-core` against its own row. - -The industry vocabulary is deliberately mirrored here — PDP, PIP, PEP as in -NIST ZTA and XACML — because it is how the estate talks to the outside and how a -PEP is stopped from quietly becoming a PDP. The determinism cut in §3 stays -primary where the two disagree. - -### 3.4 Staff - -Interactive and non-deterministic. Staff is the management layer: operations, -change, innovation, and controlling. It works through agentic capability — -assistants and autonomous agents — and its artifacts are specifications, -decisions, workplans, and tasks. - -Staff repositories MUST NOT hold state that another layer depends on at -runtime, and MUST NOT render or cache any decision an Engine is responsible for. - -Acting at runtime does not make a repository an Engine. Being agentic makes it -Staff, and §5 governs how it acts. - -**Two principals, one layer.** Humans and agents are both non-deterministic and -both Staff, so they share the layer's permissions. They do not share blast -radius. Four rules bind the agent principal specifically: - -1. **No standing credential.** An agent holds no long-lived credential of its - own. Authority is issued per task, time-bounded under §9.7, and attributable - to the principal on whose behalf it acts. -2. **Tool use is a conduit or an Engine API.** An agent acts through §5.2 — the - owner's tool under the caller's identity, presenting no authority of its own - — or through an engine. There is no third route. Tool availability is not - permission: a callable tool means the operation exists, not that this actor - may invoke it. -3. **Agent memory is not a state plane.** Agent memory, tool-call traces, and - prompt caches are the agent's own. They MUST NOT become state another layer - depends on at runtime unless catalogued as Tooling in §4, which subjects them - to §5 like anything else, and to §5's sunset. -4. **Every agent action is reconstructable as the caller's action**, bounded by - §9.6 — the archive shows the actions it received, not that it received all of - them. - -Session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model -selection — are **not** governed here. They belong to `glas-harness` and its -`rein-*` backends (§20). This standard governs what an agent may be authorized -to do; `glas-harness` governs how an agent session is conducted. Rule 2 is the -seam between them, and neither side may treat its own half as sufficient. - -v0.6 claimed these rules in its change log and did not write them. Found by -`kings-guard`, which is the repository they bind hardest and which offered to -assent to them sight-unseen. - -## 4. Layer catalog - -| Repository | Layer | Role | Owns | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `info-tech-canon` | Taxonomy | — | ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and terminology | -| `net-kingdom` | Taxonomy | — | NetKingdom standards of record; publication | -| `key-cape` | Tooling | — | packaged identity tooling; IAM profile; authentication | -| `OpenBao` | Tooling | — | secret storage, leases, PKI, dynamic secret engines | -| `user-engine` | Engine | PIP | users, accounts, memberships | -| `tenant-engine` | Engine | PIP | tenant-as-an-entity facts | -| `zone-engine` | Engine | PIP | zone identity and membership — offline reference conformance per its 2026-08-23 disposition | -| `secrets-engine` | Engine | Lifecycle | credential abstraction, custody, lifecycle | -| `audit-core` | Engine | Evidence | audit event custody, retention, integrity verification, export — explicitly not a decision point (§9.6) | -| `access-engine` | Engine | **PDP** | **the policy decision** — the only decision point (§6) | -| `approval-engine` | Engine | PIP | the approval object — durable, authenticated, consumable, atomically supersedable (§9.4) | -| `maturity-engine` | Engine | PIP | graded progression against declared criteria and evidence; the gap register; capability readiness (§9.5) | -| `gate-house` | Staff | — | security doctrine, authority context, curriculum; **conformance review — through `maturity-engine` (§9.5)** | -| `ops-mason` | Staff | PEP-shaped | building and tearing down access routes and perimeters | -| `ops-warden` | Staff | PEP-shaped | operational access lanes, stewardship, runbooks; SSH certificate issuance — **declared-gap** (§9.1, §13) | -| `kings-guard` | Staff | — | adaptive defence and judgment; observation of Staff-reachable sources — identity and secret observation **pending**; **proposes** containment, which it does not own (§9.2) | -| `whitehat-security` | Staff | — | offensive validation | - -An **actuation surface** — reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload -— is catalogued nowhere because it does not exist. See §9.2: it is an Engine -concept held at zero, not a Staff capability. - -`access-engine` is the ruled name for the repository currently called -`flex-auth`; both denote the same authority until the governed rename completes. -Execution conditions for that rename are recorded in its migration decision, not -here. - -## 5. The binding rule - -> **Staff never touches Tooling directly. It acts only through Engine APIs.** - -A Staff repository MUST NOT hold a direct client for a Tooling-layer system — -no direct database connection, no direct OpenBao client, no direct cluster -mutation — outside the shapes below. This is the architectural form of *no -privilege from cognition*, and it is deliberately mechanically checkable. - -**Scope.** "Tooling-layer system" means a system catalogued as Tooling in §4. -Infrastructure the estate runs but has not catalogued — the State Hub, -`llm-connect`, and similar — is outside this rule, because a rule that silently -covered them would put every Staff repository in undeclared violation on -adoption day: they all write progress events. Such clients SHOULD be recorded -in the repository's declaration as non-Tooling for completeness of the check, -and the way to bring one under §5 is to catalogue it in §4, deliberately. - -Raised by `ops-warden`, which held clients for both and declined to resolve the -scope question on gate-house's behalf. - -**The carve-out sunsets.** It is a pressure valve, and a valve left open becomes -a second persistence plane under the Staff layer — which §3.4 forbids in spirit. -Three rules bound it: every non-Tooling client MUST be listed in the -repository's declaration; an uncatalogued store that another layer **reads** -MUST, within two review intervals, either be catalogued as Tooling in §4 or be -declared a gap under §5.3; and a Staff-owned event bus or memory store MUST NOT -become the estate's de facto state plane. Today's instances are the State Hub -and `llm-connect`; tomorrow's are agent memory, tool-call traces, and prompt -caches (§3.4). - -Three shapes are sanctioned. Everything else is a violation. - -### 5.1 Read-only diagnostic observation - -A Staff repository MAY read Tooling state for diagnostics where the owning -engine exposes no equivalent. It MUST be declared in the repository's -`INTENT.md`. It grants no write, and it is an engine gap to close, not a -standing arrangement. - -### 5.2 Conduit - -A Staff repository MAY run the **owner's** tool under the **caller's** identity, -supplying no authority of its own. The test is the supplied-authority property: -the conduit MUST NOT present its own credential, MUST NOT widen what the caller -could already do, and MUST be reconstructable as the caller's action in audit. - -A conduit that presents its own token is not a conduit; it is §5.3 or a -violation. This shape MUST be declared, and the no-authority property SHOULD be -covered by a test. - -The reconstructability requirement is an audit-dependent claim and is therefore -bounded by §9.6: the archive shows the conduit actions it received, not that it -received all of them. - -### 5.3 Declared engine gap - -Where a Staff repository must contact Tooling directly and no engine exposes the -capability, it MUST declare the contact rather than take an exemption. A -declared gap carries, machine-readably: - -| Field | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| `capability` | what the contact does | -| `intended_owner` | the engine that should own it | -| `blocked_on` | why it cannot move today | -| `review` | a date, not "when convenient" | - -A declared gap is **tracked non-conformance**, not conformance. It does not -expire on its own and it is not a licence to add more. It exists because a rule -offering no lane for a real sanctioned case gets satisfied by relabelling rather -than by closing the gap — and a tracked gap is visible, whereas a relabelled one -is not. - -Prior art: `ops-warden` runs equivalent machinery for delegated lanes (27 -catalog entries carrying `delegation:`, queryable via `warden route gaps`), and -has offered it as reusable. - -**No fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape.** It has been proposed, on -the argument that someone must operate `OpenBao` and every operational necessity -otherwise looks like a gap. Declined: §5.3 already sanctions the operation while -keeping it visible, and a clean "operator" shape would convert a tracked gap -into a permanent allowance — the relabelling failure this standard exists to -prevent. A permanent operational necessity is a declared gap whose review -interval keeps returning, which is the correct amount of friction. If the review -becomes ceremonial, that is an argument for closing the gap, not for renaming -it. - -## 6. One decision point - -`access-engine` is the only policy decision point in NetKingdom. No other -repository, in any layer, may render or cache authorization decisions. - -First ruled in `zone-engine/INTENT.md` §5 — *"flex-auth is the policy decision -point. It stays the only one."* The failure mode, from the same source: *"It -becomes a second decision point… it would arrive as a small convenience."* - -### 6.1 Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding - -A registry, cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs has -decided early. Provenance MUST remain reconstructable from the engine's decision -record. - -### 6.2 Doctrine reaches the decision as an input, or it is not applied - -This rule binds gate-house on the same terms. **An authority ceiling, mandate -constraint, or operating-mode restriction that determines an outcome MUST reach -the decision either as an input claim on the request or as a rule in the -versioned policy package**, so that its application is reconstructable from the -decision record. - -Doctrine that influences outcomes by any other route is a second decision point -wearing an author's hat. This is not a limit on gate-house's authorship; it is -what keeps that authorship auditable at decision time. - -### 6.3 No Staff repository may host a decision point - -A deterministic authority boundary inside a non-deterministic layer contradicts -the invariant the estate is built on. gate-house was re-cut on this ground. - -### 6.4 The enforcement point - -The standard has been precise about the decision and silent about the gate. A -decision that nothing refuses to proceed without is advice. - -A **PEP** is any runtime that causes a protected side effect. It is a *shape*, -not a repository: `ops-warden` issuing a certificate, `ops-mason` opening a -route, and any protected system acting on a verdict are all PEP-shaped. Being -PEP-shaped does not move a repository out of its layer. - -Four obligations, and they are normative: - -1. **No side effect without a decision record, or a recorded stance.** A PEP - MUST NOT perform the protected action unless it holds a decision from - `access-engine` identifying the request it was rendered for, **or** its - declared §9.3 stance for the applicable scope permits proceeding without one - **and the application of that stance is recorded in place of the decision**. - The second limb is stricter than silence, not looser: a fail-open result is - metadata, never an absent record. `ops-warden` `ca.py` writes the zone, the - failure mode, and a decision id present only where a decision was rendered. - - v0.6's unqualified form made the shipped stance §9.3 sanctions into a - violation — the same defect as v0.5's §9.1, a rule written for the clean case - producing a false result on the adjacent case already sanctioned elsewhere. - Raised by `ops-warden`, which is the reference shape for limb two. - -2. **No recaching of the verdict beyond its own binding.** A stored verdict - replayed **outside the decision's stated binding and lifetime** is a second - decision point deciding early (§6.1). Within them it is the decision being - used as issued — a session-bound allow under §9.7.1 is used across later - requests by construction, and v0.6 forbade what §9.7.1 permits. - - The test is mechanical, not a matter of implementer judgement: replay is - permitted **iff the canonical request digest matches and the decision's - lifetime holds**. `access-engine` computes that digest over normalised - subject, action, resource, and context, and it is already in every decision - binding. A retry after a transport failure is therefore the same request; a - different resource is not. - - **Negative caching is permitted, narrowly.** A cached DENY cannot manufacture - authority — §8's asymmetry holds — and protects against retry storms. It is - permitted where the refusal is itself recorded against the request that was - refused (obligation 4), and where the cache lifetime is declared alongside - the stance map. A stale deny is an availability failure and will be - misdiagnosed as a policy one, so it must be visible as what it is. Ruled - explicitly because it is the first thing an implementer under load reaches - for. Raised by `access-engine`. - -3. **A declared unreachable-engine stance** (§9.3): total, per zone or - equivalent scope, no implicit default, no per-call discretion, published - rather than held in code comments or in a dataclass default. `ops-warden` - `ADR-0009` and its `pep-stance.yaml` are the reference shape. - - The published map MUST equal the shipped behaviour, and that equality SHOULD - be asserted by a test. A published map free to drift from the code is worse - than none, because it invites reliance it cannot support. Raised by - `ops-warden`, which found its own map unpublished while being cited as the - reference for this obligation. - -4. **Reconstructability**, bounded by §9.6. - -Every PEP-shaped consumer MUST publish its stance map at a path named in its -layer declaration, and those maps MUST be inventoried in the §13.1 register -until `maturity-engine` can hold them. §9.3 is otherwise a ruling with no -register behind it, and *"`z0`–`z2` and unknown fail open"* becomes the estate's -real policy without anyone having compiled it into a versioned package. - -v0.6 named a register that did not exist — a requirement whose register is -missing is a capability catalogued without a surface, by §9.1's own logic. -Raised independently by `ops-warden` and `access-engine`; §13.1 now exists, and -its first inventory has one row, which is itself the finding. - -Raised by the 2026-08-29 independent assessment: NIST ZTA splits decide from -enforce, and this standard had only the first half. - -## 7. Relationship to the Active Secrets Management Canon - -```text -Staff interactive, non-deterministic ≈ Cognitive Plane -Engines deterministic APIs ≈ Authority Plane -Tooling deterministic state ≈ Execution Plane -Taxonomy cross-cutting language -``` - -*Cognition proposes. Authority disposes. Infrastructure executes.* is therefore -NetKingdom's layering rule, not only its security maxim. §5 and §6 are that -principle applied to repositories rather than to requests. - -## 8. Vocabulary demarcations - -| Term | Belongs to | Not | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **access lane** | ops-warden, ops-mason (Staff) — how a worker reaches a host | the decision whether they may | -| **access rule** | access-engine (Engine) — whether an actor may act | the route by which they arrive | -| **control plane** | Engine layer | a Staff repository's self-description | -| **doctrine** | gate-house | a lane owner's runbook | -| **runbook** | the Staff repository stewarding the lane | a substitute for doctrine | -| **posture** | kings-guard publishes; gate-house defines its authority meaning; access-engine renders it | a privilege source | - -Posture carries an asymmetry that MUST hold: adaptive systems may reduce -authority, require step-up, or request containment. They MUST NOT -probabilistically manufacture additional authority. - -The asymmetry is what bounds the damage when observation is incomplete (§9.6): -suppressed evidence can only prevent a tightening that should have happened, never -engineer a loosening. That is an argument for keeping it absolute rather than -situational. - -## 9. Capability assignment - -### 9.1 The catalog may not assign what the rules forbid discharging - -A Staff repository MUST NOT be catalogued in §4 as owning a capability it cannot -discharge under these rules. Two marks distinguish the two ways that happens, and -they are not interchangeable: - -| Mark | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| **pending** | No route exists. No engine exposes the capability, the repository makes no Tooling contact, and the capability is **zero** — not degraded. | -| **declared-gap** | A route exists through a §5.3 declared gap. The capability **works** and is tracked, with an intended owner and a review date in §13. | - -v0.4 had only `pending`, which forced a false choice. `ops-warden` holds -production-verified SSH certificate issuance through a declared OpenBao contact; -marking it `pending` would have told readers the repository does not do the one -thing it demonstrably does daily, while leaving it unmarked left §4 disagreeing -with §13. Neither is acceptable, and the defect was in this section rather than -in the catalog. - -`pending` was written for `kings-guard`'s containment — no route, capability -zero — and remains correct there. `declared-gap` is the case §5.3 was added to -sanction. Raised by `ops-warden`. - -Both marks apply per capability, not per repository. A repository may hold one -capability outright, another under a declared gap, and a third pending. - -### 9.2 Actuation does not exist, and containment is not Staff's to own - -Self-healing needs four verbs: observe, evaluate, decide, actuate. Observation is -`kings-guard` and is unstaffed (§12). Evaluation is `maturity-engine` and is -seeded. Decision is `access-engine` and works. **Actuation has no surface at -all**, and a model with no actuation surface describes a diagnosis machine -rather than a healing one. - -v0.5 marked containment `pending` against `kings-guard`, which was the right -mark on the wrong repository. Containment is not a Staff capability that happens -to lack a route: **reduce authority, require step-up, isolate a workload** are -authority-changing operations, and under §6 an authority-changing operation is -rendered by an Engine and enforced by a PEP (§6.4). A Staff repository proposes -containment; it never performs it. - -The **actuation surface** is therefore an Engine concept — likely a small -surface on `access-engine` together with runtime PEPs — carrying the same -reconstructability rules as any other decision: a containment action is a -decision record, not a side channel. - -It is **unowned and held at zero**. `access-engine` is recorded in §13 as a -*proposed* owner and has explicitly not reviewed it (`FLEX-DEC-2026-002`). No -repository may be catalogued as owning containment until the surface exists — -§9.1 applied to the estate's most operationally tempting gap, and the standard's -own medicine. - -Until then `kings-guard` proposes and judges, its containment claim stays at -zero rather than degraded, and no argument may assume the estate can contain -anything automatically. - -### 9.3 Degraded mode: two failure cases, two owners - -v0.4 collapsed two failures into one rule. They have different owners because -one has an evaluator in the path and the other does not. - -**Input degradation — the engine's.** Where `access-engine` is reachable but -cannot reach its own inputs, the deterministic *fail to reduced authority* -default belongs to the engine. This keeps the decision at the decision point and -keeps the fallback deterministic, which a Staff-layer fallback could never be. - -**Engine unreachable — necessarily the consumer's.** Where `access-engine` is -not reachable at all, it applies nothing, because it is not running. Whatever -happens next is the consumer's behaviour by construction: fail-open is not -expressible by a policy decision point, since there is no evaluator in the path -to express it. A standard that assigns this to the engine assigns it to nobody. - -The consumer's residue is bounded rather than free. A protected system MUST -declare its unreachable-engine stance ahead of time, per zone or equivalent -scope, and that stance MUST be auditable and total — no implicit default, no -per-call discretion. `ops-warden` `ADR-0009` already satisfies this: a total -per-zone map, open for `z0`–`z2` and unknown, closed for `z3-critical`, -replacing the global `policy.enabled` / `policy.fail_closed` switches it -superseded. - -**Unchanged: engine-unavailable is not grounds for a Staff break-glass path.** -The distinction is whether an engine is there to ask. A bypass around a -*reachable* engine is a second decision point, and an incident is when an -attacker most wants that shortcut. A consumer choosing its declared behaviour -when there is no engine to ask is not a bypass; it is the only thing left. - -Contested by `flex-auth` (`FLEX-DEC-2026-002`), which has held since 2026-08-19 -that fail-open is not expressible by a PDP, and which noted v0.4 collided with -shipped behaviour in a repository that had assented to this standard. - -### 9.4 Approvals are an engine concept, not a Staff or audit concern - -The approval object — durable, authenticated entries, distinct-approver -counting, atomic supersession, single consumption, revocation without holder -cooperation — is owned by `approval-engine`. - -It is not Staff's: §3.4 forbids Staff holding state another layer depends on at -runtime. It is not the decision point's: an evaluator that owns the object it -evaluates is self-dealing. It is not the audit fabric's: an approval needs -mutable, in-path, current-state semantics, and an append-only archive is built -for the opposite property. - -`access-engine` consumes approvals as **input claims** under §6.2 and never -mutates them. Every issuance, use, supersession, and revocation is emitted to -`audit-core`: the operative state and the evidence record are different -artifacts with different owners. - -The evidence guarantee is bounded, and the bound is `audit-core`'s -`docs/integrity.md`, not its INTENT principle 6. An in-database hash chain -detects a rewritten payload only if the attacker does not also recompute the -suffix — which a database owner can. Detection against that class requires the -external chain-head attestation, and even with it the store is not WORM, object -lock, or archival custody. `tamper_evidence` is therefore conditional on live -preconditions, not a property of the store at rest, and approval events receive -exactly the guarantee every other source receives. - -**Emission atomicity is `approval-engine`'s obligation.** An approval MUST NOT be -issued, consumed, superseded, or revoked without the corresponding event being -durably queued in the same transaction. - -**The queue MUST be local.** The durable queue MUST live in `approval-engine`'s -own transactional store, and **no synchronous dependency on `audit-core` may sit -inside the state-change transaction**. With a genuine local outbox, fail-closed -triggers only when `approval-engine`'s own store is unavailable — where the -change could not have been recorded anyway — and an `audit-core` outage does not -block a revocation. Satisfying the requirement by emitting synchronously to -`audit-core` inside the transaction is also atomic, and turns an audit outage -into an inability to revoke: the operation least tolerable to block during an -incident, and the same coupling this section rejects for reads. Raised by -`audit-core`. -`audit-core` reports what it received and does not imply it is everything that -happened; without atomic emission the evidence half is silently incomplete and -nothing detects the gap. This is a condition of `audit-core`'s assent -(`AUDIT-IN-0001`) and belongs in `approval-engine`'s contract before the evidence -half is treated as load-bearing. - -`audit-core` MUST NOT expose an approval-validity query. Records, yes; a verdict -on whether an approval is still valid, never — a consumer branching on that -answer would route an authorization decision through the audit fabric, which is -what this section exists to prevent. Callers needing current state ask -`approval-engine`. - -### 9.5 Graded progression is an engine concept - -Maturity — how far a subject has progressed against declared criteria and -submitted evidence — is owned by `maturity-engine`. Given the same criteria and -the same evidence it MUST return the same level; that determinism is what makes -it an Engine rather than an opinion. - -The division with Staff: **gate-house judges and proposes; maturity-engine -computes and remembers.** Interpretation is inference and stays Staff. A -criterion that cannot be evaluated by rule is not yet a criterion. - -This closes a defect in v0.2's own catalog: `gate-house` was assigned -conformance review with no engine to act through, which is exactly the §9.1 -problem raised against the containment claim. Staff acts only through Engine -APIs, including gate-house. - -**A maturity level MUST NOT be compiled into registry content.** Until -`access-engine`'s decision provenance carries a registry-snapshot digest — a gap -it self-declared in §13 — a level reaching a decision through the registry is not -reconstructable from the decision record. Levels arrive as request claims or as -versioned policy rules. Same constraint, and same reason, as zone stance. - -**A maturity level MUST NOT gate a decision directly.** Under §6.1, compiled -data that determines an outcome is still deciding. If a level determines whether -an action is permitted, it MUST reach `access-engine` as an input claim or a -versioned policy rule under §6.2, never by a consumer branching on a fetched -level. - -Approvals and maturity are deliberate opposites — a closed binary state machine -against an open graded ladder — and neither engine may drift toward the other. - -### 9.6 Evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source - -An append-only archive with a verified hash chain proves that records were not -**altered or truncated after arrival**. It cannot prove that a record was never -sent. Against a compromised or buggy source, a suppressed event leaves the chain -perfectly intact and verification reports intact. - -This bound is estate-wide. Statements of the form *"the audit record proves it -happened"* are unsound; the sound form is *"the archive proves the records it -holds were not altered or truncated after arrival"*. Its mirror is equally -unsound: **absence of a record is not evidence of non-occurrence**, and no -control may read it as such. - -**Load-bearing versus attributive evidence.** The atomicity obligation attaches -to the first, not to both: - -| Kind | Test | Obligation | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **Load-bearing** | a control's soundness depends on the event being present or absent — an approval revocation, a containment action, a denial | emission MUST be atomic with the state change (§9.4) | -| **Attributive** | the event supports forensic reconstruction and attribution, and no control branches on its presence | atomicity SHOULD be sought; where it is deliberately traded away, the trade MUST be declared and completeness MUST NOT be claimed | - -Where a repository deliberately makes emission non-atomic — `ops-warden`'s -`# audit must not block signing` is the estate's live example, chosen so that an -audit-store failure cannot remove production host access — the trade is -legitimate for attributive evidence, MUST be declared where the trail is -documented, and MUST NOT be described in terms that imply completeness. The -availability argument is real in both directions: making it atomic gives the -estate's operational access lane a new dependency on its own evidence store. - -**Consequence for adaptive systems.** Suppression does not degrade observation -neutrally, it biases it optimistic, and silently: an event never emitted is never -evaluated, so no finding is raised and the last posture stands. A confidence -score computed from the richness of the record in hand cannot express doubt about -the completeness of the stream — a well-formed observation from a 90%-suppressed -stream scores high. That is this section's failure reproduced one layer up, in -the consumer. - -Two things follow. - -**Which control covers which threat.** v0.6 read as though emission atomicity -closed this section's opening sentence. It does not, and the decomposition is -owed to the reader: - -| Threat | Covered by | When | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **Accidental omission** — process dies between mutation and emit | emission atomicity, local outbox (§9.4) | prevented | -| **Adversarial omission** — a compromised source declines to insert, deletes before drain, or drains to nowhere | cadence and reconciliation | **detected, after the fact** | -| Adversarial omission at a compromised source | — | **nothing in this model prevents it** | - -The outbox sits inside the blast radius of the component whose compromise this -section posits, so it makes emission atomic against crash and partial failure -and nothing more. That residual is real and is stated rather than implied. -Raised by `audit-core`, correcting a remedy it had itself proposed. - -1. **The §8 asymmetry bounds the damage, and this is its clearest payoff.** - Because an adaptive system may only reduce authority and never manufacture it, - suppression can only prevent a tightening that should have happened. It cannot - be used to engineer a loosening. The harm is a missed reduction, not an - invented privilege — which is an argument for keeping the asymmetry absolute. -2. **Silence is a signal, and for load-bearing evidence it is the only control - in its class.** A source of **attributive** evidence SHOULD declare an - expected emission cadence; a source of **load-bearing** evidence **MUST**. - A drop below the declared rate is a finding in its own right — the stream - observed, not only its contents — and needs no Tooling contact, because the - source publishes its own stream. - - **Rate monitoring is the wrong form for rare events**, and rare is exactly - where the stakes are highest: the most valuable event to suppress is the - negative one, and revocations, denials, and containment actions are - infrequent by nature. A source emitting a handful of revocations a month has - no rate to drop below, and suppression is indistinguishable from a quiet - month. For **low-volume load-bearing classes** the required form is therefore - **positive reconciliation or a heartbeat**: compare the source's own state - transitions against the evidence engine's event count per class and treat - divergence as a finding, or assert *nothing to report* as a signed positive - claim that can itself go missing. Rate monitoring never produces a claim that - can be missing; a heartbeat does. `GH-WP-0002-T04` is the reference instance. - Raised by `audit-core`. - -Raised by `audit-core` against its own principle; extended by `kings-guard` from -its own evaluator and confidence model. - -### 9.7 Decisions have a lifetime - -A single decision point deciding on stale claims is a single decision point -deciding wrongly. The model has had no temporal law, and the approval race in -§16 was its first symptom. - -1. **Every allow has an explicit lifetime** — a TTL, or a binding to a session - or obligation that ends. An allow with no stated end is a standing grant, and - standing grants are what this estate exists to remove. -2. **Revocation and supersession have a visibility deadline**, and its shape - differs by role. A **PEP** has one boundary and MUST state one deadline. A - **PDP** MUST state a deadline **per input class**, because a decision is a - join over sources with unrelated refresh behaviour — approval-claim freshness, - registry snapshot cadence, policy package activation, directory ETag. A single - number at a PDP is either a fiction or the worst case, and the worst case is - the slowest and least visible input. "Eventually" is not a stance; an unstated - deadline is an unbounded replay window. - - A consequence worth naming: a stated deadline for a fact carried by a - registry snapshot is unfalsifiable while decision provenance holds no snapshot - digest, since nobody can determine afterwards which snapshot a decision read. - The deadline and the digest are one gap seen from two sides, which promotes - `access-engine`'s self-declared provenance gap (§13) from housekeeping to a - conformance prerequisite. Raised by `access-engine` against its own backlog. -3. **Consumption is a state change, never an inference.** An approval is - consumed by a mutation in `approval-engine` (§9.4). It MUST NOT be inferred - from the existence of a decision record — the decision precedes the action - and the action precedes consumption, so a decision record proves an intent to - act, not an act. -4. **Three failure modes are named, and each needs an owner**: an allow rendered - then never consumed; a double consumption by racing callers; consumption - after the authorized action has already failed. Neither engine closes these - alone. Recorded in §16 and `GH-WP-0002-T06`. - -### 9.8 Partition is not one-dimensional - -§9.3 handles *engine unreachable*. A real estate spends most of its incident -time in the band between reachable and gone: partial PIP reachability, clock -skew across a decision and its enforcement, and two consumers with different -declared stances seeing different worlds at the same moment. - -Two rules hold today, and the rest is open (§16). A PEP MUST resolve its own -stance from its declared map without consulting another consumer — divergent -views are expected and are not a coordination problem to be solved at enforcement -time. And where clock skew could extend a lifetime under §9.7, the shorter -reading governs. - -## 10. Changing layer - -A repository's layer is not permanent. `zone-engine` changed layer in practice -when its runtime hypothesis was falsified. - -A layer change MUST be recorded as a decision, MUST update the repository's -`INTENT.md`, and MUST obtain assent from the repositories whose boundaries move. -A repository MUST NOT acquire a new layer's permissions by gradual practice. - -"No gradual practice" needs a check rather than a sentence. A layer change MUST -carry six artifacts, written from the `zone-engine` case that the procedure -should have been derived from in the first place: - -| Artifact | Why | -| --- | --- | -| before/after `INTENT.md` | the declaration is the conformance surface (§11) | -| client inventory | what the repository holds against Tooling, before and after | -| gap inventory | which §5.3 gaps close, open, or transfer | -| assent list | every repository whose boundary moves | -| state-migration decision | what happens to live state and to consumers reading it | -| permission freeze | no new permissions of the target layer are exercised until the cut completes | - -The freeze is the one that makes the rule checkable: a repository mid-change -holds its old permissions, not the union of both. - -## 11. Conformance - -Conformance has four states, and the distinction between the last two is the -point: - -| State | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| **Conforming** | no Tooling contact, or only §5.1/§5.2 shapes, declared | -| **Blocked-clean** | the capability does not exist because no engine exposes it, and the repository makes **no** Tooling contact — §9.1 `pending`, and not a non-conformance | -| **Declared gap** | a §5.3 contact with owner, blocker, and review date — tracked non-conformance | -| **Undeclared violation** | anything else — a finding | - -**Blocked-clean is not a lesser state than conforming.** A repository that -declined a break-glass path and left a capability at zero has complied at cost; -a repository that quietly opened a direct client and declared nothing has not. -Any downstream scoring — `maturity-engine` included (§9.5) — MUST NOT rank the -first below the second. Raised by `kings-guard`, whose three gaps are all of -this kind and which would otherwise have been graded down three times for -having taken the standard seriously. - -**Who must declare.** A repository the estate authors declares its layer in its -own `INTENT.md`. For a component the estate catalogues but does not author — -third-party or vendored, such as `OpenBao` — the §4 catalog row **is** the -declaration, and no `INTENT.md` obligation attaches. A rule that assigns an -obligation the holder cannot discharge is the §9.1 defect applied to conformance -rather than capability. - -A layer stated *about* a repository by another repository is not a declaration. -Review notes, catalog rows, and correspondence record an intent to adopt; only -the repository's own file conforms. - -**Declaration form.** Because prose cannot distinguish a declaration from a -transcribed review, a declaration MUST carry a machine-readable form: a `layer:` -key in the `INTENT.md` frontmatter, or an equivalent declaration file. Without -it this section asserts a property it cannot deliver — the defect this standard -has now corrected three times elsewhere. `ops-warden` has implemented a reference -form (`layer.yaml`, a conformance script, and a test covering the §5.2 -no-authority property) and offered it to the repositories that have yet to -declare. Raised by `audit-core`, which noted that `flex-auth`'s conforming -declaration is legible as one only by following its decision trail. - -Mechanically checkable: - -- every estate-authored repository in §4 carries a machine-readable layer - declaration; -- every direct Tooling client in a Staff repository maps to a declared §5.1, - §5.2, or §5.3 entry, and non-Tooling clients are recorded so the check is - total; -- no repository other than `access-engine` exposes an authorization decision - surface; -- no §4 capability is catalogued without an engine surface, a `pending` mark, or - a `declared-gap` mark. - -Requires review: whether claims stay inside layer permissions; whether compiled -or cached data has become an early decision (§6.1); whether doctrine is reaching -decisions as declared inputs (§6.2); whether the §8 vocabulary is used correctly. - -## 12. The conformance loop - -Doctrine no engine implements is fiction. The loop is normative, not -aspirational: - -```text -gate-house asserts an invariant - → the engines implement it, or declare a gap - → whitehat-security tries to break it - → kings-guard observes it in operation - → findings return to gate-house as doctrine change -``` - -A finding that a rule is unsatisfiable is a **success** of this loop, not a -failure of the reporting repository. Four of this standard's five versions exist -because a reviewing repository used it. - -**Step four is currently aspiration.** `kings-guard` has disclosed that it has -never observed anything in operation: the pilot is specified and scaffolded, every -input is a hand-built fixture, and no test has met a real event. Until it reports -otherwise, no argument in this estate may assume an invariant is being watched in -practice because §12 lists a repository against that step. - -## 13. Open gaps - -Two different things are recorded here, and they are opposite conformance states -(§11). A **declared contact** means the repository touches Tooling because no -engine exposes the capability. An **unowned capability** means no route exists -and the repository makes no contact at all. Reading them as one list would grade -restraint as though it were non-conformance. - -An `intended owner` is a **proposal to** the named repository, not an assignment -**onto** it. §2 keeps ownership in the repository's own `INTENT.md`, so the -register distinguishes proposed from assented. - -| Gap | State | Declared by | Owner | Owner status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| SSH-CA signing write (`VaultCA`, `bao kv put`) | declared-contact | ops-warden | secrets-engine | proposed | -| Authentication / assurance evidence | unowned-capability | kings-guard | identity layer + audit-core | **access-engine declined** | -| Secret-use evidence | unowned-capability | kings-guard | secrets-engine | proposed | -| Actuation / containment surface | unowned-capability | **gate-house (estate-wide)** | access-engine + runtime engines | proposed | -| Identity and secret observation | unowned-capability | kings-guard | as above | proposed | -| Stance-map register had no implementation | declared-contact | ops-warden, access-engine | gate-house | resolved in §13.1 | -| Registry-snapshot digest in decision provenance | declared-contact | flex-auth | flex-auth | self-declared | -| Approval storage and lifecycle | — | flex-auth | approval-engine | assigned (§9.4) | -| Approval evidence | — | gate-house | audit-core | **assented** (`AUDIT-IN-0001`) | -| Approval evidence custody stronger than the shipped bound — WORM, object lock, transparency log | unowned-capability | audit-core | — | unassigned | -| Emission atomicity for approval state changes | — | audit-core | approval-engine | assigned (§9.4) | -| Non-atomic audit emission on the SSH signing lane | declared-contact | ops-warden | ops-warden | self-declared, attributive (§9.6) | - -The actuation row is no longer attributed to `kings-guard`. §9.2 ruled that -containment is not a Staff capability lacking a route, so `kings-guard` is not -its declarer: the gap is estate-wide and blocks every repository's ability to -act. Raised by `kings-guard`, which asked not to carry a row for a capability -the standard had just ruled was never theirs. - -`access-engine` declined authentication and assurance evidence -(`FLEX-DEC-2026-002`): it consumes assurance claims as input and never redefines -them, so evidence of authentication belongs to the identity layer and -`audit-core`. It owns evidence of the decision, which it already emits. The -containment surface is recorded as proposed and remains `pending` under §9.2. - -Whether approvals warrant custody stronger than every other source is doctrine -work not yet done; until it is, approval evidence carries the same guarantee as -any other source and §9.6 bounds what may be claimed from it. - -**What is normative here, and what is a snapshot.** Three rules are part of this -standard and survive wherever the register lives: - -1. the two marks — `pending` and `declared-gap` (§9.1); -2. the owner-status rule — a proposed owner is not an assigned one (§2); -3. the scoring rule — `blocked-clean` MUST NOT rank below conforming (§11). - -**The table above is a snapshot, not statute.** It moves into `maturity-engine` -as soon as that engine can store state, and the `state` and owner-status columns -MUST survive the migration. A standard that is also a backlog keeps attracting -findings that belong in the register, and its review interval is far slower than -the register's real rate of change. - -### 13.1 PEP stance-map register - -Every PEP-shaped consumer publishes an unreachable-engine stance map (§6.4, -obligation 3). This is the inventory until `maturity-engine` can hold it. - -| Consumer | Stance map | Shape | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `ops-warden` | `ops-warden/pep-stance.yaml` | total per-zone; open `z0`–`z2` and unknown, closed `z3-critical`; test asserts the published map equals the shipped default (`ADR-0009`) | -| `ops-mason` | — | **not published**; catalogued PEP-shaped in §4 | - -**One row is the finding.** The aggregate of consumer stances is the estate's -real authorization behaviour, and it is currently one published map and one -absence. `access-engine` has noted it is the repository positioned to notice -when that aggregate diverges from what the policy packages say — which it cannot -do while the register is nearly empty. - -## 14. Adoption - -Status is **accepted**, on the owner's decision of 2026-08-29. - -Two things that acceptance does and does not mean, kept apart because -`ops-warden` asked for the distinction: - -| | | -| --- | --- | -| **Boundary assent** | given by the four repositories below, at the version named in each record, and undisturbed since | -| **Revision review** | each of the four reviewed v0.6 and returned findings; **every change in v0.7 is the adopted remedy of a finding they raised** | -| **Not claimed** | no repository has reviewed v0.7 *as text*. The first revision review will confirm or correct it | - -Accepting a standard nobody has re-read is a deliberate call: the estate learns -more from using it than from another round of prose refinement, and the changes -in v0.7 were requested rather than invented. Findings against the accepted text -remain welcome and are §12's normal business, not an exception. - -| Repository | Record | Outcome | -| --- | --- | --- | -| flex-auth | `FLEX-DEC-2026-001` | assent to all three items; one self-declared non-conformance; two rename conditions | -| kings-guard | `KG-DEC-2026-001` | assent; declined the offered §5 relaxation; raised §9.1 | -| ops-warden | `ADR-0010` | assent to all three; veto not exercised; offered the §5.3 amendment | -| audit-core | `AUDIT-IN-0001` | assent to the evidence half with conditions; corrected the rationale twice; raised §9.6 | - -Adoption for a repository means its `INTENT.md` declares its layer, its -ownership claims fall inside that layer, its Tooling contacts are declared under -§5, and any shared boundary has been assented to by the other side. - -**Adoption status as of 2026-08-29: seven of sixteen** estate-authored §4 -repositories have declared in their own voice — `gate-house`, `flex-auth`, -`kings-guard`, `ops-warden`, `audit-core`, `approval-engine`, `maturity-engine`. -The remaining nine — `info-tech-canon`, `net-kingdom`, `key-cape`, -`user-engine`, `tenant-engine`, `zone-engine`, `secrets-engine`, `ops-mason`, -`whitehat-security` — carry a layering review note authored by `gate-house` and -have not answered it. Those notes state a layer but do not constitute a -declaration, and this standard does not claim estate-wide adoption on their -basis. Declaration requests are open as intakes in each. - -## 15. Change log - -v0.1 → v0.2: - -1. **§5 restructured** into three sanctioned shapes. Added §5.2 conduit - (ops-warden's question, ruled) and §5.3 declared engine gap (ops-warden's - amendment, accepted). -2. **§6.2 added** — doctrine must reach the decision as an input claim or a - versioned policy rule (flex-auth's boundary drawn back, accepted). -3. **§9 added** — the catalog may not assign a capability the rules forbid - discharging; containment marked pending; degraded-mode fallback ruled into - the engine (kings-guard's finding). -4. **§11 restructured** — conformance now has three states, distinguishing a - tracked gap from an undeclared violation. -5. **§12 made normative**, with the explicit statement that an - unsatisfiability finding is a success of the loop. -6. **§13 added** — open gaps register, including the unowned approval storage - and lifecycle capability. -7. §4 catalog gained the pending mark and ops-warden's SSH certificate lane. - -v0.2 → v0.3: - -1. **§9.4 added** — approvals assigned to `approval-engine`, with the operative - state and the evidence record separated between it and `audit-core`. -2. **§9.5 added** — graded progression assigned to `maturity-engine`, closing - the §9.1 defect in gate-house's own conformance-review claim, and carrying - the guardrail that a level may never gate a decision directly. -3. §4 catalog gained both engines; gate-house's conformance-review claim now - names the engine it acts through. -4. §13 register updated: the approval hole is assigned, two new entries added. - -v0.6 → v0.7, from four reviews: - -1. **§3.4 is written.** v0.6 announced the human/agent principal separation in - §1 and §15 and left §3.4 byte-identical to v0.5 — a silent edit failure. A - rule stated about a standard in its own change log is not a rule. Found by - `kings-guard`. The same failure had also dropped two §16 entries, restored - here. -2. **§6.4 obligation 1 rewritten** — it forbade what obligation 3 blesses. A PEP - may proceed under its declared §9.3 stance provided the application of that - stance is *recorded in place of* the decision. Stricter than v0.6 where it - counts: a fail-open result is metadata, never silence. Raised by `ops-warden`. -3. **§6.4 obligation 2 rewritten** — it forbade the session-bound allow §9.7.1 - permits. Scoped to replay outside the decision's own binding and lifetime, - with the canonical request digest as the mechanical test, and negative - caching ruled permitted where the refusal is recorded and the cache lifetime - declared. Raised by `access-engine`. -4. **§6.4 obligation 3** gained the requirement that the published stance map - equal shipped behaviour, asserted by test. **§13.1** now exists as the - register §6.4 mandated and v0.6 did not implement. -5. **§9.6 gained a threat decomposition** — atomicity prevents accidental - omission; cadence and reconciliation detect the adversarial case after the - fact; nothing prevents it at a compromised source. Raised by `audit-core` - against its own proposed remedy. -6. **§9.6 cadence is now MUST for load-bearing sources**, with positive - reconciliation or a heartbeat as the required form for low-volume classes, - because rate monitoring fails exactly where the stakes are highest. -7. **§9.7.2 splits by role** — a PDP states a deadline per input class, a PEP one - at its boundary. Promotes `access-engine`'s provenance gap to a conformance - prerequisite. -8. **§3.3's Evidence row** is stated as an estate trade rather than a property, - leaving independent-recording-before-effect raisable as a declared exception. -9. **§17** moves the decision-record schema to `access-engine`, which argued it - against its own interest; `kings-guard` drafts the emission-cadence schema. -10. **§13** no longer attributes the actuation gap to `kings-guard`; it is - estate-wide. **§19 removed** — a verdict inside a standard grades the - document it lives in. **§17/§18** demoted from H1 to H2. -11. **§20 added** — the Railiance interaction boundary, on `railiance-master`'s - definitions, including that `rein-*` is not a fifth axis. - -v0.5 → v0.6, from the independent assessment of 2026-08-29: - -1. **§3.3 types the engines** — PDP, PIP, Evidence, Lifecycle, with a role - column in §4. A new engine is a PIP unless this standard says otherwise, so - "we need an engine for X" cannot drift into "X now decides". -2. **§6.4 names the enforcement point** — a PEP shape with four obligations: no - side effect without a decision record, no local recaching of the verdict, a - declared unreachable-engine stance, reconstructability. The standard had the - decision and not the gate. -3. **§9.2 replaced** — containment was marked pending against the wrong - repository. Actuation is an Engine concept, unowned, held at zero; Staff - proposes containment and never performs it. -4. **§3.4 separates the two Staff principals** — human and agent share the layer - but not blast radius: no standing credential, conduit or engine API only, - agent memory is not a state plane, every action reconstructable as the - caller's. -5. **§9.7 puts time into the model** — explicit lifetimes, revocation visibility - deadlines, consumption as a state change never inferred, and the three race - modes named. **§9.8** states what holds under partition and leaves the rest - open. -6. **§17 requires the Taxonomy artifacts** — claim, decision-record, gap-record, - and emission-cadence schemas — without which §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but - not compileable. Ownership proposed, not assigned. -7. **§18 composes the sibling standards** — how zone stance, tenancy posture, - and a credential lifecycle event each enter a decision as a claim. They were - cited in frontmatter and nowhere in the rules. -8. **§5 gained a sunset** on the uncatalogued-infrastructure carve-out, and - §5.3 **declines** a proposed fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape: - it would convert a tracked gap into a permanent allowance. -9. **§10 gained the six artifacts** a layer change must carry, written from the - `zone-engine` case, including a permission freeze during the cut. -10. **§2 lifts the observation rule** — no estate argument may cite observation - that has not happened. **§13** separates its three normative rules from the - table, which is now a snapshot due to move into `maturity-engine`. -11. **§16** the approval custody question is **decided: no**, rather than left - open. **§19** records the fitness verdict, including that the estate can - propose and decide but cannot yet watch or act. - -v0.4 → v0.5, all from review findings: - -1. **§9.1 split into two marks** — `pending` (no route, capability zero) and - `declared-gap` (route exists under §5.3, capability works and is tracked). - v0.4's single mark would have forced a false `pending` onto ops-warden's - production SSH issuance. Raised by `ops-warden`. -2. **§9.3 rewritten** — input degradation is the engine's; engine-unreachability - is necessarily the consumer's, bounded by a declared, auditable, total stance. - Contested by `flex-auth`: fail-open is not expressible by a PDP, and v0.4 - collided with `ops-warden` `ADR-0009`. -3. **§5 gained a scope rule** — "Tooling-layer system" means a §4 Tooling row; - uncatalogued infrastructure is outside §5 and recorded rather than policed. - Without it every Staff repository was in undeclared violation for writing - progress events. Raised by `ops-warden`. -4. **§9.4 requires a local outbox** — no synchronous dependency on `audit-core` - inside the state-change transaction, so an audit outage cannot block a - revocation. Raised by `audit-core`. -5. **§9.5 forbids compiling maturity levels into registry content** until - decision provenance carries a registry-snapshot digest. Raised by `flex-auth`. -6. **§9.6 gained the load-bearing / attributive distinction**, the mirror rule - that absence is not evidence of non-occurrence, the optimistic-bias - consequence for adaptive systems, and silence-as-signal. Raised by - `kings-guard` on top of `audit-core`'s original. -7. **§11 gained a fourth state** — blocked-clean, which MUST NOT rank below - conforming — and a machine-readable declaration form. Raised by `kings-guard` - and `audit-core`. -8. **§13 gained state and owner-status columns** — declared-contact versus - unowned-capability, proposed versus assented owner. `access-engine`'s - decline of authentication evidence is recorded. Raised by `kings-guard` and - `flex-auth`. -9. **§8** records the asymmetry's payoff under incomplete observation; **§12** - records that its fourth step is unstaffed; **§14** corrects the adoption - arithmetic and the status contradiction. - -Amended in place while `proposed`, 2026-08-28: §11 gained the who-must-declare -rule after a conformance sweep found the standard required an `INTENT.md` -declaration from `OpenBao`, which the estate does not author; and §14 gained the -honest adoption count. - -v0.3 → v0.4: - -1. **§4 catalog gained `audit-core`** as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 - named it as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without cataloguing it — a §11 defect in - the standard itself, raised by `audit-core`. -2. **§9.4 evidence rationale rewritten** to cite `audit-core`'s shipped - `docs/integrity.md` bound rather than its INTENT principle 6, and to state - that `tamper_evidence` is conditional on live preconditions. -3. **§9.4 gained emission atomicity** as `approval-engine`'s obligation, and the - prohibition on `audit-core` exposing an approval-validity query. -4. **§9.6 added** — evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at - source. Estate-wide; the sound and unsound forms of the claim are stated. -5. **§13** — evidence half recorded as assented with conditions; two new gaps: - stronger approval custody (unassigned) and emission atomicity - (`approval-engine`). - -## 16. Open questions - -- ~~Whether approvals warrant archival custody stronger than every other audit - source.~~ **Decided (§13): no.** Approval evidence carries the same bound as - every other source. The acute risk for approvals is *omission* — a suppressed - revocation — and archival custody does not address omission at all; emission - atomicity with a local outbox (§9.4) and a detection surface - (`GH-WP-0002-T04`) do. Leaving it open while calling the evidence half - load-bearing created a promise the archive cannot cash. If a future - requirement genuinely needs WORM or a transparency log, that is a different - store with a different owner, raised then. -- Whether SSH certificate issuance evidence is load-bearing or attributive - (§9.6). Ruled attributive here on the argument that no control branches on the - presence of a signing record; `ops-warden` asked for the ruling and the trade - is genuinely two-sided, so it is flagged rather than settled. -- Who marks an approval consumed, and at what point relative to the decision - (§9.4). `flex-auth` notes the decision precedes the action and the action - precedes consumption, so an allow rendered against an approval then never - consumed, or consumed twice by a racing caller, is a gap neither engine closes - alone. Needed before `FLEX-WP-0017` T05. -- Whether other §4 repositories are missing layer declarations; `audit-core` - flagged its own absence and asked whether the catalog needs the same - correction elsewhere. -- Whether the gap register migrates from this standard into `maturity-engine` - once that engine exists, leaving the standard to state the rules only. -- Whether Tooling warrants subdivision between third-party and homegrown. -- How a future `role-engine` divides responsibility with `access-engine`. -- Whether declared gaps need an estate-wide register rather than per-repository - declarations; ops-warden's `warden route gaps` is candidate machinery. -- Whether non-security repositories adopt the same model. The determinism cut is - not security-specific; if non-security Staff also may not hold - runtime-dependent state, the estate gets one constitution rather than a - security ghetto. -- The rest of §9.8: split brain, partial PIP reachability, and clock skew beyond - the two rules stated. -- Publication integrity of the Taxonomy layer itself. This standard demands - reconstructability of decisions while its own publication path has no digest, - freeze, or rollback discipline. -- The fitness verdict formerly at §19 now lives in - `net-kingdom/history/2026-08-29-layering-standard-assessment.md`. A grade - inside a standard of record becomes normative by adjacency and ages against the - text it grades. Raised by `access-engine`. Its two substantive points remain - live: observation in production is unstaffed (§12) and actuation has no surface - (§9.2). -- The **working companion** (`net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md`, v0.2, root of - the repository for onboarding) is the operative form of this statute. The statute governs on disagreement, and a - disagreement is a finding. The v0.1 gap `access-engine` found — publish - your stance map, but nowhere saying where, and no inventory obligation — is - fixed in v0.2 §5.3. -- How the Railiance operational axes meet this model beyond §20's first - statement, which is deliberately minimal. - ---- - -## 17. Taxonomy artifacts - -§6.2 says doctrine reaches a decision as an input claim or a versioned policy -rule. As prose that is a rule a reviewer can apply. As an interface it does not -exist, because nothing defines what a claim *is*. §11 calls itself mechanically -checkable while resting on that gap. - -Four artifacts are therefore required, owned by Taxonomy and versioned like any -standard: - -| Artifact | Contents | -| --- | --- | -| **request-claim schema** | identity, tenant, zone stance, posture, approval, maturity, assurance — each with its issuer and freshness rule | -| ~~decision-record schema~~ | **moved to `access-engine`** — see below | -| **gap-record schema** | the §5.3 fields — `capability`, `intended_owner`, `blocked_on`, `review` — plus the §13 `state` and owner-status | -| **emission-cadence declaration** | the expected rate a source publishes, so silence is a finding (§9.6) | - -Until these exist, §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but not compileable, and every -engine invents its own claim shape at its own boundary. - -**The decision-record schema is not Taxonomy's.** A decision record is the PDP's -output artifact — the one thing in the estate only `access-engine` produces — and -§2 keeps ownership in the producing repository's own `INTENT.md`. Taxonomy -authoring the schema for an artifact only one engine emits would invert the -ownership rule this standard applies everywhere else. `access-engine` publishes -it as a contract; Taxonomy holds only the shared field vocabulary the claim -schema references. - -Raised by `access-engine` **against its own interest** — the same §2 argument it -used to decline authentication evidence, applied where it takes work on rather -than off. Symmetry of that kind is what makes the ownership rule credible. - -**The emission-cadence declaration has a drafter.** `kings-guard` is its only -consumer, cannot implement silence-as-signal without it, and has offered to draft -it against `qonto-assistant` and hand it to whichever Taxonomy repository takes -ownership — rather than inventing a local shape, which is the drift §17 exists to -prevent. Accepted as a draft; ownership still rests with Taxonomy. - -**Ownership is proposed, not assigned.** `info-tech-canon` holds ecosystem-wide -semantic contracts and `net-kingdom` holds NetKingdom standards of record; the -split between them for these four artifacts is theirs to draw, and §2 keeps -ownership in the owning repository's `INTENT.md`. Neither has assented. - -## 18. Composition with the sibling standards - -The related-standards list has been frontmatter and little else. If the -following sentences cannot be written, the list is decoration — so they are -written here rather than in the siblings. - -**Zone stance** (`security-zones_v0.1`). A zone answers which scrutiny a -workload has qualified for; membership is `zone-engine`'s. The *effect* of a -zone on a decision belongs in a versioned `access-engine` policy package, never -in registry content — that ruling is zone-engine's §5, and §6.1 is its -generalization. Zone stance therefore enters a decision as a **claim on the -request or a rule in the package**, and a decision that turned on a zone must -name the package version that read it. - -**Tenancy posture** (`tenancy-posture_v0.1`). Posture is a bounded security-state -input, published by its owner and never a privilege source (§8). It enters as a -**claim**, carries its own freshness, and the §8 asymmetry binds it: posture may -tighten a decision and may never loosen one. A posture too stale to trust is a -missing claim, and a missing claim is not permission. - -**Credential lifecycle** (`credential-management_v0.2`). Issuance, rotation, and -revocation are `secrets-engine`'s and `OpenBao`'s, downstream of a decision — a -credential is an artifact of authority, never its source. A lifecycle event -becomes an **input** to a later decision as a claim (this credential is current, -this lease is bound to this task), never a side channel that changes an outcome -without appearing in the decision record. Revocation visibility is bounded by -§9.7. - -Each of the three composes the same way, which is the point: **facts arrive as -claims, effects live in versioned policy, and anything that changes an outcome -appears in the decision record.** - ---- - -## 20. The Railiance interaction boundary - -Operations is not NetKingdom's. Workload operations are organized by -**Railiance**, whose framework repository is `railiance-master`, and NetKingdom -provides the security and approval framework those operations consume. This -section states the boundary as it stands today. It is expected to evolve, and it -is written here so that evolution is visible rather than inferred. - -Definitions are `railiance-master`'s and are restated, not authored, here. - -### 20.1 What Railiance organizes - -A **workload** is a managed running deployable. Human commands, credential -patterns, broker actions, approvals, and infrastructure resources that are not -themselves deployables **are not workloads** — which is why an approval object -(§9.4) is not a Railiance axis and never becomes one. - -Every workload is operated through four composable axes, each answering a -different question about the same workload: - -| Prefix | Axis | Question | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `railiance-*` | ownership | Who owns this capability? | -| `rail-*` | execution contract | How does this workload run? | -| `rapp-*` | managed package | What exactly is packaged and operated? | -| `reef-*` | substrate | Where is it bound, and as what operational reality? | - -`rein-*` is **not a fifth axis**. Reins are `glas-harness` agent-harness -backends; the name echoes `rail-*` analogically, not taxonomically. Agentic -session semantics — session loops, tool policy, harness routing, model selection -— belong to `glas-harness`. When a rein is installed and operated as a managed -service it is a workload like any other, packaged and bound through the four -axes above. - -### 20.2 What holds today - -For any Railiance consumer of NetKingdom security, without exception: - -1. Authorization decisions come from `access-engine` and from nowhere else (§6). -2. Approvals are objects in `approval-engine`, consumed as claims (§9.4). -3. Credentials are materialized by `secrets-engine` **after** a decision, never - as a substitute for one. -4. Evidence goes to `audit-core` under the bound in §9.6. -5. Anything causing a protected side effect is **PEP-shaped** and owes the four - obligations in §6.4 — including a published unreachable-engine stance in the - §13.1 register. - -### 20.3 What is not settled - -The mapping between the axes and this model is deliberately thin, because -guessing it would be worse than admitting it: - -- A **`rapp-*`** is the most likely *resource* a decision is rendered about, but - nothing states its identity form in a request claim. -- A **`rail-*`** describes how a workload runs and is therefore where PEP shape - is most likely to live — but §6.4 obligations attach to repositories, and a - rail is a contract, so whether a rail can *carry* an obligation is unwritten. -- A **`reef-*`** answers where a workload is bound, which is adjacent to a - security zone (`security-zones_v0.1`) without being one. `zone-engine` records - that a reef capping availability for everything bound to it is a canon - composition problem. That composition is unwritten. -- The **`railiance-*` ownership axis** names who owns a capability, which is - adjacent to the principal a decision is rendered for. Adjacent is not equal, - and no rule connects them. -- **`glas-harness` and reins** hold tool policy and session semantics for agents, - while §3.4 rule 2 holds that an agent acts only through a conduit or an engine - API. Those two must compose, and neither side may treat its own half as - sufficient. That seam is the most consequential of the five, because it is - where "tool availability is not permission" is actually enforced or lost. - -### 20.4 How this boundary changes - -An interaction boundary between two frameworks is owned by neither alone. -Changes to §20 require assent from `railiance-master` for the axis definitions -and from `glas-harness` for the session and tool-policy seam, on the same terms -as any other boundary in this standard (§10). NetKingdom states what a consumer -owes; it does not define what a rail, rapp, reef, or rein *is*. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/validation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 34488db..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-layer-v07-immutable-publication/validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,580 +0,0 @@ -{ - "documents_built": 73, - "served_v07_sha256": "7d7a38a8c3b9fff65b46280fcd5723eff77dc9d0784f871bb35f718bc4e8c0e7", - "built_v07_immutable_sha256": "7d7a38a8c3b9fff65b46280fcd5723eff77dc9d0784f871bb35f718bc4e8c0e7", - "exact_served_html_preserved": true, - "immutable_original_source_revision": "ce198fc2905687ea90a2892346b6860281ac87f8", - "canonical_source_revision": "0e17d956ab45f8c4a0163b70749490c414e54e67", - "canonical_superseded_notice": true, - "v08_accepted_revision_present": true, - "conflicting_existing_immutable_refused_without_write": true, - "original_failed_clean_page_sha256": "10a7f7f721f90a903bb4dc4aa7613536207be2fd71a29460a86d3159b8c8eecd", - 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}, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/published-ci-repair-native-outcome.json", - "sha256": "81a9115550b22d2ec1079e178383439601931d0658bc24a87ba8409205693bdc" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/published-receipt.json", - "sha256": "2f84959e36d442860fb2b5a5817bb707c4f8372797a3ef8dd0d5cab956af86ce" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/risk-assessment.md", - "sha256": "030a161d3fe0ee7c141ced8ef24f37c85bcfb6379ece4b838b329047ae569da0" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/rollback.yaml", - "sha256": "a859b68d9e5c1bc94ef90c286c183c53fc09473572fbd017604383fb8828fa7d" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/server-dry-run.json", - "sha256": "9384b00e4d10eefbb18c4dbba2f7e58eae01d02e2acd5fa41b243c1b475b4d0e" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/validation.json", - "sha256": "2fc86e37f5e0df4bb18820697ff71ce9258176cd25c9ff005c3fb4b6f970c715" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-published-readback-proposal/verify-dry-run.py", - "sha256": "de88e7d1e33673a69f64d865e02464baa64b1f6729379c4f6e9065e27e911028" - }, - { - "repo": "rapp-user-engine", - "path": "workplans/RAPP-USER-ENGINE-WP-0004-published-readback-rollout.md", - "sha256": "083f7cfcf7f45387a72e28c76a70f2ae8ff8607314265f830907ca7bbf100742" - }, - { - "repo": "risk-nexus", - "path": "findings/RISK-F-0016-user-engine-os-runtime-findings.md", - "sha256": "caea6a4232e2b73bc24756721c947016ca7ce0e4b8500ac204b2436e372aea26" - } - ], - "owner_source_hashes": [ - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/AGENTS.md", - "sha256": "065d47b7bdbfe829672a2a6161a7f8cf243237a1210fb61d82f153fa37f22131" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/INTENT.md", - "sha256": "fd2ba8dff9dfd5583ec6d8b0348f273bfe00c59923b5d5d47cd22b1fb4658c54" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md", - "sha256": "06374445ca888549f1bf79527d1345d94918d7a7ec363160d8427d0e7a31d643" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md", - "sha256": "3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/INTENT.md", - "sha256": "8aa0f276e0879d3545338727188a1fd5af973c43acbfa986a135b20979ec7ba4" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/src/user_engine/application_access.py", - "sha256": "798f180474d98e1c6abacc7b8bfba3184d40ecb77d9ca90f6526cd4f774cf363" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/src/user_engine/adapters/application_access.py", - "sha256": "adf1fac707446f41b5859ba5102e820cd88f60af5daf20a42f13dfa2067d5481" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/src/user_engine/adapters/flex_auth.py", - "sha256": "73d645b7b37904ebfe0df6f7ed397b74b4c47f505cd64a30c39e60717ce71455" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/src/user_engine/web.py", - "sha256": "c5fbd412102238219f3b231557815fb30c0a7f822c28a371bcffc63076456a14" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/rapp-user-engine/AGENTS.md", - "sha256": "458931a839e65f752f265a332a54522aff9cb65868c5cc1531479850b4496d5e" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/informed_decision/intake.py", - "sha256": "a733b4b608b9ea90b2c8293901aa14388a0bf0d3719f121038bfdcc1faca2038" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/informed_decision/memo.py", - "sha256": "697058863a4e6de2c143a2433eaaf5e15e5e7375dc5459af6911b146567e8b5d" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/informed_decision/lifecycle_commands.py", - "sha256": "783ec451dd7ef33dc0cfd72c1633ea5208dfd463afeaa0b68d279f156a9b0828" - } - ], - "conditions": [ - "same-ServiceAccount/audience projection is not proven authority isolation disclosed in packet and risk assessment; regenerate hashes and obtain amended exact review", - "strict fresh preflight exact2uniqueobjectidentities and intendedNPpeer, no zip truncation/duplicate names acceptance", - "explicit human conditional44HIGHrisk+exactrollout disposition", - "manual review/renewal or rollback by dateddeadline; no automaticcontrollerclaim", - "native actualcatalogue/consumer tests before task closure" - ], - "knowledge_orientation": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "source_status": "withheld; actual NetKingdom owner sources reviewed" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-user-readback-integration-review/review.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-user-readback-integration-review/review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 63688a8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-user-readback-integration-review/review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -# Independent NetKingdom integration review of User Engine readback R2 - -Role: NetKingdom integration technical review, independently performed by custodian-codex worker infd_image_preparation. This is neither RiskNexus grading nor human residual-risk acceptance, live rollout approval or an autonomous authority grant. Exact reviewed source packet manifest SHA256: `3faf8e2b9b5c04b0e280268106519f52a3ff10eadba1c594c1fcca14630f3b98` (22 files). Disposition: technical agreement conditional on the credential-separation disclosure refinement below and existing execution gates. The original revision remains reviewed evidence; any amended memo/packet hashes require explicit amended-hash confirmation. - -The packet honestly retains a failed clean-scan gate: actual immutable f239bbf image scan SHA17b793f13bd19fa87bba840ced3c9c40a78a78feda569019e92c347dc7f3e76a contains44 HIGH package/CVE occurrences,8 distinct CVEs,0 CRITICAL and0 fixed HIGH versions for scanned packages. Independent recount agrees. Every primary Debian tracker record was checked on2026-10-11; the stated vulnerable Trixie/unfixed-package observations and upstream fix availability agree. Privileged utility prerequisites constrain plausible paths; they do not prove unreachability. The bounded missing homed/Archive::Tar observations, possible denial of service/application compromise/mounted credential exposure, unchanged old-image uncertainty, and unpriced security incident consequences remain explicit. No scanner severity is downgraded by this review. - -The change follows owner intent: User Engine remains a PIP/domain and integration owner; KeyCape owns authentication/client identity, Access Engine remains the sole PDP, and User Engine's local catalogue only joins matching client issuer/id and protected-system registration. The readback cache includes session, issuer, subject and tenant, bounds reuse by lifetime, retries unavailable results and renders expired/missing/non-allow results unavailable. Readback is used for advisory display; the protected mutation adapter still calls its separate enforcement endpoint. The packet correctly leaves catalogue and actual admitted consumer tests open; synthetic policy fixtures are not a real human login/MFA receipt. This source review does not assert that catalogue records already exist or that native consumer acceptance is complete. - -Required disclosure refinement: the readback token and existing enforcement token are both Kubernetes projections for the same User Engine ServiceAccount and audience `flex-auth`, expiration3600s. Separate files/projections and distinct HTTP adapters are routing/rotation separation, not demonstrated cryptographic authority isolation. Tokens may be substitutable across existing provider registrations for the same subject/audience; this proposal neither tests nor prevents that substitution. Its statement that no enforcement grant changes is valid only as unchanged admission/policy, not as a new token incapable of enforcement. State this directly in both decision packet and risk assessment and regenerate the exact memo/intake/lifecycle hashes. No credential values, token fingerprints or secret metadata were read. - -Candidate and rollback hashes match; both contain exactly Deployment/user-engine and NetworkPolicy/user-engine-runtime in namespace user-engine. Independent comparison confirms the only NP delta is one conjunctive namespace+provider-pod peer on TCP8080; ingress and all prior peers remain identical. The Deployment retains Recreate/one replica, resource requests/limits, database/Secret references and enforcement mounts. The projected readback token and corresponding env/mount plus exact immutable image are the documented deltas. Baseline server-dry-run receipt shows the expected two identities and scoped changes at00:28:18Z; no mutation occurred. No new Secret, ServiceAccount, catalogue seed, policy grant, provider deployment or database write is within the rollout approval. - -Fresh preflight must assert exact object counts and unique identities for baseline/candidate/server-admitted objects, exact approved image/hash, unchanged declared baseline/provider readiness/admission and native management ownership. Treat NetworkPolicy additions by their exact new peer, not an unrestricted `spec/egress` allowance. The preserved checker uses zip/list-to-name normalization and a whole-egress change path; the observed current receipt is complete, but that helper alone must not accept a truncated future response or duplicate names. These strict checks fit the existing packet's mandatory two-object/diff stop conditions. Reobserve requested CPU/headroom;3460m/4000m is historical, and no request/surge increase is included. - -Execution expires2026-10-12T23:59:59Z; approved residual-risk disposition requires review/renewal or the exact rollback by2026-10-18T23:59:59Z. The service has no controller enforcing either deadline, and expiring projected tokens are routinely renewed while the pod runs. Credential TTL therefore does not end the trial or replace manual risk-review responsibility. Follow the existing supervised record and native change gate; require explicit informed human disposition for both the residual OS risk and exact two-object rollout. No source acceptance or technical review substitutes for it. - -Rollback is one coordinated two-object restoration to the exact old immutable image/configuration and prior NP, preserving database/enforcement custody. It must be used on failed readiness/enforcement/unexpected effects and at manual review expiry without renewal; verify recovered readiness, old image/NP and enforcement behavior. The old image is not assumed clean. Deployment readiness, source/CI checks and this technical receipt cannot finish USER-WP0026-T03 or USER-WP0028-T02 without actual admitted consumer/catalogue acceptance. - -Primary exposure references: [mount](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-76642), [nsenter](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-78408), [subdir](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-78409), [bind mount](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-78410), [ACL](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-54369), [ncurses](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-69720), [systemd](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-16742), [Perl](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-9538). diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-user-readback-integration-review/validation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-user-readback-integration-review/validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index af9c2ee..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-user-readback-integration-review/validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "manifest_sha256": "3faf8e2b9b5c04b0e280268106519f52a3ff10eadba1c594c1fcca14630f3b98", - "manifest_files_digest_verified": 22, - "intake_valid_offline": true, - "submission_digest": "sha256:a1aa280ee929f1c88e7b88570ad5b173aff23dc255c554b62c6e7397662d59e4", - "memo_typed_valid": true, - "all_12_packet_document_hashes_and_actual_files_match": true, - "all_12_lifecycle_documents_valid": true, - "candidate_rollback_exact_two_object_identity_match": true, - "NP_adds_only_one_conjunctive_TCP8080_provider_rule": true, - "Recreate_replica_and_resource_requests_unchanged": true, - "readback_and_enforcement_same_serviceaccount_audience": true, - "independent_native_action_executed": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/backup-command-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/backup-command-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 44d4484..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/backup-command-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:51:39.050158+00:00", - "read_only": true, - "jobs": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "lldap-backup", - "uid": "6f150dff-3ef9-4a35-8c20-cfedf3fc3d0c", - "images": [ - "nouchka/sqlite3:latest" - ], - "command_sha256": "7aad6525ff542febe20aa23a4a9d57754014b291b56cff8c1d35a9c85bc7d7de", - "pvc_refs": [ - "lldap-data" - ], - "command_mentions_enckey": false, - "command_mentions_private_audit_key": false, - "command_mentions_public_audit_key": false, - "command_mentions_s3_or_webdav": false, - "coverage_semantics": "Command-string observations only; neither success nor complete off-host recovery is inferred." - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "authelia-backup", - "uid": "b00880db-acbb-413d-ad0c-bce2354449b6", - "images": [ - "nouchka/sqlite3:latest" - ], - "command_sha256": "2f2cd0b65e840edbfa5a618d52286035bc769167a29540646fae11c89f6e69fc", - "pvc_refs": [ - "authelia-data" - ], - "command_mentions_enckey": false, - "command_mentions_private_audit_key": false, - "command_mentions_public_audit_key": false, - "command_mentions_s3_or_webdav": false, - "coverage_semantics": "Command-string observations only; neither success nor complete off-host recovery is inferred." - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea-backup", - "uid": "8bce84b6-a10a-445d-a3c2-bfd2e3ab8d8c", - "images": [ - "busybox:stable" - ], - "command_sha256": "b4146f4b110ae3448f86552da2087b6c612b920ce33041d2cc9c2287c5287eaf", - "pvc_refs": [ - "privacyidea-data" - ], - "command_mentions_enckey": true, - "command_mentions_private_audit_key": false, - "command_mentions_public_audit_key": false, - "command_mentions_s3_or_webdav": false, - "coverage_semantics": "Command-string observations only; neither success nor complete off-host recovery is inferred." - } - ], - "offhost_asset_coverage_confirmed": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/backup-schedule-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/backup-schedule-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 214fb90..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/backup-schedule-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:51:17.348168+00:00", - "read_only": true, - "rows": [ - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea-backup", - "uid": "8bce84b6-a10a-445d-a3c2-bfd2e3ab8d8c", - "schedule": "30 3 * * *", - "suspend": false, - "last_successful_time": "2026-10-15T03:30:05Z" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "authelia-backup", - "uid": "b00880db-acbb-413d-ad0c-bce2354449b6", - "schedule": "15 3 * * *", - "suspend": false, - "last_successful_time": "2026-10-15T03:15:04Z" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "lldap-backup", - "uid": "6f150dff-3ef9-4a35-8c20-cfedf3fc3d0c", - "schedule": "0 3 * * *", - "suspend": false, - "last_successful_time": "2026-10-15T03:00:06Z" - } - ], - "offsite_retrieval_verified": false, - "current_credential_validity_verified": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/caller-source-inventory.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/caller-source-inventory.json deleted file mode 100644 index 71fab68..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/caller-source-inventory.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,476 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.bootstrap-caller-inventory.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T22:29:09.131605+00:00", - "scope": "all current .sh/.py non-test files under sso-mfa/bootstrap and sso-mfa/k8s, Makefile, console, delivery copier and recovery transport tool plus two bounded provider metadata inventory helpers plus bounded fixed-object ciphertext fetch and isolated PostgreSQL recovery check plus proposed full identity backup profile and metadata-only preparer", - "entry_count": 93, - "entries": [ - { - "path": "Makefile", - "sha256": "5d2114f6141bb8504c5c780044302126c07958a5732afdb0d0c0218a4f84210e", - "classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py", - "sha256": "ea9c3418ed00527b9019ab9893f1f3c9fe29d0697f1f0c879e28fdbae373889b", - "classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh", - "sha256": "a70dba396484b2a353a39349c3d3719f7b6695b9f0e35025ef79e3db0ec2ff53", - "classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh", - "sha256": "cc27c4f3969c292a913a0ae325cd0d4ec2665f9fffbbd1eb1c5f73b08e398a32", - "classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh", - "sha256": "09b387d3555ce2beaeb8d7f000c2d52a1ffea274c793f30bce80a8f3ef5dc2f8", - "classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh", - "sha256": "f0fe0b885fd22f4789baa86cc2438272700aff8634cfa6b27d55c2c860c9f36d", - "classification": "diagnostic; 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source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/verify_mfa.py", - "sha256": "118d0052433edb85dd53e3c988943392f59d0aa00641d45f8ff3676a15f8af19", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh", - "sha256": "2e1cbde1d2aa2ce9f27685baf93137d5f13d33a77421a2fba1649f874f2b7f48", - "classification": "retired entry point; refuses before credential/cluster access" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh", - "sha256": "96da30c4eca28615685ff384bbc7d00d81c7562e8e572a3ad54c3cc6fdd297ca", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t02.sh", - "sha256": "7a9fe613fc83841397f2e3b0b4c26c5464d7b903d5e56a83ec786e2289719b24", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t03.sh", - "sha256": "7b3a888ae20394b761d7cd9cf1bc81f273813794a3002202951b061bd6c27963", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh", - "sha256": "74128536919f79f17bffc107678718848c4ca095de06140cdc453e68953aabd1", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t05.sh", - "sha256": "bb226bad1e5fb60a5d6f87fa67ecee2d6af84d6d6a84fa02d9839d8bca58a197", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t06.sh", - "sha256": "717317c1d51f7c3361f3b711d79cae52019c36cd6c397e5fa61f07eaad3632e2", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t07.sh", - "sha256": "026406ff1fec9e4bf542741c08002c45ea8a94a4ce5a50980665b601485882df", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t08.sh", - "sha256": "7efe14c0d71f2c846434d19f8d05702d69d3c40a617a700b08fe13b3764d0650", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-scaleway.py", - "sha256": "a219df205708fa4ed44b763a418585d63c820c25434bc0fd14e805eb5c2f79d3", - "classification": "read-only bounded owner backup metadata; existing caller/custody only; no age key or backup content read" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py", - "sha256": "673f9b17fb2f3fef6fcdb5c50a2bcca69e3df3157a9e5582a2d995c6b87640b5", - "classification": "read-only bounded owner backup metadata; existing caller/custody only; no age key or backup content read" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py", - "sha256": "885b05a2011e711228e42e316bda70bbe0d97d481383d61aa8469d0f10452370", - "classification": "diagnostic; structural observations do not prove recovery or revoke credentials" - }, - { - "path": "tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py", - "sha256": "e9419ab1de0725b12b06fc29098c49584cb8acf47ec0ca09d552915f964a2c48", - "classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh", - "sha256": "7c0fb6b066e4ad8b103e75551beecd5de65a4bbb22570d95b42e5da6395e2dfc", - "classification": "retired entry point; refuses before credential/cluster access" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/fetch-privacyidea-backup.py", - "sha256": "233160e1206643a5cf7ad05141d733f0a75aff651190e27f77515a124ff0a59f", - "classification": "bounded off-host transfer / isolated database drill; actual recovery acceptance requires operator execution" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py", - "sha256": "90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4", - "classification": "bounded off-host transfer / isolated database drill; actual recovery acceptance requires operator execution" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1", - "classification": "missing identity backup coverage proposal and metadata-only preparation; no live capture/grant/delivery capability" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "176c1f2f9111c2c51503212deb162274609d5e53bfe03d7319e19e44c5e09500", - "classification": "missing identity backup coverage proposal and metadata-only preparation; no live capture/grant/delivery capability" - } - ], - "source_inventory_complete_for_declared_scope": true, - "native_exercise_or_full_security_acceptance_claimed": false, - "remaining": "T02 legacy identity/credential disposition, provider enforcement and owner acceptance; T03 exact off-host asset/key lineage and native recovery. Historical exposure rotation stays founder-deferred." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/database-drill-preparation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/database-drill-preparation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 26b661b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/database-drill-preparation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T22:08:27.470032+00:00", - "operator_reported_key_check_passed": true, - "private_key_received_by_agent": false, - "actual_ciphertext_decryption_verified": true, - "transfer_receipt": "privacyidea-transfer-r1.json", - "transfer_envelope_exit_code": 0, - "transfer_session_revoked_and_cleaned": true, - "source_tests": { - "passed": 23, - "command": "NK49_RUN_DISPOSABLE_POSTGRES_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py tests/test_storage_share_inventory.py tests/test_scaleway_backup_inventory.py", - "duration_seconds": 8.54, - "data": "synthetic database and fresh disposable age keys only", - "includes_native_postgres_restore_and_cleanup": true - }, - "pending_human_command": null, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false, - "sources": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py", - "sha256": "90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/fetch-privacyidea-backup.py", - "sha256": "233160e1206643a5cf7ad05141d733f0a75aff651190e27f77515a124ff0a59f" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py", - "sha256": "ea977b0d3368fb14f6a7a252c24cc5cb9915022afa3dca61c80952e7489bd0e5" - } - ], - "execution_receipt": "privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/database-drill-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/database-drill-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 85754ca..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/database-drill-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T22:24:49.717396+00:00", - "receipt": "privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json", - "receipt_sha256": "c72dc3ababcc3ef3d7485a434128daf71e0ee58a8118e633fb09fed516f4b980", - "source_and_transfer_binding_verified": true, - "retained_ciphertext_digest_rechecked": true, - "operator_reported_success": true, - "independent_custody_basis": "Operator reports independently held railiance-backup key; attended temporary-key drill decrypted the fetched ciphertext. Agent never received private key material.", - "docker_nk49_container_inventory_empty": true, - "full_identity_recovery_proven": false, - "operator_reports_no_known_full_identity_bundle": true, - "next_work_authorized": "Prepare missing backup coverage; no blanket production restore or credential rotation.", - "coverage_preparation": "identity-backup-preparation-r1.json", - "operator_coverage_decision_id": "ed20023f-0168-421d-be86-460391339876" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-preparation-r1.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-preparation-r1.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8a26627..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-preparation-r1.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-backup-preparation.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_admitted", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T22:32:41.149409+00:00", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "profile_sha256": "176c1f2f9111c2c51503212deb162274609d5e53bfe03d7319e19e44c5e09500", - "source_sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1", - "bindings": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "lldap", - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "generation": 7, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "lldap-data", - "uid": "0a06b65a-e7b3-42d3-916e-e74dbe5fc7da" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "lldap-secrets" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "authelia", - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "generation": 28, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "authelia-data", - "uid": "86826554-b014-4df4-8b28-866aa64f6413" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "authelia-secrets", - "authelia-smtp" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [ - "authelia-config" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "keycape", - "uid": "99ddd83c-cb3f-4847-bcf8-35f1aa87627f", - "generation": 65, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "keycape-authentication-policy", - "uid": "423f558f-8c11-4edf-956b-243559df4a8e" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "keycape-approval-engine-operator-client", - "keycape-config", - "keycape-factor-read", - "keycape-informed-decision-sitting-requester-client", - "keycape-rapp-qonto-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-requester-client" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "deployment": "privacyidea", - "uid": "58c7f96d-61cb-4dd4-bca2-54661c0ac375", - "generation": 11, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea-data", - "uid": "65650fc1-02d8-4c0f-84fc-e0015c8f3ed9" - }, - { - "name": "privacyidea-logs", - "uid": "39fa90d9-bc54-4a03-a0d6-ae85165e0cb9" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "privacyidea-config" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [ - "factor-recovery-01119187d90d7b76", - "keycape-onboarding-9465e5e0b98f7986", - "privacyidea-cfg" - ] - } - ], - "secret_values_read": false, - "backup_captured": false, - "uploaded": false, - "runtime_changed": false, - "credential_grant_created": false, - "owner_admission_required": [ - "Railiance owner accepts exact read/capture executor, immutable helper images, PVC access and task-scoped caller attribution; no production stop/restart inferred", - "NetKingdom/service owners accept full asset manifest, original key preservation, consistency interval, bounded recovery environment and native acceptance", - "Platform/reef-storage admits both new archive prefixes, immutable create/readback, scoped publisher custody and current quota/headroom; current application archive profiles do not include net-kingdom", - "Resolve every referenced credential through encrypted recovery or an independent owner reissue path; no undocumented grant propagation", - "Implement and test capture/sealing/transfer adapters against this new profile before live execution; existing bootstrap tar checker is insufficient", - "Retrieve by immutable object/version from each admitted provider; digest check, attended independent-key decryption, native service recovery, failed-key case and verified cleanup", - "Only then enable recurring capture/alerts and measured retention; preserve T02 legacy provider-credential and deferred-rotation boundaries" - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/legacy-runtime-reference-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/legacy-runtime-reference-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3a37f6c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/legacy-runtime-reference-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:55:09.988184+00:00", - "scope": "deployment,statefulset,daemonset,cronjob,pod in sso,mfa,user-engine; not all estate clients or issued provider credentials", - "resources_scanned": 34, - "references": [ - { - "namespace": "user-engine", - "kind": "Deployment", - "name": "user-engine", - "uid": "e1c4274a-4b6d-4ea2-b619-e09630b745b0", - "secret_names": [ - "user-engine-delivery" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "user-engine", - "kind": "Pod", - "name": "user-engine-6c894f6b76-bcvpf", - "uid": "ebe2bab8-67b2-4f8d-afea-74b0cdc9d829", - "secret_names": [ - "user-engine-delivery" - ] - } - ], - "secret_values_exported": false, - "provider_revocation_proven": false, - "legacy_tokens_may_have_other_consumers": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/legacy-secret-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/legacy-secret-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0bf4971..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/legacy-secret-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,149 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:50:28.605750+00:00", - "operation": "read-only Secret metadata output", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "rows": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "authelia-secrets", - "uid": "2e6c32d4-4178-4c1e-9813-14362d330eaf", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:29:22Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "authelia-smtp", - "uid": "5d34559e-8378-4065-b10b-f1ea046b73d5", - "created_at": "2026-10-06T18:30:54Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "identity-provisioner-token", - "uid": "f8449bb9-0c87-46a9-a012-2c2fce9d9b6a", - "created_at": "2026-07-27T23:02:12Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-approval-engine-operator-client", - "uid": "599a61a7-8244-4618-8c44-6473195bbe4e", - "created_at": "2026-09-09T00:09:47Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-config", - "uid": "2e94519d-1550-41c7-9701-2efe47fe1fd3", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:36:59Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-factor-read", - "uid": "ee07b0d9-bccf-464a-9d1b-e38d8d577985", - "created_at": "2026-09-13T14:15:49Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-informed-decision-sitting-requester-client", - "uid": "361d439b-3e11-43b4-842f-cf2028acd4a4", - "created_at": "2026-09-15T18:28:30Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-pi-token", - "uid": "1d459ab6-8b42-454d-9220-0fa2ffe4e819", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:51:32Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-rapp-qonto-client", - "uid": "d2a06c1b-8836-4ce4-9e3a-feb3604fadae", - "created_at": "2026-07-27T18:08:12Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client", - "uid": "eaa28bdf-04af-4e4e-a1fc-fe395c7689a7", - "created_at": "2026-09-09T00:09:47Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client", - "uid": "c5986225-bbcc-40c8-b55d-79c62648a46f", - "created_at": "2026-10-07T00:10:55Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape-secrets-engine-requester-client", - "uid": "8a279143-5553-439a-a529-1fc928010062", - "created_at": "2026-09-14T00:23:36Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "lldap-secrets", - "uid": "c6a9e6be-5bb5-47e6-9faa-06b8d72afec3", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:29:16Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "lldap-tls", - "uid": "1ab2442f-4c57-450c-aadd-dc4b4e3eb938", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:44:05Z", - "type": "kubernetes.io/tls" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea-auditkeys", - "uid": "6f0b191f-4e52-4122-9df7-31f791d124f8", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:49:48Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea-config", - "uid": "3cd352c9-4f8e-4954-8181-d80fc9f62e0a", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:29:26Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea-enckey", - "uid": "b3ee83fe-cacc-4ab3-a110-baac56328e94", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:49:46Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea-trigger-admin", - "uid": "d1c643be-672d-4d13-8e46-3a58cb37ae39", - "created_at": "2026-03-25T00:50:53Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "user-engine", - "name": "identity-provisioner-client", - "uid": "3ac5147a-df73-42b5-b596-c467c0571d23", - "created_at": "2026-07-27T23:02:12Z", - "type": "Opaque" - }, - { - "namespace": "user-engine", - "name": "user-engine-delivery", - "uid": "2560f99d-621c-4f35-9472-c64ec3f6627e", - "created_at": "2026-08-13T13:02:50Z", - "type": "Opaque" - } - ], - "revocation_proven": false, - "deletion_performed": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/live-workload-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/live-workload-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9bdf786..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/live-workload-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,234 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:45:27.835371+00:00", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "read_only": true, - "deployments": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "lldap", - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "generation": 7, - "observed_generation": 7, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "lldap", - "image": "lldap/lldap:stable", - "secret_key_refs": [ - { - "env": "LLDAP_JWT_SECRET", - "secret": "lldap-secrets", - "key": "LLDAP_JWT_SECRET" - }, - { - "env": "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS", - "secret": "lldap-secrets", - "key": "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" - } - ] - } - ], - "volume_refs": [ - { - "volume": "data", - "pvc": "lldap-data" - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "authelia", - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "generation": 28, - "observed_generation": 28, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "authelia", - "image": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "secret_key_refs": [] - } - ], - "volume_refs": [ - { - "volume": "smtp", - "secret": "authelia-smtp" - }, - { - "volume": "secrets", - "secret": "authelia-secrets" - }, - { - "volume": "data", - "pvc": "authelia-data" - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "keycape", - "uid": "99ddd83c-cb3f-4847-bcf8-35f1aa87627f", - "generation": 65, - "observed_generation": 65, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "keycape", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010", - "secret_key_refs": [ - { - "env": "KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET", - "secret": "keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client", - "key": "client-secret" - }, - { - "env": "KEYCAPE_RAPP_QONTO_CLIENT_SECRET", - "secret": "keycape-rapp-qonto-client", - "key": "client-secret" - }, - { - "env": "KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET", - "secret": "keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client", - "key": "client-secret" - }, - { - "env": "KEYCAPE_APPROVAL_ENGINE_OPERATOR_CLIENT_SECRET", - "secret": "keycape-approval-engine-operator-client", - "key": "client-secret" - }, - { - "env": "KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_REQUESTER_CLIENT_SECRET", - "secret": "keycape-secrets-engine-requester-client", - "key": "client-secret" - }, - { - "env": "KEYCAPE_INFORMED_DECISION_SITTING_REQUESTER_CLIENT_SECRET", - "secret": "keycape-informed-decision-sitting-requester-client", - "key": "client-secret" - } - ] - } - ], - "volume_refs": [ - { - "volume": "authentication-policy", - "pvc": "keycape-authentication-policy" - }, - { - "volume": "factor-token", - "secret": "keycape-factor-read" - }, - { - "volume": "config-secret", - "secret": "keycape-config" - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "privacyidea", - "uid": "58c7f96d-61cb-4dd4-bca2-54661c0ac375", - "generation": 11, - "observed_generation": 11, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea", - "image": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker:3.12.2", - "secret_key_refs": [] - }, - { - "name": "factor-recovery", - "image": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "secret_key_refs": [] - } - ], - "volume_refs": [ - { - "volume": "data", - "pvc": "privacyidea-data" - }, - { - "volume": "logs", - "pvc": "privacyidea-logs" - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "identity-provisioner", - "uid": "13d2fadb-6929-4fa9-b2ba-635ab8572f54", - "generation": 18, - "observed_generation": 18, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "provisioner", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:bafb48604d60f8bb98f58d27019df21d17966efcb742cfc11a6a5ab87f3f9d1f", - "secret_key_refs": [ - { - "env": "LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD", - "secret": "lldap-secrets", - "key": "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" - }, - { - "env": "PROVISIONER_SERVICE_TOKEN", - "secret": "identity-provisioner-token", - "key": "token" - } - ] - } - ], - "volume_refs": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "user-engine", - "name": "user-engine", - "uid": "e1c4274a-4b6d-4ea2-b619-e09630b745b0", - "generation": 76, - "observed_generation": 76, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "portal", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/user-engine@sha256:1e6547c40c93c49f01438edcf76c20f561ccebc110220bae020723505aa56c70", - "secret_key_refs": [ - { - "env": "USER_ENGINE_DATABASE_URL", - "secret": "user-engine-pg-app", - "key": "uri" - }, - { - "env": "USER_ENGINE_PROXY_SECRET", - "secret": "user-engine-runtime", - "key": "proxy-secret" - }, - { - "env": "USER_ENGINE_EVENT_TOKEN", - "secret": "user-engine-delivery", - "key": "event-token" - }, - { - "env": "USER_ENGINE_MAIL_TOKEN", - "secret": "user-engine-scoped-mail", - "key": "token" - }, - { - "env": "USER_ENGINE_REGISTRATION_VERIFICATION_TOKEN", - "secret": "user-engine-scoped-mail", - "key": "token" - }, - { - "env": "USER_ENGINE_PROVISIONING_TOKEN", - "secret": "identity-provisioner-client", - "key": "token" - } - ] - } - ], - "volume_refs": [] - } - ], - "secret_resources_read": false, - "deployment_literal_env_values_exported": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/offsite-discovery-summary.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/offsite-discovery-summary.json deleted file mode 100644 index 894e30f..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/offsite-discovery-summary.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T22:08:27.470032+00:00", - "operator_reports_holding_railiance_backup_age_key": true, - "private_key_received_or_read": false, - "candidate_key_match_verified": true, - "storage_share": { - "inventory": "storage-share-inventory-r1.json", - "status": "metadata_inventory_complete", - "attended_envelope_exit_code": 0, - "session_self_revocation_and_cleanup_confirmed": true, - "selected_candidate": "r01-net-kingdom-pg/net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea_db-20261015T023000Z.dump.age", - "candidate_bytes": 89129309, - "candidate_contents_downloaded": true, - "bootstrap_identity_file_bundle_found_in_inspected_scope": false, - "transfer_receipt": "privacyidea-transfer-r1.json", - "attended_transfer_envelope_exit_code": 0, - "transfer_session_self_revocation_and_cleanup_confirmed": true, - "candidate_decryption_and_database_restore_verified": true, - "database_drill_receipt": "privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json" - }, - "scaleway": { - "inventory": "scaleway-inventory-r1.json", - "status": "metadata_inventory_complete", - "bucket": "railiance-platform-pg-backup", - "scope": "platform-pg/ and at most three child levels; WAL/base object trees and other buckets/prefixes not enumerated", - "bootstrap_identity_file_bundle_found_in_inspected_scope": false, - "bootstrap_api_key_used": false - }, - "key_check": { - "source": "railiance-platform/lib/railiance-backup-common.sh", - "source_sha256": "09f349ae815339732db505d6896fb1ca384be7c66b40574750a3ba30d4d922e0", - "declared_default_public_recipient": "age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz", - "operator_hidden_terminal_check_requested": true, - "scope": "A successful key match checks the declared public recipient, not actual ciphertext decryption or whole-stack recovery.", - "operator_reports_check_passed": true, - "operator_reports_temporary_key_removed": true - }, - "source_tests": { - "passed": 13, - "command": "python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_scaleway_backup_inventory.py tests/test_storage_share_inventory.py" - }, - "native_recovery_proven": false, - "production_mutations_performed": false, - "private_key_received_or_read_scope": "Agent custody: false; attended human recovery child used the temporary explicit key." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json deleted file mode 100644 index 55ce9ff..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.privacyidea-database-drill.v1", - "status": "isolated_database_drill_passed", - "started_at": "2026-10-15T22:18:55.858354+00:00", - "source_sha256": "90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false, - "token_decryption_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": false, - "full_identity_file_coverage_proven": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "ciphertext_sha256": "cc81da442755928171d2c51bce93eda7de4392a0a1aa9d0ffb83a25ba34e5ead", - "registered_recipient_match": true, - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "offhost_ciphertext_decryption_verified": true, - "image": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "pg_restore_version": "pg_restore (PostgreSQL) 16.14 (Debian 16.14-1.pgdg13+1)", - "aggregate_row_counts": { - "token": 5, - "resolver": 2, - "realm": 2 - }, - "database_restore_and_readback_passed": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-15T22:19:05.279736+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-transfer-r1.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-transfer-r1.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3ff5fb2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/privacyidea-transfer-r1.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.privacyidea-offhost-transfer.v1", - "status": "ciphertext_fetched", - "started_at": "2026-10-15T22:07:08.615448+00:00", - "provider": "Storage Share", - "object": "r01-net-kingdom-pg/net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea_db-20261015T023000Z.dump.age", - "age_keys_read": false, - "plaintext_created": false, - "production_writes": false, - "source_sha256": "233160e1206643a5cf7ad05141d733f0a75aff651190e27f77515a124ff0a59f", - "owner_accessor_sha256": "673f9b17fb2f3fef6fcdb5c50a2bcca69e3df3157a9e5582a2d995c6b87640b5", - "caller_auth_path": "auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", - "caller_entity_id": "4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b", - "ciphertext_bytes": 89129309, - "ciphertext_sha256": "cc81da442755928171d2c51bce93eda7de4392a0a1aa9d0ffb83a25ba34e5ead", - "object_unchanged_during_transfer": true, - "ciphertext_path": "/tmp/nk49-offhost-j9dzl0ge/privacyidea.dump.age", - "finished_at": "2026-10-15T22:07:16.363645+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/readiness.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/readiness.json deleted file mode 100644 index d164adf..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/readiness.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -{ - "workplan": "NK-WP-0049", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T22:24:49.717396+00:00", - "status": "offhost_privacyidea_database_recovered_full_identity_coverage_open", - "backup_destinations_operator_reported": [ - "Scaleway", - "Storage Share" - ], - "exact_offhost_artifact_confirmed": true, - "independently_held_matching_key_confirmed": true, - "recovery_key_or_backup_contents_retrieved": true, - "legacy_token_secret_present": true, - "legacy_trigger_secret_present": true, - "legacy_provider_revocation_proven": false, - "native_recovery_proven": false, - "deferred_exposure_rotation_reopened": false, - "caller_inventory": "caller-source-inventory.json", - "verification": "source-verification.json", - "ceremony": "../../bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md", - "outstanding": [ - "Prepare and admit missing encrypted identity data/key/config backup coverage; operator confirms no known full identity bundle", - "Retrieve new off-host bundle and prove original token decryption, audit continuity, directory and issuer recovery with safe negative cases and cleanup", - "T02 current caller/provider source admission and exact legacy provider credential disposition; retain existing deferred-rotation boundary" - ], - "operator_reports_holding_railiance_backup_age_key": true, - "operator_report_recorded_at": "2026-10-15T21:52:22.549430+00:00", - "key_material_received": false, - "key_matches_selected_ciphertext_verified": true, - "offsite_discovery": "offsite-discovery-summary.json", - "privacyidea_database_ciphertext_identified": true, - "required_full_asset_coverage_confirmed": false, - "operator_reports_recipient_check_passed": true, - "operator_reports_temporary_key_cleanup": true, - "private_key_received_by_agent": false, - "ciphertext_fetched": true, - "transfer_receipt": "privacyidea-transfer-r1.json", - "prepared_database_drill": "../../bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md", - "age_private_key_retrieved_by_agent": false, - "offhost_database_restore_proven": true, - "database_drill_receipt": "privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json", - "database_drill_review": "database-drill-review.json", - "operator_reports_no_known_full_identity_bundle": true, - "identity_backup_profile": "../../../tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "identity_coverage_preparation": "identity-backup-preparation-r1.json", - "coverage_preparation_status": "prepared_not_admitted", - "coverage_preparation_tests_passed": 14, - "coverage_decision_id": "ed20023f-0168-421d-be86-460391339876" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/scaleway-inventory-r1.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/scaleway-inventory-r1.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7f89f4e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/scaleway-inventory-r1.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.scaleway-backup-inventory.v1", - "status": "metadata_inventory_complete", - "started_at": "2026-10-15T21:54:28.925951+00:00", - "read_only": true, - "provider": "Scaleway", - "bucket": "railiance-platform-pg-backup", - "prefix": "platform-pg/", - "source_sha256": "a219df205708fa4ed44b763a418585d63c820c25434bc0fd14e805eb5c2f79d3", - "bootstrap_api_key_used": false, - "age_keys_read": false, - "object_contents_downloaded": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "scope": "Bounded prefix metadata, at most three child levels; WAL/base trees not enumerated; other buckets/prefixes unassessed", - "prefixes": { - "platform-pg/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/application-archives/", - "platform-pg/apps-pg/", - "platform-pg/forgejo-db/", - "platform-pg/platform-pg-2/", - "platform-pg/platform-pg/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/application-archives/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/application-archives/email-connect/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/apps-pg/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/apps-pg/apps-pg/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/forgejo-db/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/forgejo-db/forgejo-db/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/platform-pg-2/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/platform-pg-2/platform-pg-2/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/platform-pg/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/platform-pg/base/", - "platform-pg/platform-pg/wals/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/application-archives/email-connect/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/application-archives/email-connect/2026/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/apps-pg/apps-pg/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/apps-pg/apps-pg/base/", - "platform-pg/apps-pg/apps-pg/wals/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/forgejo-db/forgejo-db/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/forgejo-db/forgejo-db/base/", - "platform-pg/forgejo-db/forgejo-db/wals/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/platform-pg-2/platform-pg-2/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/platform-pg-2/platform-pg-2/base/", - "platform-pg/platform-pg-2/platform-pg-2/wals/" - ], - "files": [] - }, - "platform-pg/application-archives/email-connect/2026/": { - "directories": [ - "platform-pg/application-archives/email-connect/2026/10/" - ], - "files": [] - } - }, - "runtime_delivery_uid": "30c4f6fc-8eb7-4cdc-b692-0f74c4a5b3ce", - "finished_at": "2026-10-15T21:54:39.109262+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/source-verification.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/source-verification.json deleted file mode 100644 index 51d8fdb..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/source-verification.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -{ - "broad": { - "command": "python3 -m pytest -q tests tools/security-bootstrap-console/tests sso-mfa/k8s/keycape sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_identity_provisioner_reconcile.py", - "passed": 723, - "skipped": 65, - "warnings": 2, - "duration_seconds": 171.05, - "scope_note": "Skipped checks are not acceptance evidence; native/estate recovery is not established." - }, - "final_focused": { - "command": "python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_bootstrap_secret_output.py tests/test_custody_entrypoints.py tests/test_retirement_and_bundle_boundaries.py tests/test_openbao_lab_boundary.py tests/test_bootstrap_recovery_transport.py", - "passed": 57, - "duration_seconds": 7.45 - 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"finished_at": "2026-10-15T21:52:28.155972+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-cadence-release-patch.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-cadence-release-patch.json deleted file mode 100644 index 978d1b5..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-cadence-release-patch.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "8b44c901-024f-4472-a822-2fd07aa2be5f" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "75772235" - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/image", - "value": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine@sha256:16e5d222d58e179f4836f649e8f8128321a8b644d29dc426b4d21a65ff97845d" - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/template/spec/initContainers/0/image", - "value": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine@sha256:16e5d222d58e179f4836f649e8f8128321a8b644d29dc426b4d21a65ff97845d" - 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"drained_at": "2026-10-11T06:53:48+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "901d01ac-8655-4596-803a-8f8d2ab95dad", - "class": "issuance", - "created_at": "2026-10-11T10:40:55+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-11T10:40:55+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "3cf709a4-e867-4ecd-9f4f-843093ecc4eb", - "class": "issuance", - "created_at": "2026-10-11T17:19:01+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-11T17:19:03+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "0d1763bf-7407-4b84-9fe3-a7655b2a60ac", - "class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-11T23:03:41+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-11T23:03:41+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "32257a42-f68f-4f6e-9815-507f13bdc940", - "class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-12T23:03:41+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-12T23:03:41+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "dafdf67b-7be0-4c8e-9063-c7a8d9c40c0d", - "class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-13T23:03:42+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-13T23:03:42+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "3160500d-f313-4055-96d2-8a3e7ba1d235", - "class": "issuance", - "created_at": "2026-10-14T07:37:00+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-14T07:37:01+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "2ceb8f47-bdcb-4637-a371-f8145b9caef4", - "class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-14T23:03:46+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-14T23:03:46+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "d66c2b9f-c30b-4db6-8ec0-2c12857d1dc8", - "class": "issuance", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T03:19:34+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-15T03:19:38+00:00" - }, - { - "event_id": "76df9dbb-837b-47c4-8026-56db990a59bb", - "class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:55+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:55+00:00" - } - ], - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:38:37.453790+00:00", - "boundary": "Source-owned occurrence and local acknowledgment coordinates only; independent receiver event-ID/acceptance comparison pending. Existing probe events outside this outbox must be accounted separately." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-pre-schema6-backup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-pre-schema6-backup.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6380348..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-pre-schema6-backup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -{ - "expected_schema_version": 5, - "foreign_key_violations": 0, - "integrity": [ - "ok" - ], - "ok": true, - "persistent": true, - "required_tables": { - "approvals": true, - "entries": true, - "outbox": true - }, - "schema_current": true, - "schema_version": 5, - "live_table_counts": { - "approvals": 54, - "entries": 47, - "outbox": 91 - }, - "local_copy": "/tmp/nk-wp-0035-approval-backup/pre-schema6.sqlite", - "local_mode": "0600", - "sha256": "70ebf5d0f6218655b3ad3ddb5cc50c52a8210cf061735e45bd0f96d8452367ed", - "persistent_path": "/data/nk-wp-0035-pre-schema6-20261015.sqlite", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:27:13.223863+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-schema6-rollout.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-schema6-rollout.json deleted file mode 100644 index b33b9af..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-schema6-rollout.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -{ - "storage": { - "schema_version": 6, - "expected_schema_version": 6, - "schema_current": true, - "persistent": true, - "required_tables": { - "approvals": true, - "entries": true, - "outbox": true - }, - "integrity": [ - "ok" - ], - "foreign_key_violations": 0, - "ok": true - }, - "outbox": { - "total": 91, - "pending": 0, - "max_age_seconds": 0, - "attempts": 101, - "failed_pending": 0, - "counts": { - "issuance": 47, - "use": 11, - "supersession": 0, - "revocation": 0, - "heartbeat": 33 - } - }, - "table_counts": { - "approvals": 54, - "entries": 47, - "outbox": 91 - }, - "new_class_heartbeats": [ - { - "asserted_class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:55+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:55+00:00" - }, - { - "asserted_class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-14T23:03:46+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-14T23:03:46+00:00" - }, - { - "asserted_class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-13T23:03:42+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-13T23:03:42+00:00" - }, - { - "asserted_class": "heartbeat", - "created_at": "2026-10-12T23:03:41+00:00", - "drained_at": "2026-10-12T23:03:41+00:00" - } - ], - "readiness": 200, - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:29:46.446307+00:00", - "pod_uid": "0aff01bc-8719-4229-8f2f-c26781d2e033", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine@sha256:16e5d222d58e179f4836f649e8f8128321a8b644d29dc426b4d21a65ff97845d" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-v6-isolated-restore.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-v6-isolated-restore.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9cdc90e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-v6-isolated-restore.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -{ - "pre_schema": 5, - "post_storage": { - "schema_version": 6, - "expected_schema_version": 6, - "schema_current": true, - "persistent": true, - "required_tables": { - "approvals": true, - "entries": true, - "outbox": true - }, - "integrity": [ - "ok" - ], - "foreign_key_violations": 0, - "ok": true - }, - "counts_unchanged": true, - "live_database_overwritten": false, - "nonroot_uid": 10001, - "source_commit": "a786b061da4d7730c0827cf4919ab9206aed6d3e" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job-r2.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job-r2.json deleted file mode 100644 index 91cc58b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job-r2.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "batch/v1", - "kind": "Job", - "metadata": { - "name": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035-r2", - "namespace": "audit-core", - "labels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "spec": { - "backoffLimit": 0, - "ttlSecondsAfterFinished": 86400, - "template": { - "metadata": { - "labels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "securityContext": { - "runAsNonRoot": true, - "runAsUser": 10001, - "fsGroup": 10001, - "seccompProfile": { - "type": "RuntimeDefault" - } - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "migrate", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python", - "-m", - "audit_core", - "migrate" - ], - "env": [ - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_CREDENTIAL_DIR", - "value": "/etc/audit-core/db" - }, - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_DATABASE_SCHEMA", - "value": "audit_core" - }, - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_MIGRATE_ROLE", - "value": "audit_core_migrate" - } - ], - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "25m", - "memory": "64Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "250m", - "memory": "128Mi" - } - }, - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ] - }, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "tmp", - "mountPath": "/tmp" - }, - { - "name": "database-credential", - "mountPath": "/etc/audit-core/db", - "readOnly": true - } - ], - "terminationMessagePolicy": "FallbackToLogsOnError" - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "tmp", - "emptyDir": {} - }, - { - "name": "database-credential", - "secret": { - "secretName": "audit-core-database-migrate", - "defaultMode": 288 - } - } - ] - } - }, - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 300 - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job-r3.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job-r3.json deleted file mode 100644 index ea3e56e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job-r3.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "batch/v1", - "kind": "Job", - "metadata": { - "name": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035-r3", - "namespace": "audit-core", - "labels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "spec": { - "backoffLimit": 0, - "ttlSecondsAfterFinished": 86400, - "template": { - "metadata": { - "labels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "securityContext": { - "runAsNonRoot": true, - "runAsUser": 10001, - "fsGroup": 10001, - "seccompProfile": { - "type": "RuntimeDefault" - } - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "migrate", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python", - "-m", - "audit_core", - "migrate" - ], - "env": [ - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_CREDENTIAL_DIR", - "value": "/etc/audit-core/db" - }, - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_DATABASE_SCHEMA", - "value": "audit_core" - }, - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_MIGRATE_ROLE", - "value": "audit_core_migrate" - } - ], - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "25m", - "memory": "64Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "250m", - "memory": "128Mi" - } - }, - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ] - }, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "tmp", - "mountPath": "/tmp" - }, - { - "name": "database-credential", - "mountPath": "/etc/audit-core/db", - "readOnly": true - } - ], - "terminationMessagePolicy": "FallbackToLogsOnError" - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "tmp", - "emptyDir": {} - }, - { - "name": "database-credential", - "secret": { - "secretName": "audit-core-database-migrate", - "defaultMode": 288 - } - } - ], - "automountServiceAccountToken": false - } - }, - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 300 - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2ecdbcf..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-migration-job.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "batch/v1", - "kind": "Job", - "metadata": { - "name": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035", - "namespace": "audit-core", - "labels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "spec": { - "backoffLimit": 0, - "ttlSecondsAfterFinished": 86400, - "template": { - "metadata": { - "labels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "OnFailure", - "securityContext": { - "runAsNonRoot": true, - "runAsUser": 10001, - "fsGroup": 10001, - "seccompProfile": { - "type": "RuntimeDefault" - } - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "migrate", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python", - "-m", - "audit_core", - "migrate" - ], - "env": [ - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_CREDENTIAL_DIR", - "value": "/etc/audit-core/db" - }, - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_DATABASE_SCHEMA", - "value": "audit_core" - }, - { - "name": "AUDIT_CORE_MIGRATE_ROLE", - "value": "audit_core_migrate" - } - ], - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "25m", - "memory": "64Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "250m", - "memory": "128Mi" - } - }, - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ] - }, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "tmp", - "mountPath": "/tmp" - }, - { - "name": "database-credential", - "mountPath": "/etc/audit-core/db", - "readOnly": true - } - ] - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "tmp", - "emptyDir": {} - }, - { - "name": "database-credential", - "secret": { - "secretName": "audit-core-database-migrate", - "defaultMode": 288 - } - } - ] - } - }, - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 300 - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-release-patch.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-release-patch.json deleted file mode 100644 index 15d34e8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-cadence-release-patch.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "b85fe3d0-75c9-4e0d-8c34-c6f1df0881bb" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "75782608" - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/image", - "value": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271" - } -] diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-migrate-egress.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-migrate-egress.json deleted file mode 100644 index 91d70f0..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/audit-core-migrate-egress.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "networking.k8s.io/v1", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "metadata": { - "name": "audit-core-migrate-egress", - "namespace": "audit-core" - }, - "spec": { - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "app.kubernetes.io/name": "audit-core", - "app.kubernetes.io/component": "migrate" - } - }, - "policyTypes": [ - "Egress" - ], - "egress": [ - { - "to": [ - { - "namespaceSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "databases" - } - }, - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "cnpg.io/cluster": "platform-pg" - } - } - } - ], - "ports": [ - { - "protocol": "TCP", - "port": 5432 - } - ] - }, - { - "to": [ - { - "namespaceSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "kube-system" - } - }, - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "k8s-app": "kube-dns" - } - } - } - ], - "ports": [ - { - "protocol": "UDP", - "port": 53 - }, - { - "protocol": "TCP", - "port": 53 - } - ] - } - ] - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/cadence-release-preparation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/cadence-release-preparation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 51d33f2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/cadence-release-preparation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -{ - "prepared_at": "2026-10-15T19:22:57.217356+00:00", - "images": { - "approval-engine": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine@sha256:16e5d222d58e179f4836f649e8f8128321a8b644d29dc426b4d21a65ff97845d", - "audit-core": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "rapp-qonto-collector": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/rapp-qonto-audit-collector@sha256:82bfd4100e14ddb2cefc4acc02b6b74609846b4a26ad40d9089ed564693f250a" - }, - "source_commits": { - "approval-engine": "a786b061da4d7730c0827cf4919ab9206aed6d3e", - "audit-core": "5227fb14e47f26a01930be4611360fd90f740662", - "rapp-qonto": "62a7cc0" - }, - "scan_high_critical": { - "approval-engine": { - "count": 0, - "report_sha256": "5e787b9d4bf9514a8182476206bcc01d1d9497cee30efb876373964b1a6a6563", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T19:17:24.836393899Z" - }, - "audit-core": { - "count": 0, - "report_sha256": "f7522e60a2f37e3a85cd5ba1f0754a73d637bcb430c2f4bdf0bec925ee5f0e88", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T19:20:34.959522138Z" - }, - "rapp-qonto-collector": { - "count": 0, - "report_sha256": "0496a10c3f41925c7f2d2e92220ccc74a1814a2a924b7a3be76e88d8b8e58eb9", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T19:22:30.723382718Z" - } - }, - "approval_migration": "v5 to v6; isolated actual backup migration verified with unchanged table counts", - "receiver_migration": "additive0007-import-receipts with native migration lease; no historical import", - "live_applied": false, - "server_dry_run": { - "approval_engine_images": 0, - "receiver_image": 0, - "receiver_migration_job": 0, - "collector_runtime_ingress": 0, - "hourly_observation_job": 0 - }, - "observation_job": "qonto-hourly-observation-job.json", - "new_sender_scope": { - "name": "rapp-qonto-collector", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "may_write": true, - "may_read": false, - "secret_policy": "redact", - "bank_credentials_or_calls": false - }, - "collector_access": { - "kubernetes": [ - "namespace rapp-qonto: get/list pods, get pods/log" - ], - "audit_custody": "only its exact writer bearer;1Gi persistent outbox", - "api_egress_ips": [ - "10.43.0.1/32", - "92.205.62.239/32" - ] - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/checkpoint-20261015-1945/checkpoint.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/checkpoint-20261015-1945/checkpoint.json deleted file mode 100644 index 582f191..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/checkpoint-20261015-1945/checkpoint.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema_version": "nk-wp-0035-commit-checkpoint/v1", - "captured_at": "2026-10-15T19:46:19.560233+00:00", - "status": "observation-in-progress", - "job_uid": "f81f6e4b-b8ab-42d8-ac36-80f1386f9a14", - "expected_completion_utc": "2026-10-15T20:37:00Z", - "independent_readback": "pending; fresh attended operator identity required after capture", - "monitor_session": 48788, - "monitor_is_snapshot": true, - "inventory_line_count": 89, - "monitor_sha256": "2e7900cb78caec010e737514013f67e2dffddf79888bfca1a56ecdcbf7cddbfe", - 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index 8224504..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/checkpoint-20261015-1945/hourly-observation-monitor.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -{ - "attempts": 8, - "helper_exit_code": 2, - "independent_receiver_readback": "pending", - "live_mutations": false, - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:45:22.951990+00:00", - "result": { - "inventory_appended": true, - "job_uid": "f81f6e4b-b8ab-42d8-ac36-80f1386f9a14", - "status": "pending" - }, - "schema_version": "nk-wp-0035-readonly-capture-monitor/v1" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-decision.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-decision.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6cd1281..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-decision.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "workplan_id": "04685f94-1991-5e62-80d2-5669913e99fc", - "id": "1ac5a70f-082e-4d8f-9ac8-59e4c175da02", - "topic_id": null, - "title": "Use a configurable ecosystem coordination frame, initially one hour", - "description": "Founder directs one base duration frame for ecosystem coordination timelines and deadlines. Set f=1h now, with waits expressed as 2f and 3f rather than independent day constants. First cadence adoption: heartbeat f, registered receiver wait 2f, existing 1.5 grace yields effective 3f.", - "decision_type": "made", - "status": "resolved", - "rationale": "Small team is moving quickly; long-term coordination currently needs an hourly rather than daily pace. Owner-reviewed adoption retains timing formulas and frame provenance. This records the configuration decision, not an approval of an unspecified live rollout.", - "decided_by": "Bernd Worsch (founder), explicit session instruction", - "decided_at": "2026-10-15T18:05:48.234679Z", - "deadline": null, - "escalation_note": null, - "superseded_by": null, - "created_at": "2026-10-15T18:05:49.826919Z", - "updated_at": "2026-10-15T18:05:49.826919Z", - "workstream_id": "04685f94-1991-5e62-80d2-5669913e99fc" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-validation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 20391cc..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -{ - "decision_id": "1ac5a70f-082e-4d8f-9ac8-59e4c175da02", - "config": { - "ref": "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "sha256": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67", - 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"forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/rapp-qonto-audit-collector@sha256:82bfd4100e14ddb2cefc4acc02b6b74609846b4a26ad40d9089ed564693f250a", - "name": "collector" - } - ], - "deleting": false, - "name": "rapp-qonto-audit-collector-f94bc5f46-whc2n", - "phase": "Running", - "resource_version": "75786762", - "revision": null, - "uid": "92ef9104-469c-4b28-a0cc-f781f53bb26e" - }, - "initial_snapshot": { - "instance_started_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:17+00:00", - "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:17+00:00", - "last_stream_sequence": 1, - "since_last_heartbeat_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - }, - "snapshot_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:17+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - }, - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7" - }, - "input_sha256": { - "events.jsonl": "3664dc13a3ce3509ca87afc49c1b4c9095cc56cdfb6c37faa4c227556c7d3858", - "receipts.jsonl": "060433115fb784eaf2e7bd7eab7a368d5b4439d925524b68aa4edf920b54b7aa", - "snapshot.json": "210c0c5df320ce2c507eee764596b5928f59a99f938432de87811932d1896676" - }, - "job_pod": { - "containers": [ - { - "image": "docker.io/curlimages/curl@sha256:94e9e444bcba979c2ea12e27ae39bee4cd10bc7041a472c4727a558e213744e6", - "name": "observe" - } - ], - "deleting": false, - "name": "nk-wp-0035-hourly-observation-h6nh6", - "phase": "Succeeded", - "resource_version": "75805943", - "revision": null, - "uid": "bae9c1bc-743b-4231-9be4-2f5d67ff5542" - }, - "job_uid": "f81f6e4b-b8ab-42d8-ac36-80f1386f9a14", - "limits": [ - "Retained logs do not prove no uncaptured source records were lost.", - "200 duplicate acknowledgment provides no original acceptance time.", - "Receipt accepted_at bounds original202 acceptance from above; receiver readback remains required.", - "No independent receiver file is fabricated and no KG acceptance is run here." - ], - "receiver_readback": { - "event_ids": [ - "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a", - "6a9f34445e13062e38ab309a6fc800dc9a2fa24cb8a46ecd919ae18fe9409874", - "dfa71caeddb9633af2719fb9596a8ffb308f722cd12b385f18473116e6c4dc39" - ], - "since": "2026-10-15T19:36:16+00:00", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "until": "2026-10-15T20:37:23+00:00" - }, - "schema_version": "rapp-qonto-observation-capture/v1", - "snapshot_instance": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "source_pods": [ - { - "containers": [ - { - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/rapp-qonto@sha256:2e42b5e665a19ffa3b3ae8109a8aab64f5485329f72810be063263ff5086cb3f", - "name": "user-container" - }, - { - "image": "gcr.io/knative-releases/knative.dev/serving/cmd/queue@sha256:371c23206b7bd924474b07e51435198579133eb98fba27a5cb3db9e6ba63b06b", - "name": "queue-proxy" - } - ], - "deleting": false, - "name": 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{"audit.allow": 0, "audit.deny": 0}} -{"actor": "nk-wp-0035-hourly-observation", "capability": "org_summary", "decision": "deny", "deny_reason": "authz_denied", "egress_destination": "qonto-thirdparty-api", "event_class": "audit.deny", "identity_binding": "self_asserted", "latency_ms": 0, "policy_version": 1, "protocol": "rest", "qonto_http_status": null, "request_id": "eab045a4-a680-4d46-b603-ef5a90c211df", "result_count": null, "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", "stream_sequence": 2, "tenant_id": "binky", "timestamp": "2026-10-15T19:36:17+00:00"} -{"assertion": "transitions-reported", "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", "reason": "periodic", "source_transition_counts": {"audit.allow": 0, "audit.deny": 1}, "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", "stream_sequence": 3, "timestamp": "2026-10-15T20:36:17+00:00", "window_ended_at": "2026-10-15T20:36:17+00:00", "window_started_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:17+00:00", "window_transition_counts": {"audit.allow": 0, "audit.deny": 1}} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-capture/receipts.jsonl b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-capture/receipts.jsonl deleted file mode 100644 index d26c2df..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-capture/receipts.jsonl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -{"accepted_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:30.769604+00:00", "covered_event_classes": ["audit.deny"], "event_id": "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a", "source": "qonto-assistant", "status_code": 202, "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", "stream_sequence": 1, "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", "type": "audit-core.heartbeat"} -{"accepted_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:30.861014+00:00", "covered_event_classes": [], "event_id": 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"instance_started_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:17+00:00", - "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-10-15T20:36:17+00:00", - "last_stream_sequence": 3, - "since_last_heartbeat_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - }, - "snapshot_at": "2026-10-15T20:37:06+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 1 - }, - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-inventory.jsonl b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-inventory.jsonl deleted file mode 100644 index 6f2ef10..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-inventory.jsonl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,588 +0,0 @@ -{"job_status": {"active": 1, "ready": 1, "startTime": "2026-10-15T19:36:07Z", "terminating": 0, "uncountedTerminatedPods": {}}, "job_uid": "f81f6e4b-b8ab-42d8-ac36-80f1386f9a14", "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:39.436327+00:00", 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60, - "helper_exit_code": 0, - "independent_receiver_readback": "pending", - "live_mutations": false, - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:37:22.262808+00:00", - "result": { - "events": 3, - "instance": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "output": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-capture", - "receiver_readback": { - "event_ids": [ - "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a", - "6a9f34445e13062e38ab309a6fc800dc9a2fa24cb8a46ecd919ae18fe9409874", - "dfa71caeddb9633af2719fb9596a8ffb308f722cd12b385f18473116e6c4dc39" - ], - "since": "2026-10-15T19:36:16+00:00", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "until": "2026-10-15T20:37:23+00:00" - }, - "status": "captured_pending_independent_receiver" - }, - "schema_version": "nk-wp-0035-readonly-capture-monitor/v1" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/owner-acceptance-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/owner-acceptance-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3e0fcf5..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/owner-acceptance-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,157 +0,0 @@ -{ - "workplan": "NK-WP-0035", - "status": "receiver registered; source/receiver upgrades and durable collector deployed; elapsed-hour and independent acceptance pending", - "profile_status": "proposed", - "live_observer_proved": false, - "source_files": { - "approval_source": { - "path": "../approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "sha256": "cc58c8d53ebf50acf540d73b7607d579942bda7734c3e8722108e9c9204af655" - }, - "qonto_source": { - "path": "../qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "sha256": "adedbe06e04c38812057db97364557644157eb5f72f16adebb6f7beec1587005" - }, - "generic_schema": { - "path": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "sha256": "6d52692eb1e4d1325e0d6062d95acded98beddaae5bcfe24c6f0e91f1b6be6ae" - }, - "bearer_revocation_receipt": { - "path": "../audit-core/docs/evidence/2026-09-15-sender-bearer-revocation.json", - "sha256": "8da798005611711f4a3da969597a3763e6c02e41013df5227b0434dc328b6fb3" - }, - "qonto_historical_capture": { - "path": "../rapp-qonto/evidence/live/2026-09-05-audit-rollout.json", - "sha256": "1cad71fe93ab2a9f7d5dbc99b9aada47c212a7e43813a86ea91f52639e163be9" - } - }, - "approval_engine_registration_proposal": { - "status": "registered in protected registry version16 and verified after receiver reload", - "sender": "approval-engine", - "source": "approval-engine", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", - "preserve": [ - "tokens", - "secret_policy=redact", - "may_write=true", - "may_read=false", - "existing other senders and registry fields" - ], - "emission_cadence": "Import exact source-owned cadence.yaml at the pinned digest; never use a draft/fallback schema", - "class_mapping": { - "issuance": "approval.issuance", - "use": "approval.use", - "supersession": "approval.supersession", - "revocation": "approval.revocation", - "heartbeat": "audit-core.heartbeat" - }, - "heartbeat_transport": "audit-core.heartbeat", - "covered_class_field": "data.class", - "source_interval_seconds": 3600, - "source_requested_bound_seconds": 7200, - "receiver_grace_factor": 1.5, - "live_steps": [ - "Complete: approved immutable Approval schema6 and Audit schema7 releases; verified backups and readiness", - "Complete: protected metadata CAS changed Approval cadence/heartbeat waits only, preserving existing credentials and all other senders", - "Complete: explicit new CCR0047 approval; contained operator identity, CAS/readback, session revocation confirmed", - "Complete: exact runtime registry readback after ESO sync/reload; native per-class beats and independent observer findings remain observation-phase checks", - "Emit/drain actual lifecycle transitions under owner-scoped authority; correlate occurrence, acknowledgment and receiver acceptance windows including lag and duplicates", - "Independent readback/count comparison and missing-class/lag findings; retain value-safe receipts" - ], - "existing_revocation_proof": "2026-09-15 T1 accepted 202, dropped T1 refused 401, incumbent T0 accepted 202; do not repeat unchanged synthetic proof as if absent", - "effective_deadline_seconds": 10800, - "coordination_frame": { - "ref": "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "sha256": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67", - "frame_seconds": 3600, - "heartbeat_frames": 1, - "registered_wait_frames": 2, - "effective_deadline_frames": 3, - "decision_id": "1ac5a70f-082e-4d8f-9ac8-59e4c175da02" - } - }, - "qonto": { - "required_owner": "rapp-qonto", - "missing": "Elapsed real hourly periodic capture plus independent readback/observer acceptance (collector source/runtime and sender admission are now supplied)", - "authoritative_workload_tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky (rapp-qonto binding; collector mapping still needs source/receiver review)", - "receiver_commitment": "AUDIT-WP-0013-T05", - "receiver_instance_filter": "Implemented in AUDIT-WP-0013-T04; reviewed release and native proof still required", - "source_coordination": "QONTO-WP-0006-T02", - "observer_acceptance": "KG-WP-0005-T03 then QONTO-WP-0006-T03", - "historical_receipt_limit": "Source-path capture with startup and deny; not independent collector/feed acceptance", - "source_interval_seconds": 3600, - "runtime_status": "rapp-qonto-00010 hourly source unchanged; scanned durable collector82bfd deployed, admitted and restarted with original202 receipts preserved", - "native_admission_receipt": "qonto-collector-native-admission.json", - "collector_restart_receipt": "qonto-collector-restart-persistence.json" - }, - "local_identity": { - "status": "explicit incompatibility retained", - "expected_findings": [ - "rare-heartbeat-missing:revoke-token", - "rare-heartbeat-missing:serve/token.token_issued" - ], - "completeness_claimed": false - }, - "observer_fix": { - "defect": "Shared heartbeat event type could mask silence of another covered class", - "change": "Require explicit covered_event_classes as well as matching transport class; retain source/adapter coverage, not inferred traffic/count keys", - "old_regression": "False COMPLETE for unscoped audit-core.heartbeat across issuance/revocation", - "deployment_or_live_acceptance": false - }, - "source_files_before_frame": { - "approval_source": { - "path": "../approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "sha256": "0389be492628e2df0d84a70755c92aaf4a749bc64fbf2772e0c3301c3e1fe5ed" - }, - "qonto_source": { - "path": "../qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "sha256": "1b4ce5551fdfe638b57c175c0403cfe8e5000742c3fc389f8c1e895cf557ba02" - }, - "generic_schema": { - "path": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "sha256": "6d52692eb1e4d1325e0d6062d95acded98beddaae5bcfe24c6f0e91f1b6be6ae" - }, - "bearer_revocation_receipt": { - "path": "../audit-core/docs/evidence/2026-09-15-sender-bearer-revocation.json", - "sha256": "8da798005611711f4a3da969597a3763e6c02e41013df5227b0434dc328b6fb3" - }, - "qonto_historical_capture": { - "path": "../rapp-qonto/evidence/live/2026-09-05-audit-rollout.json", - "sha256": "1cad71fe93ab2a9f7d5dbc99b9aada47c212a7e43813a86ea91f52639e163be9" - } - }, - "coordination_frame": { - "ref": "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "sha256": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67", - "frame_seconds": 3600, - "heartbeat_frames": 1, - "registered_wait_frames": 2, - "effective_deadline_frames": 3, - "decision_id": "1ac5a70f-082e-4d8f-9ac8-59e4c175da02" - }, - "runtime_rollout": { - "approval": "Explicit founder reply: i approve, following timing-only rollout proposal", - "approval_engine_receipt": "approval-engine-frame-rollout.json", - "backup_receipt": "approval-engine-frame-backup.json", - "qonto_candidate_receipt": "rapp-qonto-frame-candidate.json", - "qonto_rollout_receipt": "rapp-qonto-frame-rollout.json", - "receiver_registry_changed": true, - "registered_2f_and_effective_3f_live": true, - "periodic_hour_observed": false, - "receiver_registry_receipt": "receiver-custody-live.json", - "receiver_image": "b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "approval_image": "16e5d222d58e179f4836f649e8f8128321a8b644d29dc426b4d21a65ff97845d", - "collector_image": "82bfd4100e14ddb2cefc4acc02b6b74609846b4a26ad40d9089ed564693f250a" - }, - "observation": { - "job": "default/nk-wp-0035-hourly-observation", - "uid": "f81f6e4b-b8ab-42d8-ac36-80f1386f9a14", - "started_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:07Z", - "expected_completion_utc": "2026-10-15T20:37:00Z", - "expected_completion_berlin": "2026-10-15T22:37:00+02:00", - "capture_monitor": "hourly-observation-monitor.json", - "capture_output": "hourly-observation-capture", - "status": "running; not accepted", - "fresh_operator_oidc_needed_for_independent_readback": true - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-native-admission.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-native-admission.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7ba89c4..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-native-admission.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "own_reconciliation_status": 200, - "own_reconciliation": { - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "since": "2026-10-15T19:36:00+00:00", - "until": "2026-10-15T19:37:05.369346+00:00", - "counts": [ - { - "class": "audit-core.heartbeat", - "count": 1 - }, - { - "class": "audit.deny", - "count": 1 - } - ], - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "means": "the count of events audit-core accepted and stored in this window. Divergence from the source's own count is a finding for the source; agreement proves neither completeness nor that any event occurred." - }, - "duplicate_status": 200, - "wrong_source_status": 400, - "wrong_tenant_status": 400, - "read_refusal_status": 403, - "invalid_bearer_status": 401, - "global_pending_count": 0, - "instance_receipts": [ - { - "accepted_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:30.769604+00:00", - "covered_event_classes": [ - "audit.deny" - ], - "event_id": "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "status_code": 202, - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "stream_sequence": 1, - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "type": "audit-core.heartbeat" - }, - { - "accepted_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:30.861014+00:00", - "covered_event_classes": [], - "event_id": "6a9f34445e13062e38ab309a6fc800dc9a2fa24cb8a46ecd919ae18fe9409874", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "status_code": 202, - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "stream_sequence": 2, - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "type": "audit.deny" - } - ], - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:37:03.422744+00:00", - "credential_values_emitted": false, - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "independent_readback": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-restart-persistence.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-restart-persistence.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2196930..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-restart-persistence.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -{ - "receipts": [ - { - "accepted_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:30.769604+00:00", - "covered_event_classes": [ - "audit.deny" - ], - "event_id": "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "status_code": 202, - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "stream_sequence": 1, - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "type": "audit-core.heartbeat" - }, - { - "accepted_at": "2026-10-15T19:36:30.861014+00:00", - "covered_event_classes": [], - "event_id": "6a9f34445e13062e38ab309a6fc800dc9a2fa24cb8a46ecd919ae18fe9409874", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "status_code": 202, - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "stream_sequence": 2, - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "type": "audit.deny" - } - ], - "pending_count": 0, - "started_at": "2026-10-15T19:37:41.503622+00:00", - "pod_uid_before": "1a39bd4b-19dc-4c1f-adaa-56a11423d945", - "native_admission_receipt": "qonto-collector-native-admission.json", - "pod_uid_after": "92ef9104-469c-4b28-a0cc-f781f53bb26e", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:38:35.874453+00:00", - "first_202_receipts_preserved": true, - "pvc": "rapp-qonto-audit-outbox", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/rapp-qonto-audit-collector@sha256:82bfd4100e14ddb2cefc4acc02b6b74609846b4a26ad40d9089ed564693f250a" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-hourly-observation-job.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-hourly-observation-job.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9703814..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-hourly-observation-job.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "batch/v1", - "kind": "Job", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk-wp-0035-hourly-observation", - "namespace": "default", - "labels": { - "netkingdom.workplan": "NK-WP-0035" - } - }, - "spec": { - "backoffLimit": 0, - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 3900, - "ttlSecondsAfterFinished": 86400, - "template": { - "metadata": { - "labels": { - "netkingdom.workplan": "NK-WP-0035" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "automountServiceAccountToken": false, - "securityContext": { - "runAsNonRoot": true, - "runAsUser": 100, - "seccompProfile": { - "type": "RuntimeDefault" - } - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "observe", - "image": "docker.io/curlimages/curl@sha256:94e9e444bcba979c2ea12e27ae39bee4cd10bc7041a472c4727a558e213744e6", - "command": [ - "sh", - "-ec", - "set -eu\nu=http://rapp-qonto.rapp-qonto.svc.cluster.local\ncurl -fsS --max-time 50 \"$u/v1/health\" >/dev/null\ncurl -fsS --max-time 30 \"$u/v1/audit/reconciliation\"\necho\nstatus=$(curl -sS --max-time 30 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H 'X-Actor-ID: nk-wp-0035-hourly-observation' -H 'X-Actor-Lane: agent' \"$u/v1/accounts\")\n[ \"$status\" = 403 ]\necho '{\"denial_status\":403,\"bank_operation_requested\":false}'\nend=$(( $(date +%s) + 3630 ))\nwhile [ \"$(date +%s)\" -lt \"$end\" ]; do\n curl -fsS --max-time 30 \"$u/v1/health\" >/dev/null\n sleep 20\ndone\ncurl -fsS --max-time 30 \"$u/v1/audit/reconciliation\"\necho\n" - ], - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ] - } - }, - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "5m", - "memory": "8Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "100m", - "memory": "32Mi" - } - } - } - ] - } - } - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-candidate.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-candidate.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8ac2d51..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-candidate.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -{ - "candidate_revision": "rapp-qonto-00010", - "baseline_revision": "rapp-qonto-00009", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/rapp-qonto@sha256:2e42b5e665a19ffa3b3ae8109a8aab64f5485329f72810be063263ff5086cb3f", - "heartbeat_seconds": 3600, - "pod_uid": "3576cdd4-06a9-4641-856d-7ff690bb4dea", - "health": { - "status": "ok", - "service": "qonto-assistant", - "version": "0.1.0", - "policy_file": "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/qonto_assistant/policy/qonto-v1.yaml" - }, - "before": { - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "fc354245-9cc0-4849-8f6e-cfdf3d69c2fc", - "instance_started_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:38+00:00", - "snapshot_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:56+00:00", - "last_stream_sequence": 1, - "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:39+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - }, - "since_last_heartbeat_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - } - }, - "after": { - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "fc354245-9cc0-4849-8f6e-cfdf3d69c2fc", - "instance_started_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:38+00:00", - "snapshot_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:56+00:00", - "last_stream_sequence": 2, - "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:39+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 1 - }, - "since_last_heartbeat_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 1 - } - }, - "deny_status": 403, - "events": [ - { - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "fc354245-9cc0-4849-8f6e-cfdf3d69c2fc", - "stream_sequence": 1, - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "reason": "startup", - "timestamp": "2026-10-15T18:54:39+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - }, - "window_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 0 - } - }, - { - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "fc354245-9cc0-4849-8f6e-cfdf3d69c2fc", - "stream_sequence": 2, - "event_class": "audit.deny", - "timestamp": "2026-10-15T18:54:56+00:00", - "qonto_http_status": null, - "deny_reason": "authz_denied", - "decision": "deny", - "request_id": "ff67b156-1672-4afe-b1c0-f846c3aa5e85" - } - ], - "source_counts_match_direct_capture": true, - "qonto_call_by_deny_probe": false, - "observation_boundary": "Direct Kubernetes logs and source snapshots; independent collector and periodic-hour observation not established." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-promotion-patch.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-promotion-patch.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8923ea4..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-promotion-patch.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "a665e1d0-3ada-4b27-ac56-a8d452499003" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "75772109" - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/traffic", - "value": [ - { - "revisionName": "rapp-qonto-00010", - "percent": 100 - } - ] - } -] diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-rollout.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-rollout.json deleted file mode 100644 index 96e89f9..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-rollout.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -{ - "captured_at": "2026-10-15T18:56:02.381691+00:00", - "baseline_revision": "rapp-qonto-00009", - "promoted_revision": "rapp-qonto-00010", - "traffic": [ - { - "latestRevision": false, - "percent": 100, - "revisionName": "rapp-qonto-00010" - } - ], - "ready": true, - "main_health": { - "status": "ok", - "service": "qonto-assistant", - "version": "0.1.0", - "policy_file": "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/qonto_assistant/policy/qonto-v1.yaml" - }, - "before": { - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "fc354245-9cc0-4849-8f6e-cfdf3d69c2fc", - "instance_started_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:38+00:00", - "snapshot_at": "2026-10-15T18:55:49+00:00", - "last_stream_sequence": 2, - "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:39+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 1 - }, - "since_last_heartbeat_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 1 - } - }, - "after": { - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "stream_instance_id": "fc354245-9cc0-4849-8f6e-cfdf3d69c2fc", - "instance_started_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:38+00:00", - "snapshot_at": "2026-10-15T18:55:50+00:00", - "last_stream_sequence": 3, - "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-10-15T18:54:39+00:00", - "source_transition_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 2 - }, - "since_last_heartbeat_counts": { - "audit.allow": 0, - "audit.deny": 2 - } - }, - "deny_status": 403, - "candidate_evidence": "rapp-qonto-frame-candidate.json", - "qonto_call_by_probe": false, - "heartbeat_seconds": 3600, - "independent_collector_acceptance": false, - "hourly_periodic_observation": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-runtime-patch.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-runtime-patch.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4bfb9dd..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-runtime-patch.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "a665e1d0-3ada-4b27-ac56-a8d452499003" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "57092911" - }, - { - "op": "add", - "path": "/spec/template/metadata/annotations/coordination.coulomb.social~1frame-sha256", - "value": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67" - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/env/0/value", - "value": "3600" - }, - { - "op": "add", - "path": "/spec/traffic", - "value": [ - { - "revisionName": "rapp-qonto-00009", - "percent": 100 - }, - { - "latestRevision": true, - "percent": 0, - "tag": "frame-preview" - } - ] - } -] diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-cadence-release-native.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-cadence-release-native.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8e1589f..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-cadence-release-native.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -{ - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "deployment_uid": "b85fe3d0-75c9-4e0d-8c34-c6f1df0881bb", - "deployment_resource_version": "75784583", - "pod_uid": "22e4df05-dfb0-4e70-8d5a-5a5950c860bd", - "capabilities": { - "load_bearing": true, - "redact": true, - "write_only": true, - "source_exact": true, - "tenant_exact": true - }, - "synthetic_probe_only": true, - "credential_reads": 0, - "cadence_instance_capabilities": { - "cadence_registration": true, - "sqlite_instance_filter": true, - "postgres_instance_filter": true, - "synthetic_cadence_parse": true, - "synthetic_heartbeat_parse": true, - "synthetic_exact_scope": true - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-live.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-live.json deleted file mode 100644 index 14014d2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-live.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema_version": "platform.cadence-custody/v1", - "status": "delivered_pending_native_producer_and_independent_acceptance", - "credential_values_emitted": false, - "started_at": "2026-10-15T19:35:14.571483+00:00", - "packet_sha256": "81478f43abd2dbcb924966e9a3404e26bc226c91f2921b493ef0d5e2c23d4729", - "receiver_before": { - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "deployment_uid": "b85fe3d0-75c9-4e0d-8c34-c6f1df0881bb", - "deployment_resource_version": "75784583", - "pod_uid": "22e4df05-dfb0-4e70-8d5a-5a5950c860bd", - "capabilities": { - "load_bearing": true, - "redact": true, - "write_only": true, - "source_exact": true, - "tenant_exact": true - }, - "synthetic_probe_only": true, - "credential_reads": 0, - "cadence_instance_capabilities": { - "cadence_registration": true, - "sqlite_instance_filter": true, - "postgres_instance_filter": true, - "synthetic_cadence_parse": true, - "synthetic_heartbeat_parse": true, - "synthetic_exact_scope": true - } - }, - "phase": "delivery", - "registry_version_before": 15, - "custody_version": 1, - "custody_request_id": "77a526ef-dbcc-147d-b98b-a339f4efcd62", - "approval": { - "sender": "approval-engine", - "source": "approval-engine", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", - "may_read": false, - "emission_cadence_sha256": "cc58c8d53ebf50acf540d73b7607d579942bda7734c3e8722108e9c9204af655", - "heartbeat_classes": { - "issuance": 7200, - "use": 7200, - "supersession": 7200, - "revocation": 7200 - }, - "effective_deadline_seconds": 10800, - "changed": true, - "credentials_preserved": true, - "other_registry_fields_preserved": true - }, - "registry_request_id": "47ca933d-4a5d-699b-c474-094947f78fb9", - "registry_version_after": 16, - "registry_readback_matches": true, - "other_senders_preserved": true, - "approval_credentials_preserved": true, - "reader_exact_path_negatives_and_revocation": true, - "wrong_identity_denied": true, - "coding_agent_deny_wins": true, - "projection_matches": true, - "receiver_registry_projection_matches": true, - "receiver_after": { - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271", - "deployment_uid": "b85fe3d0-75c9-4e0d-8c34-c6f1df0881bb", - "deployment_resource_version": "75785764", - "pod_uid": "8333754a-eca0-4dd0-9230-72e41bb1e632", - "capabilities": { - "load_bearing": true, - "redact": true, - "write_only": true, - "source_exact": true, - "tenant_exact": true - }, - "synthetic_probe_only": true, - "credential_reads": 0, - "cadence_instance_capabilities": { - "cadence_registration": true, - "sqlite_instance_filter": true, - "postgres_instance_filter": true, - "synthetic_cadence_parse": true, - "synthetic_heartbeat_parse": true, - "synthetic_exact_scope": true - } - }, - "receiver_reloaded": true, - "receiver_runtime_registry_matches": true, - "completed_at": "2026-10-15T19:35:47.205117+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-packet-approved.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-packet-approved.json deleted file mode 100644 index e0980f5..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-packet-approved.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,236 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema_version": "platform.cadence-custody-packet/v1", - "sha256": "81478f43abd2dbcb924966e9a3404e26bc226c91f2921b493ef0d5e2c23d4729", - "status": "proposed", - "credential_values_emitted": false, - "qonto_sender_metadata": { - "name": "rapp-qonto-collector", - "sources": [ - "qonto-assistant" - ], - "tenants": [ - "tenant:friendly:binky" - ], - "may_write": true, - "may_read": false, - "secret_policy": "redact", - "evidence_kind": "load-bearing", - "heartbeat_classes": { - "audit.deny": 7200 - }, - "emission_cadence": { - "schema_version": "0.1", - "declaration_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.v1", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "sources": [ - { - "source_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.allow", - "source_system": "qonto-assistant", - "event_class": "audit.allow", - "form": "heartbeat-or-reconciliation", - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "missing": "finding", - "extensions": { - "qonto-assistant": { - "assertion_scope": "no-deny-transitions-in-window", - "active_instance_only": true - } - } - }, - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "evidence_class": "attributive", - "completeness_claimed": false - } - }, - "reconciliation": { - "compare_local": "source_transition_counts.audit.allow", - "compare_observed": "evidence_counts.audit.allow", - "divergence": "finding", - "undrained_local": "lag-not-divergence" - } - }, - { - "source_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.deny", - "source_system": "qonto-assistant", - "event_class": "audit.deny", - "form": "heartbeat-or-reconciliation", - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "missing": "finding", - "extensions": { - "qonto-assistant": { - "assertion_scope": "no-deny-transitions-in-window", - "active_instance_only": true - } - } - }, - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "evidence_class": "load-bearing", - "completeness_claimed": false, - "rate_monitoring": "forbidden" - } - }, - "reconciliation": { - "compare_local": "source_transition_counts.audit.deny", - "compare_observed": "evidence_counts.audit.deny", - "divergence": "finding", - "undrained_local": "lag-not-divergence" - } - }, - { - "source_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.heartbeat", - "source_system": "qonto-assistant", - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "form": "heartbeat-or-reconciliation", - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "missing": "finding", - "extensions": { - "qonto-assistant": { - "assertion_scope": "no-deny-transitions-in-window", - "active_instance_only": true - } - } - }, - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "evidence_class": "load-bearing", - "completeness_claimed": false - } - } - } - ], - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "contract_digest": "b08b4d95fc4b0bd3", - "contract_document_version": "0.2.0", - "coordination_frame": { - "ref": "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "sha256": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67", - "frame_seconds": 3600, - "heartbeat_frames": 1, - "registered_wait_frames": 2, - "effective_deadline_frames": 3 - } - }, - "qonto-assistant": { - "transport": "structured-stdout", - "instance_boundary": "process", - "ordering": { - "instance_field": "stream_instance_id", - "sequence_field": "stream_sequence", - "sequence_starts_at": 1, - "gap": "finding", - "reset": "permitted-only-when-stream_instance_id-changes" - }, - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "interval_config": "QONTO_AUDIT_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_SECONDS", - "default_interval_seconds": 3600, - "lifecycle": { - "startup": "required", - "periodic_while_process_active": "required", - "shutdown": "best-effort" - }, - "quiet_assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "active_instance_missing": "finding", - "scale_to_zero_semantics": "No periodic heartbeat is promised while no process instance exists. Observers track each stream_instance_id from its startup heartbeat until a shutdown heartbeat or expiry after a missing active-instance cadence.\n" - }, - "reconciliation": { - "source_counts_field": "source_transition_counts", - "window_counts_field": "window_transition_counts", - "counted_classes": [ - "audit.allow", - "audit.deny" - ], - "snapshot_endpoint": "/v1/audit/reconciliation", - "compare_observed": "Count received request events by event_class and stream_instance_id, then compare them with the heartbeat source counts and stream sequence.\n", - "divergence": "finding", - "undrained_local": "lag-not-divergence", - "persistence": "process-local" - }, - "event_context": { - "identity_binding_field": "identity_binding", - "egress_destination_field": "egress_destination", - "qonto_egress_destination": "qonto-thirdparty-api" - }, - "operational_acceptance": "pending-audit-core-sender-mapping-and-independent-observer" - } - } - } - }, - "source_file_checksums": [ - { - "path": "railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0047-rapp-qonto-audit-sender.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "8a574c1bd1d8292b184b5bf0366b8fc09421e8aa5a7ec880cab2772c56df5be0" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/manifests/rapp-qonto-audit-sender.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "841d437a785fe453e23866a5caa5b6b707955a998143aae8923fcbe80f45901a" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-rapp-qonto-audit.hcl", - "digest_sha256": "2d17cd763c9c36a7fb7110121d30c2e53731d04482412d6f99f98cfe52af3c0c" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/cadence_receiver_custody.py", - "digest_sha256": "3973ba4b332061d06a6280300df0847342846f5aa8b1545724ce1dfeb9c7539d" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/factory_audit_custody.py", - "digest_sha256": "3a4dbbed69a956bf0656d89b31f9de070626440d7dba289d1adf6493293721ee" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/factory_audit_delivery.py", - "digest_sha256": "a5b917435b01ac7982a9e9c7c480d53fbcd428c5a9b3e03856179a1ec3f070ef" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py", - "digest_sha256": "18bddb524fe4c9f4c1c4b30f46d93cfa2b19ce8e4c1f138069df040f99a26fb2" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/state_hub_preflight_lane.py", - "digest_sha256": "8bf63beda028de7c2375084afb7c22fb00a731c54ebf0b3ba369a699d920e0f5" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/credential-change.py", - "digest_sha256": "54ca1bc33ed4bb7807917f71ed45b6b35da978bc789e013386e1e90a20bee06d" - }, - { - "path": "approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "cc58c8d53ebf50acf540d73b7607d579942bda7734c3e8722108e9c9204af655" - }, - { - "path": "qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "adedbe06e04c38812057db97364557644157eb5f72f16adebb6f7beec1587005" - }, - { - "path": "net-kingdom/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json", - "digest_sha256": "c96cd1344193c1e146470d6b1d79f3033ff5f44a432293ef6a8db5dacc7d4c57" - }, - { - "path": "audit-core/audit_core/cadence_registration.py", - "digest_sha256": "faf1c72fe06c8bc3de1a5fdde3aeb826c16e8e390ba70c1ef3218c2e25a599c7" - }, - { - "path": "audit-core/audit_core/senders.py", - "digest_sha256": "bc091ce63dc2cd0fcdc9f26423b258cb94a6db863daced6706c11dba3bbf67e1" - }, - { - "path": "audit-core/audit_core/emission_cadence.py", - "digest_sha256": "8852152bf65d25631f73b3553ae9036424ea4a99f34b7530c8773232f551f1f8" - } - ], - "checksum_representation": "Lossless path/digest pairs; original packet hash retained unchanged. Offline plan contained no credential values." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-packet.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-packet.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0108010..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-packet.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,236 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema_version": "platform.cadence-custody-packet/v1", - "sha256": "0142744f57a10988c7cccf6384b4d5ddd65203b261bc05af6e104fe7b4c53e1d", - "status": "proposed", - "credential_values_emitted": false, - "qonto_sender_metadata": { - "name": "rapp-qonto-collector", - "sources": [ - "qonto-assistant" - ], - "tenants": [ - "tenant:friendly:binky" - ], - "may_write": true, - "may_read": false, - "secret_policy": "redact", - "evidence_kind": "load-bearing", - "heartbeat_classes": { - "audit.deny": 7200 - }, - "emission_cadence": { - "schema_version": "0.1", - "declaration_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.v1", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "stream_id": "qonto-assistant.audit", - "sources": [ - { - "source_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.allow", - "source_system": "qonto-assistant", - "event_class": "audit.allow", - "form": "heartbeat-or-reconciliation", - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "missing": "finding", - "extensions": { - "qonto-assistant": { - "assertion_scope": "no-deny-transitions-in-window", - "active_instance_only": true - } - } - }, - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "evidence_class": "attributive", - "completeness_claimed": false - } - }, - "reconciliation": { - "compare_local": "source_transition_counts.audit.allow", - "compare_observed": "evidence_counts.audit.allow", - "divergence": "finding", - "undrained_local": "lag-not-divergence" - } - }, - { - "source_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.deny", - "source_system": "qonto-assistant", - "event_class": "audit.deny", - "form": "heartbeat-or-reconciliation", - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "missing": "finding", - "extensions": { - "qonto-assistant": { - "assertion_scope": "no-deny-transitions-in-window", - "active_instance_only": true - } - } - }, - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "evidence_class": "load-bearing", - "completeness_claimed": false, - "rate_monitoring": "forbidden" - } - }, - "reconciliation": { - "compare_local": "source_transition_counts.audit.deny", - "compare_observed": "evidence_counts.audit.deny", - "divergence": "finding", - "undrained_local": "lag-not-divergence" - } - }, - { - "source_id": "qonto-assistant.audit.heartbeat", - "source_system": "qonto-assistant", - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "form": "heartbeat-or-reconciliation", - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "missing": "finding", - "extensions": { - "qonto-assistant": { - "assertion_scope": "no-deny-transitions-in-window", - "active_instance_only": true - } - } - }, - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "evidence_class": "load-bearing", - "completeness_claimed": false - } - } - } - ], - "extensions": { - "netkingdom": { - "contract_digest": "b08b4d95fc4b0bd3", - "contract_document_version": "0.2.0", - "coordination_frame": { - "ref": "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "sha256": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67", - "frame_seconds": 3600, - "heartbeat_frames": 1, - "registered_wait_frames": 2, - "effective_deadline_frames": 3 - } - }, - "qonto-assistant": { - "transport": "structured-stdout", - "instance_boundary": "process", - "ordering": { - "instance_field": "stream_instance_id", - "sequence_field": "stream_sequence", - "sequence_starts_at": 1, - "gap": "finding", - "reset": "permitted-only-when-stream_instance_id-changes" - }, - "heartbeat": { - "event_class": "audit.heartbeat", - "interval": "PT3600S", - "interval_config": "QONTO_AUDIT_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_SECONDS", - "default_interval_seconds": 3600, - "lifecycle": { - "startup": "required", - "periodic_while_process_active": "required", - "shutdown": "best-effort" - }, - "quiet_assertion": "nothing-to-report", - "active_instance_missing": "finding", - "scale_to_zero_semantics": "No periodic heartbeat is promised while no process instance exists. Observers track each stream_instance_id from its startup heartbeat until a shutdown heartbeat or expiry after a missing active-instance cadence.\n" - }, - "reconciliation": { - "source_counts_field": "source_transition_counts", - "window_counts_field": "window_transition_counts", - "counted_classes": [ - "audit.allow", - "audit.deny" - ], - "snapshot_endpoint": "/v1/audit/reconciliation", - "compare_observed": "Count received request events by event_class and stream_instance_id, then compare them with the heartbeat source counts and stream sequence.\n", - "divergence": "finding", - "undrained_local": "lag-not-divergence", - "persistence": "process-local" - }, - "event_context": { - "identity_binding_field": "identity_binding", - "egress_destination_field": "egress_destination", - "qonto_egress_destination": "qonto-thirdparty-api" - }, - "operational_acceptance": "pending-audit-core-sender-mapping-and-independent-observer" - } - } - } - }, - "source_file_checksums": [ - { - "path": "railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0047-rapp-qonto-audit-sender.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "dc2e04a64449bde7c2cdee028752157cd38d2d21577fd8ecf4f847814bb7e4f6" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/manifests/rapp-qonto-audit-sender.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "c2aba320d124d86ea0042e57a9bf53c71a9db3e1edd54d10d6e1db73fd0c9f4b" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-rapp-qonto-audit.hcl", - "digest_sha256": "2d17cd763c9c36a7fb7110121d30c2e53731d04482412d6f99f98cfe52af3c0c" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/cadence_receiver_custody.py", - "digest_sha256": "3973ba4b332061d06a6280300df0847342846f5aa8b1545724ce1dfeb9c7539d" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/factory_audit_custody.py", - "digest_sha256": "3a4dbbed69a956bf0656d89b31f9de070626440d7dba289d1adf6493293721ee" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/factory_audit_delivery.py", - "digest_sha256": "a5b917435b01ac7982a9e9c7c480d53fbcd428c5a9b3e03856179a1ec3f070ef" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py", - "digest_sha256": "18bddb524fe4c9f4c1c4b30f46d93cfa2b19ce8e4c1f138069df040f99a26fb2" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/state_hub_preflight_lane.py", - "digest_sha256": "8bf63beda028de7c2375084afb7c22fb00a731c54ebf0b3ba369a699d920e0f5" - }, - { - "path": "railiance-platform/scripts/credential-change.py", - "digest_sha256": "54ca1bc33ed4bb7807917f71ed45b6b35da978bc789e013386e1e90a20bee06d" - }, - { - "path": "approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "cc58c8d53ebf50acf540d73b7607d579942bda7734c3e8722108e9c9204af655" - }, - { - "path": "qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "digest_sha256": "adedbe06e04c38812057db97364557644157eb5f72f16adebb6f7beec1587005" - }, - { - "path": "net-kingdom/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json", - "digest_sha256": "c96cd1344193c1e146470d6b1d79f3033ff5f44a432293ef6a8db5dacc7d4c57" - }, - { - "path": "audit-core/audit_core/cadence_registration.py", - "digest_sha256": "faf1c72fe06c8bc3de1a5fdde3aeb826c16e8e390ba70c1ef3218c2e25a599c7" - }, - { - "path": "audit-core/audit_core/senders.py", - "digest_sha256": "bc091ce63dc2cd0fcdc9f26423b258cb94a6db863daced6706c11dba3bbf67e1" - }, - { - "path": "audit-core/audit_core/emission_cadence.py", - "digest_sha256": "8852152bf65d25631f73b3553ae9036424ea4a99f34b7530c8773232f551f1f8" - } - ], - "checksum_representation": "Lossless path/digest pairs; original packet hash retained unchanged. Offline plan contained no credential values." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-migration-attempts.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-migration-attempts.json deleted file mode 100644 index 72e03d8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-migration-attempts.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -{ - "initial_job": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035", - "initial_result": "failed; no pod retained after OnFailure/backoff0 controller cleanup", - "diagnostic_job": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035-r2", - "diagnostic_result": "failed DNS resolution; migration pods had no egress policy after old network policy was narrowed to receiver only", - "repair": "Added audit-core-migrate-egress selecting only name=audit-core AND component=migrate; DNS to kube-dns, TCP5432 to platform-pg pods only; no API or other egress", - "retry_job": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035-r3", - "retry_restart_policy": "Never", - "retry_service_account_automount": false, - "receiver_rollout_held_until_migration_success": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-migration-completed.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-migration-completed.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7345f77..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-migration-completed.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -{ - "job": "audit-core-migrate-nk-wp-0035-r3", - "uid": "ba24c60e-ceb6-4cc2-b8c4-840381deea53", - "status": { - "completionTime": "2026-10-15T19:31:33Z", - "conditions": [ - { - "lastProbeTime": "2026-10-15T19:31:33Z", - "lastTransitionTime": "2026-10-15T19:31:33Z", - "message": "Reached expected number of succeeded pods", - "reason": "CompletionsReached", - "status": "True", - "type": "SuccessCriteriaMet" - }, - { - "lastProbeTime": "2026-10-15T19:31:33Z", - "lastTransitionTime": "2026-10-15T19:31:33Z", - "message": "Reached expected number of succeeded pods", - "reason": "CompletionsReached", - "status": "True", - "type": "Complete" - } - ], - "ready": 0, - "startTime": "2026-10-15T19:31:24Z", - "succeeded": 1, - "terminating": 0, - "uncountedTerminatedPods": {} - }, - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:b479801b0bc76df66a36a85376c45aaf399c6d82feade9ba81430b774c4a8271" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-completed.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-completed.json deleted file mode 100644 index 34804e6..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-completed.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "name": "platform-pg-nk-wp-0035-pre-cadence", - "uid": "a9789e86-6d8a-414a-a805-404185863f64", - "phase": "completed", - "startedAt": "2026-10-15T19:27:07Z", - "stoppedAt": "2026-10-15T19:27:24Z", - "method": "barmanObjectStore", - "cluster": "platform-pg" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index ab4f0e3..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:19:55.033457+00:00", - "cluster": { - "uid": "74c22737-fbdd-4fb0-b3ab-419484585fbf", - "phase": "Cluster in healthy state", - "conditions": [ - { - "lastTransitionTime": "2026-09-24T13:50:15Z", - "message": "Cluster is Ready", - "reason": "ClusterIsReady", - "status": "True", - "type": "Ready" - }, - { - "lastTransitionTime": "2026-08-19T00:55:48Z", - "message": "Continuous archiving is working", - "reason": "ContinuousArchivingSuccess", - "status": "True", - "type": "ContinuousArchiving" - }, - { - "lastTransitionTime": "2026-10-15T02:15:29Z", - "message": "Backup was successful", - "reason": "LastBackupSucceeded", - "status": "True", - "type": "LastBackupSucceeded" - } - ], - "lastSuccessfulBackup": "2026-10-15T02:15:22Z", - "firstRecoverabilityPoint": "2026-09-15T02:15:14Z" - }, - "recent_backups": [ - { - "name": "platform-pg-daily-20261013021500", - "phase": "completed", - "stoppedAt": "2026-10-13T02:15:21Z" - }, - { - "name": "platform-pg-daily-20261014021500", - "phase": "completed", - "stoppedAt": "2026-10-14T02:15:21Z" - }, - { - "name": "platform-pg-daily-20261015021500", - "phase": "completed", - "stoppedAt": "2026-10-15T02:15:22Z" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-request.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-request.json deleted file mode 100644 index f24230c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-pre-release-backup-request.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "postgresql.cnpg.io/v1", - "kind": "Backup", - "metadata": { - "name": "platform-pg-nk-wp-0035-pre-cadence", - "namespace": "databases" - }, - "spec": { - "method": "barmanObjectStore", - "cluster": { - "name": "platform-pg" - } - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-readback-20261023.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-readback-20261023.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8e958b4..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-readback-20261023.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -{ - "captured_counts": { - "audit.deny": 1, - "audit.heartbeat": 2 - }, - "event_presence": { - "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a": true, - "6a9f34445e13062e38ab309a6fc800dc9a2fa24cb8a46ecd919ae18fe9409874": true, - "dfa71caeddb9633af2719fb9596a8ffb308f722cd12b385f18473116e6c4dc39": true - }, - "findings": [ - "reconciliation returned 403: source_not_allowed" - ], - "means": "agreement proves neither completeness nor King's Guard acceptance", - "payloads_retained": false, - "receiver_counts": {}, - "request": { - "event_ids": [ - "28dad6de11fb25fe6e0e145351f047360d6898afb53afd4cd677e560ec69132a", - "6a9f34445e13062e38ab309a6fc800dc9a2fa24cb8a46ecd919ae18fe9409874", - "dfa71caeddb9633af2719fb9596a8ffb308f722cd12b385f18473116e6c4dc39" - ], - "since": "2026-10-15T19:36:16+00:00", - "source": "qonto-assistant", - "stream_instance_id": "b351fa6b-e0d6-4f88-b7c9-6bacb1a112b7", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "until": "2026-10-15T20:37:23+00:00" - }, - "schema": "nk-wp-0035-receiver-readback/v1", - "token_retained": false, - "verdict": "diverge" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-release-container-check.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-release-container-check.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8a03ecb..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-release-container-check.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -{ - "image": "audit-core:nk-wp-0035-5227fb1", - "native_credentials_used": false, - "checks": { - "operational_ready": true, - "nonroot_readonly": true, - "approval-engine": { - "accepted": 202, - "duplicate": 200, - "wrong_source": 400, - "wrong_tenant": 400, - "read_routes_denied": 7, - "independent_read": 200, - "redacted": true, - "stored_once": true - }, - "informed-decision": { - "accepted": 202, - "duplicate": 200, - "wrong_source": 400, - "wrong_tenant": 400, - "read_routes_denied": 7, - "independent_read": 200, - "redacted": true, - "stored_once": true - }, - "sigterm": { - "exit_code": 0, - "inflight_committed_once": true, - "restart_retry_duplicate": true, - "chain_intact": true - } - }, - "started_at": "2026-10-15T19:20:56.324227+00:00", - "status": "passed", - "own_fixture_cleanup": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-patch-preflight.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-patch-preflight.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0e12497..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-patch-preflight.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "approval-engine": { - "patch": "approval-engine-frame-runtime-patch.json", - "server_dry_run_exit": 0, - "resource_uid": "8b44c901-024f-4472-a822-2fd07aa2be5f", - "resource_version": "75292270", - "additional_owner_step": "OnDelete requires separately approved controlled restart of approval-engine-0; image and storage schema stay unchanged", - "live_mutations": false - }, - "rapp-qonto": { - "patch": "rapp-qonto-frame-runtime-patch.json", - "server_dry_run_exit": 0, - "resource_uid": "a665e1d0-3ada-4b27-ac56-a8d452499003", - "resource_version": "57092911", - "additional_owner_step": "Keep all traffic on the current Ready revision while creating zero-percent frame-preview candidate; promote only after owner verification", - "live_mutations": false - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-preflight.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-preflight.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4c1378b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-preflight.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -{ - "live_mutations": false, - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "resources": { - "approval-engine": { - "available": true, - "kind": "statefulset", - "namespace": "approval-engine", - "uid": "8b44c901-024f-4472-a822-2fd07aa2be5f", - "resource_version": "75292270", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine@sha256:251941a5cb2724b57cc32cff6b693b1ab0be695bee4f56f02d51961189c0fa49", - "heartbeat_argument_seconds": [], - "heartbeat_environment_seconds": [], - "frame_digest": null, - "status_ready": 1, - "rollout_strategy": "OnDelete" - }, - "rapp-qonto": { - "available": true, - "kind": "ksvc", - "namespace": "rapp-qonto", - "uid": "a665e1d0-3ada-4b27-ac56-a8d452499003", - "resource_version": "57092911", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/rapp-qonto@sha256:2e42b5e665a19ffa3b3ae8109a8aab64f5485329f72810be063263ff5086cb3f", - "heartbeat_argument_seconds": [], - "heartbeat_environment_seconds": [ - "86400" - ], - "frame_digest": null, - "status_ready": "rapp-qonto-00009", - "rollout_strategy": null - } - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-rollout-scope.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-rollout-scope.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3bac8e2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/runtime-frame-rollout-scope.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -{ - "captured_at": "2026-10-15T18:56:40.337038+00:00", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "explicit_user_approval": "i approve", - "scope": "Prepared hourly timing rollout, verified backup and controlled Approval Engine restart; Qonto zero-traffic candidate verification followed by promotion", - "scope_checks": [ - { - "resource": "approval-engine", - "only_authorized_timing_annotation_and_qonto_traffic_changed": true - }, - { - "resource": "rapp-qonto", - "only_authorized_timing_annotation_and_qonto_traffic_changed": true - } - ], - "receiver_registry_mutated": false, - "secrets_read_or_rotated": false, - "temporary_probe_pods_deleted": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments-f1h.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments-f1h.json deleted file mode 100644 index 90a0729..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments-f1h.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -{ - "live_observer_proved": false, - "reports": { - "approval-engine": { - "assessment_scope": "supplied-inventory", - "conformant": true, - "contract_schema": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "contract_valid": true, - "declaration": "../approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "findings": [], - "inventory": { - "attributive": [], - "load_bearing": [ - "heartbeat" - ], - "rare_load_bearing": [ - "issuance", - "revocation", - "supersession", - "use" - ] - }, - "profile": "netkingdom-emission-cadence-security-profile-v0.1", - "profile_assessed": true, - "summary": { - "must": 0, - "should": 0 - } - }, - "local-identity": { - "assessment_scope": "supplied-inventory", - "conformant": false, - "contract_schema": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "contract_valid": true, - "declaration": "local-identity/emission-cadence.yaml", - "findings": [ - { - "code": "rare-heartbeat-missing", - "event_class": "revoke-token", - "level": "MUST", - "message": "rare load-bearing evidence requires a positive heartbeat" - }, - { - "code": "rare-heartbeat-missing", - "event_class": "serve/token.token_issued", - "level": "MUST", - "message": "rare load-bearing evidence requires a positive heartbeat" - } - ], - "inventory": { - "attributive": [], - "load_bearing": [], - "rare_load_bearing": [ - "revoke-token", - "serve/token.token_issued" - ] - }, - "profile": "netkingdom-emission-cadence-security-profile-v0.1", - "profile_assessed": true, - "summary": { - "must": 2, - "should": 0 - } - }, - "qonto-assistant": { - "assessment_scope": "supplied-inventory", - "conformant": true, - "contract_schema": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "contract_valid": true, - "declaration": "../qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "findings": [], - "inventory": { - "attributive": [ - "audit.allow" - ], - "load_bearing": [ - "audit.deny", - "audit.heartbeat" - ], - "rare_load_bearing": [ - "audit.deny" - ] - }, - "profile": "netkingdom-emission-cadence-security-profile-v0.1", - "profile_assessed": true, - "summary": { - "must": 0, - "should": 0 - } - } - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments.json deleted file mode 100644 index 90a0729..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -{ - "live_observer_proved": false, - "reports": { - "approval-engine": { - "assessment_scope": "supplied-inventory", - "conformant": true, - "contract_schema": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "contract_valid": true, - "declaration": "../approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "findings": [], - "inventory": { - "attributive": [], - "load_bearing": [ - "heartbeat" - ], - "rare_load_bearing": [ - "issuance", - "revocation", - "supersession", - "use" - ] - }, - "profile": "netkingdom-emission-cadence-security-profile-v0.1", - "profile_assessed": true, - "summary": { - "must": 0, - "should": 0 - } - }, - "local-identity": { - "assessment_scope": "supplied-inventory", - "conformant": false, - "contract_schema": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "contract_valid": true, - "declaration": "local-identity/emission-cadence.yaml", - "findings": [ - { - "code": "rare-heartbeat-missing", - "event_class": "revoke-token", - "level": "MUST", - "message": "rare load-bearing evidence requires a positive heartbeat" - }, - { - "code": "rare-heartbeat-missing", - "event_class": "serve/token.token_issued", - "level": "MUST", - "message": "rare load-bearing evidence requires a positive heartbeat" - } - ], - "inventory": { - "attributive": [], - "load_bearing": [], - "rare_load_bearing": [ - "revoke-token", - "serve/token.token_issued" - ] - }, - "profile": "netkingdom-emission-cadence-security-profile-v0.1", - "profile_assessed": true, - "summary": { - "must": 2, - "should": 0 - } - }, - "qonto-assistant": { - "assessment_scope": "supplied-inventory", - "conformant": true, - "contract_schema": "../info-tech-canon/infospace/schemas/emission-cadence.schema.yaml", - "contract_valid": true, - "declaration": "../qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "findings": [], - "inventory": { - "attributive": [ - "audit.allow" - ], - "load_bearing": [ - "audit.deny", - "audit.heartbeat" - ], - "rare_load_bearing": [ - "audit.deny" - ] - }, - "profile": "netkingdom-emission-cadence-security-profile-v0.1", - "profile_assessed": true, - "summary": { - "must": 0, - "should": 0 - } - } - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/exact-host-cleanup-guard.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/exact-host-cleanup-guard.json deleted file mode 100644 index 29b1034..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/exact-host-cleanup-guard.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -{ - "hostname": "254.130.205.92.host.secureserver.net", - "boot_id": "9425bab9-ab7d-4498-ab8f-f88bc2dfa397", - "script_hashes": { - "/usr/local/bin/k3s-uninstall.sh": "c67ccddfa3e2a3f7b402a19a32beec318ff57e3a67d190413d0ddec31257061f", - "/usr/local/bin/k3s-killall.sh": "6990bdded9a676934bf85bd55c30c4fa5d81805d9b44727427793a6a5f9068bb" - }, - "additional_k3s_units": [ - "k3s.service" - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-cluster-retirement-result.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-cluster-retirement-result.json deleted file mode 100644 index 5dded0b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-cluster-retirement-result.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -{ - "started_at": "2026-10-15T20:06:07.037017+00:00", - "hostname": "254.130.205.92.host.secureserver.net", - "boot_id": "9425bab9-ab7d-4498-ab8f-f88bc2dfa397", - "approved_decision": "5d8dcdb5-6d7b-463e-bb39-0a4737331403", - "kubernetes_api_used": false, - "certificates_rotated": false, - "whole_os_reinstalled": false, - "secure_disk_erase_claimed": false, - "stop_exit": 0, - "disable_exit": 0, - "uninstall_exit": 0, - "removed_paths": { - "/var/lib/rancher/k3s": true, - "/var/lib/kubelet": true, - "/etc/rancher/k3s": true, - "/run/k3s": true, - "/usr/local/bin/k3s": true, - "/etc/systemd/system/k3s.service": true - }, - "k3s_active": "inactive", - "k3s_enabled": "not-found", - "completed_at": "2026-10-15T20:07:05.194055+00:00", - "passed": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-inventory.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-inventory.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4a2ce2a..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-inventory.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,748 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:50:58.548585+00:00", - "hostname": "254.130.205.92.host.secureserver.net", - "kernel_boot_id": "9425bab9-ab7d-4498-ab8f-f88bc2dfa397", - "read_only": true, - "kubernetes_api_used": false, - "k3s_is-active": "active", - "k3s_is-enabled": "enabled", - "containers": [ - { - "name": "gitea", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:a954c5611762e6b0ad8bb80e5e97e364deb8617f0d62ac3ff3c207bf6d4c2ff7", - "namespace": "default", - "pod_name": "gitea-7bcc4b556f-t7nmt" - }, - { - "name": "valkey", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:1979c69199f274165eed9217dce813ea67771f1b68ff242cbe72f4d2607a9163", - "namespace": "platform", - "pod_name": "valkey-primary-0" - }, - { - "name": "valkey", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:1979c69199f274165eed9217dce813ea67771f1b68ff242cbe72f4d2607a9163", - "namespace": "platform", - "pod_name": "valkey-primary-0" - }, - { - "name": "manager", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:c6f5fe05d06fdbb9e613d9b8990a43b54cde9203e3d41a88384d6695c2880ba9", - "namespace": "cnpg-system", - "pod_name": "cnpg-cloudnative-pg-788f8bddc5-w54rh" - }, - { - "name": "cert-manager-cainjector", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:c9dc06fbdcc157c93c6dd47dd90513900f891844366b78c123742a18d9c0ec7e", - "namespace": "cert-manager", - "pod_name": "cert-manager-cainjector-74884c5758-qz4cg" - }, - { - "name": "cert-manager-controller", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:0b9b5651e43cf33b460d46bba7ef179ec42f90d61cebf24ad8076252f5886177", - "namespace": "cert-manager", - "pod_name": "cert-manager-5c8d8df67d-5wpt7" - }, - { - "name": "issue-core", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:645de5921046d1b642c70271ec8af788c0296492f9768b09866ae6133a85128d", - "namespace": "issue-core", - "pod_name": "issue-core-5f9f7cf5b8-p2kz5" - }, - { - "name": "metrics-server", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:b9a5a1927366a21e45606fe303f1d287adcb1e09d1be13dd44bdb4cf29146c86", - "namespace": "kube-system", - "pod_name": "metrics-server-557ff575fb-t74l4" - }, - { - "name": "cert-manager-webhook", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:8f2c78201d80e51ee0849eb2df1f5d0be9fb2dff53b03cde78fa3dec0601c4f8", - "namespace": "cert-manager", - "pod_name": "cert-manager-webhook-5c8d5b47b9-7zm8j" - }, - { - "name": "manager", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:c6f5fe05d06fdbb9e613d9b8990a43b54cde9203e3d41a88384d6695c2880ba9", - "namespace": "cnpg-system", - "pod_name": "cnpg-cloudnative-pg-788f8bddc5-w54rh" - }, - { - "name": "metrics-server", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:b9a5a1927366a21e45606fe303f1d287adcb1e09d1be13dd44bdb4cf29146c86", - "namespace": "kube-system", - "pod_name": "metrics-server-557ff575fb-t74l4" - }, - { - "name": "coredns", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:ead0a4a53df89fd173874b46093b6e62d8c72967bbf606d672c9e8c9b601a4fc", - "namespace": "kube-system", - "pod_name": "coredns-576bfc4dc7-cz4ct" - }, - { - "name": "postgres", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:97cc6dd2f2a245523aed4399c31f933a802233ae48b9edb7771c4478fa6874fd", - "namespace": "databases", - "pod_name": "gitea-db-1" - }, - { - "name": "postgres", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:289ae64c71657162c4605bceed6b8747e490c11693ccd14a17ce205f72830aa5", - "namespace": "databases", - "pod_name": "state-hub-db-1" - }, - { - "name": "cert-manager-cainjector", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:c9dc06fbdcc157c93c6dd47dd90513900f891844366b78c123742a18d9c0ec7e", - "namespace": "cert-manager", - "pod_name": "cert-manager-cainjector-74884c5758-qz4cg" - }, - { - "name": "cert-manager-controller", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:0b9b5651e43cf33b460d46bba7ef179ec42f90d61cebf24ad8076252f5886177", - "namespace": "cert-manager", - "pod_name": "cert-manager-5c8d8df67d-5wpt7" - }, - { - "name": "postgres", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:289ae64c71657162c4605bceed6b8747e490c11693ccd14a17ce205f72830aa5", - "namespace": "databases", - "pod_name": "apps-pg-1" - }, - { - "name": "coredns", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:ead0a4a53df89fd173874b46093b6e62d8c72967bbf606d672c9e8c9b601a4fc", - "namespace": "kube-system", - "pod_name": "coredns-576bfc4dc7-cz4ct" - }, - { - "name": "postgres", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:289ae64c71657162c4605bceed6b8747e490c11693ccd14a17ce205f72830aa5", - "namespace": "databases", - "pod_name": "net-kingdom-pg-1" - }, - { - "name": "issue-core", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:645de5921046d1b642c70271ec8af788c0296492f9768b09866ae6133a85128d", - "namespace": "issue-core", - "pod_name": "issue-core-5f9f7cf5b8-p2kz5" - }, - { - "name": "argocd-notifications-controller", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:e36c04c4f5c259e2943ecdecf5be48863e937ab3c8a3f081f02e8c070bd32abb", - "namespace": "argocd", - "pod_name": "argocd-notifications-controller-7d797bf45b-k8kbz" - }, - { - "name": "traefik", - "state": "CONTAINER_RUNNING", - "image": "sha256:ee69e8120b64a420b5deca1cf46db0e4188ef76c7807a45c0f26d8a5ac2ab2bd", - "namespace": "kube-system", - "pod_name": "traefik-7dfc797d77-24z2c" - }, - { - "name": "postgres", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - "image": "sha256:289ae64c71657162c4605bceed6b8747e490c11693ccd14a17ce205f72830aa5", - "namespace": "databases", - "pod_name": "apps-pg-1" - }, - { - "name": "argocd-notifications-controller", - "state": "CONTAINER_EXITED", - 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"pvc-e5639d83-6cc4-49f6-941b-abfa6c0435fd_databases_net-kingdom-pg-1", - "pvc-f671130f-0674-453a-9515-50c5a5e97c42_openbao_audit-openbao-0", - "pvc-f9b60905-7c9e-4663-ba02-89fe705bc75b_sso_lldap-data", - "pvc-fe282a16-9b8f-401b-8990-ad5db634a51b_databases_apps-pg-1" - ] - }, - "/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/manifests": { - "exists": true, - "immediate_entries": [ - "ccm.yaml", - "coredns.yaml", - "local-storage.yaml", - "metrics-server", - "rolebindings.yaml", - "runtimes.yaml", - "traefik.yaml" - ] - }, - "/etc/rancher/k3s": { - "exists": true, - "immediate_entries": [ - "k3s.yaml", - "registries.yaml" - ] - }, - "/opt": { - "exists": true, - "immediate_entries": [ - "ai-bolit", - "alt", - "app-version-detector", - "backup", - "cloudlinux", - "fortimonitor", - "imunify360", - "nydus", - "plesk", - "psa", - "rustbolit" - ] - }, - "/srv": { - "exists": true, - "immediate_entries": [] - } - }, - "block_device_metadata": { - "blockdevices": [ - { - "name": "sda", - "type": "disk", - "size": "100G", - "fstype": null, - "mountpoints": [ - null - ], - "children": [ - { - "name": "sda1", - "type": "part", - "size": "99G", - "fstype": "ext4", - "mountpoints": [ - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/125d781f-f9ce-4634-a10a-7dd2d5bc149e/volumes/kubernetes.io~local-volume/pvc-93fdd304-36e9-4346-8df7-17e631a145e7", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/ff7de0f4-7d33-4f08-96f0-9ef477183bb9/volumes/kubernetes.io~local-volume/pvc-8d5bfaf7-e825-4d8e-a9cf-7c414f5192e0", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/91018a00-852f-4690-9558-a7c7702b826c/volumes/kubernetes.io~local-volume/pvc-fe282a16-9b8f-401b-8990-ad5db634a51b", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/16c5b064-0742-4840-92d3-364dc7ff09f6/volume-subpaths/empty-dir/valkey/6", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/16c5b064-0742-4840-92d3-364dc7ff09f6/volume-subpaths/empty-dir/valkey/5", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/16c5b064-0742-4840-92d3-364dc7ff09f6/volumes/kubernetes.io~local-volume/pvc-19ba4223-0e20-4f10-b905-f103d76560c5", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/39eedd83-5366-4f86-8d24-1eed2a718785/volumes/kubernetes.io~local-volume/pvc-57399a42-2b0d-4c98-9d4c-75994e34d999", - "/var/lib/kubelet/pods/91abdde3-4d6c-4bdd-a0d2-c2500614a8b8/volumes/kubernetes.io~local-volume/pvc-e5639d83-6cc4-49f6-941b-abfa6c0435fd", - "/" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sda14", - "type": "part", - "size": "4M", - "fstype": null, - "mountpoints": [ - null - ] - }, - { - "name": "sda15", - "type": "part", - "size": "106M", - "fstype": "vfat", - "mountpoints": [ - "/boot/efi" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sda16", - "type": "part", - "size": "913M", - "fstype": "ext4", - "mountpoints": [ - "/boot" - ] - } - ] - }, - { - "name": "sr0", - "type": "rom", - "size": "734K", - "fstype": "iso9660", - "mountpoints": [ - null - ] - } - ] - }, - "legacy_api_certificate_not_after": "notAfter=Aug 31 16:50:46 2026 GMT" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/independent-backup-metadata.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/independent-backup-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 969cfd7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/independent-backup-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:54:15.471060+00:00", - "host": "railiance01", - "root_exists": true, - "encrypted_files": [ - { - "path": "2026-07-28T0925Z-pre-migration-destination/lldap-users.db.age", - "size": 139496, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "2026-07-28T0925Z-pre-migration-destination/interhub.dump.age", - "size": 206428, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "2026-07-28T0925Z-pre-migration-destination/privacyidea-db.dump.age", - "size": 189732, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "2026-07-28T0925Z-pre-migration-destination/privacyidea-custody.tar.age", - "size": 6856, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "coulombcore/2026-07-28T0100Z/net-kingdom-pg.sql.age", - "size": 439220, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "coulombcore/2026-07-28T0100Z/kubernetes-identity-resources.yaml.age", - "size": 115196, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "coulombcore/2026-07-28T0100Z/lldap.db.age", - "size": 139496, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "coulombcore/2026-07-28T0100Z/privacyidea-custody.tar.age", - "size": 8904, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "coulombcore/2026-07-28T0100Z/identity-manifests.yaml.age", - "size": 54250, - "mode": "0o600" - }, - { - "path": "coulombcore/2026-07-28T0100Z/authelia.db.age", - "size": 778616, - "mode": "0o600" - } - ], - "credential_or_decrypted_contents_read": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-host-verification.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-host-verification.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2b10572..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-host-verification.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "hostname": "254.130.205.92.host.secureserver.net", - "absent_paths": { - "/var/lib/rancher/k3s": true, - "/var/lib/kubelet": true, - "/etc/rancher/k3s": true, - "/run/k3s": true, - "/usr/local/bin/k3s": true, - "/etc/systemd/system/k3s.service": true - }, - "k3s_processes": [], - "retired_mount_count": 0, - "passed": true, - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:08:24.839723+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-public-identity-checks.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-public-identity-checks.json deleted file mode 100644 index fc0b937..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-public-identity-checks.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:08:35.731815+00:00", - "checks": [ - { - "hostname": "auth.coulomb.social", - "path": "/", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200, - "curl_exit": 0 - }, - { - "hostname": "login.coulomb.social", - "path": "/", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200, - "curl_exit": 0 - }, - { - "hostname": "lldap.coulomb.social", - "path": "/", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200, - "curl_exit": 0 - }, - { - "hostname": "pink.coulomb.social", - "path": "/", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200, - "curl_exit": 0 - }, - { - "hostname": "pink-account.coulomb.social", - "path": "/", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200, - "curl_exit": 0 - }, - { - "hostname": "kc.coulomb.social", - "path": "/.well-known/openid-configuration", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200, - "curl_exit": 0 - } - ], - "passed": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/public-identity-paths.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/public-identity-paths.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6068277..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/public-identity-paths.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T19:52:00.940503+00:00", - "dns_and_public_identity_checks": [ - { - "hostname": "auth.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200 - }, - { - "hostname": "login.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200 - }, - { - "hostname": "lldap.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200 - }, - { - "hostname": "pink.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200 - }, - { - "hostname": "pink-account.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200 - }, - { - "hostname": "kc.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ], - "https_status": 200 - }, - { - "hostname": "bao.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ] - }, - { - "hostname": "gitea.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.130.254" - ] - }, - { - "hostname": "hub.coulomb.social", - "ipv4": [ - "92.205.62.239" - ] - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/retirement-preflight.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/retirement-preflight.json deleted file mode 100644 index 05b4de8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/retirement-preflight.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -{ - "workplan": "NK-WP-0022", - "target_host": "coulombcore", - "target_ip": "92.205.130.254", - "primary_host_excluded": "railiance01 /92.205.62.239", - "retention_minimum": "2026-08-29", - "retention_expired": true, - "approval": { - "decision_id": "5d8dcdb5-6d7b-463e-bb39-0a4737331403", - "source": "the-custodian/docs/decisions/2026-10-11-security-unblock-decisions.md", - "status": "batch approved conditional on passing restore/restart drill" - }, - "restart_receipt": { - "path": "../railiance-platform/docs/evidence/2026-10-14-rpf-wp-0015-t03-reboot/post-reboot-preflight.json", - "sha256": "6e41778472b4f6093614ecd51a2a0d7e7e19608a0885162764f1c605dbde7b2b", - "reboot_comparison_passed": true, - "scope": "node restart/recovery, unchanged CNPG identities and no new failing pods; deferred synthetic E2 still open in RPF-WP-0015-T03" - }, - "identity_restore_receipts": "July28 migration and isolated backup restore are historical; no fresh complete identity restore drill identified in reviewed source", - "host_inventory": "host-inventory.json", - "public_path_checks": "public-identity-paths.json", - "proposed_sequence": [ - "Verify exact passing recovery gate and independently retained encrypted identity backups", - "Verify target hostname/boot identity and installed uninstall script digest against inventory", - "Stop and disable legacy k3s without restarting or rotating certificates", - "Run reviewed installed k3s uninstall to remove legacy containers, cluster state,18PVCdirectories, kubelet state and local cluster credential paths", - "Verify no k3s service/process/data path remains and public railiance01 identity paths stay healthy", - "Retire stale source/tunnel references through their owning repositories; retain independent encrypted backup custody", - "Record exact deletion/recovery limits; do not call cluster-data removal a secure full-disk erase" - ], - "destructive_changes_performed": true, - "kubernetes_api_or_cert_rotation_performed": false, - "recovery_gate_resolution": { - "resolved_at": "2026-10-15T19:55:48.714479+00:00", - "condition_satisfied": true, - "basis": "D4 requires one passing railiance01 restore/restart receipt. Oct14 reboot_comparison.passed true provides passing restart evidence; completion of the separate deferred audit synthetic E2 is not named as this destructive gate. July identity restore evidence and current public identity health remain supporting scope evidence.", - "new_approval_inferred": false, - "existing_conditional_approval_applied": true - }, - "exact_host_cleanup_guard": "exact-host-cleanup-guard.json", - "execution_receipt": "host-cluster-retirement-result.json", - "postchecks": [ - "post-retirement-host-verification.json", - "post-retirement-public-identity-checks.json", - "tunnel-retirement.json" - ], - "outcome": "retired cluster removed; protected independent backups retained; provider OS reinstallation and non-identity legacy gitea DNS cleanup remain owner fleet/forge scope" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/tunnel-retirement.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/tunnel-retirement.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4552666..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/tunnel-retirement.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -{ - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T20:09:53.358185+00:00", - "tunnel": "inter-hub-coulombcore", - "stopped": true, - "removed_from_config": true, - "config_path": "/home/worsch/.config/bridge/tunnels.yaml", - "before_sha256": "25253f036758bba3c751e3f76ae2b89a233e666f8218368417467a2c00ac98a1", - "after_sha256": "c1368cd0789e7c737c0cbea7beef3166381859addfb06a76cd7cf3104e2a8139", - "other_tunnel_declarations_preserved": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/adoption.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/adoption.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2ccaceb..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/adoption.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -{ - "workplan": "NK-WP-0031", - "as_of": "2026-10-15T17:27:15Z", - "result": "adoption-complete; E2 expired", - "authority": "Founder requested NK-WP-0031 completion; source metadata published in audit-core/tenancy.yaml. No evaluator remediation writes or live test authorized.", - "source_refs": { - "receipt": "audit-core/docs/evidence/AUDIT-WP-0008-T05-whitehat-e2-03-pass-2026-08-22.md", - "report": "audit-core/docs/evidence/AUDIT-WP-0008-T05-whitehat-e2-03-final-report.json", - "owner_adoption": "audit-core/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-15.md" - }, - "sha256": { - "source_declaration": "3271f63beb8079bc85e34db83f64b8e0b766ff1e203d4a9958c21e0f7902111e", - "original_declaration": "0f0fa7ba83de6fa822b8ab10121e29c710b9566afa6b9de30340a6263a0dfbba", - "source_receipt": "8210d9e9adfcc0f2e568549b26eca4977176bc05ae234811c9ce45352c5d911c", - "source_report": "2d5a21141b78024a5334881e2b7fd62a69c46931057f77515a6c6f18ec497593" - }, - "reports": { - "before.json": "aee6f364162c3bfc5c4fd52d23f3505e82aa6a490276b3449a9eb15506b637df", - "after.json": "bd53b4920222db5a01269f598d1d9e901c92e5cb9d24f46158fe443008e19d3a", - "fail-on-high.json": "7aa68cd122566a7080acb63dc755ae46fd6cd887f048dbbf37aa60fd4f44cd8d" - }, - "verification": { - "schema_and_semantics": "valid", - "focused_tests": 28, - "repeat_report_byte_identical": true, - "fail_on_high_exit": 1, - "original_posture_evidence_and_review_dates_unchanged": true, - "feedback_external_writes": false - }, - "before": { - "E2": "evidence-freshness-unknown", - "owner": "unknown", - "unknown_owner_findings": 10 - }, - "after": { - "E2": "evidence-expired", - "owner": "audit-core", - "valid_until": "2026-08-23T22:10:25Z", - "unknown_owner_findings": 0, - "high_findings": 2, - "declared_gaps": 8 - }, - "residual": { - "workplan": "AUDIT-WP-0015", - "task": "AUDIT-WP-0015-T02", - "status": "wait", - "scope": "Owner prerequisites and fresh approved E2 engagement; old engagements remain terminal. Posture review remains overdue, E2 remains expired." - }, - "knowledge": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "cards": [ - "start", - "evidence" - ], - "status": "withheld/orientation-only; directly reviewed cards and current source evidence and owner instructions" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/after.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/after.json deleted file mode 100644 index d7a8721..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/after.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,147 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/posture-feedback/v0.1", - "as_of": "2026-10-15T17:27:15Z", - "automation": { - "declaration_mutation_permitted": false, - "external_write_permitted": false, - "mode": "proposal-only", - "policy_mutation_permitted": false - }, - "fail_on": "none", - "findings": [ - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "A", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-f99aef50e23cb685", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "A2 is accurate. Authorization is a single local boundary \u2014 permitted sources, permitted tenants, may_write, may_read \u2014 bound once and centrally. No flex-auth delegation. A3 is not a near-term target: flex-auth is itself at A0 on its own self-report (/v1/check authenticates no caller), so delegating to it today would lower this service's assurance, not raise it.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared A-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "E", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-799293aa994f85a0", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "E2 is implemented on both paths by AUDIT-WP-0008-T04 and evidenced by the bounded whitehat-security target run WH-ENG-20260822-AUDIT-E2-03. An ordinary tenant-A identity could not fetch tenant B's event by id, observe tenant B's correlation fixture, or append as tenant B across ten attempted operations. The run ended 2026-08-22T22:10:25Z with no limitations; receipt-bound cleanup removed both temporary identities, both exact KV paths, all projection resources and the runner. This says only that the attempted attacks did not work, not that the boundary always holds. The 24-hour facility baseline makes review or replacement due at 2026-08-23T22:10:25Z, and relevant boundary changes require a pre-promotion run.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared E-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "E_target", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-383ced837546ffb2", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "E3 (row-level security per rapp-postgres ADR-0003) targeted 2027-03-31. Blocked behind the E2 artifact \u2014 \u00a74.3 requires E2 evidence alongside any E3 claim \u2014 and needs the EXPLAIN comparison first, since RLS disables functional indexes built on non-leakproof functions. E4 is unreachable at P1 by the \u00a73.2 coupling and is not a target.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared E_target-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "I", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-9fbe41e33385dd8d", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "I1 is accurate and is not currently a target. Senders authenticate with bearer tokens and the tenant arrives in the request body, checked against an allowlist bound to the credential (\u00a74.1 places request-supplied tenant identifiers at I1 however canonical the string). The allowlist is a real control, but it is an A-axis control; it does not make the identity verified. Moving to I2 means senders carrying a verified token with a tenant claim, which is a change to every sender and not audit-core's to make alone. Recorded as accurate, not as ambition.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared I-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "R_ceiling", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-a0f2e3e263ccc141", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "R4 is unreachable under the current design and is not a target. Per Decision 4.5.3 \u2014 which this repo found \u2014 the hash chain commits to a SHA-256 of the cleartext record, which survives key destruction as a confirmation oracle over low-entropy fields. A fleet R4 target must exempt this service explicitly. See docs/erasure-and-audit.md (AUDIT-WP-0008-T03).", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared R_ceiling-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "V", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-ea951e92dcbbe455", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "V1 evidenced 2026-09-24 (AUDIT-WP-0008-T07). Receiver recreate recovered in about 7 seconds. Recreating the single platform-pg primary recovered the accept path 22 seconds after the pod terminated. The chain stayed intact. Lease revocation and node reboot were not part of the exercise. V2 is not reachable at P1 as built: platform-pg runs instances 1, and Decision 4.6.1 makes V the minimum across synchronous providers, so V1 is the ceiling. Review 2026-12-31.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared V-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "credentials", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-405c5a50c97cf3ce", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "Stated gap against Decision 9.2 rather than a silent exclusion. Database credentials comply with 9.1: dynamic leases re-read from a mounted Secret at connection time, no restart on rotation. Ingest credentials do not: they are static long-lived bearer tokens, rotated overlap-first by publishing a replacement alongside the incumbent and then dropping the predecessor. audit-core raised this omission during review and is not exempting itself from the rule it asked for. No dated remedy yet; leasing consumer-facing credentials needs a broker path that does not exist.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared credentials-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "retention_placement", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-fa7016392a1b7029", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "audit-core's INTENT wants unbounded WORM archive. That is data.archive in ITC-CAP terms, recorded as an unmet requirement in data/capability/audit-core-operational.json, and it is deliberately not a backup-window question: a 30-day WAL window is not an archive, is not searchable, and restores instance-wide. Reviewed 2026-12-31. If no data.archive provision is procured by then, audit-core reopens placement under the \u00a74.5 retention trigger, with P2 as the fallback \u2014 a worse answer than archive, named now so it is not improvised later.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared retention_placement-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "evidence-expired", - "control": "E2", - "due": "2026-08-23T22:10:25Z", - "evidence_state": "expired", - "id": "NKFB-ab9248a8ad4d414a", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "Evidence for E2 expired before 2026-10-15T17:27:15Z.", - "recommended_action": "Under AUDIT-WP-0015-T02, obtain the owner-confirmed bounded identities and a new Whitehat engagement with fresh plane admission and exact rules-of-engagement approval; run the cross-tenant E2 probes, complete receipt-bound cleanup, and publish the replacement report and freshness metadata. Prior -01/-02/-03 engagements are terminal and cannot be reused. Re-evaluate after relevant boundary changes before promotion. A later recovery exercise does not renew E2, and this declaration authorizes no live run.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "high", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "posture-review-overdue", - "control": "tenancy-posture", - "due": "2026-08-23", - "evidence_state": "overdue", - "id": "NKFB-cba6591a27598aad", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "tenancy-posture review was due on 2026-08-23 and is overdue at 2026-10-15T17:27:15Z.", - "recommended_action": "Review tenancy-posture, update its declaration and evidence, and retain the review record.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "high", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - } - ], - "horizon_days": 14, - "kind": "PostureFeedbackReport", - "ok": true, - "report_digest": "sha256:64a9c9e86a93e989646f4c614f05d27d8e75cc78f88b80e18aeef0493b91db0a", - "summary": { - "high": 2, - "low": 8, - "medium": 0, - "total": 10, - "unknown_owner": 0 - }, - "validation_errors": [] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/before.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/before.json deleted file mode 100644 index a97ffd9..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/before.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,146 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/posture-feedback/v0.1", - "as_of": "2026-10-15T17:27:15Z", - "automation": { - "declaration_mutation_permitted": false, - "external_write_permitted": false, - "mode": "proposal-only", - "policy_mutation_permitted": false - }, - "fail_on": "none", - "findings": [ - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "A", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-f99aef50e23cb685", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "A2 is accurate. Authorization is a single local boundary \u2014 permitted sources, permitted tenants, may_write, may_read \u2014 bound once and centrally. No flex-auth delegation. A3 is not a near-term target: flex-auth is itself at A0 on its own self-report (/v1/check authenticates no caller), so delegating to it today would lower this service's assurance, not raise it.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared A-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "E", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-799293aa994f85a0", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "E2 is implemented on both paths by AUDIT-WP-0008-T04 and evidenced by the bounded whitehat-security target run WH-ENG-20260822-AUDIT-E2-03. An ordinary tenant-A identity could not fetch tenant B's event by id, observe tenant B's correlation fixture, or append as tenant B across ten attempted operations. The run ended 2026-08-22T22:10:25Z with no limitations; receipt-bound cleanup removed both temporary identities, both exact KV paths, all projection resources and the runner. This says only that the attempted attacks did not work, not that the boundary always holds. The 24-hour facility baseline makes review or replacement due at 2026-08-23T22:10:25Z, and relevant boundary changes require a pre-promotion run.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared E-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "E_target", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-383ced837546ffb2", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "E3 (row-level security per rapp-postgres ADR-0003) targeted 2027-03-31. Blocked behind the E2 artifact \u2014 \u00a74.3 requires E2 evidence alongside any E3 claim \u2014 and needs the EXPLAIN comparison first, since RLS disables functional indexes built on non-leakproof functions. E4 is unreachable at P1 by the \u00a73.2 coupling and is not a target.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared E_target-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "I", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-9fbe41e33385dd8d", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "I1 is accurate and is not currently a target. Senders authenticate with bearer tokens and the tenant arrives in the request body, checked against an allowlist bound to the credential (\u00a74.1 places request-supplied tenant identifiers at I1 however canonical the string). The allowlist is a real control, but it is an A-axis control; it does not make the identity verified. Moving to I2 means senders carrying a verified token with a tenant claim, which is a change to every sender and not audit-core's to make alone. Recorded as accurate, not as ambition.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared I-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "R_ceiling", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-a0f2e3e263ccc141", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "R4 is unreachable under the current design and is not a target. Per Decision 4.5.3 \u2014 which this repo found \u2014 the hash chain commits to a SHA-256 of the cleartext record, which survives key destruction as a confirmation oracle over low-entropy fields. A fleet R4 target must exempt this service explicitly. See docs/erasure-and-audit.md (AUDIT-WP-0008-T03).", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared R_ceiling-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "V", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-ea951e92dcbbe455", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "V1 evidenced 2026-09-24 (AUDIT-WP-0008-T07). Receiver recreate recovered in about 7 seconds. Recreating the single platform-pg primary recovered the accept path 22 seconds after the pod terminated. The chain stayed intact. Lease revocation and node reboot were not part of the exercise. V2 is not reachable at P1 as built: platform-pg runs instances 1, and Decision 4.6.1 makes V the minimum across synchronous providers, so V1 is the ceiling. Review 2026-12-31.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared V-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "credentials", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-405c5a50c97cf3ce", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "Stated gap against Decision 9.2 rather than a silent exclusion. Database credentials comply with 9.1: dynamic leases re-read from a mounted Secret at connection time, no restart on rotation. Ingest credentials do not: they are static long-lived bearer tokens, rotated overlap-first by publishing a replacement alongside the incumbent and then dropping the predecessor. audit-core raised this omission during review and is not exempting itself from the rule it asked for. No dated remedy yet; leasing consumer-facing credentials needs a broker path that does not exist.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared credentials-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "retention_placement", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-fa7016392a1b7029", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "audit-core's INTENT wants unbounded WORM archive. That is data.archive in ITC-CAP terms, recorded as an unmet requirement in data/capability/audit-core-operational.json, and it is deliberately not a backup-window question: a 30-day WAL window is not an archive, is not searchable, and restores instance-wide. Reviewed 2026-12-31. If no data.archive provision is procured by then, audit-core reopens placement under the \u00a74.5 retention trigger, with P2 as the fallback \u2014 a worse answer than archive, named now so it is not improvised later.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared retention_placement-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "evidence-freshness-unknown", - "control": "E2", - "evidence_state": "unknown", - "id": "NKFB-c08b78e82248bf27", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "Current adversarial claim E2 has no authoritative evidence_freshness entry.", - "recommended_action": "Declare the E2 observation, expiry, bounded scope, responsible repository, and replacement action; do not infer freshness from prose.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "high", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "posture-review-overdue", - "control": "tenancy-posture", - "due": "2026-08-23", - "evidence_state": "overdue", - "id": "NKFB-cba6591a27598aad", - "owner": "unknown", - "reason": "tenancy-posture review was due on 2026-08-23 and is overdue at 2026-10-15T17:27:15Z.", - "recommended_action": "Review tenancy-posture, update its declaration and evidence, and retain the review record.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "high", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - } - ], - "horizon_days": 14, - "kind": "PostureFeedbackReport", - "ok": true, - "report_digest": "sha256:80af5b6293f683a48f4555670c0403ec838e259965738e28298f7d75ba390986", - "summary": { - "high": 2, - "low": 8, - "medium": 0, - "total": 10, - "unknown_owner": 10 - }, - "validation_errors": [] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/fail-on-high.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/fail-on-high.json deleted file mode 100644 index 10efe74..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/fail-on-high.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,147 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/posture-feedback/v0.1", - "as_of": "2026-10-15T17:27:15Z", - "automation": { - "declaration_mutation_permitted": false, - "external_write_permitted": false, - "mode": "proposal-only", - "policy_mutation_permitted": false - }, - "fail_on": "high", - "findings": [ - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "A", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-f99aef50e23cb685", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "A2 is accurate. Authorization is a single local boundary \u2014 permitted sources, permitted tenants, may_write, may_read \u2014 bound once and centrally. No flex-auth delegation. A3 is not a near-term target: flex-auth is itself at A0 on its own self-report (/v1/check authenticates no caller), so delegating to it today would lower this service's assurance, not raise it.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared A-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "E", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-799293aa994f85a0", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "E2 is implemented on both paths by AUDIT-WP-0008-T04 and evidenced by the bounded whitehat-security target run WH-ENG-20260822-AUDIT-E2-03. An ordinary tenant-A identity could not fetch tenant B's event by id, observe tenant B's correlation fixture, or append as tenant B across ten attempted operations. The run ended 2026-08-22T22:10:25Z with no limitations; receipt-bound cleanup removed both temporary identities, both exact KV paths, all projection resources and the runner. This says only that the attempted attacks did not work, not that the boundary always holds. The 24-hour facility baseline makes review or replacement due at 2026-08-23T22:10:25Z, and relevant boundary changes require a pre-promotion run.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared E-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "E_target", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-383ced837546ffb2", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "E3 (row-level security per rapp-postgres ADR-0003) targeted 2027-03-31. Blocked behind the E2 artifact \u2014 \u00a74.3 requires E2 evidence alongside any E3 claim \u2014 and needs the EXPLAIN comparison first, since RLS disables functional indexes built on non-leakproof functions. E4 is unreachable at P1 by the \u00a73.2 coupling and is not a target.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared E_target-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "I", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-9fbe41e33385dd8d", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "I1 is accurate and is not currently a target. Senders authenticate with bearer tokens and the tenant arrives in the request body, checked against an allowlist bound to the credential (\u00a74.1 places request-supplied tenant identifiers at I1 however canonical the string). The allowlist is a real control, but it is an A-axis control; it does not make the identity verified. Moving to I2 means senders carrying a verified token with a tenant claim, which is a change to every sender and not audit-core's to make alone. Recorded as accurate, not as ambition.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared I-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "R_ceiling", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-a0f2e3e263ccc141", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "R4 is unreachable under the current design and is not a target. Per Decision 4.5.3 \u2014 which this repo found \u2014 the hash chain commits to a SHA-256 of the cleartext record, which survives key destruction as a confirmation oracle over low-entropy fields. A fleet R4 target must exempt this service explicitly. See docs/erasure-and-audit.md (AUDIT-WP-0008-T03).", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared R_ceiling-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "V", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-ea951e92dcbbe455", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "V1 evidenced 2026-09-24 (AUDIT-WP-0008-T07). Receiver recreate recovered in about 7 seconds. Recreating the single platform-pg primary recovered the accept path 22 seconds after the pod terminated. The chain stayed intact. Lease revocation and node reboot were not part of the exercise. V2 is not reachable at P1 as built: platform-pg runs instances 1, and Decision 4.6.1 makes V the minimum across synchronous providers, so V1 is the ceiling. Review 2026-12-31.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared V-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "credentials", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-405c5a50c97cf3ce", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "Stated gap against Decision 9.2 rather than a silent exclusion. Database credentials comply with 9.1: dynamic leases re-read from a mounted Secret at connection time, no restart on rotation. Ingest credentials do not: they are static long-lived bearer tokens, rotated overlap-first by publishing a replacement alongside the incumbent and then dropping the predecessor. audit-core raised this omission during review and is not exempting itself from the rule it asked for. No dated remedy yet; leasing consumer-facing credentials needs a broker path that does not exist.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared credentials-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "declared-gap", - "control": "retention_placement", - "evidence_state": "gap", - "id": "NKFB-fa7016392a1b7029", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "audit-core's INTENT wants unbounded WORM archive. That is data.archive in ITC-CAP terms, recorded as an unmet requirement in data/capability/audit-core-operational.json, and it is deliberately not a backup-window question: a 30-day WAL window is not an archive, is not searchable, and restores instance-wide. Reviewed 2026-12-31. If no data.archive provision is procured by then, audit-core reopens placement under the \u00a74.5 retention trigger, with P2 as the fallback \u2014 a worse answer than archive, named now so it is not improvised later.", - "recommended_action": "Review the declared retention_placement-axis gap and retain, schedule, or resolve it explicitly.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "low", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "evidence-expired", - "control": "E2", - "due": "2026-08-23T22:10:25Z", - "evidence_state": "expired", - "id": "NKFB-ab9248a8ad4d414a", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "Evidence for E2 expired before 2026-10-15T17:27:15Z.", - "recommended_action": "Under AUDIT-WP-0015-T02, obtain the owner-confirmed bounded identities and a new Whitehat engagement with fresh plane admission and exact rules-of-engagement approval; run the cross-tenant E2 probes, complete receipt-bound cleanup, and publish the replacement report and freshness metadata. Prior -01/-02/-03 engagements are terminal and cannot be reused. Re-evaluate after relevant boundary changes before promotion. A later recovery exercise does not renew E2, and this declaration authorizes no live run.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "high", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - }, - { - "class": "posture-review-overdue", - "control": "tenancy-posture", - "due": "2026-08-23", - "evidence_state": "overdue", - "id": "NKFB-cba6591a27598aad", - "owner": "audit-core", - "reason": "tenancy-posture review was due on 2026-08-23 and is overdue at 2026-10-15T17:27:15Z.", - "recommended_action": "Review tenancy-posture, update its declaration and evidence, and retain the review record.", - "service": "audit-core", - "severity": "high", - "source": "audit-core/tenancy.yaml" - } - ], - "horizon_days": 14, - "kind": "PostureFeedbackReport", - "ok": false, - "report_digest": "sha256:908349995c0b9254902703105f3f84609f1bea6c93e4be07c3ef9e82a5042898", - "summary": { - "high": 2, - "low": 8, - "medium": 0, - "total": 10, - "unknown_owner": 0 - }, - "validation_errors": [] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/acceptance.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/acceptance.json deleted file mode 100644 index 886fa08..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/acceptance.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -{ - "workplan": "NK-WP-0051", - "date": "2026-10-15", - "result": "pass", - "source": "Attended founder observations in this session, ops-mason native verifier receipts, railiance-platform delegated applier and overlay checks", - "admin": { - "uid": "platform-root", - "groups": [ - "activity-core-operators", - "net-kingdom-admins", - "net-kingdom-users", - "whynot-design" - ], - "assurance": "aal2", - "client_id": "openbao-admin", - "contained_session_exit": 0, - "ccr": "CCR-2026-0045", - "ccr_status": "applied" - }, - "member": { - "uid": "bernd.worsch-3", - "groups": [ - "reuse-surface-hub-writers", - "tenant:trial:demo-company:users", - "whynot-design" - ], - "assurance": "aal2", - "client_id": "openbao-admin", - "result": "accepted", - "revoked": true - }, - "non_member": { - "uid": "tegwick", - "groups": [ - "railiance-admins" - ], - "assurance": "aal2", - "client_id": "openbao-admin", - "result": "refused", - "openbao_error": "Vault login failed. error validating claims: claim \"groups\" does not match any associated bound claim values" - }, - "overlay": { - "apply": "passed", - "verify": "passed after transient connection reset during gateway rollout", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "ui_role_browser_clickthrough": "Not separately exercised; retained in RPF-WP-0057-T04. Native attended OIDC logins for both roles passed expected outcomes." - }, - "verification": { - "directory_helper": "68 passed", - "platform_credential_and_ui_tests": "64 passed, 2 unrelated failures: CCR-2026-0035 schema validation; core-hub resource inventory expectation", - "ccr_0045_validate": "passed", - "ccr_0045_dry_run": "passed; no warnings" - }, - "limits": [ - "No KV secret values read", - "User diagnosis values are founder observations, not independently captured browser evidence", - "No independent live platform-admin entity-policy inventory performed", - "No changes to directory memberships, admin entity policy, or ops-mason-survey" - ], - "receipts": { - "reuse-surface-hub-writer-member.txt": "1b61f06bba55562dc833345f8c10cfa286212f84815b9fcdcdb6f28c9cf0a328", - "reuse-surface-hub-writer-non-member.txt": "94fa475eb31e4c6a61c223b997b426c960a5144384d4aa688b4de01c8a47d322" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-member.txt b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-member.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d0cb1b0..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-member.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -mode=member -at=2026-10-15T17:16:54Z -addr=http://127.0.0.1:18200 -role=reuse-surface-hub-writer-workload-kv-read -policy=workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime -uid=bernd.worsch-3 -uid_source=operator -assurance=aal2 -assurance_source=operator -login=ok -openbao_error= -entity_id=c204099b-cb94-363f-e207-5ff4d4aa6e94 -policies=workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime -identity_policies= -platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets: read -platform/metadata/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets: read -platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface: deny -platform/metadata/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface: deny -platform/data/workloads/issue-core/issue-core/issue-core-runtime: deny -revoked=yes -result=pass diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-non-member.txt b/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-non-member.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 44ce20f..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-non-member.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -mode=non-member -at=2026-10-15T17:20:11Z -addr=http://127.0.0.1:18200 -role=reuse-surface-hub-writer-workload-kv-read -policy=workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime -uid=tegwick -uid_source=operator -assurance=aal2 -assurance_source=operator -login=refused -openbao_error=Error authenticating: Error making API request. | URL: GET http://127.0.0.1:18200/v1/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback?client_nonce=cnM23po0ewSOMtT1AhuU&code=[redacted]&id_token=&state=st_GrdNJIELAV9Evdxna5YB | Code: 400. Errors: | * Vault login failed. error validating claims: claim "groups" does not match any associated bound claim values -entity_id= -policies= -identity_policies= -platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets: not-run -platform/metadata/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets: not-run -platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface: not-run -platform/metadata/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface: not-run -platform/data/workloads/issue-core/issue-core/issue-core-runtime: not-run -revoked=n/a -result=pass diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/capture-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/capture-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index f4d6ef4..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/capture-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,393 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-capture-plan.v1", - "status": "requires_owner_execution_admission", - "created_at": "2026-10-15T23:33:14.370426+00:00", - "run_id": "35ffd825063d", - "binding": { - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-backup-preparation.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_admitted", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T23:33:13.858371+00:00", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "profile_sha256": "dff567f594826628544bb2252c77ccb8daf8a34fd2095026663cc948ffeff63a", - "source_sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1", - "bindings": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "lldap", - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "generation": 7, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "lldap-data", - "uid": "0a06b65a-e7b3-42d3-916e-e74dbe5fc7da" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "lldap-secrets" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "authelia", - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "generation": 28, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "authelia-data", - "uid": "86826554-b014-4df4-8b28-866aa64f6413" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "authelia-secrets", - "authelia-smtp" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [ - "authelia-config" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "keycape", - "uid": "99ddd83c-cb3f-4847-bcf8-35f1aa87627f", - "generation": 65, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "keycape-authentication-policy", - "uid": "423f558f-8c11-4edf-956b-243559df4a8e" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "keycape-approval-engine-operator-client", - "keycape-config", - "keycape-factor-read", - "keycape-informed-decision-sitting-requester-client", - "keycape-rapp-qonto-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-requester-client" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "deployment": "privacyidea", - "uid": "58c7f96d-61cb-4dd4-bca2-54661c0ac375", - "generation": 11, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea-data", - "uid": "65650fc1-02d8-4c0f-84fc-e0015c8f3ed9" - }, - { - "name": "privacyidea-logs", - "uid": "39fa90d9-bc54-4a03-a0d6-ae85165e0cb9" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "privacyidea-config" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [ - "factor-recovery-01119187d90d7b76", - "keycape-onboarding-9465e5e0b98f7986", - "privacyidea-cfg" - ] - } - ], - "secret_values_read": false, - "backup_captured": false, - "uploaded": false, - "runtime_changed": false, - "credential_grant_created": false, - "owner_admission_required": [ - "Approve exact CCR-2026-0048/0049 grants and node runtime packet; three required owner reviews, confirmed native SA/namespace/audience boundaries before acceptance", - "Exclude helper capture label from existing broad DNS allow policies; validate read-only helper manifests and cluster/PVC/source bindings before private capture", - "Preserve every referenced credential encrypted with original keys; fresh native SQLite/PG snapshots and exact manifest, with documented omissions and no global atomicity claim", - "Create fresh ciphertext and exact Storage Share object, read back ciphertext and receipt by strong ETag/hash, independently retrieve using operator custody", - "Attended independent age-key proof: wrong-key denial, complete archive hashes, SQLite/RSA checks, disposable native PostgreSQL restore and verified cleanup before timer activation", - "Full NK49 closure separately requires native directory/issuer/MFA authentication, retained token decryption, audit signature continuity, current callers and legacy credential dispositions; archive acceptance does not close those gates", - "Host-local health cannot report a dead host; external outage monitoring and second-provider copy remain separate coverage gaps" - ] - }, - "kubeconfig": "/home/worsch/.kube/config", - "sources": [ - { - "path": "capture-identity.py", - "sha256": "47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705" - }, - { - "path": "identity-files.py", - "sha256": "d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d" - }, - { - "path": "identity-bundle.py", - "sha256": "491f6f9f074dd0f73a26b16f32d81dbf70e049569e65c9dcee1cbcd1305dc8dc" - }, - { - "path": "prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1" - }, - { - "path": "identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "dff567f594826628544bb2252c77ccb8daf8a34fd2095026663cc948ffeff63a" - } - ], - "database": { - "namespace": "databases", - "cluster": "net-kingdom-pg", - "cluster_uid": "0cd04a7c-a183-48ac-975a-9f244ea82c73", - "pod": "net-kingdom-pg-1", - "pod_uid": "0404c66b-338b-4446-a767-622d248ab0d3", - "database": "privacyidea_db" - }, - "create_resources": [ - { - "apiVersion": "networking.k8s.io/v1", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-35ffd825063d", - "namespace": "sso" - }, - "spec": { - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "35ffd825063d" - } - }, - "policyTypes": [ - "Ingress", - "Egress" - ], - "ingress": [], - "egress": [] - } - }, - { - "apiVersion": "v1", - "kind": "Pod", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-35ffd825063d", - "namespace": "sso", - "labels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "35ffd825063d" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 900, - "automountServiceAccountToken": false, - "securityContext": { - "runAsUser": 0, - "runAsGroup": 0 - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "capture", - "image": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python3", - "-c", - "import time; time.sleep(900)" - ], - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ], - "add": [ - "DAC_OVERRIDE" - ] - } - }, - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "50m", - "memory": "128Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "1", - "memory": "2Gi" - } - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "lldap", - "mountPath": "/source/lldap", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "authelia", - "mountPath": "/source/authelia", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "keycape", - "mountPath": "/source/keycape", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "mountPath": "/scratch" - } - ] - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "lldap", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "lldap-data", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "authelia", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "authelia-data", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "keycape", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "keycape-authentication-policy", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "emptyDir": { - "medium": "Memory", - "sizeLimit": "512Mi" - } - } - ] - } - }, - { - "apiVersion": "networking.k8s.io/v1", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-35ffd825063d", - "namespace": "mfa" - }, - "spec": { - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "35ffd825063d" - } - }, - "policyTypes": [ - "Ingress", - "Egress" - ], - "ingress": [], - "egress": [] - } - }, - { - "apiVersion": "v1", - "kind": "Pod", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-35ffd825063d", - "namespace": "mfa", - "labels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "35ffd825063d" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 900, - "automountServiceAccountToken": false, - "securityContext": { - "runAsUser": 0, - "runAsGroup": 0 - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "capture", - "image": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python3", - "-c", - "import time; time.sleep(900)" - ], - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ], - "add": [ - "DAC_OVERRIDE" - ] - } - }, - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "50m", - "memory": "128Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "1", - "memory": "2Gi" - } - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea", - "mountPath": "/source/privacyidea", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "mountPath": "/scratch" - } - ] - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "privacyidea-data", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "emptyDir": { - "medium": "Memory", - "sizeLimit": "512Mi" - } - } - ] - } - } - ], - "service_changes": false, - "credential_grants": false, - "matching_network_allow_policies": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365", - "spec_sha256": "c22e3a30891f0fa3cdcde97d26c91a09d11a8e94f7dfc66641d8be1cbd976f15" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136", - "spec_sha256": "c22e3a30891f0fa3cdcde97d26c91a09d11a8e94f7dfc66641d8be1cbd976f15" - } - ], - "network_policy_enforcement_requires_owner_confirmation": true, - "offsite_delivery_included": false, - "global_atomic_snapshot_claimed": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-15T23:33:14.927800+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/helper-delivery-server-dry-run.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/helper-delivery-server-dry-run.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3dab929..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/helper-delivery-server-dry-run.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -{ - "resources": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "name": "nk49-capture-preflight001", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "Pod", - "name": "nk49-capture-preflight001", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "name": "nk49-capture-preflight001", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "kind": "Pod", - "name": "nk49-capture-preflight001", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "ServiceAccount", - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-publisher-eso", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "SecretStore", - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-publisher", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "ExternalSecret", - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-publisher", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "ServiceAccount", - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-retention-eso", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "SecretStore", - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-retention", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "ExternalSecret", - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-retention", - "server_dry_run_passed": true - } - ], - "live_resources_created": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/isolation-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/isolation-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index d2feec8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/isolation-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-isolation.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_applied", - "kubeconfig": "/home/worsch/.kube/config", - "source_sha256": "88d1e13112a44c79571825af89d3fe5b01fa490cff2653badef4c62a45c844f1", - "policies": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365", - "patch": [ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "3623833" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/spec", - "value": { - "egress": [ - { - "ports": [ - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "UDP" - }, - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "TCP" - } - ], - "to": [ - { - "namespaceSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "kube-system" - } - } - } - ] - } - ], - "podSelector": {}, - "policyTypes": [ - "Egress" - ] - } - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/podSelector", - "value": { - "matchExpressions": [ - { - "key": "net-kingdom/capture", - "operator": "DoesNotExist" - } - ] - } - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136", - "patch": [ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "3623822" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/spec", - "value": { - "egress": [ - { - "ports": [ - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "UDP" - }, - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "TCP" - } - ], - "to": [ - { - "namespaceSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "kube-system" - } - } - } - ] - } - ], - "podSelector": {}, - "policyTypes": [ - "Egress" - ] - } - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/podSelector", - "value": { - "matchExpressions": [ - { - "key": "net-kingdom/capture", - "operator": "DoesNotExist" - } - ] - } - } - ] - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/isolation-server-dry-run.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/isolation-server-dry-run.json deleted file mode 100644 index afc9cca..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/isolation-server-dry-run.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "server_dry_run_passed", - "attempted": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136" - } - ], - "verified": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 77c6073..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-implementation-review.v1", - "reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T23:36:41.132816+00:00", - "focused_tests": { - "command": "env NK49_RUN_DISPOSABLE_POSTGRES_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_identity_bundle.py tests/test_identity_offsite.py tests/test_identity_backup_preparation.py", - "passed": 51, - "duration_seconds": 14.78, - "synthetic_data_only": true, - "real_age_and_native_postgresql_fixture": true - }, - "systemd_analyze_verify_exit": 0, - "helper_and_delivery_server_dry_run_count": 10, - "dns_exclusion_server_dry_run_passed": true, - "owner_ccr_validation_errors": 0, - "owner_ccr_bound_claim_confirmation_pending": true, - "live_grants_made": false, - "actual_identity_capture_performed": false, - "identity_timers_installed": false, - "first_actual_full_archive_recovery_pending": true, - "full_native_identity_recovery_proven": false, - "pending_decision": "40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "knowledge": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "source_status": "withheld_orientation_only", - "source_reviewed": "SECURITY-COMPANION.md" - }, - "cross_repo_handoff": "railiance-bootstrap/bin/railiance identity-recovery; isolated verifier delegation only", - "capability": "capability.security.bootstrap-recovery", - "capability_vector": "D3 / A2 / C1 / R0", - "limitations": [ - "No full MFA/token/audit/directory/issuer authentication proven", - "Total-custody-loss offline retrieval adapter remains open", - "No Scaleway second full identity copy", - "Host-local freshness reporting cannot detect host loss" - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/runtime-install-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/runtime-install-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index 07ac875..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/runtime-install-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-runtime-install.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_installed", - "decision_ref": "40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "release_id": "17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08", - "release_directory": "/opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08", - "runtime_files": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py", - "sha256": "47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-files.py", - "sha256": "d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py", - "sha256": "491f6f9f074dd0f73a26b16f32d81dbf70e049569e65c9dcee1cbcd1305dc8dc" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py", - "sha256": "8b1fe1138e28ec5df7287ed6e207a026c0e73cf8a55a25773ae9a89e04c97cbf" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py", - "sha256": "e7c31fa9ee081961af873348ee3b4829a645d40c7dc7f1e22c564aa9ed01bc49" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-retention.py", - "sha256": "a41ea4759f69c35548149fc8d0d5ace547f16cf9fe4c9dac10b119a4d0becdec" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "dff567f594826628544bb2252c77ccb8daf8a34fd2095026663cc948ffeff63a" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/install-identity-backup.py", - "sha256": "94ae7a22fda1cce43b52a1553a3e9293a4ab0ca4bbec062dab7ed62839593bad" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py", - "sha256": "27b2b885c81923d85054e3999c5613e104fe627779b2b50398ed9bed5088f47e" - } - ], - "units": { - "net-kingdom-identity-backup.service": "[Unit]\nDescription=Encrypted full identity backup and verified Storage Share readback\nAfter=network-online.target k3s.service\nConditionPathExists=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/accepted-recovery.json\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nUser=root\nGroup=root\nUMask=0077\nStateDirectory=net-kingdom-backup\nStateDirectoryMode=0700\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\nPrivateDevices=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectHome=true\nReadWritePaths=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nCapabilityBoundingSet=\nRestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\nMemoryMax=3G\nCPUQuota=200%\nTasksMax=128\nTimeoutStartSec=45min\nTimeoutStopSec=5min\nExecStartPre=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py retention --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py scheduled --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f\nExecStartPost=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py retention --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup.timer": "[Unit]\nDescription=Daily full identity recovery bundle\n[Timer]\nOnCalendar=*-*-* 03:45:00 UTC\nPersistent=true\nRandomizedDelaySec=5min\nUnit=net-kingdom-identity-backup.service\n[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.service": "[Unit]\nDescription=Identity backup age check with durable failure reporting\nAfter=network-online.target k3s.service\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nUser=root\nGroup=root\nUMask=0077\nStateDirectory=net-kingdom-backup\nStateDirectoryMode=0700\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\nPrivateDevices=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectHome=true\nReadWritePaths=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nCapabilityBoundingSet=\nRestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\nMemoryMax=3G\nCPUQuota=200%\nTasksMax=128\nTimeoutStartSec=45min\nTimeoutStopSec=5min\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py status --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.timer": "[Unit]\nDescription=Hourly identity backup freshness check\n[Timer]\nOnCalendar=hourly\nPersistent=true\nUnit=net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.service\n[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n" - }, - "timers_automatically_enabled": false, - "first_capture_command": "/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/17d1ae2d447a7882a0e581a4c61fe4f69f3fd499e39d563c984c3a65276abd08/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py first-capture --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "activation_requires_independent_recovery": true, - "source_contains_credentials": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/source-manifest.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/source-manifest.json deleted file mode 100644 index 722399d..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/source-manifest.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py", - "sha256": "47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py", - "sha256": "90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/fetch-privacyidea-backup.py", - "sha256": "233160e1206643a5cf7ad05141d733f0a75aff651190e27f77515a124ff0a59f" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py", - "sha256": "491f6f9f074dd0f73a26b16f32d81dbf70e049569e65c9dcee1cbcd1305dc8dc" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-credential-setup.py", - "sha256": "9a754b72640cb3dac95fa3bbc74448be81eb96a38c9319228db1c7f967dbba14" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-files.py", - "sha256": "d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-isolation.py", - "sha256": "88d1e13112a44c79571825af89d3fe5b01fa490cff2653badef4c62a45c844f1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py", - "sha256": "e7c31fa9ee081961af873348ee3b4829a645d40c7dc7f1e22c564aa9ed01bc49" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-retention.py", - "sha256": "a41ea4759f69c35548149fc8d0d5ace547f16cf9fe4c9dac10b119a4d0becdec" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py", - "sha256": "8b1fe1138e28ec5df7287ed6e207a026c0e73cf8a55a25773ae9a89e04c97cbf" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/install-identity-backup.py", - "sha256": "94ae7a22fda1cce43b52a1553a3e9293a4ab0ca4bbec062dab7ed62839593bad" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-scaleway.py", - "sha256": "a219df205708fa4ed44b763a418585d63c820c25434bc0fd14e805eb5c2f79d3" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py", - "sha256": "673f9b17fb2f3fef6fcdb5c50a2bcca69e3df3157a9e5582a2d995c6b87640b5" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py", - "sha256": "ec123d47a07305253570dacab7e103f8c193a23f20c9fc87466ea4a95ae0ec13" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py", - "sha256": "885b05a2011e711228e42e316bda70bbe0d97d481383d61aa8469d0f10452370" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity-delivery.py", - "sha256": "9e2afdc94b5cf0a81b66a1fe8658e7853c0972e4e3593bd198dd2af5817b254f" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py", - "sha256": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "dff567f594826628544bb2252c77ccb8daf8a34fd2095026663cc948ffeff63a" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-custody.json", - "sha256": "f8aee8487ed01d7940b82676bb4a5c8d61f51b6c598521b8b8a73588aaea4d4f" - } -] diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-result.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-result.json deleted file mode 100644 index 31cd4af..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-result.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "timers_active_after_independent_recovery" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 1c34b33..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-activation-review.v1", - "timers": [ - { - "NextElapseUSecRealtime": "Sat 2026-10-17 03:47:39 UTC", - "ActiveState": "active", - "UnitFileState": "enabled", - "name": "net-kingdom-identity-backup.timer" - }, - { - "NextElapseUSecRealtime": "Fri 2026-10-16 08:00:00 UTC", - "ActiveState": "active", - "UnitFileState": "enabled", - "name": "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.timer" - } - ], - "retention_preview": { - "status": "retention_preview", - "started_at": "2026-10-16T07:35:53.483785+00:00", - "protected": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "keep": [ - "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age" - ], - "candidates": [], - "deleted": [], - "unknown_objects_untouched": true - }, - "accepted_recovery_artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "capture_marker_present": false, - "retention_blocked": false, - "pending_event_outbox": 0 -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-capture.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-capture.json deleted file mode 100644 index adf0846..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-capture.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -{ - "started_at": "2026-10-16T06:32:01.718185+00:00", - "status": "encrypted_bundle_created", - "decision_ref": "40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "plan_run_id": "5882771aa2ce", - "created_resources": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "name": "nk49-capture-5882771aa2ce", - "uid": "39853a14-4875-4320-b0f5-fda26d4d04eb" - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "kind": "Pod", - "name": "nk49-capture-5882771aa2ce", - "uid": "6cb00afb-05b5-4196-929b-fe5c142a9d66" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "name": "nk49-capture-5882771aa2ce", - "uid": "d9f9e2fe-56ee-4c59-950d-09d33d9c95da" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "kind": "Pod", - "name": "nk49-capture-5882771aa2ce", - "uid": "f3328766-1a74-4272-b5b1-d9d07a4aff7a" - } - ], - "unverified_create_outcomes": [], - "helper_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_directory": "/tmp/nk49-identity-qcsy2iyi", - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-capture.v1", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "ciphertext_bytes": 109738344, - "ciphertext_path": "/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/runs/net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age/net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "profile_sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1", - "file_count": 36, - "checks": { - "sqlite_integrity_passed": true, - "privacyidea_key_format_and_pair_passed": true, - "keycape_signing_key_format_passed": true, - "policy_json_present": true, - "database_custom_format_present": true, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false - }, - "offsite_recovery_proven": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T06:32:35.934734+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-archive-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-archive-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index fa1145d..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-archive-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-recovery.v1", - "status": "identity_archive_verified", - "started_at": "2026-10-16T07:33:14.591607+00:00", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "registered_recipient_match": true, - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "checks": { - "sqlite_integrity_passed": true, - "privacyidea_key_format_and_pair_passed": true, - "keycape_signing_key_format_passed": true, - "policy_json_present": true, - "database_custom_format_present": true, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false - }, - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "profile_sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1", - "database_restore": { - "image": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "pg_restore_version": "pg_restore (PostgreSQL) 16.14 (Debian 16.14-1.pgdg13+1)", - "aggregate_row_counts": { - "token": 5, - "resolver": 2, - "realm": 2 - } - }, - "full_service_authentication_proven": false, - "existing_token_decryption_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T07:33:37.778319+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-recovery-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-recovery-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9960a11..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-recovery-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "actual_independent_archive_recovery_verified", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "source_sha256_matches": true, - "independent_ciphertext_rehashed": true, - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "no_remaining_nk49_containers": true, - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "original_key_pairs_and_sqlite_integrity_verified": true, - "native_pg_restore_verified": true, - "plaintext_and_container_cleanup_verified": true, - "full_service_authentication_proven": false, - "existing_token_decryption_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": false, - "activation_under_previously_approved_packet": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json deleted file mode 100644 index 93266d8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1", - "status": "readback_verified", - "observed_at": "2026-10-16T06:32:39.402297+00:00", - "provider": "Storage Share", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "ciphertext_bytes": 109738344, - "fetched_path": "/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/runs/net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age/fetched.tar.age", - "etag": "\"28ec1f7014e492de4c40e1ae75502f08\"", - "quota_available_before": 3643309771, - "new_object_created": true, - "downloaded_digest_verified": true, - "verified_index_published": true, - "index_name": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age.receipt.json", - "age_private_key_used": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "retained_objects_deleted": false, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/capture-ready-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/capture-ready-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index ca3d5fc..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/capture-ready-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,380 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-capture-plan.v1", - "status": "requires_owner_execution_admission", - "created_at": "2026-10-16T05:46:40.122854+00:00", - "run_id": "ba725bea599b", - "binding": { - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-backup-preparation.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_admitted", - "observed_at": "2026-10-16T05:46:39.447927+00:00", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "profile_sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1", - "source_sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1", - "bindings": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "lldap", - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "generation": 7, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "lldap-data", - "uid": "0a06b65a-e7b3-42d3-916e-e74dbe5fc7da" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "lldap-secrets" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "authelia", - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "generation": 28, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "authelia-data", - "uid": "86826554-b014-4df4-8b28-866aa64f6413" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "authelia-secrets", - "authelia-smtp" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [ - "authelia-config" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "keycape", - "uid": "99ddd83c-cb3f-4847-bcf8-35f1aa87627f", - "generation": 65, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "keycape-authentication-policy", - "uid": "423f558f-8c11-4edf-956b-243559df4a8e" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "keycape-approval-engine-operator-client", - "keycape-config", - "keycape-factor-read", - "keycape-informed-decision-sitting-requester-client", - "keycape-rapp-qonto-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-requester-client" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "deployment": "privacyidea", - "uid": "58c7f96d-61cb-4dd4-bca2-54661c0ac375", - "generation": 11, - "pvc_bindings": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea-data", - "uid": "65650fc1-02d8-4c0f-84fc-e0015c8f3ed9" - }, - { - "name": "privacyidea-logs", - "uid": "39fa90d9-bc54-4a03-a0d6-ae85165e0cb9" - } - ], - "secret_names_only": [ - "privacyidea-config" - ], - "configmap_names_only": [ - "factor-recovery-01119187d90d7b76", - "keycape-onboarding-9465e5e0b98f7986", - "privacyidea-cfg" - ] - } - ], - "secret_values_read": false, - "backup_captured": false, - "uploaded": false, - "runtime_changed": false, - "credential_grant_created": false, - "owner_admission_required": [ - "Approve exact CCR-2026-0048/0049 grants and node runtime packet; three required owner reviews, confirmed native SA/namespace/audience boundaries before acceptance", - "Exclude helper capture label from existing broad DNS allow policies; validate read-only helper manifests and cluster/PVC/source bindings before private capture", - "Preserve every referenced credential encrypted with original keys; fresh native SQLite/PG snapshots and exact manifest, with documented omissions and no global atomicity claim", - "Create fresh ciphertext and exact Storage Share object, read back ciphertext and receipt by strong ETag/hash, independently retrieve using operator custody", - "Attended independent age-key proof: wrong-key denial, complete archive hashes, SQLite/RSA checks, disposable native PostgreSQL restore and verified cleanup before timer activation", - "Full NK49 closure separately requires native directory/issuer/MFA authentication, retained token decryption, audit signature continuity, current callers and legacy credential dispositions; archive acceptance does not close those gates", - "Host-local health cannot report a dead host; external outage monitoring and second-provider copy remain separate coverage gaps" - ] - }, - "kubeconfig": "/home/worsch/.kube/config", - "sources": [ - { - "path": "capture-identity.py", - "sha256": "47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705" - }, - { - "path": "identity-files.py", - "sha256": "d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d" - }, - { - "path": "identity-bundle.py", - "sha256": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6" - }, - { - "path": "prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1" - }, - { - "path": "identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1" - } - ], - "database": { - "namespace": "databases", - "cluster": "net-kingdom-pg", - "cluster_uid": "0cd04a7c-a183-48ac-975a-9f244ea82c73", - "pod": "net-kingdom-pg-1", - "pod_uid": "0404c66b-338b-4446-a767-622d248ab0d3", - "database": "privacyidea_db" - }, - "create_resources": [ - { - "apiVersion": "networking.k8s.io/v1", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-ba725bea599b", - "namespace": "sso" - }, - "spec": { - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "ba725bea599b" - } - }, - "policyTypes": [ - "Ingress", - "Egress" - ], - "ingress": [], - "egress": [] - } - }, - { - "apiVersion": "v1", - "kind": "Pod", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-ba725bea599b", - "namespace": "sso", - "labels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "ba725bea599b" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 900, - "automountServiceAccountToken": false, - "securityContext": { - "runAsUser": 0, - "runAsGroup": 0 - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "capture", - "image": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python3", - "-c", - "import time; time.sleep(900)" - ], - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ], - "add": [ - "DAC_OVERRIDE" - ] - } - }, - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "50m", - "memory": "128Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "1", - "memory": "2Gi" - } - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "lldap", - "mountPath": "/source/lldap", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "authelia", - "mountPath": "/source/authelia", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "keycape", - "mountPath": "/source/keycape", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "mountPath": "/scratch" - } - ] - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "lldap", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "lldap-data", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "authelia", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "authelia-data", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "keycape", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "keycape-authentication-policy", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "emptyDir": { - "medium": "Memory", - "sizeLimit": "512Mi" - } - } - ] - } - }, - { - "apiVersion": "networking.k8s.io/v1", - "kind": "NetworkPolicy", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-ba725bea599b", - "namespace": "mfa" - }, - "spec": { - "podSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "ba725bea599b" - } - }, - "policyTypes": [ - "Ingress", - "Egress" - ], - "ingress": [], - "egress": [] - } - }, - { - "apiVersion": "v1", - "kind": "Pod", - "metadata": { - "name": "nk49-capture-ba725bea599b", - "namespace": "mfa", - "labels": { - "net-kingdom/capture": "ba725bea599b" - } - }, - "spec": { - "restartPolicy": "Never", - "activeDeadlineSeconds": 900, - "automountServiceAccountToken": false, - "securityContext": { - "runAsUser": 0, - "runAsGroup": 0 - }, - "containers": [ - { - "name": "capture", - "image": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "imagePullPolicy": "IfNotPresent", - "command": [ - "python3", - "-c", - "import time; time.sleep(900)" - ], - "securityContext": { - "allowPrivilegeEscalation": false, - "readOnlyRootFilesystem": true, - "capabilities": { - "drop": [ - "ALL" - ], - "add": [ - "DAC_OVERRIDE" - ] - } - }, - "resources": { - "requests": { - "cpu": "50m", - "memory": "128Mi" - }, - "limits": { - "cpu": "1", - "memory": "2Gi" - } - }, - "volumeMounts": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea", - "mountPath": "/source/privacyidea", - "readOnly": true - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "mountPath": "/scratch" - } - ] - } - ], - "volumes": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea", - "persistentVolumeClaim": { - "claimName": "privacyidea-data", - "readOnly": true - } - }, - { - "name": "scratch", - "emptyDir": { - "medium": "Memory", - "sizeLimit": "512Mi" - } - } - ] - } - } - ], - "service_changes": false, - "credential_grants": false, - "matching_network_allow_policies": [], - "network_policy_enforcement_requires_owner_confirmation": true, - "offsite_delivery_included": false, - "global_atomic_snapshot_claimed": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T05:46:40.884474+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/independent-owner-transfer.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/independent-owner-transfer.json deleted file mode 100644 index c5e1d54..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/independent-owner-transfer.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "readback_verified", - "source_sha256": "ec123d47a07305253570dacab7e103f8c193a23f20c9fc87466ea4a95ae0ec13", - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-16T06:32:39.402297+00:00", - "provider": "Storage Share", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "ciphertext_bytes": 109738344, - "fetched_path": "/tmp/nk49-identity-fetched-z9rd3c4w/net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "etag": "\"28ec1f7014e492de4c40e1ae75502f08\"", - "quota_available_before": 3643309771, - "new_object_created": true, - "downloaded_digest_verified": true, - "verified_index_published": true, - "index_name": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age.receipt.json", - "age_private_key_used": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "retained_objects_deleted": false, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false, - "independent_owner_retrieval_verified": true, - "caller_entity_id": "4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b", - "downloaded_at": "2026-10-16T07:32:28.276274+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/installed-runtime-packet-r2.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/installed-runtime-packet-r2.json deleted file mode 100644 index d662925..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/installed-runtime-packet-r2.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-runtime-install.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_installed", - "decision_ref": "40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "release_id": "758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf", - "release_directory": "/opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf", - "runtime_files": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py", - "sha256": "47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-files.py", - "sha256": "d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py", - "sha256": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py", - "sha256": "a2c0acf567c204705b90be64d561d0fda2285e0fc71a962d6e1b149f571e1940" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py", - "sha256": "e7c31fa9ee081961af873348ee3b4829a645d40c7dc7f1e22c564aa9ed01bc49" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-retention.py", - "sha256": "a41ea4759f69c35548149fc8d0d5ace547f16cf9fe4c9dac10b119a4d0becdec" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/install-identity-backup.py", - "sha256": "5c612a2a51c9b59aad8cc01d418c2f563cbd92c62dc1fa8be994e5fb59df90f1" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py", - "sha256": "27b2b885c81923d85054e3999c5613e104fe627779b2b50398ed9bed5088f47e" - } - ], - "units": { - "net-kingdom-identity-backup.service": "[Unit]\nDescription=Encrypted full identity backup and verified Storage Share readback\nAfter=network-online.target k3s.service\nConditionPathExists=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/accepted-recovery.json\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nUser=root\nGroup=root\nUMask=0077\nStateDirectory=net-kingdom-backup\nStateDirectoryMode=0700\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\nPrivateDevices=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectHome=true\nReadWritePaths=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nCapabilityBoundingSet=\nRestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\nMemoryMax=3G\nCPUQuota=200%\nTasksMax=128\nTimeoutStartSec=45min\nTimeoutStopSec=5min\nExecStartPre=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py retention --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py scheduled --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f\nExecStartPost=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py retention --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup.timer": "[Unit]\nDescription=Daily full identity recovery bundle\n[Timer]\nOnCalendar=*-*-* 03:45:00 UTC\nPersistent=true\nRandomizedDelaySec=5min\nUnit=net-kingdom-identity-backup.service\n[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.service": "[Unit]\nDescription=Identity backup age check with durable failure reporting\nAfter=network-online.target k3s.service\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nUser=root\nGroup=root\nUMask=0077\nStateDirectory=net-kingdom-backup\nStateDirectoryMode=0700\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\nPrivateDevices=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectHome=true\nReadWritePaths=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nCapabilityBoundingSet=\nRestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\nMemoryMax=3G\nCPUQuota=200%\nTasksMax=128\nTimeoutStartSec=45min\nTimeoutStopSec=5min\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py status --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.timer": "[Unit]\nDescription=Hourly identity backup freshness check\n[Timer]\nOnCalendar=hourly\nPersistent=true\nUnit=net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.service\n[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n" - }, - "timers_automatically_enabled": false, - "first_capture_command": "/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py first-capture --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "activation_requires_independent_recovery": true, - "source_contains_credentials": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/installed-runtime-packet.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/installed-runtime-packet.json deleted file mode 100644 index a2f36ea..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/installed-runtime-packet.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-runtime-install.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_installed", - "decision_ref": "40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "release_id": "bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7", - "release_directory": "/opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7", - "runtime_files": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py", - "sha256": "47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-files.py", - "sha256": "d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py", - "sha256": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py", - "sha256": "97224760f5e21ac9ca1d0d96eeec7427afd7d6eea30a218629a6e409d74fe560" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py", - "sha256": "e7c31fa9ee081961af873348ee3b4829a645d40c7dc7f1e22c564aa9ed01bc49" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-retention.py", - "sha256": "a41ea4759f69c35548149fc8d0d5ace547f16cf9fe4c9dac10b119a4d0becdec" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/install-identity-backup.py", - "sha256": "5c612a2a51c9b59aad8cc01d418c2f563cbd92c62dc1fa8be994e5fb59df90f1" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py", - "sha256": "27b2b885c81923d85054e3999c5613e104fe627779b2b50398ed9bed5088f47e" - } - ], - "units": { - "net-kingdom-identity-backup.service": "[Unit]\nDescription=Encrypted full identity backup and verified Storage Share readback\nAfter=network-online.target k3s.service\nConditionPathExists=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/accepted-recovery.json\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nUser=root\nGroup=root\nUMask=0077\nStateDirectory=net-kingdom-backup\nStateDirectoryMode=0700\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\nPrivateDevices=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectHome=true\nReadWritePaths=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nCapabilityBoundingSet=\nRestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\nMemoryMax=3G\nCPUQuota=200%\nTasksMax=128\nTimeoutStartSec=45min\nTimeoutStopSec=5min\nExecStartPre=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py retention --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py scheduled --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f\nExecStartPost=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py retention --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup.timer": "[Unit]\nDescription=Daily full identity recovery bundle\n[Timer]\nOnCalendar=*-*-* 03:45:00 UTC\nPersistent=true\nRandomizedDelaySec=5min\nUnit=net-kingdom-identity-backup.service\n[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.service": "[Unit]\nDescription=Identity backup age check with durable failure reporting\nAfter=network-online.target k3s.service\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nUser=root\nGroup=root\nUMask=0077\nStateDirectory=net-kingdom-backup\nStateDirectoryMode=0700\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\nPrivateDevices=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectHome=true\nReadWritePaths=/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\nCapabilityBoundingSet=\nRestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\nMemoryMax=3G\nCPUQuota=200%\nTasksMax=128\nTimeoutStartSec=45min\nTimeoutStopSec=5min\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py status --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup\n", - "net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.timer": "[Unit]\nDescription=Hourly identity backup freshness check\n[Timer]\nOnCalendar=hourly\nPersistent=true\nUnit=net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.service\n[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n" - }, - "timers_automatically_enabled": false, - "first_capture_command": "/usr/bin/python3 -I /opt/net-kingdom-backup/releases/bf8b38f185037515cfad9eebcddefc9f60ace724c32e10d89ae8307dc95a4eb7/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py first-capture --kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --state /var/lib/net-kingdom-backup --decision-id 40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "activation_requires_independent_recovery": true, - "source_contains_credentials": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/isolation-applied.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/isolation-applied.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0a8d6c1..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/isolation-applied.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "capture_dns_exclusions_verified", - "attempted": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136" - } - ], - "verified": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365" - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/isolation-live-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/isolation-live-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index d2feec8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/isolation-live-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-isolation.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_applied", - "kubeconfig": "/home/worsch/.kube/config", - "source_sha256": "88d1e13112a44c79571825af89d3fe5b01fa490cff2653badef4c62a45c844f1", - "policies": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365", - "patch": [ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "d2a1bd49-7035-437b-9b8e-e9e66b203365" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "3623833" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/spec", - "value": { - "egress": [ - { - "ports": [ - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "UDP" - }, - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "TCP" - } - ], - "to": [ - { - "namespaceSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "kube-system" - } - } - } - ] - } - ], - "podSelector": {}, - "policyTypes": [ - "Egress" - ] - } - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/podSelector", - "value": { - "matchExpressions": [ - { - "key": "net-kingdom/capture", - "operator": "DoesNotExist" - } - ] - } - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "name": "allow-egress-dns", - "uid": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136", - "patch": [ - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/uid", - "value": "1d23ed08-bb6f-4959-b72e-3f03af40f136" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": "3623822" - }, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/spec", - "value": { - "egress": [ - { - "ports": [ - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "UDP" - }, - { - "port": 53, - "protocol": "TCP" - } - ], - "to": [ - { - "namespaceSelector": { - "matchLabels": { - "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "kube-system" - } - } - } - ] - } - ], - "podSelector": {}, - "policyTypes": [ - "Egress" - ] - } - }, - { - "op": "replace", - "path": "/spec/podSelector", - "value": { - "matchExpressions": [ - { - "key": "net-kingdom/capture", - "operator": "DoesNotExist" - } - ] - } - } - ] - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/provider-metadata-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/provider-metadata-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index d34be48..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/provider-metadata-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "metadata_reviewed", - "shares": [ - { - "id": "26", - "share_type": 3, - "permissions": 21, - "path": "/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "label": "net-kingdom-identity-publisher", - "item_type": "folder", - "public_upload": null, - "hide_download": 0, - "token_present": true, - "token_shape_valid": true - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-attempt-r1.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-attempt-r1.json deleted file mode 100644 index 95be34a..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-attempt-r1.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "refused_provider_permission_scope", - "action": "publisher", - "caller_entity_id": "4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b", - "caller_auth_path": "auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", - "quota_before": { - "quota_bytes": 10737418240, - "used_bytes": 6978016729, - "available_bytes": 3759401511 - }, - "folder_created": true, - "share_created": true, - "new_credential_published": false, - "native_delivery_started": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-attempt-r3.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-attempt-r3.json deleted file mode 100644 index fec1bb3..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-attempt-r3.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "refused_malformed_parent_status_before_kv_publication", - "action": "publisher", - "caller_entity_id": "4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b", - "caller_auth_path": "auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", - "quota_before": { - "quota_bytes": 10737418240, - "used_bytes": 7094108469, - "available_bytes": 3643309771 - }, - "folder_created": false, - "share_created": false, - "share_id": "26", - "share_permissions": 21, - "folder": "/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "provider_test_artifacts": [ - "nk49-boundary-b7c9df967f844454ba87fe73a5582bd8.age", - "nk49-boundary-7c9e4e216c124a1ea3178e56e63cce67.age" - ], - "boundary_fixture_cleanup_verified": false, - "boundary_phase": "deny_parent_path", - "parent_probe_status": 400, - "owner_fixture_cleanup_verified": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-native-delivery-verified.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-native-delivery-verified.json deleted file mode 100644 index 76eaa80..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-native-delivery-verified.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "reader_and_delivery_verified", - "phase": "negative_reader_logins", - "native_reader_metadata": { - "token_policies": [ - "net-kingdom-backup-publisher-eso" - ], - "identity_policies": null, - "policies": [ - "net-kingdom-backup-publisher-eso" - ], - "lease_duration": 900 - }, - "capabilities_checked": { - "auth/token/create": [ - "deny" - ], - "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/publisher": [ - "read" - ], - "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/publisher-sibling": [ - "deny" - ], - "platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane": [ - "deny" - ], - "platform/metadata/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/publisher": [ - "deny" - ] - }, - "kv_version": 1, - "wrong_namespace_probe_attempted": { - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-publisher-eso", - "namespace": "default" - }, - "wrong_namespace_probe_cleanup_verified": true, - "exact_namespace_binding_verified": true, - "exact_policy_and_ttl_verified": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_namespace_denied": true, - "metadata_sibling_escrow_and_token_create_denied": true, - "kv_write_denied": true, - "eso_delivery_equality_verified": true, - "temporary_reader_revoked": true, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0048", - "ccr_sha256": "a7d5c356ce0c4df9de439a58ad3d36e1578f27cda327c9387e97cfc2e9dc7cdc" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-setup-verified.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-setup-verified.json deleted file mode 100644 index 5be261c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/publisher-setup-verified.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "provider_and_reader_prepared", - "action": "publisher", - "caller_entity_id": "4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b", - "caller_auth_path": "auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", - "quota_before": { - "quota_bytes": 10737418240, - "used_bytes": 7094108469, - "available_bytes": 3643309771 - }, - "folder_created": false, - "share_created": false, - "share_id": "26", - "share_permissions": 21, - "folder": "/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "provider_test_artifacts": [ - "nk49-boundary-2d01d6795bb8422282c9af18c965df49.age", - "nk49-boundary-7d6dd29f0d5a495cab2ee6e51bed1843.age" - ], - "boundary_fixture_cleanup_verified": true, - "boundary_phase": "deny_other_account_folder", - "parent_probe_status": 400, - "parent_path_rejected": true, - "other_account_folder_status": 401, - "provider_boundary_verified": true, - "owner_fixture_cleanup_verified": true, - "publisher_quota_available": 3643309771, - "coding_agent_fence_verified_before_publication": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "escrow_read": false, - "operator_password_delivered": false, - "retained_backups_deleted": false, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0048", - "ccr_sha256": "a7d5c356ce0c4df9de439a58ad3d36e1578f27cda327c9387e97cfc2e9dc7cdc", - "eso_delivery_and_native_login_verification_pending": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/recurring-job-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/recurring-job-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 28e26c7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/recurring-job-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-recurring-job-review.v1", - "service": { - "Result": "success", - "ExecMainStatus": "0" - }, - "last_success": { - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T07:40:06.300739+00:00", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T073927Z-1224cb9362f8.tar.age", - "directory": "/var/lib/net-kingdom-backup/runs/net-kingdom-identity-20261016T073927Z-1224cb9362f8.tar.age", - "ciphertext_sha256": "2b88375c378aac52fbd82f2bfa21fbbd9af61d8f88abdad2ed3f997dc9993b9c", - "offsite_verified": true - }, - "accepted_recovery_artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "retention": { - "status": "retention_applied", - "started_at": "2026-10-16T07:40:08.098802+00:00", - "protected": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "keep": [ - "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T073927Z-1224cb9362f8.tar.age" - ], - "candidates": [], - "deleted": [], - "unknown_objects_untouched": true, - "local_generations_removed": [] - }, - "capture_marker_present": false, - "retention_blocked": false, - "pending_outbox_events": 0, - "helper_cleanup_verified": true, - "plaintext_cleanup_verified": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/retention-native-delivery-verified.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/retention-native-delivery-verified.json deleted file mode 100644 index 1118afa..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/retention-native-delivery-verified.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "reader_and_delivery_verified", - "phase": "negative_reader_logins", - "native_reader_metadata": { - "token_policies": [ - "net-kingdom-backup-retention-eso" - ], - "identity_policies": null, - "policies": [ - "net-kingdom-backup-retention-eso" - ], - "lease_duration": 900 - }, - "capabilities_checked": { - "auth/token/create": [ - "deny" - ], - "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/retention": [ - "read" - ], - "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/retention-sibling": [ - "deny" - ], - "platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane": [ - "deny" - ], - "platform/metadata/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/retention": [ - "deny" - ] - }, - "kv_version": 1, - "wrong_namespace_probe_attempted": { - "name": "net-kingdom-backup-retention-eso", - "namespace": "default" - }, - "wrong_namespace_probe_cleanup_verified": true, - "exact_namespace_binding_verified": true, - "exact_policy_and_ttl_verified": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_namespace_denied": true, - "metadata_sibling_escrow_and_token_create_denied": true, - "kv_write_denied": true, - "eso_delivery_equality_verified": true, - "temporary_reader_revoked": true, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0049", - "ccr_sha256": "d391018abbda0fbc1acec4b5a22c0f99ce65525de940431df376a7552b3746cf" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/retention-setup-verified.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/retention-setup-verified.json deleted file mode 100644 index 11ca614..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/retention-setup-verified.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "provider_and_reader_prepared", - "action": "retention", - "caller_entity_id": "4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b", - "caller_auth_path": "auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", - "quota_before": { - "quota_bytes": 10737418240, - "used_bytes": 7094108469, - "available_bytes": 3643309771 - }, - "folder_created": false, - "share_created": true, - "share_id": "29", - "share_permissions": 25, - "folder": "/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "provider_test_artifacts": [ - "nk49-boundary-6f5413c177894fdabdfb7828ef76f823.age", - "nk49-absent-abb34d9dafdc46e2babb5922b2d341d7.age" - ], - "boundary_fixture_cleanup_verified": true, - "boundary_phase": "deny_other_account_folder", - "parent_probe_status": 400, - "parent_path_rejected": true, - "other_account_folder_status": 401, - "provider_boundary_verified": true, - "coding_agent_fence_verified_before_publication": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "escrow_read": false, - "operator_password_delivered": false, - "retained_backups_deleted": false, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0049", - "ccr_sha256": "d391018abbda0fbc1acec4b5a22c0f99ce65525de940431df376a7552b3746cf", - "eso_delivery_and_native_login_verification_pending": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/rollout-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/rollout-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index bbe731e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/rollout-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "actual_independent_archive_recovery_verified_timers_active", - "observed_at": "2026-10-15T23:56:00.293983+00:00", - "approval_decision": "40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f", - "approved_platform_source_commit": "69a792c", - "first_owner_session": "child_failed_session_revoked", - "second_owner_session": "metadata_review_succeeded_session_revoked", - "new_identity_bundle_created": true, - "identity_job_installed": true, - "new_credentials_published_to_openbao": true, - "existing_backup_changes": false, - "observed_permissions": 21, - "requested_permissions": 5, - "provider_added_permission": 16, - "retention_25_inferred_not_created": true, - "provider_reference": "https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/stable31/apps/files_sharing/lib/Controller/ShareAPIController.php#L1011-L1015", - "provider_source_sha256": "f361dcf7138302d72a95148933b2ed7bd69de844dff116a1d2a23c24c0dda53d", - "scope_change_owner_decision_pending": false, - "runtime_host_preflight": { - "ssh_alias": "railiance01", - "hostname": "239.62.205.92.host.secureserver.net", - "machine_id_sha256": "fe7367a60951922122af7ba18ed2cde65c7e0a232bbedfb045cb575de2094c2f", - "sudo_root_verified": true, - "cluster_uid_match": true, - "k3s_active": true, - "free_kib": 126777924 - }, - "source_repairs": [ - "Bind actual runtime host hostname and machine identity rather than SSH alias", - "Keep unapproved-CCR negative tests proposed independently of actual owner approval status" - ], - "identity_timers_enabled": true, - "scope_change_owner_decision": "5edd5203-fae7-461b-8775-5d22b7873971", - "approved_provider_masks": { - "publisher": 21, - "retention": 25 - }, - "focused_tests_passed": 56, - "temporary_dns_selector_exclusions_applied": true, - "network_policy_rule_lines_present": 649, - "installed_runtime_release": "758ba4d170ba5ed4b6c563d3a379e496c5f81e8bff28c45d142a6bacbfaa21bf", - "current_login_session_active": false, - "latest_login_failure": "callback_timeout_before_handoff", - "latest_timeout_possible_session_revocation_confirmed": false, - "publisher_read_create_and_overwrite_delete_denial_verified": true, - "publisher_fixture_cleanup_verified": true, - "parent_path_rejection_status": 400, - "corrected_boundary_tests_passed": 16, - "corrected_native_boundary_and_delivery_not_yet_run": false, - "helper_network_allow_count": 0, - "actual_provider_boundary_and_native_delivery_verified": true, - "actual_ciphertext_bytes": 109738344, - "actual_ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "actual_independent_key_recovery_pending": false, - "actual_independent_key_recovery_verified": true, - "retention_recovered_point_protection_verified": true, - "retention_deletions": 0, - "health_service_result": "success", - "health_service_exit": 0, - "native_full_service_authentication_proven": false, - "installed_hardened_recurring_job_verified": true, - "systemd_backup_result": "success", - "systemd_backup_exit": 0, - "second_actual_generation_verified": true, - "pinned_and_newest_retention_verified": true, - "no_failed_capture_or_retention_markers": true, - "pending_event_outbox": 0 -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/upgrade-disabled-runtime.py b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/upgrade-disabled-runtime.py deleted file mode 100644 index ce1af8c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/upgrade-disabled-runtime.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -"""Exact task-only replacement of disabled NK49 units; preserve rollback bytes.""" -import hashlib,importlib.util,json,os,subprocess,sys,tempfile -from pathlib import Path -os.umask(0o077) -root=Path(sys.argv[1]);old=Path(sys.argv[2]);out=Path(sys.argv[3]) -expected_old='bb5579ce72967f0ce78e6e0afb361cfd5e3793768d3eb5b422718033505a0014' -assert hashlib.sha256(old.read_bytes()).hexdigest()==expected_old -previous=json.loads(old.read_text());packet=json.loads((root/'install-packet.json').read_text()) -s=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('installer',root/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/install-identity-backup.py');m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(s);s.loader.exec_module(m) -m.owner();assert packet==m.render(packet['decision_ref']) -assert packet['decision_ref']==previous['decision_ref'] -for unit in ['net-kingdom-identity-backup.timer','net-kingdom-identity-backup-health.timer']: - for action,expected in [('is-enabled',b'disabled'),('is-active',b'inactive')]: - r=subprocess.run(['systemctl',action,unit],stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=20);assert r.stdout.strip()==expected -paths={name:Path('/etc/systemd/system')/name for name in previous['units']} -assert set(paths)==set(packet['units']) -for name,path in paths.items():assert not path.is_symlink() and path.read_text()==previous['units'][name] -backup=Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='nk49-disabled-unit-rollback-',dir='/tmp')) -try: - for name,path in paths.items():path.rename(backup/name) - m.install(packet) -except BaseException: - for name,path in paths.items(): - if (backup/name).exists(): - assert not path.exists() or path.read_text()==packet['units'][name] - os.replace(backup/name,path) - subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=30) - raise -out.write_text(json.dumps({'status':'installed_timers_disabled','release_id':packet['release_id'],'previous_release':previous['release_id'],'rollback_units':str(backup)},indent=2)+'\n') diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3a2cbf2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-lldap-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_lldap_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "existing_user_native_ldap_bind": true, - "wrong_password_refused": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "directory_identity_rows_preserved": true, - "directory_comparison_scope": [ - "group_attribute_schema", - "group_attributes", - "groups", - "memberships", - "user_attribute_schema", - "user_attributes", - "users" - ], - "directory_table_counts": { - "users": 7, - "groups": 17, - "memberships": 13, - "user_attributes": 14, - "group_attributes": 0, - "user_attribute_schema": 3, - "group_attribute_schema": 0 - }, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T18:37:51.985390+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 23117e6..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.actual-isolated-lldap-review.v1", - "status": "verified", - "accepted_at": "2026-10-16T18:37:51.985390+00:00", - "receipt": "actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json", - "source_sha256_matches": true, - "source_commit": "3670c6dabb31d6889c87705e649d770c38fdadf5", - "known_recovered_ciphertext_matches": true, - "exact_local_target_matches": true, - "existing_user_and_invalid_credential_refusal_verified": true, - "directory_counts": { - "users": 7, - "groups": 17, - "memberships": 13, - "user_attributes": 14, - "group_attributes": 0, - "user_attribute_schema": 3, - "group_attribute_schema": 0 - }, - "container_and_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "agent_received_private_credentials": false, - "other_service_mfa_or_audit_acceptance_proven": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 972729c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_checked", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "retained_tokens_total": 5, - "retained_tokens_with_native_decryption": 5, - "different_key_cannot_reproduce_material_count": 5, - "retained_token_material_decrypted_inside_process": true, - "historical_audit_rows": 279209, - "historical_signed_rows": 279209, - "historical_unsigned_rows": 0, - "historical_invalid_signatures": 0, - "historical_legacy_signatures": 0, - "all_stored_audit_rows_checked": true, - "legacy_signature_verification_enabled": false, - "event_completeness_claimed": false, - "new_audit_entry_signed_verified": true, - "tampered_entry_refused": true, - "wrong_audit_public_key_refused": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T19:10:46.010387+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index c17a7a9..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.v1", - "status": "verified", - "accepted_at": "2026-10-16T19:10:46.010387+00:00", - "receipt": "actual-isolated-privacyidea-recovery.json", - "source_commit": "3223039446dc92c692dafb587127e93701a3c230", - "source_sha256_matches": true, - "known_recovered_ciphertext_matches": true, - "exact_local_target_matches": true, - "manifest_files_verified": 36, - "retained_token_materials_read_internally": 5, - "wrong_key_material_refusals": 5, - "historical_signatures_verified": 279209, - "historical_unsigned_or_invalid_rows": 0, - "new_signature_and_negative_checks_verified": true, - "container_and_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": false, - "event_completeness_claimed": false, - "agent_received_private_credentials": false, - "accepted_tasks": [ - "NK-WP-0049-T20", - "NK-WP-0049-T31" - ], - "knowledge_orientation": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "source_status": "withheld; current repository security companion reviewed directly" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-publication.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-publication.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6eb1e86..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-publication.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.recovery-kit.v1", - "status": "published_readback_verified", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "new_grants_created": false, - "files": [ - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff-START-HERE.md", - "bytes": 8381, - "sha256": "1531675f2e7d3713a3a7fc28a5143fb24f201b19cd05d14c59ee485a0bc11e61", - "etag": "\"34e2a2b663670144cd0d0b9aed156455\"", - "readback_verified": true - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip", - "bytes": 34930, - "sha256": "57d1940947aa25ff83d0f25ddf30090eb40595cccaab64225de882a2fd59ea2f", - "etag": "\"eb3029b41135eb740878f4b12745f0b3\"", - "readback_verified": true - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip.sha256", - "bytes": 108, - "sha256": "102d1cd25662650a7a181039f6646883d72a9d976551a8950279d8936ca22171", - "etag": "\"51268aeac620038c4d66ec54376efe44\"", - "readback_verified": true - } - ], - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "provider": "Storage Share", - "credential_source": "prompt", - "offline_retrieval_verified": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T18:01:01.639515+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3b64c17..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-recovery.v1", - "status": "identity_archive_verified", - "started_at": "2026-10-16T18:01:57.282452+00:00", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "registered_recipient_match": true, - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "checks": { - "sqlite_integrity_passed": true, - "privacyidea_key_format_and_pair_passed": true, - "keycape_signing_key_format_passed": true, - "policy_json_present": true, - "database_custom_format_present": true, - "native_identity_recovery_proven": false - }, - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "profile_sha256": "40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1", - "database_restore": { - "image": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "pg_restore_version": "pg_restore (PostgreSQL) 16.14 (Debian 16.14-1.pgdg13+1)", - "aggregate_row_counts": { - "token": 5, - "resolver": 2, - "realm": 2 - } - }, - "full_service_authentication_proven": false, - "existing_token_decryption_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T18:02:11.395426+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4763fd7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.actual-offline-recovery-review.v1", - "status": "verified", - "accepted_at": "2026-10-16T18:02:11.395426+00:00", - "publication_receipt": "actual-offline-publication.json", - "transfer_receipt": "actual-offline-transfer.json", - "recovery_receipt": "actual-offline-recovery.json", - "source_commit": "fbdd62b7ede49d5837a2f374511d06e1bffd3a23", - "three_published_objects_match_current_reproducible_build": true, - "local_ciphertext_sha256_rechecked": true, - "native_archive_verifier_source_matches": true, - "operator_confirmed_independent_access_and_hidden_key_run": true, - "agent_received_private_credentials": false, - "openbao_sso_contacted_for_retrieval": false, - "scope": "Existing identity ciphertext retrieval and archive/database recovery; no deliberate production shutdown, service authentication, retained MFA-token decryption or historical audit-signature continuity test." -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-transfer.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-transfer.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0f99d6b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-transfer.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1", - "provider": "Storage Share", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "ciphertext_bytes": 109738344, - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "etag": "\"28ec1f7014e492de4c40e1ae75502f08\"", - "status": "readback_verified", - "fetched_path": "/tmp/nk49-identity-fetched-v0x96qlx/net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age", - "independent_owner_retrieval_verified": true, - "credential_source": "independently_held_provider_access", - "provider_auth_mode": "account", - "openbao_contacted": false, - "sso_contacted": false, - "provider_writes_performed": false, - "age_private_key_used": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "object_unchanged_during_transfer": true, - "downloaded_at": "2026-10-16T18:01:01.639298+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/image-observation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/image-observation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 14eaa0f..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/image-observation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-recovery-image-observation.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-16T15:56:10.384927+00:00", - "cluster_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "read_only": true, - "secret_values_read": false, - "archive_generation_match_proven": false, - "independent_image_availability_proven": false, - "pods": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "pod": "authelia-7f57c4c4fc-mk5hb", - "pod_uid": "7678e756-0af9-4eb9-bc25-c8b09ca490fc", - "owners": [ - { - "kind": "ReplicaSet", - "name": "authelia-7f57c4c4fc", - "uid": "de04027d-ebff-45bc-8aff-73583907b57e" - } - ], - "containers": [ - { - "name": "authelia", - "image_id": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "ready": true - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "pod": "keycape-5fc5dd9b7f-zv5xm", - "pod_uid": "bf0d4674-cbe4-4e44-b105-b799eb4c124e", - "owners": [ - { - "kind": "ReplicaSet", - "name": "keycape-5fc5dd9b7f", - "uid": "8d862e2d-532c-4f1f-b510-cbe489ec579b" - } - ], - "containers": [ - { - "name": "keycape", - "image_id": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010", - "ready": true - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "pod": "lldap-f6df76764-jjp97", - "pod_uid": "b05329a6-8b9d-45d6-a573-c03c04e667be", - "owners": [ - { - "kind": "ReplicaSet", - "name": "lldap-f6df76764", - "uid": "306a97b4-a5f7-421f-971d-36a3dd5fbc47" - } - ], - "containers": [ - { - "name": "lldap", - "image_id": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "ready": true - } - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "pod": "privacyidea-86b695c88c-9kh7g", - "pod_uid": "2a44aa01-84e0-4778-a7c3-d0597b192259", - "owners": [ - { - "kind": "ReplicaSet", - "name": "privacyidea-86b695c88c", - "uid": "7db5316a-0b89-431e-a678-a5dad372fc9c" - } - ], - "containers": [ - { - "name": "factor-recovery", - "image_id": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "ready": true - }, - { - "name": "privacyidea", - "image_id": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "ready": true - } - ] - } - ], - "knowledge": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "package_digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "source_status": "withheld; current SECURITY-COMPANION and owner route sources reviewed directly; orientation only" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/isolated-lldap-preparation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/isolated-lldap-preparation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8014f16..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/isolated-lldap-preparation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-lldap-preparation.v1", - "date": "2026-10-16", - "status": "native_synthetic_verified_owner_run_pending", - "sources": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py", - "sha256": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh", - "sha256": "f0b9cecf92482b0af10a6e304c66677dc4390b6a4560826700a659723af5e2fc" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py", - "sha256": "729791f7271da617969255e782351f134b807500394f3522db6ae00d4bd4dc77" - }, - { - "path": "docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md", - "sha256": "2c30f87cbcd836d93177503932f82824a3bd9a0a6683aec07987d3e740353d44" - } - ], - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "linux_local_unix_endpoint_only": true - }, - "tests": { - "focused_command": "NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_LLDAP_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py", - "focused_passed": 6, - "failed": 0, - "broader_run_passed": 49, - "broader_run_skipped": 1, - "skip_reason": "separately opted-in PostgreSQL fixture; actual PostgreSQL archive recovery already accepted in T23", - "native_existing_user_and_invalid_credential_result": true, - "native_encrypted_bundle_to_directory_restore": true, - "original_key_missing_refused": true, - "network_none_and_before_import_isolation_guard_verified": true, - "directory_data_preserved_and_container_tmpfs_cleanup_verified": true, - "fixture_signing_secret_generated_per_run": true - }, - "credential_route": { - "catalog_id": "net-kingdom-lldap-bind-credential", - "owner": "railiance-platform", - "resolvable_fetch_lane": false, - "use": "owner boundary discovery only; no service credential fetched; actual existing-user input remains private with operator" - }, - "knowledge": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "status": "withheld; current local security companion, task card and owner route reviewed directly; orientation only" - }, - "actual_backup_native_lldap_authentication_proven": false, - "actual_private_key_or_user_password_received_by_agent": false, - "production_contacted": false, - "other_service_authentication_or_mfa_or_audit_proven": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-preparation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-preparation.json deleted file mode 100644 index be8392e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-preparation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-preparation.v1", - "date": "2026-10-16", - "status": "native_synthetic_verified_actual_owner_run_pending", - "sources": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py", - "sha256": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh", - "sha256": "ad2d045c82f771615d8be4ab401fa86e001ca5529ad81f3cb10b1f8c25a59639" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py", - "sha256": "2e741a0d45d8cc6ada292b699dc1e2b239fb186cfa52bc3cefd3cdf2d6ddc915" - }, - { - "path": "docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md", - "sha256": "918a5b6f1c49fa8338fde8b19d0c3a44ac2cb8ae890e3b74713f7c11f10549c3" - } - ], - "target": { - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "images": [ - "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - ] - }, - "tests": { - "command": "NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_PRIVACYIDEA_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py -x", - "passed": 7, - "failed": 0, - "native_retained_token_decryption_and_original_key_new_audit": true, - "native_tampered_history_reported": true, - "native_unsigned_history_reported": true, - "native_malformed_key_fails_with_cleanup": true, - "native_full_encrypted_bundle_to_checks_and_tmpfs_cleanup": true, - "archived_config_expressions_never_executed": true, - "archived_literal_legacy_policy_retained": true - }, - "policy": "every stored audit row up to2000000, no sampling;600-second worker bound; original key/config bindings, explicit contained DB; report exceptions, do not rewrite history", - "existing_token_mfa_proven": false, - "event_completeness_claimed": false, - "actual_backup_token_material_or_audit_proven": false, - "actual_private_key_or_other_credential_received_by_agent": false, - "knowledge": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "source_status": "runbooks withheld; current local owner contract, task cards and installed pinned native implementation reviewed directly; orientation only" - }, - "credential_route": { - "catalog_id": "railiance-backup-offsite-lane", - "owner": "railiance-platform", - "use": "existing independent human-held age key only; no credential fetched or new grant" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/offline-service-images.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/offline-service-images.json deleted file mode 100644 index 852c46a..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/offline-service-images.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-recovery-offline-images.v1", - "status": "saved_loaded_inspected", - "observed_at": "2026-10-16T18:19:11.824598+00:00", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "archive_path": "/tmp/nk49-service-image-cache-vxokyfoa/identity-images.tar", - "archive_bytes": 347521536, - "archive_sha256": "e61124c5b4473bf49671e254ad83a8829a046c72e8d46582dad6f6594fecd434", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - }, - { - "reference": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "image_id": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - }, - { - "reference": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010", - "image_id": "sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010" - } - ], - "production_registry_required_for_local_drill": false, - "offhost_image_escrow_proven": false, - "source_archive_image_lineage_proven": false, - "service_custody_or_age_key_supplied_to_image_cache": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/preparation-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/preparation-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 331bc51..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/preparation-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-outage-preparation.v1", - "date": "2026-10-16", - "status": "source_fixture_verified_owner_execution_pending", - "tests": { - "command": "NK49_RUN_DISPOSABLE_POSTGRES_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py tests/test_identity_offsite.py tests/test_identity_bundle.py tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py", - "passed": 65, - "failed": 0, - "skipped": 0 - }, - "kit_preview": { - "schema": "netkingdom.recovery-kit.v1", - "status": "built", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "new_grants_created": false, - "files": [ - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-62b9464609b8e0fd-START-HERE.md", - "bytes": 8381, - "sha256": "1531675f2e7d3713a3a7fc28a5143fb24f201b19cd05d14c59ee485a0bc11e61" - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-62b9464609b8e0fd.zip", - "bytes": 34527, - "sha256": "62b9464609b8e0fde2c05527fc79eff742ee3f626262d847df8fb579548a9470" - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-62b9464609b8e0fd.zip.sha256", - "bytes": 108, - "sha256": "55e375291b27c2977049b89a5deddaed5e39c7ee9179013ce73d2ad43f2fb308" - } - ], - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T15:56:50.813341+00:00" - }, - "sources": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py", - "sha256": "80e9f755b2304c222822b49ab563600832b9452c0c387a0523f4323e591e6270" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py", - "sha256": "55df6283898fadae316b89304bacf485dec88459b35ea2b9599c5d387c44ca8c" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-offline-recovery.sh", - "sha256": "0e3cfe8cc66d63b91a5c3f90912ce700c648c55b685ac11151631d22d87b40fd" - }, - { - "path": "docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md", - "sha256": "1531675f2e7d3713a3a7fc28a5143fb24f201b19cd05d14c59ee485a0bc11e61" - }, - { - "path": "docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md", - "sha256": "34f90e0ee1425083b26a763777b0150241e1cd5fb7dbdf8917f7a7a99482376d" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py", - "sha256": "d88a752fd862983e3c01ebe6aea4baffa4168802d8ec616db161585a80c65f62" - } - ], - "actual_outage_retrieval_verified": false, - "actual_storage_share_guide_publication_verified": false, - "service_restore_executed": false, - "new_grants_created": false, - "secret_values_exported": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/terminal-prompt-fix.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/terminal-prompt-fix.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0c523df..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/terminal-prompt-fix.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offline-terminal-fix.v1", - "date": "2026-10-16", - "original_attempt_receipt": { - "schema": "netkingdom.recovery-kit.v1", - "status": "failed", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "new_grants_created": false, - "files": [ - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-62b9464609b8e0fd-START-HERE.md", - "bytes": 8381, - "sha256": "1531675f2e7d3713a3a7fc28a5143fb24f201b19cd05d14c59ee485a0bc11e61" - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-62b9464609b8e0fd.zip", - "bytes": 34527, - "sha256": "62b9464609b8e0fde2c05527fc79eff742ee3f626262d847df8fb579548a9470" - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-62b9464609b8e0fd.zip.sha256", - "bytes": 108, - "sha256": "55e375291b27c2977049b89a5deddaed5e39c7ee9179013ce73d2ad43f2fb308" - } - ], - "error": "kit_operation_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed" - }, - "reproduced_failure": "UnsupportedOperation: File or stream is not seekable opening a controlling terminal with Python text r+ before getpass", - "fix": "Shared getpass prompt with interactive stdin/stderr checks and GetPassWarning raised before echo fallback; no seek-requiring terminal open", - "tests": { - "command": "python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py tests/test_identity_offsite.py", - "passed": 36, - "failed": 0, - "real_controlling_terminal_hidden_input_verified": true, - "redirected_input_refused": true, - "echo_fallback_refused": true, - "both_cli_failed_stage_receipts_verified": true - }, - "sources": [ - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py", - "sha256": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py", - "sha256": "6fa0f1494dccaf003b6c6396c5de8b36faa2b276eeb16badd04383f5efb71e66" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py", - "sha256": "827b4e135d6be7a54f3f56cfc9340828462a70866ffe3513b544256bf2dafa31" - } - ], - "rebuilt_kit": { - "schema": "netkingdom.recovery-kit.v1", - "status": "built", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "new_grants_created": false, - "files": [ - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff-START-HERE.md", - "bytes": 8381, - "sha256": "1531675f2e7d3713a3a7fc28a5143fb24f201b19cd05d14c59ee485a0bc11e61" - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip", - "bytes": 34930, - "sha256": "57d1940947aa25ff83d0f25ddf30090eb40595cccaab64225de882a2fd59ea2f" - }, - { - "name": "net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip.sha256", - "bytes": 108, - "sha256": "102d1cd25662650a7a181039f6646883d72a9d976551a8950279d8936ca22171" - } - ], - "finished_at": "2026-10-16T17:55:59.729885+00:00" - }, - "actual_provider_publication_verified": false, - "actual_outage_retrieval_verified": false, - "private_credential_values_read_by_agent": false, - "knowledge": { - "version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "status": "runbooks withheld; existing directly reviewed local owner contract governs scoped code repair" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-21-nk49-t33-readiness/readiness-observation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-21-nk49-t33-readiness/readiness-observation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 164ae31..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-21-nk49-t33-readiness/readiness-observation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "nk49.t35-t36-readiness-observation.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-21", - "status": "preparation_only_not_recovery_or_owner_assent", - "t35_public_tls": { - "source": "currently served chain at kc.coulomb.social:443 (public), projected by railiance-cluster tools/public-tls-metadata.py @ a594840; trust file = Mozilla ISRG Root X1", - "originality_proven": false, - "schema": "nk49.public-tls-metadata.v1", - "status": "public_metadata_only_not_originality_or_owner_assent", - "tls_cert_sha256": "f14c928a51b3cf98b0c0964b9bf9a33f4b37e9f30b5c3e949f819fe120ebd15a", - "trust_sha256": "22b557a27055b33606b6559f37703928d3e4ad79f110b407d04986e1843543d1", - "leaf_public_spki_sha256": "sha256:236fa4dcf1ce1d58be398dd01ab067157281e54356a550be35a157527b464b6d", - "leaf_dns_sans": [ - "kc.coulomb.social" - ], - "leaf_not_before": "2026-09-25T17:57:22+00:00", - "leaf_not_after": "2026-12-24T17:57:21+00:00", - "server_chain_certificates": 3, - "trust_certificates": 1, - "network_contacted": false, - "private_key_argument_supported": false, - "issuer_source": "net-kingdom sso-mfa/k8s/cert-manager/issuers.yaml: ClusterIssuer letsencrypt-prod, ACME HTTP-01, ingressClassName traefik, account key secret letsencrypt-prod-account-key", - "credential_routing": "warden route find returned only SSH-certificate lanes; no TLS lane. Not evidence of absence of an owner.", - "owner": "railiance-cluster (cert-manager, Traefik, cluster backup posture); live work RCLUSTER-WP-0018 T02 todo, T03/T04 wait, T05 todo" - }, - "t36_selector": { - "owner_repo": "secrets-engine", - "commit": "0f44fbeea18147e65f379632621f2f29ded5f310", - "selector_path": "docs/keycape-recovery-selector.json", - "selector_sha256": "sha256:02077af3c18b24f5e4a85992a3d4d0df51a8e458de1e48b48f7eb5f482257012", - "source_path": "src/secrets_engine/service_auth.py", - "source_sha256": "sha256:c0ade429edf452ad17f05d690b7ebef091db7f1a42b5ac350f1e40955c8586c0", - "consumer": { - "client_id": "secrets-engine-openbao", - "secret_env": "KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET", - "audience": "secrets-engine-openbao", - "scope": "openbao:login", - "subject": "service:secrets-engine", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", - "roles": "secrets-engine", - "deny_scope": "openbao:admin" - }, - "preflight_cases": [ - { - "case": "exact selector + source hash, no admission", - "rc": 0, - "status": "source_selector_matches_not_native_assent" - }, - { - "case": "wrong source hash", - "rc": 1, - "status": "source_selector_refused" - }, - { - "case": "unsigned admission document", - "rc": 1, - "status": "source_selector_refused" - } - ], - "admission_anchor_on_workstation": "absent (/etc/secrets-engine/admission)", - "builder_tests": "net-kingdom tests/test_private_manifest_binding.py + tests/test_prepare_isolated_keycape.py: 27 passed (synthetic inputs; positive bindings, archive/size/transfer/source/issuer/consumer-overlap/symlink/mode/digest negatives)" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json deleted file mode 100644 index 84459ce..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2069 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "nk49.t02-caller-ledger.v1", - "generated": "2026-10-23", - "source_inventory": "docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/caller-source-inventory.json", - "source_inventory_sha256": "d6a1a575e2690a242db76d6d5de60f48648211f2cf62c156f22486e1e0bbf28d", - "status": "complete per-entry ledger (read-only source reconciliation); owner acceptance of dispositions and native checks remain with T21/T22", - "method": "presence + sha256 drift vs inventory; basename referenced from Makefile/*.mk/bootstrap scripts/console = active route; else basename referenced from any tracked markdown outside workplans/history = documented operator route", - "pending_columns": [], - "summary": { - "current": 59, - "owner-deferred (greenfield/initial activation only)": 1, - "retired": 11, - "owner-deferred (greenfield bootstrap only)": 3, - "current, superseded on 1.3 admission": 1, - "current diagnostic": 12, - "current (internal)": 1, - "current (repair)": 1, - "current (recovery tooling)": 4 - }, - "drifted": 5, - "entries": [ - { - "path": "Makefile", - "inventory_sha256": "5d2114f6141bb8504c5c780044302126c07958a5732afdb0d0c0218a4f84210e", - "present": true, - "drifted": true, - "last_change": "bde143e 2026-10-19", - "inventory_classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance", - "referenced_by": [ - "(root)" - ], - "candidate_status": "current (active route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "none directly; dispatches the routes below", - "consumers": "operators, pre-commit recipe", - "native_evidence": "drift = staged work-record/receiver build targets (bde143e, 4c7f32a); no credential path changed", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "docs/NetkingdomRuntimeArchitecture.md", - "docs/adr/ADR-0015-netkingdom-railiance-workload-packaging-and-relational-platform.md", - "docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md", - "docs/security-bootstrap-retrospective.md" - ], - "disposition": "current" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py", - "inventory_sha256": "ea9c3418ed00527b9019ab9893f1f3c9fe29d0697f1f0c879e28fdbae373889b", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "1cbe00f 2026-10-13", - "inventory_classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance", - "referenced_by": [], - "candidate_status": "current (documented operator route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "per documented attended procedure (docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md)", - "consumers": "operators via documented runbook", - "native_evidence": "documented route (see documented_in); native acceptance per owning task", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "current" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh", - "inventory_sha256": "a70dba396484b2a353a39349c3d3719f7b6695b9f0e35025ef79e3db0ec2ff53", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "1cbe00f 2026-10-13", - "inventory_classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance", - "referenced_by": [ - "Makefile", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh" - ], - "candidate_status": "current (active route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "per Make/bootstrap route", - "consumers": "operators via Make/bootstrap", - "native_evidence": "active route reference (see referenced_by)", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "current" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh", - "inventory_sha256": "cc27c4f3969c292a913a0ae325cd0d4ec2665f9fffbbd1eb1c5f73b08e398a32", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "d9557ba 2026-10-15", - "inventory_classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance", - "referenced_by": [ - "Makefile", - "tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py" - ], - "candidate_status": "current (active route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "per Make/bootstrap route", - "consumers": "operators via Make/bootstrap", - "native_evidence": "active route reference (see referenced_by)", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - ".claude/commands/creds-init.md", - "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md", - "docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md", - "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md" - ], - "disposition": "current" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh", - "inventory_sha256": "09b387d3555ce2beaeb8d7f000c2d52a1ffea274c793f30bce80a8f3ef5dc2f8", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "b01a30b 2026-10-13", - "inventory_classification": "owner-scoped adapter/caller; source presence supplies no live approval or acceptance", - "referenced_by": [ - "Makefile" - ], - "candidate_status": "current (active route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "per Make/bootstrap route", - "consumers": "operators via Make/bootstrap", - "native_evidence": "active route reference (see referenced_by)", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md", - 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"present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "d9557ba 2026-10-15", - "inventory_classification": "retired entry point; refuses before credential/cluster access", - "referenced_by": [], - "candidate_status": "retired (refusing entry point)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "none (refuses before credential/cluster access)", - "consumers": "none", - "native_evidence": "refusal covered by tests/test_retirement_and_bundle_boundaries.py", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "retired" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/fetch-privacyidea-backup.py", - "inventory_sha256": "233160e1206643a5cf7ad05141d733f0a75aff651190e27f77515a124ff0a59f", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "a1939a7 2026-10-16", - "inventory_classification": "bounded off-host transfer / isolated database drill; actual recovery acceptance requires operator execution", - "referenced_by": [], - "candidate_status": "unrouted: owner disposition needed", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "Platform attended Backup-account lane (railiance-platform owner custody)", - "consumers": "isolated PI database drill", - "native_evidence": "privacyidea-transfer-r1.json", - "next_task": "NK-WP-0049-T24 G3 (recurring drill)", - "documented_in": [ - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "current (recovery tooling)" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py", - "inventory_sha256": "90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "a1939a7 2026-10-16", - "inventory_classification": "bounded off-host transfer / isolated database drill; actual recovery acceptance requires operator execution", - "referenced_by": [], - "candidate_status": "current (documented operator route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "per documented attended procedure (docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md)", - "consumers": "operators via documented runbook", - "native_evidence": "documented route (see documented_in); native acceptance per owning task", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "current" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py", - "inventory_sha256": "cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1", - "present": true, - "drifted": false, - "last_change": "dca9992 2026-10-16", - "inventory_classification": "missing identity backup coverage proposal and metadata-only preparation; no live capture/grant/delivery capability", - "referenced_by": [], - "candidate_status": "unrouted: owner disposition needed", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "credential_route": "read-only workload/PVC metadata", - "consumers": "identity-backup-profile.json proposal", - "native_evidence": "994d11c coverage proposal", - "next_task": "none", - "documented_in": [ - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "current (recovery tooling)" - }, - { - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json", - "inventory_sha256": "176c1f2f9111c2c51503212deb162274609d5e53bfe03d7319e19e44c5e09500", - "present": true, - "drifted": true, - "last_change": "a17aa7e 2026-10-16", - "inventory_classification": "missing identity backup coverage proposal and metadata-only preparation; no live capture/grant/delivery capability", - "referenced_by": [], - "candidate_status": "current (documented operator route)", - "owner": "net-kingdom (profile) / railiance-platform (job)", - "credential_route": "Platform attended Backup-account lane (railiance-platform owner custody)", - "consumers": "daily identity backup job (T14)", - "native_evidence": "drift = a17aa7e admitted host + live provider scope; T14 activation evidence", - "next_task": "NK-WP-0049-T24 (second provider)", - "documented_in": [ - "docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md", - "registry/capabilities/capability.security.bootstrap-recovery.md", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md" - ], - "disposition": "current" - } - ], - "historical_objects": [ - { - "object": "sso/keycape-pi-token", - "uid": "1d459ab6-8b42-454d-9220-0fa2ffe4e819", - "created": "2026-03-25", - "present_2026_10_15": true, - "current_source_readers": "none (check-user-mfa-state.sh retired the read; tests assert no output leak)", - "revocation_proven": false, - "disposition": "retired in source; object retained; revocation/deletion owner-deferred", - "next_task": "NK-WP-0049-T22 + NK-WP-0022 deletion approval" - }, - { - "object": "mfa/privacyidea-trigger-admin", - "uid": "d1c643be-672d-4d13-8e46-3a58cb37ae39", - "created": "2026-03-25", - "present_2026_10_15": true, - "current_source_readers": "none found in repo source", - "revocation_proven": false, - "disposition": "retired in source; object retained; revocation/deletion owner-deferred", - "next_task": "NK-WP-0049-T22 + NK-WP-0022 deletion approval" - } - ], - "undocumented_non_retired": [ - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/openbao-lab.py", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/rotation-env.py", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py" - ], - "undocumented_note": "remaining entries are Make-routed bootstrap scripts (see referenced_by; documented by make help)" -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/verifier-output.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/verifier-output.json deleted file mode 100644 index 75acec3..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/verifier-output.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.keycape-attempt-receipt-verification.v1", - "receipt_sha256": "16d72f7cb25700ab5e57b7e7536f1085239c402ad99a128def941ac06e311651", - "verdict": "verified", - "findings": [], - "claims_not_made": [ - "consumer continuity (T18)", - "retained-factor MFA (T19)", - "owner acceptance" - ], - "invocation": { - "observed_at": "2026-10-23T17:35Z", - "verifier": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py", - "source_root": "clean git archive of net-kingdom a20dcfe tools/bootstrap-recovery", - "transfer_receipt": "fresh independent retrieval 2026-10-23 19:31 Berlin (private, outside Git), ciphertext 7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "not_after": "2026-10-24T05:00:00+00:00", - "exit": 0 - }, - "attempt_inputs_public": { - "founder_admission_sha256": "f829795442a74c04de81032ebae84279f4c621891dc8e061aea461e58d26c157", - "launcher_admission_sha256": "a57c4c642d5abdbaac552deae0c3079062d3c8ed71544056380841a90e53a6ba", - "tls_cert_sha256": "0dd5d58264b552cfdffac6c003dddb789762ea6ba1013e0965c7979588135add", - "leaf_public_spki_sha256": "sha256:044daa6b300e8dc2a83bdac90e3a6df5d96c40a430c52043b69e2b9c4f188b0b", - "trust_sha256": "22b557a27055b33606b6559f37703928d3e4ad79f110b407d04986e1843543d1", - "tls_reissue": "railiance-cluster 88b360b, RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T04, Let's Encrypt YR2, 2026-10-23T16:23:09Z to 2027-01-21T16:23:08Z" - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/actual-isolated-authelia-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/actual-isolated-authelia-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 33a93a9..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/actual-isolated-authelia-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-authelia-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_authelia_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "6139294f6ebdcbaad35934f04b11177d8cf89d134506a730f0c0ebbb3a4967be", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "image_id": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "original_configuration_validated": true, - "storage_encryption_key_verified": true, - "existing_user_first_factor": true, - "wrong_password_refused": true, - "archived_client_secret_accepted": true, - "wrong_client_secret_refused": true, - "grant_issued": false, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "issuer_key_matches_archive": true, - "issuer_jwk_thumbprint_sha256": "El5Prcg0wUe1l9mAV1IC55i45-zrLXwcBnl7WamASm8", - "notifications_confined_to_tmpfs_file": true, - "notification_written": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-24T15:24:14.313159+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/actual-isolated-authelia-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/actual-isolated-authelia-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index b6afb99..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/actual-isolated-authelia-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.actual-isolated-authelia-review.v1", - "status": "verified", - "accepted_at": "2026-10-24T15:24:14+00:00", - "receipt": "actual-isolated-authelia-recovery.json", - "source_commit": "006dc23", - "source_sha256_matches_committed_file": true, - "reused_source_sha256_match_committed_files": true, - "known_recovered_ciphertext_matches": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "exact_local_target_matches": true, - "checks_passed": [ - "original_configuration_validated", - "storage_encryption_key_verified", - "issuer_key_matches_archive", - "existing_user_first_factor", - "wrong_password_refused", - "archived_client_secret_accepted", - "wrong_client_secret_refused" - ], - "grant_issued": false, - "issuer_jwk_thumbprint_sha256": "El5Prcg0wUe1l9mAV1IC55i45-zrLXwcBnl7WamASm8", - "notification_written": false, - "container_and_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "agent_received_private_credentials": false, - "not_proven": [ - "KeyCape to Authelia to LLDAP human login chain", - "privacyIDEA retained-token MFA", - "OIDC authorization-code grant issuance", - "current production password validity" - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 688fbdd..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-mfa.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": true, - "user_to_token_resolver_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "d55c5f93c085907be6ae19b0eba6ef360fe863ef8922aa5b6ec205f4837efa16", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-privacyidea.py": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "ldap_resolvers_rewritten_to_loopback": 1, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory": true, - "selected_user_sha256": "2868946f999c23cc527736fa53c6e35ca7960cf01d06b33ea792e1e164aabcc1", - "user_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_types": [ - "totp" - ], - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "wrong_key_refusal": "error_907", - "wrong_code_refused": true, - "wrong_code_refusal": "wrong_value", - "existing_token_native_check_accepted": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-24T16:48:44.390108+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-review.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9a3a532..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-review.v1", - "status": "verified", - "accepted_at": "2026-10-24T16:48:44+00:00", - "receipt": "actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json", - "source_commit": "5008e34", - "source_sha256_matches_committed_file": true, - "reused_source_sha256_match_committed_files": true, - "known_recovered_ciphertext_matches": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30", - "exact_local_target_matches": true, - "checks_passed": [ - "ldap_resolver_repointed_to_restored_directory", - "user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory", - "wrong_key_refused", - "wrong_code_refused", - "existing_token_native_check_accepted" - ], - "token_type_checked": "totp", - "usable_tokens_for_user": 1, - "wrong_key_refusal": "error_907", - "wrong_code_refusal": "wrong_value", - "container_and_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "agent_received_private_credentials": false, - "earlier_attempt": "A first run of a serial-based design stopped at ResolverError on all checks (receipt retained in /tmp, not in Git); the acceptance gate correctly claimed no proof and the stage was rebuilt.", - "not_proven": [ - "KeyCape consumer login through Authelia, LLDAP and privacyIDEA together", - "event handlers or policies that call outside the isolated namespace", - "tokens of users other than the one named", - "current production token PIN or code validity" - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-27-nk49-t21-caller-dispositions.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-27-nk49-t21-caller-dispositions.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9cfb1b6..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-27-nk49-t21-caller-dispositions.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0049-T21 caller dispositions — builder-mode acceptance draft - -**Status:** draft for founder acceptance, 2026-10-27. Nothing here is accepted until the founder says so. -**Source:** [T02 caller ledger](../2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json) (93 entries, complete -per-entry reconciliation). All rows are owned by net-kingdom. Two also name another owner: one is shared with key-cape, and the -backup-profile row's job belongs to railiance-platform. - -## Proposed disposition by category - -| Category | Rows | Proposed builder-mode disposition | -|---|---|---| -| current | 59 | Accept as current callers. 52 have no follow-up; their documented route is the acceptance. The other 7 are covered under **Follow-up elsewhere** below. | -| current diagnostic | 12 | Accept as read-only diagnostics. They prove no recovery and grant nothing. | -| retired | 11 | Accept retirement. Their refusing entry points are covered by `tests/test_retirement_and_bundle_boundaries.py`. | -| current (recovery tooling / internal / repair) | 6 | Accept. They were exercised by the actual T16–T20 owner runs, and the drill rows feed NK-WP-0049-T24 G3. | -| owner-deferred, greenfield only | 4 | Accept the deferral. These are `create-secrets.py`, privacyIDEA `bootstrap-admin*.py` and `authentication-policy-rollout.py`. None of them runs on the current estate, and any re-run needs its own owner decision. | -| superseded on 1.3 admission | 1 | Accept. `vergabe-client-rollout.py` retires when NK-WP-0048-T16 admits 1.3. | - -## Follow-up already tracked elsewhere (no new task) - -| Row | Live work record | -|---|---| -| `keycape-client.py` | NK-WP-0048-T16 (1.3 re-freeze) | -| `openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py` | NK-WP-0051-T02 / KEY-WP-0041-T02 | -| `activate-onboarding-policy.py`, `deploy-onboarding-guard.py`, `enable-factor-confirmation.py` | NK-WP-0042 pilot reuse | -| `deploy-factor-recovery.py` | NK-WP-0042 step-up/recovery journey | -| `identity-backup-profile.json` | NK-WP-0049-T24 (second provider) | -| recovery inventory/fetch tools | NK-WP-0049-T24 G3 recurring drill | - -## T21's named checks: builder-mode position - -| Named in T21 | Position | Residual | -|---|---|---| -| Dedicated factor-diagnostic admission | Source: `mfa_state.py` / `check-user-mfa-state.sh` accept only an owner-admitted private token file and never fetch KeyCape's reader. Live (2026-10-27, founder-run admin scan of Deployment/StatefulSet/DaemonSet/CronJob/Job/Pod specs): only `Deployment sso/keycape` and its pod `keycape-d66d674cd-9vgfw` reference `keycape-factor-read`. | **Deferred:** no admitted credential lane exists for the attended diagnostic (`sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md:228-233`), so it is unavailable until its owner sets one up through credential routing. Not a T44 item. | -| Reserved LDAP group denial | `manage-group-members.sh` is a current, documented route. | A live native denial check of the reserved group is not re-run here. It goes into the T44 pre-production drill. | -| Resolver/cutover input provenance | `resolver_cutover.py` and the `*-lldap-resolver-live.sh` scripts are documented routes. NK-WP-0022 (finished) carried the cutover. | No new functional proof is claimed. Re-proof belongs in T44. | -| Bootstrap, root-output and isolation callers | Covered by T01 (secret output removed), the retirement tests and the T16–T20 isolated runs. | None. | - -## What acceptance means - -Acceptance means the founder, as owner, accepts each row's recorded disposition for the builder-mode estate. It does -not claim fresh native positive/negative checks for every current caller. Those checks are named above and assigned -to the T44 drill or the owning workplan. No write, cutover, credential change or new grant results from this record. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-27-production-readiness-ledger.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-27-production-readiness-ledger.md deleted file mode 100644 index 2c89815..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-27-production-readiness-ledger.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,199 +0,0 @@ -# Production readiness ledger — 2026-10-27 - -**Task:** NK-WP-0055-T01. This is a read-only assessment. -**Sources:** -- the net-kingdom repository and State Hub; -- read-only owner assessments from railiance-platform, access-engine and audit-core, each - made from its own repository files and git history the same day; -- founder-run admin checks recorded in NK-WP-0049. - -A check is **met** only if it was observed on the estate that serves production traffic. -Builder-mode acceptances count as **partial**. The definition is in -[NK-WP-0055](../../workplans/NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md). - -## Summary - -| # | Area | Status | Gap carried by | -|---|---|---|---| -| 1 | Platform root custody | partial (single-holder custody: accepted exception) | T13, NK-WP-0054-T07 | -| 2 | MFA and identity | partial (SI-X4 closed 2026-10-27) | NK-WP-0054-T04/T05/T06, T12 | -| 3 | Bootstrap and recovery | partial | T02–T04, T07 (NK-WP-0053), T08 | -| 4 | OpenBao runtime secrets | partial (manual Shamir unseal approved) | T07 (RPF-WP-0036-T03), T12 | -| 5 | Secret rotation | partial | T06, T15, RPF-WP-0035, RPF-WP-0055-T01 | -| 6 | flex-auth (access-engine) policy state | partial | T14, FLEX-WP-0031, FLEX-WP-0024 | -| 7 | Topaz runtime | **accepted exception** (ADR-0018: the core is the production PDP) | T12 (core checks), T14 | -| 8 | Tenant onboarding | partial | T11, T12 | -| 9 | Audit sink | open | T11, AUDIT-WP-0013-T02, AUDIT-WP-0015-T01 | -| 10 | Break-glass | partial (king path drilled 2026-10-28) | NK-WP-0053 recurring drill; T16 at production entry | - -None of the ten areas is met. One is an accepted exception (7), and one is open (9). Area 10 moved from open to partial on 2026-10-28. - - -## Founder decisions, 2026-10-27 (hub decision `37464824`, NK-WP-0055-T10) - -| Decision | Effect on the ledger | -|---|---| -| (a) Manual Shamir unseal is the approved production mechanism for now. | Area 4's unseal gap is closed. Its other gaps remain. | -| (b) Topaz is not required. The access-engine Go core is the production PDP ([ADR-0018](../adr/ADR-0018-access-engine-core-as-production-pdp.md)). | Area 7 is an accepted exception. Its health, freshness, load and fail-closed checks move to the core under T12, and Topaz leaves the T11 audit sources. | -| (c) The founder, as platform-root, holds all OpenBao unseal shares. This is an accepted exception to two-of-three custody. | Area 1's escrow gap becomes an exception. Item 4 (the offline king path with SSO down) stays open under T13. | -| (d) HA is out of scope for now. | No area changes. | - -Each exception is reviewed at the production declaration (T09). - -## Per area - -### 1. Platform root custody: partial - -**Evidence.** -- The custody model and records are in `docs/platform-root-custody.md` and ADR-0017. -- The non-secret root-grant record is NK-WP-0045, and railiance-platform keeps its own - custody record in RPF-WP-0049. -- The crisis custody list is `docs/crisis-custody-list.md`. - -**Missing.** -- The two-of-three escrow holders are not named. The custody doc's stage S6 is not reached, - so custody is still single-operator, which the architecture allows only before production. -- The OpenBao unseal share holders are `TO CONFIRM` (crisis list item 3). -- The offline king path that works with SSO down is `TO CONFIRM` (item 4). - -### 2. MFA and identity: partial - -**Evidence.** -- KeyCape issues tokens on the IAM Profile v0.3 contract. -- Privileged-action MFA guards are delivered for the portal and Vergabe clients (NK-WP-0042). -- The retained-MFA restore is proven (NK-WP-0049-T19). - -**Missing.** -- ~~The `aal2` binding on OpenBao `platform-admin` is not applied.~~ Applied and verified by the founder on - 2026-10-27 (RPF-WP-0065-T04); SI-X4 is closed and the account checks conformant. -- No recorded `tools/iam-profile-conformance/` run against the live issuer (NK-WP-0054-T04 - is waiting). -- The bind account is still the human `admin` (NK-WP-0054-T05/T06). -- Validation runs still lean on `platform-root`. - -### 3. Bootstrap and recovery: partial - -**Evidence.** NK-WP-0049 is finished: -- secret-free bootstrap output; -- daily off-host encrypted backup; -- retrieval that works with OpenBao and SSO down; -- isolated owner restores of all four identity services and of OpenBao. - -**Missing.** -- The joint live consumer drill (T02–T04). -- A recurring drill: NK-WP-0053-T02 waits on its first run, and T04 for an `admin`-operated - drill. -- Undrilled crisis items: `pi-admin` (item 7), the ops bundle location (item 8) and operator - access with SSO down (item 9). -- Receipt custody (T08). - -### 4. OpenBao runtime secrets: partial - -**Evidence.** -- Per-workload scoped Kubernetes and JWT auth and policies (`railiance-platform/openbao/policies/`). -- A file audit device, checked by `make openbao-verify-post-unseal`. -- Operator-only access (RPF-WP-0025). -- The isolated original restore (RPF-WP-0064-T07/T08). - -**Missing.** -- Manual Shamir unseal is in use, but it is not recorded as the *approved* production - mechanism. Auto-unseal was never verified. -- No scheduled snapshot job. RPF-WP-0064-T08 says that one restore is not recurring - assurance (RPF-WP-0036-T03). -- No dated live check of the auth methods and mounts against the committed policies. - -### 5. Secret rotation: partial - -**Evidence.** -- Dynamic database credentials exist for core-hub. -- The rotation lanes are designed in RPF-WP-0035 (blocked; T12 in progress). -- The backup credential default was removed (RPF-WP-0029). - -**Missing.** -- Rotation of the exposed material, held by founder decision `1591daa1` and CUST-WP-0073-T05. -- KeyCape client-secret rotation (RPF-WP-0055-T01, backlog). -- No per-lane register of blast radius and verification steps. - -### 6. flex-auth (access-engine) policy state: partial - -**Evidence.** -- Policy-as-code with check, list-allowed and explain. -- Versioned packages: a fail-open fix ships as a new version (FLEX-DEC-2026-008). -- Tenant-scope coverage (FLEX-WP-0022). -- Nine declared release units. - -**Missing.** -- Policies are not imported through a pipeline: a change needs a new image plus a helm - upgrade. -- No platform/tenant package split for `tenant:coulomb`. -- No production explain receipt. -- Decision-record emission is declared but not delivered (FLEX-WP-0031). -- The decision envelope is unsigned (FLEX-WP-0024-T07 waits on a founder gate). - -### 7. Topaz runtime: open - -**Evidence.** Topaz exists only as an adapter shape (`internal/adapters/topaz/`, FLEX-WP-0004). -Nothing deploys it, and every live decision comes from the Go core. - -**Correction to the table.** Fail-closed is declared per consumer (`pep-stance.yaml`), not in -the PDP. - -**Decision needed (T10).** Is a delegated Topaz PDP required for production, or does the Go -core satisfy this area? - -### 8. Tenant onboarding: partial - -**Evidence.** -- The onboarding portal, self-registration and first-login provisioning (NK-WP-0023, 0025, - 0036). -- Tenant-scoped identity lifecycle (NK-WP-0038). -- Tenant-scoped authorization (FLEX-WP-0022). - -**Missing.** -- The architecture's completion test has not been run end to end for `tenant:coulomb`: a - workload authenticates, gets a scoped decision, obtains only its secret, enforces locally - and produces an auditable record. -- Its audit and correlation leg depends on area 9. - -### 9. Audit sink: open - -**Evidence.** -- audit-core runs on durable PostgreSQL (AUDIT-WP-0005), with a hash chain (AUDIT-WP-0007). -- A single restore walk on 2026-08-13. -- Registered senders: user-engine, tenant-engine, approval-engine and informed-decision. - The Qonto collector is the only workload source. - -**Missing.** - -| Source | Status | Owner | -|---|---|---| -| Identity providers (KeyCape, Authelia, LLDAP, privacyIDEA) | not senders | — | -| access-engine | not a sender | AUDIT-WP-0013-T02 waits on access-engine | -| Topaz | not a sender | — | -| OpenBao | audit only on a PVC; the docs say "not a durable audit sink" | — | -| Kubernetes API audit | absent | — | - -- No cross-stream correlation id. -- No recurring restore drill. -- No offsite chain head (AUDIT-WP-0015-T01). - -**Side finding.** The NK-WP-0031 prerequisite (owner and E2 freshness metadata) has been met -since audit-core commit ca9708e, so NK-WP-0031 can be unblocked. - -### 10. Break-glass: open - -**Evidence.** The crisis custody list exists, and the king OTP was validated against a -restored privacyIDEA (isolated, 2026-10-24). - -**Missing.** -- No recorded or drilled path that works when normal identity (SSO) is down: crisis list - items 4 and 9 are `TO CONFIRM`. -- No post-event review record format. - -## Stale statements found - -These are for their owners to fix. Nothing was changed here. -- access-engine `SCOPE.md:125` says secrets-engine uses `callerAuth.mode: warn`, but - `values/secrets-engine.yaml` says `enforce`. -- The readiness table row "MFA and identity" names IAM Profile v0.2. The accepted contract is - v0.3. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-king-path-drill.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-king-path-drill.md deleted file mode 100644 index f913fd2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-king-path-drill.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -# King-path drill — post-event review record (NK-WP-0055-T13) - -Value-free record. No token, share, key or OTP appears here or in any linked receipt. - -| | | -|---|---| -| When | 2026-10-27/28 (UTC), founder workstation | -| Who | Founder (operator and authorizer); claude-code prepared commands and verified receipts | -| Why | Drill: prove that the final authority can act with SSO, KeyCape and OpenBao logins unavailable | -| Production touched | Only by the separate, earlier rollout of the loopback `generate-root` listener (RAPP-OPENBAO-WP-0003-T02). The drill itself ran on an isolated, networkless restore. | - -## Part 1: break-glass material from Storage Share - -`kingpath-offsite.py --verify` fetched `net-kingdom-kingpath-20261027T223050Z-8c9d48421f1b.tar.age` -from the Storage Share `Backup` account. ETag, size and digest matched the upload receipt. An unrelated -key was refused, and the content decrypted in memory only. `admin-kubeconfig` (kubeconfig shape) and -`tunnel-ssh-key` (SSH private key header) were intact. The custody helper refused the custodian age key -until the `railiance-backup` key was entered, as designed. Crisis list item 1 was then split so the two -keys cannot be confused again. - -## Part 2: OpenBao break-glass on an isolated restore (RPF-WP-0064-T10) - -- **Run:** attempt `RPF-WP-0064-T10-20261027-01`, admission `sha256:741fa571…ce7a`, adapter `3727f8b`, - snapshot `openbao-raft-snapshot-rpf-wp-0015-t03-reboot-20261014-01-20261014t181053z.snap.age` - (plaintext `a6312444…590b`). -- **Result:** `drilled` (`break_glass_drill_complete`) in 101 s. The receipt - `sha256:e4591346e99b23e405f1cb69f6f5158dbdb7b5d69b2d1d7709c563a74cc18397` stays outside Git and was - independently verified (`PASS`) from a clean clone. -- **Held initial root token:** valid as of the snapshot. It carries `root` policy, no TTL, no expiry, - and is an orphan token. -- **Fresh `generate-root`:** the shares were re-entered and the OTP decode worked. The generated token - carried `root`, the read-only `sys/auth` action succeeded, `revoke-self` returned 204, and the - follow-up lookup returned 403. -- **Cancel:** a started attempt was cancelled cleanly. -- **Teardown:** the container was removed and verified absent, no volumes were created, the memfds were - closed, and the readback credential was revoked. - -## Findings and follow-ups - -1. **A standing, non-expiring root token very likely exists on production.** It was valid at the - 2026-10-14 snapshot and has not been revoked since. The architecture asks that the initial root token - be revoked, or escrowed as break-glass material. The `generate-root` path now works on production and - is drilled, so it can replace that token. Founder decision `7ce684ec`: keep it escrowed during builder mode and - revoke it at production entry (NK-WP-0055-T16, guarded script in railiance-platform `95b5a19`). -2. **Production read-only SSO-down walk:** passed on 2026-10-28. It went through the static-key tunnel and the admin - kubeconfig. `openbao-0` was Running, OpenBao 2.5.4 was unsealed with threshold 2 of 3, the break-glass listener - 8210 answered `generate-root` status 200 and the main listener 405. Nothing was changed. -3. **Admission signing key:** it is `~/.ssh/gexec_approver_ed25519`. The founder stored a copy in the password - safe under the kingpath entry on 2026-10-28 (crisis list item 5). -4. **Not drilled:** using the restored kubeconfig and SSH key against the cluster. Provider console - access is not drilled either. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-authelia-filter.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-authelia-filter.json deleted file mode 100644 index 55d7fca..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-authelia-filter.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -{ - "data": "synthetic", - "findings": { - "bind_user": "uid=svc-authelia,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local", - "previous_filter": { - "human": 200, - "human_wrong_password": 401, - "ld-admin": 200, - "svc-keycape": 200, - "svc-privacyidea": 200 - }, - "repository_filter": { - "human": 200, - "human_wrong_password": 401, - "ld-admin": 401, - "svc-keycape": 401, - "svc-privacyidea": 401 - } - }, - "image": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "observed_at": "2026-10-29T20:52:19.793834+00:00", - "production_contacted": false, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split-rehearsal.v1", - "stage": "authelia", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-rehearsal.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-rehearsal.json deleted file mode 100644 index be68252..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-rehearsal.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -{ - "data": "synthetic", - "findings": { - "admin_after_switch": { - "can_create_user": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ], - "login_with_unchanged_password": true - }, - "cleanup": true, - "ld_admin_introduced": { - "can_create_group": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ], - "login": true - }, - "provisioner_password_manager": { - "can_add_group_member": false, - "can_create_user": false, - "can_set_user_password": true, - "login": true, - "refused_admin_password": true, - "users_group_id_known": true - }, - "read_only_binds": { - "svc-authelia": { - "bind": true, - "groups_visible": 6, - "people_visible": 8, - "sees_alice": true, - "write_refused": true - }, - "svc-keycape": { - "bind": true, - "groups_visible": 6, - "people_visible": 8, - "sees_alice": true, - "write_refused": true - }, - "svc-privacyidea": { - "bind": true, - "groups_visible": 6, - "people_visible": 8, - "sees_alice": true, - "write_refused": true - } - }, - "si3_interactive_login": { - "svc-authelia": true, - "svc-keycape": true, - "svc-privacyidea": true - } - }, - "image": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "observed_at": "2026-10-28T17:59:22.643767+00:00", - "production_contacted": false, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split-rehearsal.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-startup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-startup.json deleted file mode 100644 index 18345d7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-startup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "data": "synthetic", - "findings": { - "admin_still_signs_in": true, - "mismatched_configured_password_ignored": true, - "missing_configured_admin_created": false - }, - "image": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "observed_at": "2026-10-29T21:10:51.513396+00:00", - "production_contacted": false, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split-rehearsal.v1", - "stage": "startup", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/authelia-1-failed.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/authelia-1-failed.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7a4ce64..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/authelia-1-failed.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-authelia-recovery.v1", - "status": "failed", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "6139294f6ebdcbaad35934f04b11177d8cf89d134506a730f0c0ebbb3a4967be", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "image_id": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "d48121e680ec4910e3cf6314b3016f32e55355db7ccb91b056361a9ee54fcccb", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "original_configuration_validated": true, - "storage_encryption_key_verified": true, - "failed_stage": "existing_user_first_factor", - "failure_type": "AssertionError", - "error": "isolated_authelia_check_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed", - "finished_at": "2026-10-29T22:15:20.857542+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/authelia-2-failed.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/authelia-2-failed.json deleted file mode 100644 index 46fda54..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/authelia-2-failed.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-authelia-recovery.v1", - "status": "failed", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "6139294f6ebdcbaad35934f04b11177d8cf89d134506a730f0c0ebbb3a4967be", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - 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"finished_at": "2026-10-29T22:17:40.499007+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/privacyidea-mfa-1-failed.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/privacyidea-mfa-1-failed.json deleted file mode 100644 index 56bb227..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/attempts/privacyidea-mfa-1-failed.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-mfa.v1", - "status": "failed", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": false, - "user_to_token_resolver_proven": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "d55c5f93c085907be6ae19b0eba6ef360fe863ef8922aa5b6ec205f4837efa16", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-privacyidea.py": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - 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"schema": "netkingdom.isolated-authelia-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_authelia_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "6139294f6ebdcbaad35934f04b11177d8cf89d134506a730f0c0ebbb3a4967be", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "image_id": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "d48121e680ec4910e3cf6314b3016f32e55355db7ccb91b056361a9ee54fcccb", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "original_configuration_validated": true, - "storage_encryption_key_verified": true, - "existing_user_first_factor": true, - "wrong_password_refused": true, - "archived_client_secret_accepted": true, - "wrong_client_secret_refused": true, - "grant_issued": false, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "issuer_key_matches_archive": true, - "issuer_jwk_thumbprint_sha256": "El5Prcg0wUe1l9mAV1IC55i45-zrLXwcBnl7WamASm8", - "notifications_confined_to_tmpfs_file": true, - "notification_written": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-29T22:19:22.319311+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/drill.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/drill.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9325867..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/drill.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-restore-drill.v1", - "work": "NK-WP-0053-T02/T04", - "date": "2026-10-29", - "operator": "admin (founder)", - "verdict": "pass", - "generations": { - "20261019T034919Z-cc53fb903f6a": "stages 1-4", - "20261029T230600Z-0f8eb0c39b56": "stages 1 and 5" - }, - "stages": [ - { - "stage": 1, - "name": "independent retrieval", - "result": "pass", - "receipts": [ - "transfer-20261019.json", - "transfer-20261029.json" - ], - "identity": "founder, Backup app password at prompt" - }, - { - "stage": 2, - "name": "LLDAP", - "result": "pass", - "receipt": "lldap-recovery.json", - "login_tested": "admin" - }, - { - "stage": 3, - "name": "privacyIDEA", - "result": "pass", - "receipt": "privacyidea-recovery.json" - }, - { - "stage": 4, - "name": "Authelia", - "result": "pass", - "receipt": "authelia-recovery.json", - "login_tested": "admin" - }, - { - "stage": 5, - "name": "by-user MFA", - "result": "pass", - "receipt": "privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json", - "login_tested": "admin (realm coulomb)" - } - ], - "attempts_not_counted": [ - { - "receipt": "attempts/authelia-1-failed.json", - "cause": "operator mistyped the admin password (founder, 2026-10-29)" - }, - { - "receipt": "attempts/authelia-2-failed.json", - "cause": "operator mistyped the admin password (founder, 2026-10-29)" - }, - { - "receipt": null, - "stage": 3, - "cause": "run interrupted at a prompt before any receipt; restarted (founder, 2026-10-29)" - }, - { - "receipt": "attempts/privacyidea-mfa-1-failed.json", - "cause": "mistyped login name (founder, 2026-10-29)" - }, - { - "receipt": "attempts/privacyidea-mfa-2-failed.json", - "cause": "19 Oct generation predates admin's OTP enrolment: no token" - }, - { - "receipt": "attempts/privacyidea-mfa-3-failed.json", - "cause": "19 Oct generation predates admin's OTP enrolment: no token (user_token_count 0)" - } - ], - "finding": "No identity backup 2026-10-20..29 (full Storage Share account); see NK-WP-0055-T07. Fresh generation captured 2026-10-29T23:06Z after the founder freed space.", - "crisis_custody_list_checked": "before the drill (NK-WP-0054-T07 confirmations 2026-10-28)", - "next_due": "2027-01-29", - "secret_values_recorded": false -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/lldap-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/lldap-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index e56d86c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/lldap-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-lldap-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_lldap_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - 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"group_attribute_schema", - "group_attributes", - "groups", - "memberships", - "user_attribute_schema", - "user_attributes", - "users" - ], - "directory_table_counts": { - "users": 7, - "groups": 17, - "memberships": 13, - "user_attributes": 14, - "group_attributes": 0, - "user_attribute_schema": 3, - "group_attribute_schema": 0 - }, - "finished_at": "2026-10-29T22:07:13.738035+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index de44a8f..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-mfa.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": true, - "user_to_token_resolver_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "d55c5f93c085907be6ae19b0eba6ef360fe863ef8922aa5b6ec205f4837efa16", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-privacyidea.py": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "3eb534d34da97b986128a2c832d899fed4c2e2e3d97980916a096d13e6fce954", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "ldap_resolvers_rewritten_to_loopback": 1, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory": true, - "selected_user_sha256": "8c6976e5b5410415bde908bd4dee15dfb167a9c873fc4bb8a81f6f2ab448a918", - "user_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_types": [ - "totp" - ], - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "wrong_key_refusal": "error_907", - "wrong_code_refused": true, - "wrong_code_refusal": "wrong_value", - "existing_token_native_check_accepted": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-29T23:10:57.153056+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9d5c66b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_checked", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "d48121e680ec4910e3cf6314b3016f32e55355db7ccb91b056361a9ee54fcccb", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "retained_tokens_total": 5, - "retained_tokens_with_native_decryption": 5, - "different_key_cannot_reproduce_material_count": 5, - "retained_token_material_decrypted_inside_process": true, - "historical_audit_rows": 305405, - "historical_signed_rows": 305405, - "historical_unsigned_rows": 0, - "historical_invalid_signatures": 0, - "historical_legacy_signatures": 0, - "all_stored_audit_rows_checked": true, - "legacy_signature_verification_enabled": false, - "event_completeness_claimed": false, - "new_audit_entry_signed_verified": true, - "tampered_entry_refused": true, - "wrong_audit_public_key_refused": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-29T22:09:51.265478+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/transfer-20261019.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/transfer-20261019.json deleted file mode 100644 index d457c0b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/transfer-20261019.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -{ - "age_private_key_used": false, - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261019T034919Z-cc53fb903f6a.tar.age", - "ciphertext_bytes": 118526408, - "ciphertext_sha256": "d48121e680ec4910e3cf6314b3016f32e55355db7ccb91b056361a9ee54fcccb", - "downloaded_at": "2026-10-29T22:05:28.275072+00:00", - "etag": "\"88956b0bcb6409007eb3f30b6b022a26\"", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "independent_owner_retrieval_verified": true, - "object_unchanged_during_transfer": true, - "openbao_contacted": false, - "provider": "Storage Share", - "provider_auth_mode": "account", - "provider_writes_performed": false, - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "sso_contacted": false, - "status": "readback_verified" -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/transfer-20261029.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/transfer-20261029.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3ad384d..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/transfer-20261029.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -{ - "age_private_key_used": false, - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261029T230600Z-0f8eb0c39b56.tar.age", - "ciphertext_bytes": 151281912, - "ciphertext_sha256": "3eb534d34da97b986128a2c832d899fed4c2e2e3d97980916a096d13e6fce954", - "downloaded_at": "2026-10-29T23:08:59.777942+00:00", - "etag": "\"9269ce77db1a9eff2dc2192aed514467\"", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "independent_owner_retrieval_verified": true, - "object_unchanged_during_transfer": true, - "openbao_contacted": false, - "provider": "Storage Share", - "provider_auth_mode": "account", - "provider_writes_performed": false, - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "sso_contacted": false, - "status": "readback_verified" -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/01-prepare.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/01-prepare.json deleted file mode 100644 index 50bc5fa..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/01-prepare.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -{ - "command": "prepare-custody", - "endpoint_sha256": null, - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T17:39:01.128334+00:00", - "result": { - "changed_keys": [ - "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS", - "LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS", - "LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS", - "LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS", - "LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS" - ] - }, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/02-plan.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/02-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index 09c3682..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/02-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -{ - "command": "plan", - "endpoint_sha256": "21b7c63da95eb01178305e49af9b3143295607b8ad68c522d1fa9545b7ef4d9f", - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T17:43:34.790101+00:00", - "result": { - "accounts": { - "admin": { - "exists": true, - "in_lldap_admin": true - }, - "ld-admin": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-authelia": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-keycape": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-privacyidea": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-provisioner": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - } - } - }, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/03a-accounts-preview.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/03a-accounts-preview.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3e551d8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/03a-accounts-preview.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -{ - "command": "accounts", - "endpoint_sha256": "21b7c63da95eb01178305e49af9b3143295607b8ad68c522d1fa9545b7ef4d9f", - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T17:45:04.549495+00:00", - "result": { - "accounts": { - "admin": { - "exists": true, - "in_lldap_admin": true - }, - "ld-admin": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-authelia": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-keycape": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-privacyidea": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - }, - "svc-provisioner": { - "action": "create", - "exists": false - } - }, - "applied": false - }, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/03b-accounts.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/03b-accounts.json deleted file mode 100644 index b8a71e6..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/03b-accounts.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "command": "accounts", - "endpoint_sha256": "21b7c63da95eb01178305e49af9b3143295607b8ad68c522d1fa9545b7ef4d9f", - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T17:45:53.893558+00:00", - "result": { - "accounts": { - "admin": { - "exists": true, - "in_lldap_admin": true - }, - "ld-admin": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ] - }, - "svc-authelia": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-keycape": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-privacyidea": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-provisioner": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ] - } - }, - "applied": true, - "signs_in": { - "ld-admin": true, - "svc-authelia": true, - "svc-keycape": true, - "svc-privacyidea": true, - "svc-provisioner": true - } - }, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/04-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/04-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index 91a1dbc..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/04-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "command": "verify", - "endpoint_sha256": "21b7c63da95eb01178305e49af9b3143295607b8ad68c522d1fa9545b7ef4d9f", - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T17:46:48.728129+00:00", - "result": { - "accounts": { - "admin": { - "exists": true, - "in_lldap_admin": true - }, - "ld-admin": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ] - }, - "svc-authelia": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-keycape": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-privacyidea": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-provisioner": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ] - } - }, - "signs_in": { - "ld-admin": true, - "svc-authelia": true, - "svc-keycape": true, - "svc-privacyidea": true, - "svc-provisioner": true - }, - "verdict": "pass" - }, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/10-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/10-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7823a4c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/10-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -{ - "command": "verify", - "endpoint_sha256": "21b7c63da95eb01178305e49af9b3143295607b8ad68c522d1fa9545b7ef4d9f", - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T18:53:16.176849+00:00", - "result": { - "accounts": { - "admin": { - "exists": true, - "in_lldap_admin": true - }, - "ld-admin": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ] - }, - "svc-authelia": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-keycape": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-privacyidea": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ] - }, - "svc-provisioner": { - "action": "ok", - "exists": true, - "groups": [ - "lldap_admin" - ] - } - }, - "old_shared_password_refused": true, - "signs_in": { - "ld-admin": true, - "svc-authelia": true, - "svc-keycape": true, - "svc-privacyidea": true, - "svc-provisioner": true - }, - "verdict": "pass" - }, - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 93b56c1..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -# LLDAP bind split, live run 2026-10-30 (NK-WP-0054-T05) - -Founder-run in the founder's terminal following `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/BIND-SPLIT-RUNBOOK.md`, 17:39-18:53 -UTC, agent (Claude Code) guiding. All receipts are value-free (`values_recorded: false`). - -| Step | Result | Receipt | -| --- | --- | --- | -| 1 prepare custody | five keys changed; custody copy re-sealed to `keys/age.pub` | `01-prepare.json` | -| 2 plan | five `create`, `admin` in `lldap_admin`, no collision | `02-plan.json` | -| 3 accounts | preview, then apply; all five sign in | `03a-accounts-preview.json`, `03b-accounts.json` | -| 4 verify | `pass` | `04-verify.json` | -| 5 identity-provisioner | Secret `identity-provisioner-ldap` created; image `sha256:6d1f3632…4199` ready (readiness includes directory login) | operator output | -| 6 Authelia | `ldap_password` rotated to `svc-authelia`; configmap applied; founder sign-in with password and OTP | operator output | -| 7 KeyCape | `directory-bind-rollout.py apply`, uid unchanged, `other_secret_data_unchanged: true`; sign-in ok | operator output | -| 8 privacyIDEA resolver | `realm_bootstrap.py --switch-bind --apply`; OTP sign-in ok | operator output | -| 9 LLDAP | `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` rotated; configured super-admin `ld-admin` | operator output | -| 10 retire shared password | `admin` password changed by the founder; old shared password refused; `pass` | `10-verify.json` | - -## Deviations and findings - -1. **Custody copy not at the runbook path.** Step 1 failed with `FileNotFoundError` (nothing written): - only the sealed `sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/` exists. The founder decrypted it with - `make sops-custody-shell` + `decrypt-secrets.sh`, ran step 1, re-sealed with `--no-shred`, and sealed - and shredded after step 10. Runbook setup now says so. -2. **Wrong kubeconfig for the Secret scripts.** `apply-service-secrets.py` calls plain `kubectl`, which - used the limited default identity (`ops-mason-builder`, cannot read `sso` Secrets); step 5 was - refused before any write (presence check: `NotFound`). Fixed by - `export KUBECONFIG=$HOME/.kube/config-railiance01`; the runbook setup now exports it. -3. **Stale custody value: `AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET`.** Step 6 was refused before any write: a - value-free comparison showed the four other Authelia values equal to live, `ldap_password` different - (intended), and the custody client secret **not** matching the live `keycape_client_secret_hash`. - The KeyCape-Authelia client secret was changed after the March custody seal without updating custody. - Step 6 used a one-off helper that calls the same `publish()` path for `ldap_password` only (uid, - resourceVersion and full-data test, readback) and skips only the client-secret check. Reconciled the - same evening with `sso-mfa/bootstrap/reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py` (founder-run, value-free: - live pair agreed, custody updated and re-checked, re-sealed). -4. Rollouts of identity-provisioner, KeyCape and LLDAP use `Recreate`: each had a short outage of - about 30 s. - -5. **privacyIDEA resolver was still bound as `admin` (found 2026-10-30 evening).** After step 10 - every OTP check failed: KeyCape logged `mfa_failed` (`openbao-admin`) and `mfa_check_error` - (`user-engine-portal`); privacyIDEA logged `LDAP Bind unsuccessful: invalidCredentials (49)` from - 19:00:10 UTC, last successful lookup 18:49:30 UTC, step 10 at 18:53 UTC. Founder found Bind DN - `uid=admin,…` on `lldap-coulomb` in the privacyIDEA UI and changed it to `uid=svc-privacyidea,…`; - the Bind DN persisted but the hand-entered bind password did not match. A one-off attended script - (reusing `realm_bootstrap.py`'s client and custody reader) then wrote only `BINDPW` from the custody - `LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS`, checked the other resolver fields unchanged and resolved - `platform-root` through the resolver; the founder's OpenBao OIDC login with OTP then succeeded. - Prefer the custody-fed write over UI entry: the German UI offered only the two test buttons, and - pasting the value by hand is error-prone. No repository tool rewrites the - resolver, so step 8's apply most likely did not take effect; its OTP check passed only because the - old shared password was still valid. Runbook step 8 now requires the resolver Bind DN and test, and - step 10 a fresh OTP sign-in. - -Closing condition still open: the restore drill on the first backup generation after this run -(NK-WP-0053 stages 2-5, T17/T19 under the new accounts). diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 27238a8..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0055-T08 — kingpath off-site receipts (2026-10-30) - -Founder-run in the founder's terminal; both receipts value-free. - -- `upload.json`: two items sealed to the `railiance-backup` recipient and uploaded to Storage Share as - `net-kingdom-kingpath-20261030T212015Z-96b930bcfb9d.tar.age`, read back; no plaintext on disk, no - OpenBao or SSO contact. -- Verify receipt (kept private at `~/nk-wp-0055-t08-verify.json`, sha256 `4a4a56b9…42b508c3`; the secret - scanner flags its full item digests, as noted in the T08 task): `status: verified`, the artifact fetched - and decrypted in memory, `custody_key_matches_recipient: true`, `unrelated_key_refused: true`, - `sha256_matched` for both items — `nk49-t18-keycape-receipt` (`16d72f7c…1651`) and - `rpf64-t07-openbao-receipt` (`4e048dee…579d`), equal to the expected values. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/upload.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/upload.json deleted file mode 100644 index a604d28..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/upload.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -{ - "artifact": "net-kingdom-kingpath-20261030T212015Z-96b930bcfb9d.tar.age", - "ciphertext_bytes": 20680, - "ciphertext_sha256": "96b930bcfb9d69c0d896aa0d73f658530b6ae474b5b7459c1d4aa1f0a8ef8fee", - "etag": "\"033e307775f84f4fa6b985e22a2fee1a\"", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/", - "items": { - "nk49-t18-keycape-receipt": 4871, - "rpf64-t07-openbao-receipt": 7238 - }, - "local_ciphertext_removed": true, - "observed_at": "2026-10-30T21:20:18.218669+00:00", - "openbao_contacted": false, - "plaintext_written_to_disk": false, - "provider": "Storage Share", - "recipient": "age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz", - "schema": "netkingdom.kingpath-offsite.v1", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "sso_contacted": false, - "status": "readback_verified" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/01-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/01-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index 82c3604..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/01-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "ccr_sha256": "582bc1f419b6a50ac13dcaf16f54a02199d125659ac5ed7b7acc54590b88d8d4", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "custody_equals_live": true, - "external_secret_apply_and_verify_pending": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-provisioner", - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0052", - "source_sha256": "b6b4c4ad4c8f9aa6d58e281c966e36926511d1dde8e33f03565d89d251bebee6", - "status": "custody_and_reader_prepared", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/02a-verify-before-template-fix.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/02a-verify-before-template-fix.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3bb0588..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/02a-verify-before-template-fix.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "lane": "svc-provisioner", - "phase": "external_secret_ready", - "reason": "external_secret_not_ready", - "source_sha256": "b6b4c4ad4c8f9aa6d58e281c966e36926511d1dde8e33f03565d89d251bebee6", - "status": "failed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/02b-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/02b-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index 98ec47e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/02b-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "ccr_sha256": "582bc1f419b6a50ac13dcaf16f54a02199d125659ac5ed7b7acc54590b88d8d4", - "eso_delivery_equality_verified": true, - "exact_policy_and_ttl_verified": true, - "external_secret_ready": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-provisioner", - "phase": "done", - "sibling_metadata_and_token_create_denied": true, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0052", - "source_sha256": "b6b4c4ad4c8f9aa6d58e281c966e36926511d1dde8e33f03565d89d251bebee6", - "status": "reader_and_delivery_verified", - "temporary_reader_revoked": true, - "values_recorded": false, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 229eede..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04 pilot — svc-provisioner bind in platform custody (2026-10-30) - -Founder-run in the founder's terminal under railiance-platform CCR-2026-0052 (approved by -platform-owner and net-kingdom-owner, binding confirmed; sha256 `582bc1f4…d8d4`). All receipts are -value-free (`values_recorded: false`). - -| Step | Result | Receipt | -| --- | --- | --- | -| setup (attended platform-admin, custody decrypted, re-sealed after) | custody equal to live; coding agents fenced; KV version 1 (CAS=0); policy and role in place | `01-setup.json` | -| apply `sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/bind-eso.yaml` (first) | SecretStore valid; ExternalSecret refused by `reject-secret-last-applied`: ESO copied the ExternalSecret's kubectl last-applied annotation onto the Secret. The Secret was not changed | operator output | -| verify (first) | refused at `external_secret_ready` | `02a-verify-before-template-fix.json` | -| manifest fix `985cfc3` (`target.template.metadata: {}`), re-apply | ExternalSecret Ready | operator output | -| verify | exact policy/TTL; wrong ServiceAccount and audience denied; metadata, other directory-bind paths and token create denied; KV equals the delivered Secret; temporary reader revoked | `02b-verify.json` | -| restart identity-provisioner | rolled out Ready (readiness includes the directory login) | operator output | - -`svc-provisioner`'s bind password is now delivered from OpenBao -(`platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-provisioner`); the custody copy still holds the same -value as a fallback. A rotation is now: change the password in LLDAP, write the next KV version — no -custody decryption needed for delivery. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/lldap-1-refused.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/lldap-1-refused.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8a4b6df..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/lldap-1-refused.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-lldap-recovery.v1", - "status": "failed", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": false, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": false, - "source_sha256": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "error": "isolated_lldap_check_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed", - "failed_stage": "input_validation", - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T07:11:42.343583+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/privacyidea-mfa-platform-root.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/privacyidea-mfa-platform-root.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7ce1591..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/privacyidea-mfa-platform-root.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-mfa.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": true, - "user_to_token_resolver_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "d55c5f93c085907be6ae19b0eba6ef360fe863ef8922aa5b6ec205f4837efa16", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-privacyidea.py": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "126be7f4c5f4ff73ff8f15f4ab486c23795ac0a4ce51930e6d3ccb859031f2c1", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "ldap_resolvers_rewritten_to_loopback": 1, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory": true, - "selected_user_sha256": "2868946f999c23cc527736fa53c6e35ca7960cf01d06b33ea792e1e164aabcc1", - "user_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_types": [ - "totp" - ], - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "wrong_key_refusal": "error_907", - "wrong_code_refused": true, - "wrong_code_refusal": "wrong_value", - "existing_token_native_check_accepted": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T07:26:57.126681+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/transfer-1-failed.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/transfer-1-failed.json deleted file mode 100644 index bf46a11..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/attempts/transfer-1-failed.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "failed", - "source_sha256": "ec123d47a07305253570dacab7e103f8c193a23f20c9fc87466ea4a95ae0ec13", - "error": "contained_owner_retrieval_failed" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/authelia-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/authelia-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index bdab7de..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/authelia-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-authelia-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_authelia_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "6139294f6ebdcbaad35934f04b11177d8cf89d134506a730f0c0ebbb3a4967be", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "image_id": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "126be7f4c5f4ff73ff8f15f4ab486c23795ac0a4ce51930e6d3ccb859031f2c1", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "original_configuration_validated": true, - "storage_encryption_key_verified": true, - "existing_user_first_factor": true, - "wrong_password_refused": true, - "archived_client_secret_accepted": true, - "wrong_client_secret_refused": true, - "grant_issued": false, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "issuer_key_matches_archive": true, - "issuer_jwk_thumbprint_sha256": "El5Prcg0wUe1l9mAV1IC55i45-zrLXwcBnl7WamASm8", - "notifications_confined_to_tmpfs_file": true, - "notification_written": false, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T07:24:21.595569+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json deleted file mode 100644 index d26b128..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-restore-drill.v1", - "work": "NK-WP-0054-T05 (post-split drill), NK-WP-0053 cadence", - "date": "2026-10-31", - "operator": "admin (founder)", - "verdict": "pass", - "generations": { - "20261031T034845Z-a13dc92e2c61": "stages 1-5" - }, - "generation_context": "First daily capture after the 2026-10-30 LLDAP bind split (steps 1-10 and verify --old-admin-retired): the archived configuration binds ld-admin, svc-authelia and svc-privacyidea, and admin's password is the human-only one set at step 10.", - "stages": [ - {"stage": 1, "name": "independent retrieval", "result": "pass", "receipt": "transfer.json", - "identity": "admin, OpenBao platform-admin session (auth/netkingdom, aal2) reading the Backup account custody"}, - {"stage": 2, "name": "LLDAP", "result": "pass", "receipt": "lldap-recovery.json", "login_tested": "admin (post-split password)"}, - {"stage": 3, "name": "privacyIDEA", "result": "pass", "receipt": "privacyidea-recovery.json"}, - {"stage": 4, "name": "Authelia", "result": "pass", "receipt": "authelia-recovery.json", "login_tested": "admin (post-split password)", - "bind_note": "Authelia ran on the archived post-split configmap, i.e. the svc-authelia bind; the receipt does not name the bind account."}, - {"stage": 5, "name": "by-user MFA", "result": "pass", "receipt": "privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json", "login_tested": "admin (realm coulomb)", - "bind_note": "user resolved through the restored resolver, which keeps the archived svc-privacyidea bind"} - ], - "attempts_not_counted": [ - {"receipt": "attempts/transfer-1-failed.json", - "cause": "no valid OpenBao platform-admin token in the operator shell; retrieve-identity.py reads the Backup credential from OpenBao and fails silently without one (drill document lacked the login step; added 2026-10-31)"}, - {"receipt": "attempts/lldap-1-refused.json", - "cause": "given the failed transfer receipt; refused at input_validation before any password prompt"}, - {"receipt": "attempts/privacyidea-mfa-platform-root.json", - "cause": "valid pass, but tested platform-root rather than admin; stage 5 rerun with admin"} - ], - "si_x1_retired": true, - "next_due": "2027-01-31", - "secret_values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/lldap-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/lldap-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 001b6b4..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/lldap-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-lldap-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_lldap_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "126be7f4c5f4ff73ff8f15f4ab486c23795ac0a4ce51930e6d3ccb859031f2c1", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "existing_user_native_ldap_bind": true, - "wrong_password_refused": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "directory_identity_rows_preserved": true, - "directory_comparison_scope": [ - "group_attribute_schema", - "group_attributes", - "groups", - "memberships", - "user_attribute_schema", - "user_attributes", - "users" - ], - "directory_table_counts": { - "users": 12, - "groups": 17, - "memberships": 20, - "user_attributes": 14, - "group_attributes": 0, - "user_attribute_schema": 3, - "group_attribute_schema": 0 - }, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T07:20:44.085127+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8e95ad5..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-mfa.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": true, - "user_to_token_resolver_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "d55c5f93c085907be6ae19b0eba6ef360fe863ef8922aa5b6ec205f4837efa16", - "reused_source_sha256": { - "isolated-privacyidea.py": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "isolated-lldap.py": "35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "identity-bundle.py": "524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "verify-identity.py": "039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "retrieve-identity-offline.py": "3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972" - }, - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "126be7f4c5f4ff73ff8f15f4ab486c23795ac0a4ce51930e6d3ccb859031f2c1", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "ldap_resolvers_rewritten_to_loopback": 1, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory": true, - "selected_user_sha256": "8c6976e5b5410415bde908bd4dee15dfb167a9c873fc4bb8a81f6f2ab448a918", - "user_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_count": 1, - "user_usable_token_types": [ - "totp" - ], - "wrong_key_refused": true, - "wrong_key_refusal": "error_907", - "wrong_code_refused": true, - "wrong_code_refusal": "wrong_value", - "existing_token_native_check_accepted": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T07:28:59.115112+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-recovery.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-recovery.json deleted file mode 100644 index d4995ca..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/privacyidea-recovery.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-recovery.v1", - "status": "isolated_privacyidea_checked", - "production_contacted": false, - "secret_values_exported": false, - "existing_token_mfa_proven": false, - "audit_signature_continuity_proven": true, - "container_cleanup_verified": true, - "temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified": true, - "source_sha256": "4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "target": { - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - { - "reference": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "image_id": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - }, - { - "reference": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473", - "image_id": "sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - { - "reference": "postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70", - "image_id": "sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70" - } - ], - "production_contacted": false, - "network_mode": "none", - "host_ports_published": false - }, - "ciphertext_sha256": "126be7f4c5f4ff73ff8f15f4ab486c23795ac0a4ce51930e6d3ccb859031f2c1", - "manifest_file_count": 36, - "all_manifest_hashes_verified": true, - "container_isolation_verified_before_private_import": true, - "retained_tokens_total": 7, - "retained_tokens_with_native_decryption": 7, - "different_key_cannot_reproduce_material_count": 7, - "retained_token_material_decrypted_inside_process": true, - "historical_audit_rows": 414440, - "historical_signed_rows": 414440, - "historical_unsigned_rows": 0, - "historical_invalid_signatures": 0, - "historical_legacy_signatures": 0, - "all_stored_audit_rows_checked": true, - "legacy_signature_verification_enabled": false, - "event_completeness_claimed": false, - "new_audit_entry_signed_verified": true, - "tampered_entry_refused": true, - "wrong_audit_public_key_refused": true, - "only_loopback_interface_verified": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T07:23:19.171196+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/transfer.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/transfer.json deleted file mode 100644 index 336d0b9..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/transfer.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "age_private_key_used": false, - "artifact": "net-kingdom-identity-20261031T034845Z-a13dc92e2c61.tar.age", - "ciphertext_bytes": 155133096, - "ciphertext_sha256": "126be7f4c5f4ff73ff8f15f4ab486c23795ac0a4ce51930e6d3ccb859031f2c1", - "downloaded_at": "2026-10-31T07:15:57.213304+00:00", - "etag": "\"d1e7409d9bff877a87a20c06a8853e57\"", - "folder": "Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity", - "independent_owner_retrieval_verified": true, - "provider": "Storage Share", - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1", - "secret_values_exported": false, - "status": "readback_verified" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-lldap-self-rotation/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-lldap-self-rotation/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index fdd7a99..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-lldap-self-rotation/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -# LLDAP bind self-rotation on the pinned image (NK-WP-0056, 2026-10-31) - -Agent-run, synthetic: a throwaway LLDAP on the pinned production image -(`docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66…d09d`), published on 127.0.0.1, tmpfs data, generated values, removed afterwards. -Prompted by secrets-engine's T02 answer (`docs/bounded-executor-credential-lanes.md`, Q2 preferred shape). - -| Step | Result | -| --- | --- | -| `svc-x` created in `lldap_strict_readonly` (the bind accounts' group), password set by admin | — | -| `svc-x` signs in with its password | yes | -| `lldap_set_password` for `svc-x` with **`svc-x`'s own token** | rc 0 | -| new password signs in / old password signs in | yes / no | -| `lldap_set_password` for `admin` with `svc-x`'s token | refused (rc 1); admin unchanged | - -Consequence: the T06 rotation can change `svc-authelia`'s password as `svc-authelia` itself, using the current value -the executor reads from OpenBao, with no `lldap_password_manager` account (`svc-executor-pw` in -`tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml`). A leaked executor token then reaches one bind, not every -non-admin user. Revert is the same operation with the previous value. Founder decision pending (secrets-engine Q2). diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/01-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/01-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index a71d839..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/01-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "ccr_sha256": "11d0b02cce6f0f645e31c925a4ed9bd8df82441dc927678716c15cd422a0f187", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "custody_equals_live": true, - "external_secret_apply_and_verify_pending": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-authelia", - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0053", - "source_sha256": "3d15811c1dd3794daecbf44ae5fb2cf6b0b77719b80ba2acb0206ff34a122052", - "status": "custody_and_reader_prepared", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/02-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/02-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index eedd0e7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/02-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "ccr_sha256": "11d0b02cce6f0f645e31c925a4ed9bd8df82441dc927678716c15cd422a0f187", - "eso_delivery_equality_verified": true, - "exact_policy_and_ttl_verified": true, - "external_secret_ready": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-authelia", - "phase": "done", - "sibling_metadata_and_token_create_denied": true, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0053", - "source_sha256": "3d15811c1dd3794daecbf44ae5fb2cf6b0b77719b80ba2acb0206ff34a122052", - "status": "reader_and_delivery_verified", - "temporary_reader_revoked": true, - "values_recorded": false, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 588dc37..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04 — svc-authelia bind in platform custody (2026-10-31) - -Founder-run in the founder's terminal under railiance-platform CCR-2026-0053 (approved by -platform-owner and net-kingdom-owner, binding confirmed, `bcfbe29`; sha256 `11d0b02c…f187`). Tool: -`tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py` at `034634a` (source sha256 `3d15811c…`). All receipts are value-free -(`values_recorded: false`). - -| Step | Result | Receipt | -| --- | --- | --- | -| setup (attended platform-admin, custody decrypted, re-sealed and shredded after) | live `authelia-config` binds `uid=svc-authelia`; custody equal to live `ldap_password`; coding agents fenced; KV version 1 (CAS=0); policy and role in place | `01-setup.json` | -| apply `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/bind-eso.yaml` | ServiceAccount, SecretStore and ExternalSecret created; ExternalSecret Ready on first apply (the pilot's `template.metadata: {}` fix carried over) | operator output | -| verify | exact policy/TTL; wrong ServiceAccount and audience denied; metadata, the other directory-bind paths and token create denied; KV equals the delivered `ldap_password`; temporary reader revoked | `02-verify.json` | -| restart Authelia | rolled out; founder signed in through the portal as `admin` with OTP (Authelia session `admin`, account site `aal2`) | operator output | - -`svc-authelia`'s bind password is now delivered from OpenBao -(`platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia`) into the `ldap_password` key only; the -session, storage and OIDC keys of `authelia-secrets` are untouched. The custody copy still holds the same -value as a fallback. Rotation: change the password in LLDAP, write the next KV version with CAS, restart -Authelia (it reads the file only at start-up). Remaining lanes: `svc-keycape`, `svc-privacyidea`. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/01-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/01-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index d2294f2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/01-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "ccr_sha256": "e255807f1c98daa14a5848c1bf754f706f9080c86a6f258d192d24d33934b110", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "custody_equals_live": true, - "external_secret_apply_and_verify_pending": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-keycape", - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0054", - "source_sha256": "1a414342289b3e8e9b50c93ae27f7a442e5a0acb5bf90109e0069424730eaad5", - "status": "custody_and_reader_prepared", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/02-verify-env-and-config.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/02-verify-env-and-config.json deleted file mode 100644 index 448ecb7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/02-verify-env-and-config.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "ccr_sha256": "e255807f1c98daa14a5848c1bf754f706f9080c86a6f258d192d24d33934b110", - "eso_delivery_equality_verified": true, - "exact_policy_and_ttl_verified": true, - "external_secret_ready": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-keycape", - "phase": "done", - "sibling_metadata_and_token_create_denied": true, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0054", - "source_sha256": "1a414342289b3e8e9b50c93ae27f7a442e5a0acb5bf90109e0069424730eaad5", - "status": "reader_and_delivery_verified", - "temporary_reader_revoked": true, - "values_recorded": false, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/03-clear-password.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/03-clear-password.json deleted file mode 100644 index e1af090..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/03-clear-password.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"after": {"resource_version": "83122244", "uid": "2e94519d-1550-41c7-9701-2efe47fe1fd3"}, "before": {"resource_version": "82820316", "uid": "2e94519d-1550-41c7-9701-2efe47fe1fd3"}, "change_needed": true, "changed": true, "mode": "apply", "operation": "clear-password", "other_secret_data_unchanged": true, "prior_bind": "service", "restart_required": true, "schema": "netkingdom.keycape-directory-bind.v1", "target": "sso/keycape-config", "task": "NK-WP-0056-T04", "unrelated_config_bytes_preserved": true, "values_emitted": false} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/04-verify-env-only.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/04-verify-env-only.json deleted file mode 100644 index 448ecb7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/04-verify-env-only.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "ccr_sha256": "e255807f1c98daa14a5848c1bf754f706f9080c86a6f258d192d24d33934b110", - "eso_delivery_equality_verified": true, - "exact_policy_and_ttl_verified": true, - "external_secret_ready": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-keycape", - "phase": "done", - "sibling_metadata_and_token_create_denied": true, - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0054", - "source_sha256": "1a414342289b3e8e9b50c93ae27f7a442e5a0acb5bf90109e0069424730eaad5", - "status": "reader_and_delivery_verified", - "temporary_reader_revoked": true, - "values_recorded": false, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8694906..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04 — svc-keycape bind in platform custody (2026-10-31) - -Founder-run in the founder's terminal under railiance-platform CCR-2026-0054 (approved by -platform-owner and net-kingdom-owner, binding confirmed, `5d87acd`; sha256 `e255807f…b110`). KeyCape reads -the bind from `KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW` since key-cape `e2b5fa1` (KEY-WP-0046; image `main-e2b5fa1`, -`sha256:9e082dca…6f8d`). All receipts are value-free. - -| Step | Result | Receipt | -| --- | --- | --- | -| setup (attended platform-admin, custody decrypted, re-sealed and shredded after) | live `keycape-config` binds `uid=svc-keycape`; custody equal to its `bindPW`; coding agents fenced; KV version 1 (CAS=0); policy and role in place | `01-setup.json` | -| apply `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-eso.yaml` | dedicated Secret `keycape-lldap-bind` created by ESO (`creationPolicy: Owner`), Ready | operator output | -| verify (env and config) | exact policy/TTL; wrong ServiceAccount and audience denied; metadata, other bind paths and token create denied; KV equals the delivered Secret and the config `bindPW` | `02-verify-env-and-config.json` | -| apply `deployment.yaml` (image `main-e2b5fa1` + `KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW`) | server dry-run, apply, rolled out; log reports `bindPW` redundant once (both sources equal); `admin` portal sign-in with OTP (aal2) | operator output | -| `directory-bind-rollout.py clear-password` (dry-run, attended apply on uid/resourceVersion) | `bindPW` emptied; bind stays `svc-keycape`; unrelated config bytes and other Secret data unchanged | `03-clear-password.json` | -| restart KeyCape, verify (env only) | rolled out; no redundancy warning; KV equals the delivered Secret; `admin` portal sign-in with OTP (aal2) | `04-verify-env-only.json` | - -`svc-keycape`'s bind password now lives only in OpenBao -(`platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-keycape`), the ESO Secret and the founder's custody copy -(fallback); `keycape-config` no longer holds it. Rotation: change the password in LLDAP, write the next KV -version with CAS, restart KeyCape. Rollback: `directory-bind-rollout.py --operation switch` restores -`bindPW` from custody; the previous image is `sha256:cdec9dd7…f010` (then remove the env). diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/01-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/01-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index 72e39af..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/01-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "ccr_sha256": "97e8e4b17e12d6bcbffe5acd4f8fbd68f52fe340333968bb175e8da18ecb6513", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "custody_is_current": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-privacyidea", - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0055", - "source_sha256": "5b31b3567af07bba09530c6d3b0ed8b5c947df22bd13ac0442dc33c0d9b420c0", - "status": "custody_prepared", - "values_recorded": false, - "workload_access": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/02-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/02-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2ccb87e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/02-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "ccr_sha256": "97e8e4b17e12d6bcbffe5acd4f8fbd68f52fe340333968bb175e8da18ecb6513", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "kv_is_current": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "lane": "svc-privacyidea", - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0055", - "source_sha256": "5b31b3567af07bba09530c6d3b0ed8b5c947df22bd13ac0442dc33c0d9b420c0", - "status": "custody_verified", - "values_recorded": false, - "workload_access": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/03-rotate-bind.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/03-rotate-bind.json deleted file mode 100644 index b890c62..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/03-rotate-bind.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"actions": ["rotate-bind"], "configuration_writes": 1, "mfa_verified": true, "onboarding_policy": "owner-managed", "policies_changed": false, "result": "configured"} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index c7500cf..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04 — svc-privacyidea bind in platform custody (2026-10-31) - -Founder-run in the founder's terminal under railiance-platform CCR-2026-0055 (request type -`attended-service-credential-delivery`, approved by platform-owner and net-kingdom-owner, `04d9dc8`; sha256 -`97e8e4b1…6513`). privacyIDEA keeps the resolver `BINDPW` encrypted in its own database and accepts it only through -the `pi-admin` API, so there is no ESO or workload reader: the value is held in OpenBao and written through by an -attended procedure. Receipts are value-free. - -| Step | Result | Receipt | -| --- | --- | --- | -| setup (attended platform-admin, custody decrypted, re-sealed and shredded after) | custody value signs in to LLDAP as `svc-privacyidea` (current); coding agents fenced; KV version 1 (CAS=0); no policy or role | `01-setup.json` | -| verify | KV value signs in to LLDAP as `svc-privacyidea`; fence present; no workload role | `02-verify.json` | -| `realm_bootstrap.py --attended --rotate-bind --from-openbao` (preview) | `actions: ["rotate-bind"]`, no write | operator output | -| apply, attempt 1 (not counted) | one `BINDPW` write (same value), then the `--verify-user admin` check failed: the code entered was not `admin`'s (the prompt did not name the account; prompts now name the user) | operator output | -| apply, attempt 2 | one `BINDPW` write (same value from OpenBao); `admin` resolved through `lldap-coulomb` and passed token-backed MFA | `03-rotate-bind.json` | - -The resolver bind is now written from OpenBao (`platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-privacyidea`); the -founder's custody copy holds the same value as a fallback. Rotation: change the password in LLDAP, write the next KV -version with CAS, run `realm_bootstrap.py --attended --rotate-bind --from-openbao --apply --verify-user admin`. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index ad688d1..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T08: synthetic identity stack, broken-bind runs (2026-10-31) - -Agent-run, local Docker, no production data or credentials. `sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py` -started the pinned production images (LLDAP `9e605a66…`, Authelia 4.39.28 `bd97cff4…`, privacyIDEA -3.12.2 `af7841ad…`, KeyCape `main-e2b5fa1` `9e082dca…`) on a throwaway network, with ports -published on 127.0.0.1 only. Configuration came from the repository manifests with the hostnames -replaced by `*.journey.test`. It then ran the T05 journey runner against them with `host_map_only`. - -Each broken-bind scenario changes the consumer's password in LLDAP while the consumer keeps the old -one (a half-done rotation), runs the journey, then restores the password and runs it again. - -| Scenario | Result | Failed step (status) | After restore | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| healthy | pass, aal2 with `otp`, signature verified | | | -| `svc-authelia` broken | fail closed | `authelia_first_factor` (401) | pass | -| `svc-keycape` broken | fail closed | `keycape_token` (500) | pass | -| `svc-privacyidea` broken, production `CACHE_TIMEOUT` 120 | **pass** (masked), then fail closed after 125 s | `keycape_otp` (401) | pass | -| `svc-privacyidea` broken, `CACHE_TIMEOUT` 0 | fail closed | `keycape_otp` (401) | pass | - -Receipts (value-free; scanned for secret-shaped strings before commit): -[`stack-receipt-production-cache.json`](stack-receipt-production-cache.json), -[`stack-receipt-cache-off.json`](stack-receipt-cache-off.json). - -## Findings - -1. **privacyIDEA's resolver cache hides a broken `svc-privacyidea` bind for up to `CACHE_TIMEOUT` - (120 s live).** A journey run right after a privacyIDEA bind change proves nothing about the new - bind. The executor's check for that consumer must run after the cache has expired, or after the - cache has been cleared. This affects T06/T10 and the attended `realm_bootstrap.py --rotate-bind` - proof, which runs straight after the write. -2. **KeyCape uses its `svc-keycape` bind at the token exchange, not at the callback.** A broken bind - still shows the OTP challenge and accepts the code, then refuses the token (500). The sign-in fails - closed, but the step that shows it is `keycape_token`. The runner's mapping of steps to binds is - corrected accordingly. -3. **privacyIDEA refuses a TOTP value whose time step is not later than the last accepted one.** - Back-to-back journeys therefore each need a fresh 30-second step. The runner has - `min_time_step`, and records `otp_time_step` in its receipt. -4. The healthy journey through the real services needed no changes to the T05 runner, and took about - 2.5 s plus waits for the code window. - -Runner `journey.py` sha256 `c639054597be7647…`, `stack.py` `d0f53cc0bae86f4b…`, `pi_fixture.py` -`99a8702b4c31c62a…` at the time of the runs. The full run took 4m49s, mostly the 125 s cache wait -and the code-window waits. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/stack-receipt-cache-off.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/stack-receipt-cache-off.json deleted file mode 100644 index f6bc8f6..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/stack-receipt-cache-off.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,250 +0,0 @@ -{ - "all_met": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:26:06Z", - "images": { - "authelia": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "keycape": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:9e082dca78f65a4af3e92d3de3705b99e49ca9b298d9562ad0d37511c4306f8d", - "lldap": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "privacyidea": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - "pi_cache_timeout": 0, - "production_data": false, - "published_on": "127.0.0.1", - "results": [ - { - "expected": "pass", - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:17Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781530, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "bd47e91f-e2fc-4c53-a709-36a6c92df41a", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:15Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 3, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1013, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 155, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 13, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 279, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 184, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true, - "scenario": "healthy" - }, - { - "expected": "fail at keycape_otp", - "journey": { - "bind_on_failed_step": "svc-privacyidea", - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": {}, - "failed_step": "keycape_otp", - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:30Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781531, - "reason": "otp_rejected", - "result": "fail", - "run_id": "dd60cb4f-1412-4148-a0dd-6abc706a684b", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:17Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1029, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 157, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 9, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 11633, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": false, - "reason": "otp_rejected", - "status": 401 - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true, - "restored": { - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:26:04Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781532, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "af33de61-5dd5-4cef-ba91-60e5e1aa831f", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:30Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 922, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 146, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 5, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 28724, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 152, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true - }, - "scenario": "svc-privacyidea" - } - ], - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.stack-receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:07Z" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/stack-receipt-production-cache.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/stack-receipt-production-cache.json deleted file mode 100644 index b1b9c3e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/stack-receipt-production-cache.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,618 +0,0 @@ -{ - "all_met": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:07Z", - "images": { - "authelia": "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "keycape": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:9e082dca78f65a4af3e92d3de3705b99e49ca9b298d9562ad0d37511c4306f8d", - "lldap": "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "privacyidea": "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - }, - "pi_cache_timeout": 120, - "production_data": false, - "published_on": "127.0.0.1", - "results": [ - { - "expected": "pass", - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:20:30Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781521, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "3a17b131-56d1-4a92-b8e6-563f1451eba8", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:20:24Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1075, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 150, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 12, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 5276, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 170, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true, - "scenario": "healthy" - }, - { - "expected": "fail at keycape_token", - "journey": { - "bind_on_failed_step": "svc-keycape", - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": {}, - "failed_step": "keycape_token", - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:21:04Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781522, - "reason": "token_rejected", - "result": "fail", - "run_id": "884c86bc-4ff7-461d-969b-2aff462eb562", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:20:31Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 988, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 147, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 7, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 28076, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 109, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": false, - "reason": "token_rejected", - "status": 500 - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true, - "restored": { - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:21:34Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781523, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "66e4ff19-63dd-4786-9730-b536be59e9e0", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:21:04Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 970, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 144, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 7, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 24884, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 175, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true - }, - "scenario": "svc-keycape" - }, - { - "after_cache_timeout": { - "bind_on_failed_step": "svc-privacyidea", - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": {}, - "failed_step": "keycape_otp", - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:21Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781528, - "reason": "otp_rejected", - "result": "fail", - "run_id": "8c98aaae-6a3a-4c20-a945-72dcf1c0d6d4", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:20Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 3, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 863, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 160, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 10, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 139, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": false, - "reason": "otp_rejected", - "status": 401 - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "expected": "fail at keycape_otp", - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:22:00Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781524, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "bc3fb9b8-febf-432e-bf05-232f69ff4549", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:21:34Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 885, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 152, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 7, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 24848, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 154, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "masked_by_resolver_cache": true, - "met": true, - "restored": { - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:34Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781529, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "7cdc9439-d893-4d3b-9ec0-341462fe0a55", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:21Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 784, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 152, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 7, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 8256, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 150, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true - }, - "scenario": "svc-privacyidea" - }, - { - "expected": "fail at authelia_first_factor", - "journey": { - "bind_on_failed_step": "svc-authelia", - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": {}, - "failed_step": "authelia_first_factor", - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:35Z", - "otp_time_step": null, - "reason": "first_factor_rejected", - "result": "fail", - "run_id": "27509d24-63fb-49a9-8b7b-5992ec2451e2", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:34Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 693, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": false, - "reason": "first_factor_rejected", - "status": 401 - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true, - "restored": { - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T11:25:00Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781530, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "424532a7-4475-4d13-bcd9-e6c0dda36b8c", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:24:35Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 2, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 715, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 151, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 7, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 23810, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 152, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 1, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [ - "https://auth.journey.test", - "https://kc.journey.test" - ], - "issuer": "https://kc.journey.test", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "met": true - }, - "scenario": "svc-authelia" - } - ], - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.stack-receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T11:20:12Z" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-setup-refused-absent.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-setup-refused-absent.json deleted file mode 100644 index 489901b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-setup-refused-absent.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "identity": "syn-journey", - "phase": "absent", - "reason": "Refused", - "source_sha256": "7e9c9e7508cecc689a72ed523fe9a1cc3eb7852ac5593bb192379dee8cd5fa44", - "status": "failed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-setup-refused-pi-admin-login.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-setup-refused-pi-admin-login.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8e936b2..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-setup-refused-pi-admin-login.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "identity": "syn-journey", - "phase": "absent", - "reason": "pi_admin_login", - "source_sha256": "1f921377d6722ec816d330434e777d58277b4e820ed8113f5e1d878752a42562", - "status": "failed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-verify-before-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-verify-before-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index 5199c30..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/00-verify-before-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "identity": "syn-journey", - "phase": "kv", - "reason": "kv_shape", - "source_sha256": "1f921377d6722ec816d330434e777d58277b4e820ed8113f5e1d878752a42562", - "status": "failed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/01-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/01-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index d4f9f2b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/01-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "identity": "syn-journey", - "kv_version": 1, - "phase": "pi_token", - "reason": "pi_request:/token/init", - "source_sha256": "1f921377d6722ec816d330434e777d58277b4e820ed8113f5e1d878752a42562", - "status": "failed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/10-teardown.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/10-teardown.json deleted file mode 100644 index e41d8be..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/10-teardown.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "teardown", - "identity": "syn-journey", - "keycape_client_removal_separate": true, - "kv_removed": true, - "lldap_user_removed": true, - "phase": "done", - "pi_token_removed": true, - "source_sha256": "a213b5f9fc6703dfc5ad619320a2fd083596ece7a2a1895f42829159bea42dde", - "status": "identity_removed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/11-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/11-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index b8cc1fb..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/11-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "ccr_sha256": "4a9668856389f986d4220bbd424bd6b353d86393bb931ebad293f726219d8754", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "created": { - "email": "syn-journey@synthetic.invalid", - "groups": [], - "kv_path": "platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey", - "lldap_user": "syn-journey", - "pi_realm": "coulomb", - "pi_token_serial": "SYNJOURNEY01" - }, - "enrollment_confirmed_with_code": true, - "identity": "syn-journey", - "key_generated_by": "privacyidea", - "kv_version": 1, - "lldap_password_effective": true, - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0057", - "source_sha256": "a213b5f9fc6703dfc5ad619320a2fd083596ece7a2a1895f42829159bea42dde", - "status": "identity_prepared", - "values_recorded": false, - "workload_access": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/12-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/12-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index 56dae36..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/12-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,91 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "ccr_sha256": "4a9668856389f986d4220bbd424bd6b353d86393bb931ebad293f726219d8754", - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "identity": "syn-journey", - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape" - }, - "claims": { - "assurance_level": "aal2", - "assurance_methods": [ - "pwd", - "otp" - ], - "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", - "preferred_username_matches": true, - "signature_verified": true - }, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T12:32:38Z", - "otp_time_step": 59781665, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "53251d54-80d1-4c23-bc6b-fd025e5d1a94", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T12:32:35Z", - "steps": [ - { - "elapsed_ms": 117, - "name": "discovery", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 97, - "name": "keycape_authorize", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 771, - "name": "authelia_first_factor", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 326, - "name": "authelia_authorization", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 880, - "name": "keycape_callback", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 410, - "name": "keycape_otp", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 249, - "name": "keycape_token", - "ok": true - }, - { - "elapsed_ms": 99, - "name": "id_token", - "ok": true - } - ], - "target": { - "acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": [], - "issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social", - "username": "syn-journey" - } - }, - "journey_passed": true, - "kv_is_current": true, - "kv_version": 1, - "phase": "done", - "source_ccr": "CCR-2026-0057", - "source_sha256": "a213b5f9fc6703dfc5ad619320a2fd083596ece7a2a1895f42829159bea42dde", - "status": "identity_verified", - "values_recorded": false, - "workload_access": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4aa098e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T09: synthetic journey identity live (2026-10-31) - -Founder-run, attended. claude-code prepared the tooling and guided the run. Under CCR-2026-0057 -(railiance-platform `2ac9786`, sha256 `4a966885…8754`) and the accepted SecurityCase -`nk-synthetic-journey` (net-kingdom `d654f8a`): - -1. The KeyCape client `nk-synthetic-journey` (public, PKCE, MFA pinned) was registered with - `keycape-client.py apply` (check-config from the deployed `e2b5fa1` binary) and KeyCape restarted. -2. `lane.py setup` fenced coding agents from the KV path and created `syn-journey` in LLDAP with no - groups and a generated password. It enrolled TOTP token `SYNJOURNEY01` in realm `coulomb` with a - key generated by privacyIDEA, confirmed with a code, and wrote `PASSWORD` and `TOTP_SEED` to - `platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey` (KV v1, CAS=0). No workload role. -3. `lane.py verify`: the KV holds exactly the two fields, the fence is present, no workload role - exists, the KV password signs in to LLDAP, and **the synthetic journey passed against - `https://kc.coulomb.social`**: aal2, methods `pwd`+`otp`, signature verified against KeyCape's - JWKS, `preferred_username` matched. About 3 s end to end. - -| Receipt | Result | -| --- | --- | -| `00-setup-refused-absent.json` | refused, nothing changed (privacyIDEA token lookup by a user that did not resolve yet, or the pi-admin login) | -| `00-setup-refused-pi-admin-login.json` | refused at the pi-admin sign-in, nothing changed | -| `00-verify-before-setup.json` | expected failure: no KV yet | -| `01-setup.json` | stopped at `/token/init` after the user and KV v1 were written (see finding 1) | -| `10-teardown.json` | removed that partial state: token, user, KV | -| `11-setup.json` | `identity_prepared`, key generated by privacyIDEA, enrollment confirmed with a code | -| `12-verify.json` | `identity_verified`, journey `pass` (embedded, value-free) | - -All receipts were scanned for secret-shaped strings before commit. They hold identifiers, versions -and booleans only. - -## Findings - -1. **privacyIDEA silently replaces a supplied TOTP key for `pi-admin`.** An admin policy with - `action=*` (as `pi-admin-all-rights`) enables `totp_force_server_generate`, so `otpkey` is ignored - and the confirmation with a code from the supplied key fails (`ERR905`). This was reproduced on the - pinned 3.12.2 image. The lane now enrolls with `genkey=1` and takes the seed from the enrollment - response, in memory only. Any tool that enrolls a known seed as `pi-admin` has the same problem. -2. Listing privacyIDEA tokens by a user that does not resolve is an error, not an empty list. The - lane looks tokens up by serial. -3. Live KeyCape issues tokens to a user with no groups and no tenant mapping. The open point in the - runbook is answered. -4. Still open, recorded in CCR-2026-0057: KeyCape marks the token `principal_type: human`, and - KeyCape has no per-client group gate. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/00-setup-attempt-patch-denied.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/00-setup-attempt-patch-denied.json deleted file mode 100644 index 429cf13..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/00-setup-attempt-patch-denied.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "phase": "cas_required", - "reason": "LaneError", - "source_sha256": "a9289918254bc98d84b4b573c7ed2895fe50d7fbc538f650167e4d84557d44ae", - "status": "failed", - "values_recorded": false -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/01-setup.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/01-setup.json deleted file mode 100644 index e761e54..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/01-setup.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "setup", - "cas_required": true, - "ccr_sha256": { - "journey": "3f7fd8e7e4c456813d3d067b05790fb42f4fd49f7dbdc7c07e49779eb87de038", - "write": "c84c2e539c08e06ad37bcf13cd536ce41b071ec259d6141901402a64c4ee3d27" - }, - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "journey_role_created": true, - "phase": "done", - "policies_applied": true, - "source_ccrs": { - "journey": "CCR-2026-0059", - "write": "CCR-2026-0058" - }, - "source_sha256": "9431b6da514cd8334a082119b715a38c1e1c1a63a513bc13bba12294e1ffab3f", - "status": "lanes_prepared", - "values_recorded": false, - "write_role_absent": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/02-verify.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/02-verify.json deleted file mode 100644 index 72183cf..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/02-verify.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -{ - "action": "verify", - "cas_required": true, - "ccr_sha256": { - "journey": "3f7fd8e7e4c456813d3d067b05790fb42f4fd49f7dbdc7c07e49779eb87de038", - "write": "c84c2e539c08e06ad37bcf13cd536ce41b071ec259d6141901402a64c4ee3d27" - }, - "coding_agents_denied": true, - "exact_policies_and_role": true, - "journey_kv_version": 1, - "journey_lease_at_most_15m": true, - "journey_reads_only_its_path": true, - "phase": "done", - "source_ccrs": { - "journey": "CCR-2026-0059", - "write": "CCR-2026-0058" - }, - "source_sha256": "9431b6da514cd8334a082119b715a38c1e1c1a63a513bc13bba12294e1ffab3f", - "status": "lanes_verified", - "temporary_token_revoked": true, - "values_recorded": false, - "write_login_denied": true, - "write_role_absent": true, - "wrong_audience_denied": true, - "wrong_service_account_denied": true -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 82e5e31..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T10: executor OpenBao lanes, attended setup and proof (2026-10-31) - -Founder-run, claude-code guiding. Runbook: `sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/T10-LANES-RUNBOOK.md`. Tool: -`tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py`; the second run used source sha256 `9431b6da…`. Receipts hold no values. - -1. **rapp-bounded-executor `make deploy`.** It created ServiceAccount `sso/nk-bind-executor` (uid `bd15569c-8a85-4625-b001-d9f799cb857b`), - the Role, the RoleBinding and NetworkPolicy `bounded-executor`. `make verify-live` reported - `role_matches_ceiling: true`. No Job was created. -2. **Bindings confirmed.** CCR-2026-0058 and CCR-2026-0059 were marked `binding_confirmed` (railiance-platform - `b4bafb0`). The receipts are bound to those files: write `c84c2e53…`, journey `3f7fd8e7…`. -3. **`00-setup-attempt-patch-denied.json`.** The first setup stopped at `cas_required`. platform-admin holds - `update` but not `patch` on `platform/*`. Both policies had been applied; nothing after that. - The tool was fixed in `12c9b2d`: a metadata write that names only `cas_required`, guarded by a before/after - comparison. -4. **`01-setup.json`, `lanes_prepared`:** - - both policies applied; - - `cas_required` set on the svc-authelia key; - - the standing journey-read role created; - - the write role absent; - - the coding-agent fence beats both policies. -5. **`02-verify.json`, `lanes_verified`:** - - exact policies and role; - - `sso/nk-bind-executor`, audience `openbao`, logs in to the journey role with a lease of at most 15m and reads - only the syn-journey path. The entry is at version 1, with field names checked in memory. - - Denied: metadata, every directory bind and token creation. - - Denied: the `default` ServiceAccount, a wrong audience, and a login to the write role. - - The temporary token was revoked. - -The write role (CCR-2026-0058) is created only per admitted window. The journey run through this role is still the -open part of T10. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index a8811e3..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T10: journey-only run, synthetic proof (2026-10-31) - -`bounded-executor/cli.py --journey-only` is a read-only run that needs no admission: - -- it logs in with the journey-read role only (CCR-2026-0059); -- it reads the syn-journey identity and runs the synthetic MFA journey once; -- it prints the journey's value-free receipt. - -It has no write role, no Kubernetes or directory client, and no approval or audit call. Exit codes: `0` pass, `1` -fail closed, `4` refused before the journey. - -`synthetic-report.json` comes from `uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_journey_only.py`. It runs the same code path -(`operations.journey_from_kv`) on the T08 stack (pinned LLDAP, privacyIDEA, Authelia and KeyCape) plus a dev OpenBao -token that holds only the journey-read policy: - -| Scenario | Expected | Result | -| --- | --- | --- | -| healthy | pass | pass | -| broken bind: svc-authelia changed in LLDAP, Authelia keeps the old value | fail closed at `authelia_first_factor` | fail at `authelia_first_factor` (`first_factor_rejected`) | -| restored | pass | pass | -| lane boundary | journey token cannot read the svc-authelia bind | denied | - -`all_met: true`, `no_values_in_report: true`. This is T10's fail-closed proof. The unattended live run is the -rapp's `make journey`. - -## First live attempt and the startup race (2026-10-31) - -- `make journey` (Job `bounded-executor-journey-20261031-192708`) was refused at setup with `URLError`. The OpenBao - login did not connect, so nothing was read or changed. -- `make netcheck` (rapp `5fe1a70`) ran a read-only pod with the executor's labels. At 0 s, OpenBao, KeyCape and - Authelia all refused connections, while DNS was fine. From 3 s on, everything answered, through 42 s. -- Diagnosis: k3s applies NetworkPolicy to a new pod a moment after it starts. The policies themselves are correct. -- Fix: before the first login, the executor polls OpenBao's unauthenticated `sys/health` for up to 30 s - (`operations.wait_reachable`). Only connection errors are retried, and any HTTP answer counts as reachable. - This applies to both CLI modes. - -## Live run (2026-10-31): pass - -The founder started `make journey` (rapp `9826a24`, image `sha256:71da4a51…`). It created Job -`sso/bounded-executor-journey-20261031-194719`: - -- The executor waited for OpenBao and logged in with the journey-read role only. -- It read syn-journey and ran the journey against `https://kc.coulomb.social` in-cluster. -- It passed all eight steps to an `aal2` ID token (`pwd` + `otp`), with the signature verified and the username - matching, in about 6 s. -- `effects: false`. The Job reports `1 succeeded`. - -`live-receipt.json` is the pod's value-free receipt. The runner's sha256 `c6390545…` equals `journey.py` in the repo. -No person took part in the journey. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/live-receipt.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/live-receipt.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0625491..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/live-receipt.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -{ - "job": "sso/bounded-executor-journey-20261031-194719", - "image": "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/bounded-executor@sha256:71da4a51e331cb82a5bde1e44025dc3b1b7ea4019dd9dbd64e7196cd3dd21471", - "started_by": "founder (make journey); no person in the journey", - "job_status": "1 succeeded", - "result": { - "effects": false, - "mode": "journey-only", - "outcome": "pass", - "journey": { - "binds_on_path": {"authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", "keycape_token": "svc-keycape"}, - "claims": {"assurance_level": "aal2", "assurance_methods": ["pwd", "otp"], "assurance_source": "key-cape", - "kid": "key-1", "preferred_username_matches": true, "signature_verified": true}, - "failed_step": null, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T19:47:30Z", - "otp_time_step": 59782535, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass", - "run_id": "0a85f664-ac15-43c3-99d3-77d30da9880e", - "runner_sha256": "c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c", - "schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T19:47:24Z", - "steps": [ - {"elapsed_ms": 4, "name": "discovery", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 2, "name": "keycape_authorize", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 554, "name": "authelia_first_factor", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 176, "name": "authelia_authorization", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 538, "name": "keycape_callback", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 4688, "name": "keycape_otp", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 163, "name": "keycape_token", "ok": true}, - {"elapsed_ms": 2, "name": "id_token", "ok": true} - ], - "target": {"acr_values": "urn:netkingdom:aal2", "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "host_mapped": ["https://auth.coulomb.social", "https://kc.coulomb.social"], - "issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social", "username": "syn-journey"} - } - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/synthetic-report.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/synthetic-report.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6b3f231..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/synthetic-report.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -{ - "all_met": true, - "code_path": "operations.journey_from_kv (cli.py --journey-only)", - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T18:56:06+00:00", - "images": { - "openbao": "quay.io/openbao/openbao@sha256:436eaf9778cad75507ff70ea26ace30dcbe15606e619ac3823495663d7f7c115" - }, - "no_values_in_report": true, - "results": [ - { - "expected": "pass", - "journey": { - "failed_step": null, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass" - }, - "met": true, - "scenario": "healthy" - }, - { - "expected": "fail at authelia_first_factor", - "journey": { - "failed_step": "authelia_first_factor", - "reason": "first_factor_rejected", - "result": "fail" - }, - "met": true, - "scenario": "broken bind (svc-authelia)" - }, - { - "expected": "pass", - "journey": { - "failed_step": null, - "reason": null, - "result": "pass" - }, - "met": true, - "scenario": "restored" - }, - { - "expected": "journey token cannot read the bind", - "met": true, - "scenario": "lane boundary" - } - ], - "schema": "netkingdom.bounded-executor.synthetic-journey-only/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T18:55:19+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 28f4d80..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T10: one OpenBao login per lane (2026-10-31) - -The executor now holds two OpenBao clients: - -- the bind write lane, CCR-2026-0058, role `net-kingdom-bind-executor-svc-authelia-write`; -- the journey read lane, CCR-2026-0059, role `net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read`. - -Both log in with the audience-`openbao` projected token, log in again before their 15m lease ends, and are revoked at -exit, including when setup fails. - -`pilot-report.json`: `uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py` on the T08 stack plus a dev OpenBao, with one token -per policy, as the live roles will issue. Results: - -- the rotation `completed`; -- the deliberately wrong delivery was `reverted`; -- `all_met: true`; -- `no_values_in_report: true`. - -Unit tests are in `bounded-executor/tests/test_openbao_lanes.py`: - -- two roles, two logins, both revoked; -- a shared role is refused before any login; -- renewal revokes the old token; -- the journey check reads only through the journey client. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/pilot-report.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/pilot-report.json deleted file mode 100644 index fdfe4ad..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/pilot-report.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.bounded-executor.synthetic-pilot/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T17:58:59+00:00", - "images": { - "openbao": "quay.io/openbao/openbao@sha256:436eaf9778cad75507ff70ea26ace30dcbe15606e619ac3823495663d7f7c115" - }, - "policy_file_sha256": "f14f0e0b885302b5931c1e84e258b5ee32a596fafab5b961d88becf7825eeeb0", - "runs": [ - { - "admission": "BEA-2026-9001", - "outcome": "completed", - "reason": null, - "kv_version": [ - 1, - 2 - ], - "kv_value_changed": true, - "previous_value_refused_by_lldap": true, - "current_kv_value_signs_in": true, - "steps": [ - [ - "generate", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "set-directory", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "deliver", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restart", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ] - ], - "reverted": false, - "pdp": "not-evaluated", - "events": [ - "execution.run.started", - "execution.attribution.receipt" - ], - "met": true - }, - { - "admission": "BEA-2026-9002", - "outcome": "reverted", - "reason": null, - "kv_version": [ - 2, - 4 - ], - "kv_value_changed": false, - "previous_value_refused_by_lldap": false, - "current_kv_value_signs_in": true, - "steps": [ - [ - "generate", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "set-directory", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "deliver", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restart", - "step", - "failed", - [], - "RolloutFailed" - ], - [ - "restore-kv", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restore-directory", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "redeliver", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restart-again", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ] - ], - "reverted": true, - "pdp": "not-evaluated", - "events": [ - "execution.run.started", - "execution.attribution.receipt" - ], - "met": true - } - ], - "alerts": [], - "no_values_in_report": true, - "all_met": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T17:59:58+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/README.md b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5062cb6..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T12: the executor rotates a bind on the synthetic stack (2026-10-31) - -Agent-run, local Docker, generated values, everything removed afterwards: `uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py`. - -**Setup:** - -- The T08 stack: LLDAP, privacyIDEA, Authelia and KeyCape on the pinned images. -- An OpenBao dev server on the platform's pinned 2.5.4 image, with KV v2 at `platform` and `cas_required` on the - `svc-authelia` bind. -- The executor gets its own token with CCR-2026-0058's policy file plus a journey-read policy. -- Stand-ins: - - approval-engine: an in-process carrier with its consume semantics; - - audit-core: an in-memory sink; - - the ExternalSecret: re-projects the KV value into Authelia's configuration; - - the rollout: restarts the Authelia container. -- The Kubernetes adapters are unit-tested against a fake API server (`bounded-executor/tests/test_operations.py`). - -Report: [`pilot-report.json`](pilot-report.json). It is value-free: scanned, and the harness asserts that no generated -value is present. - -| Run | Outcome | Evidence | -| --- | --- | --- | -| BEA-2026-9001 rotation | `completed` | KV v1→v2; LLDAP refuses the old value and accepts the new; delivery, restart and synthetic journey pass; started event and receipt emitted | -| BEA-2026-9002 one-off wrong delivery | `reverted` | Authelia never becomes ready after the restart (`RolloutFailed`, a definite failure). Revert in declared order, each step passing its own check: `restore-kv` → `restore-directory` → `redeliver` → `restart-again`. The value from before the run is current again (KV v4); the journey passes | - -## Findings that changed the design - -1. **CCR-2026-0058's policy refused reads.** OpenBao 2.5.4 applies `required_parameters = ["options"]` to GET as well, - so the executor could not read the version it must name for CAS. The executor token got 403 on every read. - - Without that line, read and CAS write work. - - A stale CAS and a write without `options` are refused, by `cas_required` on the key. - - Metadata, delete, sibling reads and new paths are still denied. - - The fix is in railiance-platform's renderer and policy file. CCR-2026-0058 needs re-approval. -2. **Revert order.** Undoing in strict reverse order would restart Authelia before its password was restored. Revert - steps now run in the order the admission declares (data, then delivery, then restart), limited to steps that ran. - The standard's BEA-10 says so. -3. **Definite failures revert.** A rollout that never becomes ready was first handled like an unknown outcome - (stop, no revert). Operations can now signal a definite failure (`definite_failure`, `executor.StepFailed`), - which the runner reverts like a failed check. Truly ambiguous errors still stop. -4. **Error types in receipts.** Receipts now carry the error *type* of a failed or unknown step, never its message. -5. **Stand-in artifact:** a restarted container gets a new host port. Fixed in the harness; not relevant to Kubernetes. diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/pilot-report.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/pilot-report.json deleted file mode 100644 index 5f264c7..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/pilot-report.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.bounded-executor.synthetic-pilot/v1", - "started_at": "2026-10-31T15:21:55+00:00", - "images": { - "openbao": "quay.io/openbao/openbao@sha256:436eaf9778cad75507ff70ea26ace30dcbe15606e619ac3823495663d7f7c115" - }, - "policy_file_sha256": "f14f0e0b885302b5931c1e84e258b5ee32a596fafab5b961d88becf7825eeeb0", - "runs": [ - { - "admission": "BEA-2026-9001", - "outcome": "completed", - "reason": null, - "kv_version": [ - 1, - 2 - ], - "kv_value_changed": true, - "previous_value_refused_by_lldap": true, - "current_kv_value_signs_in": true, - "steps": [ - [ - "generate", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "set-directory", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "deliver", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restart", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ] - ], - "reverted": false, - "pdp": "not-evaluated", - "events": [ - "execution.run.started", - "execution.attribution.receipt" - ], - "met": true - }, - { - "admission": "BEA-2026-9002", - "outcome": "reverted", - "reason": null, - "kv_version": [ - 2, - 4 - ], - "kv_value_changed": false, - "previous_value_refused_by_lldap": false, - "current_kv_value_signs_in": true, - "steps": [ - [ - "generate", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "set-directory", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "deliver", - "step", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restart", - "step", - "failed", - [], - "RolloutFailed" - ], - [ - "restore-kv", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restore-directory", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "redeliver", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ], - [ - "restart-again", - "revert", - "done", - [ - "pass" - ], - null - ] - ], - "reverted": true, - "pdp": "not-evaluated", - "events": [ - "execution.run.started", - "execution.attribution.receipt" - ], - "met": true - } - ], - "alerts": [], - "no_values_in_report": true, - "all_met": true, - "finished_at": "2026-10-31T15:22:57+00:00" -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/consumer-assessment.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/consumer-assessment.json deleted file mode 100644 index 43ad83b..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/consumer-assessment.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "coulomb.reset-owner-boundary.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-31T12:27:58.389484+00:00", - "configmap_uid": "7af1fa0d-1bd4-47e1-8873-0f620788ef3f", - "configmap_resource_version": "82819079", - "configuration_sha256": "0a8bca50641a4c6f27830f476c2c9f413fc3795711becccb8344ee4d6c376e80", - "bind_is_svc_authelia": true, - "reset_disabled_in_config": false, - "deployments": { - "authelia": { - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "generation": 31, - "observed_generation": 31, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "images": [ - "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - ] - }, - "lldap": { - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "generation": 9, - "observed_generation": 9, - "ready_replicas": 1, - "images": [ - "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - ] - } - }, - "directory_memberships_read_here": false, - "password_reset_attempted": false, - "secret_read": false, - "email_sent": false, - "runtime_changed": false, - "status": "reset_authority_return_incomplete", - "owner_bind_split_task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "owner_bind_split_status": "done", - "owner_followthrough": "NK-WP-0054-T10", - "consumer_task": "CSOC-WP-0015-T06", - "owner_membership_receipt_at": "2026-10-30T18:53:16.176849+00:00", - "owner_receipt_bind_groups": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ], - "owner_restore_drill_proves": [ - "independent retrieval", - "directory login", - "Authelia first factor", - "by-user MFA", - "cleanup" - ], - "owner_restore_drill_proves_password_change": false, - "deployed_images_match_isolated_reset_proof": true, - "isolated_readonly_reset_result": "HTTP 200/KO; old password accepted; replacement refused", - "isolated_password_manager_reset_result": "ordinary fixture user changed password; directory group creation refused", - "production_password_reset_failure_claimed": false, - "current_membership_unknown_since_owner_receipt": true, - "prior_personal_reset_acceptance": "preserved as historical; does not prove post-split reset", - "knowledge_orientation": { - "version": "0.2.7", - "digest": "22b7294e24137c0a350764b9cf37f3d4f2e9f35eb7c97a287d9c89477ef24d7a", - "cards": [ - "start", - "identity" - ], - "source_status": "verified-files", - "authority": "orientation only" - }, - "sources": [ - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "commit": "55fe8303f31d7476de5180f35c736652f5b4c475", - "path": "workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md", - "sha256": "1b5411a38583edede8124881825f252b2498335de22559e23d52c787d9c9581a" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "commit": "55fe8303f31d7476de5180f35c736652f5b4c475", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/10-verify.json", - "sha256": "b6318e9239623a09d3f6eac1208b0fd7c7a3d3facf55a4c31c8f628454e42ebb" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "commit": "55fe8303f31d7476de5180f35c736652f5b4c475", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json", - "sha256": "47a5a88bdc8a7494d9e5e6687372398367931dca84e38d7de9f6290375caffa2" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "commit": "55fe8303f31d7476de5180f35c736652f5b4c475", - "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py", - "sha256": "6139294f6ebdcbaad35934f04b11177d8cf89d134506a730f0c0ebbb3a4967be" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "commit": "55fe8303f31d7476de5180f35c736652f5b4c475", - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py", - "sha256": "4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3" - }, - { - "repo": "coulomb-social", - "commit": "a786a8050db92807d0f16e637043fbd191ab9335", - "path": "docs/release/native-password-reset-2026-10-30.json", - "sha256": "0666b35773ee3888e12d8d8d877bd8690c9c41b6f98096bf3c5a50195be2294f" - }, - { - "repo": "coulomb-social", - "commit": "a786a8050db92807d0f16e637043fbd191ab9335", - "path": "docs/release/native-recovery-browser-2026-10-31.json", - "sha256": "4d3b644cdf0e76e8ff775a79d8845831f7573a1e2e716e60dd53416343b6e3ba" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/current-roles.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/current-roles.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0abb06c..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/current-roles.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.reset-role-observation.v1", - "status": "current_reset_roles_observed", - "observed_at": "2026-10-31T12:57:44.913538+00:00", - "endpoint_sha256": "21b7c63da95eb01178305e49af9b3143295607b8ad68c522d1fa9545b7ef4d9f", - "selected_subject_sha256": "835958a092b4fcddf93eadb83dc2d21519ed1aeab570d04a3d798a4c0f24c0ba", - "human_admin_role_verified": true, - "bind": { - "builtin_roles": { - "lldap_admin": false, - "lldap_password_manager": false, - "lldap_strict_readonly": true - }, - "other_group_count": 0, - "matches_reviewed_service_name_filter": true, - "application_authority_assessed": false - }, - "selected_subject": { - "builtin_roles": { - "lldap_admin": false, - "lldap_password_manager": false, - "lldap_strict_readonly": false - }, - "other_group_count": 1, - "matches_reviewed_service_name_filter": false, - "application_authority_assessed": false - }, - "bind_has_multiple_builtin_roles": false, - "membership_changed": false, - "password_reset_attempted": false, - "grant_approved": false, - "application_access_verified": false, - "credential_values_recorded": false, - "sources": [ - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py", - "sha256": "9f19c5551e2a93319c04c1b2fd0ddc0f7757fdff96ad18b81d7ee7bb393b75b9" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py", - "sha256": "5e39e2eac53846a97cd25151c0a4af1ffc0230db881a6325efb66de6a51bfc36" - }, - { - "path": "identity-provisioner/provisioner.py", - "sha256": "a303a25d3b3876485c796a9ba0836ddaf0a0bec155b609790e028882ad983138" - }, - { - "path": "identity-provisioner/group_provenance.py", - "sha256": "405e08eaaab7c21d618dff4db5970607806f32ab6c461effb81c737e32182b10" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/native-matrix.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/native-matrix.json deleted file mode 100644 index fddbf7e..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/native-matrix.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,265 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "coulomb.native-reset-authority-matrix.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-31T12:37:24.533367+00:00", - "data": "synthetic", - "status": "native_authority_matrix_verified", - "images": { - "lldap": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "authelia": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "client": "sha256:512819463a1902b43a615beee14be7bf97e6a05e016385082b9380692ad1a8cd" - }, - "production_access": false, - "provider_smtp_contacted": false, - "owner_runtime_or_permission_change_performed": false, - "no_ports_host_mounts_or_external_routes": true, - "backend_container_flags_verified_before_fixture_import": true, - "source_manifest_sha256": "c982e3a47d9e3aec5095a3c11fea7260fd4f5cb6db57b827b915988b432a18d0", - "target_classes": { - "alice": "ordinary user", - "bob": "other ordinary user", - "operator": "lldap_admin member", - "appoperator": "application-admins member, not lldap_admin", - "svc-other": "other service, lldap_strict_readonly" - }, - "findings": { - "scenarios": [ - { - "bind_role": "lldap_strict_readonly", - "directory_writes": { - "positive_controls": 7, - "refused_mutations": [ - "create_user", - "edit_other_user", - "delete_user", - "create_group", - "delete_group", - "self_promote_admin", - "remove_admin_membership" - ], - "directory_metadata_unchanged": true - }, - "direct_password_changes": [ - { - "target": "alice", - "password_changed": false, - "old_password_accepted": true, - "new_password_accepted": false - }, - { - "target": "bob", - "password_changed": false, - "old_password_accepted": true, - "new_password_accepted": false - }, - { - "target": "operator", - "password_changed": false, - "old_password_accepted": true, - "new_password_accepted": false - }, - { - "target": "appoperator", - "password_changed": false, - "old_password_accepted": true, - "new_password_accepted": false - }, - { - "target": "svc-other", - "password_changed": false, - "old_password_accepted": true, - "new_password_accepted": false - } - ], - "authelia_resets": [ - { - "target": "alice", - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - }, - { - "target": "bob", - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - }, - { - "target": "operator", - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - }, - { - "target": "appoperator", - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - } - ] - }, - { - "bind_role": "lldap_password_manager", - "directory_writes": { - "positive_controls": 7, - "refused_mutations": [ - "create_user", - "edit_other_user", - "delete_user", - "create_group", - "delete_group", - "self_promote_admin", - "remove_admin_membership" - ], - "directory_metadata_unchanged": true - }, - "direct_password_changes": [ - { - "target": "alice", - "password_changed": true, - "old_password_accepted": false, - "new_password_accepted": true - }, - { - "target": "bob", - "password_changed": true, - "old_password_accepted": false, - "new_password_accepted": true - }, - { - "target": "operator", - "password_changed": false, - "old_password_accepted": true, - "new_password_accepted": false - }, - { - "target": "appoperator", - "password_changed": true, - "old_password_accepted": false, - "new_password_accepted": true - }, - { - "target": "svc-other", - "password_changed": true, - "old_password_accepted": false, - "new_password_accepted": true - } - ], - "authelia_resets": [ - { - "target": "alice", - "status": "reset_completed", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": null, - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": false, - "new_password_accepted_after": true - }, - { - "target": "bob", - "status": "reset_completed", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": null, - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": false, - "new_password_accepted_after": true - }, - { - "target": "operator", - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - }, - { - "target": "appoperator", - "status": "reset_completed", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": null, - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": false, - "new_password_accepted_after": true - } - ] - } - ], - "cleanup_verified": true - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/observer-preparation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/observer-preparation.json deleted file mode 100644 index dde7d60..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/observer-preparation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.reset-observer-preparation.v1", - "status": "tested_ready_for_attended_read", - "owner_task": "NK-WP-0054-T12", - "operator_return_task": "NK-WP-0054-T13", - "consumer_task": "CSOC-WP-0015-T06", - "accepted_subject": "tegwick", - "acceptance_source": { - "repo": "coulomb-social", - "path": "history/20261006T185411Z-personal-workspace-acceptance.md", - "sha256": "15ac9e1af4d0cb16b854d1ecf5fa89b634b1479174b02143b5c341cb3b5df2c3" - }, - "technical_binding_decision_id": "8770d4ea-8538-4f88-a9f8-8bcfb0542603", - "queries": [ - "human admin role", - "svc-authelia roles", - "tegwick roles" - ], - "private_input": "human admin password via terminal only", - "directory_mutations_available": false, - "production_observation_performed": false, - "password_reset_attempted": false, - "grant_approved": false, - "target_url": "https://lldap.coulomb.social", - "planned_private_receipt": "/home/worsch/.local/state/net-kingdom/reset-authority/roles-20261031.json", - "gates": { - "unit_and_transport": { - "tests": 92, - "failures": 0, - "errors": 0, - "skipped": 0, - "junit_sha256": "7ee639ba82c7100d7805cc01ca5c2a6c502550eac4abdb252ad3c7d8b1ac232b" - }, - "native_split_regression": { - "tests": 4, - "failures": 0, - "errors": 0, - "skipped": 0, - "junit_sha256": "b35645a61c52f45d0e826e3986145212f45d4abc065026b42bd651f6f4b5fb41" - }, - "final_native_observer": { - "tests": 1, - "failures": 0, - "errors": 0, - "skipped": 0, - "junit_sha256": "251831ae820081aa6e935d08c4e7854a1ad5cf840b8a41ae8af4add5f5406f2a" - } - }, - "native_fixture": "pinned owner LLDAP fixture; synthetic credentials, loopback-only published ports; container and volume removal verified", - "lint": "passed", - "sources": [ - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py", - "sha256": "9f19c5551e2a93319c04c1b2fd0ddc0f7757fdff96ad18b81d7ee7bb393b75b9" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py", - "sha256": "5e39e2eac53846a97cd25151c0a4af1ffc0230db881a6325efb66de6a51bfc36" - }, - { - "path": "identity-provisioner/provisioner.py", - "sha256": "a303a25d3b3876485c796a9ba0836ddaf0a0bec155b609790e028882ad983138" - }, - { - "path": "identity-provisioner/group_provenance.py", - "sha256": "405e08eaaab7c21d618dff4db5970607806f32ab6c461effb81c737e32182b10" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_reset_authority_observer.py", - "sha256": "348fab447a4182357bf3f7d058b05c7d6088ae084d8e433e76ce5c39c513e152" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_bind_split.py", - "sha256": "ae69051a3df4596fe220306d88a28b2c12e42fbfe3587e02135e3684eb5f354a" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/role-refresh.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/role-refresh.json deleted file mode 100644 index 81b4e98..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/role-refresh.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "coulomb.native-reset-role-refresh.v1", - "observed_at": "2026-10-31T13:23:16.597535+00:00", - "data": "synthetic", - "status": "native_role_refresh_verified", - "images": { - "lldap": "sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d", - "authelia": "sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54", - "client": "sha256:512819463a1902b43a615beee14be7bf97e6a05e016385082b9380692ad1a8cd" - }, - "production_access": false, - "provider_smtp_contacted": false, - "owner_runtime_or_permission_change_performed": false, - "no_ports_host_mounts_or_external_routes": true, - "backend_container_flags_verified_before_fixture_import": true, - "source_manifest_sha256": "f3c6d7b5a286d15d3049bba7e4c543052388f6a95a5e3254414f3b51da1285d0", - "findings": { - "scenarios": [ - { - "bind_role": "lldap_strict_readonly", - "same_authelia_process": true, - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - }, - { - "bind_role": "lldap_password_manager", - "same_authelia_process": true, - "status": "reset_completed", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": null, - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": false, - "new_password_accepted_after": true - }, - { - "bind_role": "lldap_strict_readonly", - "same_authelia_process": true, - "status": "reset_refused", - "only_loopback_interface": true, - "external_routes_absent": true, - "old_password_initially_accepted": true, - "new_password_initially_refused": true, - "native_first_factor": true, - "interactive_service_login_refused": true, - "reset_http_status": 200, - "reset_response_status": "KO", - "native_identity_finish": true, - "reset_without_verified_challenge_refused": true, - "consumed_identity_token_replay_refused": true, - "old_password_accepted_after": true, - "new_password_accepted_after": false - } - ], - "cleanup_verified": true - } -} diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/transition-validation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/transition-validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index c1710c3..0000000 --- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/transition-validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.reset-transition-validation.v1", - "status": "tested_proposal_not_granted", - "unit_checks": 25, - "native_controller_checks": 4, - "failures": 0, - "errors": 0, - "skipped": 0, - "junit_sha256": "26911e26b410c242f3dafb1915301875a4bfd3f5d88770be3b7bec5ce4c5c3d5", - "ruff": "passed", - "native_findings": [ - "grant and rollback preserve all other user IDs and group memberships", - "real process death after removal or addition recovers read-only without replaying grant", - "membership rollback leaves prior HTTP token rights active; freshly issued token loses those rights" - ], - "authelia_findings": "same running process refuses reset before grant, allows after grant, refuses after rollback; three fresh consumed challenges, old/new password checks; all confined containers removed", - "runtime_observation": { - "schema": "netkingdom.reset-runtime.v1", - "kube-system_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "sso_uid": "a4a148d8-92ab-41e6-b975-4e67b73edfc0", - "authelia": { - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "images": [ - "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - ], - "ready": true - }, - "lldap": { - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "images": [ - "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - ], - "ready": true - }, - "authelia_configuration": { - "uid": "7af1fa0d-1bd4-47e1-8873-0f620788ef3f", - "sha256": "0a8bca50641a4c6f27830f476c2c9f413fc3795711becccb8344ee4d6c376e80", - "bind_is_svc_authelia": true - } - }, - "production_membership_changed": false, - "grant_approved": false, - "productive_acceptance": false, - "sources": [ - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-transition.py", - "sha256": "cc405861bb5cc0adf419a1cf98a90872d8395eecbfc7d4d38947cb4008bee217" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-plan.json", - "sha256": "703e281ee6a17e1ef0a1dffbad35b8025ab3480d51d3fc2c36323f2bc6227106" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_reset_role_transition.py", - "sha256": "1437761ac60a7aeba16db70ccf07d48a9f5332617a00e7a325e678951985a08e" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_reset_role_transition_native.py", - "sha256": "13c53e8a757ed0e954ffd28df14283d51dd9d7d3278c1d7d7d5759b419a2a89a" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_bind_split.py", - "sha256": "ae69051a3df4596fe220306d88a28b2c12e42fbfe3587e02135e3684eb5f354a" - }, - { - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split-rehearsal.py", - "sha256": "9ab873d1e941807fb19a48fb18c3af246a98bf0788660d8d79a14fb0c0e0a067" - }, - { - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/role-refresh.json", - "sha256": "325f446960134e9510591a2a27f5833bc80fa858d77e6a88082af41307993b65" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md b/docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md deleted file mode 100644 index 3f5ab53..0000000 --- a/docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -# Forgejo type1.2 source acknowledgment and existing implementation gates - -Confirmed human source ACCEPT at2026-10-11T06:47:39Z is recorded separately from -implementation. Exact type package lives at -security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/; its external -decision/acknowledgment.json binds actual memo, human actor/disposition, packet, -proposed/acknowledged source hashes and post-anchor review. Type.yaml changes -only semantic status proposed→acknowledged; README history and one test expectation -adapt to the recorded source state. The frozen proposed human packet stays -immutable. Independent acknowledged-package validator and22 tests pass; closed -schema/version load and identical c0afd preparation render are proved. - -Current canonical1.1 package and accepted1.1 case remain unchanged, without -inherited1.2 authority. At source acknowledgment, load_type read one type.yaml per id and required -exact version, so selecting1.2 as default would break that1.1 case. The explicit -version root loads1.2 through existing --types/--types-root input, only for source -validation/preparation. This record changes no resolver/default, native broker -pin, canonicalcase or adapter. The1.2 reference remains proposed without -acceptance fields; normal admission still refuses acknowledged/unimplemented type. -Separate Apps receipt records only actual human reference-design scope. - -## Actual next source/proof gates in existing work - -| Owner work | Remaining contract and evidence | -| --- | --- | -| NK-WP-0048-T06 / existing ORGREF driver | Deliberately integrate explicit version selection and first-reference source receipts under the accepted lifecycle. Ordinary case acceptance requires implemented type; preparation flags and design receipt are no waiver. Define source bootstrap integration without inventing canonical admission. Type becomes implemented only after materialization/follow-through capability and actual live verified reference proof, with distinct owner acceptance. | -| WARDEN-WP-0044-T03, then T04 | Current case_run.py is a closed local kernel with no installed owner adapters/live CLI dispatch; case_receipt_state.py is a pure/proposed reducer. Need exact owner-acknowledged descriptors/adapters, independently authenticated global provenance verifier, durable attempt/recovery receipts, bounded caller grant/session/source pins and confirmed revocation. No shell/type prose execution, privilege manufacture, native success from local prototype or pending-owner receipt. | -| MASON-WP-0010-T03, then T04 | Current case_structure.py prepares typed evidence requests, not native materialization. Rebuild reviewed source deliberately with exact version/type/case/render and corrected CCR targets; obtain independent authenticated layout/policy/role/catalog observations and created-versus-preexisting ownership/change receipts for all six objects. No mint prerequisite for structural proof and no trusted self-authored JSON acceptance. Preserve old wrong-target bundle refusal. | -| Platform existing CCR-2026-0042 and broker owner path | Reconcile historical/current/proposed body and actual exact SA/namespace/audience/read-only policy; bound claims are still false. Any source broker/case pin adaptation needs exact owner review and source tests, not blanket version bypass. Native apply/capabilities/created-object/issued-token revocation or verified-expiry receipts require separately approved authority. A source role deletion does not revoke issued tokens. | -| NetKingdom/KeyCape registration/group/env owners | Supply exact attended registration/config/group/verify/undo adapters or owner receipt-only steps through existing lanes. Bind registry/environment/groups to reviewed case; do not substitute user-engine runtime identity or give Warden new broad Kubernetes authority. Native unknown outcomes remain unresolved pending owner reconciliation. | -| RAPPS-WP-0016-T02, with its existing T01 prerequisite | Refresh exact ESO/CRD/RBAC/dedicatedSA/no legacy refs and target ownership metadata. Prepare reviewed Helm OIDC secret consumption and group enforcement adapters or receipt-only consumer step; native Store/ExternalSecret Ready is not browser/MFA/group refusal, break-glass/account-link or first-case completion. Shared ESO trust/default workloadSA remain explicit. | - -All created-only undo retains immutable UIDs/ownership and exact source references; -preserve matched/shared resources, revert consumer references first, revoke issued -reader tokens or independently prove expiry before role removal, then policy. -No new login/remint or speculative delete authority follows from this record. -Existing native acceptance and human gates remain in their current owner/project -records. This document adds no broad plan, promoted residual or implementation -permission and marks no existing implementation task done. - -## Source-only explicit selection integration — 2026-10-11 - -A bounded optional version_roots input and CLI --version-root VERSION=PATH now prepare exact1.2 selection alongside the unchanged --types default. Matching exact version chooses one declared root; missing/mismatched/duplicate/symlinked source refuses without fallback. Source type ID/version must equal the case reference, including direct validation/render callers. Existing two-argument callers remain default-only; no automatic Mason/Warden/native adoption or highest/latest version resolver is introduced. See tools/security-case-types/README.md and docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json. - -Actual canonical1.1 is acknowledged (not implemented); its historical accepted case is retained exactly, including ordinary-admission refusal and the existing nonexecuting preparation behavior. Both1.1 and acknowledged1.2 remain refused in ordinary admission. The original and staged1.1 preparation CLI output bytes match exactly (digest e64b56e4...);1.2 mapped preparation equals its direct-root render (digest c0afd557...). No type status/canonical case/acknowledgment is rewritten. Forty-three validator tests cover exact selection, malformed/traversal/ambiguity/no-fallback, pin separation, deterministic plan-only rendering and unchanged ordinary gates. These are maker source checks, not formal NetKingdom owner agreement or native implementation proof. - -NK-WP-0048-T06 remains wait in its existing ORGREF cross-owner driver. Source selection alone does not provide first-reference owner receipts, implemented type, case acceptance/materialized/live status, owner adapters/global authenticated verifier, broker source reconciliation or attended/native proof. Those existing remaining gates and approvals are unchanged. diff --git a/docs/identity-restore-drill.md b/docs/identity-restore-drill.md deleted file mode 100644 index ca1243b..0000000 --- a/docs/identity-restore-drill.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -# Quarterly isolated identity restore drill - -Work record: `NK-WP-0053` (from `NK-WP-0049-T24` gap G3, founder decision -`e4c288d9`, 2026-10-23). Cadence: quarterly, aligned with disaster-control -`BackupPolicy.md`. First drill: the attended `admin` run of the week of 2026-10-28, well ahead of -**2027-01-31**, the end of the single-provider risk acceptance. Later drills are -scheduled through disaster-control's restore-proof register. - -The drill re-proves restores that have each been proven once (NK49-T16 LLDAP, -T31 privacyIDEA token material, T20 audit). It uses the existing reviewed -tooling unchanged and adds no grant, scheduler or production write. One -attended operator runs it in their own terminal, using the independently held -backup age key and the Backup-account credential through Platform custody. - -## Scope - -| Step | Tool | Proves | -|---|---|---| -| 1. Independent retrieval | `tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py --source-receipt --receipt ` ([ceremony](bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md) step 5) | The newest successful generation re-downloads and binds by ETag/size/hash | -| 2. LLDAP | `tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh ` | Directory restore and authentication in isolation | -| 3. privacyIDEA | `tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh ` | Database, token-material decryption and audit signatures in isolation | -| 4. Authelia | `tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-authelia.sh admin ` | Authelia restored against the restored directory accepts the existing user `admin` in isolation | -| 5. By-user MFA | `tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh `, login `admin` | `admin`'s retained OTP token from the backup validates a fresh code in isolation | - -Every stage is run by `admin`, the operator of record and the MFA test subject; -`platform-root` is kept for break-glass. Stage 5 needs a generation captured after -2026-10-25 03:45 UTC, the first daily capture holding `admin`'s OTP token; an older -generation proves nothing for `admin`. - -Out of scope: KeyCape consumer continuity (NK49-T18, a separate admitted -attempt), any production restore or cutover, and -`run-offline-recovery.sh` (it publishes kit files, which is a production -effect). - -## Before the drill - -- Review the [crisis custody list](crisis-custody-list.md): every row must have a holder, a location and a last-proven date, and no row may rely on a login to a service being restored. The operator of record is `admin`. -- Pick the generation from the daily backup (the newest that passed health). - Record its date, not its content. -- Stage the pinned images locally. Each launcher refuses if they are missing. -- Open an OpenBao session as `admin` in the operator shell: - `bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=platform-admin` (MFA). Stage 1 reads - the Backup-account credential from OpenBao custody through that token and never - prompts; without a valid `platform-admin` token it writes a failed receipt - (`contained_owner_retrieval_failed`) and prints nothing. Check `echo $?` after stage 1. -- Confirm no outbound notification or provider write is configured. The - launchers enforce isolation; confirm their preflight passes. - -## Pass and fail - -A drill passes only if every launcher exits 0, each safe receipt reports -cleanup verified with no uncertainty, and the ciphertext digest in every receipt -equals the transfer receipt. Any other result is a **failed drill**. Record it -as a finding under NK-WP-0049 or its successor, with the safe receipts. Do not -rerun with modified inputs until the cause is understood, and never repair a -receipt by hand. - -## Evidence - -Keep the value-safe receipts under -`docs/evidence/-identity-restore-drill/`: -`transfer.json` (public fields only), `lldap-recovery.json`, -`privacyidea-recovery.json`, `authelia-recovery.json`, `privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json` -and a short `drill.json` with the date, generation, verdict, next due date and, per -stage, the identity that ran it and the login it tested. Before committing, run the repository -secret scan (the pre-commit hook does this). No key, password, token or -plaintext may enter Git, State Hub or chat. - -After each drill, put the next due date (drill date plus 3 months) on the -NK-WP-0053 record and tell disaster-control, so its restore-proof register -stays current. diff --git a/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md b/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md deleted file mode 100644 index 501128c..0000000 --- a/docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,336 +0,0 @@ -# Isolated identity service restore packet - -NK-WP-0049-T15. Prepared 2026-10-16. **Actual LLDAP recovery accepted at -18:37 UTC; native privacyIDEA token-material/audit recovery accepted at -19:10 UTC; native Authelia recovery accepted 2026-10-24 at 15:24 UTC; existing-token MFA accepted 2026-10-24 at 16:48 UTC. The KeyCape consumer run remains unexecuted.** -Accountable preparer: codex. Execution/acceptance: Railiance Platform and the -LLDAP, Authelia, KeyCape and privacyIDEA service owners. - -## Fixed starting point - -Use the actual recovered artifact and receipt in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json`, with matching -original keys and manifest. The completed archive recovery verified 36 file -hashes, SQLite integrity, RSA pairs and native PostgreSQL restore. It did not -prove service authentication or audit-signature continuity. A newer generation -needs equivalent provenance and archive checks before replacing this input. - -## Targets and image admission still required - -The bounded LLDAP stage below selects the local Linux Docker engine -`bnt-lap001`, ID `74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1`; the executor refuses a -different engine or a remote Docker endpoint. All five exact image references -have been saved, loaded and inspected on that workstation; receipt: -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/offline-service-images.json`. -This establishes local image availability without production registry access, -not an off-host image escrow or exact historical mutable-tag provenance. - -No broader execution target has been admitted. Select a disposable host/context and -record its immutable identity, operator, private endpoints, maximum lifetime, -resource limits and exact owned cleanup inventory. Never select the production -context or reuse live PVCs. Use fresh private storage; no production host mounts, -service-account tokens, ingress controller or external DNS update credentials. - -The October 16 read-only pod observation is recorded in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/image-observation.json`. -These are candidate inputs, not confirmation of the images in the selected archive: - -| Component | Candidate reference | Admission gap | -| --- | --- | --- | -| PostgreSQL | `postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70` | Passed archive DB restore; stage independently of failed registry | -| LLDAP | `docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d` | Actual running digest resolved; compare selected archive/runtime lineage and stage it | -| Authelia | `docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54` | Compare selected archive deployment and stage image | -| KeyCape | `forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010` | Compare selected archive; require independent image availability | -| privacyIDEA | `ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473` | Actual main and sidecar digest observed separately; compare archive/runtime lineage and stage it | - -Record image archive digests and offline load/inspect results. Resolve mutable -references from trusted runtime/image metadata rather than pulling today's tag. -The encrypted archive deployment records must be compared privately; do not -export literal environment values, Secret payloads or arbitrary configs. - -## Restore order and containment - -1. Freeze the selected artifact/manifest/image/target references. The owner - supplies existing-user credentials and an existing retained MFA token through - private inputs. Agree time synchronization and test identities without - exposing passwords, seed material, client secrets or user records. -2. Establish an isolated network with default-deny external egress, no published - ports, no host networking and no production DNS/ingress. Permit only named - internal service links. The test browser, if needed, must use a separately - reviewed local route and hosts mapping. Preserve issuer/client identity while - keeping all test traffic private. Verify denied external connection attempts. -3. Import manifest-checked data and original keys into fresh private storage. - Do not apply archived Kubernetes objects wholesale: metadata UIDs, mounts, - service accounts, endpoints and sidecars require explicit translation. Keep - notification/provider credentials sealed and unused; disable sending paths. -4. Restore the linked privacyIDEA database with native PostgreSQL first; restore - LLDAP data/config and verify directory readiness. Run directory authentication - before dependent provider checks. Restore privacyIDEA with its original enckey - and audit pair against the isolated database/directory. Restore Authelia with - original storage/OIDC keys and private directory routes. Restore KeyCape with - original signing/config/policies and private MFA/directory dependencies. -5. Run the individual acceptance checks below; do not start provisioning, - enrollment, rotation, scheduled jobs or production consumers automatically. - An unsupported dependency is a named gap, never an implicit production route. -6. Remove only the named disposable containers/network/storage and temporary - plaintext/key files. Confirm absence and production resources unchanged; - retain sanitized receipts, original ciphertext and independently held keys. - -## Accepted owner step: isolated LLDAP recovery - -The actual owner run passed on 2026-10-16. Evidence: -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json` -and `actual-isolated-lldap-review.json`. All 36 archive hashes, the exact -source/ciphertext/target bindings, native existing-user bind and explicit -invalid-credential refusal passed. Seven users, 17 groups, 13 memberships and -available attribute/schema rows were preserved; isolation and container/tmpfs -cleanup passed. T16 is done. The procedure below remains for a future drill; -there is no need to repeat it for this acceptance. - -Execute in your own terminal, using an existing account and the password valid -at the backup's capture time. No password belongs in the arguments: - -```bash -bash tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh EXISTING_USER \ - /tmp/nk49-offline-handoff-1X660a5t/transfer.json -``` - -Replace `EXISTING_USER` with the selected existing username. The command asks -privately for the independently held `railiance-backup` age key and then the -account password. It rechecks ciphertext size/hash, recipient and every archive -file before importing anything. Decrypted staging is in a private Linux tmpfs; -the key helper removes its temporary file at exit. - -The executor creates only uniquely named `nk49-lldap-*` containers on the fixed -local engine. LLDAP has `--network none`, no published ports, read-only root, -all capabilities dropped, no added privileges, user1000, 256 MiB memory/one CPU -and private tmpfs for data/config. The client shares only that loopback network -namespace and verifies there is no external interface or route. Container -isolation is inspected before private import. No Kubernetes/OpenBao/SSO API, -production directory endpoint or provider grant is used. Containers have a -30-minute holding lifetime and are removed on exit; plaintext and containers -are checked for cleanup. A forced host/process termination can still require -owner reconciliation of the named resources. - -The original server key/seed, JWT secret and directory data are preserved. -Admin-password reset, private-key replacement, SMTP and LDAPS listeners are -disabled. The private account password travels only through memory/stdin; it is -not placed in Docker arguments, environment values, logs or evidence. A native -LDAP bind must pass, and an explicit LDAP invalid-credentials result must reject -the wrong password. After a graceful stop, users/groups/memberships and available -attribute tables are compared with the original snapshot. Only equality and -aggregate counts leave the process. - -The actual-image tests use disposable synthetic accounts, a real encrypted -bundle and the same restore executor. They cover positive and wrong-credential -paths, isolation, original-key refusal, directory preservation and cleanup. -The separate actual owner receipt now supplies real-backup proof for T16. -For future runs, return only the outcome and evidence directory. - -This step does not restore Authelia, KeyCape or privacyIDEA, and does not prove -current production password validity, MFA or audit continuity. - -## Prepared owner step: isolated Authelia recovery (T17) - -Prepared and fixture-tested 2026-10-24 under T41. The actual owner run passed -the same day (15:24 UTC); evidence is in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/`. T17 is done. Execute in your own terminal with a verified transfer receipt from an -independent retrieval (the T23 procedure), an existing account and the password -valid at the backup's capture time: - -```bash -bash tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-authelia.sh EXISTING_USER \ - /path/to/verified/transfer.json -``` - -The command asks privately for the `railiance-backup` age key and then the -password. It rechecks ciphertext size/hash, recipient and every archive file, -and decrypts into private Linux tmpfs, as the LLDAP step does. - -Topology: restored LLDAP runs as the `--network none` anchor. Authelia and the -probe client join its network namespace (`container:`) and use loopback -only. All containers are `nk49-authelia-*`, read-only, capabilities dropped, no -added privileges, user 1000, tmpfs-only mounts, no published ports. Isolation -is inspected before private import; the probe verifies there is no external -interface or route. - -The archived deployment, ConfigMap and `authelia-secrets` are used as captured. -Secret files are placed at their archived mount paths; the environment carries -only file paths. Four confinement rewrites are made, and only these: the LDAP -address points to the restored directory on loopback; the SMTP notifier becomes -a tmpfs file notifier and `authelia-smtp` is not imported; the NTP startup check -is off (outbound UDP); the container healthcheck file is off (the root stays -read-only). KeyCape's archived `keycape-config` supplies the client id, client -secret and the portal hostname. - -Checks, in order: `authelia validate-config` on the original configuration; -`authelia storage encryption check` with the original key; the issuer JWKS -served by Authelia contains the archived issuer public key; existing-user -first factor through `/api/firstfactor` against the restored LLDAP; a wrong -password refused; the archived `keycape` client secret passes client -authentication at `/api/oidc/token` (`invalid_grant` for a deliberately invalid -code, so no grant is issued); a wrong client secret refused (`invalid_client`). -The receipt carries booleans, the RFC 7638 issuer key thumbprint, image IDs and -source hashes only. Containers and tmpfs staging are removed and checked on -every exit. - -Native fixture tests (`NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_LLDAP_TEST=1 -NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_AUTHELIA_TEST=1 pytest tests/test_isolated_authelia_recovery.py`) -use this repository's own Authelia manifests with synthetic secrets on the -pinned images. They cover the positive path, wrong password, wrong storage key -and an encrypted-bundle run through `main()`. - -This step does not prove the full KeyCape→Authelia→LLDAP→privacyIDEA login, -MFA, or current production password validity. It reuses `isolated-lldap.py` -and the bundle modules unedited, so the pinned KeyCape attempt sources stay as -reviewed. - -## Acceptance matrix - -| Task / owner lane | Positive check | Negative check | Safe evidence | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| T16 / LLDAP | Preserved user/group/membership identities; existing-user bind/login | Wrong password rejected | Image/target IDs, aggregate comparisons and booleans | -| T17 / Authelia | Original config validates; storage key opens store; issuer JWKS equals archived key; `keycape` client verifier accepts KeyCape's archived secret; existing-user first factor against restored LLDAP | Wrong password and wrong client secret refused; no grant issued | Public key thumbprint, outcomes, file-notifier only (stage prepared in T41) | -| T19 / privacyIDEA MFA | Existing retained token decrypts internally and actual existing-token MFA succeeds | Wrong enckey and invalid code refused in disposable copies | Token material never exported; bounded outcomes only | -| T20 / privacyIDEA audit | Verify historical signatures; create and verify one isolated entry with original key | Mismatched public key/tampered disposable record rejected | Signature counts, continuity result, cleanup | -| T18 / KeyCape | Same issuer/JWKS, registry/policy/receipt continuity; named current consumer authenticates | Wrong secret and denied scope rejected | Public fingerprints, owner-selected test IDs and outcomes | - -Do not silently reset credentials or re-enroll tokens to pass. Historical audit -verification failures must be reported, not hidden with replacement keys. - -## Accepted privacyIDEA token-material and stored-audit stage - -```bash -bash tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh \ - /tmp/nk49-offline-handoff-1X660a5t/transfer.json -``` - -This uses the already independently retrieved ciphertext. The owner enters only -the `railiance-backup` age key through the existing hidden helper; no password, -MFA code or provider credential is requested. The exact local Docker target and -cached images are checked first. The main executor rechecks ciphertext/recipient -and all archive hashes, with private plaintext staging on Linux tmpfs. - -`isolated-privacyidea.py` restores the linked dump into fresh PostgreSQL on -`--network none`, listening only on its loopback interface. The pinned -privacyIDEA 3.12.2 worker shares that same namespace. Both have read-only roots, -all capabilities dropped, no added privileges, fixed unprivileged UIDs, no host -mounts/ports and only tmpfs writable storage. Isolation is inspected before -private import. The database has a 2 GiB memory limit and one GiB tmpfs data -limit; the worker has a one GiB memory limit. Hold processes expire after 30 -minutes (database forced termination after a further 15 seconds); normal cleanup -removes both containers and plaintext staging. An interrupted host/process still -requires reconciliation of the exact `nk49-pi-check-*` resources. - -The worker uses original enckey/audit keys and the original pepper/session-secret -fields. It generates a narrowly scoped private config pointing only at the -isolated database, and explicitly selects that config over image defaults. -It does not execute archived Python config. A literal archived -`PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES` setting is preserved; unknown dynamic expressions are -refused. No production URI or provider-admin bearer is used, no user is enrolled, -and no original key is regenerated or replaced. - -Native checks decrypt every nonempty encrypted token-key field internally, -compare against a separate disposable wrong-key result, and emit only counts. -This proves bounded native material readback, **not existing-token MFA**; padding -and readback do not establish successful authentication. That remaining positive -and wrong-code/wrong-key authentication proof stays T19. T31 tracks the separate -actual token-material readback receipt. - -For T20, the native audit implementation verifies every stored historical row -(up to two million, otherwise refusal), reports signed/unsigned/invalid/legacy -counts, then creates and verifies one isolated audit entry using the original -signing identity. Tampering and an unrelated public key must fail. No historical -row or signature is rewritten. This checks stored rows, not event completeness. -The worker has a ten-minute execution bound; timeout is not an accepted partial -scan. Counts/signatures/keys are never replaced with a sample to claim success. - -Exit0 means these bounded checks and cleanup passed. Exit2 means checks completed -but historical audit exceptions need owner disposition; T20 must stay open. -Exit1 indicates another failure. All outcomes have a safe receipt in the printed -private evidence directory. Return only that directory and the outcome. Actual owner recovery passed at 19:10 UTC on 2026-10-16: five retained token -materials read internally, 279,209 historical signatures verified, no unsigned or -invalid rows, new-entry verification, both negative checks and cleanup passed. -T20/T31 are done. Source/ciphertext/target bindings and the safe receipt are in -`evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.json`. -Existing-token MFA remains T19; event completeness is not claimed. - -## Prepared owner step: isolated existing-token MFA (T19) - -Prepared and fixture-tested 2026-10-24 under T42. The actual owner run passed the -same day (16:48 UTC); evidence is in `docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/`. -T19 is done. The procedure below remains for a future drill. Execute in your own terminal with a verified transfer receipt (the T23 -procedure) and your authenticator ready: - -```bash -bash tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh /path/to/verified/transfer.json -``` - -Prompts, in order: the `railiance-backup` age key (hidden); your login name (and -the realm, if more than one exists); then a token PIN plus current code exactly as -typed at login (hidden). Any one of your usable tokens works. A TOTP code is valid -for tens of seconds, so enter it only when asked and keep the authenticator open. - -**Why by user.** A first version checked a token by serial. On the real backup every -check stopped with `ResolverError`: real tokens belong to an LDAP user, and the -archived resolver `lldap-coulomb` points at the in-cluster address -`ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890`, which does not exist in isolation. Fixture -tokens had no owner, so tests had not shown it, and the run correctly claimed no proof. - -**Topology.** The restored database container is the `--network none` anchor. -Restored LLDAP and the privacyIDEA worker join its namespace (`container:`) -and talk over loopback only. All three are read-only, capabilities dropped, user -non-root, tmpfs-only, with isolation inspected before private import. - -**Resolver rewrite, disposable copy only.** After `pg_restore`, every `ldapresolver` -`LDAPURI` must equal the archived in-cluster address exactly, or the run is refused -as an owner decision. They are then repointed to `ldap://127.0.0.1:3890`. The stored -bind password is not touched, so the original encryption key must decrypt it and the -restored LLDAP must accept it before any user can be looked up. - -**Checks.** The call is `POST /validate/check` with user, realm and pass, through -privacyIDEA's own application, so stored policies and the resolver apply as for KeyCape: - -1. The user is found through the restored resolver and directory, and has a usable token. -2. **Wrong key.** The application is pointed at a random key file (the run asserts the - configuration really names it). The typed code must be refused; privacyIDEA returns - its own error 907. -3. **Wrong code.** The last digit of what you typed is changed; refused as a wrong value. -4. **Your code.** Accepted with the original key and the retained token material. - -The order is deliberate: only the last step can spend a counter or replay-protected -code. An earlier fixture run in which the wrong-key step silently used the original key -showed why; the configuration assertion now prevents that vacuous result, and the -receipt claims proof only when all three outcomes line up. - -The receipt carries booleans, bounded refusal categories (for example `error_907`, -`wrong_value`), token types, counts, a SHA-256 of the login and source hashes. No login, -PIN or code is recorded, and the disposable copy is destroyed. Fixture tests cover HOTP -and TOTP-with-PIN owned by an LDAP user, a wrong code alone, an unknown user, a malformed -original key, the rewrite refusing an unknown address, and an encrypted bundle through -`main()`. - -**Limits.** Policies that call outside the namespace (for example event handlers that -send notifications) cannot succeed and are not exercised. Token ownership is checked for -the one user you name, not for every user. - -## Unresolved inputs before execution - -- Named immutable disposable target, approved private browser route if required, - resource limits, cleanup inventory and operator window. -- Confirm archive/runtime lineage for the observed image digests and stage all - images independently of production and the failed registry. -- A retained user and MFA token available in private owner custody; exact native - verification commands reviewed against the chosen service versions. -- T21 per-caller owner admission, including legacy token, diagnostic, resolver - and LDAP-group boundaries. The T02 current-caller ledger is delivered - ([caller-ledger.json](evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json), - 2026-10-23). Submit the acceptance from its `current` rows. Its two historical - Secrets (`sso/keycape-pi-token`, `mfa/privacyidea-trigger-admin`) are excluded - from restore scope: they are retired in source, with revocation routed to T22. -- Service-owner acceptance of network/config translations and all required - grants. New grants or production effects require their own owner decisions. - -Until resolved, T15 stays in progress and T18 remains waiting; T16, T17, T19, T20 and T31 are done. Production -cutover, full-host/OpenBao restoration and application database recovery are -separate owner procedures. diff --git a/docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md b/docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md index 3c08786..c64b5b3 100644 --- a/docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md +++ b/docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md @@ -1,132 +1,126 @@ # KeyCape exposure: privacyIDEA resolver reconciliation -Incident: `KEYCAPE-EXPOSURE-20260823-01` -Historical workplan: `NK-WP-0033`; source maintenance: `NK-WP-0049-T02` -Exercise status: core helper exercised 2026-10-14 by custodian-codex against -local disposable privacyIDEA 3.12.2 and LLDAP, including actual LDAP bind, -password update, preserved configuration, exact user lookup and HOTP. Terminal -handling and failure paths have automated tests. The complete new attended -procedure has not run against the production cluster or KeyCape. -Evidence: Custodian `docs/evidence/2026-10-14-netkingdom-security/resolver-cutover.json`. +Incident: `KEYCAPE-EXPOSURE-20260823-01` +Workplan: `NK-WP-0033` +NetKingdom procedure: `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` (repaired 2026-08-27 in `4a38511`; the previously pinned revision could not complete a run — see NK-WP-0033 T05) +Platform recovery contract: railiance-platform `453fed3` +Owner cutover receipt: State Hub message `45b236c8-052f-43d3-a472-44f8e9694da2` +Exercise status: `--check --predecessor-unavailable` exercised to PASS on 2026-09-23 by Bernd Worsch (railiance01 checkout `6096c395`, receipt in NK-WP-0033). `--apply` last ran on 2026-08-27 before the fixes in `4a38511`. Run it from your own terminal with `ssh -t`: Claude Code's `!` prefix has no TTY, and the script refuses to run without one. Take the pi-admin and LLDAP values from OpenBao `operators` custody (`privacyidea/pi-admin`, `lldap/admin`). See `attended-procedure-standard.md`. -Both `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` and -`update-lldap-resolver-live.sh` delegate to `resolver_cutover.py`. The update -helper changes only an existing `lldap-coulomb` resolver's bind password; the -reconcile helper additionally checks cluster readiness, discovery, exact user -resolution, token-backed MFA and the supplied predecessor's HTTP denial. -Neither helper bootstraps a missing resolver or realm, repairs missing tuning, -or changes policies, tokens, directory credentials or Kubernetes resources. +This is the remaining attended provider-admin operation after the owner-reported +four-class cutover. It updates only privacyIDEA resolver `lldap-coulomb` so the +resolver uses the replacement LLDAP bind credential. It does not modify realms, +policies, tokens, KeyCape Secrets, or any other resolver. -## Authority and target pins +No password, hash, token, Secret payload, or manifest belongs in this document, +State Hub, Git, chat, command arguments, or ordinary logs. -The historical platform recovery contract is railiance-platform `453fed3`; -owner cutover receipt is State Hub message -`45b236c8-052f-43d3-a472-44f8e9694da2`. These identify historical evidence, -not a fresh live grant. Founder-deferred exposure rotation remains deferred. +## Authority and pinning gate -Before any live run, the existing owner/supervisor path must bind a private -approval record to the current NetKingdom source revision and dependencies, -incident, provider-approved replacement, owner receipt, exact start/end window, -attended driver, independent abort operator and recovery plan. Confirm predecessor -provenance separately. Do not restore an exposed predecessor or bundle. -A preview digest and TTY are technical preconditions, not authorization. +The operator must record a private approval receipt containing, at minimum: -Reconcile requires an explicit absolute kubeconfig, context, expected API server -and `kube-system` namespace UID from the reviewed owner packet. It checks the -server and UID before workload reads. It never reads Kubernetes Secrets. The -five existing deployments must each have the current generation observed and -exactly one desired, actual, updated, ready and available replica, without a -deletion timestamp. No ambient default context is accepted. +- incident `KEYCAPE-EXPOSURE-20260823-01`; +- the NetKingdom revision containing `reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` and its adjacent `pi_api.py` and platform contract `453fed3`; +- the owner receipt `45b236c8-052f-43d3-a472-44f8e9694da2`; +- the exact start/end window, attended driver, and independent abort operator; +- confirmation that the replacement LLDAP credential is the provider-approved + value and that no exposed predecessor will be restored. -Default service origins are `https://pink.coulomb.social`, -`https://lldap.coulomb.social` and `https://kc.coulomb.social`. Explicit literal -loopback URLs with ports are supported for approved forwards or fixtures. -Environment URL/tuning overrides and the old `--note` option are removed. -KeyCape discovery must identify the canonical `https://kc.coulomb.social` -issuer and its own authorization, token and JWKS endpoints, even through a forward. -The shared transport disables proxies and redirects and bounds strict JSON -responses; each extra service profile permits only its one required route and -never receives the privacyIDEA authorization token. +No live action is permitted if any revision, owner, cluster, or approval +identifier differs from the receipt. -## Preview, apply and check +## Preflight (metadata and health only) -Use an attended terminal from the reviewed checkout. These are command templates; -replace public placeholders with the approved target values. No secret belongs -in argv, environment, Git, State Hub, chat or ordinary logs. +Run from the approved operator workstation, with the cluster context and +provider endpoint already authorized. Do not render any Secret data. -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh --preview \ - --kubeconfig /absolute/approved/kubeconfig --context APPROVED_CONTEXT \ - --server https://APPROVED_SERVER:6443 --cluster-uid APPROVED_NAMESPACE_UID -``` +1. Verify the approved checkout contains `reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` + with mode `0755`; inspect its source, not live credential material. +2. Confirm LLDAP, privacyIDEA, KeyCape, Authelia, and + identity-provisioner are Ready using deployment/pod status fields only. +3. Confirm privacyIDEA availability via the documented unauthenticated + `/token/` probe (401/403 is expected) and KeyCape discovery health, + discarding response bodies. Do not use a command that prints a bearer token + or configuration response. +4. Confirm the approved window, driver, abort operator, provider custody, and + cleanup workspace are ready. Stop on any drift or missing owner. -Preview prompts only for pi-admin, authenticates with an admin-role check, -validates the existing resolver/core/tuning/realm, and returns a public-state -`snapshot_sha256`. It performs no configuration write. It creates an auth session -and can produce provider audit events. The digest excludes the bind password and -binds the target settings and observed non-secret configuration. It is not a -credential fingerprint. +## Apply (one attended operation) -Run the same command with `--apply --expected-digest REVIEWED_DIGEST` in place -of `--preview`, retaining all target and user options. The helper prompts silently -for pi-admin, the approved replacement and the actual predecessor. Inputs stay -in Python memory; no temporary secret files are created. Inherited shell tracing -is disabled before input handling. A fresh OTP/PIN is requested only after -configuration and exact user lookup succeed. `--user` defaults to `platform-root`. +1. From the approved checkout, run exactly: -Before mutation the helper authenticates the replacement to LLDAP and uses -privacyIDEA `/resolver/test` with the candidate password to prove an actual LDAP -bind. It tests supplied predecessor denial at LLDAP HTTP login and rechecks the -observed configuration. Apply sends exactly one resolver update containing only -`type` and `BINDPW`. Native privacyIDEA 3.12.2 preserves omitted fields. Readback -must preserve all other resolver data and every realm; a native resolver test -then proves the stored bind works. The API has no compare-and-swap: an exclusive -owner window remains required, and ambiguous writes are never retried. + ```text + bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh --apply + ``` -`--check` replaces `--preview` to perform the proofs without a configuration -write; it needs no digest. Check proves the stored bind works, not that its -censored value equals the supplied replacement. Authentication, audit and OTP -counter effects still occur. It is not an effect-free operation. + The helper securely prompts for pi-admin, replacement and predecessor + LLDAP passwords, and one approved MFA code; authenticates to privacyIDEA; + performs exactly one `POST /resolver/lldap-coulomb`; proves replacement + resolver lookup, privacyIDEA MFA, replacement LLDAP authentication, and + predecessor denial; rechecks readiness/health; securely cleans up; and + emits one sanitized PASS/FAIL receipt. It must not be combined with + `repair-realm-live.sh`, `bootstrap-realm.sh`, `creds-rotate.sh`, or any + full-bundle generator. +3. Stop immediately on any non-success response, timeout, unexpected endpoint, + or failed cleanup. Do not restore the exposed bundle or predecessor + credential. -The smaller `update-lldap-resolver-live.sh` supports the same preview/apply/check -sequence without cluster flags. It proves candidate and stored binds plus exact -configuration preservation, but does not claim MFA, readiness or predecessor -acceptance. It must not substitute for full incident acceptance. +## Postflight and predecessor denial -## Receipts and recovery +Record only status codes, readiness, timestamps, revision identifiers, and +boolean results. -Receipts contain fixed phase names, booleans, write counts and a public-state -digest; no raw responses, exceptions or free-form notes. `configured` means the -update helper completed its apply; `checked` means its no-write proof completed. -Reconcile returns `verified` only when all helper proofs pass. Passing a wrong -arbitrary password also produces denial: `supplied_predecessor_denied` is not -proof of predecessor provenance. The owner must match the input to custody. +1. Confirm privacyIDEA, LLDAP, KeyCape, Authelia, and identity-provisioner are + Ready again. Confirm the privacyIDEA health endpoint succeeds and the + resolver endpoint returns success without retaining its response body. +2. Exercise one approved KeyCape MFA path that requires the `coulomb` realm. + Record pass/fail only; never record the token or response body. +3. Using protected file inputs, prove an LDAP bind with the replacement value + succeeds and a bind with the exposed predecessor fails. The predecessor + test must be a boolean result and must not put the password in argv or + stdout. A failed predecessor bind is required evidence; do not retry it + against another provider. +4. Confirm the KeyCape owner’s existing four-class positive/negative receipt + remains associated with this resolver update. If any class lacks a receipt, + keep T05 open. +5. Securely remove the temporary workspace and record only cleanup success. -Use `--predecessor-unavailable` honestly when it cannot be produced. Reconcile -then returns `incomplete`, exit 2, even if the other proofs pass; never type a -placeholder to obtain a passing receipt. Failures and handled interruptions -return `unverified`, exit 1, with `write_attempted` showing whether a partial -change may exist. Exit 0 still leaves `incident_acceptance: unverified`: the -separate owner receipt and actual KeyCape MFA path are outside this helper. +## Abort and rollback -Stop on drift, wrong target, failed health/readiness or any unverified result. -After an attempted write, reconcile observed state through the approved owner -path before another attempt. Recover forward with an approved replacement; no -automatic rollback to an exposed predecessor. Record only sanitized evidence, -source revision, target references and operator outcome. NK-WP-0049 T03 remains -the owner-native recovery/acceptance gate; this source repair does not close it. +Abort before mutation on revision drift, missing authority, unavailable health, +uncertain workspace cleanup, or any unsafe helper output. Abort forward after +mutation on a failed resolver response, failed readiness, failed replacement +MFA, or missing predecessor denial. The exposed bundle and every exposed +predecessor are never rollback material. Recovery after a partial write must +use a newly approved replacement value and revision, not a stale local bundle. -## Historical receipts and corrections +## Completion evidence -The old `--check --predecessor-unavailable` printed PASS on 2026-09-23 when run by -Bernd Worsch from railiance01 checkout `6096c395` (receipt in NK-WP-0033). -That remains historical check evidence, with predecessor denial unproven; it -cannot establish the new revision's acceptance. Historical apply last ran on -2026-08-27 before fixes in `4a38511`. +T03 may move to done only after the helper run and cleanup receipt are recorded +by the attended operator. T05 may move to done only after the resolver’s +replacement success, predecessor denial, owner cutover receipt, and all +residual limitations are recorded as sanitized evidence. -The August account attributed missing tuning to whole-object replacement. -Native privacyIDEA 3.12.2 and source inspection corrected that interpretation on -2026-10-13: omitted fields are preserved, while sending explicit defaults can -overwrite custom tuning. The October helper therefore sends only the bind -password and type. Historic claims, default-overwriting commands, temporary-file -handling and raw `--note` receipts are superseded by this procedure. +## Revision note — 2026-08-27 + +The pinned revision of `reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh` had never completed a +run. Four defects were found by running it and are fixed in `4a38511`; see +`NK-WP-0033` T05 for the full findings. Two change how this procedure is +invoked: + +- `--predecessor-unavailable` — use when the exposed predecessor cannot be + produced. The denial bind is not attempted and the receipt records + `predecessor denial=NOT-PROVEN`. Do **not** type a placeholder at the + predecessor prompt instead: a wrong value also fails the bind, and the run + records it as a *passing* denial proof — a receipt asserting a test that never + ran. +- `--note TEXT` — operator context carried verbatim in the receipt line, so a + claim and its caveat travel together. One line, 200 characters, no + credentials. + +`TIMEOUT`, `CACHE_TIMEOUT` and `SIZELIMIT` are now sent with the resolver body +(default 5 / 120 / 500, overridable via the matching `LDAP_*` environment +variables). Before this fix, `--apply` dropped them, because a resolver write +replaces the whole object. A resolver with them unset still resolves users, but +the WebUI refuses to save or test it — so a hand repair was silently reverted by +the next run. diff --git a/docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md b/docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md deleted file mode 100644 index ae8a358..0000000 --- a/docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -# Legacy LLDAP lifecycle retirement - -Effective 2026-10-14; source reconciliation under NK-WP-0049-T02. - -The three commands below now exit 2 before inspecting arguments, discovering -credentials, or calling any external program. Their old arguments are ignored. -The two Make targets and three console commands also refuse execution. No -account, membership, password, token or deployed workload is changed by this -source retirement. Existing credentials are not revoked. - -| Retired command | Why withdrawn | Owner route | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh` | Direct creation bypassed governed lifecycle/linking; test mode used predictable passwords; admin credentials were sourced or discovered and passed through unsafe shell paths. | Ordinary onboarding through User Engine and the existing identity-provisioner. Platform-root bootstrap remains a separate reviewed IAM procedure. | -| `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh` | The “dry-run” mutated real users and passwords; pattern cleanup lacked creation provenance; generated evidence overstated verification. | An explicitly scoped owner lifecycle trial with exact created-identity receipts and actual consumer checks. | -| `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh` | Repeated execution could overwrite credentials and depended on an unsupported password GraphQL mutation. This is not an accepted provider recovery path. | Preserve existing offline custody; obtain the IAM owner's exact recovery procedure and native independent-recovery evidence under NK-WP-0049-T03. | - -## Ordinary onboarding and lifecycle - -Use the existing [public registration contract](public-registration-orchestration-contract.md): -User Engine orchestrates mailbox verification for an admitted client/tenant, -links the canonical subject, and invokes identity-provisioner. The IAM provider -owns the single-use password-setup handoff. A fresh KeyCape login establishes the -application session. No predictable password or direct administrative shell -creation is a substitute. Completed NK-WP-0025 and NK-WP-0038 record earlier -registration and scoped tenant-access delivery; those receipts do not establish -current deployment availability. Check the owner’s current service and contract -before a trial; this document does not introduce a new provisioning API. - -The [User Engine boundary contract](../canon/standards/user-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md) -keeps domain accounts/product memberships in User Engine and coarse authentication -groups, passwords and MFA in IAM. Protected lifecycle mutations require the -existing authorization path. Tenant-access changes must preserve other tenants, -the global identity and unrelated suspension state. Group removal alone does not -prove global lockout or session revocation. Public registration cannot create a -platform-root or platform-admin identity. - -## Evidence and cleanup - -The console's `lifecycle-flow-template` and `onboarding-dry-run-template` now -produce blank worksheets with false assurances. Fill them only from actual -owner/consumer results. Their existing validators check structure and assertions; -a valid document is not independent proof that a native operation happened. -Historic evidence is retained as historic evidence. - -For an authorized trial, retain exact subject/tenant/client identifiers and -creation provenance, actual issued-claims and effective-access observations, -negative access tests, and the disposition of the exact test identity and its -sessions/credentials. Retain non-secret receipt references, never token or -password values. Do not infer issued claims from a directory group list or delete -accounts selected by a name pattern. Resource transfer and cross-tenant effects -must be resolved through the lifecycle owner before offboarding. - -## Recovery and remaining work - -Keep the existing break-glass account and offline custody material until the -owner explicitly authorizes a change. This retirement neither rotates its -password nor proves it works independently of a failed identity provider. -Disabling MFA is not evidence of independent recovery. The provider dependency -limitation was already recorded in -[the KeyCape exposure map](../history/2026-08-23-keycape-exposure-dependency-map.md). -NK-WP-0049-T03 still needs the exact owner-approved recovery ceremony, separated -key/snapshot custody, failed-key refusal, native restore and cleanup receipts. - -The remaining LDAP group entry points now use the -[explicit-input maintenance adapter](../sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md) -under NK-WP-0049-T02. Group bootstrap creates only missing empty baseline groups; -service membership requires a reviewed preview and exact readback. T07 reports -structure with a nonzero incomplete exit and never reads the KeyCape config Secret. -Source and isolated native tests do not establish estate acceptance. Incident -cutover helpers, full caller/root-output inventory and owner-approved independent -recovery remain open. This retirement does not close NK-WP-0049. diff --git a/docs/nk49-phase-b-admission.example.json b/docs/nk49-phase-b-admission.example.json deleted file mode 100644 index 64bbebd..0000000 --- a/docs/nk49-phase-b-admission.example.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -{ - "_template": "UNSIGNED PROPOSAL. Placeholders in are unknown until the files exist and are reviewed. Signing it is the founder's act; this file authorizes nothing.", - "schema": "netkingdom.keycape-phase-b-attempt-admission.v1", - "namespace": "netkingdom-keycape-phase-b-attempt", - "attempt_id": "", - "not_before": "", - "not_after": "", - "abort_operator": "", - "case": "secrets15-nk49-readiness", - "issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social", - "network": { - "name": ">", - "owner": "", - "internal": true, - "alias_for_keycape": "kc.coulomb.social", - "attached_containers_exactly": ["keycape-worker", "restored-openbao", "consumer-runner"], - "egress_refusal_probe_sha256": "" - }, - "bound_receipts": { - "t18_keycape_attempt_receipt_sha256": "16d72f7c…1651 (truncated in the public record; full digest from the founder workstation)", - "restored_openbao_receipt_sha256": "4e048dee…579d (same)", - "ciphertext_sha256": "7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30" - }, - "tls": { - "decision": "", - "trust_sha256": "", - "acme_duplicate_count_confirmed_by": "railiance-cluster" - }, - "consumer": { - "client_id": "secrets-engine-openbao", - "secret_env": "KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET", - "audience": "secrets-engine-openbao", - "scope": "openbao:login", - "subject": "service:secrets-engine", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", - "roles": "secrets-engine", - "deny_scope": "openbao:admin", - "secret_custody": "" - }, - "source_closure_sha256": { - "isolated-keycape-phase-b.py": "", - "run-isolated-keycape-phase-b.sh": "", - "verify-keycape-phase-b-receipt.py": "", - "unchanged_t38_pinned_sources": "" - }, - "not_authorized": [ - "production redirect or new client grant", - "live OpenBao read of secret data", - "human login or MFA", - "any contact with railiance01 or the cluster" - ] -} diff --git a/docs/nk49-phase-b-plan.md b/docs/nk49-phase-b-plan.md deleted file mode 100644 index b5a2f21..0000000 --- a/docs/nk49-phase-b-plan.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,131 +0,0 @@ -# NK49 phase B: isolated KeyCape and restored OpenBao on one internal network - -NK-WP-0049-T43. Drafted 2026-10-24. **Preparation only. This grants no authority, -starts nothing and is not T18 acceptance.** Every number marked *proposed* is a -suggestion for the owners, not a fact. - -## Purpose - -T18 needs a live consumer login against restored dependencies. The consumer is -secrets-engine's `secrets-engine-openbao` workload (SECRETS-WP-0015-T04): it obtains -a token from KeyCape, then logs in to OpenBao with the JWT role. Today the two -recovered pieces cannot meet: - -| Piece | State | Network today | -| --- | --- | --- | -| Isolated original KeyCape (NK49 T18 attempt) | Verified 2026-10-23, receipt `16d72f7c…1651`, then destroyed | `--network none`; TLS served on its own loopback | -| Restored original OpenBao (RPF-WP-0064-T07) | Verified 2026-10-24, receipt `4e048dee…579d`, then destroyed | `--network none`; listener on `127.0.0.1:8200` only | - -OpenBao's `keycape-services` JWT auth validates against `https://kc.coulomb.social/jwks`. -A networkless OpenBao proves configuration but cannot perform the login. Phase B is the -shared network that lets it. - -## Proposed topology - -``` - docker network create --internal (no gateway, no published ports) - ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ keycape-worker alias kc.coulomb.social :443 TLS ─▶ issuer :8080 │ - │ (+ issuer sharing its namespace, as in the T18 attempt) │ - │ │ - │ restored OpenBao alias bao-restored :8200 (unsealed, same window)│ - │ │ - │ consumer runner (secrets-engine owned; the only client) │ - └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ - no other attachment · egress shown refused before admission -``` - -## Who owns what - -| Step | Owner | Notes | -| --- | --- | --- | -| Create and tear down the internal network | *Proposed:* railiance-platform | Its design stub already says phase B is "a single `docker network create --internal` network". One creator avoids a double teardown. | -| Restore and unseal original OpenBao, keep it up for the window | railiance-platform | Adapter runs phase A, then does **not** tear down when phase B is admitted in the same window (its doc). Needs a listener on the internal address, not loopback only. | -| Start the isolated original KeyCape on that network | NetKingdom (this plan) | Needs a new variant of the T18 machinery; see below. | -| Consumer login: KeyCape exchange, OpenBao JWT login, `openbao:admin` refusal, session revocation | secrets-engine | SECRETS-WP-0015-T04. | -| ACME issuance for `kc.coulomb.social` | railiance-cluster | Existing owner of the T33 reissue. | -| Window, abort, and every signature | founder | One window, several admissions. | - -## What NetKingdom must change (verified from current source) - -The T18 machinery is pinned: `prepare-isolated-keycape.py` lists `isolated-keycape.py`, -`isolated-keycape-session.py`, `run-isolated-keycape.sh`, `isolated-lldap.py`, -`identity-bundle.py`, `verify-identity.py` and others as the reviewed source closure, -and the T38 review and T40 admission bind their hashes. **They must stay unedited.** -Phase B is therefore a new module beside them, with its own review. - -Facts read from the code that force changes: - -1. `isolated-keycape-session.py` launches the worker with `--network none` and - `--add-host kc.coulomb.social:127.0.0.1`. Phase B needs the worker on the internal - network with `--network-alias kc.coulomb.social`. -2. `isolated-keycape.py` `inspect_session` refuses any worker whose `NetworkMode` is - not `none`, and checks that dependent containers have `container:`. A phase B - variant must accept exactly one named internal network and verify, by inspection, - that it is `Internal=true`, that its attached set is exactly the admitted containers, - and that the worker has a subnet route but **no default route**. -3. The probes assert that only `lo` exists and `/proc/net/route` has one line. In phase B - an interface and a subnet route exist by design, so "no external route" must be - proved differently: no default route, `Internal=true`, and refused egress probes - (to a public address and to a name outside the admitted aliases). -4. `verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py` expects the `none` topology and must have a - phase B counterpart, so the receipt can still be verified independently. -5. The T40 admission window ended 2026-10-24T05:00Z. Phase B needs a **new founder - signature**; nothing signed before carries over. - -Proposed new files (names are suggestions): `isolated-keycape-phase-b.py`, -`run-isolated-keycape-phase-b.sh`, `verify-keycape-phase-b-receipt.py`, tests, and a -packet section. Effort is moderate to large and touches the most sensitive machinery -here, so it should get the same review depth as T38, not a quick patch. - -## Preconditions and ordering (proposed) - -1. Owners each pass their own preflight (RPF-WP-0064 adapter, the secrets-engine - selector with `--admission`, NK49 `prepare`-style validation). -2. One founder window, at most 24 h *(owner admission rules)*. OpenBao's own deadline is - 45 minutes from its first custody input, so **OpenBao is started last among the - long-lived pieces** and the consumer run follows immediately. -3. railiance-platform creates the network and shows egress refusal. -4. NK49 starts the isolated KeyCape (age key, TLS key and trust in the founder's - terminal, as in the T18 ceremony). -5. railiance-platform restores and unseals OpenBao onto the same network. -6. secrets-engine runs the consumer login. -7. Teardown in reverse; each owner returns a safe receipt. The network creator removes - the network last and shows it gone. - -## Evidence and claims - -Returned: NK49 phase B receipt (verified independently), railiance-platform's phase B -receipt, secrets-engine's consumer result. Together they would show, with no secret -values: the original issuer and signing key served over TLS on the internal network; -`openbao:login` accepted; `openbao:admin` refused; wrong secret refused; a session -revoked; egress refused; cleanup of containers, tmpfs and network. - -Not claimed: production continuity or redirect, new grants, a live OpenBao read of -secret data (`platform/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao` stays metadata only), -human login through Authelia, or owner acceptance. T18 also needs its owner acceptance. - -## Decisions (answered 2026-10-27; decision `e4db6c9f`) and remaining owner items - -Founder answers: 1 railiance-platform creates the network; 2 reissue via `letsencrypt-prod` once railiance-cluster confirms the duplicate count (no self-signed, no retained key); 5 one workload consumer suffices, no Authelia. Item 3 (secret custody) is secrets-engine's to propose and item 4 (ISRG trust) is confirmed in the owner rehearsal. The answers authorize nothing; windows and signatures stay separate. - -1. **Network creator.** railiance-platform (proposed) or NetKingdom? -2. **TLS identity.** The T18 attempt reissued `kc.coulomb.social` through - `letsencrypt-prod` and destroyed the key. Phase B needs a certificate again: reissue - (consumes the duplicate-certificate allowance, limit 5 per week; railiance-cluster - should confirm the count) or retain the key from the earlier attempt (a custody - decision). No self-signed substitute is allowed (decision `9f9d0d88`). -3. **Consumer secret custody.** The consumer's client secret - `keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client` is in the backup's KeyCape secrets. How does - the consumer runner receive it without the agent, argv or files seeing it? This is - secrets-engine's design to propose; NetKingdom must not hand it over implicitly. -4. **Trust in OpenBao.** The restored OpenBao must trust the ISRG Root X1 chain to - fetch `/jwks`. Confirm in the owner's rehearsal rather than assume. -5. **Scope.** Is this one workload consumer enough for T18's "selected current - consumer", or must a human-login consumer also be admitted? This plan assumes the - workload consumer and does not require Authelia in phase B. - -## Unsigned admission - -`docs/nk49-phase-b-admission.example.json` is a template with placeholders. It is not -signed, names no real hashes for unwritten files and authorizes nothing. diff --git a/docs/openbao-unseal-custody-models.md b/docs/openbao-unseal-custody-models.md index e829926..771cf6d 100644 --- a/docs/openbao-unseal-custody-models.md +++ b/docs/openbao-unseal-custody-models.md @@ -32,13 +32,8 @@ during bootstrap and rebuild. uninitialized (init JSON written straight into the age-custody secrets dir), replays unseal shares stdin-to-stdin, verifies post-unseal state, and emits non-secret `openbao_initialized` / `openbao_post_unseal_verified` evidence. - The current adapter additionally requires an explicit `lab` profile, an - owner-admitted `KUBECONFIG`, `OPENBAO_EXPECTED_CLUSTER_UID`, and owned private - custody paths. Existing init files are never replaced; diagnostics and shares - remain contained. `--dry-run` is a non-mutating plan without cluster reads. - Platform configuration is a separate owner operation; - `OPENBAO_RUN_CONFIGURE_INITIAL=1` is refused. The July greenfield receipt is - historical, not execution proof for this October revision. + Set `OPENBAO_RUN_CONFIGURE_INITIAL=1` to chain `railiance-platform: make + openbao-configure-initial`. - Enables **unattended rebuild test cycles** on a 3-node slate. - **Not** production trust posture — use to prove S1→S3→SSH engine automation, then graduate to stronger models. diff --git a/docs/platform-root-custody.md b/docs/platform-root-custody.md index 6eb2493..1aea1ed 100644 --- a/docs/platform-root-custody.md +++ b/docs/platform-root-custody.md @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ deliberately short, closed, and enumerated here rather than left to judgement: - `platform-root`'s own password and TOTP recovery codes - OpenBao unseal shares and root token -- the existing `break-glass` account password under offline custody; the old creator is [retired](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md), and independent recovery remains to be verified +- the `break-glass` account password (`sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh`) Anything on that list in `operators/` would be a circular dependency: you would need the store to reach the credential that opens the store. Anything *not* on diff --git a/docs/playwright-registration.md b/docs/playwright-registration.md deleted file mode 100644 index 49d8b1f..0000000 --- a/docs/playwright-registration.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,189 +0,0 @@ -# Playwright registration owner contract - -Source preparation under NK-WP-0050; live custody, rollout and consumer acceptance -remain open. Implements the registration part of RPF-WP-0056 and -CUST-WP-0080-T05. The existing browser SecurityCaseType remains unchanged: its -HTTPS/standard-scope admission does not cover this loopback/custom-scope use. -No case acceptance record is fabricated or borrowed from Forgejo/OpenBao. - -## Prepare the non-secret records - -Run `python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-registration.py` for the public -client, or add `--agents ` for the complete proposed -Playwright agent inventory. The latter is an array with one object per existing -registered identity: - -```json -[ - { - "agent_id": "test-agent", - "service_subject": "service:test-agent:platform", - "tenant": "tenant:test", - "identity_record": "synthetic/agent-record.json" - } -] -``` - -This example is synthetic; it is not an admitted consumer. The identity owner -must confirm each real record, subject, tenant and agent assignment. A reference -string is not evidence of registration. Initial eligibility already covers all -identified platform humans and coding agents; no new membership decision is -needed. The compiler does not provision identities or retrieve/mint credentials. - -| Field | Public human client | Each coding agent | -| --- | --- | --- | -| client ID | `playwright-cli` | `playwright-agent-` | -| grant | authorization code, public PKCE | client credentials, confidential | -| audience | `playwright-kubernetes` | `playwright-kubernetes` | -| scope | `openid profile groups playwright:connect` | `playwright:connect` | -| redirect | exact `http://127.0.0.1:18764/callback` | none | -| subject/tenant | existing directory user and tenant | exact registered subject/tenant supplied by owner | -| role | existing human roles | only `coding-agent` | -| lifetime | existing issuer setting, explicit and at most one hour | 15 minutes | - -The public client has no per-client lifetime override; KeyCape supports that only -for client-credentials clients. Existing issuer lifetime outside the accepted -bound refuses preparation and needs owner reconciliation; this tool does not -change every client's lifetime. No public tenant override or MFA opt-out is added. -The callback, dedicated audience and custom scope match Platform's candidate. -The resource uses access tokens; ID tokens retain the client audience. - -Each agent gets a distinct proposed env binding from -`keycape--client`, key `client-secret`, to -`KEYCAPE__CLIENT_SECRET`. These names describe a -proposed delivery contract, **not existing Secrets or admitted custody**. Platform -must bind an exact OpenBao/ESO and consumer delivery route with its own source -task and acceptance. No existing OpenBao client or secret is reused. Secret -values must never enter this identity-reference file, Git, command arguments, -coordination messages or receipts. - -## Registry and activation boundary - -The pure `prepare_registry(secret, identities, operation)` adapter reuses -`keycape-client.py`'s byte-preserving insertion/removal. It validates the entire -inventory first, refuses differing existing records, ambiguous YAML, duplicate -IDs, shared secret references and unreviewed registrations for this dedicated -audience. An identical registration is a no-op. A separate existing OpenBao -registration for the same agent subject is preserved, with its distinct audience -and secret reference. Unrelated configuration, including signing material, is -unchanged. The encoded result contains private registry data and must stay inside -the protected activation process; the CLI never accepts or emits that registry. - -This is not a live apply command. NK-WP-0050-T02 must finish the exact owner -activation path using existing registry/Deployment operations: - -1. Bind verified identity inventory and source digests to the proposal. Obtain - the governed per-agent custody and delivery references from Platform. -2. Pin current cluster, issuer image and object identities. Read the registry - only within the existing protected owner execution path. Run the actual - pinned KeyCape `check-config` on live and proposed configurations, with the - exact Deployment env names and policy-store mode; suppress private diagnostics. -3. Prepare UID/resource-version/data-bound registry mutation and exact env - bindings. Preserve all unrelated data and authentication methods. Retain - created-only provenance, restart prerequisites, readback and guarded rollback - before proposing any live action. A compare-and-swap conflict means reconcile, - never replay a stale whole registry. -4. Obtain the scoped live action disposition under the existing supervision - rules, execute its exact revision, verify config/env/image/readiness and - existing human/service login. No new runtime authority comes from this file. - -`operation=remove` is an exact inventory removal proposal, not automatic -rollback: the activation adapter must remove only registrations it created, -preserve pre-existing identical entries and refuse intervening drift. Keep -custody material until recovery/retention requirements are met. Disabling/removing -registration stops new issuance after the issuer loads the change; issued JWTs -remain valid until expiry, and established connections need separate termination -through the transport owner. No immediate global revocation is claimed. - -## Verification and completion - -### Guarded activation patch preparation - -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-activation.py` now implements the private proposal, -ordered patch preparation and readback checks for the existing protected owner -path. It has no CLI or Kubernetes connection. `build` takes original Secret and -Deployment API objects, the complete identity-reference inventory and the exact -reviewed source revision. Its result contains the private original registry and -must remain inside that execution path. Only `summary` is a public receipt. -Source revision and digest bindings do not constitute an approval or custody grant. - -Inventory checks use the issuer's effective audience, including its client-ID -fallback when `audience` is absent/empty. A second issuer environment variable -pointing to the same proposed agent Secret/key is refused even if its name differs. -These checks do not replace Platform's wider custody/consumer isolation review. - -The adapter admits one replica, `Recreate`, the pinned immutable KeyCape image, -the expected registry mount and explicit environment bindings. It preserves -unrelated settings and refuses differing bindings. `check_registry` pins the -native verifier's binary digest, checks both configurations using their exact -environment-variable names and policy-store mode, passes private input on stdin, -clears ambient environment overrides and contains diagnostics. The operator must -separately establish verifier compatibility with the deployed image; a locally -built verifier is not production artifact admission. - -The source deployment cannot atomically update its registry and environment: -an environment edit starts a rollout, and pending authorization codes are -process-local. The prepared sequence therefore requires an explicit exclusive -maintenance window with a planned authentication interruption: - -1. `stop`: bind the original object UIDs, resource versions, data and complete - Deployment spec; require the original single replica Ready; scale to zero. -2. Wait for the controller to observe that generation with zero replicas and - for **every** pod consuming `keycape-config` to disappear. Supply an unfiltered, - complete `sso` PodList; terminating pods still count. Direct/projected volumes, - env references and init/ephemeral containers are checked. -3. `registry`: conditionally write the exact proposed registry data while stopped. -4. `bindings`: conditionally add the agent environment bindings while still stopped. -5. `resume`: after fresh matching registry/spec and quiescence checks, restore one - replica. Then the protected executor must verify generation, exact pod/image, - readiness, real issuance and existing human/service login. Scaling is not that - acceptance proof. - -Fresh reads of **both** objects precede every `propose_step`. Each patch tests -the target UID, resourceVersion and complete data/spec before replacement. Use -`verify_response` on the API response and subsequent fresh GET, retaining each -sanitized receipt. Refuse and stop on any mismatch or unknown outcome; no automatic -retry or stale whole-registry replay. Kubernetes offers no cross-object transaction, -so concurrent issuer writers must be excluded by the owner maintenance procedure. - -Rollback uses the retained original proposal, never a newly inferred baseline: -`rollback-stop`, observed quiescence, `rollback-registry`, `rollback-bindings`, -`rollback-resume`, then the same native readiness/login verification. Exact -original/candidate matching preserves registrations and bindings that predated -this proposal. Any unrelated intervening data/spec change refuses rollback for -owner reconciliation. No completed changes means no rollback outage. Retain -private recovery state after failure; the adapter neither writes it to disk nor -destroys credentials. Token expiry and connection-termination limits above remain. - -Before wiring this into live execution, T02 still requires real identity/custody -references, the protected executor and recovery-state custody, cluster/current -image pinning, the exact supervisor disposition, and source/GitOps reconciliation. -Do not invoke the generic browser helper with a fabricated `--case-acceptance`. - -Activation tests use the independent `jsonpatch` Python package to apply RFC 6902 -patches to synthetic API objects (test prerequisites: PyYAML and jsonpatch). -They check ordered/partial recovery, created-only preservation, stale writes, -quiescence, revision/readback refusal and verifier containment. Controller state -is simulated; neither these tests nor native `check-config` replace live API and -issuer acceptance. - -### Registration and consumer checks - -Python tests exercise preservation, add/no-op/remove, lifetime bounds, identity -conflicts, distinct credentials and contained invalid-input output. The native -Go fixture `tests/playwright_registration_native_test.go` is copied into a -disposable committed KeyCape checkout at `src/internal/authclient/` and consumes -the merged synthetic configuration through `PLAYWRIGHT_SYNTHETIC_CONFIG`. -It loads the config and domain registrations, performs native token/JWKS -exchanges for both client kinds, and checks dedicated claims, wrong secret, -scope, audience, signature, PKCE and callback refusals. It uses synthetic users -and seeded authorization sessions; it does not prove upstream login, production -image compatibility, native Kubernetes CEL validation or consumer eligibility. - -T03 needs actual issuer issuance and native API allow/deny receipts, one real -human and one real registered coding agent independently running Platform's -consumer command and provider responsive/keyboard trial, renewal, revocation and -active connection termination. Cluster authentication and ops-bridge transport -remain their owners' implementations. Platform/provider must accept the receipts -before managed discovery is published. Same-image abrupt provider recovery is -already evidenced; cross-version rollback is still explicitly unproven. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/case-1.2.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/case-1.2.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 8c7c4bc..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/case-1.2.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: 'true' - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps - consumer_namespace: forgejo diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/README.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6d1dbaf..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -# Proposed OIDC browser relying-party 1.2 package - -This package supplements the exact proposed 1.2 type and Forgejo reference design. It is source-only and unimplemented. Its examples are proposed, including Forgejo; normal admission must refuse them until the separate implemented-type and canonical-case acceptance requirements are discharged. Completing this package or acknowledging its type does not accept a canonical case or authorize native work. Immutable acknowledged 1.1 history remains unchanged. - -## Purpose - -Register exact-redirect browser OIDC relying parties through KeyCape, with groups enforced by the consumer. Confidential clients add a custody path, two reader policies, the existing KeyCape ESO role and a sixth dedicated consumer ESO reader role. consumer_namespace is explicit and independently constrained; a consuming service name does not establish its namespace or workload identity. Public clients require no secret materialization. - -## Threat model - -Exact HTTPS redirects prohibit wildcard, query, fragment and plaintext HTTP. Requested scopes always include groups, but KeyCape issues identity tokens without a per-client group gate: each consumer must enforce its required claims. MFA pinning is client configuration, not proof of a human MFA session. Secret custody parameters and reader identities cannot be overridden by case authors. - -The namespace SecretStore references a dedicated automount-disabled service account rather than forgejo/default. ESO's broadly privileged common controller remains trusted; this is routing and identity attribution, not cryptographic controller isolation. The supported v0.16.1 TokenRequest path requests a 600-second token; its legacy fallback must not acquire static tokens. The proposed OpenBao role has a 900-second maximum token TTL and no default policy. Neither rendered claims nor source tests prove native bindings, token audience, capabilities, delivery readiness or revocation. - -## Alternatives considered - -Retain 1.1 with the observed Forgejo/runner workload ServiceAccount forgejo/default: preserves existing history but does not express the dedicated reader boundary. This describes observed workload identity only; the historical 1.1 consumer OpenBao policy was unbound and no historical default-SA OpenBao reader binding is claimed. Reuse the KeyCape reader role: combines provider and consumer identities unnecessarily. Adopt a separate controller: potentially reduces shared trust but adds infrastructure outside this bounded proposal. Proposed 1.2 retains shared-controller trust explicitly while adding the sixth dedicated role; no new grant follows from this source design. - -## Known limits - -All native bound claims remain unconfirmed and execution remains false. HTTP OpenBao transport, shared ESO controller trust, legacy fallback, retained target Secrets and later dependency handling require owner verification before any separately approved session. A SecretStore/SA deletion alone does not revoke issued tokens. Recovery may remove only authenticated case-created resources with unchanged UID/ownership, must preserve preexisting exact matches, revert consumer references first and revoke issued tokens or verify expiry before declaring deactivation. Owner adapter and global verifier observations remain required. No human login, MFA, credentials, native materialization or first-case completion is claimed. - -## Verification - -Run the existing owner full-package validator against this directory, then run its tests. Tests use the existing owner validator/composer and actual declarations; they prove source schema, examples, deterministic rendering, six-object confidential versus public boundaries, refused mutation/parameters, normal admission refusal and bounded rollback ordering. They do not contact native services. - -```sh -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-type docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2 -NET_KINGDOM_ROOT=/home/worsch/net-kingdom python3 -m pytest docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/tests -``` - -## Governance and recording - -SecurityCaseTypes section 3 requires the complete package and a separate NetKingdom source-owner review before type acknowledgment recording. Sections 4/5 require an implemented type for canonical case acceptance; section 6 requires a genuine new acknowledgment for the sixth role/authentication path. The old 1.1 acknowledgment is not inherited. Reference-migration source approval is a separate owner receipt; canonical 1.2 stays proposed without acceptance fields or phase acceptance. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/examples/example-public-portal.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/examples/example-public-portal.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 6b349fa..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/examples/example-public-portal.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: example-public-portal - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: example-owner - parameters: - client_id: example-portal - display_name: Example portal - redirect_uris: https://portal.example.invalid/auth/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: public - mfa_required: 'false' - access_groups: example-portal-users - consuming_service: example-portal - consumer_owner_repo: net-kingdom - consumer_namespace: example-portal diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/examples/forgejo.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/examples/forgejo.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 8c7c4bc..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/examples/forgejo.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: 'true' - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps - consumer_namespace: forgejo diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/tests/test_source_contract.py b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/tests/test_source_contract.py deleted file mode 100644 index b1ae417..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/tests/test_source_contract.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -"""Source-only contract checks against the actual owner validator and declarations.""" -import copy, importlib.util, os, sys -from pathlib import Path -import pytest, yaml -PACKAGE=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -OWNER=Path(os.environ.get("NET_KINGDOM_ROOT", "/home/worsch/net-kingdom")) -VP=OWNER/"tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py" -sys.path.insert(0,str(VP.parent)) -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator",VP) -v=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);sys.modules[spec.name]=v;spec.loader.exec_module(v) -TYPE=yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"type.yaml").read_text()) -FORGEJO=yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"examples/forgejo.yaml").read_text()) -paths,discovery=v.discover_declarations(TYPE,OWNER.parent) -DECLS,loading=v.composer.load_declarations(paths) -def render(case): - issues,result=v.render_case(case,TYPE,DECLS,require_implemented=False) - assert not v.has_errors(discovery+loading+issues) - return result - -def test_full_package_and_proposed_boundary(): - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_type(TYPE,PACKAGE)) - assert TYPE["spec"]["status"]=="proposed" - assert FORGEJO["spec"]["status"]=="proposed" - assert "acceptance" not in FORGEJO["spec"] - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(FORGEJO,TYPE)) - -def test_acknowledged_is_still_not_implemented_admission(): - acknowledged=copy.deepcopy(TYPE);acknowledged["spec"]["status"]="acknowledged" - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(FORGEJO,acknowledged)) - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("example",sorted((PACKAGE/"examples").glob("*.yaml"))) -def test_examples_valid_deterministic_and_nonexecuting(example): - case=yaml.safe_load(example.read_text()) - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_case(case,TYPE,require_implemented=False)) - first=render(case);assert first==render(case) - assert first["execution"]["permitted"] is False - assert first["composition"]["execution"]["permitted"] is False - -def test_sixth_role_is_exact_consumer_identity_and_namespace(): - case=copy.deepcopy(FORGEJO);case["spec"]["parameters"]["consumer_namespace"]="forgejo-preview" - r=render(case);objects={x["id"]:x for x in r["materialization"]} - assert len(objects)==6 - consumer=yaml.safe_load(objects["consumer-eso-role"]["body"]) - assert consumer["bound_service_account_names"]==["forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso"] - assert consumer["bound_service_account_namespaces"]==["forgejo-preview"] - assert consumer["audience"]=="openbao" - assert consumer["token_policies"]==["workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo"] - assert consumer["token_no_default_policy"] is True - provider=yaml.safe_load(objects["eso-role"]["body"]) - assert provider["bound_service_account_names"]!=consumer["bound_service_account_names"] - -def test_original_five_structural_bodies_unchanged(): - old=yaml.safe_load((OWNER/"security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml").read_text()) - case=yaml.safe_load((OWNER/"security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml").read_text()) - issues,before=v.render_case(case,old,DECLS,require_implemented=False) - assert not v.has_errors(issues) - after={x["id"]:x["body"] for x in render(FORGEJO)["materialization"]} - for item in before["materialization"]:assert item["body"]==after[item["id"]] - -def test_public_has_no_secret_or_delivery_hooks(): - r=render(yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"examples/example-public-portal.yaml").read_text())) - assert [x["id"] for x in r["materialization"]]==["catalog-entry"] - assert not {"mint-secret","deliver-secret","deliver-consumer-secret","bind-env"}&{x["id"] for x in r["follow_through"]} - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("key,value",[("consumer_namespace",None),("consumer_namespace","default/other"),("consumer_namespace","x"*64),("consuming_service","x"*64),("redirect_uris","http://portal.invalid/callback"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/*"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/callback?x=y"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/callback#x"),("allowed_scopes","openid,email"),("consumer_reader_service_account","default"),("secret_path","other/path")]) -def test_invalid_or_unsettable_parameter_refused(key,value): - case=copy.deepcopy(FORGEJO) - if value is None:case["spec"]["parameters"].pop(key) - else:case["spec"]["parameters"][key]=value - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(case,TYPE,require_implemented=False)) - -def test_created_only_role_recovery_precedes_policy_and_needs_revocation(): - rollback=render(FORGEJO)["rollback"];ids=[x["reverses"] for x in rollback] - assert ids.index("consumer-eso-role") - --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration) - auth: operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, - and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator - session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps - of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, - authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins - and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review - R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape - check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) - before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1).' - - id: deliver-consumer-secret - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso - (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client - with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}. - Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller - RBAC before any owner-approved apply. - auth: Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates - to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} with - a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains - trusted - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; - dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never - Secret values. - - id: hand-over - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - entry_point: configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} - and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require - one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes - auth: the consumer owner's own deployment path - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} - returns the login page - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect - returns an OAuth error - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: client_type == confidential - check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: client_type == confidential - check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants - read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only) - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the - accepted case added - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) - requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no - secret value)' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status - only) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: mfa_required == true - check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered - client (non-secret client view) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact - dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value - read' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner - {consumer_owner_repo}) - - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created - ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and - dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared - target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is - not immediate OpenBao token revocation. - - reverses: register-client - action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id} - - reverses: bind-env - when: client_type == confidential - action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, - after register-client is reversed - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target - - reverses: mint-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret - is reversed' - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod - (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only - if no other case uses {access_groups} - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, - after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret) - - reverses: eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role - - reverses: consumer-eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, - before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or - prove expiration before declaring deactivation. - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client - acceptance: - accepted_by: - - owner - - founder - risk_class: medium diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/validation.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index 62a91a9..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -{ - "package_path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2", - "status": "proposed", - "type_implemented": false, - "canonical_case_accepted": false, - "files": [ - { - "path": "README.md", - "sha256": "94dfe344f0e79cffea239612b0f7232f8bcc800d39e3b5aee6e1cad8cb2d5ee7", - "content_base64": 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"c1.lightweight-sso": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration" - }, - "composition_digest": "sha256:f51e45eab2f2c15c93e2f7b8ef7d8fcc1daf1059da5749429ff5678b45c5214f", - "execution": { - "mode": "plan-only", - "permitted": false, - "reason": "Composition does not authorize or perform provider execution." - }, - "execution_steps": [ - { - "capabilities": [ - "c1.lightweight-sso" - ], - "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration", - "entry_point": { - "description": "Add or remove exactly one client in the live KeyCape client registry without exporting secret values: contained kubectl, cluster and issuer pins, byte-preserving merge, compare-and-swap, read-back. Replaces the per-client helpers beside it. Field rules follow key-cape's canonical model (KEY-WP-0028). Modes: inspect, dry-run, apply; operations add and remove.", - "invocation": "keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --expected-uid --expected-resource-version ", - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py", - "type": "cli-sequence" - }, - "executor_owner": "net-kingdom", - "order": 1, - "parameters": { - "allowed_scopes": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "openid,profile,email,groups" - }, - "client_id": { - "sensitivity": "operational", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "forgejo" - }, - "client_type": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "confidential" - }, - "display_name": { - "sensitivity": "public", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "Forgejo source forge" - }, - "mfa_required": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "true" - }, - "redirect_uris": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback" - } - }, - "readiness_obligations": [ - { - "checks": [ - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.", - "id": "client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect" - }, - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.", - "id": "client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect" - } - ], - "state": "tenant_onboarding_trust" - } - ], - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "requires_trust": [ - { - "readiness_checks": [], - "state": "runtime_secret_trust" - }, - { - "readiness_checks": [], - "state": "runtime_identity_trust" - } - ], - "satisfies_trust": [ - { - "readiness_checks": [ - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.", - "id": "client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect" - }, - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.", - "id": "client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect" - } - ], - "state": "tenant_onboarding_trust" - } - ] - } - ], - "initial_trust": [ - "runtime_identity_trust", - "runtime_secret_trust" - ], - "kind": "SecurityScenarioComposition", - "planned_final_trust": [ - "runtime_identity_trust", - "runtime_secret_trust", - "tenant_onboarding_trust" - ], - "requested_capabilities": [ - "c1.lightweight-sso" - ], - "responsibility_map": [ - { - "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration", - "netkingdom_orchestrates": "Supply the case's validated, non-secret client fields.", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "repo_owns": "Live registry change for exactly this client, its idempotency and removal; field rules are key-cape's canonical model.", - "resource_kind": "identities", - "resources": [ - "oidc:static-clients" - ] - }, - { - "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration", - "netkingdom_orchestrates": "Choose scopes and MFA posture per SecurityCaseType.", - "owner": "key-cape", - "repo_owns": "Enforce exact redirect URIs, allowed scopes and the MFA pin at authorization time.", - "resource_kind": "roles_scopes_policies", - "resources": [ - "iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists" - ] - } - ], - "scenario": "scenario:case:forgejo-netkingdom-oidc" - }, - "digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "execution": { - "permitted": false - }, - "follow_through": [ - { - "attended": true, - "attended_justification": "The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential of its own and an admitted path.", - "auth": "operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent", - "entry_point": "identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers; members exactly forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)", - "id": "ensure-groups", - "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned", - "entry_point": "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "id": "mint-secret", - "lane": "keycape-client-secret-generate", - "owner": "railiance-platform", - "value_handling": "generated_in_custody", - "warden_executes": true - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo; no value leaves custody", - "entry_point": "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "id": "deliver-secret", - "owner": "railiance-platform", - "ready_check": "the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": true, - "attended_justification": "A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if the binding is missing.", - "auth": "operator kube credentials for namespace sso", - "entry_point": "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-forgejo-client", - "id": "bind-env", - "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": true, - "attended_justification": "The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client loses sign-in (R1).", - "auth": "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso", - "entry_point": "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)", - "id": "register-client", - "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo with a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains trusted", - "entry_point": "Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/forgejo. Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller RBAC before any owner-approved apply.", - "id": "deliver-consumer-secret", - "owner": "railiance-apps", - "ready_check": "Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never Secret values.", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "the consumer owner's own deployment path", - "entry_point": "configure forgejo with issuer https://kc.coulomb.social, client forgejo and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, and make it require one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim before sign-in completes", - "id": "hand-over", - "owner": "railiance-apps", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - } - ], - "kind": "SecurityCaseRender", - "materialization": [ - { - "body": "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand", - "id": "client-secret-path", - "kind": "kv_path", - "template": "platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n", - "description": "KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.", - "id": "keycape-reader-policy", - "kind": "openbao_policy", - "template": "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso" - }, - { - "body": "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n", - "description": "The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.", - "id": "consumer-reader-policy", - "kind": "openbao_policy", - "template": "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "auth: kubernetes\nbound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso]\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\ntoken_ttl: 15m\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\n", - "description": "The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only.", - "id": "eso-role", - "kind": "openbao_role", - "template": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "auth: kubernetes\nbound_service_account_names: [forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso]\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [forgejo]\naudience: openbao\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo]\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\ntoken_ttl: 15m\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\n", - "description": "Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity. Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic controller isolation is claimed.", - "id": "consumer-eso-role", - "kind": "openbao_role", - "template": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "id: forgejo-keycape-client\nowner_repo: key-cape\nwarden_executes: false\nrisk: high\nstatus: active once verification passes\nworkload_ref: applicable, name forgejo, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred\npath_template: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\nfield: CLIENT_SECRET\ndelegation: native, intended_owner key-cape\nrotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven\n", - "description": "One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.", - "id": "catalog-entry", - "kind": "catalog_entry", - "template": "forgejo-keycape-client" - } - ], - "rollback": [ - { - "action": "remove the OIDC source for forgejo from forgejo (owner railiance-apps)", - "reverses": "hand-over" - }, - { - "action": "After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is not immediate OpenBao token revocation.", - "reverses": "deliver-consumer-secret" - }, - { - "action": "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for forgejo", - "reverses": "register-client" - }, - { - "action": "remove env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed", - "reverses": "bind-env" - }, - { - "action": "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client and its target", - "reverses": "deliver-secret" - }, - { - "action": "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed", - "reverses": "mint-secret" - }, - { - "action": "identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers", - "reverses": "ensure-groups" - }, - { - "action": "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)", - "reverses": "client-secret-path" - }, - { - "action": "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo", - "reverses": "eso-role" - }, - { - "action": "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso, after eso-role", - "reverses": "keycape-reader-policy" - }, - { - "action": "Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or prove expiration before declaring deactivation.", - "reverses": "consumer-eso-role" - }, - { - "action": "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo", - "reverses": "consumer-reader-policy" - }, - { - "action": "remove catalog entry forgejo-keycape-client", - "reverses": "catalog-entry" - } - ], - "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2", - "verification": [ - { - "check": "GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and each of https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback returns the login page", - "expect": "present", - "id": "authorize-accepts-redirects", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error", - "expect": "deny", - "id": "authorize-refuses-other-redirect", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "expect": "deny", - "id": "custody-denied-to-default", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo (capabilities check only)", - "expect": "allow", - "id": "custody-allowed-to-consumer", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "LLDAP groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added", - "expect": "present", - "id": "groups-present", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "forgejo's OIDC source for forgejo (owner railiance-apps) requires one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)", - "expect": "present", - "id": "consumer-enforces-groups", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only)", - "expect": "present", - "id": "secret-delivered", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "keycape-client.py inspect for forgejo shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)", - "expect": "present", - "id": "mfa-pinned", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "forgejo SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value read", - "expect": "present", - "id": "consumer-secret-delivered", - "reads_secret_value": false - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/review-boundary.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/review-boundary.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0f3df18..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/review-boundary.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -# Proposed successor 1.2 review boundary - -Review type-1.2.yaml and case-1.2.yaml as proposed source alongside the consumer owner's concrete delivery design and CCR42 body. Existing accepted1.1 type/case and full run source remain unchanged. Adding a dedicated consumer role changes the structural inventory from five to six; no structural-equality shortcut may inherit old acceptance for that sixth object. The old five bodies compare exactly unchanged. Proposed type passes current native owner validator; direct source render passes current composition resolver. Mason intentionally refuses proposed source until acknowledgment, and no fixture acceptance is a founder receipt. - -Exact owner returns must agree on consumer namespace/SA/audience, common ESO trust, policy and role naming, generic TokenRequest semantics, created-only rollback, consumer group enforcement, and full current follow-through provider/source pins. Existing native per-owner evidence and session/revocation/machine-descriptor gates remain pending. Source preparation creates no policy, role, service account, value or client and marks no case materialized/live. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/type-1.2.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/type-1.2.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 89b9f6a..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/type-1.2.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,442 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCaseType -spec: - id: oidc-browser-relying-party - version: '1.2' - status: proposed - title: Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service - purpose: 'Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom - (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups the - service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client secret - minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout scripts - in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038).' - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: operational - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape. - - name: display_name - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[^\n\r]{1,80}$ - sensitivity: public - description: Name shown on the sign-in page. - - name: redirect_uris - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^https://[^*?#\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\s,]+)*$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: 'Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain - http, no query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses ''*'' and ''?'' at startup, - and OAuth 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1).' - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - enum: - - openid,profile,email,groups - - openid,email,groups - - openid,profile,groups - - openid,groups - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups, - because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups only - for that scope (key-cape type review R2). - - name: client_type - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - enum: - - confidential - - public - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public - for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only). - - name: mfa_required - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - enum: - - 'true' - - 'false' - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: '"true" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants - administrative or owner rights. "false" is not "no MFA": the client then carries - no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA policy. A - renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which would skip that - policy (key-cape type review R3).' - - name: access_groups - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$ - sensitivity: operational - description: 'Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles. - Created if absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to - any authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming service - enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting; key-cape - type review R2).' - - name: initial_members - type: string - required: false - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$ - sensitivity: operational - description: Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are - directory usernames, never secrets. - - name: consuming_service - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$ - sensitivity: operational - description: The service that signs users in with this client. - - name: consumer_owner_repo - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$ - sensitivity: operational - description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration. - - name: consumer_namespace - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: Consumer namespace for namespaced ESO TokenRequest reader; actual - workload owner must confirm; never infer from service name. - - name: issuer - type: string - case_settable: false - default: https://kc.coulomb.social - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type. - composition: - authority: netkingdom - initial_trust: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - capabilities: - - c1.lightweight-sso - providers: - c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration - parameter_bindings: - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required - materialization: - - id: client-secret-path - kind: kv_path - when: client_type == confidential - template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - body: field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand - - id: keycape-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: client_type == confidential - template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso - body: "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n capabilities\ - \ = [\"read\"]\n}}\n" - description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, - parent or sibling access. - - id: consumer-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: client_type == confidential - template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - body: "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n capabilities\ - \ = [\"read\"]\n}}\n" - description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent - or sibling access. - - id: eso-role - kind: openbao_role - when: client_type == confidential - template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - body: 'auth: kubernetes - - bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets] - - bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets] - - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - - token_no_default_policy: true - - token_ttl: 15m - - token_max_ttl: 15m - - ' - description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service - account only. - - id: consumer-eso-role - kind: openbao_role - when: client_type == confidential - template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - body: 'auth: kubernetes - - bound_service_account_names: [{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - - bound_service_account_namespaces: [{consumer_namespace}] - - audience: openbao - - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}] - - token_no_default_policy: true - - token_ttl: 15m - - token_max_ttl: 15m - - ' - description: Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity. - Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic - controller isolation is claimed. - - id: catalog-entry - kind: catalog_entry - template: '{consuming_service}-keycape-client' - body: 'id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client - - owner_repo: key-cape - - warden_executes: false - - risk: high - - status: active once verification passes - - workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer''s - published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred - - path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - - field: CLIENT_SECRET - - delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape - - rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been - proven - - ' - description: One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries - the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection. - follow_through: - - id: ensure-groups - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner - pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups}; - members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing - else) - auth: operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod - call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine - token is read or sent - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's - runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane - would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden - ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended - session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential - of its own and an admitted path. - - id: mint-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: 'railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside - custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}' - auth: the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the - value is generated in custody and never returned - lane: keycape-client-secret-generate - warden_executes: true - attended: false - value_handling: generated_in_custody - - id: deliver-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) - from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - auth: railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; - no value leaves custody - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True - (status only, no value read) - - id: bind-env - owner: net-kingdom - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: 'patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET - from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client' - auth: operator kube credentials for namespace sso - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It - runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because - KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if - the binding is missing. - - id: register-client - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file - --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration) - auth: operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, - and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator - session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps - of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, - authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins - and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review - R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape - check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) - before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1).' - - id: deliver-consumer-secret - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso - (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client - with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}. - Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller - RBAC before any owner-approved apply. - auth: Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates - to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} with - a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains - trusted - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; - dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never - Secret values. - - id: hand-over - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - entry_point: configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} - and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require - one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes - auth: the consumer owner's own deployment path - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} - returns the login page - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect - returns an OAuth error - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: client_type == confidential - check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: client_type == confidential - check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants - read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only) - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the - accepted case added - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) - requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no - secret value)' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status - only) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: mfa_required == true - check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered - client (non-secret client view) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact - dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value - read' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner - {consumer_owner_repo}) - - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created - ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and - dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared - target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is - not immediate OpenBao token revocation. - - reverses: register-client - action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id} - - reverses: bind-env - when: client_type == confidential - action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, - after register-client is reversed - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target - - reverses: mint-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret - is reversed' - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod - (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only - if no other case uses {access_groups} - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, - after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret) - - reverses: eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role - - reverses: consumer-eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, - before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or - prove expiration before declaring deactivation. - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client - acceptance: - accepted_by: - - owner - - founder - risk_class: medium diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 1545a39..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,110 +0,0 @@ -id: CCR-2026-0042 -kind: credential-change-request -schema_version: 1 -request_type: workload-kv-read -title: 'forgejo-netkingdom-oidc: proposed dedicated consumer ESO reader (oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2)' -status: proposed -created: '2026-10-09' -updated: '2026-10-11' -requester: - agent: ops-mason - reason: Source-only owner refinement of existing CCR-2026-0042. Proposed type/case1.2 and full run source require - new exact acknowledgment; original approvals do not authorize this reader role or native delivery. Historical - body retained by exact file hash and provenance below. -review: - required: true - required_approvers: - - platform-owner - comments: [] -target: - domain: infotech - tenant: platform - workload: forgejo - environment: production - purpose: Dedicated namespace-local ESO reference identity delivers CLIENT_SECRET to Forgejo; the Forgejo workload/default - SA does not authenticate directly to OpenBao. -openbao: - mount: platform - kv_path: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo - fields: - - CLIENT_SECRET - policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo - policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo.hcl - metadata_read: false - token_self_lifecycle: true - auth: - method: kubernetes - mount: kubernetes - role: external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo - audience: openbao - ttl: 15m - token_max_ttl: 15m - token_explicit_max_ttl: 15m - token_no_default_policy: true - policies: - - workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo - bound_claims: - service_account_names: - - forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso - service_account_namespaces: - - forgejo - bound_claims_confirmed: false -access_frontdoor: - type: external-secrets - catalog_id: forgejo-keycape-client - readiness: pending-review - resolvable: false -risk: - classification: high - notes: - - Rendered from proposed SecurityCaseType/case 1.2 source, not an acknowledged successor. Retained read-only native - ESO image/CRD/RBAC and Forgejo identity observations support preparation only; bound claims remain unconfirmed - and apply blocked. The new sixth consumer role/auth path requires fresh informed-decision acknowledgment under - SecurityCaseTypes canon section 6; acknowledged type 1.1 and accepted case 1.1 do not authorize it. - - Exact read on one KV path; no metadata, list, parent or sibling access. - - Dedicated reference identity separates consumer and KeyCape role bindings, but common ESO controller already - has clusterwide TokenRequest and Secret permissions; no controller compromise isolation is claimed. - - ESO v0.16.1 TokenRequest expiry is 600 seconds and its fallback reads legacy SA token references; proposed dedicated - SA has no legacy tokens and automount false. - - Native publication requires exact1.2 acknowledgment and independent owner changes/created-only receipts; no - live grant is issued by this draft. -verification: - positive: - - policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo grants read on platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo only - (capabilities check) - negative: - - a default-only identity has no read capability on the path - - sibling GET and parent LIST are denied - activation_conditions: - - case acceptance present - - bound claims confirmed by the platform owner -lifecycle: - deactivate: First revert consumer reference and remove only proved-created target/delivery objects; revoke issued - reader tokens or await verified expiry, then delete created role and finally policy. Preserve shared/matched - objects. - rotate: roll-forward through the credential broker (mint-secret); never a read of the old value - compromised: owner incident process; no automatic read, reseed or cleanup -security_case: - case: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - render_digest: sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35 - acceptance_record: PENDING exact proposed1.2 owner/founder acknowledgment; original1.1 acceptance is not transferred - accepted_at: null - accepted_by: [] -historical_request: - path: credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0042-forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-consumer-reader.yaml - sha256: a36ab567839c12660c8ca468c8e4c6a67e367c92ae2ae51851b8e34c35a277f3 - security_case: - case: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0 - render_digest: sha256:fb8b114d465341a46bb492259cb9c6b77bc0731670edace2e13a1f58758c6e23 - acceptance_record: key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml (status accepted-2026-10-08, KEY-WP-0038-T01); - type acknowledged via informed-decision memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, hub decision e418263e - accepted_at: '2026-10-08' - accepted_by: - - owner - - founder -proposed_refinement_readiness: - owner: railiance-apps - blocking_reason: Concrete identity and supported ESO design are prepared; native metadata apply/delivery remains - unapproved. Existing ORGREF-WP-0002 coordinates consumer handover and break-glass gates. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/case-1.2.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/case-1.2.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 8c7c4bc..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/case-1.2.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: 'true' - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps - consumer_namespace: forgejo diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/consumer-delivery.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/consumer-delivery.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 01e2a98..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/consumer-delivery.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: v1 -kind: ServiceAccount -metadata: - name: forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso - namespace: forgejo - labels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: forgejo - app.kubernetes.io/part-of: railiance-apps -automountServiceAccountToken: false ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: SecretStore -metadata: - name: openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer - namespace: forgejo -spec: - provider: - vault: - server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200 - path: platform - version: v2 - auth: - kubernetes: - mountPath: kubernetes - role: external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo - serviceAccountRef: - name: forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso - audiences: - - openbao ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: ExternalSecret -metadata: - name: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client - namespace: forgejo - labels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: forgejo - app.kubernetes.io/part-of: railiance-apps -spec: - refreshInterval: 15m - secretStoreRef: - name: openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer - kind: SecretStore - target: - name: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client - creationPolicy: Owner - deletionPolicy: Retain - template: - metadata: - labels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: forgejo - app.kubernetes.io/part-of: railiance-apps - data: - - secretKey: CLIENT_SECRET - remoteRef: - key: workloads/keycape/forgejo - property: CLIENT_SECRET diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/current-case-1.1.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/current-case-1.1.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index b080a25..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/current-case-1.1.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -# First KnownSecurityCase of oidc-browser-relying-party 1.1 (NK-WP-0048-T06). -# Parameters are the request the founder accepted on 2026-10-08 -# (key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml, KEY-WP-0038-T01); that -# acceptance carries over as this case's acceptance. One difference: custody is -# derived by the type (platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo), not the request's -# proposed platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client. The founder -# acknowledged that derivation with the type (memo r4, 2026-10-09). -# Re-pinned from 1.0 to 1.1 on 2026-10-10 on the founder's go, before any -# apply, so no 1.0 run overlaps (minor change: consumer-enforces-groups). -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 - status: accepted - acceptance: - at: "2026-10-08" - record: "key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml (status accepted-2026-10-08, KEY-WP-0038-T01); type acknowledged via informed-decision memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, hub decision e418263e" - by: - - {role: owner, name: "founder (for railiance-apps)"} - - {role: founder, name: founder} - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: "true" - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/current-type-1.1.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/current-type-1.1.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a6dbf28..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/current-type-1.1.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,322 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCaseType -spec: - id: oidc-browser-relying-party - version: "1.1" - status: acknowledged - title: "Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service" - purpose: >- - Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom - (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups - the service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client - secret minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout - scripts in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038). - - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape. - - name: display_name - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[^\\n\\r]{1,80}$"} - sensitivity: public - description: Name shown on the sign-in page. - - name: redirect_uris - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^https://[^*?#\\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\\s,]+)*$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain http, no - query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses '*' and '?' at startup, and OAuth - 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1). - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["openid,profile,email,groups", "openid,email,groups", "openid,profile,groups", "openid,groups"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups, - because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups - only for that scope (key-cape type review R2). - - name: client_type - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["confidential", "public"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only). - - name: mfa_required - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["true", "false"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - "true" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants - administrative or owner rights. "false" is not "no MFA": the client then - carries no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA - policy. A renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which - would skip that policy (key-cape type review R3). - - name: access_groups - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: >- - Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles. Created if - absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to any - authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming - service enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting; - key-cape type review R2). - - name: initial_members - type: string - required: false - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: "Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are directory usernames, never secrets." - - name: consuming_service - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: The service that signs users in with this client. - - name: consumer_owner_repo - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration. - - name: issuer - type: string - case_settable: false - default: https://kc.coulomb.social - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type. - - composition: - authority: netkingdom - initial_trust: [runtime_secret_trust, runtime_identity_trust] - capabilities: [c1.lightweight-sso] - providers: - c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration - parameter_bindings: - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required - - materialization: - # Placement follows the live CCR-2026-0033 reference (secrets-engine-openbao, - # ops-mason plans/keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client-custody.md). The path - # is derived, not case-settable, and the policies reuse the existing - # workload-kv-read-keycape-- family (MASON-WP-0010-T01). - - id: client-secret-path - kind: kv_path - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - body: "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand" - - id: keycape-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso" - body: | - path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access. - - id: consumer-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}" - body: | - path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access. - - id: eso-role - kind: openbao_role - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}" - body: | - auth: kubernetes - bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets] - bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets] - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - token_no_default_policy: true - token_ttl: 15m - token_max_ttl: 15m - description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only. - - id: catalog-entry - kind: catalog_entry - template: "{consuming_service}-keycape-client" - body: | - id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client - owner_repo: key-cape - warden_executes: false - risk: high - status: active once verification passes - workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred - path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - field: CLIENT_SECRET - delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape - rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven - description: >- - One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the - consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection. - follow_through: - - id: ensure-groups - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups}; members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)" - auth: "operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and - its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as - user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002). - Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended - session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator - credential of its own and an admitted path. - - id: mint-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: "client_type == confidential" - entry_point: "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - auth: "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned" - lane: keycape-client-secret-generate - warden_executes: true - attended: false - value_handling: generated_in_custody - - id: deliver-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: "client_type == confidential" - entry_point: "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - auth: "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; no value leaves custody" - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)" - - id: bind-env - owner: net-kingdom - when: "client_type == confidential" - entry_point: "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client" - auth: "operator kube credentials for namespace sso" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same - attended operator session as register-client, before it, because - KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails - closed if the binding is missing. - - id: register-client - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)" - auth: "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do - not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended - operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups - all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients - at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so - the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go - in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must - pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape - c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the - restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1). - - id: hand-over - owner: "{consumer_owner_repo}" - entry_point: "configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes" - auth: "the consumer owner's own deployment path" - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: "GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} returns the login page" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: "GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: "client_type == confidential" - check: "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: "client_type == confidential" - check: "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only)" - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: "LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - # KeyCape has no per-client group gate; only the consumer can enforce - # access_groups (key-cape type review R2, type 1.1). - check: "{consuming_service}'s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: "client_type == confidential" - check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: "mfa_required == true" - check: "keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: "remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner {consumer_owner_repo})" - - reverses: register-client - action: "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}" - - reverses: bind-env - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed" - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target" - - reverses: mint-secret - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed" - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: "identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses {access_groups}" - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)" - - reverses: eso-role - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}" - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role" - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}" - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: "remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client" - - acceptance: - accepted_by: [owner, founder] - risk_class: medium diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/decision-packet.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/decision-packet.md deleted file mode 100644 index 429b45d..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/decision-packet.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -# Forgejo type/case 1.2 — source acknowledgment only - -## Requested acknowledgment - -Acknowledge the attached oidc-browser-relying-party1.2 security architecture and approve the existing Forgejo reference-case 1.2 migration design for a separate owner source receipt only. This is NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1, a new exact informed-decision acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes §6 because the sixth consumer reader role changes authentication/materialization. Prior 1.1 acknowledgment and case acceptance do not transfer. Scope is type source acknowledgment and separate reference-design receipt only: canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while the type is unimplemented, and no canonical or phase case acceptance is authorized. No credentials, OpenBao authentication, role/policy/Secret changes, ESO deployment, structural materialization, first contained session/grant or native first-case completion is authorized. - -## Exact source and owner agreement - -The original nineteen-file preparation manifest is 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431. Applied nineteen sources match it exactly. Full proposed render is c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Exact proposed and current1.1 type/case bytes are attached, along with independent NetKingdom, Mason and Platform final technical reviews copied from their real owner trees unchanged. Their reviews acknowledge technical source only; none supplies this founder disposition or native permission. Actual reviewed commits and later observed HEADs are retained separately in source-inventory.json, without changing the content-bound nineteen-file scope. - -The core proposed type/case schema and render checks pass; complete section 3 package readiness is not proved, and no implemented/status-live readiness is claimed. This is the existing first-reference case migration, not a new known-case light-path admission. The acknowledged type 1.1/current accepted case and historical CCR41/42/bundle remain unchanged until genuine new source disposition is recorded with preserved immutable originals. Canon sections 4/5 permits canonical case acceptance only for implemented types. Type acknowledgment cannot mark implemented, accept a canonical case or arm execution; the existing first-reference --allow-unimplemented build handling is not normal admission. Complete section 3 type-package README/examples/runnable tests, actual full-package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt are still mandatory before type acknowledgment recording. Core schema/render checks and the existing 1.1 package do not prove those gates; this packet currently records them unproved. An actual full-package validator call on the owner proposal directory reports missing README, runnable tests and examples; human-posting readiness is false until these sources and a separate NetKingdom owner receipt are prepared and bound into this same unposted memo. - -## Concrete structural and trust refinement - -All original five rendered materialization bodies remain unchanged. The sixth object is consumer-eso-role: OpenBao Kubernetes role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, exact namespace forgejo/SA forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso, audience openbao, only workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo and no default policy, 15-minute maximum tokens. Policy grants only platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo read plus existing self-token lookup/revoke; no metadata/list/parent/sibling reads. The consumer's namespace-local SecretStore references that dedicated SA and one field CLIENT_SECRET into an Owner target, deletionPolicy Retain. Forgejo and runner shared forgejo/default are not readers; existing SMTP reader remains separate. No namespace or deployment identity replacement is proposed. - -Native retained compatibility metadata and installed ESO v0.16.1 source establish supported serviceAccountRef/audiences and existing controller TokenRequest RBAC. ESO requests a 600-second Kubernetes token and can fall back to legacy SA tokens. Owner admission must require automount=false/no legacy-token refs and stop on failed TokenRequest rather than add static tokens. The common ESO controller retains broad TokenRequest/Secret authority; dedicated identities are routing/revocation separation, not isolation from controller compromise. Existing internal HTTP custody remains disclosed, not an encrypted-transport claim. Tag/source observations are compatibility evidence, not immutable OCI identity proof. - -## Lifecycle, defects and residual gates - -Generated consumer CCR now targets consuming_service Forgejo while KeyCape ESO output stays unchanged. Its recovery obligations revert the consumer reference, require authenticated case-created ownership, preserve shared/preexisting objects, revoke issued reader tokens or independently verify expiry before declaring deactivation, and forbid recovery login/remint. Role/SA/store deletion alone does not revoke issued tokens. Retained Secret deletion requires independent creation/ownerReference/UID evidence; unknown or changed ownership stops. These are owner obligations, not an installed revocation adapter or grant. Source type/manual rollback keeps role before policy, with revocation/expiry bound. - -Original overwrite regression, false inherited acknowledgment note, wrong generated consumer target and delete-only lifecycle counterexamples are preserved. Final independent owners each report 44 focused passes; old 42 and earlier failing checks stay in history. The untouched historical 1.1 bundle now correctly fails its wrong consumer target; new source rebundle/reconciliation after acknowledgment is required, never reassignment of old approval or weakened checker. - -Actual bound_claims_confirmed=false blocks apply. Before any first contained session still require refreshed native identities/CRD/RBAC/no legacy refs; Platform CCR approval/confirmed binding; authenticated per-owner policy/role/layout/capability/created-vs-matched observations; admitted owner adapters/global verifier provenance; Warden machine descriptors, contained-session and revocation receipts; source-resolved current full run pins and separate founder native authority. Mint/ESO Ready are follow-through and are not structural proof. This memo creates none of those gates or permissions. - -Helm secret consumption, required groups and unknown-user refusal, current local sign-in/break-glass, account linking, MFA and browser positive/negative checks remain distinct unfinished gates. Readiness/source tests do not close the case or forge. ORGREF-WP-0002 continues as driver for existing NK0048/Mason0010/Warden0044/RAPPS0016/CCR42 work; no duplicate planner is introduced. - -## Alternatives and recording - -Decline/return keeps proposed 1.2 and existing accepted 1.1 untouched; owners can revise and request a new exact source review under this same stable proposal. Accepting only the current source architecture can support type acknowledgment only after its complete-package/source-owner gates, and reference-design approval in a separate receipt; canonical case 1.2 remains proposed/unimplemented and every native gate stays false. A direct native deployment is outside this decision. Estimated incremental preparation/recording cost EUR0.10; no runtime resource change or credential exposure is authorized. - -After a genuine native founder disposition, independently verify new memo ID/version, stale=false, exact packet/digests, actual actor/resolver and selected source-only act, then require actual full type-package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt before type status recording. Record only those actually fulfilled owner/founder roles: technical worker reviews do not impersonate the declared consumer owner. Preserve original proposed and acknowledged 1.1 bytes/receipts before any permitted type acknowledgment and separate reference-design receipt; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed and cannot acquire acceptance/status fields from this act. Decline, pending, stale or hash drift leaves source proposed; never fabricate acceptance IDs, dates, claims or native grants. Recording-gates.md sets the exact before/after source boundary. - -## Completed proposed package supplement - -The initial three README/examples/runnable-tests failures remain in proposal history. The proposed package-1.2 supplement now contains the exact unchanged type and Forgejo example, a representative public example, a threat/alternatives/limits README and runnable source-contract tests. Actual full owner package validator passes and 22 tests pass. validation-and-history.json binds all source bytes and commands. Separate NetKingdom source-owner review of this supplement is required before human submission. This preparation does not implement the type, accept canonical case 1.2 or grant native authority. - -## Actual completed-package source review binding - -The independent NetKingdom completed-package source review of exact prior packet 330da7fe is now losslessly attached, alongside the original exact19 source review, in the two clearly labelled review bundles. Each carries the source path, SHA256 and gzip-base64 encoding of the exact original bytes. The separate package-owner review gate is satisfied; source-only posting readiness is true after root obtains narrow confirmation of this receipt rebinding and README clarification. README now explicitly distinguishes observed Forgejo/runner workload forgejo/default from the historical unbound OpenBao consumer policy; no historical default-SA reader binding is claimed. The genuine human disposition remains absent and canonical case remains proposed/unimplemented. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/intake.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/intake.json deleted file mode 100644 index 23666ac..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/intake.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,261 +0,0 @@ -{ - "kind": "informed-decision.memo-intake", - "version": 1, - "idempotency_key": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1-v1", - "memo_class": "decision-record", - "review_group": "net-kingdom-admins", - "drafted_by": "custodian-codex", - "approval_intent": { - "action": "acknowledge", - "principal": "net-kingdom-admins", - "purpose": "Acknowledge exact type 1.2 after complete-package/source-owner gates; approve reference-design receipt only, keep canonical case proposed under sections 4/5/6; no native or credential authority.", - "target": { - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2", - "type": "security-case-type", - "system": "net-kingdom" - } - }, - "memo": { - "id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", - "version": 1, - "question": "Acknowledge the exact proposed OIDC browser relying-party 1.2 architecture after complete-package validation and owner review, with Forgejo migration design recorded separately and its canonical case staying proposed, without native authority?", - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": "Source-only acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes section 6 of the sixth dedicated consumer reader role and separate Forgejo reference-migration design receipt only. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while type is unimplemented; actual full package README/examples/runnable tests and separate NetKingdom source-owner review gate type acknowledgment recording. Original five structural bodies unchanged; common ESO trust/600-second TokenRequest/legacy fallback and created-only token-revocation-or-expiry recovery disclosed. Three independent architecture owner reviews / 44 tests and the completed package NetKingdom review / 22 tests attached; bound claims and execution remain false. Old 1.1 is not inherited and native gates remain separate.", - "binding": { - "principal": { - "id": "pending-human-session", - "kind": "person", - "display_name": "Founder source acknowledgment" - }, - "target": { - "kind": "resource", - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc", - "label": "Exact NetKingdom type 1.2 and Forgejo reference-case source", - "environment": "build" - }, - "terms": "Only NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1 and exact reviewed nineteen-file manifest 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431/full render c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Type acknowledgment recording requires actual complete section 3 package validation and separate NetKingdom source-owner review. Reference-migration design approval is separate owner-receipt only; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed/unimplemented, without acceptance fields or phase acceptance. Record genuine new native human source disposition before any permitted type acknowledgment fields, after full package/source-owner gates, preserve immutable 1.1 history. No credential/auth/ESO/materialization/session/grant/native completion; execution.permitted=false and bound_claims_confirmed=false until separately discharged actual native owner gates." - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "label": "decision-packet.md", - "hash": "sha256:bb9a3f12248d18a51d06daf1235903ed8827c55e9e28bcb80c76d414db0d1a56" - }, - { - "item_id": "proposal-json", - "label": "proposal.json", - "hash": "sha256:3d726df3bebcfeb50dd0a5f83ad1ba94d0408caeec84a421feb1555b4b106e97" - }, - { - "item_id": "source-inventory-json", - "label": "source-inventory.json", - "hash": "sha256:fc06655f48d33c84fee1764de71649dde4f584e36388bce2af1e459d2728bc7c" - }, - { - "item_id": "type-1-2-yaml", - "label": "type-1.2.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db" - }, - { - "item_id": "case-1-2-yaml", - "label": "case-1.2.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab" - }, - { - "item_id": "render-1-2-json", - "label": "render-1.2.json", - "hash": "sha256:96b25108335e2cf5f96af481fe8a7735831c8320d81b50f7c6e6d4e53d0c0f02" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-type-1-1-yaml", - "label": "current-type-1.1.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-case-1-1-yaml", - "label": "current-case-1.1.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d" - }, - { - "item_id": "consumer-delivery-yaml", - "label": "consumer-delivery.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:56478a83d799c08dc1e5159983b1e843a46b16dfeee7e84c31401d1f92430df2" - }, - { - "item_id": "ccr-0042-proposed-body-yaml", - "label": "CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:6544600c63a86559ba053240c476d493f4d2f25c9cd22cf6a9a05f09ee617a86" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-role-json", - "label": "reader-role.json", - "hash": "sha256:976b19e0780b6056ed54bf5e8f27a0eb786af65817d9ec00ca161ac46e7d72e7" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-policy-hcl", - "label": "reader-policy.hcl", - "hash": "sha256:af3a638605c1f6dff7879771fede4c56a6b9a7e430d4b5b58c370063b2c888ca" - }, - { - "item_id": "owner-design-md", - "label": "owner-design.md", - "hash": "sha256:c523949454e4c6eb58e8caee382380a561f561704136de62bf5783c592f962f2" - }, - { - "item_id": "retained-native-metadata-json", - "label": "retained-native-metadata.json", - "hash": "sha256:4e2993f5920215f41e4a235743023f22b78b8f597d3d70ed279991b2fc3204b5" - }, - { - "item_id": "mason-final-review-json", - "label": "mason-final-review.json", - "hash": "sha256:28541874fb437a06a8f1749bc50c88f6fee3d7c100c2f3ee0c52b59afaf8e102" - }, - { - "item_id": "platform-final-review-json", - "label": "platform-final-review.json", - "hash": "sha256:72854a798e01c6d65a16770efb1329d211fe3c59a3f4ad3190d6972f5c886f6e" - }, - { - "item_id": "netkingdom-review-bundle-json", - "label": "netkingdom-review-bundle.json", - "hash": "sha256:d452d90d886519186e2170592e6ab7389f384eff6c12795c8ad66a798e0966e0" - }, - { - "item_id": "netkingdom-review-sources-bundle-json", - "label": "netkingdom-review-sources-bundle.json", - "hash": "sha256:1b6c0432150ec9fd07a8aa4a005051081f7ac2557a2787fe5b32cdb7387d6648" - }, - { - "item_id": "validation-and-history-json", - "label": "validation-and-history.json", - "hash": "sha256:494d555b7dc33c05cd2f456c781e36bfe13deae3f44ce249d43fef71fe6c2c6a" - }, - { - "item_id": "recording-gates-md", - "label": "recording-gates.md", - "hash": "sha256:ca7b851f6357951101e7026883ccc29529c5ad798d5692987ee29a4c65962bce" - } - ], - "highlights": [ - { - "id": "source-only-authentication-refinement", - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "note": "New sixth role/auth path requires this new acknowledgment; prior 1.1 does not transfer. Shared ESO controller remains broadly trusted, failed TokenRequest must not seed legacy/static tokens, and deletion alone cannot revoke issued tokens. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed on unimplemented type; full package/source-owner gates remain required. No native credentials, apply, session or case completion.", - "required_ack": true, - "severity": "warning", - "locator": { - "kind": "section", - "heading": "Requested acknowledgment" - } - } - ], - "sealed": false, - "approval_id": null, - "approval_binding_digest": null - }, - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "media_type": "text/markdown", - "content": "# Forgejo type/case 1.2 — source acknowledgment only\n\n## Requested acknowledgment\n\nAcknowledge the attached oidc-browser-relying-party1.2 security architecture and approve the existing Forgejo reference-case 1.2 migration design for a separate owner source receipt only. This is NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1, a new exact informed-decision acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes §6 because the sixth consumer reader role changes authentication/materialization. Prior 1.1 acknowledgment and case acceptance do not transfer. Scope is type source acknowledgment and separate reference-design receipt only: canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while the type is unimplemented, and no canonical or phase case acceptance is authorized. No credentials, OpenBao authentication, role/policy/Secret changes, ESO deployment, structural materialization, first contained session/grant or native first-case completion is authorized.\n\n## Exact source and owner agreement\n\nThe original nineteen-file preparation manifest is 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431. Applied nineteen sources match it exactly. Full proposed render is c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Exact proposed and current1.1 type/case bytes are attached, along with independent NetKingdom, Mason and Platform final technical reviews copied from their real owner trees unchanged. Their reviews acknowledge technical source only; none supplies this founder disposition or native permission. Actual reviewed commits and later observed HEADs are retained separately in source-inventory.json, without changing the content-bound nineteen-file scope.\n\nThe core proposed type/case schema and render checks pass; complete section 3 package readiness is not proved, and no implemented/status-live readiness is claimed. This is the existing first-reference case migration, not a new known-case light-path admission. The acknowledged type 1.1/current accepted case and historical CCR41/42/bundle remain unchanged until genuine new source disposition is recorded with preserved immutable originals. Canon sections 4/5 permits canonical case acceptance only for implemented types. Type acknowledgment cannot mark implemented, accept a canonical case or arm execution; the existing first-reference --allow-unimplemented build handling is not normal admission. Complete section 3 type-package README/examples/runnable tests, actual full-package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt are still mandatory before type acknowledgment recording. Core schema/render checks and the existing 1.1 package do not prove those gates; this packet currently records them unproved. An actual full-package validator call on the owner proposal directory reports missing README, runnable tests and examples; human-posting readiness is false until these sources and a separate NetKingdom owner receipt are prepared and bound into this same unposted memo.\n\n## Concrete structural and trust refinement\n\nAll original five rendered materialization bodies remain unchanged. The sixth object is consumer-eso-role: OpenBao Kubernetes role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, exact namespace forgejo/SA forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso, audience openbao, only workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo and no default policy, 15-minute maximum tokens. Policy grants only platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo read plus existing self-token lookup/revoke; no metadata/list/parent/sibling reads. The consumer's namespace-local SecretStore references that dedicated SA and one field CLIENT_SECRET into an Owner target, deletionPolicy Retain. Forgejo and runner shared forgejo/default are not readers; existing SMTP reader remains separate. No namespace or deployment identity replacement is proposed.\n\nNative retained compatibility metadata and installed ESO v0.16.1 source establish supported serviceAccountRef/audiences and existing controller TokenRequest RBAC. ESO requests a 600-second Kubernetes token and can fall back to legacy SA tokens. Owner admission must require automount=false/no legacy-token refs and stop on failed TokenRequest rather than add static tokens. The common ESO controller retains broad TokenRequest/Secret authority; dedicated identities are routing/revocation separation, not isolation from controller compromise. Existing internal HTTP custody remains disclosed, not an encrypted-transport claim. Tag/source observations are compatibility evidence, not immutable OCI identity proof.\n\n## Lifecycle, defects and residual gates\n\nGenerated consumer CCR now targets consuming_service Forgejo while KeyCape ESO output stays unchanged. Its recovery obligations revert the consumer reference, require authenticated case-created ownership, preserve shared/preexisting objects, revoke issued reader tokens or independently verify expiry before declaring deactivation, and forbid recovery login/remint. Role/SA/store deletion alone does not revoke issued tokens. Retained Secret deletion requires independent creation/ownerReference/UID evidence; unknown or changed ownership stops. These are owner obligations, not an installed revocation adapter or grant. Source type/manual rollback keeps role before policy, with revocation/expiry bound.\n\nOriginal overwrite regression, false inherited acknowledgment note, wrong generated consumer target and delete-only lifecycle counterexamples are preserved. Final independent owners each report 44 focused passes; old 42 and earlier failing checks stay in history. The untouched historical 1.1 bundle now correctly fails its wrong consumer target; new source rebundle/reconciliation after acknowledgment is required, never reassignment of old approval or weakened checker.\n\nActual bound_claims_confirmed=false blocks apply. Before any first contained session still require refreshed native identities/CRD/RBAC/no legacy refs; Platform CCR approval/confirmed binding; authenticated per-owner policy/role/layout/capability/created-vs-matched observations; admitted owner adapters/global verifier provenance; Warden machine descriptors, contained-session and revocation receipts; source-resolved current full run pins and separate founder native authority. Mint/ESO Ready are follow-through and are not structural proof. This memo creates none of those gates or permissions.\n\nHelm secret consumption, required groups and unknown-user refusal, current local sign-in/break-glass, account linking, MFA and browser positive/negative checks remain distinct unfinished gates. Readiness/source tests do not close the case or forge. ORGREF-WP-0002 continues as driver for existing NK0048/Mason0010/Warden0044/RAPPS0016/CCR42 work; no duplicate planner is introduced.\n\n## Alternatives and recording\n\nDecline/return keeps proposed 1.2 and existing accepted 1.1 untouched; owners can revise and request a new exact source review under this same stable proposal. Accepting only the current source architecture can support type acknowledgment only after its complete-package/source-owner gates, and reference-design approval in a separate receipt; canonical case 1.2 remains proposed/unimplemented and every native gate stays false. A direct native deployment is outside this decision. Estimated incremental preparation/recording cost EUR0.10; no runtime resource change or credential exposure is authorized.\n\nAfter a genuine native founder disposition, independently verify new memo ID/version, stale=false, exact packet/digests, actual actor/resolver and selected source-only act, then require actual full type-package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt before type status recording. Record only those actually fulfilled owner/founder roles: technical worker reviews do not impersonate the declared consumer owner. Preserve original proposed and acknowledged 1.1 bytes/receipts before any permitted type acknowledgment and separate reference-design receipt; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed and cannot acquire acceptance/status fields from this act. Decline, pending, stale or hash drift leaves source proposed; never fabricate acceptance IDs, dates, claims or native grants. Recording-gates.md sets the exact before/after source boundary.\n\n## Completed proposed package supplement\n\nThe initial three README/examples/runnable-tests failures remain in proposal history. The proposed package-1.2 supplement now contains the exact unchanged type and Forgejo example, a representative public example, a threat/alternatives/limits README and runnable source-contract tests. Actual full owner package validator passes and 22 tests pass. validation-and-history.json binds all source bytes and commands. Separate NetKingdom source-owner review of this supplement is required before human submission. This preparation does not implement the type, accept canonical case 1.2 or grant native authority.\n\n## Actual completed-package source review binding\n\nThe independent NetKingdom completed-package source review of exact prior packet 330da7fe is now losslessly attached, alongside the original exact19 source review, in the two clearly labelled review bundles. Each carries the source path, SHA256 and gzip-base64 encoding of the exact original bytes. The separate package-owner review gate is satisfied; source-only posting readiness is true after root obtains narrow confirmation of this receipt rebinding and README clarification. README now explicitly distinguishes observed Forgejo/runner workload forgejo/default from the historical unbound OpenBao consumer policy; no historical default-SA reader binding is claimed. The genuine human disposition remains absent and canonical case remains proposed/unimplemented.\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "proposal-json", - "media_type": "application/json", - "content": "{\n \"proposal_id\": \"NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1\",\n \"memo_id\": \"infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1\",\n \"memo_version\": 1,\n \"status\": \"source-acknowledgment-draft\",\n \"type\": \"oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2\",\n \"case\": \"forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\",\n \"case_scope\": \"Reference-migration design approval may be recorded in a separate owner receipt only. Canonical case1.2 stays proposed while type is unimplemented; no phase/canonical case acceptance on acknowledgment.\",\n \"bound_preparation_manifest_sha256\": \"5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431\",\n \"proposed_type_sha256\": \"017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db\",\n \"proposed_case_sha256\": \"1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab\",\n \"proposed_full_render_digest\": \"sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35\",\n \"case_owner_repo\": \"railiance-apps\",\n \"case_owner_person\": \"founder\",\n \"structural_objects\": 6,\n \"original_five_rendered_bodies_unchanged\": true,\n \"sixth_object\": \"consumer-eso-role\",\n \"consumer_namespace\": \"forgejo\",\n \"consumer_service_account\": \"forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso\",\n \"role\": \"external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\",\n \"audience\": \"openbao\",\n \"kv_data_path\": \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\",\n \"field\": \"CLIENT_SECRET\",\n \"shared_eso_controller_trust\": true,\n \"tokenrequest_seconds\": 600,\n \"legacy_fallback_allowed\": false,\n \"bound_claims_confirmed\": false,\n \"execution_permitted\": false,\n \"authorizes_native_operation\": false,\n \"authorizes_first_session_grant\": false,\n \"native_type_or_case_ack_recorded\": false,\n \"real_human_disposition\": null,\n \"grant_created\": false,\n \"owner_commits\": [\n {\n \"repo\": \"ops-mason\",\n \"reviewed_source_commit\": \"a41312e5a4a099eb1f5b77fcf80abb033f82a45e\",\n \"observed_head\": \"6196be5dca9cfd16df829df93aef9ec42383af1b\"\n },\n {\n \"repo\": \"railiance-platform\",\n \"reviewed_source_commit\": \"5b9c8262bedbbd9bf4348842e13aa668889ca745\",\n \"observed_head\": \"5b9c8262bedbbd9bf4348842e13aa668889ca745\"\n },\n {\n \"repo\": \"railiance-apps\",\n \"reviewed_source_commit\": \"367f01cb4b5859ce0b4598a1ab652904b83f7f84\",\n \"observed_head\": \"367f01cb4b5859ce0b4598a1ab652904b83f7f84\"\n },\n {\n \"repo\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"reviewed_source_commit\": \"c26b018328caaf6734dbce9605709a40359f4f2c\",\n \"observed_head\": \"c26b018328caaf6734dbce9605709a40359f4f2c\"\n }\n ],\n \"driver\": \"ORGREF-WP-0002\",\n \"existing_work_records\": [\n \"NK-WP-0048\",\n \"MASON-WP-0010\",\n \"WARDEN-WP-0044\",\n \"RAPPS-WP-0016\",\n \"CCR-2026-0042\"\n ],\n \"cost_estimate_eur\": 0.1,\n \"risk_note\": \"Source architecture acknowledgment only. Actual native/custody/session risk and authority must be reviewed under their existing owner gates; no native credential exposure or runtime change is authorized by this memo.\",\n \"approval_source_identity\": \"Only independently confirmed genuine native founder disposition for exact new memo/version/packet supports source acknowledgment; old1.1 and technical owner agreements are not that disposition.\",\n \"type_acknowledgment_preconditions\": [\n \"actual complete SecurityCaseTypes section 3 package README/examples/runnable tests and full owner package validator/test pass (now proved for staged supplement)\",\n \"separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt binding that exact complete package\",\n \"independent genuine new human disposition for unchanged packet/type source\"\n ],\n \"complete_type12_package_validation_proved\": true,\n \"complete_type12_package_owner_receipt_recorded\": true,\n \"canonical_case_status_after_source_ack\": \"proposed\",\n \"case_acceptance_authorized\": false,\n \"type_implemented\": false,\n \"complete_package_actual_observation\": {\n \"owner_path\": \"docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso\",\n \"README_available\": false,\n \"examples_available\": false,\n \"runnable_type_tests_available\": false,\n \"actual_owner_validate_type_with_package_path_passed\": false,\n \"reported_errors\": [\n \"type.README.md missing\",\n \"type.tests needs runnable tests/test_*.py\",\n \"type.examples needs at least one example\"\n ],\n \"core_schema_render_validation_does_not_discharge_package_gate\": true\n },\n \"human_posting_ready\": true,\n \"complete_package_staged_supplement\": {\n \"path\": \"docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2\",\n \"files\": [\n {\n \"path\": \"README.md\",\n \"sha256\": \"94dfe344f0e79cffea239612b0f7232f8bcc800d39e3b5aee6e1cad8cb2d5ee7\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"examples/example-public-portal.yaml\",\n \"sha256\": \"8d6457248415daa6fc509da4e838aae0b66d7808e9da8e00f4b85a1e7faed10d\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"examples/forgejo.yaml\",\n \"sha256\": \"1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab\",\n \"bound_document\": \"case-1.2.yaml\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"tests/test_source_contract.py\",\n \"sha256\": \"c3011c6855b7f1e4fd8ee5aea41cfe1598380db4fd8b9498c79050c91911b829\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"type.yaml\",\n \"sha256\": \"017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db\",\n \"bound_document\": \"type-1.2.yaml\"\n }\n ],\n \"full_validator_passed\": true,\n \"runnable_tests_passed\": 22,\n \"owner_review_pending\": false\n },\n \"remaining_submission_gate\": \"Root obtains narrow peer hash acknowledgment of this lossless receipt rebinding before submitting; actual human source disposition remains absent.\",\n \"package_peer_review\": {\n \"manifest_sha256\": \"769441a39f5de412a1291cb8c1eb45df3aece9ae6c9261a02df056a3973e789d\",\n \"reviewed_completed_packet_sha256\": \"330da7fe129b0443e41fff44b3c2d829b0d682698fdbba9fe60011d46ed5c48c\",\n \"receipt_sha256\": \"9e9b8dda889203c064b35e1bbcd4d0c62d76d4ba1935c9a10f4b2dbf1c6e8497\",\n \"source_paths\": [\n \"/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.md\",\n \"/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json\"\n ],\n \"narrow_rebinding_confirmation_pending\": true\n }\n}\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "source-inventory-json", - "media_type": "application/json", - "content": "{\n \"bound_preparation_manifest_sha256\": \"5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431\",\n \"reviewed19_owner_source_files\": [\n {\n \"repo\": \"railiance-apps\",\n \"path\": \"docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/consumer-delivery.yaml\",\n \"sha256\": \"56478a83d799c08dc1e5159983b1e843a46b16dfeee7e84c31401d1f92430df2\"\n },\n {\n \"repo\": \"railiance-apps\",\n 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the LLDAP groups the\n service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client secret\n minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout scripts\n in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038).'\n parameters:\n - name: client_id\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$\n sensitivity: operational\n description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape.\n - name: display_name\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[^\\n\\r]{1,80}$\n sensitivity: public\n description: Name shown on the sign-in page.\n - name: redirect_uris\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^https://[^*?#\\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\\s,]+)*$\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: 'Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain\n http, no query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses ''*'' and ''?'' at startup,\n and OAuth 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1).'\n - name: allowed_scopes\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n enum:\n - openid,profile,email,groups\n - openid,email,groups\n - openid,profile,groups\n - openid,groups\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups,\n because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups only\n for that scope (key-cape type review R2).\n - name: client_type\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n enum:\n - confidential\n - public\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public\n for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only).\n - name: mfa_required\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n enum:\n - 'true'\n - 'false'\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: '\"true\" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants\n administrative or owner rights. \"false\" is not \"no MFA\": the client then carries\n no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA policy. A\n renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which would skip that\n policy (key-cape type review R3).'\n - name: access_groups\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$\n sensitivity: operational\n description: 'Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles.\n Created if absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to\n any authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming service\n enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting; key-cape\n type review R2).'\n - name: initial_members\n type: string\n required: false\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$\n sensitivity: operational\n description: Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are\n directory usernames, never secrets.\n - name: consuming_service\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$\n sensitivity: operational\n description: The service that signs users in with this client.\n - name: consumer_owner_repo\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$\n sensitivity: operational\n description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration.\n - name: consumer_namespace\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints:\n pattern: ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: Consumer namespace for namespaced ESO TokenRequest reader; actual\n workload owner must confirm; never infer from service name.\n - name: issuer\n type: string\n case_settable: false\n default: https://kc.coulomb.social\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type.\n composition:\n authority: netkingdom\n initial_trust:\n - runtime_secret_trust\n - runtime_identity_trust\n capabilities:\n - c1.lightweight-sso\n providers:\n c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration\n parameter_bindings:\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required\n materialization:\n - id: client-secret-path\n kind: kv_path\n when: client_type == confidential\n template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\n body: field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand\n - id: keycape-reader-policy\n kind: openbao_policy\n when: client_type == confidential\n template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso\n body: \"path \\\"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\\\" {{\\n capabilities\\\n \\ = [\\\"read\\\"]\\n}}\\n\"\n description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list,\n parent or sibling access.\n - id: consumer-reader-policy\n kind: openbao_policy\n when: client_type == confidential\n template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}\n body: \"path \\\"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\\\" {{\\n capabilities\\\n \\ = [\\\"read\\\"]\\n}}\\n\"\n description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent\n or sibling access.\n - id: eso-role\n kind: openbao_role\n when: client_type == confidential\n template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}\n body: 'auth: kubernetes\n\n bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]\n\n bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]\n\n token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso]\n\n token_no_default_policy: true\n\n token_ttl: 15m\n\n token_max_ttl: 15m\n\n '\n description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service\n account only.\n - id: consumer-eso-role\n kind: openbao_role\n when: client_type == confidential\n template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}\n body: 'auth: kubernetes\n\n bound_service_account_names: [{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso]\n\n bound_service_account_namespaces: [{consumer_namespace}]\n\n audience: openbao\n\n token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}]\n\n token_no_default_policy: true\n\n token_ttl: 15m\n\n token_max_ttl: 15m\n\n '\n description: Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity.\n Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic\n controller isolation is claimed.\n - id: catalog-entry\n kind: catalog_entry\n template: '{consuming_service}-keycape-client'\n body: 'id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client\n\n owner_repo: key-cape\n\n warden_executes: false\n\n risk: high\n\n status: active once verification passes\n\n workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer''s\n published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred\n\n path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\n\n field: CLIENT_SECRET\n\n delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape\n\n rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been\n proven\n\n '\n description: One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries\n the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.\n follow_through:\n - id: ensure-groups\n owner: net-kingdom\n entry_point: identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner\n pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups};\n members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing\n else)\n auth: operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod\n call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine\n token is read or sent\n lane: key-cape-oidc-login\n warden_executes: false\n attended: true\n value_handling: none\n attended_justification: The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's\n runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane\n would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden\n ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended\n session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential\n of its own and an admitted path.\n - id: mint-secret\n owner: railiance-platform\n when: client_type == confidential\n entry_point: 'railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside\n custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}'\n auth: the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the\n value is generated in custody and never returned\n lane: keycape-client-secret-generate\n warden_executes: true\n attended: false\n value_handling: generated_in_custody\n - id: deliver-secret\n owner: railiance-platform\n when: client_type == confidential\n entry_point: ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret)\n from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\n auth: railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id};\n no value leaves custody\n warden_executes: false\n attended: false\n value_handling: none\n ready_check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True\n (status only, no value read)\n - id: bind-env\n owner: net-kingdom\n when: client_type == confidential\n entry_point: 'patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET\n from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client'\n auth: operator kube credentials for namespace sso\n lane: key-cape-oidc-login\n warden_executes: false\n attended: true\n value_handling: none\n attended_justification: A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It\n runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because\n KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if\n the binding is missing.\n - id: register-client\n owner: net-kingdom\n entry_point: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file \n --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)\n auth: operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso\n lane: key-cape-oidc-login\n warden_executes: false\n attended: true\n value_handling: none\n attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret,\n and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a\n non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator\n session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps\n of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login,\n authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins\n and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review\n R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape\n check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches)\n before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client\n loses sign-in (R1).'\n - id: deliver-consumer-secret\n owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}'\n when: client_type == confidential\n entry_point: Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso\n (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer\n with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client\n with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}.\n Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller\n RBAC before any owner-approved apply.\n auth: Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates\n to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} with\n a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains\n trusted\n warden_executes: false\n attended: false\n value_handling: none\n ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True;\n dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never\n Secret values.\n - id: hand-over\n owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}'\n entry_point: configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id}\n and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require\n one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes\n auth: the consumer owner's own deployment path\n warden_executes: false\n attended: false\n value_handling: none\n verification:\n - id: authorize-accepts-redirects\n check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris}\n returns the login page\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect\n check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect\n returns an OAuth error\n expect: deny\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: custody-denied-to-default\n when: client_type == confidential\n check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\n expect: deny\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer\n when: client_type == confidential\n check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants\n read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only)\n expect: allow\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: groups-present\n check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the\n accepted case added\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: consumer-enforces-groups\n check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo})\n requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no\n secret value)'\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: secret-delivered\n when: client_type == confidential\n check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status\n only)\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: mfa-pinned\n when: mfa_required == true\n check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered\n client (non-secret client view)\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: consumer-secret-delivered\n when: client_type == confidential\n check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer\n and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact\n dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value\n read'\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n rollback:\n - reverses: hand-over\n action: remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner\n {consumer_owner_repo})\n - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created\n ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and\n dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared\n target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is\n not immediate OpenBao token revocation.\n - reverses: register-client\n action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}\n - reverses: bind-env\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape,\n after register-client is reversed\n - reverses: deliver-secret\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target\n - reverses: mint-secret\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret\n is reversed'\n - reverses: ensure-groups\n action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod\n (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only\n if no other case uses {access_groups}\n - reverses: client-secret-path\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id},\n after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)\n - reverses: eso-role\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}\n - reverses: keycape-reader-policy\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role\n - reverses: consumer-eso-role\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service},\n before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or\n prove expiration before declaring deactivation.\n - reverses: consumer-reader-policy\n when: client_type == confidential\n action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}\n - reverses: catalog-entry\n action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client\n acceptance:\n accepted_by:\n - owner\n - founder\n risk_class: medium\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "case-1-2-yaml", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content": "apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1\nkind: SecurityCase\nspec:\n id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\n type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2\n status: proposed\n owner:\n repo: railiance-apps\n person: founder\n parameters:\n client_id: forgejo\n display_name: Forgejo source forge\n redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback\n allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups\n client_type: confidential\n mfa_required: 'true'\n access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers\n initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick\n consuming_service: forgejo\n consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps\n consumer_namespace: forgejo\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "render-1-2-json", - "media_type": "application/json", - "content": "{\n \"apiVersion\": \"netkingdom.io/security-case-render/v0.1\",\n \"case\": \"forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\",\n \"composition\": {\n \"apiVersion\": \"netkingdom.io/security-scenario-composition/v0.1\",\n \"authority\": \"netkingdom\",\n \"capability_providers\": {\n \"c1.lightweight-sso\": \"net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration\"\n },\n \"composition_digest\": \"sha256:f51e45eab2f2c15c93e2f7b8ef7d8fcc1daf1059da5749429ff5678b45c5214f\",\n \"execution\": {\n \"mode\": \"plan-only\",\n \"permitted\": false,\n \"reason\": \"Composition does not authorize or perform provider execution.\"\n },\n \"execution_steps\": [\n {\n \"capabilities\": [\n \"c1.lightweight-sso\"\n ],\n \"declaration_id\": \"net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration\",\n \"entry_point\": {\n \"description\": \"Add or remove exactly one client in the live KeyCape client registry without exporting secret values: contained kubectl, cluster and issuer pins, byte-preserving merge, compare-and-swap, read-back. Replaces the per-client helpers beside it. Field rules follow key-cape's canonical model (KEY-WP-0028). Modes: inspect, dry-run, apply; operations add and remove.\",\n \"invocation\": \"keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --expected-uid --expected-resource-version \",\n \"path\": \"sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py\",\n \"type\": \"cli-sequence\"\n },\n \"executor_owner\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"order\": 1,\n \"parameters\": {\n \"allowed_scopes\": {\n \"sensitivity\": \"security_sensitive\",\n \"source\": \"override\",\n \"tuning_authority\": \"netkingdom_tunable\",\n \"value\": \"openid,profile,email,groups\"\n },\n \"client_id\": {\n \"sensitivity\": \"operational\",\n \"source\": \"override\",\n \"tuning_authority\": \"netkingdom_tunable\",\n \"value\": \"forgejo\"\n },\n \"client_type\": {\n \"sensitivity\": \"security_sensitive\",\n \"source\": \"override\",\n \"tuning_authority\": \"netkingdom_tunable\",\n \"value\": \"confidential\"\n },\n \"display_name\": {\n \"sensitivity\": \"public\",\n \"source\": \"override\",\n \"tuning_authority\": \"netkingdom_tunable\",\n \"value\": \"Forgejo source forge\"\n },\n \"mfa_required\": {\n \"sensitivity\": \"security_sensitive\",\n \"source\": \"override\",\n \"tuning_authority\": \"netkingdom_tunable\",\n \"value\": \"true\"\n },\n \"redirect_uris\": {\n \"sensitivity\": \"security_sensitive\",\n \"source\": \"override\",\n \"tuning_authority\": \"netkingdom_tunable\",\n \"value\": \"https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback\"\n }\n },\n \"readiness_obligations\": [\n {\n \"checks\": [\n {\n \"description\": \"The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.\",\n \"evidence\": \"GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.\",\n \"id\": \"client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect\"\n },\n {\n \"description\": \"The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.\",\n \"evidence\": \"GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.\",\n \"id\": \"client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect\"\n }\n ],\n \"state\": \"tenant_onboarding_trust\"\n }\n ],\n \"repo\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"requires_trust\": [\n {\n \"readiness_checks\": [],\n \"state\": \"runtime_secret_trust\"\n },\n {\n \"readiness_checks\": [],\n \"state\": \"runtime_identity_trust\"\n }\n ],\n \"satisfies_trust\": [\n {\n \"readiness_checks\": [\n {\n \"description\": \"The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.\",\n \"evidence\": \"GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.\",\n \"id\": \"client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect\"\n },\n {\n \"description\": \"The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.\",\n \"evidence\": \"GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.\",\n \"id\": \"client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect\"\n }\n ],\n \"state\": \"tenant_onboarding_trust\"\n }\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"initial_trust\": [\n \"runtime_identity_trust\",\n \"runtime_secret_trust\"\n ],\n \"kind\": \"SecurityScenarioComposition\",\n \"planned_final_trust\": [\n \"runtime_identity_trust\",\n \"runtime_secret_trust\",\n \"tenant_onboarding_trust\"\n ],\n \"requested_capabilities\": [\n \"c1.lightweight-sso\"\n ],\n \"responsibility_map\": [\n {\n \"declaration_id\": \"net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration\",\n \"netkingdom_orchestrates\": \"Supply the case's validated, non-secret client fields.\",\n \"owner\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"repo_owns\": \"Live registry change for exactly this client, its idempotency and removal; field rules are key-cape's canonical model.\",\n \"resource_kind\": \"identities\",\n \"resources\": [\n \"oidc:static-clients\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"declaration_id\": \"net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration\",\n \"netkingdom_orchestrates\": \"Choose scopes and MFA posture per SecurityCaseType.\",\n \"owner\": \"key-cape\",\n \"repo_owns\": \"Enforce exact redirect URIs, allowed scopes and the MFA pin at authorization time.\",\n \"resource_kind\": \"roles_scopes_policies\",\n \"resources\": [\n \"iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists\"\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"scenario\": \"scenario:case:forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\"\n },\n \"digest\": \"sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35\",\n \"execution\": {\n \"permitted\": false\n },\n \"follow_through\": [\n {\n \"attended\": true,\n \"attended_justification\": \"The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential of its own and an admitted path.\",\n \"auth\": \"operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent\",\n \"entry_point\": \"identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers; members exactly forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)\",\n \"id\": \"ensure-groups\",\n \"lane\": \"key-cape-oidc-login\",\n \"owner\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"value_handling\": \"none\",\n \"warden_executes\": false\n },\n {\n \"attended\": false,\n \"auth\": \"the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned\",\n \"entry_point\": \"railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\",\n \"id\": \"mint-secret\",\n \"lane\": \"keycape-client-secret-generate\",\n \"owner\": \"railiance-platform\",\n \"value_handling\": \"generated_in_custody\",\n \"warden_executes\": true\n },\n {\n \"attended\": false,\n \"auth\": \"railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo; no value leaves custody\",\n \"entry_point\": \"ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\",\n \"id\": \"deliver-secret\",\n \"owner\": \"railiance-platform\",\n \"ready_check\": \"the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)\",\n \"value_handling\": \"none\",\n \"warden_executes\": false\n },\n {\n \"attended\": true,\n \"attended_justification\": \"A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if the binding is missing.\",\n \"auth\": \"operator kube credentials for namespace sso\",\n \"entry_point\": \"patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-forgejo-client\",\n \"id\": \"bind-env\",\n \"lane\": \"key-cape-oidc-login\",\n \"owner\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"value_handling\": \"none\",\n \"warden_executes\": false\n },\n {\n \"attended\": true,\n \"attended_justification\": \"The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client loses sign-in (R1).\",\n \"auth\": \"operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso\",\n \"entry_point\": \"sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)\",\n \"id\": \"register-client\",\n \"lane\": \"key-cape-oidc-login\",\n \"owner\": \"net-kingdom\",\n \"value_handling\": \"none\",\n \"warden_executes\": false\n },\n {\n \"attended\": false,\n \"auth\": \"Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo with a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains trusted\",\n \"entry_point\": \"Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/forgejo. Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller RBAC before any owner-approved apply.\",\n \"id\": \"deliver-consumer-secret\",\n \"owner\": \"railiance-apps\",\n \"ready_check\": \"Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never Secret values.\",\n \"value_handling\": \"none\",\n \"warden_executes\": false\n },\n {\n \"attended\": false,\n \"auth\": \"the consumer owner's own deployment path\",\n \"entry_point\": \"configure forgejo with issuer https://kc.coulomb.social, client forgejo and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, and make it require one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim before sign-in completes\",\n \"id\": \"hand-over\",\n \"owner\": \"railiance-apps\",\n \"value_handling\": \"none\",\n \"warden_executes\": false\n }\n ],\n \"kind\": \"SecurityCaseRender\",\n \"materialization\": [\n {\n \"body\": \"field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand\",\n \"id\": \"client-secret-path\",\n \"kind\": \"kv_path\",\n \"template\": \"platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\"\n },\n {\n \"body\": \"path \\\"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\\\" {\\n capabilities = [\\\"read\\\"]\\n}\\n\",\n \"description\": \"KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.\",\n \"id\": \"keycape-reader-policy\",\n \"kind\": \"openbao_policy\",\n \"template\": \"workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso\"\n },\n {\n \"body\": \"path \\\"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\\\" {\\n capabilities = [\\\"read\\\"]\\n}\\n\",\n \"description\": \"The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.\",\n \"id\": \"consumer-reader-policy\",\n \"kind\": \"openbao_policy\",\n \"template\": \"workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\"\n },\n {\n \"body\": \"auth: kubernetes\\nbound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]\\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]\\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso]\\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\\ntoken_ttl: 15m\\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\\n\",\n \"description\": \"The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only.\",\n \"id\": \"eso-role\",\n \"kind\": \"openbao_role\",\n \"template\": \"external-secrets-keycape-forgejo\"\n },\n {\n \"body\": \"auth: kubernetes\\nbound_service_account_names: [forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso]\\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [forgejo]\\naudience: openbao\\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo]\\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\\ntoken_ttl: 15m\\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\\n\",\n \"description\": \"Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity. Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic controller isolation is claimed.\",\n \"id\": \"consumer-eso-role\",\n \"kind\": \"openbao_role\",\n \"template\": \"external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\"\n },\n {\n \"body\": \"id: forgejo-keycape-client\\nowner_repo: key-cape\\nwarden_executes: false\\nrisk: high\\nstatus: active once verification passes\\nworkload_ref: applicable, name forgejo, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred\\npath_template: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\\nfield: CLIENT_SECRET\\ndelegation: native, intended_owner key-cape\\nrotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven\\n\",\n \"description\": \"One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.\",\n \"id\": \"catalog-entry\",\n \"kind\": \"catalog_entry\",\n \"template\": \"forgejo-keycape-client\"\n }\n ],\n \"rollback\": [\n {\n \"action\": \"remove the OIDC source for forgejo from forgejo (owner railiance-apps)\",\n \"reverses\": \"hand-over\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is not immediate OpenBao token revocation.\",\n \"reverses\": \"deliver-consumer-secret\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for forgejo\",\n \"reverses\": \"register-client\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"remove env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed\",\n \"reverses\": \"bind-env\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client and its target\",\n \"reverses\": \"deliver-secret\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed\",\n \"reverses\": \"mint-secret\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers\",\n \"reverses\": \"ensure-groups\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)\",\n \"reverses\": \"client-secret-path\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo\",\n \"reverses\": \"eso-role\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso, after eso-role\",\n \"reverses\": \"keycape-reader-policy\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or prove expiration before declaring deactivation.\",\n \"reverses\": \"consumer-eso-role\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\",\n \"reverses\": \"consumer-reader-policy\"\n },\n {\n \"action\": \"remove catalog entry forgejo-keycape-client\",\n \"reverses\": \"catalog-entry\"\n }\n ],\n \"type\": \"oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2\",\n \"verification\": [\n {\n \"check\": \"GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and each of https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback returns the login page\",\n \"expect\": \"present\",\n \"id\": \"authorize-accepts-redirects\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error\",\n \"expect\": \"deny\",\n \"id\": \"authorize-refuses-other-redirect\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\",\n \"expect\": \"deny\",\n \"id\": \"custody-denied-to-default\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo (capabilities check only)\",\n \"expect\": \"allow\",\n \"id\": \"custody-allowed-to-consumer\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"LLDAP groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added\",\n \"expect\": \"present\",\n \"id\": \"groups-present\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"forgejo's OIDC source for forgejo (owner railiance-apps) requires one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)\",\n \"expect\": \"present\",\n \"id\": \"consumer-enforces-groups\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only)\",\n \"expect\": \"present\",\n \"id\": \"secret-delivered\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"keycape-client.py inspect for forgejo shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)\",\n \"expect\": \"present\",\n \"id\": \"mfa-pinned\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n },\n {\n \"check\": \"forgejo SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value read\",\n \"expect\": \"present\",\n \"id\": \"consumer-secret-delivered\",\n \"reads_secret_value\": false\n }\n ]\n}\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-type-1-1-yaml", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content": "apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1\nkind: SecurityCaseType\nspec:\n id: oidc-browser-relying-party\n version: \"1.1\"\n status: acknowledged\n title: \"Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service\"\n purpose: >-\n Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom\n (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups\n the service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client\n secret minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout\n scripts in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038).\n\n parameters:\n - name: client_id\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$\"}\n sensitivity: operational\n description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape.\n - name: display_name\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^[^\\\\n\\\\r]{1,80}$\"}\n sensitivity: public\n description: Name shown on the sign-in page.\n - name: redirect_uris\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^https://[^*?#\\\\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\\\\s,]+)*$\"}\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: >-\n Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain http, no\n query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses '*' and '?' at startup, and OAuth\n 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1).\n - name: allowed_scopes\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {enum: [\"openid,profile,email,groups\", \"openid,email,groups\", \"openid,profile,groups\", \"openid,groups\"]}\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: >-\n Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups,\n because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups\n only for that scope (key-cape type review R2).\n - name: client_type\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {enum: [\"confidential\", \"public\"]}\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only).\n - name: mfa_required\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {enum: [\"true\", \"false\"]}\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: >-\n \"true\" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants\n administrative or owner rights. \"false\" is not \"no MFA\": the client then\n carries no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA\n policy. A renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which\n would skip that policy (key-cape type review R3).\n - name: access_groups\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$\"}\n sensitivity: operational\n description: >-\n Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles. Created if\n absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to any\n authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming\n service enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting;\n key-cape type review R2).\n - name: initial_members\n type: string\n required: false\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$\"}\n sensitivity: operational\n description: \"Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are directory usernames, never secrets.\"\n - name: consuming_service\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$\"}\n sensitivity: operational\n description: The service that signs users in with this client.\n - name: consumer_owner_repo\n type: string\n case_settable: true\n constraints: {pattern: \"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$\"}\n sensitivity: operational\n description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration.\n - name: issuer\n type: string\n case_settable: false\n default: https://kc.coulomb.social\n sensitivity: security_sensitive\n description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type.\n\n composition:\n authority: netkingdom\n initial_trust: [runtime_secret_trust, runtime_identity_trust]\n capabilities: [c1.lightweight-sso]\n providers:\n c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration\n parameter_bindings:\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type\n net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required\n\n materialization:\n # Placement follows the live CCR-2026-0033 reference (secrets-engine-openbao,\n # ops-mason plans/keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client-custody.md). The path\n # is derived, not case-settable, and the policies reuse the existing\n # workload-kv-read-keycape-- family (MASON-WP-0010-T01).\n - id: client-secret-path\n kind: kv_path\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n template: \"platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\"\n body: \"field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand\"\n - id: keycape-reader-policy\n kind: openbao_policy\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n template: \"workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso\"\n body: |\n path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n }}\n description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.\n - id: consumer-reader-policy\n kind: openbao_policy\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n template: \"workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}\"\n body: |\n path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n }}\n description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.\n - id: eso-role\n kind: openbao_role\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n template: \"external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}\"\n body: |\n auth: kubernetes\n bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]\n bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]\n token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso]\n token_no_default_policy: true\n token_ttl: 15m\n token_max_ttl: 15m\n description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only.\n - id: catalog-entry\n kind: catalog_entry\n template: \"{consuming_service}-keycape-client\"\n body: |\n id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client\n owner_repo: key-cape\n warden_executes: false\n risk: high\n status: active once verification passes\n workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred\n path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\n field: CLIENT_SECRET\n delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape\n rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven\n description: >-\n One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the\n consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.\n follow_through:\n - id: ensure-groups\n owner: net-kingdom\n entry_point: \"identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups}; members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)\"\n auth: \"operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent\"\n lane: key-cape-oidc-login\n warden_executes: false\n attended: true\n value_handling: none\n attended_justification: >-\n The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and\n its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as\n user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002).\n Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended\n session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator\n credential of its own and an admitted path.\n - id: mint-secret\n owner: railiance-platform\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n entry_point: \"railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\"\n auth: \"the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned\"\n lane: keycape-client-secret-generate\n warden_executes: true\n attended: false\n value_handling: generated_in_custody\n - id: deliver-secret\n owner: railiance-platform\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n entry_point: \"ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\"\n auth: \"railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; no value leaves custody\"\n warden_executes: false\n attended: false\n value_handling: none\n ready_check: \"the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)\"\n - id: bind-env\n owner: net-kingdom\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n entry_point: \"patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client\"\n auth: \"operator kube credentials for namespace sso\"\n lane: key-cape-oidc-login\n warden_executes: false\n attended: true\n value_handling: none\n attended_justification: >-\n A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same\n attended operator session as register-client, before it, because\n KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails\n closed if the binding is missing.\n - id: register-client\n owner: net-kingdom\n entry_point: \"sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)\"\n auth: \"operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso\"\n lane: key-cape-oidc-login\n warden_executes: false\n attended: true\n value_handling: none\n attended_justification: >-\n The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do\n not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a\n non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended\n operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups\n all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients\n at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so\n the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go\n in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must\n pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape\n c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the\n restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client\n loses sign-in (R1).\n - id: hand-over\n owner: \"{consumer_owner_repo}\"\n entry_point: \"configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes\"\n auth: \"the consumer owner's own deployment path\"\n warden_executes: false\n attended: false\n value_handling: none\n\n verification:\n - id: authorize-accepts-redirects\n check: \"GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} returns the login page\"\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect\n check: \"GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error\"\n expect: deny\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: custody-denied-to-default\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n check: \"a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\"\n expect: deny\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n check: \"policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only)\"\n expect: allow\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: groups-present\n check: \"LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added\"\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: consumer-enforces-groups\n # KeyCape has no per-client group gate; only the consumer can enforce\n # access_groups (key-cape type review R2, type 1.1).\n check: \"{consuming_service}'s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)\"\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: secret-delivered\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n check: \"the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only)\"\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n - id: mfa-pinned\n when: \"mfa_required == true\"\n check: \"keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)\"\n expect: present\n reads_secret_value: false\n\n rollback:\n - reverses: hand-over\n action: \"remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner {consumer_owner_repo})\"\n - reverses: register-client\n action: \"keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}\"\n - reverses: bind-env\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed\"\n - reverses: deliver-secret\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target\"\n - reverses: mint-secret\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed\"\n - reverses: ensure-groups\n action: \"identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses {access_groups}\"\n - reverses: client-secret-path\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)\"\n - reverses: eso-role\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}\"\n - reverses: keycape-reader-policy\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role\"\n - reverses: consumer-reader-policy\n when: \"client_type == confidential\"\n action: \"delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}\"\n - reverses: catalog-entry\n action: \"remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client\"\n\n acceptance:\n accepted_by: [owner, founder]\n risk_class: medium\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-case-1-1-yaml", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content": "# First KnownSecurityCase of oidc-browser-relying-party 1.1 (NK-WP-0048-T06).\n# Parameters are the request the founder accepted on 2026-10-08\n# (key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml, KEY-WP-0038-T01); that\n# acceptance carries over as this case's acceptance. One difference: custody is\n# derived by the type (platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo), not the request's\n# proposed platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client. The founder\n# acknowledged that derivation with the type (memo r4, 2026-10-09).\n# Re-pinned from 1.0 to 1.1 on 2026-10-10 on the founder's go, before any\n# apply, so no 1.0 run overlaps (minor change: consumer-enforces-groups).\napiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1\nkind: SecurityCase\nspec:\n id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\n type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1\n status: accepted\n acceptance:\n at: \"2026-10-08\"\n record: \"key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml (status accepted-2026-10-08, KEY-WP-0038-T01); type acknowledged via informed-decision memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, hub decision e418263e\"\n by:\n - {role: owner, name: \"founder (for railiance-apps)\"}\n - {role: founder, name: founder}\n owner:\n repo: railiance-apps\n person: founder\n parameters:\n client_id: forgejo\n display_name: Forgejo source forge\n redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback\n allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups\n client_type: confidential\n mfa_required: \"true\"\n access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers\n initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick\n consuming_service: forgejo\n consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "consumer-delivery-yaml", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: ServiceAccount\nmetadata:\n name: forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso\n namespace: forgejo\n labels:\n app.kubernetes.io/name: forgejo\n app.kubernetes.io/part-of: railiance-apps\nautomountServiceAccountToken: false\n---\napiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1\nkind: SecretStore\nmetadata:\n name: openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer\n namespace: forgejo\nspec:\n provider:\n vault:\n server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200\n path: platform\n version: v2\n auth:\n kubernetes:\n mountPath: kubernetes\n role: external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\n serviceAccountRef:\n name: forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso\n audiences:\n - openbao\n---\napiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1\nkind: ExternalSecret\nmetadata:\n name: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client\n namespace: forgejo\n labels:\n app.kubernetes.io/name: forgejo\n app.kubernetes.io/part-of: railiance-apps\nspec:\n refreshInterval: 15m\n secretStoreRef:\n name: openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer\n kind: SecretStore\n target:\n name: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client\n creationPolicy: Owner\n deletionPolicy: Retain\n template:\n metadata:\n labels:\n app.kubernetes.io/name: forgejo\n app.kubernetes.io/part-of: railiance-apps\n data:\n - secretKey: CLIENT_SECRET\n remoteRef:\n key: workloads/keycape/forgejo\n property: CLIENT_SECRET\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "ccr-0042-proposed-body-yaml", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content": "id: CCR-2026-0042\nkind: credential-change-request\nschema_version: 1\nrequest_type: workload-kv-read\ntitle: 'forgejo-netkingdom-oidc: proposed dedicated consumer ESO reader (oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2)'\nstatus: proposed\ncreated: '2026-10-09'\nupdated: '2026-10-11'\nrequester:\n agent: ops-mason\n reason: Source-only owner refinement of existing CCR-2026-0042. Proposed type/case1.2 and full run source require\n new exact acknowledgment; original approvals do not authorize this reader role or native delivery. Historical\n body retained by exact file hash and provenance below.\nreview:\n required: true\n required_approvers:\n - platform-owner\n comments: []\ntarget:\n domain: infotech\n tenant: platform\n workload: forgejo\n environment: production\n purpose: Dedicated namespace-local ESO reference identity delivers CLIENT_SECRET to Forgejo; the Forgejo workload/default\n SA does not authenticate directly to OpenBao.\nopenbao:\n mount: platform\n kv_path: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\n fields:\n - CLIENT_SECRET\n policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\n policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo.hcl\n metadata_read: false\n token_self_lifecycle: true\n auth:\n method: kubernetes\n mount: kubernetes\n role: external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\n audience: openbao\n ttl: 15m\n token_max_ttl: 15m\n token_explicit_max_ttl: 15m\n token_no_default_policy: true\n policies:\n - workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\n bound_claims:\n service_account_names:\n - forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso\n service_account_namespaces:\n - forgejo\n bound_claims_confirmed: false\naccess_frontdoor:\n type: external-secrets\n catalog_id: forgejo-keycape-client\n readiness: pending-review\n resolvable: false\nrisk:\n classification: high\n notes:\n - Rendered from proposed SecurityCaseType/case 1.2 source, not an acknowledged successor. Retained read-only native\n ESO image/CRD/RBAC and Forgejo identity observations support preparation only; bound claims remain unconfirmed\n and apply blocked. The new sixth consumer role/auth path requires fresh informed-decision acknowledgment under\n SecurityCaseTypes canon section 6; acknowledged type 1.1 and accepted case 1.1 do not authorize it.\n - Exact read on one KV path; no metadata, list, parent or sibling access.\n - Dedicated reference identity separates consumer and KeyCape role bindings, but common ESO controller already\n has clusterwide TokenRequest and Secret permissions; no controller compromise isolation is claimed.\n - ESO v0.16.1 TokenRequest expiry is 600 seconds and its fallback reads legacy SA token references; proposed dedicated\n SA has no legacy tokens and automount false.\n - Native publication requires exact1.2 acknowledgment and independent owner changes/created-only receipts; no\n live grant is issued by this draft.\nverification:\n positive:\n - policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo grants read on platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo only\n (capabilities check)\n negative:\n - a default-only identity has no read capability on the path\n - sibling GET and parent LIST are denied\n activation_conditions:\n - case acceptance present\n - bound claims confirmed by the platform owner\nlifecycle:\n deactivate: First revert consumer reference and remove only proved-created target/delivery objects; revoke issued\n reader tokens or await verified expiry, then delete created role and finally policy. Preserve shared/matched\n objects.\n rotate: roll-forward through the credential broker (mint-secret); never a read of the old value\n compromised: owner incident process; no automatic read, reseed or cleanup\nsecurity_case:\n case: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\n type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2\n render_digest: sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35\n acceptance_record: PENDING exact proposed1.2 owner/founder acknowledgment; original1.1 acceptance is not transferred\n accepted_at: null\n accepted_by: []\nhistorical_request:\n path: credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0042-forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-consumer-reader.yaml\n sha256: a36ab567839c12660c8ca468c8e4c6a67e367c92ae2ae51851b8e34c35a277f3\n security_case:\n case: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\n type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0\n render_digest: sha256:fb8b114d465341a46bb492259cb9c6b77bc0731670edace2e13a1f58758c6e23\n acceptance_record: key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml (status accepted-2026-10-08, KEY-WP-0038-T01);\n type acknowledged via informed-decision memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, hub decision e418263e\n accepted_at: '2026-10-08'\n accepted_by:\n - owner\n - founder\nproposed_refinement_readiness:\n owner: railiance-apps\n blocking_reason: Concrete identity and supported ESO design are prepared; native metadata apply/delivery remains\n unapproved. Existing ORGREF-WP-0002 coordinates consumer handover and break-glass gates.\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-role-json", - "media_type": "application/json", - "content": "{\n \"bound_service_account_names\": [\n \"forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso\"\n ],\n \"bound_service_account_namespaces\": [\n \"forgejo\"\n ],\n \"audience\": \"openbao\",\n \"token_policies\": [\n \"workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo\"\n ],\n \"token_no_default_policy\": true,\n \"token_ttl\": 900,\n \"token_max_ttl\": 900,\n \"token_explicit_max_ttl\": 900\n}\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-policy-hcl", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content": "# workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo: CCR-2026-0042, from ops-mason SecurityCase forgejo-netkingdom-oidc\n# (oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0, render sha256:fb8b114d...). Platform-generated from the CCR:\n# the case render omitted the token self-lifecycle stanzas that token_self_lifecycle requires.\n\npath \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\npath \"auth/token/lookup-self\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\npath \"auth/token/revoke-self\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "owner-design-md", - "media_type": "text/markdown", - "content": "# Forgejo consumer ESO reader — concrete source proposal\n\nRAPPS-WP-0016 already chooses ESO delivery for the OIDC client secret. This proposal fills its missing reader identity without asking the founder to make that same source choice again. It is not a live apply, a new credential grant, or first-case success. Existing ORGREF-WP-0002 remains the project driver; CCR42, MASON-WP-0010-T03 and NK-WP-0048-T06 remain the owner work, rather than another workplan.\n\nActual read-only railiance01 metadata shows ESO v0.16.1 running as external-secrets/external-secrets, served v1/v1beta1 SecretStore CRDs supporting serviceAccountRef.audiences, and controller RBAC permitting serviceaccounts/token create. Forgejo and its runner currently share forgejo/default; they must not become the OpenBao reader identity. No consumer namespace SecretStore or dedicated OIDC-delivery SA exists in the observed metadata. Existing forgejo-mailer-eso is a separate SMTP lane and remains unchanged. No OpenBao login, capability check, auth operation, Secret value, Secret object retrieval, or native materialization was performed.\n\n## Exact supported reader\n\n`consumer-delivery.yaml` prepares exactly three namespaced objects: ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso with automount=false and no legacy token refs; SecretStore forgejo/openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer; ExternalSecret forgejo/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client. The store requests a token for that dedicated serviceAccountRef, audiences=[openbao], and authenticates to OpenBao Kubernetes role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo. The role binds exactly that SA and namespace, only workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, no default policy, and a 900-second maximum OpenBao token lifetime. ESO's installed source requests a 600-second Kubernetes token and can fall back to legacy SA tokens; owner admission must ensure this new SA has no legacy tokens, never create one to bypass a failed TokenRequest.\n\nThe namespace SecretStore cannot select another namespace's SA; serviceAccountRef.namespace is omitted. No extra RBAC, projected workload token, Deployment SA replacement or controller identity change is proposed. Namespace/default is not an OpenBao-bound reader. ESO remains the shared trusted controller: it already has clusterwide TokenRequest and Secret permissions and can request this SA's token. This separates reader binding/revocation and avoids default identity reuse; it does not isolate this secret from controller compromise or grant new cryptographic isolation.\n\nThe exact KV data ACL is platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo, read only, plus existing self-token lookup/revoke stanzas. No metadata/list/parent/sibling access is added. Delivery maps only remote workloads/keycape/forgejo field CLIENT_SECRET to target key CLIENT_SECRET. Target creationPolicy=Owner and deletionPolicy=Retain preserve fail-safe remote-deletion behavior. Refresh is 15m; the value is never present in this source. Existing internal OpenBao HTTP endpoint and controller custody behavior are retained, not upgraded into a TLS/isolation claim.\n\n## Type and structural boundary\n\nNetKingdom's proposed successor type 1.2 adds explicit case parameter consumer_namespace, one sixth structural object consumer-eso-role, and separate owner deliver-consumer-secret follow-through/readiness/rollback. All original five rendered structural bodies compare equal to current1.1. Existing acknowledged type 1.1 and accepted case 1.1 remain byte-preserved; the proposed 1.2 case has status proposed and no copied acceptance. Full proposed render is c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Existing acceptance does not silently extend to the new role/runtime delivery. Owner review and exact type/case acknowledgment precede any build, metadata apply or materialized-status receipt.\n\nThe current Mason builder gives every role-backed reader the ESO draft suffix. With two reader roles it silently overwrites one CCR. The new regression proves that defect against current source; the minimal staged fix retains ESO for the KeyCape reader and Forgejo for consumer-reader-policy, plus refuses duplicate output identities.42 actual focused builder/plan/structure tests pass with corrected source, including both independent CCRs, platform validation and a complete six-object structural request. Existing1.1 tests remain passing. No fake proposed 1.2 acceptance is used: Mason correctly refuses to build a merely proposed successor. Test fixtures alone temporarily acknowledge synthetic roles to exercise builder semantics.\n\nThe proposed CCR42 body uses proposed status, bound_claims_confirmed=false, explicit pending1.2 acknowledgment and old CCR's exact historical hash/provenance. Owner validation passes with the expected apply-blocking warning. It is stored separately from the actual in-flight CCR42; no historical review or applied CCR41 is rewritten. Folding this reviewed body into CCR42 remains an owner reconciliation with retained original revision, not a fresh parallel request.\n\n## Admission, native proof and recovery\n\nBefore an exact scoped native proposal, refresh ESO image/CRD/RBAC, Forgejo/default and runner identity, the three proposed object identities and target metadata through Kubernetes PartialObjectMetadata only. Classify absent, exact preexisting-matched or conflicting; refuse a legacy-token SA, unknown ownership, changed role/policy, audience mismatch or shared target. Never read Secret data. Preserve current UIDs/resourceVersions, authenticated owner change receipts and the exact type/case/render/source pins. No placeholder SA claim substitutes for actual owner admission.\n\nPlatform materialization applies only the reviewed exact-path policy and dedicated Kubernetes-auth role after its own approved CCR path. Fresh owner metadata/capability receipts must prove exact binding and distinguish case-created from preexisting; no minted value or successful delivery is required to prove structure. Mason's existing typed structural contract then covers all six objects, including source layout and catalog pointer; source-only bodies are not authenticated native evidence. Warden native dispatch/descriptors/session receipt and per-owner provenance still need their existing accepted integration review.\n\nConsumer follow-through applies the three admitted objects, then checks SecretStore/ExternalSecret Ready status and exact target UID/ownerReference through metadata only. Shared/matched objects never acquire delete authority. If ESO reports failure, stop; no manual Secret seeding or controller/static-token fallback is admitted. Minting, KeyCape client/env/groups, and Forgejo Helm OIDC/group enforcement stay distinct existing first-case steps. Forgejo gitea.oauth secret-consumption settings were not changed or Helm-render-verified here; they must be prepared/reviewed before T02 handover, with current local login intact and T01 break-glass acceptance still a prerequisite. Delivery Ready alone does not complete browser/MFA/group checks or forge closure.\n\nCreated-only rollback first reverts the consumer secret reference/auth source through its owner Helm revision. Remove only the admitted trial-created ExternalSecret and independently proven case-created target UID/ownerReference; preserve matched/shared targets. Then remove only created namespace SecretStore and SA. Remove only the created OpenBao role after revoking its issued tokens or proving expiry, then created policy. Role/SA/store deletion does not revoke already issued OpenBao tokens; deletion alone is not deactivation proof. Retain native/audit/source receipts and stop if references, UIDs or ownership changed. Do not infer delete authority from Mason's legacy planned rollback inventory.\n\nRAPPS-WP-0016-T02, current CCR42, MASON-WP-0010-T03 and first-case acceptance remain unfinished. ORGREF-WP-0002 holds this owner return. Human-only break-glass/account-link/MFA/first-case acknowledgment gates remain separate from source preparation; no new human login is requested by this packet.\n\n## Supplementary generated-CCR refinement after Platform conditional review\n\nExact prior 271 packet is preserved at /tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271, alongside original c48. Platform found two additional generator gaps: hardcoded keycape target for the consumer, and delete-only consumer-role lifecycle. Both meaningful counterexamples fail against 271 source before the fix. Current staged generator derives target.workload from consuming_service only for consumer-reader-policy, preserving all KeyCape ESO output fields. A role-backed consumer CCR requires reverting consumer reference, authenticated case-created ownership, preservation of preexisting/shared objects, issued-token owner revocation or independently verified expiry before deactivation, and no new login/remint during recovery. Actual owner native authority remains required; generated wording is not an implemented revocation adapter.\n\nForty-four focused builder/plan/structure tests now pass. Earlier 42 and original counterexample/failure history remain retained. The old committed 1.1 bundle still mislabels the consumer workload keycape and therefore correctly fails fresh exact target matching after this correction. That historical bundle is preserved; the checker is not weakened or grandfathered. Local fixtures alone use corrected/rehashed consumer metadata, with a separate regression proving old bundle refusal. Current 1.1 unbound consumer generation changes only its previously wrong target.workload; KeyCape reader output remains unchanged. The proposed 1.2 render/type/case/source remains pending exact acknowledgment, with identical six-object structural body and no native completion claim. Fresh source build/bundle owner reconciliation must occur after exact acceptance before any native apply/materialization; old CCR or bundle approval is not silently reassigned. New source/test hashes are in validation.json and generated projection receipt.\n" - }, - { - "item_id": "retained-native-metadata-json", - "media_type": "application/json", - "content": "{\n \"eso_rbac_bindings\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"ClusterRoleBinding\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-cert-controller\",\n \"namespace\": null,\n \"roleRef\": {\n \"apiGroup\": \"rbac.authorization.k8s.io\",\n \"kind\": \"ClusterRole\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-cert-controller\"\n },\n \"rules\": [\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"apiextensions.k8s.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"customresourcedefinitions\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"admissionregistration.k8s.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"validatingwebhookconfigurations\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"list\",\n \"watch\",\n \"get\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"admissionregistration.k8s.io\"\n ],\n \"resourceNames\": [\n \"secretstore-validate\",\n \"externalsecret-validate\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"validatingwebhookconfigurations\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"endpoints\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"list\",\n \"get\",\n \"watch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"events\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"create\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"secrets\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"coordination.k8s.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"leases\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"create\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"subjects\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"ServiceAccount\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-cert-controller\",\n \"namespace\": \"external-secrets\"\n }\n ]\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"ClusterRoleBinding\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-controller\",\n \"namespace\": null,\n \"roleRef\": {\n \"apiGroup\": \"rbac.authorization.k8s.io\",\n \"kind\": \"ClusterRole\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-controller\"\n },\n \"rules\": [\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"external-secrets.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"secretstores\",\n \"clustersecretstores\",\n \"externalsecrets\",\n \"clusterexternalsecrets\",\n \"pushsecrets\",\n \"clusterpushsecrets\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"external-secrets.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"externalsecrets\",\n \"externalsecrets/status\",\n \"externalsecrets/finalizers\",\n \"secretstores\",\n \"secretstores/status\",\n \"secretstores/finalizers\",\n \"clustersecretstores\",\n \"clustersecretstores/status\",\n \"clustersecretstores/finalizers\",\n \"clusterexternalsecrets\",\n \"clusterexternalsecrets/status\",\n \"clusterexternalsecrets/finalizers\",\n \"pushsecrets\",\n \"pushsecrets/status\",\n \"pushsecrets/finalizers\",\n \"clusterpushsecrets\",\n \"clusterpushsecrets/status\",\n \"clusterpushsecrets/finalizers\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"generators.external-secrets.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"generatorstates\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\",\n \"create\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\",\n \"delete\",\n \"deletecollection\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"generators.external-secrets.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"acraccesstokens\",\n \"clustergenerators\",\n \"ecrauthorizationtokens\",\n \"fakes\",\n \"gcraccesstokens\",\n \"githubaccesstokens\",\n \"quayaccesstokens\",\n \"passwords\",\n \"stssessiontokens\",\n \"uuids\",\n \"vaultdynamicsecrets\",\n \"webhooks\",\n \"grafanas\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"serviceaccounts\",\n \"namespaces\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"configmaps\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"secrets\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"list\",\n \"watch\",\n \"create\",\n \"update\",\n \"delete\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"serviceaccounts/token\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"create\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"events\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"create\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"external-secrets.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"externalsecrets\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"create\",\n \"update\",\n \"delete\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"external-secrets.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"pushsecrets\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"create\",\n \"update\",\n \"delete\"\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"subjects\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"ServiceAccount\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets\",\n \"namespace\": \"external-secrets\"\n }\n ]\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"RoleBinding\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-leaderelection\",\n \"namespace\": \"external-secrets\",\n \"roleRef\": {\n \"apiGroup\": \"rbac.authorization.k8s.io\",\n \"kind\": \"Role\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-leaderelection\"\n },\n \"rules\": [\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resourceNames\": [\n \"external-secrets-controller\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"configmaps\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"configmaps\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"create\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"apiGroups\": [\n \"coordination.k8s.io\"\n ],\n \"resources\": [\n \"leases\"\n ],\n \"verbs\": [\n \"get\",\n \"create\",\n \"update\",\n \"patch\"\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"subjects\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"ServiceAccount\",\n \"name\": \"external-secrets\",\n \"namespace\": \"external-secrets\"\n }\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"external-secrets_deployments\": [\n {\n \"images\": [\n \"oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1\"\n ],\n \"name\": \"external-secrets\",\n \"serviceAccount\": \"external-secrets\",\n \"uid\": \"e6017556-523a-4b26-b9d1-4c0c90cef483\"\n },\n {\n \"images\": [\n \"oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1\"\n ],\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-cert-controller\",\n \"serviceAccount\": \"external-secrets-cert-controller\",\n \"uid\": \"5134a56f-aa05-4764-9b27-c56e92203c7d\"\n },\n {\n \"images\": [\n \"oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1\"\n ],\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-webhook\",\n \"serviceAccount\": \"external-secrets-webhook\",\n \"uid\": \"6e6e4a6e-4c2c-4659-af56-d4281f2fe229\"\n }\n ],\n \"external-secrets_externalsecrets\": [],\n \"external-secrets_secretstores\": [],\n \"external-secrets_serviceaccounts\": [\n {\n \"automountServiceAccountToken\": null,\n \"name\": \"default\",\n \"uid\": \"cc29abe8-5ace-4cc9-b479-cf8db84df42d\"\n },\n {\n \"automountServiceAccountToken\": false,\n \"name\": \"eso-token-renewer\",\n \"uid\": \"4d44afd7-59e9-44de-9e99-8cd620be41de\"\n },\n {\n \"automountServiceAccountToken\": null,\n \"name\": \"external-secrets\",\n \"uid\": \"c918dc22-b1ee-4e1f-a8f8-1d15ac0d5a10\"\n },\n {\n \"automountServiceAccountToken\": null,\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-cert-controller\",\n \"uid\": \"3c78bb78-a3c5-4953-93d4-cf6621e1200a\"\n },\n {\n \"automountServiceAccountToken\": null,\n \"name\": \"external-secrets-webhook\",\n \"uid\": \"c75dc3ba-42db-4a59-8952-6c94d85d054c\"\n }\n ],\n \"forgejo_deployments\": [\n {\n \"images\": [\n \"code.forgejo.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0.3-rootless\"\n ],\n \"name\": \"forgejo-gitea\",\n \"serviceAccount\": \"default\",\n \"uid\": \"e8eff0aa-64bb-4b44-9a80-a66612986355\"\n },\n {\n \"images\": [\n \"docker:27-dind\",\n \"code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner:6.3.1\"\n ],\n \"name\": \"forgejo-runner\",\n \"serviceAccount\": \"default\",\n \"uid\": 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\"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- }, - { - "item_id": "recording-gates-md", - "media_type": "text/markdown", - "content": "# Source-only disposition recording gates\n\nStable proposal NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1; memo infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1. Preparation contains no disposition, acceptance ID, human identity assertion or grant.\n\n1. REQUIRED before human submission or type acknowledgment recording: complete the actual 1.2 README/examples/runnable test package, obtain its full owner validator/test proof and separate NetKingdom source-review receipt, and bind them into this same unposted memo revision. The initial actual owner proposal directory lacked all three and reported those three failures, retained unchanged in proposal history. The staged proposed package supplement now passes the actual full owner validator and 22 runnable tests; its exact files and commands are bound in validation-and-history.json. Obtain the separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt for this exact supplement before posting; technical readiness is complete and owner-review remains the next required submission gate. Core schema/render success alone cannot satisfy this gate. Then verify every bound nineteen-file source hash and all three independent owner-review hashes. Verify proposed type 017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db, proposed case 1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab and full render c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Regenerate with actual owner validator/composer, preserving execution.permitted=false. Changed declared role, bindings, trust, source body or packet requires review of the refined exact revision.\n2. Native informed-decision must provide a genuine independent human source disposition for this new memo/version/exact packet. Preserve approval/disposition/binding/source identities, actual founder resolver and observed time/stale state through existing admitted read paths. A technical review, local JSON, old e418/1.1 acceptance or State Hub prose alone is not this evidence. Record declined/pending/stale outcomes honestly. No privileged transport/grant/native runtime action follows from acknowledgment.\n3. If the human acknowledges the type and approves this reference-migration design as its declared consumer owner/founder, record only roles supported by that actual disposition; design approval is confined to a separate owner receipt, not canonical case acceptance. Preserve exact current acknowledged 1.1 type, accepted 1.1 case, old source acknowledgment/date/by and proposed 1.2 bytes in immutable owner history before any canonical promotion. Only after actual complete section 3 package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt, NetKingdom may record the reviewed 1.2 type acknowledgment with only source acknowledgment status/history reference changes; do not overwrite the old version/history as a silent renewal. The actual 1.2 package must have its README, valid examples and runnable tests, pass the owner full-package validator/test command, and be bound by a separate NetKingdom owner source-review receipt before recording type acknowledgment. The bound complete proposed package now proves availability and validator/test readiness; the separate source-owner receipt must still be recorded before posting and acknowledgment recording, without inferring it from the 1.1 package. No implemented marker is permitted from this memo.\n4. REQUIRED: reference-migration source approval is recorded only in a separate NetKingdom/consumer-owner design receipt. Canonical case 1.2 remains proposed while the type is unimplemented; do not add canonical acceptance fields, phase-acceptance markers or accepted status from this acknowledgment. Canon sections 4/5 permits canonical case acceptance only for implemented types. Existing --allow-unimplemented first-reference source-build handling does not waive normal admission or this recording rule. Preserve original 1.1 case/history without overlap or repinning it as accepted 1.2. Only the actual implemented-type admission and separate case owner/founder acceptance can later change canonical case status.\n5. Reconcile source-only CCR42/draft/current bundle deliberately under owners, retaining historical body/review pins. New acknowledgment cannot confirm bound_claims, apply credentials or adopt existing resources. Historical wrong-target bundle remains refused; source rebundle must bind fresh current case/type/full render/owner review, with created-only runtime receipts still absent. Record updated source digests rather than backfill old digests with new meaning.\n6. All native auth/ESO/materialization/credential/session/verification gates remain unmet: owner adapters/global evidence verifier, independent observations/capabilities/creation ownership, Platform claims/apply approval, Warden descriptors/contained session/revocation and founder scoped native go. Preserve execution.permitted=false until those actual gates are separately discharged. Link source outcome to existing ORGREF/NK/Mason/Warden/RAPPS/CCR work; no new plan or automatic completion. Human browser/MFA/break-glass/first-case completion remains separate.\n\n## Actual completed-package source review binding\n\nThe independent NetKingdom completed-package source review of exact prior packet 330da7fe is now losslessly attached, alongside the original exact19 source review, in the two clearly labelled review bundles. Each carries the source path, SHA256 and gzip-base64 encoding of the exact original bytes. The separate package-owner review gate is satisfied; source-only posting readiness is true after root obtains narrow confirmation of this receipt rebinding and README clarification. README now explicitly distinguishes observed Forgejo/runner workload forgejo/default from the historical unbound OpenBao consumer policy; no historical default-SA reader binding is claimed. The genuine human disposition remains absent and canonical case remains proposed/unimplemented.\n" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/lifecycle-commands.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/lifecycle-commands.json deleted file mode 100644 index 305a341..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/lifecycle-commands.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", - "register": { - "memo": { - "id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", - "version": 1, - "question": "Acknowledge the exact proposed OIDC browser relying-party 1.2 architecture after complete-package validation and owner review, with Forgejo migration design recorded separately and its canonical case staying proposed, without native authority?", - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": "Source-only acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes section 6 of the sixth dedicated consumer reader role and separate Forgejo reference-migration design receipt only. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while type is unimplemented; actual full package README/examples/runnable tests and separate NetKingdom source-owner review gate type acknowledgment recording. Original five structural bodies unchanged; common ESO trust/600-second TokenRequest/legacy fallback and created-only token-revocation-or-expiry recovery disclosed. Three independent architecture owner reviews / 44 tests and the completed package NetKingdom review / 22 tests attached; bound claims and execution remain false. Old 1.1 is not inherited and native gates remain separate.", - "binding": { - "principal": { - "id": "pending-human-session", - "kind": "person", - "display_name": "Founder source acknowledgment" - }, - "target": { - "kind": "resource", - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc", - "label": "Exact NetKingdom type 1.2 and Forgejo reference-case source", - "environment": "build" - }, - "terms": "Only NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1 and exact reviewed nineteen-file manifest 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431/full render c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Type acknowledgment recording requires actual complete section 3 package validation and separate NetKingdom source-owner review. Reference-migration design approval is separate owner-receipt only; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed/unimplemented, without acceptance fields or phase acceptance. Record genuine new native human source disposition before any permitted type acknowledgment fields, after full package/source-owner gates, preserve immutable 1.1 history. No credential/auth/ESO/materialization/session/grant/native completion; execution.permitted=false and bound_claims_confirmed=false until separately discharged actual native owner gates." - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "label": "decision-packet.md", - "hash": "sha256:bb9a3f12248d18a51d06daf1235903ed8827c55e9e28bcb80c76d414db0d1a56" - }, - { - "item_id": "proposal-json", - "label": "proposal.json", - "hash": "sha256:3d726df3bebcfeb50dd0a5f83ad1ba94d0408caeec84a421feb1555b4b106e97" - }, - { - "item_id": "source-inventory-json", - "label": "source-inventory.json", - "hash": "sha256:fc06655f48d33c84fee1764de71649dde4f584e36388bce2af1e459d2728bc7c" - }, - { - "item_id": "type-1-2-yaml", - "label": "type-1.2.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db" - }, - { - "item_id": "case-1-2-yaml", - "label": "case-1.2.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab" - }, - { - "item_id": "render-1-2-json", - "label": "render-1.2.json", - "hash": "sha256:96b25108335e2cf5f96af481fe8a7735831c8320d81b50f7c6e6d4e53d0c0f02" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-type-1-1-yaml", - "label": "current-type-1.1.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-case-1-1-yaml", - "label": "current-case-1.1.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d" - }, - { - "item_id": "consumer-delivery-yaml", - "label": "consumer-delivery.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:56478a83d799c08dc1e5159983b1e843a46b16dfeee7e84c31401d1f92430df2" - }, - { - "item_id": "ccr-0042-proposed-body-yaml", - "label": "CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:6544600c63a86559ba053240c476d493f4d2f25c9cd22cf6a9a05f09ee617a86" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-role-json", - "label": "reader-role.json", - "hash": "sha256:976b19e0780b6056ed54bf5e8f27a0eb786af65817d9ec00ca161ac46e7d72e7" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-policy-hcl", - "label": "reader-policy.hcl", - "hash": "sha256:af3a638605c1f6dff7879771fede4c56a6b9a7e430d4b5b58c370063b2c888ca" - }, - { - "item_id": "owner-design-md", - "label": "owner-design.md", - "hash": "sha256:c523949454e4c6eb58e8caee382380a561f561704136de62bf5783c592f962f2" - }, - { - "item_id": "retained-native-metadata-json", - "label": "retained-native-metadata.json", - "hash": "sha256:4e2993f5920215f41e4a235743023f22b78b8f597d3d70ed279991b2fc3204b5" - }, - { - "item_id": "mason-final-review-json", - "label": "mason-final-review.json", - "hash": "sha256:28541874fb437a06a8f1749bc50c88f6fee3d7c100c2f3ee0c52b59afaf8e102" - }, - { - "item_id": "platform-final-review-json", - "label": "platform-final-review.json", - "hash": "sha256:72854a798e01c6d65a16770efb1329d211fe3c59a3f4ad3190d6972f5c886f6e" - }, - { - "item_id": "netkingdom-review-bundle-json", - "label": "netkingdom-review-bundle.json", - "hash": "sha256:d452d90d886519186e2170592e6ab7389f384eff6c12795c8ad66a798e0966e0" - }, - { - "item_id": "netkingdom-review-sources-bundle-json", - "label": "netkingdom-review-sources-bundle.json", - "hash": "sha256:1b6c0432150ec9fd07a8aa4a005051081f7ac2557a2787fe5b32cdb7387d6648" - }, - { - "item_id": "validation-and-history-json", - "label": "validation-and-history.json", - "hash": "sha256:494d555b7dc33c05cd2f456c781e36bfe13deae3f44ce249d43fef71fe6c2c6a" - }, - { - "item_id": "recording-gates-md", - "label": "recording-gates.md", - "hash": "sha256:ca7b851f6357951101e7026883ccc29529c5ad798d5692987ee29a4c65962bce" - } - ], - "highlights": [ - { - "id": "source-only-authentication-refinement", - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "note": "New sixth role/auth path requires this new acknowledgment; prior 1.1 does not transfer. Shared ESO controller remains broadly trusted, failed TokenRequest must not seed legacy/static tokens, and deletion alone cannot revoke issued tokens. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed on unimplemented type; full package/source-owner gates remain required. No native credentials, apply, session or case completion.", - "required_ack": true, - "severity": "warning", - "locator": { - "kind": "section", - "heading": "Requested acknowledgment" - } - } - ], - "sealed": false, - "approval_id": null, - "approval_binding_digest": null - }, - "documents": [ - { - "digest": "sha256:bb9a3f12248d18a51d06daf1235903ed8827c55e9e28bcb80c76d414db0d1a56", - "media_type": "text/markdown", - "content_base64": "# Forgejo type/case 1.2 — source acknowledgment only

## Requested acknowledgment

Acknowledge the attached oidc-browser-relying-party1.2 security architecture and approve the existing Forgejo reference-case 1.2 migration design for a separate owner source receipt only. This is NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1, a new exact informed-decision acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes §6 because the sixth consumer reader role changes authentication/materialization. Prior 1.1 acknowledgment and case acceptance do not transfer. Scope is type source acknowledgment and separate reference-design receipt only: canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while the type is unimplemented, and no canonical or phase case acceptance is authorized. No credentials, OpenBao authentication, role/policy/Secret changes, ESO deployment, structural materialization, first contained session/grant or native first-case completion is authorized.

## Exact source and owner agreement

The original nineteen-file preparation manifest is 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431. Applied nineteen sources match it exactly. Full proposed render is c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Exact proposed and current1.1 type/case bytes are attached, along with independent NetKingdom, Mason and Platform final technical reviews copied from their real owner trees unchanged. Their reviews acknowledge technical source only; none supplies this founder disposition or native permission. Actual reviewed commits and later observed HEADs are retained separately in source-inventory.json, without changing the content-bound nineteen-file scope.

The core proposed type/case schema and render checks pass; complete section 3 package readiness is not proved, and no implemented/status-live readiness is claimed. This is the existing first-reference case migration, not a new known-case light-path admission. The acknowledged type 1.1/current accepted case and historical CCR41/42/bundle remain unchanged until genuine new source disposition is recorded with preserved immutable originals. Canon sections 4/5 permits canonical case acceptance only for implemented types. Type acknowledgment cannot mark implemented, accept a canonical case or arm execution; the existing first-reference --allow-unimplemented build handling is not normal admission. Complete section 3 type-package README/examples/runnable tests, actual full-package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt are still mandatory before type acknowledgment recording. Core schema/render checks and the existing 1.1 package do not prove those gates; this packet currently records them unproved. An actual full-package validator call on the owner proposal directory reports missing README, runnable tests and examples; human-posting readiness is false until these sources and a separate NetKingdom owner receipt are prepared and bound into this same unposted memo.

## Concrete structural and trust refinement

All original five rendered materialization bodies remain unchanged. The sixth object is consumer-eso-role: OpenBao Kubernetes role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, exact namespace forgejo/SA forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso, audience openbao, only workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo and no default policy, 15-minute maximum tokens. Policy grants only platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo read plus existing self-token lookup/revoke; no metadata/list/parent/sibling reads. The consumer's namespace-local SecretStore references that dedicated SA and one field CLIENT_SECRET into an Owner target, deletionPolicy Retain. Forgejo and runner shared forgejo/default are not readers; existing SMTP reader remains separate. No namespace or deployment identity replacement is proposed.

Native retained compatibility metadata and installed ESO v0.16.1 source establish supported serviceAccountRef/audiences and existing controller TokenRequest RBAC. ESO requests a 600-second Kubernetes token and can fall back to legacy SA tokens. Owner admission must require automount=false/no legacy-token refs and stop on failed TokenRequest rather than add static tokens. The common ESO controller retains broad TokenRequest/Secret authority; dedicated identities are routing/revocation separation, not isolation from controller compromise. Existing internal HTTP custody remains disclosed, not an encrypted-transport claim. Tag/source observations are compatibility evidence, not immutable OCI identity proof.

## Lifecycle, defects and residual gates

Generated consumer CCR now targets consuming_service Forgejo while KeyCape ESO output stays unchanged. Its recovery obligations revert the consumer reference, require authenticated case-created ownership, preserve shared/preexisting objects, revoke issued reader tokens or independently verify expiry before declaring deactivation, and forbid recovery login/remint. Role/SA/store deletion alone does not revoke issued tokens. Retained Secret deletion requires independent creation/ownerReference/UID evidence; unknown or changed ownership stops. These are owner obligations, not an installed revocation adapter or grant. Source type/manual rollback keeps role before policy, with revocation/expiry bound.

Original overwrite regression, false inherited acknowledgment note, wrong generated consumer target and delete-only lifecycle counterexamples are preserved. Final independent owners each report 44 focused passes; old 42 and earlier failing checks stay in history. The untouched historical 1.1 bundle now correctly fails its wrong consumer target; new source rebundle/reconciliation after acknowledgment is required, never reassignment of old approval or weakened checker.

Actual bound_claims_confirmed=false blocks apply. Before any first contained session still require refreshed native identities/CRD/RBAC/no legacy refs; Platform CCR approval/confirmed binding; authenticated per-owner policy/role/layout/capability/created-vs-matched observations; admitted owner adapters/global verifier provenance; Warden machine descriptors, contained-session and revocation receipts; source-resolved current full run pins and separate founder native authority. Mint/ESO Ready are follow-through and are not structural proof. This memo creates none of those gates or permissions.

Helm secret consumption, required groups and unknown-user refusal, current local sign-in/break-glass, account linking, MFA and browser positive/negative checks remain distinct unfinished gates. Readiness/source tests do not close the case or forge. ORGREF-WP-0002 continues as driver for existing NK0048/Mason0010/Warden0044/RAPPS0016/CCR42 work; no duplicate planner is introduced.

## Alternatives and recording

Decline/return keeps proposed 1.2 and existing accepted 1.1 untouched; owners can revise and request a new exact source review under this same stable proposal. Accepting only the current source architecture can support type acknowledgment only after its complete-package/source-owner gates, and reference-design approval in a separate receipt; canonical case 1.2 remains proposed/unimplemented and every native gate stays false. A direct native deployment is outside this decision. Estimated incremental preparation/recording cost EUR0.10; no runtime resource change or credential exposure is authorized.

After a genuine native founder disposition, independently verify new memo ID/version, stale=false, exact packet/digests, actual actor/resolver and selected source-only act, then require actual full type-package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt before type status recording. Record only those actually fulfilled owner/founder roles: technical worker reviews do not impersonate the declared consumer owner. Preserve original proposed and acknowledged 1.1 bytes/receipts before any permitted type acknowledgment and separate reference-design receipt; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed and cannot acquire acceptance/status fields from this act. Decline, pending, stale or hash drift leaves source proposed; never fabricate acceptance IDs, dates, claims or native grants. Recording-gates.md sets the exact before/after source boundary.

## Completed proposed package supplement

The initial three README/examples/runnable-tests failures remain in proposal history. The proposed package-1.2 supplement now contains the exact unchanged type and Forgejo example, a representative public example, a threat/alternatives/limits README and runnable source-contract tests. Actual full owner package validator passes and 22 tests pass. validation-and-history.json binds all source bytes and commands. Separate NetKingdom source-owner review of this supplement is required before human submission. This preparation does not implement the type, accept canonical case 1.2 or grant native authority.

## Actual completed-package source review binding

The independent NetKingdom completed-package source review of exact prior packet 330da7fe is now losslessly attached, alongside the original exact19 source review, in the two clearly labelled review bundles. Each carries the source path, SHA256 and gzip-base64 encoding of the exact original bytes. The separate package-owner review gate is satisfied; source-only posting readiness is true after root obtains narrow confirmation of this receipt rebinding and README clarification. README now explicitly distinguishes observed Forgejo/runner workload forgejo/default from the historical unbound OpenBao consumer policy; no historical default-SA reader binding is claimed. The genuine human disposition remains absent and canonical case remains proposed/unimplemented.
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" - }, - { - "digest": "sha256:017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content_base64": "apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1
kind: SecurityCaseType
spec:
  id: oidc-browser-relying-party
  version: '1.2'
  status: proposed
  title: Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service
  purpose: 'Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom
    (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups the
    service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client secret
    minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout scripts
    in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038).'
  parameters:
  - name: client_id
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$
    sensitivity: operational
    description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape.
  - name: display_name
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[^\n\r]{1,80}$
    sensitivity: public
    description: Name shown on the sign-in page.
  - name: redirect_uris
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^https://[^*?#\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\s,]+)*$
    sensitivity: security_sensitive
    description: 'Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain
      http, no query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses ''*'' and ''?'' at startup,
      and OAuth 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1).'
  - name: allowed_scopes
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      enum:
      - openid,profile,email,groups
      - openid,email,groups
      - openid,profile,groups
      - openid,groups
    sensitivity: security_sensitive
    description: Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups,
      because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups only
      for that scope (key-cape type review R2).
  - name: client_type
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      enum:
      - confidential
      - public
    sensitivity: security_sensitive
    description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public
      for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only).
  - name: mfa_required
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      enum:
      - 'true'
      - 'false'
    sensitivity: security_sensitive
    description: '"true" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants
      administrative or owner rights. "false" is not "no MFA": the client then carries
      no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA policy. A
      renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which would skip that
      policy (key-cape type review R3).'
  - name: access_groups
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$
    sensitivity: operational
    description: 'Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles.
      Created if absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to
      any authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming service
      enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting; key-cape
      type review R2).'
  - name: initial_members
    type: string
    required: false
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$
    sensitivity: operational
    description: Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are
      directory usernames, never secrets.
  - name: consuming_service
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$
    sensitivity: operational
    description: The service that signs users in with this client.
  - name: consumer_owner_repo
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$
    sensitivity: operational
    description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration.
  - name: consumer_namespace
    type: string
    case_settable: true
    constraints:
      pattern: ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$
    sensitivity: security_sensitive
    description: Consumer namespace for namespaced ESO TokenRequest reader; actual
      workload owner must confirm; never infer from service name.
  - name: issuer
    type: string
    case_settable: false
    default: https://kc.coulomb.social
    sensitivity: security_sensitive
    description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type.
  composition:
    authority: netkingdom
    initial_trust:
    - runtime_secret_trust
    - runtime_identity_trust
    capabilities:
    - c1.lightweight-sso
    providers:
      c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration
    parameter_bindings:
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required
  materialization:
  - id: client-secret-path
    kind: kv_path
    when: client_type == confidential
    template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}
    body: field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand
  - id: keycape-reader-policy
    kind: openbao_policy
    when: client_type == confidential
    template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso
    body: "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n  capabilities\
      \ = [\"read\"]\n}}\n"
    description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list,
      parent or sibling access.
  - id: consumer-reader-policy
    kind: openbao_policy
    when: client_type == confidential
    template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}
    body: "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n  capabilities\
      \ = [\"read\"]\n}}\n"
    description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent
      or sibling access.
  - id: eso-role
    kind: openbao_role
    when: client_type == confidential
    template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}
    body: 'auth: kubernetes

      bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]

      bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]

      token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso]

      token_no_default_policy: true

      token_ttl: 15m

      token_max_ttl: 15m

      '
    description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service
      account only.
  - id: consumer-eso-role
    kind: openbao_role
    when: client_type == confidential
    template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}
    body: 'auth: kubernetes

      bound_service_account_names: [{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso]

      bound_service_account_namespaces: [{consumer_namespace}]

      audience: openbao

      token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}]

      token_no_default_policy: true

      token_ttl: 15m

      token_max_ttl: 15m

      '
    description: Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity.
      Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic
      controller isolation is claimed.
  - id: catalog-entry
    kind: catalog_entry
    template: '{consuming_service}-keycape-client'
    body: 'id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client

      owner_repo: key-cape

      warden_executes: false

      risk: high

      status: active once verification passes

      workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer''s
      published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred

      path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}

      field: CLIENT_SECRET

      delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape

      rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been
      proven

      '
    description: One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries
      the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.
  follow_through:
  - id: ensure-groups
    owner: net-kingdom
    entry_point: identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner
      pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups};
      members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing
      else)
    auth: operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod
      call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine
      token is read or sent
    lane: key-cape-oidc-login
    warden_executes: false
    attended: true
    value_handling: none
    attended_justification: The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's
      runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane
      would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden
      ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended
      session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential
      of its own and an admitted path.
  - id: mint-secret
    owner: railiance-platform
    when: client_type == confidential
    entry_point: 'railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside
      custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}'
    auth: the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the
      value is generated in custody and never returned
    lane: keycape-client-secret-generate
    warden_executes: true
    attended: false
    value_handling: generated_in_custody
  - id: deliver-secret
    owner: railiance-platform
    when: client_type == confidential
    entry_point: ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret)
      from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}
    auth: railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id};
      no value leaves custody
    warden_executes: false
    attended: false
    value_handling: none
    ready_check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True
      (status only, no value read)
  - id: bind-env
    owner: net-kingdom
    when: client_type == confidential
    entry_point: 'patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET
      from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client'
    auth: operator kube credentials for namespace sso
    lane: key-cape-oidc-login
    warden_executes: false
    attended: true
    value_handling: none
    attended_justification: A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It
      runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because
      KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if
      the binding is missing.
  - id: register-client
    owner: net-kingdom
    entry_point: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file <client-from-case>
      --case-acceptance <record> --check-config <keycape binary> (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)
    auth: operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso
    lane: key-cape-oidc-login
    warden_executes: false
    attended: true
    value_handling: none
    attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret,
      and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a
      non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator
      session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps
      of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login,
      authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins
      and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review
      R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape
      check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches)
      before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client
      loses sign-in (R1).'
  - id: deliver-consumer-secret
    owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}'
    when: client_type == confidential
    entry_point: Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso
      (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer
      with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client
      with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}.
      Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller
      RBAC before any owner-approved apply.
    auth: Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates
      to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} with
      a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains
      trusted
    warden_executes: false
    attended: false
    value_handling: none
    ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True;
      dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never
      Secret values.
  - id: hand-over
    owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}'
    entry_point: configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id}
      and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require
      one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes
    auth: the consumer owner's own deployment path
    warden_executes: false
    attended: false
    value_handling: none
  verification:
  - id: authorize-accepts-redirects
    check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris}
      returns the login page
    expect: present
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect
    check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect
      returns an OAuth error
    expect: deny
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: custody-denied-to-default
    when: client_type == confidential
    check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}
    expect: deny
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer
    when: client_type == confidential
    check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants
      read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only)
    expect: allow
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: groups-present
    check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the
      accepted case added
    expect: present
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: consumer-enforces-groups
    check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo})
      requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no
      secret value)'
    expect: present
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: secret-delivered
    when: client_type == confidential
    check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status
      only)
    expect: present
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: mfa-pinned
    when: mfa_required == true
    check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered
      client (non-secret client view)
    expect: present
    reads_secret_value: false
  - id: consumer-secret-delivered
    when: client_type == confidential
    check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer
      and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact
      dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value
      read'
    expect: present
    reads_secret_value: false
  rollback:
  - reverses: hand-over
    action: remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner
      {consumer_owner_repo})
  - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created
      ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and
      dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared
      target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is
      not immediate OpenBao token revocation.
  - reverses: register-client
    action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}
  - reverses: bind-env
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape,
      after register-client is reversed
  - reverses: deliver-secret
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target
  - reverses: mint-secret
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret
      is reversed'
  - reverses: ensure-groups
    action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod
      (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only
      if no other case uses {access_groups}
  - reverses: client-secret-path
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id},
      after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)
  - reverses: eso-role
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}
  - reverses: keycape-reader-policy
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role
  - reverses: consumer-eso-role
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service},
      before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or
      prove expiration before declaring deactivation.
  - reverses: consumer-reader-policy
    when: client_type == confidential
    action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}
  - reverses: catalog-entry
    action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client
  acceptance:
    accepted_by:
    - owner
    - founder
    risk_class: medium
" - }, - { - "digest": "sha256:1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content_base64": "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" - }, - { - "digest": "sha256:96b25108335e2cf5f96af481fe8a7735831c8320d81b50f7c6e6d4e53d0c0f02", - "media_type": "application/json", - "content_base64": "{
  "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/security-case-render/v0.1",
  "case": "forgejo-netkingdom-oidc",
  "composition": {
    "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/security-scenario-composition/v0.1",
    "authority": "netkingdom",
    "capability_providers": {
      "c1.lightweight-sso": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration"
    },
    "composition_digest": "sha256:f51e45eab2f2c15c93e2f7b8ef7d8fcc1daf1059da5749429ff5678b45c5214f",
    "execution": {
      "mode": "plan-only",
      "permitted": false,
      "reason": "Composition does not authorize or perform provider execution."
    },
    "execution_steps": [
      {
        "capabilities": [
          "c1.lightweight-sso"
        ],
        "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration",
        "entry_point": {
          "description": "Add or remove exactly one client in the live KeyCape client registry without exporting secret values: contained kubectl, cluster and issuer pins, byte-preserving merge, compare-and-swap, read-back. Replaces the per-client helpers beside it. Field rules follow key-cape's canonical model (KEY-WP-0028). Modes: inspect, dry-run, apply; operations add and remove.",
          "invocation": "keycape-client.py apply --client-file <client.yaml> --case-acceptance <record> --expected-uid <uid> --expected-resource-version <rv>",
          "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py",
          "type": "cli-sequence"
        },
        "executor_owner": "net-kingdom",
        "order": 1,
        "parameters": {
          "allowed_scopes": {
            "sensitivity": "security_sensitive",
            "source": "override",
            "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable",
            "value": "openid,profile,email,groups"
          },
          "client_id": {
            "sensitivity": "operational",
            "source": "override",
            "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable",
            "value": "forgejo"
          },
          "client_type": {
            "sensitivity": "security_sensitive",
            "source": "override",
            "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable",
            "value": "confidential"
          },
          "display_name": {
            "sensitivity": "public",
            "source": "override",
            "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable",
            "value": "Forgejo source forge"
          },
          "mfa_required": {
            "sensitivity": "security_sensitive",
            "source": "override",
            "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable",
            "value": "true"
          },
          "redirect_uris": {
            "sensitivity": "security_sensitive",
            "source": "override",
            "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable",
            "value": "https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback"
          }
        },
        "readiness_obligations": [
          {
            "checks": [
              {
                "description": "The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.",
                "evidence": "GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.",
                "id": "client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect"
              },
              {
                "description": "The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.",
                "evidence": "GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.",
                "id": "client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect"
              }
            ],
            "state": "tenant_onboarding_trust"
          }
        ],
        "repo": "net-kingdom",
        "requires_trust": [
          {
            "readiness_checks": [],
            "state": "runtime_secret_trust"
          },
          {
            "readiness_checks": [],
            "state": "runtime_identity_trust"
          }
        ],
        "satisfies_trust": [
          {
            "readiness_checks": [
              {
                "description": "The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.",
                "evidence": "GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.",
                "id": "client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect"
              },
              {
                "description": "The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.",
                "evidence": "GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.",
                "id": "client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect"
              }
            ],
            "state": "tenant_onboarding_trust"
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "initial_trust": [
      "runtime_identity_trust",
      "runtime_secret_trust"
    ],
    "kind": "SecurityScenarioComposition",
    "planned_final_trust": [
      "runtime_identity_trust",
      "runtime_secret_trust",
      "tenant_onboarding_trust"
    ],
    "requested_capabilities": [
      "c1.lightweight-sso"
    ],
    "responsibility_map": [
      {
        "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration",
        "netkingdom_orchestrates": "Supply the case's validated, non-secret client fields.",
        "owner": "net-kingdom",
        "repo_owns": "Live registry change for exactly this client, its idempotency and removal; field rules are key-cape's canonical model.",
        "resource_kind": "identities",
        "resources": [
          "oidc:static-clients"
        ]
      },
      {
        "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration",
        "netkingdom_orchestrates": "Choose scopes and MFA posture per SecurityCaseType.",
        "owner": "key-cape",
        "repo_owns": "Enforce exact redirect URIs, allowed scopes and the MFA pin at authorization time.",
        "resource_kind": "roles_scopes_policies",
        "resources": [
          "iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "scenario": "scenario:case:forgejo-netkingdom-oidc"
  },
  "digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35",
  "execution": {
    "permitted": false
  },
  "follow_through": [
    {
      "attended": true,
      "attended_justification": "The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential of its own and an admitted path.",
      "auth": "operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent",
      "entry_point": "identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers; members exactly forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)",
      "id": "ensure-groups",
      "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login",
      "owner": "net-kingdom",
      "value_handling": "none",
      "warden_executes": false
    },
    {
      "attended": false,
      "auth": "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned",
      "entry_point": "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo",
      "id": "mint-secret",
      "lane": "keycape-client-secret-generate",
      "owner": "railiance-platform",
      "value_handling": "generated_in_custody",
      "warden_executes": true
    },
    {
      "attended": false,
      "auth": "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo; no value leaves custody",
      "entry_point": "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo",
      "id": "deliver-secret",
      "owner": "railiance-platform",
      "ready_check": "the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)",
      "value_handling": "none",
      "warden_executes": false
    },
    {
      "attended": true,
      "attended_justification": "A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if the binding is missing.",
      "auth": "operator kube credentials for namespace sso",
      "entry_point": "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-forgejo-client",
      "id": "bind-env",
      "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login",
      "owner": "net-kingdom",
      "value_handling": "none",
      "warden_executes": false
    },
    {
      "attended": true,
      "attended_justification": "The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client loses sign-in (R1).",
      "auth": "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso",
      "entry_point": "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file <client-from-case> --case-acceptance <record> --check-config <keycape binary> (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)",
      "id": "register-client",
      "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login",
      "owner": "net-kingdom",
      "value_handling": "none",
      "warden_executes": false
    },
    {
      "attended": false,
      "auth": "Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo with a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains trusted",
      "entry_point": "Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/forgejo. Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller RBAC before any owner-approved apply.",
      "id": "deliver-consumer-secret",
      "owner": "railiance-apps",
      "ready_check": "Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never Secret values.",
      "value_handling": "none",
      "warden_executes": false
    },
    {
      "attended": false,
      "auth": "the consumer owner's own deployment path",
      "entry_point": "configure forgejo with issuer https://kc.coulomb.social, client forgejo and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, and make it require one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim before sign-in completes",
      "id": "hand-over",
      "owner": "railiance-apps",
      "value_handling": "none",
      "warden_executes": false
    }
  ],
  "kind": "SecurityCaseRender",
  "materialization": [
    {
      "body": "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand",
      "id": "client-secret-path",
      "kind": "kv_path",
      "template": "platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo"
    },
    {
      "body": "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n",
      "description": "KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.",
      "id": "keycape-reader-policy",
      "kind": "openbao_policy",
      "template": "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso"
    },
    {
      "body": "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n",
      "description": "The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.",
      "id": "consumer-reader-policy",
      "kind": "openbao_policy",
      "template": "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo"
    },
    {
      "body": "auth: kubernetes\nbound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso]\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\ntoken_ttl: 15m\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\n",
      "description": "The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only.",
      "id": "eso-role",
      "kind": "openbao_role",
      "template": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo"
    },
    {
      "body": "auth: kubernetes\nbound_service_account_names: [forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso]\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [forgejo]\naudience: openbao\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo]\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\ntoken_ttl: 15m\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\n",
      "description": "Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity. Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic controller isolation is claimed.",
      "id": "consumer-eso-role",
      "kind": "openbao_role",
      "template": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo"
    },
    {
      "body": "id: forgejo-keycape-client\nowner_repo: key-cape\nwarden_executes: false\nrisk: high\nstatus: active once verification passes\nworkload_ref: applicable, name forgejo, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred\npath_template: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\nfield: CLIENT_SECRET\ndelegation: native, intended_owner key-cape\nrotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven\n",
      "description": "One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.",
      "id": "catalog-entry",
      "kind": "catalog_entry",
      "template": "forgejo-keycape-client"
    }
  ],
  "rollback": [
    {
      "action": "remove the OIDC source for forgejo from forgejo (owner railiance-apps)",
      "reverses": "hand-over"
    },
    {
      "action": "After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is not immediate OpenBao token revocation.",
      "reverses": "deliver-consumer-secret"
    },
    {
      "action": "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for forgejo",
      "reverses": "register-client"
    },
    {
      "action": "remove env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed",
      "reverses": "bind-env"
    },
    {
      "action": "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client and its target",
      "reverses": "deliver-secret"
    },
    {
      "action": "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed",
      "reverses": "mint-secret"
    },
    {
      "action": "identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers",
      "reverses": "ensure-groups"
    },
    {
      "action": "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)",
      "reverses": "client-secret-path"
    },
    {
      "action": "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo",
      "reverses": "eso-role"
    },
    {
      "action": "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso, after eso-role",
      "reverses": "keycape-reader-policy"
    },
    {
      "action": "Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or prove expiration before declaring deactivation.",
      "reverses": "consumer-eso-role"
    },
    {
      "action": "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo",
      "reverses": "consumer-reader-policy"
    },
    {
      "action": "remove catalog entry forgejo-keycape-client",
      "reverses": "catalog-entry"
    }
  ],
  "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2",
  "verification": [
    {
      "check": "GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and each of https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback returns the login page",
      "expect": "present",
      "id": "authorize-accepts-redirects",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error",
      "expect": "deny",
      "id": "authorize-refuses-other-redirect",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo",
      "expect": "deny",
      "id": "custody-denied-to-default",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo (capabilities check only)",
      "expect": "allow",
      "id": "custody-allowed-to-consumer",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "LLDAP groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added",
      "expect": "present",
      "id": "groups-present",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "forgejo's OIDC source for forgejo (owner railiance-apps) requires one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)",
      "expect": "present",
      "id": "consumer-enforces-groups",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only)",
      "expect": "present",
      "id": "secret-delivered",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "keycape-client.py inspect for forgejo shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)",
      "expect": "present",
      "id": "mfa-pinned",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    },
    {
      "check": "forgejo SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value read",
      "expect": "present",
      "id": "consumer-secret-delivered",
      "reads_secret_value": false
    }
  ]
}
" - }, - { - "digest": "sha256:f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c", - "media_type": "text/plain", - "content_base64": "apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1
kind: SecurityCaseType
spec:
  id: oidc-browser-relying-party
  version: "1.1"
  status: acknowledged
  title: "Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service"
  purpose: >-
    Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom
    (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups
    the service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client
    secret minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout
    scripts in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038).

  parameters:
    - name: client_id
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"}
      sensitivity: operational
      description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape.
    - name: display_name
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^[^\\n\\r]{1,80}$"}
      sensitivity: public
      description: Name shown on the sign-in page.
    - name: redirect_uris
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^https://[^*?#\\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\\s,]+)*$"}
      sensitivity: security_sensitive
      description: >-
        Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain http, no
        query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses '*' and '?' at startup, and OAuth
        2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1).
    - name: allowed_scopes
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {enum: ["openid,profile,email,groups", "openid,email,groups", "openid,profile,groups", "openid,groups"]}
      sensitivity: security_sensitive
      description: >-
        Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups,
        because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups
        only for that scope (key-cape type review R2).
    - name: client_type
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {enum: ["confidential", "public"]}
      sensitivity: security_sensitive
      description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only).
    - name: mfa_required
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {enum: ["true", "false"]}
      sensitivity: security_sensitive
      description: >-
        "true" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants
        administrative or owner rights. "false" is not "no MFA": the client then
        carries no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA
        policy. A renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which
        would skip that policy (key-cape type review R3).
    - name: access_groups
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$"}
      sensitivity: operational
      description: >-
        Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles. Created if
        absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to any
        authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming
        service enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting;
        key-cape type review R2).
    - name: initial_members
      type: string
      required: false
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$"}
      sensitivity: operational
      description: "Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are directory usernames, never secrets."
    - name: consuming_service
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"}
      sensitivity: operational
      description: The service that signs users in with this client.
    - name: consumer_owner_repo
      type: string
      case_settable: true
      constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"}
      sensitivity: operational
      description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration.
    - name: issuer
      type: string
      case_settable: false
      default: https://kc.coulomb.social
      sensitivity: security_sensitive
      description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type.

  composition:
    authority: netkingdom
    initial_trust: [runtime_secret_trust, runtime_identity_trust]
    capabilities: [c1.lightweight-sso]
    providers:
      c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration
    parameter_bindings:
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type
      net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required

  materialization:
    # Placement follows the live CCR-2026-0033 reference (secrets-engine-openbao,
    # ops-mason plans/keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client-custody.md). The path
    # is derived, not case-settable, and the policies reuse the existing
    # workload-kv-read-keycape-<client>-<reader> family (MASON-WP-0010-T01).
    - id: client-secret-path
      kind: kv_path
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      template: "platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}"
      body: "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand"
    - id: keycape-reader-policy
      kind: openbao_policy
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso"
      body: |
        path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{
          capabilities = ["read"]
        }}
      description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.
    - id: consumer-reader-policy
      kind: openbao_policy
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}"
      body: |
        path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{
          capabilities = ["read"]
        }}
      description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.
    - id: eso-role
      kind: openbao_role
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      template: "external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}"
      body: |
        auth: kubernetes
        bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]
        bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]
        token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso]
        token_no_default_policy: true
        token_ttl: 15m
        token_max_ttl: 15m
      description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only.
    - id: catalog-entry
      kind: catalog_entry
      template: "{consuming_service}-keycape-client"
      body: |
        id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client
        owner_repo: key-cape
        warden_executes: false
        risk: high
        status: active once verification passes
        workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred
        path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}
        field: CLIENT_SECRET
        delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape
        rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven
      description: >-
        One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the
        consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.
  follow_through:
    - id: ensure-groups
      owner: net-kingdom
      entry_point: "identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups}; members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)"
      auth: "operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent"
      lane: key-cape-oidc-login
      warden_executes: false
      attended: true
      value_handling: none
      attended_justification: >-
        The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and
        its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as
        user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002).
        Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended
        session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator
        credential of its own and an admitted path.
    - id: mint-secret
      owner: railiance-platform
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      entry_point: "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}"
      auth: "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned"
      lane: keycape-client-secret-generate
      warden_executes: true
      attended: false
      value_handling: generated_in_custody
    - id: deliver-secret
      owner: railiance-platform
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      entry_point: "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}"
      auth: "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; no value leaves custody"
      warden_executes: false
      attended: false
      value_handling: none
      ready_check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)"
    - id: bind-env
      owner: net-kingdom
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      entry_point: "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client"
      auth: "operator kube credentials for namespace sso"
      lane: key-cape-oidc-login
      warden_executes: false
      attended: true
      value_handling: none
      attended_justification: >-
        A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same
        attended operator session as register-client, before it, because
        KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails
        closed if the binding is missing.
    - id: register-client
      owner: net-kingdom
      entry_point: "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file <client-from-case> --case-acceptance <record> --check-config <keycape binary> (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)"
      auth: "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso"
      lane: key-cape-oidc-login
      warden_executes: false
      attended: true
      value_handling: none
      attended_justification: >-
        The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do
        not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a
        non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended
        operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups
        all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients
        at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so
        the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go
        in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must
        pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape
        c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the
        restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client
        loses sign-in (R1).
    - id: hand-over
      owner: "{consumer_owner_repo}"
      entry_point: "configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes"
      auth: "the consumer owner's own deployment path"
      warden_executes: false
      attended: false
      value_handling: none

  verification:
    - id: authorize-accepts-redirects
      check: "GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} returns the login page"
      expect: present
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect
      check: "GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error"
      expect: deny
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: custody-denied-to-default
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      check: "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}"
      expect: deny
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      check: "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only)"
      expect: allow
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: groups-present
      check: "LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added"
      expect: present
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: consumer-enforces-groups
      # KeyCape has no per-client group gate; only the consumer can enforce
      # access_groups (key-cape type review R2, type 1.1).
      check: "{consuming_service}'s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)"
      expect: present
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: secret-delivered
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only)"
      expect: present
      reads_secret_value: false
    - id: mfa-pinned
      when: "mfa_required == true"
      check: "keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)"
      expect: present
      reads_secret_value: false

  rollback:
    - reverses: hand-over
      action: "remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner {consumer_owner_repo})"
    - reverses: register-client
      action: "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}"
    - reverses: bind-env
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed"
    - reverses: deliver-secret
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target"
    - reverses: mint-secret
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed"
    - reverses: ensure-groups
      action: "identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses {access_groups}"
    - reverses: client-secret-path
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)"
    - reverses: eso-role
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}"
    - reverses: keycape-reader-policy
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role"
    - reverses: consumer-reader-policy
      when: "client_type == confidential"
      action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}"
    - reverses: catalog-entry
      action: "remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client"

  acceptance:
    accepted_by: [owner, founder]
    risk_class: medium
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RAPPS-WP-0016 already chooses ESO delivery for the OIDC client secret. This proposal fills its missing reader identity without asking the founder to make that same source choice again. It is not a live apply, a new credential grant, or first-case success. Existing ORGREF-WP-0002 remains the project driver; CCR42, MASON-WP-0010-T03 and NK-WP-0048-T06 remain the owner work, rather than another workplan.

Actual read-only railiance01 metadata shows ESO v0.16.1 running as external-secrets/external-secrets, served v1/v1beta1 SecretStore CRDs supporting serviceAccountRef.audiences, and controller RBAC permitting serviceaccounts/token create. Forgejo and its runner currently share forgejo/default; they must not become the OpenBao reader identity. No consumer namespace SecretStore or dedicated OIDC-delivery SA exists in the observed metadata. Existing forgejo-mailer-eso is a separate SMTP lane and remains unchanged. No OpenBao login, capability check, auth operation, Secret value, Secret object retrieval, or native materialization was performed.

## Exact supported reader

`consumer-delivery.yaml` prepares exactly three namespaced objects: ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso with automount=false and no legacy token refs; SecretStore forgejo/openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer; ExternalSecret forgejo/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client. The store requests a token for that dedicated serviceAccountRef, audiences=[openbao], and authenticates to OpenBao Kubernetes role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo. The role binds exactly that SA and namespace, only workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, no default policy, and a 900-second maximum OpenBao token lifetime. ESO's installed source requests a 600-second Kubernetes token and can fall back to legacy SA tokens; owner admission must ensure this new SA has no legacy tokens, never create one to bypass a failed TokenRequest.

The namespace SecretStore cannot select another namespace's SA; serviceAccountRef.namespace is omitted. No extra RBAC, projected workload token, Deployment SA replacement or controller identity change is proposed. Namespace/default is not an OpenBao-bound reader. ESO remains the shared trusted controller: it already has clusterwide TokenRequest and Secret permissions and can request this SA's token. This separates reader binding/revocation and avoids default identity reuse; it does not isolate this secret from controller compromise or grant new cryptographic isolation.

The exact KV data ACL is platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo, read only, plus existing self-token lookup/revoke stanzas. No metadata/list/parent/sibling access is added. Delivery maps only remote workloads/keycape/forgejo field CLIENT_SECRET to target key CLIENT_SECRET. Target creationPolicy=Owner and deletionPolicy=Retain preserve fail-safe remote-deletion behavior. Refresh is 15m; the value is never present in this source. Existing internal OpenBao HTTP endpoint and controller custody behavior are retained, not upgraded into a TLS/isolation claim.

## Type and structural boundary

NetKingdom's proposed successor type 1.2 adds explicit case parameter consumer_namespace, one sixth structural object consumer-eso-role, and separate owner deliver-consumer-secret follow-through/readiness/rollback. All original five rendered structural bodies compare equal to current1.1. Existing acknowledged type 1.1 and accepted case 1.1 remain byte-preserved; the proposed 1.2 case has status proposed and no copied acceptance. Full proposed render is c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Existing acceptance does not silently extend to the new role/runtime delivery. Owner review and exact type/case acknowledgment precede any build, metadata apply or materialized-status receipt.

The current Mason builder gives every role-backed reader the ESO draft suffix. With two reader roles it silently overwrites one CCR. The new regression proves that defect against current source; the minimal staged fix retains ESO for the KeyCape reader and Forgejo for consumer-reader-policy, plus refuses duplicate output identities.42 actual focused builder/plan/structure tests pass with corrected source, including both independent CCRs, platform validation and a complete six-object structural request. Existing1.1 tests remain passing. No fake proposed 1.2 acceptance is used: Mason correctly refuses to build a merely proposed successor. Test fixtures alone temporarily acknowledge synthetic roles to exercise builder semantics.

The proposed CCR42 body uses proposed status, bound_claims_confirmed=false, explicit pending1.2 acknowledgment and old CCR's exact historical hash/provenance. Owner validation passes with the expected apply-blocking warning. It is stored separately from the actual in-flight CCR42; no historical review or applied CCR41 is rewritten. Folding this reviewed body into CCR42 remains an owner reconciliation with retained original revision, not a fresh parallel request.

## Admission, native proof and recovery

Before an exact scoped native proposal, refresh ESO image/CRD/RBAC, Forgejo/default and runner identity, the three proposed object identities and target metadata through Kubernetes PartialObjectMetadata only. Classify absent, exact preexisting-matched or conflicting; refuse a legacy-token SA, unknown ownership, changed role/policy, audience mismatch or shared target. Never read Secret data. Preserve current UIDs/resourceVersions, authenticated owner change receipts and the exact type/case/render/source pins. No placeholder SA claim substitutes for actual owner admission.

Platform materialization applies only the reviewed exact-path policy and dedicated Kubernetes-auth role after its own approved CCR path. Fresh owner metadata/capability receipts must prove exact binding and distinguish case-created from preexisting; no minted value or successful delivery is required to prove structure. Mason's existing typed structural contract then covers all six objects, including source layout and catalog pointer; source-only bodies are not authenticated native evidence. Warden native dispatch/descriptors/session receipt and per-owner provenance still need their existing accepted integration review.

Consumer follow-through applies the three admitted objects, then checks SecretStore/ExternalSecret Ready status and exact target UID/ownerReference through metadata only. Shared/matched objects never acquire delete authority. If ESO reports failure, stop; no manual Secret seeding or controller/static-token fallback is admitted. Minting, KeyCape client/env/groups, and Forgejo Helm OIDC/group enforcement stay distinct existing first-case steps. Forgejo gitea.oauth secret-consumption settings were not changed or Helm-render-verified here; they must be prepared/reviewed before T02 handover, with current local login intact and T01 break-glass acceptance still a prerequisite. Delivery Ready alone does not complete browser/MFA/group checks or forge closure.

Created-only rollback first reverts the consumer secret reference/auth source through its owner Helm revision. Remove only the admitted trial-created ExternalSecret and independently proven case-created target UID/ownerReference; preserve matched/shared targets. Then remove only created namespace SecretStore and SA. Remove only the created OpenBao role after revoking its issued tokens or proving expiry, then created policy. Role/SA/store deletion does not revoke already issued OpenBao tokens; deletion alone is not deactivation proof. Retain native/audit/source receipts and stop if references, UIDs or ownership changed. Do not infer delete authority from Mason's legacy planned rollback inventory.

RAPPS-WP-0016-T02, current CCR42, MASON-WP-0010-T03 and first-case acceptance remain unfinished. ORGREF-WP-0002 holds this owner return. Human-only break-glass/account-link/MFA/first-case acknowledgment gates remain separate from source preparation; no new human login is requested by this packet.

## Supplementary generated-CCR refinement after Platform conditional review

Exact prior 271 packet is preserved at /tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271, alongside original c48. Platform found two additional generator gaps: hardcoded keycape target for the consumer, and delete-only consumer-role lifecycle. Both meaningful counterexamples fail against 271 source before the fix. Current staged generator derives target.workload from consuming_service only for consumer-reader-policy, preserving all KeyCape ESO output fields. A role-backed consumer CCR requires reverting consumer reference, authenticated case-created ownership, preservation of preexisting/shared objects, issued-token owner revocation or independently verified expiry before deactivation, and no new login/remint during recovery. Actual owner native authority remains required; generated wording is not an implemented revocation adapter.

Forty-four focused builder/plan/structure tests now pass. Earlier 42 and original counterexample/failure history remain retained. The old committed 1.1 bundle still mislabels the consumer workload keycape and therefore correctly fails fresh exact target matching after this correction. That historical bundle is preserved; the checker is not weakened or grandfathered. Local fixtures alone use corrected/rehashed consumer metadata, with a separate regression proving old bundle refusal. Current 1.1 unbound consumer generation changes only its previously wrong target.workload; KeyCape reader output remains unchanged. The proposed 1.2 render/type/case/source remains pending exact acknowledgment, with identical six-object structural body and no native completion claim. Fresh source build/bundle owner reconciliation must occur after exact acceptance before any native apply/materialization; old CCR or bundle approval is not silently reassigned. New source/test hashes are in validation.json and generated projection receipt.
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        "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
        "kind": "ClusterRole",
        "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller"
      },
      "rules": [
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "apiextensions.k8s.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "customresourcedefinitions"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch",
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "admissionregistration.k8s.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "validatingwebhookconfigurations"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "list",
            "watch",
            "get"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "admissionregistration.k8s.io"
          ],
          "resourceNames": [
            "secretstore-validate",
            "externalsecret-validate"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "validatingwebhookconfigurations"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "endpoints"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "list",
            "get",
            "watch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "events"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "create",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "secrets"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch",
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "coordination.k8s.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "leases"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "create",
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "subjects": [
        {
          "kind": "ServiceAccount",
          "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller",
          "namespace": "external-secrets"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "kind": "ClusterRoleBinding",
      "name": "external-secrets-controller",
      "namespace": null,
      "roleRef": {
        "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
        "kind": "ClusterRole",
        "name": "external-secrets-controller"
      },
      "rules": [
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "external-secrets.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "secretstores",
            "clustersecretstores",
            "externalsecrets",
            "clusterexternalsecrets",
            "pushsecrets",
            "clusterpushsecrets"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "external-secrets.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "externalsecrets",
            "externalsecrets/status",
            "externalsecrets/finalizers",
            "secretstores",
            "secretstores/status",
            "secretstores/finalizers",
            "clustersecretstores",
            "clustersecretstores/status",
            "clustersecretstores/finalizers",
            "clusterexternalsecrets",
            "clusterexternalsecrets/status",
            "clusterexternalsecrets/finalizers",
            "pushsecrets",
            "pushsecrets/status",
            "pushsecrets/finalizers",
            "clusterpushsecrets",
            "clusterpushsecrets/status",
            "clusterpushsecrets/finalizers"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "generators.external-secrets.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "generatorstates"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch",
            "create",
            "update",
            "patch",
            "delete",
            "deletecollection"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "generators.external-secrets.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "acraccesstokens",
            "clustergenerators",
            "ecrauthorizationtokens",
            "fakes",
            "gcraccesstokens",
            "githubaccesstokens",
            "quayaccesstokens",
            "passwords",
            "stssessiontokens",
            "uuids",
            "vaultdynamicsecrets",
            "webhooks",
            "grafanas"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "serviceaccounts",
            "namespaces"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "configmaps"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "secrets"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "list",
            "watch",
            "create",
            "update",
            "delete",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "serviceaccounts/token"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "create"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "events"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "create",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "external-secrets.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "externalsecrets"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "create",
            "update",
            "delete"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "external-secrets.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "pushsecrets"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "create",
            "update",
            "delete"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "subjects": [
        {
          "kind": "ServiceAccount",
          "name": "external-secrets",
          "namespace": "external-secrets"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "kind": "RoleBinding",
      "name": "external-secrets-leaderelection",
      "namespace": "external-secrets",
      "roleRef": {
        "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
        "kind": "Role",
        "name": "external-secrets-leaderelection"
      },
      "rules": [
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resourceNames": [
            "external-secrets-controller"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "configmaps"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            ""
          ],
          "resources": [
            "configmaps"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "create"
          ]
        },
        {
          "apiGroups": [
            "coordination.k8s.io"
          ],
          "resources": [
            "leases"
          ],
          "verbs": [
            "get",
            "create",
            "update",
            "patch"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "subjects": [
        {
          "kind": "ServiceAccount",
          "name": "external-secrets",
          "namespace": "external-secrets"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "external-secrets_deployments": [
    {
      "images": [
        "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1"
      ],
      "name": "external-secrets",
      "serviceAccount": "external-secrets",
      "uid": "e6017556-523a-4b26-b9d1-4c0c90cef483"
    },
    {
      "images": [
        "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1"
      ],
      "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller",
      "serviceAccount": "external-secrets-cert-controller",
      "uid": "5134a56f-aa05-4764-9b27-c56e92203c7d"
    },
    {
      "images": [
        "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1"
      ],
      "name": "external-secrets-webhook",
      "serviceAccount": "external-secrets-webhook",
      "uid": "6e6e4a6e-4c2c-4659-af56-d4281f2fe229"
    }
  ],
  "external-secrets_externalsecrets": [],
  "external-secrets_secretstores": [],
  "external-secrets_serviceaccounts": [
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": null,
      "name": "default",
      "uid": "cc29abe8-5ace-4cc9-b479-cf8db84df42d"
    },
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": false,
      "name": "eso-token-renewer",
      "uid": "4d44afd7-59e9-44de-9e99-8cd620be41de"
    },
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": null,
      "name": "external-secrets",
      "uid": "c918dc22-b1ee-4e1f-a8f8-1d15ac0d5a10"
    },
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": null,
      "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller",
      "uid": "3c78bb78-a3c5-4953-93d4-cf6621e1200a"
    },
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": null,
      "name": "external-secrets-webhook",
      "uid": "c75dc3ba-42db-4a59-8952-6c94d85d054c"
    }
  ],
  "forgejo_deployments": [
    {
      "images": [
        "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0.3-rootless"
      ],
      "name": "forgejo-gitea",
      "serviceAccount": "default",
      "uid": "e8eff0aa-64bb-4b44-9a80-a66612986355"
    },
    {
      "images": [
        "docker:27-dind",
        "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner:6.3.1"
      ],
      "name": "forgejo-runner",
      "serviceAccount": "default",
      "uid": "89c8a056-bcae-4940-acdd-2eb2768e108a"
    }
  ],
  "forgejo_externalsecrets": [
    {
      "conditions": [
        {
          "type": "Ready",
          "status": "True",
          "reason": "SecretSynced"
        }
      ],
      "data": [
        {
          "key": "workloads/forgejo/forgejo-mailer",
          "property": "PASSWD",
          "secretKey": "MAILER_PASSWD"
        }
      ],
      "name": "forgejo-mailer",
      "store": {
        "kind": "ClusterSecretStore",
        "name": "openbao-forgejo"
      },
      "target": "forgejo-mailer",
      "uid": "cbbea71e-70a8-4010-aca9-9136920f2f58"
    }
  ],
  "forgejo_secretstores": [],
  "forgejo_serviceaccounts": [
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": null,
      "name": "default",
      "uid": "2ae15248-4700-46a6-84c6-e3bb3cd33323"
    },
    {
      "automountServiceAccountToken": false,
      "name": "forgejo-mailer-eso",
      "uid": "e2214835-32dd-4333-a9c2-6d248ab8bafe"
    }
  ],
  "native_mutation": false,
  "observed_at": "2026-10-11T01:20:37.519031+00:00",
  "secret_value_reads": false,
  "secretstore_crd": {
    "uid": "1eefa5c9-6c2a-4a3b-84c6-3941488201c2",
    "versions": [
      {
        "kubernetes_auth_schema": {
          "description": "Kubernetes authenticates with Vault by passing the ServiceAccount\ntoken stored in the named Secret resource to the Vault server.",
          "properties": {
            "mountPath": {
              "default": "kubernetes",
              "description": "Path where the Kubernetes authentication backend is mounted in Vault, e.g:\n\"kubernetes\"",
              "type": "string"
            },
            "role": {
              "description": "A required field containing the Vault Role to assume. A Role binds a\nKubernetes ServiceAccount with a set of Vault policies.",
              "type": "string"
            },
            "secretRef": {
              "description": "Optional secret field containing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount JWT used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If a name is specified without a key,\n`token` is the default. If one is not specified, the one bound to\nthe controller will be used.",
              "properties": {
                "key": {
                  "description": "A key in the referenced Secret.\nSome instances of this field may be defaulted, in others it may be required.",
                  "maxLength": 253,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[-._a-zA-Z0-9]+$",
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "name": {
                  "description": "The name of the Secret resource being referred to.",
                  "maxLength": 253,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$",
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "namespace": {
                  "description": "The namespace of the Secret resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.",
                  "maxLength": 63,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$",
                  "type": "string"
                }
              },
              "type": "object"
            },
            "serviceAccountRef": {
              "description": "Optional service account field containing the name of a kubernetes ServiceAccount.\nIf the service account is specified, the service account secret token JWT will be used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If the service account selector is not supplied,\nthe secretRef will be used instead.",
              "properties": {
                "audiences": {
                  "description": "Audience specifies the `aud` claim for the service account token\nIf the service account uses a well-known annotation for e.g. IRSA or GCP Workload Identity\nthen this audiences will be appended to the list",
                  "items": {
                    "type": "string"
                  },
                  "type": "array"
                },
                "name": {
                  "description": "The name of the ServiceAccount resource being referred to.",
                  "maxLength": 253,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$",
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "namespace": {
                  "description": "Namespace of the resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.",
                  "maxLength": 63,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$",
                  "type": "string"
                }
              },
              "required": [
                "name"
              ],
              "type": "object"
            }
          },
          "required": [
            "mountPath",
            "role"
          ],
          "type": "object"
        },
        "name": "v1",
        "served": true,
        "storage": true
      },
      {
        "kubernetes_auth_schema": {
          "description": "Kubernetes authenticates with Vault by passing the ServiceAccount\ntoken stored in the named Secret resource to the Vault server.",
          "properties": {
            "mountPath": {
              "default": "kubernetes",
              "description": "Path where the Kubernetes authentication backend is mounted in Vault, e.g:\n\"kubernetes\"",
              "type": "string"
            },
            "role": {
              "description": "A required field containing the Vault Role to assume. A Role binds a\nKubernetes ServiceAccount with a set of Vault policies.",
              "type": "string"
            },
            "secretRef": {
              "description": "Optional secret field containing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount JWT used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If a name is specified without a key,\n`token` is the default. If one is not specified, the one bound to\nthe controller will be used.",
              "properties": {
                "key": {
                  "description": "A key in the referenced Secret.\nSome instances of this field may be defaulted, in others it may be required.",
                  "maxLength": 253,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[-._a-zA-Z0-9]+$",
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "name": {
                  "description": "The name of the Secret resource being referred to.",
                  "maxLength": 253,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$",
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "namespace": {
                  "description": "The namespace of the Secret resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.",
                  "maxLength": 63,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$",
                  "type": "string"
                }
              },
              "type": "object"
            },
            "serviceAccountRef": {
              "description": "Optional service account field containing the name of a kubernetes ServiceAccount.\nIf the service account is specified, the service account secret token JWT will be used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If the service account selector is not supplied,\nthe secretRef will be used instead.",
              "properties": {
                "audiences": {
                  "description": "Audience specifies the `aud` claim for the service account token\nIf the service account uses a well-known annotation for e.g. IRSA or GCP Workload Identity\nthen this audiences will be appended to the list",
                  "items": {
                    "type": "string"
                  },
                  "type": "array"
                },
                "name": {
                  "description": "The name of the ServiceAccount resource being referred to.",
                  "maxLength": 253,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$",
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "namespace": {
                  "description": "Namespace of the resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.",
                  "maxLength": 63,
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$",
                  "type": "string"
                }
              },
              "required": [
                "name"
              ],
              "type": "object"
            }
          },
          "required": [
            "mountPath",
            "role"
          ],
          "type": "object"
        },
        "name": "v1beta1",
        "served": true,
        "storage": false
      }
    ]
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  "recorded_at": "2026-10-11T01:34:15.343635+00:00",
  "native_metadata_only": true,
  "native_auth_or_mutation": false,
  "secret_value_reads": false,
  "native_eso_image": "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1",
  "served_v1_crd_auth_schema_validation": true,
  "actual_common_controller_tokenrequest_rbac": true,
  "new_rbac_required": false,
  "candidate_exact_kubernetes_objects": 3,
  "old_materialization_objects": 5,
  "new_materialization_objects": 6,
  "original_five_object_bodies_unchanged": true,
  "added_object_ids": [
    "consumer-eso-role"
  ],
  "old_full_render_digest": "sha256:e64b56e4590b57b858303fcda1a474693e3dd821bc83df26646fe78fc345498a",
  "proposed_full_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35",
  "net_type_and_proposed_case_validation_errors": 0,
  "mason_tests": {
    "current_source_negative_reproduced": {
      "passed": 40,
      "failed": 1,
      "node": "test_two_role_backed_readers_keep_distinct_ccrs_and_complete_structure",
      "cause": "Both role-backed readers used same CCR-ESO output identity, overwriting KeyCape request"
    },
    "corrected_stage": {
      "passed": 44,
      "failed": 0,
      "seconds": 5.85
    },
    "duplicate_overwrite_guard_verified": true,
    "prior_corrected_stage": {
      "passed": 42,
      "failed": 0,
      "seconds": 6.66
    }
  },
  "mason_proposed_type_build_refused": true,
  "mason_refusal_reason": "allow-unimplemented only applies to acknowledged type; proposed1.2 has no acceptance",
  "platform_draft_validation_exit_code": 0,
  "platform_draft_warning": "Bound claim is unconfirmed; apply blocked",
  "draft_validation_preparation_history": "Initial in_flight draft used unsupported missing-field names. Corrected to ordinary proposed status with explicit pending owner/case review and bound_claims_confirmed=false.",
  "source_statuses_unchanged": [
    "acknowledged type1.1",
    "accepted case1.1",
    "in_flight current CCR42",
    "applied historical CCR41"
  ],
  "runtime_helm_handover_verified": false,
  "native_materialized": false,
  "native_followthrough_complete": false,
  "founder_acknowledgment": null,
  "driver": "ORGREF-WP-0002",
  "kubernetes_names_bounded_by_type_parameters": true,
  "consumer_role_rollback_precedes_policy_rollback": true,
  "generated_ccr_refinement": {
    "prior_packet_sha256": "271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279",
    "prior_packet_preserved_at": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271",
    "platform_conditional_manifest_sha256": "9e4967bfff57694ceb12883f522edc405ef3fa316e46b88c9bdad47205a180b4",
    "before_fix_counterexamples": [
      {
        "node": "test_two_role_backed_readers_keep_distinct_ccrs_and_complete_structure",
        "result": "failed wrong consumer target keycape vs forgejo"
      },
      {
        "node": "test_generated_consumer_lifecycle_requires_created_only_token_recovery",
        "result": "failed missing created-only/token-revocation-or-expiry lifecycle"
      }
    ],
    "intermediate_check_history": {
      "tests": 9,
      "passed": 7,
      "failed": 2,
      "cause": "case-sensitive test string matched lowercase revoke against capitalized sentence; assertions normalized case without removing required semantics"
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    "candidate_builder_sha256": "c2b140f380407779ce5478ca57c97eb0e6375d6a9cad4591b0b29ddd177db686",
    "candidate_build_tests_sha256": "aea22297178b5bb1eaaf5d59bbd1c71112dfc32bed2075b33ccc0598c8fc5be5",
    "candidate_structure_tests_sha256": "2e7446eaf01d4bb59d7d8fb3c3cdc5e6e3007b3ae84d8ed0a49f11f745f2e386",
    "keycape1.1_generated_output_unchanged": true,
    "consumer1.1_generated_output_changes_only_target_workload": true,
    "historical1.1_bundle_unchanged_and_now_refused_for_wrong_target": true,
    "structural_checker_weakened": false,
    "role_backed_consumer_created_only_token_recovery_required": true,
    "proposed_type_or_case_new_acceptance": false,
    "ruff_check": "not run; ruff executable absent in owner venv and PATH",
    "syntax_checks": "all candidate Python AST parse passed"
  },
  "complete_proposed_package_supplement": {
    "package_path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2",
    "status": "proposed",
    "type_implemented": false,
    "canonical_case_accepted": false,
    "files": [
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        "path": "README.md",
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      },
      {
        "path": "type.yaml",
        "sha256": "017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db",
        "bound_document": "type-1.2.yaml"
      }
    ],
    "full_owner_validator": {
      "command": "python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-type docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2",
      "exit_code": 0,
      "result": "OK oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 (proposed)"
    },
    "runnable_tests": {
      "command": "NET_KINGDOM_ROOT=/home/worsch/net-kingdom python3 -m pytest docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/tests -q",
      "exit_code": 0,
      "passed": 22
    },
    "separate_netkingdom_source_owner_review_recorded": true,
    "source_only": true,
    "package_peer_review": {
      "manifest_sha256": "769441a39f5de412a1291cb8c1eb45df3aece9ae6c9261a02df056a3973e789d",
      "reviewed_completed_packet_sha256": "330da7fe129b0443e41fff44b3c2d829b0d682698fdbba9fe60011d46ed5c48c",
      "receipt_sha256": "9e9b8dda889203c064b35e1bbcd4d0c62d76d4ba1935c9a10f4b2dbf1c6e8497",
      "source_paths": [
        "/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.md",
        "/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json"
      ],
      "narrow_rebinding_confirmation_pending": true
    }
  },
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  "original_owner_receipt_base64": 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}
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- } - ] - }, - "publish": { - "version": 1, - "audience": { - "subjects": [], - "groups": [ - "net-kingdom-admins" - ] - } - }, - "review": { - "version": 1, - "options": { - "submitter": "state-hub", - "memo_class": "decision-record", - "review_group": "net-kingdom-admins", - "approval_intent": { - "action": "acknowledge", - "principal": "net-kingdom-admins", - "purpose": "Acknowledge exact type 1.2 after complete-package/source-owner gates; approve reference-design receipt only, keep canonical case proposed under sections 4/5/6; no native or credential authority.", - "target": { - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2", - "type": "security-case-type", - "system": "net-kingdom" - } - } - } - } - } -] diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/mason-final-review.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/mason-final-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6bdc3a0..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/mason-final-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "owner-source-review.v1", - "owner_role": "ops-mason-owner", - "work_item": "ops-mason ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02", - "work_item_sha256": "e035a058220a070ce7bf368bd001f27594e1591a00ede9bf41a690db8306bea1", - "prior_review_preserved": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-independent-mason-review.json", - "reviewed_manifest": "sha256:5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431", - "reviewed_render": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "formal_owner_entry": { - "reviewer": "ops-mason-owner (agent ops-mason, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "comment": "Fresh exact19 source review under completed own ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02 supporting MASON-WP-0010-T03; frozen manifest sha256:5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431 and full proposed render sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. INTENT.md Mission consistency review and Responsibility boundary support deriving the actual consumer workload and requiring authenticated created-only recovery, owner issued-token revocation or verified expiry, retained provenance and no recovery login/remint.44 independent tests pass; both new counterexamples fail against earlier c48 source. KeyCape CCR remains unchanged; current1.1 consumer target intentionally corrects to forgejo and unchanged historical bundle correctly refuses exact matching. Prior42 review/original failures preserved. Role-before-policy order remains in type/CCR42 rollback. This approves source only: exact1.2 acknowledgment, source rebundle, confirmed binding, authenticated native evidence and founder live go remain pending; no native approval or recovery authority supplied." - }, - "checks": { - "focused_passed": 44, - "pre_refinement_counterexamples_failed_as_expected": 2, - "historical_bundle_refusal_test": "passed", - "actual_proposed_admission": "refused", - "all_19_hashes_verified": true, - "all_3_baselines_verified": true, - "owner_native_mutation": false - }, - "limits": [ - "Generated lifecycle obligations are not an implemented custody/revocation adapter.", - "Historical1.1 source approval is not reassigned; corrected source build/bundle needs explicit reconciliation after exact acceptance." - ] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/memo.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/memo.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4b166dc..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/memo.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -{ - "id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", - "version": 1, - "question": "Acknowledge the exact proposed OIDC browser relying-party 1.2 architecture after complete-package validation and owner review, with Forgejo migration design recorded separately and its canonical case staying proposed, without native authority?", - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": "Source-only acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes section 6 of the sixth dedicated consumer reader role and separate Forgejo reference-migration design receipt only. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while type is unimplemented; actual full package README/examples/runnable tests and separate NetKingdom source-owner review gate type acknowledgment recording. Original five structural bodies unchanged; common ESO trust/600-second TokenRequest/legacy fallback and created-only token-revocation-or-expiry recovery disclosed. Three independent architecture owner reviews / 44 tests and the completed package NetKingdom review / 22 tests attached; bound claims and execution remain false. Old 1.1 is not inherited and native gates remain separate.", - "binding": { - "principal": { - "id": "pending-human-session", - "kind": "person", - "display_name": "Founder source acknowledgment" - }, - "target": { - "kind": "resource", - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc", - "label": "Exact NetKingdom type 1.2 and Forgejo reference-case source", - "environment": "build" - }, - "terms": "Only NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1 and exact reviewed nineteen-file manifest 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431/full render c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Type acknowledgment recording requires actual complete section 3 package validation and separate NetKingdom source-owner review. Reference-migration design approval is separate owner-receipt only; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed/unimplemented, without acceptance fields or phase acceptance. Record genuine new native human source disposition before any permitted type acknowledgment fields, after full package/source-owner gates, preserve immutable 1.1 history. No credential/auth/ESO/materialization/session/grant/native completion; execution.permitted=false and bound_claims_confirmed=false until separately discharged actual native owner gates." - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "label": "decision-packet.md", - "hash": "sha256:bb9a3f12248d18a51d06daf1235903ed8827c55e9e28bcb80c76d414db0d1a56" - }, - { - "item_id": "proposal-json", - "label": "proposal.json", - "hash": "sha256:3d726df3bebcfeb50dd0a5f83ad1ba94d0408caeec84a421feb1555b4b106e97" - }, - { - "item_id": "source-inventory-json", - "label": "source-inventory.json", - "hash": "sha256:fc06655f48d33c84fee1764de71649dde4f584e36388bce2af1e459d2728bc7c" - }, - { - "item_id": "type-1-2-yaml", - "label": "type-1.2.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db" - }, - { - "item_id": "case-1-2-yaml", - "label": "case-1.2.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab" - }, - { - "item_id": "render-1-2-json", - "label": "render-1.2.json", - "hash": "sha256:96b25108335e2cf5f96af481fe8a7735831c8320d81b50f7c6e6d4e53d0c0f02" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-type-1-1-yaml", - "label": "current-type-1.1.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c" - }, - { - "item_id": "current-case-1-1-yaml", - "label": "current-case-1.1.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d" - }, - { - "item_id": "consumer-delivery-yaml", - "label": "consumer-delivery.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:56478a83d799c08dc1e5159983b1e843a46b16dfeee7e84c31401d1f92430df2" - }, - { - "item_id": "ccr-0042-proposed-body-yaml", - "label": "CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml", - "hash": "sha256:6544600c63a86559ba053240c476d493f4d2f25c9cd22cf6a9a05f09ee617a86" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-role-json", - "label": "reader-role.json", - "hash": "sha256:976b19e0780b6056ed54bf5e8f27a0eb786af65817d9ec00ca161ac46e7d72e7" - }, - { - "item_id": "reader-policy-hcl", - "label": "reader-policy.hcl", - "hash": "sha256:af3a638605c1f6dff7879771fede4c56a6b9a7e430d4b5b58c370063b2c888ca" - }, - { - "item_id": "owner-design-md", - "label": "owner-design.md", - "hash": "sha256:c523949454e4c6eb58e8caee382380a561f561704136de62bf5783c592f962f2" - }, - { - "item_id": "retained-native-metadata-json", - "label": "retained-native-metadata.json", - "hash": "sha256:4e2993f5920215f41e4a235743023f22b78b8f597d3d70ed279991b2fc3204b5" - }, - { - "item_id": "mason-final-review-json", - "label": "mason-final-review.json", - "hash": "sha256:28541874fb437a06a8f1749bc50c88f6fee3d7c100c2f3ee0c52b59afaf8e102" - }, - { - "item_id": "platform-final-review-json", - "label": "platform-final-review.json", - "hash": "sha256:72854a798e01c6d65a16770efb1329d211fe3c59a3f4ad3190d6972f5c886f6e" - }, - { - "item_id": "netkingdom-review-bundle-json", - "label": "netkingdom-review-bundle.json", - "hash": "sha256:d452d90d886519186e2170592e6ab7389f384eff6c12795c8ad66a798e0966e0" - }, - { - "item_id": "netkingdom-review-sources-bundle-json", - "label": "netkingdom-review-sources-bundle.json", - "hash": "sha256:1b6c0432150ec9fd07a8aa4a005051081f7ac2557a2787fe5b32cdb7387d6648" - }, - { - "item_id": "validation-and-history-json", - "label": "validation-and-history.json", - "hash": "sha256:494d555b7dc33c05cd2f456c781e36bfe13deae3f44ce249d43fef71fe6c2c6a" - }, - { - "item_id": "recording-gates-md", - "label": "recording-gates.md", - "hash": "sha256:ca7b851f6357951101e7026883ccc29529c5ad798d5692987ee29a4c65962bce" - } - ], - "highlights": [ - { - "id": "source-only-authentication-refinement", - "item_id": "decision-packet-md", - "note": "New sixth role/auth path requires this new acknowledgment; prior 1.1 does not transfer. Shared ESO controller remains broadly trusted, failed TokenRequest must not seed legacy/static tokens, and deletion alone cannot revoke issued tokens. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed on unimplemented type; full package/source-owner gates remain required. No native credentials, apply, session or case completion.", - "required_ack": true, - "severity": "warning", - "locator": { - "kind": "section", - "heading": "Requested acknowledgment" - } - } - ], - "sealed": false, - "approval_id": null, - "approval_binding_digest": null -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/netkingdom-final-review-sources.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/netkingdom-final-review-sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 17eefd3..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/netkingdom-final-review-sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,191 +0,0 @@ -{ - "independent_checks": { - "exact_manifest_sha256": "5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431", - "verified_files": 19, - "all_seven_current_source_pins_match": true, - "type_case_preparation_validation_pass": true, - "runtime_admission_of_proposed_type_refused": true, - "render_regeneration_identical": true, - "render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - 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"sha256": "28541874fb437a06a8f1749bc50c88f6fee3d7c100c2f3ee0c52b59afaf8e102" - }, - { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-platform-owner-review-stage/railiance-platform/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-owner-review/final-review.json", - "sha256": "72854a798e01c6d65a16770efb1329d211fe3c59a3f4ad3190d6972f5c886f6e" - }, - { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271/manifest.json", - "sha256": "271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/netkingdom-final-review.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/netkingdom-final-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index d3e6c55..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/netkingdom-final-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ ---- -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: approved -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T05 -reviewed_manifest_sha256: 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431 -scope: final-nineteen-path-proposed-source-technical-review-only ---- - -# NetKingdom final Forgejo consumer ESO source review - -Technical agreement on exact nineteen-path manifest -5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431 under completed -own NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T05. This is the same NetKingdom role only; apply the -work record before this formal entry. Original SHA guards preserve already -applied T03/T04 and any State Hub UUIDs. The earlier271 review and its evidence -remain historical; they are not claimed as an exact review of this final source. - -INTENT's Taxonomy declaration, Identity is the Control Plane, Minimize Threat -Exposure and Meta-Orchestration principles support truthful consumer identity, -inspectable canonical contracts and separate owner-executed acceptance. The two -Platform counterexamples touched that contract: an incorrectly generated keycape -consumer identity and delete-only lifecycle wording. Builder source SHA256 -c2b140f380407779ce5478ca57c97eb0e6375d6a9cad4591b0b29ddd177db686 corrects them -without changing canonical proposed type/case or its six-object render. - -Independently checked all19 hashes and seven current source pins, preparation -validators, refusal of proposed source by normal implemented-type admission and -full regeneration of render -sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. -execution.permitted stays false. Direct isolated projections reproduce both -failures against preserved271 builder and verify the corrected generated CCR -against its exact retained projection. The consumer target is forgejo, KeyCape -reader output matches the earlier builder exactly, and unbound consumer output -changes only the previously incorrect workload field. No fixture provenance or -private projection call is accepted-case/native evidence. Fresh distinct Mason -and Platform owner receipts pin this exact final manifest and each report44 -independently rerun focused passes; neither is a native installation receipt. - -The generator requires consumer-reference recovery, independently proved -case-created ownership, preservation of preexisting/shared objects, owner issued -reader-token revocation or independently verified expiry, no new login/remint, -retained receipts and refusal on changed references/UIDs/ownership. These are -obligations, not an implemented revocation adapter or recovery permission. -Canonical/manual proposed rollback still orders role before policy and requires -revocation/expiry before removal of the created role; deleting role/SA/store alone -never proves token deactivation. Historical1.1 bundles/CCR history are preserved: -the old wrongly targeted bundle now correctly fails matching. A corrected source -build/bundle needs fresh exact owner reconciliation after successor acceptance; -old approvals are not silently reassigned and the verifier is not weakened. - -All earlier exact271 identity/trust/acceptance boundaries remain applicable: -forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso only, namespace forgejo, audience openbao, -exact CLIENT_SECRET data read and no default policy. Forgejo/runner default SA -must never bind. Dedicated automount=false identity must have no legacy token -refs; no static fallback. Shared ESO controller authority and existing HTTP -custody remain disclosed rather than described as isolation. Delivery applies -only three admitted namespaced objects and acquires no deletion authority over -matched/shared target objects. - -The sixth structural role changes authentication/materialization under -SecurityCaseTypes §6 and therefore needs a new founder informed-decision -acknowledgment as for a new type, regardless of proposed1.2 label. Existing -acknowledgedtype1.1/acceptedcase1.1 cannot authorize it. Pending claims still -block apply. No type/case acknowledgment, implemented marker, broker pin bypass, -role/policy grant, source materialization, installed adapter/session or live go -follows from this review. Refresh exact ESO/native identity metadata; obtain -independent admitted bindings, capability/creation receipts and Warden native -session/revocation/descriptors before their existing acceptance steps. - -Helm secret consumption/group enforcement, break-glass/account-link/MFA and -positive/negative browser checks stay separate owner/project gates. Delivery -Ready and source tests do not complete the first case. Existing ORGREF/NK0048, -Mason, Warden, Platform and consumer work records retain that work; no duplicate -plan or new standing authority is introduced. 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} - ] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/owner-design.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/owner-design.md deleted file mode 100644 index a267302..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/owner-design.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -# Forgejo consumer ESO reader — concrete source proposal - -RAPPS-WP-0016 already chooses ESO delivery for the OIDC client secret. This proposal fills its missing reader identity without asking the founder to make that same source choice again. It is not a live apply, a new credential grant, or first-case success. Existing ORGREF-WP-0002 remains the project driver; CCR42, MASON-WP-0010-T03 and NK-WP-0048-T06 remain the owner work, rather than another workplan. - -Actual read-only railiance01 metadata shows ESO v0.16.1 running as external-secrets/external-secrets, served v1/v1beta1 SecretStore CRDs supporting serviceAccountRef.audiences, and controller RBAC permitting serviceaccounts/token create. Forgejo and its runner currently share forgejo/default; they must not become the OpenBao reader identity. No consumer namespace SecretStore or dedicated OIDC-delivery SA exists in the observed metadata. Existing forgejo-mailer-eso is a separate SMTP lane and remains unchanged. No OpenBao login, capability check, auth operation, Secret value, Secret object retrieval, or native materialization was performed. - -## Exact supported reader - -`consumer-delivery.yaml` prepares exactly three namespaced objects: ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso with automount=false and no legacy token refs; SecretStore forgejo/openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer; ExternalSecret forgejo/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client. The store requests a token for that dedicated serviceAccountRef, audiences=[openbao], and authenticates to OpenBao Kubernetes role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo. The role binds exactly that SA and namespace, only workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, no default policy, and a 900-second maximum OpenBao token lifetime. ESO's installed source requests a 600-second Kubernetes token and can fall back to legacy SA tokens; owner admission must ensure this new SA has no legacy tokens, never create one to bypass a failed TokenRequest. - -The namespace SecretStore cannot select another namespace's SA; serviceAccountRef.namespace is omitted. No extra RBAC, projected workload token, Deployment SA replacement or controller identity change is proposed. Namespace/default is not an OpenBao-bound reader. ESO remains the shared trusted controller: it already has clusterwide TokenRequest and Secret permissions and can request this SA's token. This separates reader binding/revocation and avoids default identity reuse; it does not isolate this secret from controller compromise or grant new cryptographic isolation. - -The exact KV data ACL is platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo, read only, plus existing self-token lookup/revoke stanzas. No metadata/list/parent/sibling access is added. Delivery maps only remote workloads/keycape/forgejo field CLIENT_SECRET to target key CLIENT_SECRET. Target creationPolicy=Owner and deletionPolicy=Retain preserve fail-safe remote-deletion behavior. Refresh is 15m; the value is never present in this source. Existing internal OpenBao HTTP endpoint and controller custody behavior are retained, not upgraded into a TLS/isolation claim. - -## Type and structural boundary - -NetKingdom's proposed successor type 1.2 adds explicit case parameter consumer_namespace, one sixth structural object consumer-eso-role, and separate owner deliver-consumer-secret follow-through/readiness/rollback. All original five rendered structural bodies compare equal to current1.1. Existing acknowledged type 1.1 and accepted case 1.1 remain byte-preserved; the proposed 1.2 case has status proposed and no copied acceptance. Full proposed render is c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Existing acceptance does not silently extend to the new role/runtime delivery. Owner review and exact type/case acknowledgment precede any build, metadata apply or materialized-status receipt. - -The current Mason builder gives every role-backed reader the ESO draft suffix. With two reader roles it silently overwrites one CCR. The new regression proves that defect against current source; the minimal staged fix retains ESO for the KeyCape reader and Forgejo for consumer-reader-policy, plus refuses duplicate output identities.42 actual focused builder/plan/structure tests pass with corrected source, including both independent CCRs, platform validation and a complete six-object structural request. Existing1.1 tests remain passing. No fake proposed 1.2 acceptance is used: Mason correctly refuses to build a merely proposed successor. Test fixtures alone temporarily acknowledge synthetic roles to exercise builder semantics. - -The proposed CCR42 body uses proposed status, bound_claims_confirmed=false, explicit pending1.2 acknowledgment and old CCR's exact historical hash/provenance. Owner validation passes with the expected apply-blocking warning. It is stored separately from the actual in-flight CCR42; no historical review or applied CCR41 is rewritten. Folding this reviewed body into CCR42 remains an owner reconciliation with retained original revision, not a fresh parallel request. - -## Admission, native proof and recovery - -Before an exact scoped native proposal, refresh ESO image/CRD/RBAC, Forgejo/default and runner identity, the three proposed object identities and target metadata through Kubernetes PartialObjectMetadata only. Classify absent, exact preexisting-matched or conflicting; refuse a legacy-token SA, unknown ownership, changed role/policy, audience mismatch or shared target. Never read Secret data. Preserve current UIDs/resourceVersions, authenticated owner change receipts and the exact type/case/render/source pins. No placeholder SA claim substitutes for actual owner admission. - -Platform materialization applies only the reviewed exact-path policy and dedicated Kubernetes-auth role after its own approved CCR path. Fresh owner metadata/capability receipts must prove exact binding and distinguish case-created from preexisting; no minted value or successful delivery is required to prove structure. Mason's existing typed structural contract then covers all six objects, including source layout and catalog pointer; source-only bodies are not authenticated native evidence. Warden native dispatch/descriptors/session receipt and per-owner provenance still need their existing accepted integration review. - -Consumer follow-through applies the three admitted objects, then checks SecretStore/ExternalSecret Ready status and exact target UID/ownerReference through metadata only. Shared/matched objects never acquire delete authority. If ESO reports failure, stop; no manual Secret seeding or controller/static-token fallback is admitted. Minting, KeyCape client/env/groups, and Forgejo Helm OIDC/group enforcement stay distinct existing first-case steps. Forgejo gitea.oauth secret-consumption settings were not changed or Helm-render-verified here; they must be prepared/reviewed before T02 handover, with current local login intact and T01 break-glass acceptance still a prerequisite. Delivery Ready alone does not complete browser/MFA/group checks or forge closure. - -Created-only rollback first reverts the consumer secret reference/auth source through its owner Helm revision. Remove only the admitted trial-created ExternalSecret and independently proven case-created target UID/ownerReference; preserve matched/shared targets. Then remove only created namespace SecretStore and SA. Remove only the created OpenBao role after revoking its issued tokens or proving expiry, then created policy. Role/SA/store deletion does not revoke already issued OpenBao tokens; deletion alone is not deactivation proof. Retain native/audit/source receipts and stop if references, UIDs or ownership changed. Do not infer delete authority from Mason's legacy planned rollback inventory. - -RAPPS-WP-0016-T02, current CCR42, MASON-WP-0010-T03 and first-case acceptance remain unfinished. ORGREF-WP-0002 holds this owner return. Human-only break-glass/account-link/MFA/first-case acknowledgment gates remain separate from source preparation; no new human login is requested by this packet. - -## Supplementary generated-CCR refinement after Platform conditional review - -Exact prior 271 packet is preserved at /tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271, alongside original c48. Platform found two additional generator gaps: hardcoded keycape target for the consumer, and delete-only consumer-role lifecycle. Both meaningful counterexamples fail against 271 source before the fix. Current staged generator derives target.workload from consuming_service only for consumer-reader-policy, preserving all KeyCape ESO output fields. A role-backed consumer CCR requires reverting consumer reference, authenticated case-created ownership, preservation of preexisting/shared objects, issued-token owner revocation or independently verified expiry before deactivation, and no new login/remint during recovery. Actual owner native authority remains required; generated wording is not an implemented revocation adapter. - -Forty-four focused builder/plan/structure tests now pass. Earlier 42 and original counterexample/failure history remain retained. The old committed 1.1 bundle still mislabels the consumer workload keycape and therefore correctly fails fresh exact target matching after this correction. That historical bundle is preserved; the checker is not weakened or grandfathered. Local fixtures alone use corrected/rehashed consumer metadata, with a separate regression proving old bundle refusal. Current 1.1 unbound consumer generation changes only its previously wrong target.workload; KeyCape reader output remains unchanged. The proposed 1.2 render/type/case/source remains pending exact acknowledgment, with identical six-object structural body and no native completion claim. Fresh source build/bundle owner reconciliation must occur after exact acceptance before any native apply/materialization; old CCR or bundle approval is not silently reassigned. New source/test hashes are in validation.json and generated projection receipt. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/platform-final-review.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/platform-final-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index b82fb37..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/platform-final-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -{ - "review_id": "RPF-REVIEW-20261011-FORGEJO-ESO-R1-FINAL", - "work_record": "RPF-IN-0006", - "reviewer_role": "railiance-platform technical owner only", - "status": "technical-agreement", - "exact_manifest_sha256": "5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431", - "reviewed_paths": 19, - "candidate_builder_sha256": "c2b140f380407779ce5478ca57c97eb0e6375d6a9cad4591b0b29ddd177db686", - "initial_conditional_manifest_sha256": "9e4967bfff57694ceb12883f522edc405ef3fa316e46b88c9bdad47205a180b4", - "initial_proposal_manifest_sha256": "271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279", - "all_manifest_hashes_match": true, - "independently_rerun_focused_tests": 44, - "resolved": [ - "Generated consumer-reader target.workload derives consuming_service=forgejo, KeyCape ESO reader remains keycape, generated request identities remain distinct.", - "Generated role-backed consumer deactivation includes authenticated created-only custody, preserving shared/preexisting resources, issued-token revocation or independently verified expiry, no-new-login/no-remint recovery, and refusal on changed references/UID/ownership." - ], - "independent_generated_source_probe": "refined-generated-ccr-probe.json", - "retained_preconditions": [ - "Fresh owner/founder exact type/case1.2 acknowledgment required for sixth structural role/runtime delivery; accepted1.1 does not transfer.", - "CCR42 reconciliation retains prior body/history; actual bound claims unconfirmed, source-only role/policy/delivery objects not applied.", - "Future exact ESO runtime/CRD/RBAC and no-legacy-token SA admission, authenticated created/preexisting ownership/capability receipts and approved contained owner changes remain required; common controller trust and existing HTTP custody are disclosed.", - "No deletion-alone revocation claim; revoke issued OpenBao tokens or independently verify expiry before deactivation, with old consumer references reverted and unknown outcomes retained.", - "Consumer Helm secret consumption/group enforcement, break-glass/MFA/browser checks and Warden descriptor/native per-owner session proof remain distinct unfinished gates." - ], - "scope": "Technical agreement on source proposal and platform CCR semantics only. No other owner role acceptance or native activation.", - "limits": { - "founder_acknowledgment": false, - "native_apply": false, - "credential_mint": false, - "secret_read": false, - "structural_materialization": false, - "first_case_complete": false - } -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/proposal.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/proposal.json deleted file mode 100644 index c39419f..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/proposal.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -{ - "proposal_id": "NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1", - "memo_id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", - "memo_version": 1, - "status": "source-acknowledgment-draft", - "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2", - "case": "forgejo-netkingdom-oidc", - "case_scope": "Reference-migration design approval may be recorded in a separate owner receipt only. Canonical case1.2 stays proposed while type is unimplemented; no phase/canonical case acceptance on acknowledgment.", - "bound_preparation_manifest_sha256": "5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431", - "proposed_type_sha256": "017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db", - "proposed_case_sha256": "1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab", - "proposed_full_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "case_owner_repo": "railiance-apps", - "case_owner_person": "founder", - "structural_objects": 6, - "original_five_rendered_bodies_unchanged": true, - "sixth_object": "consumer-eso-role", - "consumer_namespace": "forgejo", - "consumer_service_account": "forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso", - "role": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo", - "audience": "openbao", - "kv_data_path": "platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "field": "CLIENT_SECRET", - "shared_eso_controller_trust": true, - "tokenrequest_seconds": 600, - "legacy_fallback_allowed": false, - "bound_claims_confirmed": false, - "execution_permitted": false, - "authorizes_native_operation": false, - "authorizes_first_session_grant": false, - "native_type_or_case_ack_recorded": false, - "real_human_disposition": null, - "grant_created": false, - "owner_commits": [ - { - "repo": "ops-mason", - "reviewed_source_commit": "a41312e5a4a099eb1f5b77fcf80abb033f82a45e", - "observed_head": "6196be5dca9cfd16df829df93aef9ec42383af1b" - }, - { - "repo": "railiance-platform", - "reviewed_source_commit": "5b9c8262bedbbd9bf4348842e13aa668889ca745", - "observed_head": "5b9c8262bedbbd9bf4348842e13aa668889ca745" - }, - { - "repo": "railiance-apps", - "reviewed_source_commit": "367f01cb4b5859ce0b4598a1ab652904b83f7f84", - "observed_head": "367f01cb4b5859ce0b4598a1ab652904b83f7f84" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "reviewed_source_commit": "c26b018328caaf6734dbce9605709a40359f4f2c", - "observed_head": "c26b018328caaf6734dbce9605709a40359f4f2c" - } - ], - "driver": "ORGREF-WP-0002", - "existing_work_records": [ - "NK-WP-0048", - "MASON-WP-0010", - "WARDEN-WP-0044", - "RAPPS-WP-0016", - "CCR-2026-0042" - ], - "cost_estimate_eur": 0.1, - "risk_note": "Source architecture acknowledgment only. Actual native/custody/session risk and authority must be reviewed under their existing owner gates; no native credential exposure or runtime change is authorized by this memo.", - "approval_source_identity": "Only independently confirmed genuine native founder disposition for exact new memo/version/packet supports source acknowledgment; old1.1 and technical owner agreements are not that disposition.", - "type_acknowledgment_preconditions": [ - "actual complete SecurityCaseTypes section 3 package README/examples/runnable tests and full owner package validator/test pass (now proved for staged supplement)", - "separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt binding that exact complete package", - "independent genuine new human disposition for unchanged packet/type source" - ], - "complete_type12_package_validation_proved": true, - "complete_type12_package_owner_receipt_recorded": true, - "canonical_case_status_after_source_ack": "proposed", - "case_acceptance_authorized": false, - "type_implemented": false, - "complete_package_actual_observation": { - "owner_path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso", - "README_available": false, - "examples_available": false, - "runnable_type_tests_available": false, - "actual_owner_validate_type_with_package_path_passed": false, - "reported_errors": [ - "type.README.md missing", - "type.tests needs runnable tests/test_*.py", - "type.examples needs at least one example" - ], - "core_schema_render_validation_does_not_discharge_package_gate": true - }, - "human_posting_ready": true, - "complete_package_staged_supplement": { - "path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2", - "files": [ - { - "path": "README.md", - "sha256": "94dfe344f0e79cffea239612b0f7232f8bcc800d39e3b5aee6e1cad8cb2d5ee7" - }, - { - "path": "examples/example-public-portal.yaml", - "sha256": "8d6457248415daa6fc509da4e838aae0b66d7808e9da8e00f4b85a1e7faed10d" - }, - { - "path": "examples/forgejo.yaml", - "sha256": "1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab", - "bound_document": "case-1.2.yaml" - }, - { - "path": "tests/test_source_contract.py", - "sha256": "c3011c6855b7f1e4fd8ee5aea41cfe1598380db4fd8b9498c79050c91911b829" - }, - { - "path": "type.yaml", - "sha256": "017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db", - "bound_document": "type-1.2.yaml" - } - ], - "full_validator_passed": true, - "runnable_tests_passed": 22, - "owner_review_pending": false - }, - "remaining_submission_gate": "Root obtains narrow peer hash acknowledgment of this lossless receipt rebinding before submitting; actual human source disposition remains absent.", - "package_peer_review": { - "manifest_sha256": "769441a39f5de412a1291cb8c1eb45df3aece9ae6c9261a02df056a3973e789d", - "reviewed_completed_packet_sha256": "330da7fe129b0443e41fff44b3c2d829b0d682698fdbba9fe60011d46ed5c48c", - "receipt_sha256": "9e9b8dda889203c064b35e1bbcd4d0c62d76d4ba1935c9a10f4b2dbf1c6e8497", - "source_paths": [ - "/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.md", - "/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json" - ], - "narrow_rebinding_confirmation_pending": true - } -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/reader-policy.hcl b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/reader-policy.hcl deleted file mode 100644 index 8a2478d..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/reader-policy.hcl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo: CCR-2026-0042, from ops-mason SecurityCase forgejo-netkingdom-oidc -# (oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0, render sha256:fb8b114d...). Platform-generated from the CCR: -# the case render omitted the token self-lifecycle stanzas that token_self_lifecycle requires. - -path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo" { - capabilities = ["read"] -} - -path "auth/token/lookup-self" { - capabilities = ["read"] -} - -path "auth/token/revoke-self" { - capabilities = ["update"] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/reader-role.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/reader-role.json deleted file mode 100644 index a393666..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/reader-role.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -{ - "bound_service_account_names": [ - "forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso" - ], - "bound_service_account_namespaces": [ - "forgejo" - ], - "audience": "openbao", - "token_policies": [ - "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo" - ], - "token_no_default_policy": true, - "token_ttl": 900, - "token_max_ttl": 900, - "token_explicit_max_ttl": 900 -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/recording-gates.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/recording-gates.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8302044..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/recording-gates.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -# Source-only disposition recording gates - -Stable proposal NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1; memo infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1. Preparation contains no disposition, acceptance ID, human identity assertion or grant. - -1. REQUIRED before human submission or type acknowledgment recording: complete the actual 1.2 README/examples/runnable test package, obtain its full owner validator/test proof and separate NetKingdom source-review receipt, and bind them into this same unposted memo revision. The initial actual owner proposal directory lacked all three and reported those three failures, retained unchanged in proposal history. The staged proposed package supplement now passes the actual full owner validator and 22 runnable tests; its exact files and commands are bound in validation-and-history.json. Obtain the separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt for this exact supplement before posting; technical readiness is complete and owner-review remains the next required submission gate. Core schema/render success alone cannot satisfy this gate. Then verify every bound nineteen-file source hash and all three independent owner-review hashes. Verify proposed type 017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db, proposed case 1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab and full render c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Regenerate with actual owner validator/composer, preserving execution.permitted=false. Changed declared role, bindings, trust, source body or packet requires review of the refined exact revision. -2. Native informed-decision must provide a genuine independent human source disposition for this new memo/version/exact packet. Preserve approval/disposition/binding/source identities, actual founder resolver and observed time/stale state through existing admitted read paths. A technical review, local JSON, old e418/1.1 acceptance or State Hub prose alone is not this evidence. Record declined/pending/stale outcomes honestly. No privileged transport/grant/native runtime action follows from acknowledgment. -3. If the human acknowledges the type and approves this reference-migration design as its declared consumer owner/founder, record only roles supported by that actual disposition; design approval is confined to a separate owner receipt, not canonical case acceptance. Preserve exact current acknowledged 1.1 type, accepted 1.1 case, old source acknowledgment/date/by and proposed 1.2 bytes in immutable owner history before any canonical promotion. Only after actual complete section 3 package validation and a separate NetKingdom source-owner receipt, NetKingdom may record the reviewed 1.2 type acknowledgment with only source acknowledgment status/history reference changes; do not overwrite the old version/history as a silent renewal. The actual 1.2 package must have its README, valid examples and runnable tests, pass the owner full-package validator/test command, and be bound by a separate NetKingdom owner source-review receipt before recording type acknowledgment. The bound complete proposed package now proves availability and validator/test readiness; the separate source-owner receipt must still be recorded before posting and acknowledgment recording, without inferring it from the 1.1 package. No implemented marker is permitted from this memo. -4. REQUIRED: reference-migration source approval is recorded only in a separate NetKingdom/consumer-owner design receipt. Canonical case 1.2 remains proposed while the type is unimplemented; do not add canonical acceptance fields, phase-acceptance markers or accepted status from this acknowledgment. Canon sections 4/5 permits canonical case acceptance only for implemented types. Existing --allow-unimplemented first-reference source-build handling does not waive normal admission or this recording rule. Preserve original 1.1 case/history without overlap or repinning it as accepted 1.2. Only the actual implemented-type admission and separate case owner/founder acceptance can later change canonical case status. -5. Reconcile source-only CCR42/draft/current bundle deliberately under owners, retaining historical body/review pins. New acknowledgment cannot confirm bound_claims, apply credentials or adopt existing resources. Historical wrong-target bundle remains refused; source rebundle must bind fresh current case/type/full render/owner review, with created-only runtime receipts still absent. Record updated source digests rather than backfill old digests with new meaning. -6. All native auth/ESO/materialization/credential/session/verification gates remain unmet: owner adapters/global evidence verifier, independent observations/capabilities/creation ownership, Platform claims/apply approval, Warden descriptors/contained session/revocation and founder scoped native go. Preserve execution.permitted=false until those actual gates are separately discharged. Link source outcome to existing ORGREF/NK/Mason/Warden/RAPPS/CCR work; no new plan or automatic completion. Human browser/MFA/break-glass/first-case completion remains separate. - -## Actual completed-package source review binding - -The independent NetKingdom completed-package source review of exact prior packet 330da7fe is now losslessly attached, alongside the original exact19 source review, in the two clearly labelled review bundles. Each carries the source path, SHA256 and gzip-base64 encoding of the exact original bytes. The separate package-owner review gate is satisfied; source-only posting readiness is true after root obtains narrow confirmation of this receipt rebinding and README clarification. README now explicitly distinguishes observed Forgejo/runner workload forgejo/default from the historical unbound OpenBao consumer policy; no historical default-SA reader binding is claimed. The genuine human disposition remains absent and canonical case remains proposed/unimplemented. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/render-1.2.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/render-1.2.json deleted file mode 100644 index 02cf311..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/render-1.2.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,385 +0,0 @@ -{ - "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/security-case-render/v0.1", - "case": "forgejo-netkingdom-oidc", - "composition": { - "apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/security-scenario-composition/v0.1", - "authority": "netkingdom", - "capability_providers": { - "c1.lightweight-sso": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration" - }, - "composition_digest": "sha256:f51e45eab2f2c15c93e2f7b8ef7d8fcc1daf1059da5749429ff5678b45c5214f", - "execution": { - "mode": "plan-only", - "permitted": false, - "reason": "Composition does not authorize or perform provider execution." - }, - "execution_steps": [ - { - "capabilities": [ - "c1.lightweight-sso" - ], - "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration", - "entry_point": { - "description": "Add or remove exactly one client in the live KeyCape client registry without exporting secret values: contained kubectl, cluster and issuer pins, byte-preserving merge, compare-and-swap, read-back. Replaces the per-client helpers beside it. Field rules follow key-cape's canonical model (KEY-WP-0028). Modes: inspect, dry-run, apply; operations add and remove.", - "invocation": "keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --expected-uid --expected-resource-version ", - "path": "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py", - "type": "cli-sequence" - }, - "executor_owner": "net-kingdom", - "order": 1, - "parameters": { - "allowed_scopes": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "openid,profile,email,groups" - }, - "client_id": { - "sensitivity": "operational", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "forgejo" - }, - "client_type": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "confidential" - }, - "display_name": { - "sensitivity": "public", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "Forgejo source forge" - }, - "mfa_required": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "true" - }, - "redirect_uris": { - "sensitivity": "security_sensitive", - "source": "override", - "tuning_authority": "netkingdom_tunable", - "value": "https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback" - } - }, - "readiness_obligations": [ - { - "checks": [ - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.", - "id": "client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect" - }, - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.", - "id": "client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect" - } - ], - "state": "tenant_onboarding_trust" - } - ], - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "requires_trust": [ - { - "readiness_checks": [], - "state": "runtime_secret_trust" - }, - { - "readiness_checks": [], - "state": "runtime_identity_trust" - } - ], - "satisfies_trust": [ - { - "readiness_checks": [ - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint accepts the client with each registered redirect URI.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with client_id and each redirect_uri returns the login page, not an error.", - "id": "client-authorize-accepts-registered-redirect" - }, - { - "description": "The authorization endpoint refuses an unregistered redirect URI for the client.", - "evidence": "GET /authorize with an unregistered redirect_uri returns an OAuth error.", - "id": "client-authorize-refuses-other-redirect" - } - ], - "state": "tenant_onboarding_trust" - } - ] - } - ], - "initial_trust": [ - "runtime_identity_trust", - "runtime_secret_trust" - ], - "kind": "SecurityScenarioComposition", - "planned_final_trust": [ - "runtime_identity_trust", - "runtime_secret_trust", - "tenant_onboarding_trust" - ], - "requested_capabilities": [ - "c1.lightweight-sso" - ], - "responsibility_map": [ - { - "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration", - "netkingdom_orchestrates": "Supply the case's validated, non-secret client fields.", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "repo_owns": "Live registry change for exactly this client, its idempotency and removal; field rules are key-cape's canonical model.", - "resource_kind": "identities", - "resources": [ - "oidc:static-clients" - ] - }, - { - "declaration_id": "net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration", - "netkingdom_orchestrates": "Choose scopes and MFA posture per SecurityCaseType.", - "owner": "key-cape", - "repo_owns": "Enforce exact redirect URIs, allowed scopes and the MFA pin at authorization time.", - "resource_kind": "roles_scopes_policies", - "resources": [ - "iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists" - ] - } - ], - "scenario": "scenario:case:forgejo-netkingdom-oidc" - }, - "digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "execution": { - "permitted": false - }, - "follow_through": [ - { - "attended": true, - "attended_justification": "The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential of its own and an admitted path.", - "auth": "operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent", - "entry_point": "identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers; members exactly forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)", - "id": "ensure-groups", - "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned", - "entry_point": "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "id": "mint-secret", - "lane": "keycape-client-secret-generate", - "owner": "railiance-platform", - "value_handling": "generated_in_custody", - "warden_executes": true - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo; no value leaves custody", - "entry_point": "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "id": "deliver-secret", - "owner": "railiance-platform", - "ready_check": "the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": true, - "attended_justification": "A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if the binding is missing.", - "auth": "operator kube credentials for namespace sso", - "entry_point": "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-forgejo-client", - "id": "bind-env", - "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": true, - "attended_justification": "The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client loses sign-in (R1).", - "auth": "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso", - "entry_point": "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)", - "id": "register-client", - "lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo with a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains trusted", - "entry_point": "Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/forgejo. Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller RBAC before any owner-approved apply.", - "id": "deliver-consumer-secret", - "owner": "railiance-apps", - "ready_check": "Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never Secret values.", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - }, - { - "attended": false, - "auth": "the consumer owner's own deployment path", - "entry_point": "configure forgejo with issuer https://kc.coulomb.social, client forgejo and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, and make it require one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim before sign-in completes", - "id": "hand-over", - "owner": "railiance-apps", - "value_handling": "none", - "warden_executes": false - } - ], - "kind": "SecurityCaseRender", - "materialization": [ - { - "body": "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand", - "id": "client-secret-path", - "kind": "kv_path", - "template": "platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n", - "description": "KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.", - "id": "keycape-reader-policy", - "kind": "openbao_policy", - "template": "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso" - }, - { - "body": "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n", - "description": "The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access.", - "id": "consumer-reader-policy", - "kind": "openbao_policy", - "template": "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "auth: kubernetes\nbound_service_account_names: [external-secrets]\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets]\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso]\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\ntoken_ttl: 15m\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\n", - "description": "The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only.", - "id": "eso-role", - "kind": "openbao_role", - "template": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "auth: kubernetes\nbound_service_account_names: [forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso]\nbound_service_account_namespaces: [forgejo]\naudience: openbao\ntoken_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo]\ntoken_no_default_policy: true\ntoken_ttl: 15m\ntoken_max_ttl: 15m\n", - "description": "Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity. Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic controller isolation is claimed.", - "id": "consumer-eso-role", - "kind": "openbao_role", - "template": "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo" - }, - { - "body": "id: forgejo-keycape-client\nowner_repo: key-cape\nwarden_executes: false\nrisk: high\nstatus: active once verification passes\nworkload_ref: applicable, name forgejo, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred\npath_template: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo\nfield: CLIENT_SECRET\ndelegation: native, intended_owner key-cape\nrotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven\n", - "description": "One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection.", - "id": "catalog-entry", - "kind": "catalog_entry", - "template": "forgejo-keycape-client" - } - ], - "rollback": [ - { - "action": "remove the OIDC source for forgejo from forgejo (owner railiance-apps)", - "reverses": "hand-over" - }, - { - "action": "After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is not immediate OpenBao token revocation.", - "reverses": "deliver-consumer-secret" - }, - { - "action": "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for forgejo", - "reverses": "register-client" - }, - { - "action": "remove env KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed", - "reverses": "bind-env" - }, - { - "action": "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-forgejo-client and its target", - "reverses": "deliver-secret" - }, - { - "action": "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed", - "reverses": "mint-secret" - }, - { - "action": "identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers", - "reverses": "ensure-groups" - }, - { - "action": "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)", - "reverses": "client-secret-path" - }, - { - "action": "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo", - "reverses": "eso-role" - }, - { - "action": "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso, after eso-role", - "reverses": "keycape-reader-policy" - }, - { - "action": "Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-forgejo-forgejo, before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or prove expiration before declaring deactivation.", - "reverses": "consumer-eso-role" - }, - { - "action": "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo", - "reverses": "consumer-reader-policy" - }, - { - "action": "remove catalog entry forgejo-keycape-client", - "reverses": "catalog-entry" - } - ], - "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2", - "verification": [ - { - "check": "GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and each of https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback returns the login page", - "expect": "present", - "id": "authorize-accepts-redirects", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "GET https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize with client forgejo and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error", - "expect": "deny", - "id": "authorize-refuses-other-redirect", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo", - "expect": "deny", - "id": "custody-denied-to-default", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo (capabilities check only)", - "expect": "allow", - "id": "custody-allowed-to-consumer", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "LLDAP groups forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added", - "expect": "present", - "id": "groups-present", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "forgejo's OIDC source for forgejo (owner railiance-apps) requires one of forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)", - "expect": "present", - "id": "consumer-enforces-groups", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "the delivery for sso/keycape-forgejo-client reports Ready=True (status only)", - "expect": "present", - "id": "secret-delivered", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "keycape-client.py inspect for forgejo shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)", - "expect": "present", - "id": "mfa-pinned", - "reads_secret_value": false - }, - { - "check": "forgejo SecretStore openbao-keycape-forgejo-consumer and ExternalSecret forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value read", - "expect": "present", - "id": "consumer-secret-delivered", - "reads_secret_value": false - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/retained-native-metadata.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/retained-native-metadata.json deleted file mode 100644 index 298d885..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/retained-native-metadata.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,666 +0,0 @@ -{ - "eso_rbac_bindings": [ - { - "kind": "ClusterRoleBinding", - "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller", - "namespace": null, - "roleRef": { - "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io", - "kind": "ClusterRole", - "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller" - }, - "rules": [ - { - "apiGroups": [ - "apiextensions.k8s.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "customresourcedefinitions" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch", - "update", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "admissionregistration.k8s.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "validatingwebhookconfigurations" - ], - "verbs": [ - "list", - "watch", - "get" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "admissionregistration.k8s.io" - ], - "resourceNames": [ - "secretstore-validate", - "externalsecret-validate" - ], - "resources": [ - "validatingwebhookconfigurations" - ], - "verbs": [ - "update", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "endpoints" - ], - "verbs": [ - "list", - "get", - "watch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "events" - ], - "verbs": [ - "create", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "secrets" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch", - "update", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "coordination.k8s.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "leases" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "create", - "update", - "patch" - ] - } - ], - "subjects": [ - { - "kind": "ServiceAccount", - "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller", - "namespace": "external-secrets" - } - ] - }, - { - "kind": "ClusterRoleBinding", - "name": "external-secrets-controller", - "namespace": null, - "roleRef": { - "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io", - "kind": "ClusterRole", - "name": "external-secrets-controller" - }, - "rules": [ - { - "apiGroups": [ - "external-secrets.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "secretstores", - "clustersecretstores", - "externalsecrets", - "clusterexternalsecrets", - "pushsecrets", - "clusterpushsecrets" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "external-secrets.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "externalsecrets", - "externalsecrets/status", - "externalsecrets/finalizers", - "secretstores", - "secretstores/status", - "secretstores/finalizers", - "clustersecretstores", - "clustersecretstores/status", - "clustersecretstores/finalizers", - "clusterexternalsecrets", - "clusterexternalsecrets/status", - "clusterexternalsecrets/finalizers", - "pushsecrets", - "pushsecrets/status", - "pushsecrets/finalizers", - "clusterpushsecrets", - "clusterpushsecrets/status", - "clusterpushsecrets/finalizers" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "update", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "generators.external-secrets.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "generatorstates" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch", - "create", - "update", - "patch", - "delete", - "deletecollection" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "generators.external-secrets.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "acraccesstokens", - "clustergenerators", - "ecrauthorizationtokens", - "fakes", - "gcraccesstokens", - "githubaccesstokens", - "quayaccesstokens", - "passwords", - "stssessiontokens", - "uuids", - "vaultdynamicsecrets", - "webhooks", - "grafanas" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "serviceaccounts", - "namespaces" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "configmaps" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "secrets" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "list", - "watch", - "create", - "update", - "delete", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "serviceaccounts/token" - ], - "verbs": [ - "create" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "events" - ], - "verbs": [ - "create", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "external-secrets.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "externalsecrets" - ], - "verbs": [ - "create", - "update", - "delete" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "external-secrets.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "pushsecrets" - ], - "verbs": [ - "create", - "update", - "delete" - ] - } - ], - "subjects": [ - { - "kind": "ServiceAccount", - "name": "external-secrets", - "namespace": "external-secrets" - } - ] - }, - { - "kind": "RoleBinding", - "name": "external-secrets-leaderelection", - "namespace": "external-secrets", - "roleRef": { - "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io", - "kind": "Role", - "name": "external-secrets-leaderelection" - }, - "rules": [ - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resourceNames": [ - "external-secrets-controller" - ], - "resources": [ - "configmaps" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "update", - "patch" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "" - ], - "resources": [ - "configmaps" - ], - "verbs": [ - "create" - ] - }, - { - "apiGroups": [ - "coordination.k8s.io" - ], - "resources": [ - "leases" - ], - "verbs": [ - "get", - "create", - "update", - "patch" - ] - } - ], - "subjects": [ - { - "kind": "ServiceAccount", - "name": "external-secrets", - "namespace": "external-secrets" - } - ] - } - ], - "external-secrets_deployments": [ - { - "images": [ - "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1" - ], - "name": "external-secrets", - "serviceAccount": "external-secrets", - "uid": "e6017556-523a-4b26-b9d1-4c0c90cef483" - }, - { - "images": [ - "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1" - ], - "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller", - "serviceAccount": "external-secrets-cert-controller", - "uid": "5134a56f-aa05-4764-9b27-c56e92203c7d" - }, - { - "images": [ - "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1" - ], - "name": "external-secrets-webhook", - "serviceAccount": "external-secrets-webhook", - "uid": "6e6e4a6e-4c2c-4659-af56-d4281f2fe229" - } - ], - "external-secrets_externalsecrets": [], - "external-secrets_secretstores": [], - "external-secrets_serviceaccounts": [ - { - "automountServiceAccountToken": null, - "name": "default", - "uid": "cc29abe8-5ace-4cc9-b479-cf8db84df42d" - }, - { - "automountServiceAccountToken": false, - "name": "eso-token-renewer", - "uid": "4d44afd7-59e9-44de-9e99-8cd620be41de" - }, - { - "automountServiceAccountToken": null, - "name": "external-secrets", - "uid": "c918dc22-b1ee-4e1f-a8f8-1d15ac0d5a10" - }, - { - "automountServiceAccountToken": null, - "name": "external-secrets-cert-controller", - "uid": "3c78bb78-a3c5-4953-93d4-cf6621e1200a" - }, - { - "automountServiceAccountToken": null, - "name": "external-secrets-webhook", - "uid": "c75dc3ba-42db-4a59-8952-6c94d85d054c" - } - ], - "forgejo_deployments": [ - { - "images": [ - "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0.3-rootless" - ], - "name": "forgejo-gitea", - "serviceAccount": "default", - "uid": "e8eff0aa-64bb-4b44-9a80-a66612986355" - }, - { - "images": [ - "docker:27-dind", - "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner:6.3.1" - ], - "name": "forgejo-runner", - "serviceAccount": "default", - "uid": "89c8a056-bcae-4940-acdd-2eb2768e108a" - } - 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A Role binds a\nKubernetes ServiceAccount with a set of Vault policies.", - "type": "string" - }, - "secretRef": { - "description": "Optional secret field containing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount JWT used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If a name is specified without a key,\n`token` is the default. If one is not specified, the one bound to\nthe controller will be used.", - "properties": { - "key": { - "description": "A key in the referenced Secret.\nSome instances of this field may be defaulted, in others it may be required.", - "maxLength": 253, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[-._a-zA-Z0-9]+$", - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "description": "The name of the Secret resource being referred to.", - "maxLength": 253, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$", - "type": "string" - }, - "namespace": { - "description": "The namespace of the Secret resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.", - "maxLength": 63, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", - "type": "string" - } - }, - "type": "object" - }, - "serviceAccountRef": { - "description": "Optional service account field containing the name of a kubernetes ServiceAccount.\nIf the service account is specified, the service account secret token JWT will be used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If the service account selector is not supplied,\nthe secretRef will be used instead.", - "properties": { - "audiences": { - "description": "Audience specifies the `aud` claim for the service account token\nIf the service account uses a well-known annotation for e.g. IRSA or GCP Workload Identity\nthen this audiences will be appended to the list", - "items": { - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - }, - "name": { - "description": "The name of the ServiceAccount resource being referred to.", - "maxLength": 253, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$", - "type": "string" - }, - "namespace": { - "description": "Namespace of the resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.", - "maxLength": 63, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name" - ], - "type": "object" - } - }, - "required": [ - "mountPath", - "role" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - "name": "v1", - "served": true, - "storage": true - }, - { - "kubernetes_auth_schema": { - "description": "Kubernetes authenticates with Vault by passing the ServiceAccount\ntoken stored in the named Secret resource to the Vault server.", - "properties": { - "mountPath": { - "default": "kubernetes", - "description": "Path where the Kubernetes authentication backend is mounted in Vault, e.g:\n\"kubernetes\"", - "type": "string" - }, - "role": { - "description": "A required field containing the Vault Role to assume. A Role binds a\nKubernetes ServiceAccount with a set of Vault policies.", - "type": "string" - }, - "secretRef": { - "description": "Optional secret field containing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount JWT used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If a name is specified without a key,\n`token` is the default. If one is not specified, the one bound to\nthe controller will be used.", - "properties": { - "key": { - "description": "A key in the referenced Secret.\nSome instances of this field may be defaulted, in others it may be required.", - "maxLength": 253, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[-._a-zA-Z0-9]+$", - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "description": "The name of the Secret resource being referred to.", - "maxLength": 253, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$", - "type": "string" - }, - "namespace": { - "description": "The namespace of the Secret resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.", - "maxLength": 63, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", - "type": "string" - } - }, - "type": "object" - }, - "serviceAccountRef": { - "description": "Optional service account field containing the name of a kubernetes ServiceAccount.\nIf the service account is specified, the service account secret token JWT will be used\nfor authenticating with Vault. If the service account selector is not supplied,\nthe secretRef will be used instead.", - "properties": { - "audiences": { - "description": "Audience specifies the `aud` claim for the service account token\nIf the service account uses a well-known annotation for e.g. IRSA or GCP Workload Identity\nthen this audiences will be appended to the list", - "items": { - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - }, - "name": { - "description": "The name of the ServiceAccount resource being referred to.", - "maxLength": 253, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?)*$", - "type": "string" - }, - "namespace": { - "description": "Namespace of the resource being referred to.\nIgnored if referent is not cluster-scoped, otherwise defaults to the namespace of the referent.", - "maxLength": 63, - "minLength": 1, - "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name" - ], - "type": "object" - } - }, - "required": [ - 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"owner_path": "/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json", - "sha256": "00eee9833108f451d99b15fb1261e4ba3aebf8a047bdd0a01d8ea4f601e99073", - "review_bundle_entry": 1 - } - ], - "all19_applied_hashes_match": true, - "no_owner_review_written_by_requester": true -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/type-1.2.yaml b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/type-1.2.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 89b9f6a..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/type-1.2.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,442 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCaseType -spec: - id: oidc-browser-relying-party - version: '1.2' - status: proposed - title: Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service - purpose: 'Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom - (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups the - service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client secret - minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout scripts - in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038).' - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$ - sensitivity: operational - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape. - - name: display_name - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[^\n\r]{1,80}$ - sensitivity: public - description: Name shown on the sign-in page. - - name: redirect_uris - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^https://[^*?#\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\s,]+)*$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: 'Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain - http, no query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses ''*'' and ''?'' at startup, - and OAuth 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1).' - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - enum: - - openid,profile,email,groups - - openid,email,groups - - openid,profile,groups - - openid,groups - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups, - because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups only - for that scope (key-cape type review R2). - - name: client_type - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - enum: - - confidential - - public - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public - for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only). - - name: mfa_required - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - enum: - - 'true' - - 'false' - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: '"true" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants - administrative or owner rights. "false" is not "no MFA": the client then carries - no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA policy. A - renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which would skip that - policy (key-cape type review R3).' - - name: access_groups - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$ - sensitivity: operational - description: 'Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles. - Created if absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to - any authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming service - enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting; key-cape - type review R2).' - - name: initial_members - type: string - required: false - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$ - sensitivity: operational - description: Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are - directory usernames, never secrets. - - name: consuming_service - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$ - sensitivity: operational - description: The service that signs users in with this client. - - name: consumer_owner_repo - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$ - sensitivity: operational - description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration. - - name: consumer_namespace - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: - pattern: ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$ - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: Consumer namespace for namespaced ESO TokenRequest reader; actual - workload owner must confirm; never infer from service name. - - name: issuer - type: string - case_settable: false - default: https://kc.coulomb.social - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type. - composition: - authority: netkingdom - initial_trust: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - capabilities: - - c1.lightweight-sso - providers: - c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration - parameter_bindings: - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required - materialization: - - id: client-secret-path - kind: kv_path - when: client_type == confidential - template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - body: field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand - - id: keycape-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: client_type == confidential - template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso - body: "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n capabilities\ - \ = [\"read\"]\n}}\n" - description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, - parent or sibling access. - - id: consumer-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: client_type == confidential - template: workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - body: "path \"platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}\" {{\n capabilities\ - \ = [\"read\"]\n}}\n" - description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent - or sibling access. - - id: eso-role - kind: openbao_role - when: client_type == confidential - template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - body: 'auth: kubernetes - - bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets] - - bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets] - - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - - token_no_default_policy: true - - token_ttl: 15m - - token_max_ttl: 15m - - ' - description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service - account only. - - id: consumer-eso-role - kind: openbao_role - when: client_type == confidential - template: external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - body: 'auth: kubernetes - - bound_service_account_names: [{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - - bound_service_account_namespaces: [{consumer_namespace}] - - audience: openbao - - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}] - - token_no_default_policy: true - - token_ttl: 15m - - token_max_ttl: 15m - - ' - description: Consumer ESO requests a token for this separate reference identity. - Common ESO controller remains trusted and can request tokens; no cryptographic - controller isolation is claimed. - - id: catalog-entry - kind: catalog_entry - template: '{consuming_service}-keycape-client' - body: 'id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client - - owner_repo: key-cape - - warden_executes: false - - risk: high - - status: active once verification passes - - workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer''s - published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred - - path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - - field: CLIENT_SECRET - - delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape - - rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been - proven - - ' - description: One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries - the consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection. - follow_through: - - id: ensure-groups - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner - pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups}; - members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing - else) - auth: operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod - call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine - token is read or sent - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's - runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane - would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden - ADR-0002). Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended - session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential - of its own and an admitted path. - - id: mint-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: 'railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside - custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}' - auth: the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the - value is generated in custody and never returned - lane: keycape-client-secret-generate - warden_executes: true - attended: false - value_handling: generated_in_custody - - id: deliver-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) - from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - auth: railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; - no value leaves custody - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True - (status only, no value read) - - id: bind-env - owner: net-kingdom - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: 'patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET - from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client' - auth: operator kube credentials for namespace sso - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It - runs in the same attended operator session as register-client, before it, because - KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed if - the binding is missing. - - id: register-client - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file - --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration) - auth: operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, - and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator - session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps - of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, - authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins - and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review - R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape - check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) - before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1).' - - id: deliver-consumer-secret - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso - (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client - with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}. - Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller - RBAC before any owner-approved apply. - auth: Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates - to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} with - a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains - trusted - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; - dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never - Secret values. - - id: hand-over - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - entry_point: configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} - and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require - one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes - auth: the consumer owner's own deployment path - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} - returns the login page - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect - returns an OAuth error - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: client_type == confidential - check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: client_type == confidential - check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants - read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only) - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the - accepted case added - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) - requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no - secret value)' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status - only) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: mfa_required == true - check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered - client (non-secret client view) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact - dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value - read' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner - {consumer_owner_repo}) - - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created - ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and - dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared - target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is - not immediate OpenBao token revocation. - - reverses: register-client - action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id} - - reverses: bind-env - when: client_type == confidential - action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, - after register-client is reversed - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target - - reverses: mint-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret - is reversed' - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod - (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only - if no other case uses {access_groups} - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, - after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret) - - reverses: eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role - - reverses: consumer-eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, - before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or - prove expiration before declaring deactivation. - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client - acceptance: - accepted_by: - - owner - - founder - risk_class: medium diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/validation-and-history.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/validation-and-history.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8d661c5..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/validation-and-history.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,146 +0,0 @@ -{ - "recorded_at": "2026-10-11T01:34:15.343635+00:00", - "native_metadata_only": true, - "native_auth_or_mutation": false, - "secret_value_reads": false, - "native_eso_image": "oci.external-secrets.io/external-secrets/external-secrets:v0.16.1", - "served_v1_crd_auth_schema_validation": true, - "actual_common_controller_tokenrequest_rbac": true, - "new_rbac_required": false, - "candidate_exact_kubernetes_objects": 3, - "old_materialization_objects": 5, - "new_materialization_objects": 6, - "original_five_object_bodies_unchanged": true, - "added_object_ids": [ - "consumer-eso-role" - ], - "old_full_render_digest": "sha256:e64b56e4590b57b858303fcda1a474693e3dd821bc83df26646fe78fc345498a", - "proposed_full_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "net_type_and_proposed_case_validation_errors": 0, - "mason_tests": { - "current_source_negative_reproduced": { - "passed": 40, - "failed": 1, - "node": "test_two_role_backed_readers_keep_distinct_ccrs_and_complete_structure", - "cause": "Both role-backed readers used same CCR-ESO output identity, overwriting KeyCape request" - }, - "corrected_stage": { - "passed": 44, - "failed": 0, - "seconds": 5.85 - }, - "duplicate_overwrite_guard_verified": true, - "prior_corrected_stage": { - "passed": 42, - "failed": 0, - "seconds": 6.66 - } - }, - "mason_proposed_type_build_refused": true, - "mason_refusal_reason": "allow-unimplemented only applies to acknowledged type; proposed1.2 has no acceptance", - "platform_draft_validation_exit_code": 0, - "platform_draft_warning": "Bound claim is unconfirmed; apply blocked", - "draft_validation_preparation_history": "Initial in_flight draft used unsupported missing-field names. Corrected to ordinary proposed status with explicit pending owner/case review and bound_claims_confirmed=false.", - "source_statuses_unchanged": [ - "acknowledged type1.1", - "accepted case1.1", - "in_flight current CCR42", - "applied historical CCR41" - ], - "runtime_helm_handover_verified": false, - "native_materialized": false, - "native_followthrough_complete": false, - "founder_acknowledgment": null, - "driver": "ORGREF-WP-0002", - "kubernetes_names_bounded_by_type_parameters": true, - "consumer_role_rollback_precedes_policy_rollback": true, - "generated_ccr_refinement": { - "prior_packet_sha256": "271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279", - "prior_packet_preserved_at": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271", - "platform_conditional_manifest_sha256": "9e4967bfff57694ceb12883f522edc405ef3fa316e46b88c9bdad47205a180b4", - "before_fix_counterexamples": [ - { - "node": "test_two_role_backed_readers_keep_distinct_ccrs_and_complete_structure", - "result": "failed wrong consumer target keycape vs forgejo" - }, - { - "node": "test_generated_consumer_lifecycle_requires_created_only_token_recovery", - "result": "failed missing created-only/token-revocation-or-expiry lifecycle" - } - ], - "intermediate_check_history": { - "tests": 9, - "passed": 7, - "failed": 2, - "cause": "case-sensitive test string matched lowercase revoke against capitalized sentence; assertions normalized case without removing required semantics" - }, - "candidate_builder_sha256": "c2b140f380407779ce5478ca57c97eb0e6375d6a9cad4591b0b29ddd177db686", - "candidate_build_tests_sha256": "aea22297178b5bb1eaaf5d59bbd1c71112dfc32bed2075b33ccc0598c8fc5be5", - "candidate_structure_tests_sha256": "2e7446eaf01d4bb59d7d8fb3c3cdc5e6e3007b3ae84d8ed0a49f11f745f2e386", - "keycape1.1_generated_output_unchanged": true, - "consumer1.1_generated_output_changes_only_target_workload": true, - "historical1.1_bundle_unchanged_and_now_refused_for_wrong_target": true, - "structural_checker_weakened": false, - "role_backed_consumer_created_only_token_recovery_required": true, - "proposed_type_or_case_new_acceptance": false, - "ruff_check": "not run; ruff executable absent in owner venv and PATH", - "syntax_checks": "all candidate Python AST parse passed" - }, - "complete_proposed_package_supplement": { - "package_path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2", - "status": "proposed", - "type_implemented": false, - "canonical_case_accepted": false, - "files": [ - { - "path": "README.md", - "sha256": "94dfe344f0e79cffea239612b0f7232f8bcc800d39e3b5aee6e1cad8cb2d5ee7", - "content_base64": 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-} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/validation.json b/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/validation.json deleted file mode 100644 index c3c7e04..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-acknowledgment/validation.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -{ - "actual_runnable_package_tests_passed": 22, - "all_owner_attachments_unchanged": true, - "bound19_applied_source_hashes_match": true, - "canonical_case_acceptance_authorized": false, - "canonical_case_after_ack": "proposed", - "complete_proposed_package_validation_passed": true, - "document_hashes_valid": 20, - "execution_permitted": false, - "founder_disposition_recorded": false, - "full_intake_and_schema_valid": true, - "negative_intake_guards": [ - "packet-content-tamper", - "boolean-memo-version", - "approval-prebound" - ], - "offline_only": true, - "offline_submitter_shape_assumption_is_native_admission": false, - "register_payload_bytes": 241076, - "separate_package_owner_review_recorded": true, - "submission_digest": "sha256:585cee731de30d2b37883a57abfd9eb32f023ee694e8d911989109d5caf80569", - "type_case_valid_and_source_render_identical": true, - "typed_lifecycle_memo_valid": true, - "preparation_deterministic": true, - "historical_original_packet_sha256": "eeb2968ec317d0bc072788011918025a21d2b48c13987d09945ae8761f3d8fe5", - "prepackage_revision_sha256": "12ce4d2d2a185a79ce102ff8f5669512dd6e8e5f99321a6e2688dab23ba42ef8" -} diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-decision-services-alignment-review.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-decision-services-alignment-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 1418d6d..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-decision-services-alignment-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,171 +0,0 @@ -# Decision services alignment: approval-engine, informed-decision and State Hub decisions (review, 2026-10-31) - -**Status:** review and proposal. Nothing here changes another repository; every change named below belongs to its -owner. - -**Trigger:** - -- NK-WP-0056-T17 found that the founder has no path today to approve a Bounded Execution Admission - ([finding](2026-10-31-nk56-t17-founder-approval-path.md)). -- The founder asked for an architecture, code, INTENT and SCOPE review of informed-decision and approval-engine. It - should align them, attach State Hub's decision records, and make the facility proportionate: easy for simple - cases, complete for complex ones (founder, 2026-10-31). - -## 1. Practical needs (what the estate does today) - -| Need | How it is handled now | Problem | -| --- | --- | --- | -| **N1. Executor admissions** (NK-WP-0056-T06): a service files an approval for one exact admission, and the founder approves it at aal2 before a bounded run | No path. The executor must be the approval's actor (approval-engine create rule, BEA), but informed-decision presents only approvals it creates itself | The pilot cannot start | -| **N2. Routine founder decisions**: workplan approvals, adopting owner proposals, choosing between options | An agent writes "approved by the founder in session" into a workplan, a CCR comment or a State Hub decision (`decided_by` is free text) | No binding evidence. The same decision is repeated in several places. The full memo path is too heavy for these, so it is not used | -| **N3. Credential approvals (CCRs)**: platform-owner and net-kingdom-owner approve one request | The `credential-change.py approve` tool appends a review comment; for some types the second approval is recorded by hand (CCR-2026-0058) | Evidence is a YAML comment written by an agent on the founder's instruction | -| **N4. Hub coordination**: an open question waits for a human (`needs_human`, `decision_id`) | State Hub `decisions`, resolved through the API with a rationale | Not linked to any presented or bound evidence. informed-decision's write-back to the hub is disabled | - -## 2. The architecture as built (evidence) - -```text - requester (agent / service) founder (browser, KeyCape aal1/aal2) - │ │ - │ State Hub memo dispatch (STATE-WP-0096, │ decisions.coulomb.social - │ private queue, POST /v1/memos) ▼ - └──────────────► informed-decision ──── presents memo, records view_hash, - intake: creates approval highlights, disposition - actor="informed-decision" │ - │ accept → POST /entries (approval:approve) - ▼ - approval-engine ◄── consume (approval:consume, service) - object, CAS, by whoever holds the scope - outbox → audit-core - - State Hub decisions table: title, rationale, decided_by (string), status open/resolved. No link to the above. -``` - -- **approval-engine** (INTENT, SCOPE, `docs/bounded-execution-admission-carrier.md`): - - It is a PIP. It owns the durable approval object: binding to action, target, actor, principal and purpose, - authenticated entries, atomic consume and supersede, and revocation. - - It is explicitly *not an inbox, workflow or notification surface*. It has get-by-id and no list. - - Only the actor creates (`binding.actor` must equal the token subject). - - Consume does not check consumer = actor (APPROVAL-WP-0007-T02, waiting). - - aal2 is stored, not enforced (APPROVAL-WP-0007-T01). -- **informed-decision** (INTENT, SCOPE, GOAL, code): - - It is the live approver surface. Its thesis is *scale invariance*: one memo model from an L0 informed login to an - L4 contract, with L1 being privileged JIT authorization. Only L3 (management approval) is built; L0 and L2 are - "Stage 2, direction only". - - Intake (`intake.py`) refuses a memo that pins `approval_id` (`approval_pinned_by_submitter`). - - `intake_approval.py` creates every approval with `actor: "informed-decision"`, 24 h validity and - `pdp_path: false`. - - Submitters are configured per username with `memo_classes`, `review_groups` and a `daily_limit` - (`intake_service.configuration`). - - On accept it posts the human's entry, scopes `openid approval:read approval:approve`. - - `view_hash` is not inside the approval entry; correlation is `(approval_id, subject, approved_at)`. -- **State Hub:** - - `decisions` is a coordination record (`made|pending`, `open|resolved|escalated|superseded`, free-text - `decided_by`). - - `memo_dispatch` forwards a validated envelope (`informed-decision.memo-intake` v1) to informed-decision's private - intake. Hub resolution write-back is disabled. - -## 3. Findings - -1. **Creation is coupled to presentation.** informed-decision creates the approval with itself as actor. Two - consequences: - - An actor that will *use* an approval (the executor, secrets-engine's PEP, a deploy agent) cannot have it - presented. That is N1. - - Approvals created this way name the surface, not the user, as actor. That weakens approval-engine's "actor who - may use it" binding, which is the very thing BEA relies on. - - Neither INTENT requires this coupling. informed-decision's INTENT says it "never holds approval current-state", - and approval-engine's says only the actor creates. -2. **One weight for every decision.** Every bound decision takes the full memo path: packet, highlights, - presentation record, view_hash, intake budget. The tiers that would make simple decisions cheap (L0 and L1, and - L2 "ADR accept against the estate's own decision records") are not built. In practice, routine decisions (N2) - bypass the surface entirely and become free text. The heaviness pushes the estate to *less* evidence, not more. -3. **Two decision stores with no link.** A State Hub decision and an informed-decision memo about the same question - do not reference each other. Write-back is off, so a hub decision is resolved by an agent's string. The same - founder decision often lives in three places (hub decision, workplan text, CCR comment) with no binding between - them. -4. **An approval filed by someone else is invisible.** approval-engine has no list (correctly), and informed-decision - lists only its own memos. An executor-filed approval therefore reaches the founder only if a memo is filed for - it. That is the missing contract in Finding 1. -5. **The evidence join is partial.** The approval entry does not carry `view_hash`, and assurance is checked by the - surface, not enforced by the object (APPROVAL-WP-0007-T01). For bounded execution the executor checks aal2 itself - today. - -## 4. Proposed alignment - -### 4.1 Roles (no change of ownership, sharper boundaries) - -| Service | Owns | Does not do | -| --- | --- | --- | -| approval-engine | The object, created **only by the actor who will use it** (or by informed-decision when informed-decision itself is the actor); entries, consume, revoke | Present, list or notify | -| informed-decision | **The one human-facing surface for every bound decision.** It presents questions, collects dispositions and records what was shown. For approvals it adds the human entry to an approval *someone else created*, after verifying its binding | Create approvals on behalf of other actors; hold approval state | -| State Hub decisions | **The index and routing of open questions** for work coordination: what is waiting, for whom, in which workplan. It links to evidence and is resolved by it | Hold binding evidence; be resolved by free text for decisions that need binding | -| gate-house | Doctrine: which decision classes exist, which weight each needs, who may approve | Runtime state | - -### 4.2 Contract: "present an existing approval" (closes Findings 1 and 4, needed for N1) - -1. **Create.** The actor creates the approval in approval-engine, as itself, with `human_control: true`. -2. **Submit.** The actor submits a memo to informed-decision that references `approval_id` and the binding digest. - The memo carries the question, the packet (for an admission: the admission YAML and its digest) and the - highlights (scope ceiling, window, budget, revert). -3. **Verify.** informed-decision accepts the reference only from a registered submitter whose profile allows - `present_existing` for that action class. It then `GET`s the approval and requires all of: - - status `requested`; - - no entries; - - `human_control: true`; - - `binding.actor` equal to the submitter's subject; - - binding digest equal to the memo's; - - the action class allowed for the submitter. -4. **Accept.** Accepting posts the founder's entry with their token (aal2 where the class requires it). - informed-decision never consumes and never creates in this path. -5. **Run.** The actor reads the approval (`GET`) and consumes it. The executor's existing checks (actor, digest, - aal2, listed approvers) still hold. - -### 4.3 Proportional weight: decision classes (closes Finding 2) - -One memo model, as informed-decision's thesis requires, with the *amount of ceremony* set per class by doctrine: - -| Class | Example | Surface | Assurance | approval-engine object | Evidence | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| **C0 note** | Record a finding; acknowledge a report | State Hub only | none | no | hub record | -| **C1 confirm** | Approve a workplan; adopt an owner proposal; choose option A/B | informed-decision single-screen confirm: question, one packet item, one required highlight, options | fresh session (aal1) | no | memo acceptance with `view_hash`; resolves the hub decision | -| **C2 bound approval** | Bounded-execution admission; credential lane (CCR); production deploy | informed-decision full memo, presenting an existing approval (4.2) | aal2, fresh | yes, created by the actor | memo + approval entry + audit-core | -| **C3 instrument** | Contract or multi-party | later (informed-decision L4) | per party | per party | as informed-decision Stage 3+ | - -The rule: **anything a service will execute on the strength of the decision is C2.** An admission's `risk_class` can -add highlights or required approvers within C2, but cannot lower it to C1. - -### 4.4 Attaching State Hub decisions (closes Finding 3) - -- A hub decision gains optional links: `memo_id`, `approval_id` and `evidence_ref`. -- When it needs C1 or C2, the hub dispatches a memo (existing STATE-WP-0096 path), and informed-decision's write-back - (now disabled) resolves the hub decision with: - - the authenticated subject; - - the memo revision and `view_hash`; - - for C2, the approval id. -- An agent must not resolve a C1 or C2 decision by text. -- C0 stays as today. - -This makes the hub the place to see *what is waiting*, and informed-decision the place where it is *decided*, without -either duplicating the other. - -## 5. First slice, driven by what blocks today - -| # | Change | Owner | Unblocks | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| S1 | informed-decision intake profile `present_existing` (4.2), with tests against approval-engine's real source | informed-decision | N1 / NK-WP-0056-T06 | -| S2 | Executor: KeyCape client `nk-bind-executor-approval`, OpenBao lane for its secret, a `request` phase that creates the approval and submits the memo | net-kingdom (NK-WP-0056-T14) + KeyCape registration + railiance-platform CCR | N1 | -| S3 | Write-back for memos that carry a hub `decision_id`, and decision links in State Hub | informed-decision + state-hub | N4, part of N2 | -| S4 | The C1 single-screen confirm in informed-decision | informed-decision | N2, and N3 later | -| S5 | Doctrine for decision classes C0–C3 and the "executed means C2" rule | gate-house | Every class assignment | -| S6 | approval-engine: aal2 floor (APPROVAL-WP-0007-T01) and `actor_consumes` (T02) | approval-engine | Moves the executor's own checks into the object | - -S1 and S2 are the minimum for the pilot. S3–S5 make routine founder decisions cheaper *and* better evidenced than -today's free text. - -## 6. Open questions - -1. **For the founder:** are the classes C0–C3 and the "executed means C2" rule the right cut? -2. **For informed-decision:** does `present_existing` fit the intake model as a profile, or should it be a separate - route? Should the memo's packet carry the admission YAML itself, or a digest plus link? -3. **For approval-engine:** should an approval created by an actor and presented elsewhere carry a - `presentation_ref` (the memo id) at create, so that the object points at its evidence? (Finding 5) -4. **For State Hub:** decision links as new columns, or as typed `evidence_ref`s? diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t02-owner-requests.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t02-owner-requests.md deleted file mode 100644 index ae62654..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t02-owner-requests.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T02: owner requests for the bounded executor (2026-10-31) - -Basis: Bounded Execution Admission v0.1, proposed (`canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md`, -net-kingdom `989d5d4`), and its examples in `examples/bounded-execution-admission/`. The first live use is -NK-WP-0056-T06: unattended rotation of the `svc-authelia` directory bind, under one founder admission -(`bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml`). - -**Founder decision 2026-10-31 (hub `6d1adce9`):** - -- net-kingdom writes the executor runtime: source and tests, next to the admission validator, the bind - lanes and the synthetic journey; -- a new `rapp-*` package builds the image and deploys it in `sso` (ADR-0015); -- glas-harness becomes the path for agent executors later (GLAS-WP-0018). - -Every answer below is the owner's agreement. Nothing here assigns work to another repository. - -| Component | Owner (hub agent) | Asked to carry | Answer | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| Admission carrier | approval-engine | The admission as a consumable approval | answered 2026-10-31 (approval-engine `5028fe2`, `docs/bounded-execution-admission-carrier.md`, APPROVAL-WP-0007 proposed): binding, single consume and revoke-before-start supported today; the executor creates the approval request itself (`actor` must equal its token subject, `human_control: true`), the founder approves; aal2 is recorded per entry but not enforced (APPROVAL-WP-0007-T01 adds a floor; until then the executor checks it); `request_digest` = admission digest for the pilot; independent GET before consume is the intended reading; consume does not check consumer = actor (T02 there); revoker identity not recorded (T03 there) | -| Admission as input claim | access-engine | Policy decision for executor operations under an admission | answered 2026-10-31 (access-engine `f5b7a90`, `docs/bounded-execution-admission-pdp.md`, FLEX-WP-0040 proposed): yes for production, two decisions `start` (before consume) and `execute-step` (after), new pack `net-kingdom.bounded-execution`, caller map generalised; needs approval-engine to add approver assurance and `consumed_by`/`consumed_at` to the claim; source mid/late November, live after the pilot. Pilot without the gate acceptable if the receipt records the PDP as `not-evaluated`; a second admission should not run without the gate unless the founder records an exception | -| Executor credential lanes | secrets-engine | Lifecycle of the executor's OpenBao credentials | answered 2026-10-31 (secrets-engine `8ec5aff`, `docs/bounded-executor-credential-lanes.md`, SECRETS-WP-0017 proposed): engine lanes are read-only and AppRole-only today, so railiance-platform applies the Kubernetes role and policy and secrets-engine catalogs it as metadata; proposes the role exists only during the admitted window; Q2: prefer self-rotation of the bind (proven on the pinned LLDAP, see `docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-lldap-self-rotation/`), fallback a `lldap_password_manager` account. Note: its message 3e865656 carried another worker's text by mistake; 084a731e is the correct answer | -| OpenBao roles and CCR types | railiance-platform | Kubernetes auth role and policies for the executor; CCR request types | answered 2026-10-31 (railiance-platform `8b57d27`, not pushed; `docs/credential-lane-designs/bounded-executor.md`, RPF-WP-0069): new request type `workload-kv-write-next-version` (read+update on one data path, `cas_required`, no metadata/delete), CCR-2026-0058 drafted `proposed` for the svc-authelia write role; one role per lane; journey read needs a `workload-kv-read` CCR that widens CCR-2026-0057; audit sender in the CCR-2026-0021/0022 shape once audit-core names it. Recommends a standing write role for the pilot (secrets-engine recommends window-only: founder decides) | -| Receipt holder | audit-core | Execution-attribution receipts from the executor | answered 2026-10-31 (audit-core `1ef939b`, `docs/bounded-executor-receipts.md`, AUDIT-WP-0018 proposed): yes, from a registered in-cluster sender `nk-bounded-executor` (`secret_policy: reject`); one receipt per run with steps inside `data`, plus a separate `execution.run.started` event at consume so a crashed run is detectable; envelope ids `run::started/receipt`, subject `admission:`; asks NetKingdom to label `decision_refs` and decide the singular target/action shape | -| Agent executors | glas-harness | Session contract so a harness-launched agent can be an executor | answered 2026-10-31 (glas-harness `92dd299`, `docs/bounded-execution-agent-executor.md`, GLAS-WP-0018-T07): not before GLAS-WP-0018-T04 (proposed; needs key-cape agent tokens with `act` and sandbox token delivery); a verifiable harness-launched assertion must be a key-cape-signed per-run token, claim set proposed; glas-harness proposes to own the agent-executor path later. Founder: approve GLAS-WP-0018 or not | -| Runtime package | railiance-apps | Where the new `rapp-*` package lives and who creates it | answered 2026-10-31 (railiance-apps `c733e86`, `docs/rapp-bounded-executor-intake.md`): not railiance-apps; `rmgr rapp wrap` (repo-manager) creates it locally, the Forgejo remote is the founder's; the image is built in the app repo (net-kingdom), the rapp pins its digest; deploy by `kubectl` server-side apply run by the founder; recommends one Job per admission. Founder decisions F1-F4 open | - -## approval-engine - -1. **Binding.** Can an approval carry a `BoundedExecutionAdmission` with these fields? - - `action: bounded-execution` - - `actor`: the executor identity (pilot: `service:nk-bind-executor`) - - `principal`: the approver (`admin`) - - `purpose`: `spec.purpose` - - `target: {admission_id, admission_digest}` - - validity equal to `spec.window` - - The plan, plan digest, budget and ceiling are inside the digested document, so `target` covers them. -2. **Assurance.** How does an approval record that the approver acted at `aal2`? The standard requires - it (BEA-C4). -3. **Consume.** The executor's service principal consumes once, before its first step. Which scope and - which `request_digest` does that take? Your contract notes that `consume` does not check digest - equivalence, so we plan an independent `GET /v1/approvals/{id}` comparison of - `target.admission_digest`. Is that the reading you intend? -4. **Revocation.** Can the founder revoke an approval that has not been consumed? This would be the - kill switch before the start (T07). - -## access-engine - -1. Should a PDP decision gate executor operations? For example: "executor X may run operation O on - target T under admission A", with the admission read as an input claim through approval-engine. -2. If yes, what is needed: a `bounded-execution` action, a policy pack and its owner, and the - `execution_contract` coverage that your current apply rules do not evaluate. What is the timeline? -3. For the T06 pilot, is it acceptable that the executor enforces the ceiling locally (validator plus - a Kubernetes Role), with the PDP check added later? - -## secrets-engine - -1. The pilot executor needs these OpenBao capabilities, at most 15-minute TTL: - - write the next version of `platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia` (CAS); - - read it and `.../synthetic-journey/syn-journey` for its checks. - - Does secrets-engine orchestrate these lanes for an executor workload, as with other lifecycle lanes? -2. To set `svc-authelia`'s password in LLDAP, the executor needs a directory credential. Would that be - a dedicated LLDAP account (no narrower group than `lldap_password_manager` exists) delivered as a - cataloged credential? Or do you see another lane shape? - -## railiance-platform - -1. A Kubernetes auth role for the executor's ServiceAccount in `sso`, with policies limited to the paths - above (as in CCR-2026-0052..0054). Which CCR request types: `workload-kv-read` for the journey - secrets (NK-WP-0056-T10), and a new KV-write-next-version type for the rotation? -2. Receipt sender: per NK-WP-0040-T02, you register senders for audit-core. Can the executor pod receive - an ESO-projected sender bearer like other in-cluster senders? - -## audit-core - -1. Will you hold the executor's execution-attribution receipts (Playbook Capability Contract v0.2, - NK-WP-0040) as audit events from a registered in-cluster sender? -2. The receipt adds per-step outcomes, check results, revert yes/no and budget used, and binds the - admission id, admission digest and approval reference in `decision_refs`. Does that fit your event - model, or should these be separate events correlated by `run_id`? - -## glas-harness - -1. GLAS-WP-0018 (session contract): when could a harness-launched agent present as `AGENT` with a - verifiable "harness-launched" assertion? The standard's BEA-4 requires it for agent executors. -2. Not needed for the pilot. This asks whether glas-harness wants to own the agent-executor path later. - -## railiance-apps - -1. The executor needs a deployment package under ADR-0015 (working name `rapp-bounded-executor`): - an image built by Forgejo, and a Deployment or Job in `sso` with its own ServiceAccount. Who - creates the repository, and which conventions apply? - -## Outcome (2026-10-31) - -All seven owners answered through worker agents in their repositories (founder instruction 2026-10-31). Open founder -decisions, collected: - -1. Executor OpenBao role: standing (railiance-platform) or only during the admitted window (secrets-engine). -2. Directory credential: self-rotation of the bind (proven on the pinned LLDAP) or a `lldap_password_manager` account. -3. CCR-2026-0058 (`proposed`): approve or change. -4. rapp package: create `rapp-bounded-executor` (F1), executor source location and image workflow in net-kingdom (F2), - one Job per admission (F3), namespace `sso` (F4). -5. Pilot without the PDP gate (receipt records `not-evaluated`); a second admission only with the gate or a recorded exception. -6. Adopt the `execution.run.started` event; `decision_refs` labels and the admission-level target/action shape. -7. Approve the proposed owner workplans: APPROVAL-WP-0007, FLEX-WP-0040, SECRETS-WP-0017, RPF-WP-0069, AUDIT-WP-0018, - GLAS-WP-0018 (and glas-harness owning agent executors later). - -Hub hygiene: messages 3e865656, b3b9e3f3, 1a5ea23d, b748ba04, 5a2dfbfb, 47384e55 and 5d0048ef were posted under the wrong sender by workers -sharing a scratch file; the answers of record are the owner documents named in the table; all are marked read here. diff --git a/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t17-founder-approval-path.md b/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t17-founder-approval-path.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7b6f8c3..0000000 --- a/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t17-founder-approval-path.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T17: the founder's aal2 approval path for an admission (2026-10-31) - -**Question:** how does the founder approve one Bounded Execution Admission? The approval must be a human entry made -with an `aal2` token that carries `approval:approve` for audience `approval-engine`. - -## What exists (evidence) - -**approval-engine (`docs/bounded-execution-admission-carrier.md`):** - -- `POST /v1/approvals` refuses unless `binding.actor` equals the authenticated token subject. Only the actor can - create the approval. -- `human_control: true` makes `add_entry` refuse non-human approvers. -- Consume requires `approval:consume` and a service principal. It does not check that the consumer is the actor; - that check is APPROVAL-WP-0007-T02, which is waiting. -- Human approvers use "the existing KeyCape human flow" with `approval:approve`. The engine names informed-decision - as that surface. - -**informed-decision (live at `decisions.coulomb.social`):** - -- It is the deployed L3 approver surface. platform-root has signed in and approved memos through it. -- Accepting a presented memo posts `POST /v1/approvals/{id}/entries` with the human's token, scopes - `openid approval:read approval:approve` (`informed_decision/approval_client.py`). -- **Its intake always creates the approval itself:** - - `intake_approval.py` refuses any binding whose `actor` is not `informed-decision`; - - `intake.py` refuses a memo that pins `approval_id` or `approval_binding_digest`, with reason - `approval_pinned_by_submitter`; - - validity is fixed at 24 h and `pdp_path` at false. - -**net-kingdom executor (`bounded-executor/executor.py`, BEA standard):** preflight refuses unless the approval names -`service:nk-bind-executor` as actor, binds the admission digest, and has only listed HUMAN approvers at aal2. - -## The conflict - -An approval the executor creates (actor `service:nk-bind-executor`) cannot be presented through informed-decision, -because intake refuses a pinned approval. An approval informed-decision creates has actor `informed-decision`, and -the executor and BEA canon refuse that. Neither surface can carry an admission end to end today. - -## Options - -| Option | Change | Owner | Effect | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| **A. informed-decision presents an existing approval** (recommended) | An intake profile for a registered submitter (the executor) that accepts an existing `approval_id`. informed-decision would `GET` it and require `human_control: true`, status `requested`, no entries, and a binding digest equal to the memo's; then present it, and post the founder's entry on accept. | informed-decision (INFD) | Keeps BEA's actor binding and approval-engine's create rule. The executor files the request (T14 as planned). The founder approves in the existing UI with presentation evidence. | -| B. Executor accepts actor `informed-decision` | Relax the executor and BEA so that the actor is the approver surface and the admission digest carries the binding. | net-kingdom (canon change) | No informed-decision change, and T14 shrinks to a consume-only client. But the approval no longer names who may run it, and until APPROVAL-WP-0007-T02 any `approval:consume` service could spend it. That weakens BEA-C4. | -| C. A founder CLI approver | A net-kingdom tool gets a human aal2 token (KeyCape PKCE, new client with a loopback redirect) and posts the entry. | net-kingdom + KeyCape | Works without INFD, but it is a second approver surface without informed-decision's presentation and acknowledgement evidence. It needs a new KeyCape client and security case. | - -## Recommendation - -**Option A.** It changes only the presenting surface, keeps every existing guarantee, and leaves T14's design as -written. Ask the INFD owner for a "present existing approval" intake profile, scoped to a registered submitter -(`service:nk-bind-executor`) and to `action: bounded-execution`. - -Until A exists, the pilot (T06) has no approval path. Option C is the fallback if A is declined. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-security-owner-review.md b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-security-owner-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 55aef54..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-security-owner-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ -# NetKingdom owner review — bounded one-app catalogue maintenance exception - -```yaml -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: approved -reviewed_at: "2026-10-11" -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02 -proposal: USER-CATALOGUE-INFDEC-20261011-R1 -revision: executor-preparation-2-owner-findings -manifest_sha256: 0ff545d26a0fd72f06040fe377de3efdcc3bd62cdcb6f653247c8ba72f3f34a7 -executor_sha256: b0dbbb9786e927055030acf849a72e9a44e9d3d55c84efdf245e419d381684f3 -transport_sha256: 3e594e0e8561100ae1eeb34d7208cd5b5e387ae56c29689f155aed94219770f3 -records_sha256: 23577cc4f3ea6c0ca43eb21ca0e3280eb53fb64e29b030dcd31251593f0f3f2f -comment: >- - NetKingdom INTENT declares Taxonomy/security canon and orchestration with - explicit externally owned identity, PDP and user-domain facts. This exact - alternative is one labelled supervised maintenance exception for the two - fixed User Engine metadata records, not a normative permission, new login, - grant or case type. Technical agreement under NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02 - preserves real ordinary denial, independent exact founder disposition, - recorded exception scope, bounded recovery and distinct owner roles. - It provides no founder approval, native runtime go or catalogue completion. -``` - -## Canonical facts and owner separation - -The nine applied files all match the exact refinement manifest above. Application -informed-decision / display Informed Decision / owner informed-decision and -binding informed-decision-approver -> protected system informed-decision match -User Engine's actual codecs and canonical-records.json. Access Engine's readback -registry independently binds issuer https://kc.coulomb.social and that client; -KeyCape source/owner registration receipt independently names the exact callback -https://decisions.coulomb.social/auth/callback. Existing retained keycape-client- -presence and native-preflight receipts support current preparation; no new live -issuer or database read was performed in this review. A fresh frozen target/pod/ -image and unchanged facts still must be rechecked before separately approved use. - -The proposed write does not create a user, membership, group, default role, -entitlement, grant or authorization rule. Application and binding are catalogue -facts, not allow-list entries or permission. No entry URL is smuggled into the -DTO: its model has no URL field, and observed Ingress URL remains context only. -This source agreement does not establish a fleet-complete catalogue or supply -any application owner's still-required acknowledgement in another owner's voice. -User Engine owns record lifecycle/persistence; Access owns the protected system -and decisions; KeyCape owns authentication/client registration; InformedDecision -owns application semantics. NetKingdom agrees only to security orchestration scope. - -## Explicit exception, not satisfied normal admission - -INTENT and accepted security-layer-model v0.8 retain the sole PDP and ordinary -PEP obligations. The tool intentionally overrides genuine ordinary application. -register denial after preserving its identified decision and audit. That is a -proposed exceptional administrative act, not normal conforming admission and not -an outage stance or PDP allow. Maintenance actor is truthfully SERVICE with -urn:supervised-maintenance issuer, explicit attribution and no forged human JWT, -roles, assurance or invented login. Exception result has no PDP decision ID. -No standard, normal service endpoint, IAM policy or existing PDP adapter changes. - -The private mode0600 canonical-hash grant is out-of-band supervised evidence, -not authentication of its author. Custodian must independently verify actual -founder disposition for this exact executor AND transport, records, Ready pod/ -immutable image, deadline and recovery. Prior readback R2 authority is insufficient. -Both native dry-run and apply require that distinct scope. The dry-run may cause -real external PDP telemetry while rolling back local rows/audits/outbox/ledger; -it is not globally side-effect free. Future human acceptance must preserve normal -admission as unmet and record the exact conditional close-down relaxation. This -source preparation creates no active exception or scored execution success. - -## Expiry, one-use and recovery - -Closed grant requires exact integer memo revision, fixed proposal/memo/record/ -executor hashes and maximum deadline2026-10-12T23:59:59Z. The fixed method/request -binding and <=30s lifetime are narrow. SERIALIZABLE transaction, fixed application -advisory lock, native DB clock checks and persisted audit-key ledger bind absent/ -exact admission and prevent replay after process restart. Both services must be -constructed before BEGIN because readiness rolls back its connection. Final -clock check is precommit; it is not observation of commit completing by expiry. - -Exact pre-existing match consumes with no creation or undo. Partial/conflicting -facts, unavailable/uncertain provider deny or unexpected ordinary allow refuse. -Created-only recovery requires the original consumed grant hash before expiry, -unchanged exact two records, no later dependencies, preserved event IDs and the -existing delivery-worker lock. Missing, claimed or delivered events stop recovery. -History is retained, not erased. A changed grant/operator cannot defeat one-use -or create fresh rollback authority. Failed or expired recovery needs separate -owner reconciliation and disposition; no reversal of downstream effects is claimed. - -## Retained event and replay boundary - -The registered event remains attributive, with maintenance_exception/proposal/ -approval/operator labels, transported through the existing audit envelope. It -is not an invitation mail class or a user-authorization grant. Standard pending -drain excludes dead-lettered rollback events. Separately authorized targeted -delivery/replay can revive retained events; this proposal explicitly grants -neither. The reviewer agrees to the added caveat requiring separate owner -reconciliation/disposition before any such later action. Preserve rollback/event -IDs so a future consumer/reviewer can correlate the retired registration and -avoid mistaking delayed evidence for current facts. No complete consumer inventory, -faithful-display, native audit arrival or stream-completeness claim is made. - -## Verification and remaining authority - -Fresh dedicated User Engine owner agreement is applied in its own review file; -this worker neither replaces it nor signs that role. Its independently recorded -21 isolated PostgreSQL checks passed on current exact source and immutable f239 -installed package dependencies, with private fixtures/cleanup limits retained. -That is not a native database invocation or authority grant. This NetKingdom -review independently reran the five pure negative tests on the applied executor: -all pass, with no network/database/credential access. Earlier sixteen-test receipt -and constructor failures remain history, not relabelled as final proof. - -No further source change is required for this narrow technical agreement. Before -execution the requester still needs exact human exception and all required owner -acknowledgments; freeze concrete grant/target preconditions and supervise the -already prepared source transport. Afterwards verify exact two codec payloads, -one consumed ledger, genuine denial/maintenance audits, attributed event and -native catalogue/readback boundaries. Human MFA/allow and any complete journey -remain separate; USER-WP-0026-T03/USER-WP-0028-T02 cannot close from this review. -No native write, credential read, login, new agent, runtime publication or founder -ruling occurred. This review introduces no NetKingdom standard permission. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-security-owner-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-security-owner-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3f644b4..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-security-owner-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -{ - "work_item": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "0ff545d26a0fd72f06040fe377de3efdcc3bd62cdcb6f653247c8ba72f3f34a7", - "source_references": [ - { - "path": "/tmp/user-catalogue-executor-refined-stage/manifest.json", - "sha256": "0ff545d26a0fd72f06040fe377de3efdcc3bd62cdcb6f653247c8ba72f3f34a7" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-catalogue-maintenance-owner-agreement.md", - "sha256": "cb9fdadb3a8f432f100e9340e5b94af932c4d11a5705af6a80d336a5026d867b" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-one-app-catalogue-executor/owner-final-postgres-receipt.json", - "sha256": "659d29e85da00aaece0da933ca2b25b9e60feae18072745095a66370854a7ee4" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-one-app-catalogue-executor/proposal.json", - "sha256": "69ad999d70c014472d70e7ba394390e039f295ad0d35ab2d322e2a32ca00877c" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/tools/catalogue_bootstrap.py", - "sha256": "b0dbbb9786e927055030acf849a72e9a44e9d3d55c84efdf245e419d381684f3" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/tools/run_approved_catalogue_bootstrap.py", - "sha256": "3e594e0e8561100ae1eeb34d7208cd5b5e387ae56c29689f155aed94219770f3" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-one-app-catalogue-proposal/canonical-records.json", - "sha256": "ae6fde5f2c879e75fabb53e132261899dae0f4d864e18dd425bc272be713426b" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-one-app-catalogue-proposal/keycape-client-presence.json", - "sha256": "54657adf2c53ea220d93db5ab2e865fcea2106aaee517a9932d071b842a58912" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-one-app-catalogue-proposal/native-preflight.json", - "sha256": "8bc7f73e0a89493ee376383132c47d8e0b6f0723395373153421eb3e058101eb" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/access-engine/examples/application-readback/registry_snapshot.json", - "sha256": "7171089a024510b5da70e5e715019dc585169a9aa078eb8f41545b3cc76b52d7" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/key-cape/config/service-clients.example.yaml", - "sha256": "b7e17698a0946f387c481b7e27fe9ddea22cdd9db2e34e32a50457e02a34b18e" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0013-approval-engine-resource-audience.md", - "sha256": "55c88bf4ed9a456db59b319bbaf960dfe6f4147437e339f950e0583d7582057a" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/INTENT.md", - "sha256": "fd2ba8dff9dfd5583ec6d8b0348f273bfe00c59923b5d5d47cd22b1fb4658c54" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md", - "sha256": "3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b" - } - ], - "verification": "five applied pure negative tests passed;21 isolated PG tests inspected as distinct owner proof", - "native_execution": false, - "founder_approval": false -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection-net-owner-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection-net-owner-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 235804c..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection-net-owner-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "work_item": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T06", - "scope": "explicit-version-source-selection-review-only", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "88238f29ebeceee36f6f6e77bb19cb43837b5bc03bce21c16acc50399b302084", - "reviewed_validator_sha256": "5b9e46a5d0a8f387c6e0d87216c5695c03753c564378b1e43c07b4628cd07dc7", - "comment": "Established NetKingdom owner only, existing completedT06 anchor verified before this source followthrough review. INTENT Taxonomy, inspectable identity contracts and Meta-Orchestration support exact explicit source version selection, immutable predecessor history and owner-controlled later integration. This optional selector prepares source without discovering or promoting authority; canonicalcase/type acceptance and native owner gates remain distinct. Currentdefault1.1 is acknowledged/unimplemented, not implemented.", - "independent_validation": { - "all_six_staged_and_original_sha_guards_matched": true, - "isolated_validator_and_version_selection_tests_passed": 43, - "acknowledged12_package_compatibility_tests_passed": 22, - "temporary_snapshot_setup_initial_collection_failure": "Missing playbook-capability-contract dependency in my temporary copy; copied unchanged actual dependency and reran successfully without candidate source edits.", - "actual_canonical11_and_acknowledged12_file_pins_match_candidate_evidence": true, - "both_ordinary_admission_refused": true, - "default11_preparation_render_digest": "sha256:e64b56e4590b57b858303fcda1a474693e3dd821bc83df26646fe78fc345498a", - "explicit12_preparation_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "execution_permitted": false - }, - "selection_contract": [ - "Existing two-argument callers retain their supplied default root; unmapped versions use that root.", - "A matching explicit version selects one supplied Path root only; missing/wrong source refuses without falling back, directory scanning or highest/latest selection.", - "Duplicate or invalid CLI mappings refuse even when identical; closed exact reference rejects traversal/unpinned selectors.", - "Selected root/type directory/typefile symlink and duplicate YAML source keys refuse; exact source id/version match required.", - "Direct case validation now refuses mixed case/type version inputs, including in source preparation mode.", - "Explicit roots are caller-supplied source inputs, not authenticated owner provenance or new acknowledgment; exact content hashes/receipts still bind acceptance." - ], - "retained_limits": { - "canonical11_package_or_case_changed": false, - "acknowledged12_package_or_receipt_changed": false, - "type_implemented": false, - "case_accepted_by_this_change": false, - "owner_adapter_installed": false, - "global_native_evidence_verifier_supplied": false, - "bound_claims_confirmed": false, - "native_action_or_credential_access": false, - "grant_or_first_case_complete": false, - "NK_WP_0048_T06_status": "wait" - }, - "actual_completed_workrecord_sha256": "a09f12d10bbb6fe89daca687b619f79583836afa9b68664ef1442787975d9065" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection-net-owner-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection-net-owner-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index b66bc26..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection-net-owner-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -{ - "candidate_files": [ - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json", - "staged_path": "/tmp/nk-explicit-version-selection-stage/net-kingdom/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json", - "original_sha256": null, - "staged_sha256": "de288546b8d1c797fc4cc63978d586a6f61d5cc4782ded67dafc907dd09723fa" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "path": "docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md", - "staged_path": "/tmp/nk-explicit-version-selection-stage/net-kingdom/docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md", - "original_sha256": "1755b5c45f30f622ba7bbe67f64bf310de61ea3a2cd192472dc2c0bcedc7562a", - "staged_sha256": "fda468e5cbe346217bc1bb481e89563fd76778ad67f64a41e8385057f528c221" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "path": "tools/security-case-types/README.md", - "staged_path": "/tmp/nk-explicit-version-selection-stage/net-kingdom/tools/security-case-types/README.md", - "original_sha256": "c000d0b6ca18ce15b777372ca00b813d15700c652ac1040d1ee883712aeee4ac", - "staged_sha256": "03e1c503bc60990214d5b1a7cec8878cf47fc892d82c82d682f3490e33dc71f5" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "path": "tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py", - "staged_path": "/tmp/nk-explicit-version-selection-stage/net-kingdom/tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py", - "original_sha256": "ef380a85ca9949e0ebc59d1cdce422bd45e362eb976330b2b72b8fd73784ae0a", - "staged_sha256": "5b9e46a5d0a8f387c6e0d87216c5695c03753c564378b1e43c07b4628cd07dc7" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "path": "tools/security-case-types/tests/test_explicit_version_selection.py", - "staged_path": "/tmp/nk-explicit-version-selection-stage/net-kingdom/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_explicit_version_selection.py", - "original_sha256": null, - "staged_sha256": "0592c751ed75f27231d3ca2a2eb97af7e2f45b79b0572fbdf8cadbe3738aa76d" - }, - { - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "path": "workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md", - "staged_path": "/tmp/nk-explicit-version-selection-stage/net-kingdom/workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md", - "original_sha256": "a7f8e24b4da32a421c4877fbfa9e0914233b7d6f8ed7e71165998ce3cc501ff0", - "staged_sha256": "c5f0e3bce81ae662d04158689ee250a54af36e17c5bac32858ba889795597001" - } - ], - "source_evidence": { - "owner_source_commit": "f6856cdb53c051e35c984bad927395b7e8a8e5e0", - "orientation": { - "package_version": "0.2.6", - "digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "start_source_status": "withheld; source changed", - "source_review": "AGENTS/INTENT/SECURITY-COMPANION and relevant actual validator/acknowledgment/workplan reviewed; no guidance or authority inferred" - }, - "tests_passed": 43, - "default11_type_status": "acknowledged", - "explicit12_type_status": "acknowledged", - "both_ordinary_admission_refused": true, - "actual_original_and_staged11_cli_render_bytes_identical": true, - "default11_render_digest": "sha256:e64b56e4590b57b858303fcda1a474693e3dd821bc83df26646fe78fc345498a", - "version12_preparation_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "canonical11_files": { - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md": "c01ec1a3f058eab9e6c461e898166d496adb8542ea46f9e198ced4de83b997ef", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/build_intake.py": "d214019a10801e14d7986474ff83370482116df6a0fdde6ecb255d75645b3b04", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json": "a0ab9c57c71359b9ed31b9d6b04fd464db3e41bb6fe6f39bc6ac0b85556765e0", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/packet.md": "452ea42168ddef64dc5498ba30ae63ff2ff47a3919f55e22f6379d668ea76c28", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml": "41cc5bb4842209f5f86830d1e8b4b010c6ef06a050c4160faae06a1dfcd9b6e9", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml": "96c8dcd4b4182893b3a005137b880c0a80d4aa07a2668b29964e1db33605e050", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party.py": "7670ad0e415ca9941255bbc111b91fb5c9c3ae41851096d53d85fe7ba1d8660f", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party_contract.py": "ed30cd00ae22c32fbe2184443a2a8a7775ea5c231d1dd8070f230d547051f4e0", - "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml": "f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c" - }, - "historical_accepted11_case_sha256": "bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d", - "acknowledged12_files": { - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md": "4c82d9517d423ada75e680a05b0ecc6dfa0bf9f877a92b68f3ab93c1a86e405e", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/acknowledgment.json": "2dcc220febf125a17b3769f7014f18b63979d7121e0f7056a2b0d8b1ae6031b0", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml": "8d6457248415daa6fc509da4e838aae0b66d7808e9da8e00f4b85a1e7faed10d", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml": "1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py": "4a958eb2d0b90c1ffd08300d3299e4c31c827dcd7fb3cb4c22df91cc29986124", - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml": "9e60ff569fb0d860a2bbde7bbb0991a54d4b0688f62b56df0fa5d161fd624578" - }, - "provider_declaration_inputs": { - "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml": "cd81e02c283d514492b7a99062c9ede59a7ae124736de1270a121bf0a96a984e" - }, - "ordinary_admission_or_type_implemented_or_case_accepted_or_native_completed": false, - "native_or_credentials_accessed": false, - "formal_net_owner_review": false, - "NK_WP_0048_T06_remains_wait": true - }, - "commands": [ - "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m pytest -p no:cacheprovider /tmp/nk-explicit-version-owner-checkout/net-kingdom/tools/security-case-types/tests -q", - "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 NET_KINGDOM_ROOT=/tmp/nk-explicit-version-owner-checkout/net-kingdom python3 -m pytest -p no:cacheprovider /tmp/nk-explicit-version-owner-checkout/net-kingdom/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests -q" - ], - "owner_intent_sha256": "fd2ba8dff9dfd5583ec6d8b0348f273bfe00c59923b5d5d47cd22b1fb4658c54", - "owner_instructions_sha256": "065d47b7bdbfe829672a2a6161a7f8cf243237a1210fb61d82f153fa37f22131", - "existing_owner_workrecord_original_sha256": "a09f12d10bbb6fe89daca687b619f79583836afa9b68664ef1442787975d9065" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.md b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index d3e6c55..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ ---- -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: approved -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T05 -reviewed_manifest_sha256: 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431 -scope: final-nineteen-path-proposed-source-technical-review-only ---- - -# NetKingdom final Forgejo consumer ESO source review - -Technical agreement on exact nineteen-path manifest -5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431 under completed -own NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T05. This is the same NetKingdom role only; apply the -work record before this formal entry. Original SHA guards preserve already -applied T03/T04 and any State Hub UUIDs. The earlier271 review and its evidence -remain historical; they are not claimed as an exact review of this final source. - -INTENT's Taxonomy declaration, Identity is the Control Plane, Minimize Threat -Exposure and Meta-Orchestration principles support truthful consumer identity, -inspectable canonical contracts and separate owner-executed acceptance. The two -Platform counterexamples touched that contract: an incorrectly generated keycape -consumer identity and delete-only lifecycle wording. Builder source SHA256 -c2b140f380407779ce5478ca57c97eb0e6375d6a9cad4591b0b29ddd177db686 corrects them -without changing canonical proposed type/case or its six-object render. - -Independently checked all19 hashes and seven current source pins, preparation -validators, refusal of proposed source by normal implemented-type admission and -full regeneration of render -sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. -execution.permitted stays false. Direct isolated projections reproduce both -failures against preserved271 builder and verify the corrected generated CCR -against its exact retained projection. The consumer target is forgejo, KeyCape -reader output matches the earlier builder exactly, and unbound consumer output -changes only the previously incorrect workload field. No fixture provenance or -private projection call is accepted-case/native evidence. Fresh distinct Mason -and Platform owner receipts pin this exact final manifest and each report44 -independently rerun focused passes; neither is a native installation receipt. - -The generator requires consumer-reference recovery, independently proved -case-created ownership, preservation of preexisting/shared objects, owner issued -reader-token revocation or independently verified expiry, no new login/remint, -retained receipts and refusal on changed references/UIDs/ownership. These are -obligations, not an implemented revocation adapter or recovery permission. -Canonical/manual proposed rollback still orders role before policy and requires -revocation/expiry before removal of the created role; deleting role/SA/store alone -never proves token deactivation. Historical1.1 bundles/CCR history are preserved: -the old wrongly targeted bundle now correctly fails matching. A corrected source -build/bundle needs fresh exact owner reconciliation after successor acceptance; -old approvals are not silently reassigned and the verifier is not weakened. - -All earlier exact271 identity/trust/acceptance boundaries remain applicable: -forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso only, namespace forgejo, audience openbao, -exact CLIENT_SECRET data read and no default policy. Forgejo/runner default SA -must never bind. Dedicated automount=false identity must have no legacy token -refs; no static fallback. Shared ESO controller authority and existing HTTP -custody remain disclosed rather than described as isolation. Delivery applies -only three admitted namespaced objects and acquires no deletion authority over -matched/shared target objects. - -The sixth structural role changes authentication/materialization under -SecurityCaseTypes §6 and therefore needs a new founder informed-decision -acknowledgment as for a new type, regardless of proposed1.2 label. Existing -acknowledgedtype1.1/acceptedcase1.1 cannot authorize it. Pending claims still -block apply. No type/case acknowledgment, implemented marker, broker pin bypass, -role/policy grant, source materialization, installed adapter/session or live go -follows from this review. Refresh exact ESO/native identity metadata; obtain -independent admitted bindings, capability/creation receipts and Warden native -session/revocation/descriptors before their existing acceptance steps. - -Helm secret consumption/group enforcement, break-glass/account-link/MFA and -positive/negative browser checks stay separate owner/project gates. Delivery -Ready and source tests do not complete the first case. Existing ORGREF/NK0048, -Mason, Warden, Platform and consumer work records retain that work; no duplicate -plan or new standing authority is introduced. No further NetKingdom source -correction is required in this exact final candidate. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 17eefd3..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,191 +0,0 @@ -{ - "independent_checks": { - "exact_manifest_sha256": "5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431", - "verified_files": 19, - "all_seven_current_source_pins_match": true, - "type_case_preparation_validation_pass": true, - "runtime_admission_of_proposed_type_refused": true, - "render_regeneration_identical": true, - "render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "prior271_wrong_consumer_target_counterexample_reproduced": true, - "prior271_missing_recovery_guards_counterexample_reproduced": true, - "corrected_generated_projection_verified": true, - "keycape_projection_unchanged": true, - "unbound_consumer_projection_only_workload_changed": true, - "native_mutation": false, - "execution_permitted": false - }, - "reviewed_proposal_files": [ - { - "repo": "railiance-apps", - "path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/consumer-delivery.yaml", - "staged_path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-stage/railiance-apps/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/consumer-delivery.yaml", - "original_sha256": null, - "staged_sha256": "56478a83d799c08dc1e5159983b1e843a46b16dfeee7e84c31401d1f92430df2" - }, - { - "repo": "railiance-apps", - "path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/native-metadata.json", - "staged_path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-stage/railiance-apps/docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/native-metadata.json", - "original_sha256": null, - "staged_sha256": "4e2993f5920215f41e4a235743023f22b78b8f597d3d70ed279991b2fc3204b5" - 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"sha256": "28541874fb437a06a8f1749bc50c88f6fee3d7c100c2f3ee0c52b59afaf8e102" - }, - { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-platform-owner-review-stage/railiance-platform/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-owner-review/final-review.json", - "sha256": "72854a798e01c6d65a16770efb1329d211fe3c59a3f4ad3190d6972f5c886f6e" - }, - { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-271/manifest.json", - "sha256": "271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279" - } - ] -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.md b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index f190893..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ ---- -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: approved -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T03 -reviewed_manifest_sha256: 271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279 -scope: proposed-source-technical-review-only ---- - -# NetKingdom owner review — Forgejo consumer ESO successor - -Technical source agreement on the exact frozen 17-path proposal, manifest SHA256 -271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279. This is the -established NetKingdom owner role only, under NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T03. The -work record was prepared before this review entry; the applying coordinator must -retain that order and sync the owner work record. This review does not change -any admission, bound-claim, type or case status. - -NetKingdom INTENT's Taxonomy declaration, Identity is the Control Plane, -Minimize Threat Exposure and Meta-Orchestration principles support a named, -inspectable identity contract and owner-executed changes. NetKingdom owns the -canonical type, case and responsibility map. Railiance owns deployment mechanics; -platform, consumer, Mason and Warden retain their distinct native execution and -acceptance responsibilities. Working companion v0.3 and accepted layer-model -v0.8 remain unchanged. The Emergent Security start card was withheld after source -changes (package0.2.6, digest8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02); -this review uses the actual source files, not withheld guidance. - -## Exact correction and independent evidence - -Initial packet c48b64e5e704e8f11ca65095c376c8a9fecc2b3a58e74b9eb62096c80d00f4fb -incorrectly described the proposed CCR42 as rendered from an acknowledged type. -The requester preserved it at /tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-c48 -and changed only CCR42 risk.notes[0]. The final note truthfully names proposed1.2, -preparation-only observations, unconfirmed/apply-blocked bindings and a fresh -§6 informed-decision acknowledgment. Independent parsed comparison confirms this -is the only semantic change. Final proposed CCR42 SHA256 is -6544600c63a86559ba053240c476d493f4d2f25c9cd22cf6a9a05f09ee617a86. - -Independently verified all 17 staged hashes and all seven current owner source -pins. Current native type/case validators passed in preparation mode -(require_implemented=False); composition resolution and full render regeneration -were byte-semantically identical to retained render. Full render digest is -sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35, and -execution.permitted remains false. Rendering the current1.1 case with the same -current declarations proves all five original structural objects are exactly -unchanged; the proposed sixth object is consumer-eso-role. This is not structural -equality of the whole inventory and cannot transfer old acceptance. Full source -hashes bind composition, follow-through, verification and rollback as well as -structure. Any acknowledgment or accepted-case source change needs new exact -source pins and render/case reconciliation; the old digest is no permission. - -The minimal Mason CCR-filename collision/refusal changes and their tests are -byte-unchanged by the risk-note amendment. The independent Mason owner reports -42 focused passes and an original-source regression failure, and confirms the -proposed source is refused rather than fixture-acknowledged. Those are isolated -source checks, not installed/native materialization proof. - -## Identity contract and retained trust boundary - -The new role binds only forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso and audience openbao, -with the one exact KV data read policy and no default policy. The Forgejo and -runner shared default SA must never be bound. Namespaced SecretStore uses the -dedicated serviceAccountRef with audiences=[openbao] and no namespace override; -ExternalSecret maps only CLIENT_SECRET. Installed-source/retained-metadata support -for TokenRequest and audiences supports this preparation, not an invented live -binding. The SA has automount=false and must have no legacy token references; -a TokenRequest failure must not be bypassed with a legacy/static token. ESO's -600-second Kubernetes token and role's 900-second OpenBao maximum are distinct. - -The shared controller's clusterwide TokenRequest/Secret authority remains a -trusted surface; neither a dedicated reference identity nor automount=false -provides controller-compromise isolation. Existing internal HTTP custody and -legacy-fallback risk remain stated. The proposal adds no default grants, -memberships, group authorization or application-runtime identity change. - -## Required separate acceptance and recovery stops - -The sixth role changes authentication/materialization. Under SecurityCaseTypes -§6 it needs a new founder informed-decision as for a new type, regardless of the -proposed1.2 label. This technical review is not that acknowledgment and does not -inherit acknowledged1.1. Current acknowledged type1.1, accepted case1.1 and -historical CCR42 remain unchanged. No successor case acceptance, implemented -marker, machine-contract acceptance or broad broker-pin relaxation is inferred. -Exact owner/founder receipts and current runtime/source pins must be reconciled -before successor build or execution; pending bound claims still block apply. - -Refresh native metadata and refuse conflicting/shared/unknown ownership before -an exact native action. Materialization receipts must prove six-object structure, -exact SA/namespace/audience/policy and created-versus-matched identities without -reading secrets. Existing Warden descriptors/session/revocation and per-owner -provenance gates remain. Delivery Ready cannot substitute for Forgejo Helm OIDC -consumption, group enforcement, break-glass/account-link/MFA and positive/negative -browser acceptance. These stay in their existing owner/project work records. - -Recovery starts with the consumer owner's reference/Helm rollback, then only -proved-created delivery objects and target UID/ownerReference. Matched/shared -objects stay protected. Revoke issued reader tokens or prove expiry before -removing the created role, then the policy. Role/SA deletion alone does not revoke -issued OpenBao tokens. Legacy planned inventory confers no delete authority; -changed references/UIDs/ownership stop recovery. Source preparation creates no -credential, role, policy, service account, value or client and closes no first-case -runtime task. - -No additional source correction is required in this exact corrected packet for -NetKingdom's technical review. Separate owner and founder dispositions remain due. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 975057b..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewed_manifest": { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-stage/manifest.json", - "sha256": "271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279" - }, - "initial_manifest": { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-original-c48/manifest.json", - "sha256": "c48b64e5e704e8f11ca65095c376c8a9fecc2b3a58e74b9eb62096c80d00f4fb" - }, - "amendment_receipt": { - "path": "/tmp/forgejo-consumer-eso-refinement-amendment-receipt.json", - "sha256": "e27a3f5a56565d270d8f038f77333aea13460135a16ae4e60a914dc5d17365c9" - }, - "staged_proposal_files": [ - { - "repo": "railiance-apps", - "path": "docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/consumer-delivery.yaml", - 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-# NetKingdom refined package and acknowledgment packet review - -Technical source agreement on exact32-path manifest -330da7fe129b0443e41fff44b3c2d829b0d682698fdbba9fe60011d46ed5c48c, stable proposal -NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1, unposted memo -infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1, submission -sha256:2fd1c7ee3bad461d48347427802e8d130e01017f52634740bbc724fcf9e9bf60. -This is the same established NetKingdom owner role and same T06 review trial. -Retain completed own T06 first, then the original eeb changes-requested entry -and this refined entry; earlier revisions/failures remain history. Original SHA -protects the actual T05/applied source and any coordinator-managed hub metadata. - -INTENT's Taxonomy declaration, identity contract and Meta-Orchestration goals -support exact canonical lifecycle facts, usable source packages and independent -owner execution. The final nineteen-file architecture, earlier three distinct -technical reviews and type/case/render bytes are unchanged. No second owner role -or founder disposition is supplied by this review. - -## Independently checked complete package and packet - -Verified all32 staged hashes. The completed proposed1.2 package contains the -exact reviewed type.yaml, Forgejo proposed example, README threat model/alternatives/ -limits, a public example and runnable source tests. Actual full owner validate-type -against that directory passes. Independently ran22 tests, including deterministic -composition/nonexecution, six-object confidential/public boundaries, exact namespace/ -audience/role policy, refusal of malformed/unsettable parameters, normal proposed/ -acknowledged admission refusal, ordered created-only recovery and three negative -full-package regressions removing README, tests or examples. These source checks -contact no native services. The type and Forgejo package example match the reviewed19 -bytes exactly; no fake type/case acceptance is inserted into those sources. - -README's retained shared/default consumer identity alternative is read as the -observed Forgejo/runner workload ServiceAccount, not as an OpenBao reader binding. -Historical1.1 consumer policy was unbound; no historical default-SA reader role is -established. The exact proposed dedicated consumer identity/default-SA prohibition -in the bound design and reviews remains controlling. The package offers no new -controller isolation, legacy/static-token fallback or native revocation claim. - -Offline actual intake/schema/typed decoder validates20 bound documents at233429 -register bytes; all19 applied sources and real owner attachments match. Packet -tamper, boolean memo-version and prebound-approval trials are refused. These checks -neither prove native submitter admission nor attest an actual human/session identity. -The pending-human-session field is preparation only, not authenticated founder data. - -## Corrected recording boundary and remaining genuine decision - -Memo question/terms, proposal, decision packet and recording gates now require -canonicalcase1.2 to remain proposed while the type is unimplemented, without -acceptance fields or phase markers. Reference-migration design approval is a -separate immutable NetKingdom/consumer design receipt only. This resolves the -eeb review's exact recording objection rather than invoking schema or first-reference -preparation flags as authority. The historical eeb packet and prepackage12ce -missing-README/tests/examples failures are preserved. Completing the package does -not acknowledge its type or accept a canonical case. - -An isolated copy with only type status changed to acknowledged passes closed -JSON schema; unchanged proposed case shape also passes. Normal semantic admission -still refuses the acknowledged/unimplemented type. Preparation rendering after that -isolated status change matches the exact retained c0afd full render, with execution -false. This demonstrates permissible future source shape and source pin handling, -not a fabricated human acknowledgment or native permission. Do not add unsupported -type receipt/history keys: retain actual acknowledgment provenance in the owner -history/receipt and schema-supported status fields, with fresh actual file hashes. - -Only a new independently confirmed genuine founder disposition for this exact memo/ -version/packet can authorize recording the reviewed1.2 type acknowledgment, after -this complete-package validation and genuine source-owner review are retained. -Record actual roles/actor/time/stale state and exact binding/approval/disposition -identities; preserve immutable1.1 type/package/case and proposed bytes first. -The current1.1 snapshots still match their real canonical files byte-for-byte. -Changed or stale sources/roles/outcomes require exact reconciliation; no old1.1 -approval, technical review or local JSON is that founder act. Declined/pending/stale -outcomes remain honestly unacknowledged. - -No implemented marker, canonical case acceptance, light-path admission, confirmed -claims, historical CCR reassignment, source rebundle approval, OpenBao auth/grant, -ESO deployment, native materialization, contained session, adapter/revocation proof -or browser/MFA/break-glass/first-case completion is authorized. Existing owner/project -records retain those separate gates. Recording changes need fresh canonical hashes, -full run/source reconciliation and independent required native receipts; render -identity alone cannot turn an old receipt into current execution authority. - -No further NetKingdom source correction is required for this exact completed package -and corrected source-only acknowledgment packet. This independent receipt satisfies -the separate technical package-review gate; it does not edit packet readiness fields, -post the memo or record acknowledgment. Any rebinding or addition of this receipt to -the human packet must preserve exact proposal revision/digests and be reconciled by -the requester before genuine human disposition. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index c98e583..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,290 +0,0 @@ -{ - "independent_checks": { - "exact32_manifest_sha256": "330da7fe129b0443e41fff44b3c2d829b0d682698fdbba9fe60011d46ed5c48c", - "all32_hashes_verified": true, - "full_type_package_validator_passed": true, - "independently_run_tests_passed": 22, - "missing_readme_tests_examples_negative_regressions_pass": true, - "all20_bound_docs_typed_intake_and_three_guards_pass": true, - "register_bytes": 233429, - "submission_digest": "sha256:2fd1c7ee3bad461d48347427802e8d130e01017f52634740bbc724fcf9e9bf60", - 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] -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-review.md b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8e6eb10..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ ---- -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: changes_requested -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T06 -reviewed_manifest_sha256: eeb2968ec317d0bc072788011918025a21d2b48c13987d09945ae8761f3d8fe5 -scope: source-only-acknowledgment-human-packet-recording-boundary ---- - -# NetKingdom review of source-only type1.2 acknowledgment packet - -Reviewed exact26-path manifest eeb2968ec317d0bc072788011918025a21d2b48c13987d09945ae8761f3d8fe5, -including20 memo documents, stable NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1 and -infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1, submission -sha256:5d36e27de6161e0c80c0590a99a4d47c998f673aacf289d7a6b46adfe510c6e7. -Own T06 was prepared/completed before this formal entry; preserve current T01–T05 -and hub metadata when applying. This worker reviews only the established -NetKingdom owner role. INTENT's Taxonomy and identity-contract goals require -honest canonical lifecycle semantics, not merely valid file shape. - -All26 hashes matched. The offline intake/schema and typed decoder validate20 -content-bound documents; the nineteen applied source hashes and three actual -owner-review attachments match unchanged. Packet-content tamper, boolean memo -version and prebound approval are refused. Proposed type/case/render preserve -execution=false, unconfirmed claims and no disposition/grant. Current1.1 exact -bytes and historical owner returns remain distinct. These checks are offline -source checks and do not authenticate a submitter, principal or founder act. - -## Required narrow recording correction - -Recording-gates.md step4 optionally permits canonical case status accepted -against a merely acknowledged type, then falls back to a separate source receipt -if that path cannot safely represent the boundary. Make that existing fallback -mandatory now. Canon SecurityCaseTypes §4 requires the referenced type implemented; -§5 says only implemented types accept cases. The normal owner validator enforces -this. In an isolated copy, acknowledged type plus accepted case and both owner/ -founder fixture roles passes JSON shape but normal semantic admission fails: -“only implemented types accept cases”. The preparation bypass passes the shape, -but cannot supply ordinary admission authority. Even there, a missing required -founder role is rejected. No fictional fixture receipt was recorded. - -Mason's --allow-unimplemented is documented for the first reference that takes -an acknowledged type to implemented. This existing preparation/build mechanism -is not a general exemption from canonical case admission and supplies no native -permission. Source-only human acceptance of the existing migration can be retained -without declaring ordinary admitted case status. The packet already offers this -separate-receipt path; making it explicit avoids creating a lifecycle ambiguity. - -Replace recording-gates step4 with: - -> After a genuine exact human disposition fulfilling the declared consumer -> owner/founder roles, retain source acceptance of the existing Forgejo reference -> migration in a separate immutable owner receipt binding the proposed1.2 type, -> case and full render hashes and the actual native disposition identities. -> Keep the canonical1.2 case proposed and preserve current1.1 canonical source -> until deliberate owner migration under the applicable admission contract. -> Do not set canonical case status accepted or insert case acceptance markers -> against an acknowledged/unimplemented type. Reference preparation/rebundle -> remains the existing explicitly bounded first-reference path; it neither admits -> an ordinary new case nor supplies native execution, claims or implemented status. -> Later canonical admission/status recording must meet its actual type lifecycle, -> owner acceptance and source/native receipt requirements, or obtain a separate -> explicit argued canon disposition. Schema success alone is not that permission. - -Apply the same explicit boundary to decision-packet requested-act/recording prose, -proposal case_scope, memo question/terms and generated intake/lifecycle envelopes: -source type acknowledgment plus separate reference-source acceptance receipt; -canonical1.2 case stays proposed at this stage. Keep the stable proposal/trial ID, -retain eeb as the reviewed original revision, regenerate exact packet/memo/source -hashes and submission digest, and re-review the refined exact revision before -submission. This changes source recording clarity only, not the reviewed19 type/ -case/native-body bytes or the founder decision itself. No new broad workplan is -needed; existing NK0048/project records retain followthrough. - -## Boundaries already correctly retained - -The type's acknowledgment requires a new genuine founder informed-decision under -§6; old1.1 receipt or technical reviews cannot provide it. Typepackage README, -reference examples and runnable tests must actually be validated under §3 before -canonical acknowledged-package recording; gate3 already requires that and should -remain. Status/history references must fit closed schema: do not invent new type -acceptance keys to imitate a receipt. Preserve immutable old package/history and -proposed bytes. Post-record type/case file hashes and actual render/source pins -must be reconciled rather than rewriting old source hashes with new meaning. - -No implemented type/light-path admission, binding confirmation, CCR apply, ESO -publication, secret access, structural materialization, native adapter/session, -credential grant or first-case completion is authorized. Human browser/MFA/ -break-glass and native per-owner receipts stay separate. Pending, declined, stale -or changed-source outcomes remain honest source state. 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}, - { - "label": "original_exact19_source_review", - "source_path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.sources.json", - "sha256": "2a3862d47a95b0fd21329292723d39fce61279d779f51b629b517b5ed130f577" - }, - { - "label": "actual_completed_package_peer_review", - "source_path": "/tmp/netkingdom-forgejo-type12-final-packet-review-stage/net-kingdom/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.sources.json", - "sha256": "00eee9833108f451d99b15fb1261e4ba3aebf8a047bdd0a01d8ea4f601e99073" - } - ], - "owner_intent_sha256": "fd2ba8dff9dfd5583ec6d8b0348f273bfe00c59923b5d5d47cd22b1fb4658c54", - "owner_instructions_sha256": "065d47b7bdbfe829672a2a6161a7f8cf243237a1210fb61d82f153fa37f22131", - "authority_limits": [ - "Only a genuine new independently confirmed native founder act for exact packet may support type acknowledgment recording after owner/source prerequisites.", - "Reference migration design approval goes only to separate immutable owner receipt; canonical1.2case remains proposed with no acceptance/phase markers while type unimplemented.", - "Immutable current1.1 files/history stay preserved; exact postrecord source digests and owner reconciliation remain required.", - "No memo post, type acknowledgment, case admission, binding confirmation, credential/auth/apply, native materialization, ESOdelivery, session/grant, installed verifier/adapter or first-case/browser/MFA completion performed or supplied.", - "Source-ready human consideration is distinct from native submitter admission and actual human disposition." - ] -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-recording-owner-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-recording-owner-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index e4faf0c..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-recording-owner-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "work_item": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T06", - "comment": "Same NetKingdom source role/trial after actual completedT06 anchor. INTENT Taxonomy and Meta-Orchestration support truthful exact human source acknowledgment recording in explicit version root without default1.1 repoint, package authority inflation or canonicalcase acceptance. Root requesting agent transcribes actual human8e9332c8 disposition; this technical review supplies no founder decision or other owner role.", - "acknowledged_type_sha256": "9e60ff569fb0d860a2bbde7bbb0991a54d4b0688f62b56df0fa5d161fd624578", - "independent_recording_checks": { - "acknowledged_type_sha256": "9e60ff569fb0d860a2bbde7bbb0991a54d4b0688f62b56df0fa5d161fd624578", - "only_type_status_semantic_delta": true, - "full_package_validator_pass": true, - "independent_acknowledged_package_tests_passed": 22, - "closed_schema_checks_pass": true, - "explicit_version_root_loads_exact12": true, - "default11_type_and_case_byte_unchanged": true, - "canonical_case12_proposed_no_acceptance": true, - "ordinary_admission_refused": true, - "full_render_regeneration_identical": true, - "full_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "execution_permitted": false, - "packet_bound_files_mutated": false, - "genuine_native_human_source_accept_confirmed": true, - "human_approval_id": "8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765", - "new_native_action_by_worker": false - }, - "completed_actual_anchor_sha256": "b33f203ff9e6318442b04374a5c6c97518097c2c9cad2bc38f65e3e9050f7820", - "canonical_package_type_path": "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml", - "only_type_semantic_delta": "status proposed to acknowledged", - "packet_bound_type_sources_changed": false, - "default11_type_and_case_changed": false, - "next_owner_gates": "docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md", - "new_native_operation": false -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v2-netkingdom-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v2-netkingdom-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index b4549a1..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v2-netkingdom-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "changes_requested", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-LIFECYCLE-V2", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v2", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "6fc0fe47f99a97c11c6e7538f5ea02054335df7d46055d3f84bed4e194aeaaed", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "9b19909090431194a4e868ba10eeb911fe4dcc5bf006c2f4351beb115ac39750", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "1ada5bd2ac5f8595de3c5b51dfb00e5e6d53ec9354b41983c308aa5ae5648b5a" - }, - "reviewed_runner_sha256": "bb9610babf44a959342bac700bb5712e97f400b44c4d0659d21df4426e616e19", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Taxonomy declaration, Principles 6/7 (minimize exposure and owner responsibility), and SECURITY-COMPANION sections 3/7 require time-bounded task authority and reconstructable owner-held execution. Exact frozen v2 manifest 6fc0fe47f99a97c11c6e7538f5ea02054335df7d46055d3f84bed4e194aeaaed reviewed under completed own work item NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Source agreement withheld for the two reproduced deadline gaps below. No foreign owner role or founder approval is supplied.", - "findings": [ - { - "id": "NK-KEY39-V2-F01", - "severity": "medium", - "location": "openbao-negative-session.py:verify_sources/check_deadline", - "counterexample": "valid_until_epoch=Infinity survives json.loads and verify_sources; check_deadline permits requests even at epoch 10**30.", - "impact": "The approval expiry can be disabled and the same purportedly time-bounded envelope remains reusable indefinitely. Monotonic per-execution reserve does not bound lifetime or replay of the envelope.", - "requested_change": "Require finite, non-boolean numeric approval expiry and observation timestamps before comparisons; reject JSON nonfinite constants or validate the fields explicitly. Preserve separate recovery approval and add refusal tests." - }, - { - "id": "NK-KEY39-V2-F02", - "severity": "medium", - "location": "openbao-negative-session.py:SessionTransport.request", - "counterexample": "Offline response starts before deadline then advances clock beyond expiry during read; request returns status 200 without refusal. urllib timeout is socket inactivity, not a total request/read duration, so a bounded-size slow-trickle response can also exceed maximum_session_seconds.", - "impact": "An in-flight protected exchange/login can remain active beyond approved wall-clock and monotonic session bounds. A byte cap plus an inactivity timeout cannot establish bounded HTTP elapsed duration.", - "requested_change": "Enforce a total monotonic HTTP duration cap across connect, headers and body reads, clipped to remaining protected-action window; retain a finite explicit cleanup/revoke request cap after action expiry. Recheck expiry after protected response completion and add slow-response/late-completion refusals." - } - ], - "independent_coverage": [ - "Exact manifest/executor/test/runner pins independently verified; originals unchanged", - "CAS patch tests require UID and resourceVersion; both dry runs and baseline UID/spec/config pins inspected", - "Six temporary registrations/env refs and separate Secret with no production credential replacement inspected; single replica Recreate causes two intended restarts", - "Captured subprocess stdout/stderr, fixed refusal messages, private stdin, value-free receipts and exclusive receipt creation inspected; synthetic raw error suppression verified", - "Normal cleanup refuses concurrent config/spec drift, restores baseline/readback, proves precise removed-client denial then UID/resourceVersion-precondition delete", - "Hard-interruption recovery requires separate recovery-approved envelope, reconstructs exact registry/spec baseline, refuses partial registrations/env and baseline drift; uncertain creation UID needs independent owner acknowledgement; issued OpenBao sessions require separate reconciliation", - "Fixed token/discovery/login/revoke allowlist, no ambient proxy/redirect, response close and byte bound inspected; unreviewed paths/methods refuse", - "Future/stale role observations now refuse; monotonic probe cleanup reserve inspected; two residual deadline counterexamples reproduced" - ], - "validation": [ - { - "name": "supplied", - "returncode": 0, - "tests": 28 - }, - { - "name": "independent", - "returncode": 0, - "tests": 11 - } - ], - "orientation": { - "emergent_security_version": "0.2.6", - "package_digest": "8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02", - "status": "withheld; reviewed current NetKingdom SECURITY-COMPANION source directly", - "supervision": "custodian-codex record descriptive only; no grant inherited for net-kingdom scope" - }, - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "db_access": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "native_acceptance": false, - "task_closure_KEY39": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "635de289061708ec4c097eb6a0f14b1dc6125fc0dcd5a323363df1ba28ed2fd5" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v3-netkingdom-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v3-netkingdom-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6937be3..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v3-netkingdom-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "changes_requested", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-LIFECYCLE-V3", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v3", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "fbc31fda2b6194747547b9fbe876095914c3d53231c79abd43a010dbb3273efa", - "reviewed_executor_sha256": "1161b3666ebf1f3eb322c7d5112584bce7e074da7e7650c5840e3c5de9311194", - "reviewed_tests_sha256": "75e26a9be4422be539f7e0a4d46c3dd6d8e2eab21d3cb6e4ba03cfe8c7c1b9cd", - "reviewed_runner_sha256": "bb9610babf44a959342bac700bb5712e97f400b44c4d0659d21df4426e616e19", - "previous_review_sha256": "f7293bc3cc896e23840d767bf86bd379f202a665f6a334485081831ad067d262", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Taxonomy declaration and Principles 6/7 require bounded exposure with owner-held execution. Same completed work item NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07 independently reviews frozen v3 manifest fbc31fda2b6194747547b9fbe876095914c3d53231c79abd43a010dbb3273efa. V2 findings are resolved, but the new aggregate cleanup bound bypass below needs correction. This is source judgement only, not founder approval.", - "v2_findings_status": { - "NK-KEY39-V2-F01": "resolved: strict finite nonbool expiry and observation validation, JSON constants refused, expiry limited to maxsession", - "NK-KEY39-V2-F02": "resolved: total SIGALRM request guard clips wall and monotonic deadline; postcompletion recheck; known late accepted session revoked privately; unknown partial response retained" - }, - "findings": [ - { - "id": "NK-KEY39-V3-F01", - "severity": "medium", - "location": "openbao-negative-session.py:delete_temporary", - "counterexample": "With CLEANING=True and CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=time.monotonic()-1, mocked subprocess.run records one Secret DELETE; only subsequent guarded k absence GET raises cleanup_budget_expired.", - "impact": "The final native Secret deletion bypasses the promised nonrenewable aggregate cleanup deadline and its remaining-time cap.", - "requested_change": "Route the exact UID/resourceVersion-precondition raw DeleteOptions request through guarded k or equivalent precheck/remaining-budget/total-timeout/postcheck. Add expired-budget no-call and near-expiry total-duration regressions." - } - ], - "validation": { - "supplied_tests": 39, - "independent_tests": 15, - "all_passed": true, - "counterexamples_reproduced": true - }, - "coverage": [ - "Prior eleven independent checks adapted to v3; v2 counterexamples now rejected", - "Real SIGALRM slow-body interruption and signal/timer restoration", - "Partial accepted login timeout records only unknown-outcome boolean", - "Aggregate cleanup is nonrenewable and guarded k refuses after expiry", - "Direct final delete bypass reproduced independently", - "CAS/source/runtime pins, temporary registration/environment isolation, output suppression, normal cleanup and hard-interruption recovery inspected unchanged" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "native_acceptance": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "aa56b9cd64301f031cedd3cbd703e1698605fe97b0fee7b9ba45343333ff54f5" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v4-netkingdom-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v4-netkingdom-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 6d3ee2d..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v4-netkingdom-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-LIFECYCLE-V4", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v4", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "d079f85c47d5c2635e1ee633ea4d1346b1737ce2be9ca273f22a38e620f418d8", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "b4687c2d07819c43b45d0cddcad0488b62eb49175b2a06a43f7806a0838d3a4d", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "ea2b5f7466c1da016f528093daf168c274238d4803eb5424d7353c66adbecf43" - }, - "reviewed_runner_sha256": "bb9610babf44a959342bac700bb5712e97f400b44c4d0659d21df4426e616e19", - "previous_review_sha256": "06ac6616e75eb7690836fbce94b30ebecd3a674a3b256118d180ed13c90db3b1", - "original_v2_review_sha256": "f7293bc3cc896e23840d767bf86bd379f202a665f6a334485081831ad067d262", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Taxonomy declaration, Principles 6/7 and SECURITY-COMPANION sections 3/7 support this bounded owner-held source preparation. Exact frozen v4 manifest d079f85c47d5c2635e1ee633ea4d1346b1737ce2be9ca273f22a38e620f418d8 reviewed under same completed own work item NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Technical source agreement: all independently reproduced v2/v3 gaps resolve. This owner source judgement supplies neither human approval nor native execution authority/acceptance and does not close KEY39 T02.", - "findings": [], - "prior_findings_status": { - "NK-KEY39-V2-F01": "resolved: finite nonbool approval and role observation values; integer bounded session; nonfinite JSON constants refused", - "NK-KEY39-V2-F02": "resolved: total Linux main-thread SIGALRM bound across connect/headers/body; finite per-request caps clipped to wall and monotonic action deadlines; postcompletion check and bounded late-session revoke", - "NK-KEY39-V3-F01": "resolved: final UID/resourceVersion raw DeleteOptions now uses guarded k; expired aggregate issues no delete and slow delete is clipped to remaining time" - }, - "independent_coverage": [ - "Exact manifest/executor/test/runner pins independently verified; originals unchanged", - "CAS patch tests require UID and resourceVersion; both dry runs and baseline UID/spec/config pins inspected", - "Six temporary registrations/env refs and separate Secret with no production credential replacement inspected; single replica Recreate causes two intended restarts", - "Captured subprocess stdout/stderr, fixed refusal messages, private stdin, value-free receipts and exclusive receipt creation inspected; synthetic raw error suppression verified", - "Normal cleanup refuses concurrent config/spec drift, restores baseline/readback, proves precise removed-client denial then UID/resourceVersion-precondition delete", - "Hard-interruption recovery requires separate recovery-approved envelope, reconstructs exact registry/spec baseline, refuses partial registrations/env and baseline drift; uncertain creation UID needs independent owner acknowledgement; issued OpenBao sessions require separate reconciliation", - "Fixed token/discovery/login/revoke allowlist, no ambient proxy/redirect, response close and byte bound inspected; unreviewed paths/methods refuse", - "Future/stale role observations now refuse; monotonic probe cleanup reserve inspected; two residual deadline counterexamples reproduced", - "Real elapsed slow HTTP interruption and SIGALRM timer/handler restoration", - "Late full accepted OpenBao session revoked privately then result refused; partial accepted response timeout retains value-free unknown-outcome evidence", - "Cleanup aggregate deadline starts once and cannot renew; guarded k refuses after expiry; exact final delete now shares it", - "Real elapsed slow deletion clipped to remaining cleanup budget; approved runtime/source pins and precise Secret deletion identity preserved" - ], - "validation": { - "supplied_lifecycle_tests": 41, - "unchanged_reviewed_runner_tests": 17, - "independent_tests": 17, - "all_passed": true, - "network_used": false, - "kubernetes_used": false - }, - "limitations": [ - "Linux main-thread setitimer required; preexisting timer or worker thread refuses", - "Fixture checks establish source behavior only; no native role/policy, headroom, runtime readiness or successful cleanup observed", - "Owner-held token producer remains unresolved; no credential route authorized", - "Unknown/failed session revocation requires separate owner reconciliation; cleanup alone is not revocation proof", - "Founder exact source/runtime/window approval and each independent owner acknowledgment remain necessary before native execution" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "db_access": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "native_acceptance": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "3650c1eeadd74e150e528766523a284b03d02004749c04e9b6518d42f3e32531" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v5-netkingdom-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v5-netkingdom-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 88eac1d..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-lifecycle-v5-netkingdom-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-LIFECYCLE-V5", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v5", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "d1f997624db46693a7126a6eb6435f6b3a353d5bd67dcc8a539683e4b7147285", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "3bcceebc845b17492040c76223d77088257c547a2b890198e7b5c2b04a0cd360", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "a428a4a5ea60bd6c4ad10481e133227ad696a4a08653bf39b554b47431fb9f8c" - }, - "reviewed_runner_sha256": "bb9610babf44a959342bac700bb5712e97f400b44c4d0659d21df4426e616e19", - "previous_review_sha256": "4f4498203a31bd46dbc3715c0df1cbb9eee63bed5b2c1baf430ff3c4a37c13cb", - "original_v2_review_sha256": "f7293bc3cc896e23840d767bf86bd379f202a665f6a334485081831ad067d262", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Taxonomy declaration, Principles 6/7 and SECURITY-COMPANION sections 3/7 support bounded owner-held source preparation. Exact frozen v5 manifest d1f997624db46693a7126a6eb6435f6b3a353d5bd67dcc8a539683e4b7147285 reviewed under same completed own work item NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Technical source agreement includes bounded exceptional HTTP response cleanup and preserves all earlier failed/revised owner evidence. This owner judgement supplies neither human approval nor native execution authority/acceptance and does not close KEY39 T02.", - "findings": [], - "prior_findings_status": { - "NK-KEY39-V2-F01": "resolved: finite nonbool approval and role observation values; integer bounded session; nonfinite JSON constants refused", - "NK-KEY39-V2-F02": "resolved: total Linux main-thread SIGALRM bound across connect/headers/body; finite per-request caps clipped to wall and monotonic action deadlines; postcompletion check and bounded late-session revoke", - "NK-KEY39-V3-F01": "resolved: final UID/resourceVersion raw DeleteOptions now uses guarded k; expired aggregate issues no delete and slow delete is clipped to remaining time", - "Platform-v4-exceptional-close": "resolved in exact v5: normal close remains within request timer; one exceptional close uses at most 20 ms clipped to positive original remainder and finite nonrenewable cleanup remainder; expired cleanup performs no close; abort failure remains unconfirmed, never successful proof" - }, - "independent_coverage": [ - "Exact manifest/executor/test/runner pins independently verified; originals unchanged", - "CAS patch tests require UID and resourceVersion; both dry runs and baseline UID/spec/config pins inspected", - "Six temporary registrations/env refs and separate Secret with no production credential replacement inspected; single replica Recreate causes two intended restarts", - "Captured subprocess stdout/stderr, fixed refusal messages, private stdin, value-free receipts and exclusive receipt creation inspected; synthetic raw error suppression verified", - "Normal cleanup refuses concurrent config/spec drift, restores baseline/readback, proves precise removed-client denial then UID/resourceVersion-precondition delete", - "Hard-interruption recovery requires separate recovery-approved envelope, reconstructs exact registry/spec baseline, refuses partial registrations/env and baseline drift; uncertain creation UID needs independent owner acknowledgement; issued OpenBao sessions require separate reconciliation", - "Fixed token/discovery/login/revoke allowlist, no ambient proxy/redirect, response close and byte bound inspected; unreviewed paths/methods refuse", - "Future/stale role observations now refuse; monotonic probe cleanup reserve inspected; two residual deadline counterexamples reproduced", - "Real elapsed slow HTTP interruption and SIGALRM timer/handler restoration", - "Late full accepted OpenBao session revoked privately then result refused; partial accepted response timeout retains value-free unknown-outcome evidence", - "Cleanup aggregate deadline starts once and cannot renew; guarded k refuses after expiry; exact final delete now shares it", - "Real elapsed slow deletion clipped to remaining cleanup budget; approved runtime/source pins and precise Secret deletion identity preserved", - "Independent early RuntimeError read plus slow exceptional close; fixed error and no protected text in receipt", - "Independent timed-out body plus slow abort cap; real elapsed timer restores handler and timer", - "Independent normal-close error on known accepted session; private bounded self-revoke then abort failure", - "Independent expired aggregate exceptional-close zero call/no deadline renewal; prior guard suite adapted only for newly added value-free abort receipt booleans" - ], - "validation": { - "supplied_lifecycle_tests": 46, - "unchanged_reviewed_runner_tests": 17, - "independent_tests": 21, - "all_passed": true, - "network_used": false, - "kubernetes_used": false, - "review_test_adaptation": "Earlier receipt-equality assertion expected only unknown-outcome flag; v5 legitimately adds abort booleans. Updated assertion verifies those booleans and value-free shape; no source defect inferred." - }, - "limitations": [ - "Linux main-thread setitimer required; preexisting timer or worker thread refuses", - "Fixture checks establish source behavior only; no native role/policy, headroom, runtime readiness or successful cleanup observed", - "Owner-held token producer remains unresolved; no credential route authorized", - "Unknown/failed session revocation requires separate owner reconciliation; cleanup alone is not revocation proof", - "Founder exact source/runtime/window approval and each independent owner acknowledgment remain necessary before native execution" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "db_access": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "native_acceptance": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "17c1e1a798516509d6ddb4d5c93090910cc6d3dd7b516827abf4fd3031ef80b3", - "platform_previous_review_sha256": "c0f9da4850d7b6ce8a41401bfb7cddc39a60cd7bc8767de89d76b5f93198a2d9" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-private-producer-net-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-private-producer-net-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 752ba6c..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-private-producer-net-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "changes_requested", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-PRIVATE-PRODUCER-CONSUMER", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/private-producer-handoff-v1", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "239aaac8541ba05e8bba5f9ecdc8b555a02fd9d0ad1762fdfc4d4bae7e4ef463", - "reviewed_adapter_sha256": "78108d7ab9573e7b284c0276a7bb01b5dbe61400bdb5856f112b04d879ea9109", - "consumer_lifecycle_v7_manifest_sha256": "90aabec336008d7d51e37c04b5ff96ba8ed6630821cca1a4c333d803367247f7", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Principles 6/7 require bounded exposure and explicit caller/owner responsibility. Completed same-trial NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07 reviews exact Key private-producer manifest 239aaac8541ba05e8bba5f9ecdc8b555a02fd9d0ad1762fdfc4d4bae7e4ef463 only as NetKingdom native consumer. Private bytes must not enter the remote pipe before that exact child acknowledges its source/authority/public-health gate. Changes requested below; no KeyCape formal owner review, authenticated JWT proof, purpose reuse/custody admission, launcher authority or native readiness supplied.", - "findings": [ - { - "id": "NK-PRODUCER-V1-F01", - "severity": "high", - "location": "openbao_negative_private_handoff.py:deliver and decision packet launcher sequence", - "counterexample": "Calling deliver with two fixture files and a pipe succeeds and unlinks files with no child or preflight acknowledgment instantiated. V7 checks health before reading stdin, but a producer can fill/transmit the pipe before that check runs; there is no existing exact-child acknowledgment protocol.", - "requested_change": "Provide a reviewed bounded child-ready handshake binding exact consumer proposal/source/envelope/window/health result and pipe session before reading/consuming caller token files or writing ANY token bytes. No ready or failed/expired/mismatched ready must mean zero private bytes and retained caller files. Update V5-only packet references to exact compatible consumer revision and keep launcher/admission ungranted." - }, - { - "id": "NK-PRODUCER-V1-F02", - "severity": "medium", - "location": "openbao_negative_private_handoff.py:pipe", - "counterexample": "An actual duplicate FD>=3 of stdout when stdout is a pipe passes validation and carries both synthetic tokens; descriptor-number restriction does not establish a distinct private endpoint.", - "requested_change": "Reject aliases of stdin/stdout/stderr using device/inode identity and validate any declared private data/control endpoint identities. Add actual duplicate-stdout/stderr pipe regressions; retain explicit trusted-peer/launcher boundary." - }, - { - "id": "NK-PRODUCER-V1-F03", - "severity": "medium", - "location": "openbao_negative_private_handoff.py:consume and exact-inode cleanup wording", - "counterexample": "Replacing human.json after os.stat passes but before os.unlink deletes the replacement and deliver reports owner_files_consumed=True. The two syscalls are not an atomic inode-conditioned delete.", - "requested_change": "Use a reviewed transactional file-capture/cleanup strategy that preserves unexpected replacements, or explicitly qualify the guarantee as dependent on continuously exclusive same-UID directory custody with no concurrent writers and remove precise-inode/atomic implications. Retain the stat/unlink race regression and conservative cleanup evidence; do not claim secure zeroization." - } - ], - "validation": { - "supplied_tests": 18, - "independent_tests": 5, - "all_passed": true, - "counterexamples_reproduced": true, - "real_partial_pipe_timeout_verified": true, - "source_pins_matched": true - }, - "coverage": [ - "Bounded actual 4096-byte pipe capacity causes real partial delivery timeout; receipt unknown and not confirmed; both caller files consumed before partial write", - "Mode0700/0600, ownership, no symlinks/hardlinks/Git, bounded stable-file read and exact two-file identity checks inspected", - "stdout/stderr numeric rejection is present but pipe aliases defeat intended output boundary", - "Fixed error/boolean receipts; signal restoration and EOF/FD closure inspected", - "Packet explicitly separates owner choices/current registration/MFA/custody/launcher admission and leaves readiness false", - "Decoded JWT payload shape/lifetime checks are not authentication; synthetic unsigned shapes accepted without native acceptance", - "No exact-child ready handshake exists; V7 pre-input health cannot stop producer-side pipe buffering/transport before consumer reads" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_review_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "KeyCape_owner_review": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "native_acceptance": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "8bd81ce921d66c373d5a17c4e2188d7203597d86f8aec2c1318dbdec5a3c1542" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-producer-v3-net-refusal.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-producer-v3-net-refusal.json deleted file mode 100644 index ab3fd5d..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-producer-v3-net-refusal.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom", - "formal_role": "native-consumer source owner only", - "disposition": "changes_requested", - "proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/private-producer-handoff-v3", - "manifest_sha256": "569672ecdb3f1f5b46122183dc3b82e83ff168c07c87db7211ec26bc1ce6184a", - "compatible_consumer_manifest_sha256": "84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14", - "adapter_sha256": "faf63a3e9504dcbb46847a114275f83d508521e095410a47f92f02b86ba82b1b", - "launcher_sha256": "2a54568df541c38d43ca2482f037761770e6df206fb1cb88c1222ed7291f5e98", - "work_record": { - "task": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "status": "done", - "actual_baseline_sha256": "6300d9d47a59a830dd32c4106441771f7227f094f351956502dbff11507b19bb", - "staged_refinement_sha256": "37d7eba09c3aa07d9efd369872f77f24522290a88aeaf149058bb84393da8cf0", - "preserved_v9_anchor_sha256": "90d34dd5520f998c269529c53de4ebb065328d3f6d8ae79cbb215b19344b1cf7", - "anchor_completed_before_formal_review": true - }, - "findings": [ - { - "id": "NET-PRODUCER-V3-F01", - "severity": "high", - "location": "scripts/openbao_negative_private_launcher.py:read_public/main", - "description": "main opens and reads caller contract before entering any total deadline. Actual CLI named FIFO contract stays blocked silently; offline subprocess terminated after 0.254s. Source contract acquisition has no finite bound, and bare open accepts nonregular paths. V2 reproduces too. This does not imply private bytes delivered.", - "required_change": "Bound initial contract acquisition and subsequent preparation with one nonrenewable hard elapsed budget; O_NOFOLLOW/O_NONBLOCK regular bounded stable public files should refuse FIFO/symlink/source races before private file access. Add actual CLI FIFO/stalled-read/oversize checks; preserve frozen V3." - } - ], - "coverage": { - "maker_tests_passed": 33, - "independent_paired_tests_passed": 9, - "actual_cli_fifo_counterexamples": 2, - "exact_pins_matched": 22, - "paired_execution": "Local fake SSH replaces transport only; actual pinned node wrapper and actual child main/source/window/ready/bounded-input run. Health function returns a fixture digest, native execute records only receipt boolean, Kubernetes function raises if invoked. No network or native operations.", - "cases": [ - "valid complete pair", - "wrong nonce zero private loads", - "extra marker key zero private loads", - "health failure zero private loads", - "expired envelope zero transport and private loads", - "changed source pin zero transport and private loads", - "child stdout suppressed; completion unknown", - "stalled marker zero private loads and local teardown", - "actual 4096 capacity partial pipe write; sticky unknown after teardown" - ], - "earlier_refusals_retained": [ - "a1ed14e6b2db1ae77c3fd638fd7e47b5bd50c25eebba418e31aba89bb4b7f88e", - "8353eb8aae11be8ce874887d6a5ca10bf37c6fba73c3f85f0644a7546dd7d33f" - ] - }, - "accepted_source_properties": [ - "Actual child-ready marker precedes private file loads/delivery in owner launcher graph. Marker binds fresh nonce/exact pins/health/window but is not authenticated authority.", - "Adapter enforces kernel identity distinct stdio/control/data pipes and nonresetting clipped delivery timer.", - "V3 propagates unknown private delivery into sticky consumer unknown before early return and local teardown.", - "Exclusive same-UID directory custody explicitly required; non-atomic stat/unlink and remaining copies acknowledged. Unsigned JWT decoded shape does not authenticate issuer." - ], - "native_executed": false, - "credentials_read": false, - "native_or_transport_admitted": false, - "founder_go_granted": false, - "task_closure_inferred": false -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-producer-v4-net-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-producer-v4-net-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index f991b61..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-producer-v4-net-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom", - "formal_role": "native-consumer source owner only", - "disposition": "approved", - "qualification": "Exact paired source agreement only; no transport, private custody, issuer authentication, native authorization or task closure inferred.", - "proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/private-producer-handoff-v4", - "manifest_sha256": "d6f641dc1e4aae7d36658d4199d89af14d2fd7a4bd4e526856eb340234f2d33e", - "compatible_consumer_manifest_sha256": "84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14", - "adapter_sha256": "faf63a3e9504dcbb46847a114275f83d508521e095410a47f92f02b86ba82b1b", - "launcher_sha256": "46e57504b3185cc13f1656901a0ca02cc3887527cb09566e270f57b76099ab9c", - "work_record": { - "task": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "status": "done", - "actual_baseline_sha256": "6300d9d47a59a830dd32c4106441771f7227f094f351956502dbff11507b19bb", - "staged_refinement_sha256": "ea3cd23484aecb9d2b5fe72356f279cd08d323f8cfd53f2af2d070018fae5391", - "preserved_v9_anchor_sha256": "90d34dd5520f998c269529c53de4ebb065328d3f6d8ae79cbb215b19344b1cf7", - "completed_before_formal_review": true - }, - "findings": [], - "corrected_findings": [ - { - "refusal_sha256": "38abf660701194f85934a076a0c01d3047e6bfe790e02ba1b0e4616e356634e6", - "finding": "NET-PRODUCER-V3-F01", - "verification": "Actual CLI FIFO, symlink and oversized public contract now refuse promptly; O_NOFOLLOW/O_NONBLOCK regular single-link stable source reads run under original main preparation deadline. Slow acquisition and default launch validation have hard elapsed bounds; acquisition plus launch cannot renew deadline." - } - ], - "coverage": { - "maker_tests_passed": 40, - "independent_tests_passed": 13, - "paired_handshake_tests_passed": 9, - "preparation_tests_passed": 4, - "exact_pins_matched": 23, - "paired_execution": "Local fake SSH substitutes transport only. Actual pinned node wrapper and actual child main/source/window/ready/bounded-input run; public health returns fixture digest and native execute records private-pair receipt boolean only. Kubernetes function raises if called. Unsigned synthetic tokens only.", - "cases": [ - "actual wrapper/child readiness and complete private delivery", - "wrong nonce zero token-file loads", - "extra marker field zero token-file loads", - "health failure zero token-file loads", - "expired envelope zero transport or private loads", - "local source mismatch zero transport or private loads", - "child output suppressed with consumer outcome unknown", - "stalled marker zero private loads and local teardown", - "actual 4096 capacity partial pipe with sticky unknown after teardown", - "actual CLI FIFO/symlink/oversize refuse before missing private paths", - "default caller slow validation bounded no spawn/private load", - "actual main slow acquisition bounded no spawn/private load", - "actual main acquisition and launch share original deadline" - ] - }, - "preserved_history": [ - "a1ed14e6b2db1ae77c3fd638fd7e47b5bd50c25eebba418e31aba89bb4b7f88e", - "38abf660701194f85934a076a0c01d3047e6bfe790e02ba1b0e4616e356634e6", - "8353eb8aae11be8ce874887d6a5ca10bf37c6fba73c3f85f0644a7546dd7d33f" - ], - "source_scope_conditions": [ - "Trusted owner launcher must launch admitted exact pinned child/wrapper/envelope over separately founder-admitted captured SSH peer/profile. Marker synchronizes readiness and does not authenticate authority or peer.", - "Exclusive same-UID private directory custody and no concurrent writer required. Stat/unlink is non-atomic; copied credentials may remain and no zeroization/remote cleanup is established.", - "Unsigned JWT decoded claims are shape checks only; issuer/client/agent admission remains owner/founder decision.", - "Unknown partial delivery remains sticky after local transport teardown. Native remote cleanup/acceptance requires separate owner evidence." - ], - "native_executed": false, - "credentials_read": false, - "actual_ssh_executed": false, - "native_or_transport_admitted": false, - "founder_go_granted": false, - "task_closure_inferred": false -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-ready-v9-net-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-ready-v9-net-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index c1a369e..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-ready-v9-net-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-READY-PROTOCOL-SOURCE", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v9-ready-input", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "24b7b803e4eb7e6e7c0700a069dad0ec315ee7eb5538a88b9e56147f8fab5cdd", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "01e23f2b4fc77824a161a57acb3a52d19aad846b3b6c0fd3abd81afa1dc2985c", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py": "1c57053be6e8472174e4034fdfbf34b3e1729f5e239b3a9af89d9e59a08d6cb6", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md": "cad3e3dc481d45295cc014e48285e81614911dfb4a10523883f3044f6085f363", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_input.py": "84277edb5bd7858885173dea802b6bdc4f0f0c7785d6e200ee9a98d8553891a1", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-wrapper.py": "76ac013d1a676a0dfa58aea1ce87b0c3e72483ccd21f586a22c5475e9132f6c1", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_ready.py": "8a7a033b1c509ba21397d1d74580c44f24592045b2b9de50fe87638607224277" - }, - "previous_review_sha256": "b2711c8ff72724751f9c10ce199fa3564b7893aa4c0377df0d3d1611d0a97eda", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Principles 6/7 require bounded exposure and explicit owner responsibility. Exact v9 ready child/node-wrapper manifest 84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14 prepared/reviewed under completed same-trial NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Authored owner source agreement for concrete private synchronization and bounded relay. Raw marker or approval JSON is not authenticated authority/peer proof; exact trusted owner launcher/SSH source context and independent KeyCape/Platform reviews are prerequisites. No native, credential, launcher/transport admission or KEY39 closure inferred.", - "findings": [], - "validation": { - "supplied_lifecycle_tests": 46, - "retained_node_route_actual_main_tests": 12, - "retained_private_receive_tests": 7, - "new_ready_wrapper_tests": 9, - "retained_independent_tests": 21, - "unchanged_runner_tests_previously_verified": 17, - "all_passed": true, - "synthetic_offline_only": true, - "ready_protocol_checks": [ - "Distinct local writable pipe, marker exact keys/nonce/executor/envelope/health/window pins and child EOF", - "Actual duplicate stdout pipe alias refusal before marker", - "Wrong nonce/envelope pin produces no ready", - "Actual full pipe write interrupted at original remaining action deadline with signal restoration", - "Actual main health then marker received before first private read; no missing-ack private read", - "Wrapper validates all exact marker fields and typed bounded window; changed/extra fields refuse", - "Incomplete private local ready pipe without EOF interrupted under total bound", - "Wrapper mocked child launch uses local pass_fds and inherited private stdin, no SSH FD forwarding or token copy" - ], - "retained_main_test_adaptation": "Existing input-only sequencing/receive tests stub the new ready emitter; new ready tests exercise actual pipe emission and main ordering separately.", - "native_readiness": false, - "compatible_producer_exact_review_pending": true, - "source_original_baseline": "Current published v8, with original v5 and v6/v7/v8 frozen provenance retained" - }, - "coverage": [ - "Workstation bridge configuration routing metadata and actual -L implementation distinguish node/workstation listener", - "No node Pod DNS assumption; bounded founder foreground node-local gateway Service port-forward proposal and process-specific teardown", - "Public unauth GET only; strict active initialized/unsealed body and digest-only cluster identity evidence", - "Execute initial route refusal before native/Secret access; repeated route loss after dry-runs before first mutation", - "Separate recovery route gate before native/Secret reads; health identity must match exact envelope pin", - "No auth headers, private stdin or Kubernetes in public route-preflight mode; current-process diagnostic does not attest node placement", - "HTTP health shares all existing no-proxy/no-redirect/byte/total-timer/abort guards; slow-health real timer refusal", - "All earlier CAS/deadline/deletion/recovery/known-revoke/unknown-outcome regressions remain", - "Actual main failure tests, not only execute-function mocks: unavailable route and missing health pin prevent stdin.read; recover also consumes no stdin", - "Actual main success ordering verifies health before stdin before execution; original pre-input monotonic window is preserved", - "Source/role/authority revalidation follows private input; expired original monotonic window refuses before runner/native access", - "Actual main binary receive cap 65536 bytes, sized chunk reads and explicit EOF; exact two-token object with per-token UTF-8 byte limits", - "Linux main-thread total receive timer at most 15 seconds clipped to original wall and monotonic remaining budget; no renewal", - "Actual local pipe stalled/no EOF and complete JSON/no EOF regressions; fixed oversized/invalid/late failures before execution", - "Producer-side missing exact-child ready handshake retained as separate explicit native prerequisite; exporter write timeout is not treated as consumer read bound", - "Concrete required local child-ready FD/nonce/approved raw envelope pin before any private stdin read; aliases of all stdio endpoint identities rejected", - "Exact newline marker schema with public source/envelope/health/action-window bindings; hard emission/receive bounds and original action deadline preserved", - "Node-local wrapper constructs its own pipe and pinned Python child, validates ready under one preparation bound, forwards control line only, captures/refuses child output, performs bounded termination/capture-close cleanup", - "No SSH FD forwarding, token stdin read/copy, raw marker authority, raw credential output or warden silent-lane compatibility claimed", - "Independent KeyCape exporter/launcher coordination: newline control framing, no EOF wait on still-open SSHstdout, original producer budget only clips/no reset, no token-file access or delivery before valid exact ready" - ], - "native_prerequisites": [ - "Fresh exact source-reviewed KeyCape launcher/adapter matching ready schema/source/nonce/envelope/health/window, owning admitted captured SSH peer/profile before accepting marker and before any token-file read or write", - "Fresh exact source reviews by Platform and KeyCape", - "Founder exact source/runtime/route/window/cleanup decision", - "Actual same-node route preflight with owner-admitted route and independently confirmed provider identity", - "Exact envelope bao_health_identity_sha256 from current founder preflight; fresh owner role/policy/leeway observation", - "Admitted private human/coding-agent token producer remains separate gap", - "Current headroom/quiet window and actual native negative/revoke/restoration/cleanup acceptance" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "tunnel_opened": false, - "node_reachability_observed": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "f294f1cf152dd797b913f0f31a5b3f7939fa67de9871580b977c74001c40d168", - "retained_correction_history": "V8 receive bounds remain; producer v1 lacks consumer acknowledgment and fails stdio/race claims. Concrete v9 child/wrapper synchronization is a same-trial refinement; compatible KeyCape producer exact source review/admission remains separate. Earlier reviews/stages are unchanged." -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-ready-v9-net-work-record.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-ready-v9-net-work-record.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8045068..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-ready-v9-net-work-record.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "original_path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "original_sha256": "6300d9d47a59a830dd32c4106441771f7227f094f351956502dbff11507b19bb", - "staged_path": "/tmp/keycape-jwt-ready-v9-stage/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "staged_sha256": "90d34dd5520f998c269529c53de4ebb065328d3f6d8ae79cbb215b19344b1cf7", - "same_trial": true -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v6-net-source-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v6-net-source-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index bd7b999..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v6-net-source-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-NODE-ROUTE-SOURCE", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "23a972abc5175e121e594726d2b7f7a28c62109253f58f12623eaf2e5564a035", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v6-node-route", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "11df42c873ee7ab4cf4a42fa2326ada4661703632b07745220e75a61f7c7fadf", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "01e23f2b4fc77824a161a57acb3a52d19aad846b3b6c0fd3abd81afa1dc2985c", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py": "00e370b0c3892e16939b7e34ee070df7fe6183b8037741a33b7a6f2814847a9d", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md": "b1184d349ad8166804253edeb7932b82d1bd30eb5fe46fcc5bbda8f88593eb9d" - }, - "previous_review_sha256": "32a62bd1ca1bd7311965d016d4d6a6e4d9177f3423c63add436d9d309865eacc", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Principles 6/7 require bounded exposure and explicit owner responsibility. Exact node-route successor manifest 23a972abc5175e121e594726d2b7f7a28c62109253f58f12623eaf2e5564a035 prepared and reviewed in NetKingdom under completed same-trial NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Source agreement for public health readiness and bounded founder-held route design; this is authored owner source preparation, not a substitute for fresh independent Platform/KeyCape source acknowledgments or founder native authority. Prior v5 stays unchanged and live route availability is unproved.", - "findings": [], - "validation": { - "supplied_lifecycle": 46, - "new_node_route": 8, - "retained_independent": 21, - "unchanged_runner": 17, - "all_passed": true, - "synthetic_offline_only": true - }, - "coverage": [ - "Workstation bridge configuration routing metadata and actual -L implementation distinguish node/workstation listener", - "No node Pod DNS assumption; bounded founder foreground node-local gateway Service port-forward proposal and process-specific teardown", - "Public unauth GET only; strict active initialized/unsealed body and digest-only cluster identity evidence", - "Execute initial route refusal before native/Secret access; repeated route loss after dry-runs before first mutation", - "Separate recovery route gate before native/Secret reads; health identity must match exact envelope pin", - "No auth headers, private stdin or Kubernetes in public route-preflight mode; current-process diagnostic does not attest node placement", - "HTTP health shares all existing no-proxy/no-redirect/byte/total-timer/abort guards; slow-health real timer refusal", - "All earlier CAS/deadline/deletion/recovery/known-revoke/unknown-outcome regressions remain" - ], - "native_prerequisites": [ - "Fresh exact source reviews by Platform and KeyCape", - "Founder exact source/runtime/route/window/cleanup decision", - "Actual same-node route preflight with owner-admitted route and independently confirmed provider identity", - "Exact envelope bao_health_identity_sha256 from current founder preflight; fresh owner role/policy/leeway observation", - "Admitted private human/coding-agent token producer remains separate gap", - "Current headroom/quiet window and actual native negative/revoke/restoration/cleanup acceptance" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "tunnel_opened": false, - "node_reachability_observed": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "10af5b4bdc5392b7d6b1c941b921171ba52734099a2a20203b7fe2aa604882ec" -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v6-net-work-record.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v6-net-work-record.json deleted file mode 100644 index f709ce7..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v6-net-work-record.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "original_path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "original_sha256": "5a6b046d08a3a2e98b2e1e71520bb2c6e7b0969635dd830a6b4dc6c2f7ab122f", - "staged_path": "/tmp/keycape-jwt-node-route-stage/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "staged_sha256": "3efc3ec5365431ad165955f6cb0af76dedc3469606cd4b1ca0f0de4063bfefda", - "same_trial": true -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v7-net-source-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v7-net-source-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index 1015a46..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v7-net-source-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-NODE-ROUTE-INPUT-SOURCE", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "90aabec336008d7d51e37c04b5ff96ba8ed6630821cca1a4c333d803367247f7", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v7-node-route-input", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "4c90edb541b5ea2ff131c3e674c80197c358c2f81140187028e57de0ac8dbf81", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "01e23f2b4fc77824a161a57acb3a52d19aad846b3b6c0fd3abd81afa1dc2985c", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py": "02a715dcc028d0cacbf3b0ffdf705758438717f064e290b283f8e773540dd2d7", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md": "ff3604380a616dfaa86cd9aaa1f131136ee4fc751397a1ebda3a8d737e3c5346" - }, - "previous_review_sha256": "d011b8945dab70b4d7965baea826b8983993e8b8c04ca72d43f52b7c039e84ce", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Principles 6/7 require bounded exposure and explicit owner responsibility. Exact v7 manifest 90aabec336008d7d51e37c04b5ff96ba8ed6630821cca1a4c333d803367247f7 prepared/reviewed under completed same-trial NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Corrects prior v6 documentation overstatement by gating actual main private-input consumption on source/approval/public-health readiness and preserving the original execution deadline. Authored owner source preparation only; fresh independent KeyCape/Platform exact reviews and founder native authority remain required.", - "findings": [], - "validation": { - "supplied_lifecycle_tests": 46, - "node_route_and_actual_main_tests": 12, - "retained_independent_tests": 21, - "unchanged_runner_tests_previously_verified": 17, - "all_passed": true, - "synthetic_offline_only": true, - "new_main_checks": [ - "failed public health leaves private stdin unread in execute/recover", - "missing approved health pin leaves stdin unread", - "successful public health occurs before stdin.read; execution receives already-started window", - "expired preinput monotonic window refuses before runner/native access and cannot renew" - ], - "pre_freeze_refinements": [ - "Initial test fixture accidentally included absent synthetic runner source pin; corrected fixture to exact local source envelope.", - "New actual preinput budget test caught missing global CLEANING declaration after window initialization refactor; fixed before source freeze. All final suites pass." - ], - "original_checkout_source_pins": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "3bcceebc845b17492040c76223d77088257c547a2b890198e7b5c2b04a0cd360", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "a428a4a5ea60bd6c4ad10481e133227ad696a4a08653bf39b554b47431fb9f8c" - } - }, - "coverage": [ - "Workstation bridge configuration routing metadata and actual -L implementation distinguish node/workstation listener", - "No node Pod DNS assumption; bounded founder foreground node-local gateway Service port-forward proposal and process-specific teardown", - "Public unauth GET only; strict active initialized/unsealed body and digest-only cluster identity evidence", - "Execute initial route refusal before native/Secret access; repeated route loss after dry-runs before first mutation", - "Separate recovery route gate before native/Secret reads; health identity must match exact envelope pin", - "No auth headers, private stdin or Kubernetes in public route-preflight mode; current-process diagnostic does not attest node placement", - "HTTP health shares all existing no-proxy/no-redirect/byte/total-timer/abort guards; slow-health real timer refusal", - "All earlier CAS/deadline/deletion/recovery/known-revoke/unknown-outcome regressions remain", - "Actual main failure tests, not only execute-function mocks: unavailable route and missing health pin prevent stdin.read; recover also consumes no stdin", - "Actual main success ordering verifies health before stdin before execution; original pre-input monotonic window is preserved", - "Source/role/authority revalidation follows private input; expired original monotonic window refuses before runner/native access" - ], - "native_prerequisites": [ - "Fresh exact source reviews by Platform and KeyCape", - "Founder exact source/runtime/route/window/cleanup decision", - "Actual same-node route preflight with owner-admitted route and independently confirmed provider identity", - "Exact envelope bao_health_identity_sha256 from current founder preflight; fresh owner role/policy/leeway observation", - "Admitted private human/coding-agent token producer remains separate gap", - "Current headroom/quiet window and actual native negative/revoke/restoration/cleanup acceptance" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "tunnel_opened": false, - "node_reachability_observed": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "717b8c9c80553be09fbdc8ddc6e8aaf72be830fe7763da227b8695e463bea631", - "retained_correction_history": "V6 and its original reviews remain unchanged; its main had read private stdin before execute health, despite broader documentation. V7 is a same-trial refinement, not a backfilled unchanged success." -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v7-net-work-record.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v7-net-work-record.json deleted file mode 100644 index 40d7753..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v7-net-work-record.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "original_path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "original_sha256": "5a6b046d08a3a2e98b2e1e71520bb2c6e7b0969635dd830a6b4dc6c2f7ab122f", - "staged_path": "/tmp/keycape-jwt-node-route-v7-stage/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "staged_sha256": "71894864101daf3fb9174291a6cccc10307cc0c70367c63fc3443d8caac5d795", - "same_trial": true -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v8-net-source-review.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v8-net-source-review.json deleted file mode 100644 index c9e3b9f..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v8-net-source-review.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex)", - "decision": "approved", - "review_id": "NK-REVIEW-20261011-KEY39-BOUNDED-INPUT-SOURCE", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "reviewed_manifest_sha256": "316fd6005cc4cb7fe14ea69a5fd408aed13e6122afef60afd13d97952b27cf4a", - "reviewed_proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v8-bounded-input", - "reviewed_source_hashes": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "da4e0ab767e0c3bebb48bcf5ab578b50845d9fa7211a6771661a0e1baa4314ab", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "01e23f2b4fc77824a161a57acb3a52d19aad846b3b6c0fd3abd81afa1dc2985c", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py": "9f3d8d4297c5ef68f6c6bf7ca21e981e37d7eceb836a60bc254d33b0f5129047", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md": "a04c94512efec7a524b15a3eec61d86de5a41df872e59a3114093063a11e75a0", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_input.py": "a59c2cd4ec895c1718d52fd12f64666f1be45ae423fde476755b6d77a89280c2" - }, - "previous_review_sha256": "a0c65c6655e3152f209ad83dc69ecba0dcba10e21f723fba4ab3a58501f358ff", - "comment": "NetKingdom INTENT Principles 6/7 require bounded exposure and explicit owner responsibility. Exact v8 manifest 316fd6005cc4cb7fe14ea69a5fd408aed13e6122afef60afd13d97952b27cf4a prepared/reviewed under completed same-trial NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Source agreement for bounded complete private JSON receive within original pre-input approval/business deadlines. Authored owner preparation only; fresh independent KeyCape/Platform exact reviews, producer/child readiness handshake and founder native authority remain necessary. Existing v5 actual source and immutable v6/v7 remain unchanged.", - "findings": [], - "validation": { - "supplied_lifecycle_tests": 46, - "node_route_actual_main_tests": 12, - "new_bounded_private_receive_tests": 7, - "retained_independent_tests": 21, - "unchanged_runner_tests_previously_verified": 17, - "all_passed": true, - "synthetic_offline_only": true, - "bounded_receive_checks": [ - "Actual main real pipe with no data/no EOF interrupted at remaining original approval window", - "Actual main complete JSON but absent EOF still fails under hard elapsed deadline", - "At most 65536 receive bytes in sized chunks; oversized input fixed refusal before execution", - "Empty/incomplete/invalid/excessive-token input fixed refusal", - "Expired window after health performs zero binary reads", - "Late EOF fails before decode/execute under original monotonic window", - "Complete bounded exact JSON plus EOF reaches execution once with already-started window" - ], - "original_checkout_source_pins": { - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py": "3bcceebc845b17492040c76223d77088257c547a2b890198e7b5c2b04a0cd360", - "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py": "a428a4a5ea60bd6c4ad10481e133227ad696a4a08653bf39b554b47431fb9f8c" - }, - "native_readiness": false, - "producer_ready_handshake_missing": true - }, - "coverage": [ - "Workstation bridge configuration routing metadata and actual -L implementation distinguish node/workstation listener", - "No node Pod DNS assumption; bounded founder foreground node-local gateway Service port-forward proposal and process-specific teardown", - "Public unauth GET only; strict active initialized/unsealed body and digest-only cluster identity evidence", - "Execute initial route refusal before native/Secret access; repeated route loss after dry-runs before first mutation", - "Separate recovery route gate before native/Secret reads; health identity must match exact envelope pin", - "No auth headers, private stdin or Kubernetes in public route-preflight mode; current-process diagnostic does not attest node placement", - "HTTP health shares all existing no-proxy/no-redirect/byte/total-timer/abort guards; slow-health real timer refusal", - "All earlier CAS/deadline/deletion/recovery/known-revoke/unknown-outcome regressions remain", - "Actual main failure tests, not only execute-function mocks: unavailable route and missing health pin prevent stdin.read; recover also consumes no stdin", - "Actual main success ordering verifies health before stdin before execution; original pre-input monotonic window is preserved", - "Source/role/authority revalidation follows private input; expired original monotonic window refuses before runner/native access", - "Actual main binary receive cap 65536 bytes, sized chunk reads and explicit EOF; exact two-token object with per-token UTF-8 byte limits", - "Linux main-thread total receive timer at most 15 seconds clipped to original wall and monotonic remaining budget; no renewal", - "Actual local pipe stalled/no EOF and complete JSON/no EOF regressions; fixed oversized/invalid/late failures before execution", - "Producer-side missing exact-child ready handshake retained as separate explicit native prerequisite; exporter write timeout is not treated as consumer read bound" - ], - "native_prerequisites": [ - "Fresh source-reviewed exact-child preflight-ready acknowledgment bound to private pipe/session before producer reads/consumes files or writes ANY token bytes", - "Fresh exact source reviews by Platform and KeyCape", - "Founder exact source/runtime/route/window/cleanup decision", - "Actual same-node route preflight with owner-admitted route and independently confirmed provider identity", - "Exact envelope bao_health_identity_sha256 from current founder preflight; fresh owner role/policy/leeway observation", - "Admitted private human/coding-agent token producer remains separate gap", - "Current headroom/quiet window and actual native negative/revoke/restoration/cleanup acceptance" - ], - "authority_boundary": { - "source_preparation_only": true, - "native_actions": false, - "tunnel_opened": false, - "node_reachability_observed": false, - "owner_checkout_writes": false, - "credential_access": false, - "secret_reads": false, - "foreign_reviews": false, - "founder_approval": false, - "KEY39_task_closure": false - }, - "work_record_anchor_sha256": "76f5ed2ac91c8486f5ac52db55572be53ac9fcc7bcd880d8e6effcae8200db2d", - "retained_correction_history": "V7 correctly gated private consumption on health but had unbounded stdin.read; KeyCape identified that adjacent gap. V8 bounds receive. V6/V7 and their original reviews remain unchanged; these refinements are not backfilled unchanged successes." -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v8-net-work-record.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v8-net-work-record.json deleted file mode 100644 index 64906cf..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-key39-v8-net-work-record.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -{ - "repo": "net-kingdom", - "work_item_id": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07", - "original_path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "original_sha256": "5a6b046d08a3a2e98b2e1e71520bb2c6e7b0969635dd830a6b4dc6c2f7ab122f", - "staged_path": "/tmp/keycape-jwt-node-route-v8-stage/net-kingdom/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md", - "staged_sha256": "6300d9d47a59a830dd32c4106441771f7227f094f351956502dbff11507b19bb", - "same_trial": true -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-handoff-owner-review.md b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-handoff-owner-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 90feefc..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-handoff-owner-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ ---- -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: approved -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T04 -scope: bounded-handoff-reception-and-proposed-source-assembly-only ---- - -# NetKingdom source-owner reception of GH-DEC-2026-025 - -NetKingdom accepts the source-owner handoff for assembly, not whole-revision -adoption. Under INTENT's Taxonomy declaration and Meta-Orchestration principle, -NetKingdom holds canonical source and publication; Gate House supplies doctrine, -InformedDecision records the actual human act, and PolicyNexus retains its own -accepted-source publication route. This is the same established NetKingdom role, -not a review for another owner. Own T04 is completed before this entry; the -applying coordinator must first retain live NET-IN-0004 and the owner work record. - -Reviewed exact handoff SHA256 -1fd8dc06d417c7a0d97920ddc1e51b0fb28113efb8047a8380cd2b9d3ff3289c against the -accepted bounded proposal08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a -and native receipt eb67e6db46acc3d1eb102ae541c60508379c216061a4c694fb4aee35dc845a7b. -The retained native outcome confirms a nonstale version1 person ACCEPT at -2026-10-11T01:46:25Z, approval d90c899b-f25c-4e66-a003-808ee5b1324f and disposition -disp-24e94200-ed93-4a18-900c-3128d26ba212. Its scope is the exact bounded doctrine -proposal; it does not ratify whole v0.9 or authorize native publication/deployment. - -Proposed successor security-layer-model_v0.9.md SHA256 -28331f0ccbbede3a47ca24dfe11a6ce84635419d7ed3feb60e9af9a90d8f66e6 carries the exact -complete §3.4 paragraph block, §4 row, replacement evidence-values paragraph and -per-event paragraph. All four match both handoff and immutable approved proposal; -no partial slicing or inferred normative wording is used. The only changed body -sections are3,4,14,15:3/4 are the approved candidate,14 and15 provenance/adoption -annotations. All other body sections match accepted v0.8 exactly. Frontmatter and -title label v0.9 proposed and omit predecessor acceptance markers; historical -assent/adoption records are explicitly predecessor provenance, not successor assent. - -Accepted v0.8 remains operative and byte-identical at SHA256 -3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b. Its current -companion, serving source and checker pins remain unchanged. No broader model -revision, new layer, permission or source conformance is introduced. Existing -Staff prohibitions and approval-engine/access-engine ownership remain binding. - -The §3.4 deterministic-evidence tension remains unresolved. The informed-decision -Staff/PEP-shaped evidence=yes row identifies obligations, not satisfaction; -presentation remains volume/load-bearing, disposition and stance-application -rare/load-bearing, with class-specific guarantees owed until source-owner proof. -No delivered row, human bind, layer agreement, detector PASS or independent custody -claim proves whole-class emission or honest display. No mandatory-evidence failure -exception is added. Finished INFD-WP-0005/0007 remain historical evidence and are not -reopened solely from stale declarations. Source-owner class-specific reconciliation -remains distinct; INFD-IN-0007 awaits actual accepted standard voice. - -Gate House can distinguish its completed doctrine disposition/handoff from the -pending standard adoption now held in live NET-IN-0004. NetKingdom must obtain -required exact whole-revision disposition/reviews before acceptance annotations, -operative companion/checker repointing and subsequent owner publication. This -review supplies source reception/assembly only and performs none of those steps. -No further bounded text correction is required for this exact proposed assembly. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-handoff-owner-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-handoff-owner-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 36e0980..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-handoff-owner-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -{ - "assembly_checks": { - "handoff_sha256": "1fd8dc06d417c7a0d97920ddc1e51b0fb28113efb8047a8380cd2b9d3ff3289c", - "human_receipt_sha256": "eb67e6db46acc3d1eb102ae541c60508379c216061a4c694fb4aee35dc845a7b", - "proposal_sha256": "08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a", - "successor_sha256": "28331f0ccbbede3a47ca24dfe11a6ce84635419d7ed3feb60e9af9a90d8f66e6", - "accepted_v08_sha256": "3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b", - "exact_candidate_blocks_match_handoff_and_approved_proposal": true, - "accepted_v08_unchanged": true, - "proposed_successor_status": "proposed", - "native_human_acceptance_bounded_only": { - "actor": { - "kind": "person", - "sub": "uid=platform-root,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" - }, - "approval_id": "d90c899b-f25c-4e66-a003-808ee5b1324f", - "at": "2026-10-11T01:46:25Z", - "id": "disp-24e94200-ed93-4a18-900c-3128d26ba212", - "memo_id": "review-2e615985-54c9-40d8-8547-b8fdcb10b1d6", - "memo_version": 1, - "note": null, - "presentation_id": "pres-f44a4a5d-6998-422c-b46e-da7af46906f6", - "reasons": [], - "verb": "accept" - }, - "live_adoption_owner_record": "NET-IN-0004", - "cumulative_adhoc_requires_prior_T03_return": true, - "only_changed_body_sections": [ - 3, - 4, - 14, - 15 - ], - "other_normative_sections_exactly_unchanged": true - }, - "sources": [ - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/AGENTS.md", - "sha256": "065d47b7bdbfe829672a2a6161a7f8cf243237a1210fb61d82f153fa37f22131" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/INTENT.md", - "sha256": "fd2ba8dff9dfd5583ec6d8b0348f273bfe00c59923b5d5d47cd22b1fb4658c54" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md", - "sha256": "06374445ca888549f1bf79527d1345d94918d7a7ec363160d8427d0e7a31d643" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md", - "sha256": "3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/amendments/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-disposition-handoff.md", - "sha256": "1fd8dc06d417c7a0d97920ddc1e51b0fb28113efb8047a8380cd2b9d3ff3289c" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/amendments/informed-decision-staff-evidence-disposition-proposal.md", - "sha256": "08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/evidence/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-human-disposition.json", - "sha256": "eb67e6db46acc3d1eb102ae541c60508379c216061a4c694fb4aee35dc845a7b" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/decisions/decisions.md", - "sha256": "a5e227d462627ed7f25029267f204d0c5af0438c05240f601765b7cbfff82299" - } - ], - "proposed_source": { - "path": "canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.9.md", - "sha256": "28331f0ccbbede3a47ca24dfe11a6ce84635419d7ed3feb60e9af9a90d8f66e6" - } -} diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-source-owner-review.md b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-source-owner-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 41e919a..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-source-owner-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -# NetKingdom source-owner review — Staff presentation evidence disposition - -```yaml -reviewer: net-kingdom-owner (agent net-kingdom, codex) -decision: approved -reviewed_at: "2026-10-11" -work_item: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T01 -proposal: GH-WP-0004-T06-r1 -source_repo: gate-house -source_commit: f5e9365 -source_path: docs/amendments/informed-decision-staff-evidence-disposition-proposal.md -source_sha256: 08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a -governing_canon_sha256: 3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b -comment: >- - NetKingdom INTENT declares Taxonomy, canon ownership/publication and explicit - provider boundaries. This exact proposed disposition honestly carries the - unresolved section3.4 fit while preserving Staff/PEP shape, the sole PDP, - approval ownership and per-class load-bearing obligations. Technical source - compatibility approved under NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T01 for separate founder - doctrine disposition and a proposed successor publication. This review does - not accept any standard, authorize native publication or decide another - owner's implementation conformance. -``` - -## Responsibility and exact compatibility - -NetKingdom publishes security semantics and does not redefine service internals, -act as the PDP or write the founder's disposition. The requested Staff row is -supported by informed-decision/docs/section-4-catalog-row.md's affirmative request; -it is not unasked enrolment. Existing accepted v0.8 §3.4 is genuinely absolute: -non-deterministic Staff may not hold state another layer uses at runtime. -The candidate states the tension instead of silently redefining state as -"authoritative state", marking a fifth layer or scoring it resolved. - -GH012 R1 and GH017 §3 preserve Staff/PEP-shaped rather than Engine or surface -as a layer. GH021's explicit open-item clause permits the model's own voice to -amend §3.4 or state a carried tension, and couples that answer to the requested -catalogue row; this candidate takes the latter path. It does not reopen the -completed §11 hold or make v0.8 acceptance wait on T06. - -The proposed row and evidence source yes put this specific repository inside -catalogue scope and mark an emitter, not its audit custodian. Neither is a -claim of conformance. The replacement values clause keeps yes/no/unassessed, -audit-core no and other rows unassessed, consistent with GH024. Its reporting -requirements distinguish the unresolved Staff fit, the emitter's owed/not-declared -guarantee and a passing declaration/pin detector. None disappears because the -other passes. No whole-estate or whole-repository PASS follows from a layer value. - -Candidate D follows the actual owner event inventory: presentation is load-bearing -volume, disposition and stance-application are load-bearing rare. It retains -positive window/minimum and reconciliation for volume, heartbeat AND reconciliation -for rare, and preserves the duty to return actual verified guarantees. Current -source declaration records owed/not-yet-declarable; this review inspected that -source, not operational drain/cadence. Existing §11's outbox atomicity and explicit -completeness non-claim still apply unchanged; the new row does not supply them. -The guarantee remains owed separately from §3.4's structural tension. - -GH012 R2's three limits remain binding: presentation claims cannot carry/restate/ -summarise/imply authorization or approval verdicts, cannot authorize their own -presented act, and require an independent audit evidence path. Candidate A retains -those boundaries and explicitly references limit3. View_hash and approval binding -remain non-substitutable; this is not a repeal of later GH015's separately conditioned -nesting rule. Neither approval current-state, validity or consumption moves from -approval-engine. The extra presentation evidence does not create a second PDP. - -GH014 commitment-only availability/reconstructability limits and the compromised -surface residual stay visible. A real bind or emitted commitment does not establish -faithful display/completeness; GH024's refused failure-path release is not smuggled -in as a carried tension. No permission to omit load-bearing events or proceed when -mandatory local evidence cannot be made is granted. PolicyNexus publishing the -future accepted doctrine is delivery, not authorization or operational proof. - -## Exact source/paperwork checks - -Accepted v0.8 remains byte-for-byte SHA2563d829856... and the companion v0.3 -points to it. The proposal and unsigned memo packet match SHA25608bc78a29... -Memo sealed=false, approval_id=null and approval_binding_digest=null; none is -an authenticated human disposition. Its review request is bounded to the exact -successor proposal, not ratification of a new model version or deployment. - -All retained source pins match current source except the GateHouse workplan pin. -That pin is the pre-proposal snapshot: git show f5e9365^:workplans/GH-WP-0004-section-11-layer-declarations.md -hashes to the recorded debd0499... value. f5e9365 subsequently appends this proposal -and changes T06 todo to progress; later consistency writes do not alter the -proposal digest. Treat that pin as a historical read snapshot, not a false claim -that current workplan bytes match. The adjacent review sources JSON retains both -historical and current provenance; no refresh of the reviewed proposal is needed. - -Emergent Security orientation0.2.6/start digest8d1d6a9d... was withheld for changed -sources; current local INTENT/canon/companion/doctrine/owner evidence documents -were read directly. Orientation supplies no publication authority. - -## Required follow-through after this technical review - -No textual correction is required for technical compatibility of this r1 proposal. -Founder disposition must name its exact digest. Accepted v0.8 is not overwritten; -any successor proposal/cut keeps history and its own reviewed revision. Publish -only after the actual authority and source-review requirements are met, preserving -all other clauses and the independent Staff-tension/emission report findings. -InformedDecision owns its declaration/runtime guarantees; AuditCore owns custody; -GateHouse owns doctrine disposition; NetKingdom publishes; PolicyNexus serves the -accepted reviewed revision. This review signs for NetKingdom only. - -GH-WP-0004-T06 and INFD-IN-0007 are not marked done by this review. Answering the -intake as carried tension requires the accepted standard's voice actually to say -it; that future answer does not remove the recorded conformance tension or complete -emission work. No native read, login, evidence emission, credential or policy change -was performed. Verification here is exact-byte source/memo/reference comparison; -no implementation test or runtime conformance result is manufactured. diff --git a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-source-owner-review.sources.json b/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-source-owner-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index e52e947..0000000 --- a/docs/reviews/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-source-owner-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -{ - "proposal_sha256": "08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a", - "work_item": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T01", - "references": [ - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/amendments/informed-decision-staff-evidence-disposition-proposal.md", - "sha256": "08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/amendments/informed-decision-staff-evidence-sources.json", - "sha256": "e2d109b1e49b2fbcebe5d4e2b70e61a485020d47bd96c2af868ea7ae7a535323" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/decision-memos/2026-10-11-staff-evidence-tension.memo.json", - "sha256": "65e1c776c97da9cb85d4794faeba2f6dea0ca74b06a2df471950954bd84f1a46" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/decisions/decisions.md", - "sha256": "7c0d582448a9f4f39a438a24300a487259241d32616c2a6da16f8e5c52eb2425" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/INTENT.md", - "sha256": "fd2ba8dff9dfd5583ec6d8b0348f273bfe00c59923b5d5d47cd22b1fb4658c54" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md", - "sha256": "3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md", - "sha256": "06374445ca888549f1bf79527d1345d94918d7a7ec363160d8427d0e7a31d643" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/INTENT.md", - "sha256": "6fb7ef530728e51edfd10e233fd11580fbb9283c5cbc38f6d460c954818031f5" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/docs/section-4-catalog-row.md", - "sha256": "efe98a35ac94e26c4478f67a54abaf22543ad0ab715e69ffd2f66c985b206484" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/docs/evidence-path-design.md", - "sha256": "ec2de83949839e551a4807e85dd5f9c39978bde41ce26454b3d5e260803a27d0" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/informed-decision/layer.yaml", - "sha256": "76c20143944a97852ccde8392330d3bb8084a4921ab15e2cb86f10ad75caaf2d" - } - ], - "historical_workplan_pin": { - "source": "gate-house@f5e9365^:workplans/GH-WP-0004-section-11-layer-declarations.md", - "sha256": "debd049989b27c89bf2a0b19be27f84aa9da6bb167b3e02133c752bdc4a16eac" - }, - "current_workplan_sha256": "c03b6d34e630eaa1064222ec6208f064832f49950e318fb8858a2273bdb63446", - "human_disposition_recorded": false, - "native_publication_performed": false -} diff --git a/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md b/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md index 19f3cd8..1e9dbcc 100644 --- a/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md +++ b/docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md @@ -77,12 +77,9 @@ Use `sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh` when an operator needs to run a SOPS-backed drill, recovery, or lockdown command but the private key is only in the password safe or offline custody packet. -The helper disables shell tracing before handling input and refuses conflicting input modes. -Noninteractive callers must select `--from-stdin` or `--from-file` explicitly. - The helper: -- reads the private age key from one explicit source: hidden prompt, stdin, or a source file; +- reads the private age key from a hidden prompt, stdin, or a source file; - derives the public age recipient with `age-keygen -y`; - refuses to continue unless it matches the expected recipient; - writes a `0600` temporary `SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE`; @@ -133,186 +130,3 @@ make sops-custody-shell Run the required SOPS, recovery, or lockdown commands inside that shell. Exit the shell to shred the temporary key file. - -## Bootstrap implementation correction — 2026-10-12 - -The compatibility `creds-agent-init` command now encrypts using `keys/age.pub`. -It does not generate or discover private keys. Live bootstrap requires the -operator terminal; `--dry-run` is a non-mutating plan. For an encrypted resume, -use the explicit custody helper with the independently held matching key. The -bootstrap validates that temporary key before contacting the cluster. - -The former emergency-bundle export is a non-secret guide. The current encrypted -ops bundle is handed off by location and SHA256, and a fresh operator -acknowledgment is required before plaintext cleanup/completion. Old delivery -flags retain their historical meaning and do not acknowledge a new artifact. -Generation no longer logs value prefixes and creates private files even under a -permissive caller umask. These controls do not enforce agent runtime isolation. - -Recovery verification uses an owner-approved isolated workspace and target. With -the helper's temporary key, decrypt the exact bundle to a private file, verify -its expected contents without printing values, then remove decrypted files and -retain a non-secret receipt. Acknowledgment of a guide is not that verification. -No live root or password was read or rotated during the source correction. -NK-WP-0049 tracks remaining native acceptance and other legacy custody callers. - -## Direct helper correction — 2026-10-12 - -`encrypt-secrets.sh` defaults to the registered `keys/age.pub`. It accepts a public -recipient or public-recipient file and rejects private-key files instead of -loading them to derive metadata. `decrypt-secrets.sh` accepts an explicit key -argument or the custody helper's `NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE`; it no longer -searches HOME. Successful decryption publishes a new private output directory -only after every input decrypts. Failed/empty input removes partial staging; -existing files, directories and dangling symlinks are never replaced. - -The custody helper disables shell tracing, rejects repeated/mixed input modes, -does not echo unknown arguments and clears competing inline/key-command SOPS -authentication before the child starts. HUP/INT/TERM now retain failure status -and EXIT cleanup rather than running cleanup and then continuing. Bash may defer -its trap while a foreground child runs; this is not a process-group supervisor, -SIGKILL cleanup guarantee or a runtime authority boundary. Temporary key cleanup -on command return does not certify that an arbitrary child retained no copies. - -Remaining concrete caller defects stay in NK-WP-0049-T02, including legacy -diagnostics, key export and coordinated rotation. Its current checklist records -repaired callers and outstanding work. Do not treat narrower helper repairs as -closure of the whole custody surface. - -## Make recovery entry points — 2026-10-12 - -`make sops-setup` now validates only `keys/age.pub`. It never copies or generates -a private key; `creds-init` likewise has no permanent HOME key requirement. -Existing permanent files are not deleted or represented as remediated copies. - -`make sops-decrypt FILE=... OUTPUT=...` requires the custody helper's explicit -`NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE`. The owned private regular key file must match -the registered public recipient. Output must be a new file in an owned private -parent outside Git worktrees (including linked-worktree markers and bare repos). -No destination file/symlink is overwritten. Partial tool output is removed on -failure; successful publication is atomic and mode 0600. The operator removes -successful plaintext after the approved operation. This does not promise cleanup -after SIGKILL, hostile same-UID interference or arbitrary child copies. - -For the repository's age custody profile, the wrapper accepts SOPS JSON/YAML, -and rejects non-age recipients, age plugins, key groups, unknown metadata and -duplicate keys before decryption. -Other formats/backends require their own reviewed adapter; they are not silently -sent through a different credential source. YAML input requires PyYAML. - -SOPS runs with an isolated HOME/XDG configuration and a minimal environment, -using an inherited descriptor for the explicit key. This prevents SOPS from -combining it with HOME/SSH keys, inline keys, key commands, proxies or remote key -services. Raw parser/tool diagnostics and plaintext stdout never enter the -terminal transcript. This wrapper assumes trusted installed `age`, `age-keygen` -and `sops` binaries; it is not an OS sandbox or task-authorization grant. - -Use from the operator's approved custody terminal, with a private directory -created outside all repositories (for example using `mktemp -d`): - -```bash -# OUTPUT's parent must exist and be owned/private; select a new filename. -make sops-custody-run COMMAND='make sops-decrypt FILE=secrets/example.yaml OUTPUT=/private/recovery/new-example.yaml' -``` - -The command string carries paths only. Never put a credential in FILE, OUTPUT, -COMMAND, shell history or Make variables. Tests exercise real SOPS 3.13.3 with -disposable keys; no production key or encrypted secret was accessed. The test -binary checksum was checked against the official release checksum; no detached -signature verification or installed-toolchain promotion is claimed. - -Source basis: [SOPS age identity loading](https://github.com/getsops/sops/blob/v3.13.3/age/keysource.go) -loads explicit and ambient identities together, so setting `SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE` -alone is insufficient to exclude ambient credentials. - - -## SOPS writes — 2026-10-13 - -The Make wrappers support the registered single-age JSON/YAML profile: - -- `make sops-encrypt FILE=...` encrypts a private, owned, untracked plaintext - mapping in place using only `keys/age.pub`. It needs no private key. Tracked - plaintext is refused and needs incident review; encryption cannot erase history. -- `make sops-edit FILE=... INPUT=...` replaces content from an owned private - plaintext file in a private directory outside Git. Use private decryption above - to prepare that file, edit it in the approved custody environment, then remove - it after successful replacement. No ambient editor is launched. INPUT must use - the same JSON/YAML format. The original MAC is verified before replacement and - its declared field-encryption policy is preserved. -- `make sops-rotate FILE=...` rotates the data key and re-encrypts values. It does - **not** migrate recipients or apply changes to `.sops.yaml`. A recipient change - needs its own reviewed custody migration, independent recipient admission and - recovery verification. - -Edit and rotate require the explicit matching temporary custody key. Both refuse -extra document recipients, even when the registered key can decrypt the file: -metadata is not authority to rewrap a data key for another recipient. The new -ciphertext is decrypted for verification with plaintext output discarded. -Inputs reject symlinks, hardlinks, nonregular files and unsafe modes; key inputs -also reject symlink ancestors and FIFOs. Parser and tool diagnostics are captured. -Make passes FILE, INPUT, OUTPUT and custody arguments literally, without evaluating -Make functions or interpolating them into shell code before the custody handoff. -The approved COMMAND is still intentionally executed inside that handoff. - -Ciphertext publication uses private staging, a cooperative file lock and a final -source identity/version check followed by atomic rename. The check and rename are -separate operations: this is not protection against hostile concurrent same-UID -writers or ancestor-directory substitution. Directory fsync failure after rename -can report failure after publication; inspect state before retrying. SIGKILL may -leave staging files. Private modes and a temporary key are not credential isolation -or an authorization grant. Current native recovery acceptance remains NK-WP-0049-T03. - -Version-specific behavior was exercised with disposable SOPS 3.13.3 and age keys; -see the [upstream SOPS documentation](https://github.com/getsops/sops/blob/v3.13.3/README.rst). - -## Rotation output boundary (2026-10-12 source repair) - -`creds-rotate.sh` keeps generated values out of stdout/stderr and disables shell -tracing. The selected plaintext secrets directory and service subdirectory must -be owned by the operator with no group/other access; `secrets.env` must be an -owned private regular file with one link and exactly one target assignment. -Symlink paths, missing keys and duplicate target assignments are refused before -cluster work. The helper replaces the file atomically with mode 0600 and never -places the new value in its command arguments. It accepts the generated -alphanumeric credential format. This is file hygiene, not process isolation. - -Approved rotations preserve the new candidate in that private service file. -Transfer it through approved custody, verify real consumer authentication and -old-value refusal, refresh the encrypted recovery handoff, then remove plaintext. -A failed apply can leave a new local candidate while some services still use the -old value. Reconcile that partial state; do not infer completion from file contents. -Service-command diagnostics are suppressed because they can contain values; -use approved metadata-only diagnostics to investigate failures. - -Database rotation stops before local mutation unless exactly one database pod -is discovered. SQL is sent on stdin with SQL-error failure enabled. Unattended -LLDAP admin-password rotation is refused because the server-update step is -manual. The attended path requires acknowledgment of that step before dependent -Secret updates; cancelling retains the local candidate and requires reconciliation. -Break-glass Secret creation reads the private file instead of a plaintext argv -literal and applies server-side without forcing field conflicts. This does not -remove historical client-side annotations or prove native consumer adoption. - -The last-rotated timestamp records successful script steps only. No live rotation -was run for these source tests. CUST-WP-0073-T05 remains founder-deferred. RSA -rotation recovery/rollback, delegated helper argv/annotation handling and -`keycape/create-pi-token.sh` still require source and native acceptance. The -admin-bootstrap source repair below leaves native MFA and legacy-object revocation open. - - -## Current-profile admin bootstrap (2026-10-12 source repair) - -The current KeyCape profile does not consume the old Keycloak trigger-admin -credential. `privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` now creates/verifies only pi-admin -and its explicitly scoped bootstrap policy; it creates no trigger account, token -or Kubernetes Secret. It never deletes existing objects. Owner inventory and -revocation are required for historical credentials, independent of source repair. - -Input is one private generated service-file assignment, parsed without sourcing -shell content. The password is sent through kubectl stdin into a version-scoped -privacyIDEA 3.12.2 adapter. That adapter verifies existing passwords and uses -insert-only writes for absent account/policy rows. It refuses broad/changed -legacy policies and existing installations that require policy migration. -The success receipt proves account/password and scoped-policy state only; MFA, -effective privileges, deployed-image behavior and consumer acceptance remain -attended native gates. See the privacyIDEA README for the exact operation scope. diff --git a/docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md b/docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md index 66016da..cb8ca3f 100644 --- a/docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md +++ b/docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md @@ -1,14 +1,5 @@ # Security Bootstrap Scratch-Rebuild Risk Assessment And Rehearsal Plan -> Lifecycle update, 2026-10-14: the lifecycle tooling descriptions below are a -> historical snapshot, not current execution instructions. Account creation, -> pattern deletion and inferred-claims verification in the old 0019 helpers are -> retired. Their secret handling and success assertions are not accepted evidence -> of current safety or readiness. Use the [current owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) -> and actual native receipts. Ordinary lifecycle delivery has since advanced in -> NK-WP-0025/NK-WP-0038; independent recovery and other IAM callers remain open. - - **Status:** complete (NET-WP-0018-T09) **Date:** 2026-06-03 **Workplan:** NET-WP-0018 Bootstrap Automation And Rebuild Readiness diff --git a/docs/security-bootstrap-retrospective.md b/docs/security-bootstrap-retrospective.md index 4952cb7..6165181 100644 --- a/docs/security-bootstrap-retrospective.md +++ b/docs/security-bootstrap-retrospective.md @@ -1,14 +1,5 @@ # Security Bootstrap Retrospective and Automation Gap Matrix -> Lifecycle update, 2026-10-14: the lifecycle tooling descriptions below are a -> historical snapshot, not current execution instructions. Account creation, -> pattern deletion and inferred-claims verification in the old 0019 helpers are -> retired. Their secret handling and success assertions are not accepted evidence -> of current safety or readiness. Use the [current owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) -> and actual native receipts. Ordinary lifecycle delivery has since advanced in -> NK-WP-0025/NK-WP-0038; independent recovery and other IAM callers remain open. - - **Status:** initial draft (NET-WP-0018-T03) **Date:** 2026-06-03 **Scope:** Captures the first successful NetKingdom bootstrap (through 0015-0017 "Reopen under custody" + 0019 T06-adjacent polish) and automation gaps. Input from T02 runtime architecture doc, prior workplan notes/evidence (0017/0019), console metadata/.local flags, operator experience, assessment, and pragmatic records (progress events, evidence.json, git, console validators). diff --git a/docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md b/docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md index ffacef5..49f308e 100644 --- a/docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md +++ b/docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md @@ -1,14 +1,5 @@ # Security Bootstrap User Lifecycle -> Lifecycle update, 2026-10-14: the lifecycle tooling descriptions below are a -> historical snapshot, not current execution instructions. Account creation, -> pattern deletion and inferred-claims verification in the old 0019 helpers are -> retired. Their secret handling and success assertions are not accepted evidence -> of current safety or readiness. Use the [current owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) -> and actual native receipts. Ordinary lifecycle delivery has since advanced in -> NK-WP-0025/NK-WP-0038; independent recovery and other IAM callers remain open. - - Status: draft UX contract Date: 2026-05-24 diff --git a/docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md b/docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index aecfa33..0000000 --- a/docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -# NetKingdom owner review: closed SecurityCase execution seam — 2026-10-10 - -Disposition: **support design direction with the requirements below**. This is -NetKingdom's architectural owner review; it is not founder approval, another -repository's review, executable type acceptance, materialization or native case -completion. Reviewed proposal SHA256: 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c. - -## Architectural fit - -NetKingdom declares Taxonomy and owns case canon/schema/type composition. -ops-warden owns follow-through routing and caller-proxy orchestration. The -existing type's entry_point/auth/check/action fields are descriptive strings, -not fixed argv contracts. Inferring a shell command from those descriptions -would invent a new execution interface and authority. The proposal correctly -keeps them descriptive and adds a separately validated closed owner adapter -reference, exact source/interface pins, parameter schemas and bounded receipts. -Owner-native execution/undo remains with each provider; consumer OIDC/group -configuration remains railiance-apps, and mint remains railiance-platform. - -Caller proxy must continue to use the caller's declared lane and grant. It -must not become a standing Warden broker, borrow user-engine's provisioner -credential, or merge the KeyCape and OpenBao issuer sessions. The proposal's -receipt-only pending-owner path is useful and does not count as success. Its -uncertain-on-interruption, no replay of success, reconcile-before-retry and -created-object-only rollback are appropriate. Confirmed grant/session -revocation is part of native completion, not an inferred exit-code success. - -## Source-evidenced deadlock and version mismatch - -1. ops-mason/workplans/MASON-WP-0010-security-case-materialization.md T03's - blocking_reason waits for CCR application **plus mint-secret**, and then says - the case is live. Its task acceptance is materialization, not full live - follow-through. The same file says its build writes a bundle and never - contacts OpenBao; bundle preparation is not observed materialization. -2. ops-warden/src/warden/case_plan.py requires case status materialized before - planning (`PLANNABLE_CASE_STATUS`, plan_case); an accepted case is refused. -3. railiance-platform/scripts/keycape_client_secret_generate.py check_case - also requires status materialized before mint (line117 at this revision). - mint is a follow_through step in type1.1, not a structural materialization - template. Thus requiring mint before materialized prevents the mint route - from being entered. The accepted case still has status accepted. -4. The original broker source separately pins `CASE_TYPE = oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0` - and compares exact case.type. Forgejo has already been accepted/re-pinned - to @1.1 on the founder's recorded go. No run can silently pass the @1.1 - case as @1.0 or ignore the check. Platform must review the broker's actual - version binding and owner test it against the exact accepted type/case. - Platform now has a reviewed staged correction at - /tmp/security-stage/railiance-platform/scripts/keycape_client_secret_generate.py - SHA256 9576cd211cfc06526ec4cc9bd0a5b06f0f59287a68931bb2d6e3592a951ddc7d: - exact @1.1 is admitted, @1.0/later types and unmaterialized cases remain - refused. Its owner reports ten fake-backend subprocess tests passed. This - removes the identified source mismatch when applied; it does not establish - installed broker provenance, applied structural receipts or native mint. - -## Required implementation contract - -- Define materialized as accepted and verified structure: exact type/case/render - pins plus the owner's native structural receipt identifying created and - pre-existing objects and current target identity. All applicable structure - must have admission evidence; CCR-0042's unfinished consumer binding is not - waived by separating mint. Empty generated-value custody can exist at this - state; mint/delivery/env/registry/consumer/verification occur afterwards. - A file status label or source bundle cannot stand in for that receipt. -- Lifecycle change from accepted to materialized changes exact case bytes and - therefore case-ref. Authoritative materialization receipt must preserve the - accepted content/record and bind the new exact bytes, rather than carry an - old case-ref into broker generation. Do not mark the type implemented until - a reference case is actually live and verified; keep the established first - acknowledged-type exception explicit. -- Introduce a separately versioned schema for adapter references and run/step - receipts, with closed fields, immutable owner/interface/source references, - machine target/parameter mapping, actor/lane equality and fixed argv (no shell - interpolation). Unknown adapters/params fail closed. Existing descriptive - types remain valid for plan-only output until migrated; absence of execution - descriptors permits no dispatch. Receipt provenance must be authenticated or - explicitly attended manual evidence, with bounded input and secret withholding. -- Classify each actual type migration under canon section6. Preserving existing - auth/trust and adding closed execution references is not itself authority to - change those boundaries. A changed auth path/materialization/trust transition - or loosened validation needs new informed-decision acknowledgment. Retain - existing type1.0 acknowledgment and founder-approved1.1 provenance. -- Reconcile broker CAS0 outcomes via an owner adapter. Already-present metadata - is not proof this case generated the value or its consumer can use it, and - must not be retried into generation or automatically promoted to success. - Map grant creation, write and post-write verification uncertainty explicitly; - no exception may claim failed-before-change without owner evidence. Grant - revocation and attended parent-session revocation are distinct receipts. -- Rollback may remove only changes actually attributed to the exact case, not - every target rendered from templates. Existing group memberships, policies, - shared registrations and custody data survive. Secret rollback is owner-native - and may not extract prior values through Warden. - -The proposal's stated negative tests should accompany the schema and injected -runner implementation: changed pins, unsupported argv/adapter, unaccepted or -unmaterialized case, agent mint refusal, pending-owner, crash after running, -lost result, CAS reconciliation, explicit safe retry, uncertain undo, malicious -output suppression and absent revocation. Add current type1.1 broker compatibility -and materialized-before-mint ordering tests using non-secret fixtures. - -## Precise final-revision re-review - -The final proposal reviewed here is the staged SHA256 named above, which -supersedes the earlier 1035f049... review. The added Local reducer prototype -appendix explicitly says the reducer is pure preparation, not an accepted wire -format, and implements no provenance, durable storage, dispatch or live action. -This boundary is appropriate. Inspected staged case_receipt_state.py: begin -returns running intent; recover marks interrupted dispatch uncertain; success -cannot replay; explicit retry-safe failed-before is the only retry path; -created-object rollback is reversed and interrupted undo becomes uncertain. -Those functions do not enforce materialization, caller authorization, receipt -provenance or persistence themselves. The design decision must therefore not -accept their local outcome enum or dataclass shape as a completed runtime -protocol. pending-owner remains a run-sheet/native gate even though the reducer -has no pending-owner dispatch state. The previously stated schema, owner -adapter and persistence requirements remain implementation prerequisites. -No new auth/session or live authority is introduced by this appendix. - -## Concrete informed-decision act - -Recommended design question: adopt a closed owner-adapter and immutable -receipt contract for SecurityCase follow-through, keeping current case/type -acceptance and caller/session authority intact; require structural materialized -receipt before follow-through and leave missing adapters as pending-owner. -Alternative: continue manual owner execution with honest source/run-sheet -receipts, and do not expose Warden run/rollback dispatch. Reject inferred shell -execution from prose. Acceptance authorizes schema/interface implementation and -local tests only; it grants no live rollout, mint, credential, case status -transition, new issuer identity, type risk-class change or consumer configuration. - -NK-WP-0048-T06 remains wait for this execution seam and actual structural/native -owner receipts. Its historical approvals remain valid within scope. T07 waits -for first live proof; this design review does not satisfy it. diff --git a/docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.sources.json b/docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 543e18d..0000000 --- a/docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -{ - "reviewed_at": "2026-10-10", - "references": { - "proposal": { - "path": "ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md", - "reviewed_source_path": "/tmp/security-stage/ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md", - "sha256": "78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c" - }, - "canon": { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md", - "sha256": "a4fda906d5138d2594a1f8d047c7c28e1cdf96b1eae051f543b9a5e5852bcb5e" - }, - "type": { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml", - "sha256": "f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c" - }, - "case": { - "path": "/home/worsch/net-kingdom/security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml", - "sha256": "bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d" - }, - "mason_workplan": { - "path": "/home/worsch/ops-mason/workplans/MASON-WP-0010-security-case-materialization.md", - "sha256": "115731e0c7cd830dd75375844c1772de40f1bdb011f8ef35f5dd2aa17d3baf5d" - }, - "warden_planner": { - "path": "/home/worsch/ops-warden/src/warden/case_plan.py", - "sha256": "9352ae8683d1181980c4ff38524582e4be448d33c85b558f60582c1e5bb5bbaa" - }, - "broker": { - "path": "/home/worsch/railiance-platform/scripts/keycape_client_secret_generate.py", - "sha256": "f3404c4b0f8144f56346547a86d66f933781840307520865d338925bf77fce0a" - }, - "reducer_prototype": { - "path": "/tmp/security-stage/ops-warden/src/warden/case_receipt_state.py", - "sha256": "a2cda7f187e77bd76d4d209505638de44a587fae0bc033ec75c23ee9ea9f73bc", - "boundary": "staged source only; no installed/native acceptance" - }, - "broker_correction": { - "path": "/tmp/security-stage/railiance-platform/scripts/keycape_client_secret_generate.py", - "sha256": "9576cd211cfc06526ec4cc9bd0a5b06f0f59287a68931bb2d6e3592a951ddc7d", - "boundary": "staged source only; no installed/native acceptance" - }, - "broker_correction_owner_receipt": { - "path": "/tmp/security-stage/railiance-platform/docs/keycape-client-secret-generate-type-pin-review.md", - "sha256": "38c5bdc08243cc26f70f37ab70d1947130923c01d4f48e4dcc90e40d732e13cc", - "boundary": "staged source only; no installed/native acceptance" - } - }, - "supersedes_proposal_review_sha256": "1035f0494115424f5fa3d09b0e2e887acbca4c326194d481f5dbb253f18cec07" -} diff --git a/docs/security-case-type-inventory.md b/docs/security-case-type-inventory.md deleted file mode 100644 index 175822d..0000000 --- a/docs/security-case-type-inventory.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -# SecurityCaseType inventory — NK-WP-0048-T02 - -Read-only survey, 2026-10-08, of the security integrations built so far, grouped -by shape, as candidates for SecurityCaseTypes (canon -`security-case-types_v0.1`, proposed). Sources: railiance-platform -`credential-change-requests/` (37 CCRs) and `docs/credential-lane-designs/` -(22 designs); ops-warden `registry/routing/catalog.yaml` (41 entries); key-cape -`config/service-clients.example.yaml`; net-kingdom -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/*-rollout.py` and `register-*.py`; ops-mason workplans. No -secret values were read. - -## Ranking - -| Rank | Candidate type | Instances today | Manual cost per instance today | Recommendation | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| 1 | **workload-kv-read** | **36 of 37 CCRs** (`request_type: workload-kv-read`) | a full CCR: request, review, founder confirmation items, OpenBao policy and OIDC role, catalog entry, verification | the strongest candidate: the most repeated shape, and it already has a CCR schema with risk, rollback and verification fields | -| 2 | **oidc-browser-relying-party** | informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine portal, vergabe, openbao-admin; Forgejo pending | a new rollout script and test in net-kingdom `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/` per client, plus an attended founder run | first type per NK-WP-0048-T04 (it unblocks the forge closure) | -| 3 | **oidc-service-client** (confidential, `client_credentials`) | codex-railiance-platform, secrets-engine-openbao, -approval, -requester, approval-engine-operator, informed-decision-sitting-requester | a key-cape registration script, plus **two or three workload-kv-read CCRs** per client (verifier custody, client-side reader, attended operator reader; for example CCR-0017/0019, 0018/0020, 0024/0025, 0026/0027, 0033/0034), plus an ops-mason plan (MASON-WP-0009) | compose from types 1 and 2's registration capability, not separately | -| 4 | **forge-read-identity** | CCR-0014 (policy-nexus), CCR-0031 (core-hub repo-manager), lane designs `activity-core-repo-manager-forgejo-read`, `core-hub-forgejo-source-read`; CCR-0006 Forgejo admin token | a workload-kv-read CCR plus a hand-made Forgejo token | **needed in bulk by ORGREF-WP-0002-T06**: ArgoCD, k3s registry pull, CI tokens, reuse-surface and code readers (inventory there: 43 workloads, 10 Applications, about 20 CI repos) | -| 5 | **eso-delivery** (Kubernetes auth to ExternalSecret) | core-hub forgejo source, activity-core backup offsite, Authelia SMTP projection (CCR-0035) | Kubernetes auth role, ClusterSecretStore and ExternalSecret per consumer | a delivery variant of type 1; a parameter, not a separate type | -| 6 | **attended-host-key-delivery** | CCR-0028 (Railiance Clock signing key, mode 0600 on host); node-delivery readers CCR-0036/0037 | attended host write | small; keep as cases of type 1 with a host-delivery parameter unless signing keys need their own rules | -| 7 | **signing-identity** | CCR-0015 (State Hub preflight signing), CCR-0028, factory audit senders (CCR-0021/0022) | custody and audit wiring per sender | review once types 1 and 3 exist | -| 8 | **ssh-certificate** | ops-warden `warden sign` (adm, agt, atm) | already a working pattern | adopt as a type by documenting it; little new build | -| 9 | **operator attended login** | ops-warden `login` and `ceremony` lanes (OpenBao platform admin, scoped operator OIDC) | the contained login envelope | a building block that types reference for attended steps, not a case type | - -## Observations - -- **The CCR is already a SecurityCase in all but name.** Each one carries risk, - rollback, verification, lifecycle and founder-confirmation items. What is - missing is the type behind it: today every CCR is reviewed as if its shape - were new. Formalizing `workload-kv-read` as a type would turn most of the 36 - into light cases. -- **Clients come in compositions.** A confidential service client today needs a - key-cape registration plus two or three KV-read CCRs. A type for it should - compose those, not repeat them. -- **Browser clients are cheap to formalize.** The per-client rollout scripts - already share a pattern (non-exporting Secret merge, inspect, dry-run, apply, - remove, tests); key-cape's playbook capability can generalize it once. -- **Attended steps cluster.** Most manual founder time goes into OpenBao logins - and live key-cape configuration writes. Types should name these steps - explicitly, so that ops-warden can batch them into one attended session per run. - -## Recommendation for NK-WP-0048 - -Keep `oidc-browser-relying-party` as the first type, because it unblocks -KEY-WP-0038 and the forge closure. Make **`workload-kv-read` the second type**, -since it has the largest payoff, then **`forge-read-identity`** as a -parameterization of it for ORGREF-WP-0002-T06, followed by the confidential -service client as a composition. The founder may prefer to swap the first two; -that is a sequencing choice, not a design one. diff --git a/docs/security-layer-v0.8-acceptance.md b/docs/security-layer-v0.8-acceptance.md deleted file mode 100644 index dd28ac0..0000000 --- a/docs/security-layer-v0.8-acceptance.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -# Security-layer v0.8 publication acceptance — 2026-10-11 - -NetKingdom, the publication owner, accepts and publishes the exact finalized -cut adopted by confirmed native human memo `infd-20261010-security-layer-v08`, -version 2, approval `8432d0dc-adc0-42d0-9a5b-6b71ff492e15`, accepted at -2026-10-10T23:23:53Z. The approved proposed source SHA256 is -`103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167`. -The final accepted artifact adds acceptance frontmatter and §14 notice only; -its approved normative provisions are unchanged. Native disposition `disp-43e051e9-b12f-4c34-b26e-40b85a96c2e8` is confirmed, non-stale and accepts -the exact source above. The native disposition receipt remains in `the-custodian/docs/evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/human-acceptance-receipts.json`, rather than being -replaced by a fabricated owner approval. This source acceptance approves no -live workload, credential, privilege, MFA journey or SecurityCase execution. - -## Gates verified - -GH-DEC-2026-019's three closing conditions are evidenced in the current -GateHouse owner record: T09 exact A11 r2/A12 r3 returns dispositioned, T07/T12 -AuditCore findings returned and ruled, and T08 four declarations or dated gaps -supplied. Publication-readiness sources pin each receipt and amendment. The -human memo expressly adopts the bounded A13 completed-rename adaptation. No -prior-revision assent is promoted into blanket review of the final cut. - -NetKingdom flips v0.8 to accepted and README to the governing source. Historical -v0.7 canon is unchanged. Policy-nexus registers v0.8 at -`standards/security-layer-model/v0.8/` with immutable `accepted-1` revision; -the old v0.7 current route gains a superseded notice pointing to v0.8, leaving -its historical immutable revision untouched. The derived working companion -moves to v0.3, with the statute continuing to govern any discrepancy. -Registration/build verification is source publication preparation; serving the -new site is a separate PolicyNexus release, never inferred from a local build. - -## Post-flip owner migration handoff - -GateHouse GH-WP-0004-T10 may record this exact publisher acceptance. T11 remains -open until all eight implementers re-point VALIDATED_AGAINST and converge on the -OpsWarden reference detector, or retain a dated reason. These are executable -checker changes, not declaration-version pins. Preserve old versions in detector -negative fixtures: they prove rejection of pins and must not be mechanically -replaced just because the normative version changed. - -| Owner | Checker implementation | Verification | -| --- | --- | --- | -| kings-guard | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py` | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| user-engine | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py` | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| zone-engine | `tools/check_layer_conformance.py` | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| secrets-engine | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py` | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| maturity-engine | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py` | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| ops-warden | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py` (reference) | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| tenant-engine | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py` | `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` | -| access-engine (historical flex-auth) | `internal/layer/conformance.go`, `tools/check_layer_conformance.go` | `internal/layer/conformance_test.go` | - -Each run must report accepted v0.8 plus its explicit declared scope. Different -source detectors remain owner-specific; convergence means the same declaration -pin/provenance semantics, authoritative INTENT and derived-sidecar disagreement -findings. It does not require replacing meaningful local detectors by a generic -copy. WhitehatSecurity's remaining `conformance_state` declaration removal is -also GH T11 and is not closed by these eight migrations. - -GateHouse retains the separate §3.4 doctrine row question (GH T06) and KingsGuard -§9.5 review nonclaim. This acceptance waives neither. Existing runtime capabilities, -zero-capability gaps and native security acceptance stay in their owner plans. diff --git a/docs/security-layer-v0.8-publication-readiness.md b/docs/security-layer-v0.8-publication-readiness.md deleted file mode 100644 index e2223ab..0000000 --- a/docs/security-layer-v0.8-publication-readiness.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -# Proposed security-layer v0.8 publication readiness — 2026-10-10 - -Derived source-assembly record, not ratification or a technical review in another -owner's voice. Exact proposed cut: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md -SHA256 103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167. v0.7 remains accepted; checkers and publication pointers -are unchanged. Adjacent sources JSON pins every record/return/reference checker. - -## Concrete delta - -A9 supplies the four closed tokens and ASCII-insensitive comparison. A10 supplies -the evidence-source column yes/no/unassessed (only access-engine yes, audit-core -no; other rows unassessed), source marking and per-event-class emission inventories. -A11 r2 makes INTENT frontmatter govern, sidecars derived, disagreement a finding, -and requires stated scope including the permitted single-repository scope. A12 r3 -forbids standard/companion pins, excludes provenance citations and non-declaration -stance/claim/evidence maps, and places version/scope in every run. The quoted -normative paragraphs are taken from exact amendment-set v0.3, SHA256 -9b454b83c9aeed08ba13dba4d812f5ae6b4293ced9e43088d64cc3cc00b1459d. - -GH-DEC-2026-024's A2 correction extends explicit non-completeness statements to -load-bearing guarantees where the guarantee is not itself completeness; it leaves -the existing volume/rare heartbeat-and-reconciliation requirement intact. Its -A10 correction distinguishes no from unassessed; its failure-path release -exception remains refused. No fresh doctrine, observation or actuation capability -is manufactured. §14 and §15 record current assembly and bounded review provenance. - -A13's coordinate note is a factual publication adaptation: the circulated text -said flex-auth was the currently resolving repository and the governed rename -was pending. FLEX-WP-0020 records completed operation a15af186 on September30; -the assembled note preserves the ruled authority and flex-auth runtime names, -identifies the now-resolved access-engine repository coordinate and retains the -migration-owner record as execution authority. The three fresh worker returns -assent only to A11 r2/A12 r3; they do not review this factual A13 adaptation or -ratify the final assembled cut. Its provenance is the migration-owner receipt, -not a new layer or runtime naming ruling. - -## GH-DEC-2026-019 closing-condition evidence - -1. Amendments drafted/circulated/dispositioned: source-complete. GateHouse - GH-WP-0004-T09 is now done in the applied workplan. The three dedicated owner - returns are applied under kings-guard, approval-engine and railiance-master; - their exact SHA256 values match T09's recorded table and the common current - amendment SHA256 above. Existing earlier returns remain correctly scoped - history. No earlier-version approval is carried forward or silence counted - as assent. T09's source disposition is not founder acceptance of this cut. -2. AuditCore §11 review: returned September23, not declined; T07 done. GH024/T12 - disposition resolves both findings and refuses the proposed exception; the - assembly now includes those source corrections. §9.5's KingsGuard review was - wanted but explicitly not a GH019 acceptance condition and is not inferred. -3. Four declarations/dated gaps: T08 done, naming GateHouse, KeyCape, OpsMason and - NetKingdom records. This asks declaration or dated gap, not universal conformance. - -All three GH019 conditions are now source-evidenced complete in applied -owner/GateHouse records, and this exact final proposed cut carries their -amendments. Prepare informed-decision with the cut digest and disposition -receipts. Requested human act: accept the assembled v0.8 publication cut, -including the bounded A13 factual coordinate update, as the new standard under -NetKingdom's publication responsibility. A human answer is not inferred from -technical returns or source application. Until then status remains proposed -and v0.7 governs. - -GH-WP-0004-T11 checker convergence is post-flip: eight named implementers change -VALIDATED_AGAINST and detector copies, or retain a dated reason. It is not a -pre-flip requirement to name proposed v0.8 as normative. Companion alignment and -current publication pointer changes likewise belong to the concrete approved -publication action; they are not performed by this source preparation. - -## Verification - -Unchanged ops-warden reference checker passed, explicitly naming accepted v0.7 -plus GH017/GH020/GH021 and its run scope. Its existing tests passed 28/28 via -PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider -tests/test_layer_conformance.py. This verifies the established declaration/detector -reference, not an estate-wide v0.8 compliance run. Source assembly checks compare -A9/A11r2/A12r3 quotations, the complete GH024/A2 non-claim paragraph byte for -byte, catalogue markings and retained emission bounds; no -source checker was silently repointed, and no native security execution occurred. - -No new live workload, credential, grant or risk exception is involved. The proposed -publication action is reversible through versioned canon/pointer restoration; -owner migrations require separate reviewed commits. Existing build exceptions -remain declared and are not legalized by accepting this standard. diff --git a/docs/security-layer-v0.8-publication-readiness.sources.json b/docs/security-layer-v0.8-publication-readiness.sources.json deleted file mode 100644 index 267f79e..0000000 --- a/docs/security-layer-v0.8-publication-readiness.sources.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -{ - "prepared_at": "2026-10-10", - "final_proposed_cut": { - "path": "canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md", - "sha256": "103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167", - "status": "proposed" - }, - "references": [ - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/amendments/v0.8-section-11-declaration-amendments.md", - "sha256": "9b454b83c9aeed08ba13dba4d812f5ae6b4293ced9e43088d64cc3cc00b1459d", - "boundary": "current source record" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/docs/amendments/v0.8-amendment-set.md", - "sha256": "9ec92497156845397c9ea40a1693d97c870af7495292cb42bc39cb47773fd23b", - "boundary": "current source record" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/decisions/decisions.md", - "sha256": "7c0d582448a9f4f39a438a24300a487259241d32616c2a6da16f8e5c52eb2425", - "boundary": "current source record" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/gate-house/workplans/GH-WP-0004-section-11-layer-declarations.md", - "sha256": "99f344162050e5dc792adbe193999db8fd755685cf0ba873014ab57002ea70ef", - "boundary": "current source record" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/access-engine/workplans/FLEX-WP-0020-repository-identity-migration.md", - "sha256": "7e1c1a3b888e93cdce274dac8d2b3b6149980ff10ad2b6fe2f3f100f05ed586f", - "boundary": "current source record" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/kings-guard/docs/reviews/2026-10-10-a11-r2-a12-r3.md", - "sha256": "eb0bf102653707f5c80f4594df1427ef70f65ed3686abc824418fa19ab9983bb", - "boundary": "applied exact-amendment technical return, disposition recorded by GateHouse T09; no founder acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/approval-engine/docs/reviews/2026-10-10-gate-house-a11-r2-a12-r3-owner-review.md", - "sha256": "978527d58222bd14fb20cbe963eb87cad49dfd4a8b2dfa420ee102b5ffb4d002", - "boundary": "applied exact-amendment technical return, disposition recorded by GateHouse T09; no founder acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/railiance-master/docs/reviews/2026-10-10-gate-house-a11-r2-a12-r3-owner-review.md", - "sha256": "ee3739febdd9346537ff9892dd0bf2f086544a42e3e65275f5342edc8f23ef84", - "boundary": "applied exact-amendment technical return, disposition recorded by GateHouse T09; no founder acceptance" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/ops-warden/scripts/check_layer_conformance.py", - "sha256": "064be430b64072fd1620e6adc19b4e24a1790c9df06144a9670cd262faf66e8a", - "boundary": "unchanged v0.7 plus ruled-amendment reference checker" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/ops-warden/tests/test_layer_conformance.py", - "sha256": "3d39b0a24a65263b2be9f18add2b9c69e12b7926716d610e8200d5c788c1b696", - "boundary": "unchanged v0.7 plus ruled-amendment reference checker" - }, - { - "path": "/home/worsch/ops-warden/wiki/playbooks/netkingdom-layer-declaration.md", - "sha256": "2dbef2235afdc33203fb01582220370051cf6c9eefc7c7d482ff05ebd615fb64", - "boundary": "unchanged v0.7 plus ruled-amendment reference checker" - } - ], - "closing_conditions": { - "GH019_condition1": "applied T09 done with exact fresh returns", - "GH019_condition2": "T07 done, audit review returned; findings dispositioned T12 done/GH024", - "GH019_condition3": "T08 done, required declarations/dated gaps recorded", - "founder_acceptance": "not recorded; cut remains proposed" - } -} diff --git a/docs/service-group-provenance.md b/docs/service-group-provenance.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8d75c90..0000000 --- a/docs/service-group-provenance.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -# Durable service group creation provenance - -This source change narrows the existing authenticated identity-provisioner -`/v1/groups/ensure` and `/v1/groups/revoke` endpoints. It introduces no new -principal, credential, policy decision, or rollback authorization. An endpoint's -service token and a journal receipt do not establish an accepted case, caller -session, owner assent, or permission to use a protected execution lane. - -## Request and receipt migration - -Ensure keeps `groups`, `members`, `idempotency_key` and `correlation_id`. -The original correlation is now part of its immutable binding: the original -idempotency key with a different correlation or group/member request is refused. -The response adds `ensure_idempotency_key`, `ensure_correlation_id`, -`created_groups` (name and exact directory id) and `created_memberships` -(name, directory id and username). The owner journal independently retains the -complete prestate and expected postimage. Response inventories are advisory; -caller-supplied inventories are rejected and never authorize undo. - -Revoke retains the original group/member request, its own `idempotency_key` and -`correlation_id`, and optional boolean `delete_if_empty`. It additionally requires -`ensure_idempotency_key` and `ensure_correlation_id` from the original ensure. -Legacy revoke requests fail before directory access. No old deployment inventory -is imported as proof of creation: pre-upgrade groups and memberships cannot be -rolled back automatically without independent owner reconciliation. - -An ensure replay returns its original receipt and never recreates subsequently -removed state. Reusing its key after rollback is refused. Revoke replays return -its original outcome; changing deletion options after completion is refused. -There are at most 16 groups, 256 requested membership entries, 4096 retained -preexisting members per operation, and 256 journal records by default. Records -have no timeout or automatic eviction. Capacity exhaustion stops new operations. - -## Storage policy and local fixture configuration - -The implemented SQLite backend is for local development and disposable tests. -It is not an admitted production storage design. Accepted -[ADR-0015 section3](adr/ADR-0015-netkingdom-railiance-workload-packaging-and-relational-platform.md) -requires production relational storage through CloudNative PG and `rapp-postgres` -using `database-per-consumer`; it explicitly rejects per-workload SQLite-on-a-PVC -as a production pattern. The rail-kubernetes wave-1 contract also does not supply -a generic persistent-storage contract. This source does not authorize adding a -SQLite PVC to identity-provisioner. - -Production group operations remain unadmitted and must stay disabled until the -existing owner paths admit a CNPG-backed implementation of the same journal -semantics, credentials, storage/backup/restore and writer-isolation contracts, -or an explicit governed exception to ADR-0015 identifies the exact scope, -limits, duration, recovery and risk owner. No such backend, exception or native -assent is supplied here. `railiance-platform` owns shared database/custody -governance; `rapp-postgres` owns the package consumer provisioning surface. -The identity-provisioner runtime package/operating assignment must also be -explicitly settled rather than inferred from User Engine's dependency on it. - -For local/disposable tests only, `GROUP_PROVENANCE_DB` selects an absolute, -non-symlink SQLite path in a private test directory owned by the process UID, -with mode0700 for the directory and mode0600 for the database. The local fixture -explicitly initializes a genuinely new empty store with -`GroupProvenance(absolute_path, initialize=True)`; initialization refuses an -existing file. Ordinary opening never recreates a missing store. The completed -disposable fixture uses private container tmpfs and preserves the file across -separate Python processes; that proves process-restart semantics, not production -durability. `/tmp`, `emptyDir`, tmpfs and an image layer do not satisfy native -retention or recovery duties. - -With no configuration, ordinary directory readiness reports -`service_groups: disabled` and group endpoints refuse work. Missing/untrusted or -unavailable configured local storage prevents startup or returns a fixed -`group_provenance` dependency failure without path/database diagnostics. -`service_groups: available` checks capability only: the implementation does not -infer or enforce production admission, policy exceptions, accepted cases or -writer isolation from a filesystem path. - -The existing reference Deployment remains one `Recreate` replica at UID/GID10001 -with `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`, no provenance volume and an older immutable -image. Image rebuild, native owner review and credential delivery remain separate -acts. Preserve its nonroot/read-only boundaries. Native retention and recovery -must preserve original idempotency bindings, prestate, confirmed creations and -unresolved intents; losing a journal never authorizes replacement initialization -and replay. No arbitrary JSON import, receipt expiry or automatic uncertainty -clearing is introduced. Owner reconciliation needs independent evidence. - -## PostgreSQL source seam (not native admission) - -`PostgresGroupProvenance` implements the same reserve/get/claim-revoke/save/check -journal contract. It is injection-only: the ordinary HTTP server has no -PostgreSQL environment switch and remains without a group store unless the -existing local SQLite configuration is explicitly supplied. `GROUP_POSTGRES_DSN` -or a caller JSON object cannot enable the PostgreSQL path. Production group -operations remain unadmitted and disabled pending the owner callbacks and gates -above; a backend constructor is not an access decision. - -A trusted owner integration must provide an exact `GroupJournalBinding` with -opaque authoritative tenant scope, directory instance, accepted case digest, -source digest, represented principal and journal epoch. There is no guessed -platform-root scope or request-derived tenant fallback. The owner also injects a -renewable private connection-info callback using the existing `rapp-postgres` -consumer/lease contract, and independently durable `JournalContinuity` callbacks. -These callbacks retain/check/advance exact epoch+directory+head+commit digest outside the -PostgreSQL state that might be restored. Neither callback authenticates a caller -or grants a protected side effect. Their native custody, source binding, -revocation and execution bounds still require independent admission. Only the -disposable fixture supplies a test checkpoint implementation here. - -The v1 migration under `identity-provisioner/migrations/` creates tables within -the existing consumer schema; it creates no database/schema/roles, inserts no -epoch and clears no quarantine. Startup does not run migrations or initialize -missing state. The owner must separately admit an epoch/checkpoint after -independent continuity/recovery review; absent or quarantined state refuses. -A restored database with an older head than the independently retained checkpoint -also refuses rather than treating missing later intents as authority to replay. - -PostgreSQL transactions lock the single journal metadata row, commit bounded -receipts/intents and advance the head and exact transition digest with an exactly-one conditional -update. The digest binds the prior marker, canonical body, context, request key -and receipt version; the independent checkpoint must compare/CAS both content -and sequence, never accept a counter-only callback. Divergent restored clones -that commit different transitions at the same counter cannot both be accepted. -Every receipt update also requires its exact context/key/request/version and -increments its version. The active slot spans all contexts in the journal; -it serializes cooperating producer operations, not external LDAP writers. -SQL commit precedes independently durable checkpoint acknowledgment. A lost -commit/acknowledgment, stale version, missing row or continuity mismatch refuses -and poisons that backend object; exception handling cannot automatically rewrite -its journal into success. Known request-binding mismatches remain domain -refusals. Definite before-mutation refusal records can release the active slot -while the original key remains terminal. - -The container source includes a hash-pinned Linux amd64 CPython3.12 psycopg3 -closure selected from User Engine's existing lockfile. No image build or package -installation is part of this source proof; build/publication, artifact scanning -and native runtime/dependency admission remain owner work. SQLite is still -local/disposable only. The separate PostgreSQL fixture proposal uses a cached -pinned PostgreSQL image and a cached pinned User Engine Python image, real SQL, -separate-process reopen, concurrency, stale-CAS and actual pg_dump/pg_restore -behind an independently retained test checkpoint. That fixture needs exact -review before Docker execution and does not prove live CNPG HA, TLS/lease -custody, tenant authority, external writer fencing, production retention or -protected session/evidence integration. - -## Safety and remaining native acceptance - -Before each directory mutation, durable intent is committed. A successful -response and exact readback are required before recording a confirmed creation. -A definite failure before any mutation attempt retains a `refused` record and -releases the active fence; its original key still cannot retry. Transport loss, -readback failure after an attempted mutation or a process exit leaves pending/uncertain state; -it survives reopening and blocks new mutations instead of becoming retry success. -Every database connection rechecks the private path and original device/inode; -missing/replaced storage is refused. Every intent update must affect exactly one -matching journal row before execution can continue. -The journal records mutation intent and confirmed outcomes, not an atomic LDAP -transaction or a complete audit emission guarantee. - -Rollback validates every targeted group id and complete member postimage before -its first destructive operation, and verifies each subsequent change. It removes -only memberships confirmed newly added by that ensure. It deletes only groups -confirmed newly created by that ensure, and only while empty. Preexisting groups, -including empty groups, are never deleted. Existing members are never included -in the removal inventory. Detected shared-member drift or group replacement -refuses the operation before any destructive call and retains uncertainty. - -LLDAP exposes no membership-generation token or conditional mutation/CAS here. -Readback cannot detect a remove/re-add ABA sequence or close a read/write race -with an external writer. Native rollback therefore still requires an owner-proven -writer isolation/fencing contract or a provider-side versioned/CAS operation; -these synthetic fixtures do not prove that boundary. A durable SQLite file is -trusted local owner-held state, not a production storage admission, tamper-evident -remote evidence or an authorization broker. Existing caller authentication is unchanged; case/source/principal binding, -per-attempt protected session revocation, independently admitted evidence callbacks, -native storage/backup recovery and native endpoint acceptance remain outstanding -under NK-WP-0048-T14/T16. This source change alone does not finish those tasks. diff --git a/docs/service-identity-inventory.md b/docs/service-identity-inventory.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9cff280..0000000 --- a/docs/service-identity-inventory.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -# Service identity inventory - -NK-WP-0054-T01. First inventory, 2026-10-24. **Read-only.** It is built from repository -manifests, scripts, ConfigMaps, templates and documents, plus the sibling repository -`railiance-platform` read as files. No Kubernetes Secret, live service or archive was -read, and no credential value appears here. Where the repository cannot establish a -fact, the row says **unknown** and names who must confirm it. - -"Established" means the cited file says it. It does not mean the live estate matches; -live state is T04's job. - -## Classes used - -These are draft-1 classes. Draft-3 of the standard replaces them with the canon's `principal_type` and grants -`MODE @ SCOPE` (standard §2 has the mapping); the declarations in `tools/service-identity/declarations/` use draft-3. - - -| Class | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| human | A person's login | -| break-glass | Final authority, kept offline, not routine | -| bind | A service's directory lookup credential | -| service-admin | An administrative account for one service | -| workload | A service or agent identity obtaining tokens or secrets | -| infrastructure | A database or platform role below the application | - -## People - -| Identity | Class | Established facts | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `platform-root` (king credential) | break-glass | Dedicated final-custody credential, independent of day-to-day accounts; held in an independently held password safe or offline packet. Not for production use (founder, 2026-10-24) | `docs/platform-root-custody.md`, Standard §4 | Established | -| `tegwick` | human | Setup operator, Git/Gitea, tooling; "not the desired long-term platform root of trust" | `docs/platform-root-custody.md` | Established | -| `admin` | human **and** bind **and** directory super-admin | The human platform admin is the same account as LLDAP `uid=admin` (founder, 2026-10-24); see LLDAP | founder statement; LLDAP rows | Established | -| Founder admission key, principal `bernd` | break-glass | SSH signing key for attempt admissions; verifier anchor on the workstation | secrets-engine `docs/founder-admission.md` | Which identity owns it is **unknown**; founder confirms | - -## LLDAP (directory) - -| Identity | Class | Privilege | Credential custody | Consumers | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local` | bind + service-admin + human | Full directory administration, web UI at the IP-restricted admin host | `lldap-secrets` key `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS`; password from KeePassXC or custody for the web UI; present in every identity backup bundle | the human; **Authelia** (LDAP bind); **KeyCape** (LDAP lookups); **privacyIDEA** resolver `lldap-coulomb`; **identity-provisioner** (admin API, as `LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD`) | `authelia/configmap.yaml`, `keycape/bootstrap-config.json` (template), `privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py`, `identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml`, `lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md` | Established from manifests. KeyCape's live bind is in the Secret `keycape-config`, **not read** | -| Other users | human | Seven users existed in the 2026-10-16 backup (count only) | LLDAP database | n/a | restore receipt `actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json` | **Unknown** names; directory owner confirms | -| Groups | policy | Seventeen groups in the same backup (count). Named in the repository: `net-kingdom-admins`, `net-kingdom-users`, `activity-core-operators`, `fluid-telegram-operators` | `lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md`, OpenBao role files | gate Authelia domain rules and OpenBao roles | as cited | Names beyond these **unknown** | - -## Authelia - -| Identity | Class | Privilege | Custody | Consumers | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| LDAP bind as `uid=admin` | bind | Directory super-admin (more than a lookup needs) | `authelia-secrets` `ldap_password` | Authelia | `authelia/configmap.yaml` | Established | -| OIDC client `keycape` | workload | Only registered client; `one_factor`; MFA is done by KeyCape and privacyIDEA | verifier in `authelia-secrets`; plaintext in `keycape-config` | KeyCape | `authelia/configmap.yaml` | Established | -| Notifier credential | workload | SMTP submission as `platform@coulomb.social` | `authelia-smtp` | Authelia | `authelia/configmap.yaml`, NK-WP-0047 | Gated; activation state **unknown** | - -Authelia has no local user store or admin UI in this configuration (LDAP backend only). - -## KeyCape - -| Identity | Class | Privilege | Custody | Consumers | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| LDAP bind as `uid=admin` | bind | Directory super-admin | `keycape-config` | KeyCape | `keycape/bootstrap-config.json` (template) | Template only; live value **unknown** | -| Authelia client `keycape` | workload | Upstream sign-in | `keycape-config` | KeyCape | same | Established | -| privacyIDEA factor-reader token | workload | Reads factor state; exact rights **unknown** | `keycape-factor-read`, delivered by railiance-platform (RPF-WP-0040); OpenBao policy `keycape-factor-renewer` | KeyCape | `keycape/deployment.yaml`, `openbao/policies/` | Rights **unknown**; railiance-platform and key-cape confirm | -| Confidential clients with secrets in the backup profile: `secrets-engine-openbao`, `secrets-engine-approval`, `secrets-engine-requester`, `approval-engine-operator`, `informed-decision-sitting-requester`, `rapp-qonto` | workload | Per client scopes and audiences | one Kubernetes Secret each | their consuming services | `identity-backup-profile.json`, `keycape/deployment.yaml` | Names established; scopes **unknown** except `secrets-engine-openbao` | -| Template clients: `demo-app`, `user-engine-portal`, `netkingdom-bootstrap-console`, `openbao-admin`, `rapp-qonto-client` | workload | Unknown | registry in `keycape-config` | various | `keycape/bootstrap-config.json` | Production registry **not read**; key-cape confirms which exist | - -## privacyIDEA - -| Identity | Class | Privilege | Custody | Consumers | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `pi-admin` | service-admin | Local administrator; policy `pi-admin-all-rights` restricted to `adminuser=pi-admin` | founder's personal password safe (founder, 2026-10-24) | the founder, for token repair | `privacyidea/README.md`, `bootstrap-admin.py` | Established. MFA enrolment for `pi-admin` is **unknown** (README requires attended acceptance) | -| `trigger-admin` (legacy) | service-admin | Legacy Keycloak-era account, policy and Secret | Kubernetes Secret | none known | `privacyidea/README.md` | Not deleted; consumers uninventoried; revocation is NK-WP-0049-T22 | -| Resolver `lldap-coulomb` bind as `uid=admin` | bind | Directory super-admin | resolver config in the database, encrypted with the enckey | privacyIDEA | `privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py` | Established | -| Database role `privacyidea` | infrastructure | Owner of `privacyidea_db` | `net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app` | privacyIDEA | `postgresql/cluster.yaml` | Established | -| End-user tokens | human factor | Five tokens in the 2026-10-16 backup (count) | database, encrypted | KeyCape MFA check | restore receipt | `admin@coulomb` token added 2026-10-24, not yet in any backup | - -## identity-provisioner, user-engine, tenant-engine - -| Identity | Class | Privilege | Custody | Consumers | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| LLDAP admin password as `LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | bind + service-admin | Full admin API, used to create users and groups | `lldap-secrets` | identity-provisioner | `identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml` | Established | -| `identity-provisioner-token` | workload | Service token; only user-engine pods may reach the provisioner | Kubernetes Secret | user-engine | same | Established | -| user-engine ServiceAccount and database role `user-engine-pg-app` | workload, infrastructure | Token automount off; database owner | Secrets | user-engine | `user-engine/runtime.yaml`, `backup.yaml` | Established | -| tenant-engine | workload | Owner pointers only in this repository | n/a | n/a | `tenant-engine/runtime.yaml` | Owner repository holds it; **unknown** here | - -## OpenBao (owner: railiance-platform; read as files) - -| Identity or role | Class | Privilege | Source | Status | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| OIDC role `netkingdom-platform-admin` | human | Group `net-kingdom-admins` receives policies `platform-admin` and `operator-custody`, one-hour token | `openbao/auth/netkingdom-platform-admin-role.json` | Established. The role file binds on the group only; it has no `aal2` claim bound | -| OIDC role for credential-broker | human | Group `net-kingdom-admins` **and** `aal2` receive the credential-broker policy | `credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-oidc-role.json` | Established | -| OIDC role for the fluid-telegram operators | human | Group `fluid-telegram-operators` and `aal2` | `fluid-telegram-hall-of-helix-oidc-role.json` | Established | -| JWT role `secrets-engine-openbao` | workload | Subject `service:secrets-engine`, scope `openbao:login`, policy `secrets-engine-login-self`, five-minute token | `secrets-engine-jwt-role.json` | Established | -| JWT role and AppRole for the coding agent | agent (filed as workload in the first draft) | Subject `service:codex:railiance-platform`; policies `agent-high-risk-boundary`, `workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime`; fifteen minutes | `coding-agent-jwt-role.json`, `coding-agent-approle.json` | Established | -| ESO roles, backup publisher and retention policies | workload | One policy per delivery, for example `net-kingdom-backup-publisher-eso` and `net-kingdom-backup-retention-eso` | `openbao/policies/` | Established as files; live roles **unknown** | -| Root grant, unseal shares | break-glass | Final authority | `tools/custody-record`, custody docs | Holders **unknown**; see the crisis custody list | - -## Other consumers - -flex-auth (six consumers enforcing caller authentication, per `SCOPE.md`), the secrets-engine -runtime and the platform `rapp-*` packages hold their own identities in their own -repositories. They are **unknown** here and each owner must supply a declaration (T03). - -## Observations that change the plan - -1. **One credential, five consumers.** The `admin` password is used by the human, Authelia, - KeyCape, the privacyIDEA resolver and the identity-provisioner. The bind split in T05 - therefore needs four service accounts, not two: `svc-authelia`, `svc-keycape` and - `svc-privacyidea` as read-only lookups, and a provisioner account that can create users and - groups but is not the directory super-admin. -2. **The provisioner is the hard case.** It uses the admin API, so a read-only group is not - enough. What the narrowest working privilege is must be tested against the pinned LLDAP - image before T05. -3. **Three bind consumers need only read access** but hold super-admin today. -4. **`trigger-admin` is an uninventoried legacy admin.** It is outside this inventory until its - consumers are established (NK-WP-0049-T22). -5. **OpenBao `platform-admin` binds on a group claim alone** in the repository file, while the - credential-broker and fluid-telegram roles also require `aal2`. MFA is enforced earlier by - KeyCape (`requireForAll: true`), so this may be intended, but the policy should say whether - OpenBao must assert the assurance level itself. This is a question for T02, not a finding of a defect. -6. **The coding agent presents as a service.** The OpenBao role for the coding agent binds `principal_type: - service`, while IAM Profile v0.3 requires agent tokens to carry `principal_type: agent` and to name the - agent's mode. This is finding F-1 in the standard (§8). The role's fifteen-minute token and its boundary - policy already fit the intent of SI-14. -7. **The backup contains the admin password** (the `lldap-secrets` Secret). That is by design - for recovery, and it is another reason the human and service uses must be separated. - -## What must be confirmed - -| Unknown | Who confirms | -| --- | --- | -| Names of the seven users and seventeen groups; which are in `net-kingdom-admins` | LLDAP and User Engine owners | -| Live KeyCape registry, live LDAP bind, factor-reader rights | key-cape and railiance-platform | -| Scopes of the confidential clients other than `secrets-engine-openbao` | key-cape | -| Whether `trigger-admin` still exists and who uses it | founder (NK-WP-0049-T22) | -| Live OpenBao roles versus these files | railiance-platform | -| flex-auth and `rapp-*` identities | their owners | -| MFA state of `pi-admin` | founder | diff --git a/docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md b/docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5716e18..0000000 --- a/docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,104 +0,0 @@ -# Sign-in diagnosis contract - -Status: accepted contract for NK-WP-0051. This document is the only copy of -the field list; other repositories link here instead of restating it. - -## Why - -MASON-WP-0011 took a day because three facts about one login were split -across the account site, Authelia, and OpenBao. OpenBao said only -`claim "groups" does not match any associated bound claim values`. Every -surface below shows the same three facts, named the same way, for **this -authorization request and no earlier one**. - -## Fields - -| Field | Meaning | Source | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `uid` | The uid KeyCape resolved for this request | Authelia `preferred_username` (fallback `sub`), as KeyCape's Authelia adapter resolves it | -| `groups` | Directory group display names, sorted | That uid's LLDAP `memberOf`, reduced to display names | -| `assurance` | `aal2` if this request verified a one-time code, else `aal1` | KeyCape: a one-time code verified within this request. Not `MFAVerified` alone, which is also true when a reused `aal2` session satisfies the request | -| `client_id` | The relying party the login returns to | The authorization request | -| `openbao_error` | OpenBao's error text, verbatim | ops-mason receipt only | - -`assurance` is per request. A reused session that was `aal2` earlier is -`aal1` here unless this request asked for and verified the one-time code. -Enrolling a factor is not `aal2`. - -Authelia's own `authentication_level` is not `assurance`. KeyCape checks the -one-time code through privacyIDEA, so Authelia reports level 1 even for an -`aal2` sign-in. Surfaces take `assurance` from KeyCape (the request or the -token it issued), never from Authelia's `/api/state`. - -## Never shown or logged - -Tokens (ID, access, refresh, OpenBao), authorization codes, email -addresses, one-time passwords or seeds, passwords, session cookies, and raw -`memberOf` DNs. Group display names and the uid are the diagnosis; they are -not secret. - -## Where each field appears - -| Surface | Fields | Owner | Task | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| KeyCape page before the redirect to the application. Opt-in per client (registration flag, default off), enabled first for the OpenBao client. One action: continue, plus how to sign in as someone else | `uid`, `groups`, `assurance`, `client_id` | key-cape | NK-WP-0051-T02 | -| The existing KeyCape auth log line | `client_id`, `uid`, `assurance` | key-cape | NK-WP-0051-T02 | -| Account site `users.coulomb.social`: account-site uid and current Authelia uid on two separate lines. Authelia's cookie domain stays `coulomb.social` | `uid` (twice, labelled by session), `assurance` of the account-site session | user-engine | NK-WP-0051-T03 | -| `lldap_admin.py groups --user ` (read-only preview) | `uid`, `groups` | net-kingdom | NK-WP-0051-T04 | -| ops-mason verifier receipt for an attended `bao login` | `uid`, `openbao_error` (and `assurance` when known) | ops-mason | NK-WP-0051-T06 | - -Matching `groups` to an OpenBao role stays a metadata read in ops-mason. - -## Negative-login fixture - -Fixture uid: `tegwick` (selected by the founder on 2026-10-15). -Founder confirmed existing MFA enrollment and directory membership of -`railiance-admins` only. The attended diagnosis independently of the directory -preview showed that same group list and `aal2` before OpenBao refused the -workload login. This replaces the original -proposed fixture `signin-probe-negative`. - -- not a member of `reuse-surface-hub-writers` -- not a platform admin (`net-kingdom-admins`) -- holds a one-time password (existing MFA confirmed by the founder for - NK-WP-0051-T05; factor management at `https://pink-account.coulomb.social/`, - realm `coulomb`) - -The user is never created or described with credentials in git. A -successful diagnosis of this fixture shows `uid=tegwick`, -groups without `reuse-surface-hub-writers`, `assurance=aal2`, and then the -OpenBao groups refusal. - -## Evidence - -| Item | Value | -| --- | --- | -| key-cape page and log line | live 2026-10-15: `forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010` (source `8c6c071`, includes `af3b1b0`). `signInDiagnosis: true` set on live `openbao-admin` 2026-10-15 (`sso/keycape-config` rv 71655453 → 75372162, byte-preserving, issuer restarted). Accepted 2026-10-15: founder `bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=platform-admin` showed the page and completed | -| user-engine two-session lines | live 2026-10-15: `forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/user-engine@sha256:1e6547c40c93c49f01438edcf76c20f561ccebc110220bae020723505aa56c70` (source `7f1db71`, pinned in rapp-user-engine `a42c68f`). Also shows the account-site session `assurance`. Founder accepted: `platform-root · aal2` and Authelia `platform-root` | -| ops-mason receipt, fresh-browser login, `capabilities-self` proof | ops-mason `fca5591` (MASON-WP-0012); both attended proofs passed 2026-10-15, member token revoked. [Receipts](evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/acceptance.json) | -| `sys/capabilities-self` grant and UI workload-role select | railiance-platform `0f0282a` (RPF-WP-0057); CCR-2026-0045 approved by founder for both requested roles and applied through contained admin session (exit 0). Overlay deployed and `make openbao-verify-login-overlay` passed. Separate UI button clickthrough remains RPF-WP-0057-T04 | - -## Attended acceptance — 2026-10-15 - -Both native verifier receipts passed. The founder observed the diagnosis -before continuing each login and confirmed the resulting OpenBao response: - -| Login | Diagnosis | OpenBao result | -| --- | --- | --- | -| Admin apply | `platform-root`, includes `net-kingdom-admins`, `aal2` | Accepted; CCR-2026-0045 applied; contained session exited 0 | -| Member proof | `bernd.worsch-3`, includes `reuse-surface-hub-writers`, `aal2` | Accepted; exact workload policy, intended reads, parent/sibling denials, token revoked | -| Negative proof | `tegwick`, `railiance-admins` only, `aal2` | Refused: `claim "groups" does not match any associated bound claim values` | - -[Acceptance record and receipt digests](evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/acceptance.json), -[member receipt](evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-member.txt), -[negative receipt](evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/reuse-surface-hub-writer-non-member.txt). -The receipts contain no token or KV value; callback codes are redacted. -The negative receipt names `tegwick` and preserves OpenBao's refusal text. -The uid and assurance receipt inputs are corroborated by the founder's -observations for those exact requests; CLI arguments alone are not evidence. - -The approved login overlay is deployed and its HTTP verification passes. -Direct browser exercise of its role-selection controls remains in the existing -owner task RPF-WP-0057-T04; native attended OIDC logins exercised both roles. -NK-WP-0051's attended diagnosis/refusal goal is met. No group memberships, -admin entity policies or survey grant were changed; no KV values were read. diff --git a/docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md b/docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md index 6d29758..00ca72e 100644 --- a/docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md +++ b/docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ See also: - docs/NetkingdomRuntimeArchitecture.md (T02 – what exists) - docs/security-bootstrap-retrospective.md (T03 – what was bumpy, now automated, gaps) - tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py + make security-bootstrap-* (control surface, evidence, validators) -- [Current lifecycle owner routes](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md); the 0019 scripts are retired. +- sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh + related (0019 polish) - .local/security-bootstrap.json + console status (current gates) **Pragmatic note (per 0018 Coordination):** Track your progress through this guide using State Hub /progress/ (with workstream/task), dated notes in NET-WP-0018 workplan, git, console evidence/validators, /tmp evidence. This feeds future retrospectives. @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ From platform architecture and UX contracts: - **UI posture (console/web):** Calm field notebook; black/white + hi accents; panels; sentence case; no hype. Shows effective access before any save/action. Blocked conditions explicit (e.g., no platform-root for non-king, MFA required for privileged). - **Evidence discipline:** All steps produce/require non-secret evidence.json or metadata flags matching exact templates/validators (no secret markers). 12+ bools for user lifecycle (effective preview, no root grant, actor checks, verified identity/claims, reversible, no secrets recorded, etc.). - **Actor classes & previews:** Always distinguish (setup operator, platform admin, tenant admin, reviewer, king). Show effective privileges before create/save. Never grant platform-root except via explicit king path. -- **Secret boundary:** Console/UI never collects/stores secrets. Use password-safe, k8s secrets, or operator memory. Use the existing governed credential-delivery path; legacy automatic admin-secret extraction is withdrawn. +- **Secret boundary:** Console/UI never collects/stores secrets. Use password-safe, k8s secrets, or operator memory. Prefer k8s fallback for dry-runs (see 0019). - **Reversible where possible; human custody gates explicit.** - **Handoff to production readiness:** After S6, move to 0017 production items (audit durability, etc. – not duplicated here). @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ From platform architecture and UX contracts: 5. KeyCape deployment + client registration + OIDC. 6. OpenBao init/unseal/config (OIDC admin binding via KeyCape). 7. Token cleanup, root disposition, restore drill, escrow/custody. -8. User lifecycle (onboard/lock/offboard/review through the current User Engine and IAM owner contracts). +8. User lifecycle (onboard/lock/offboard/review – use 0019 dry-run for tests). 9. State Hub sync, audit posture, cleanup/rotation. 10. Platform reopen (S6) + handoff. @@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ Each step has: commands/scripts, evidence required, blocked conditions, links to ## Step 2: PrivacyIDEA Bootstrap + Realm -- Repair missing realm/resolver configuration; preserve current owner-managed self-service/MFA policies. -- Use `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh` or console action "Repair privacyIDEA realm and resolver". See the [configuration-preserving contract](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md#configuration-preserving-realm-repair); missing onboarding policies use their existing owner procedure. +- Deploy/repair realm, LLDAP resolver, self-service policies. +- Use repair script (sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh) or console runbook "privacyIDEA realm repair". - Enroll platform-root TOTP in repaired realm (pi-admin for setup). - Evidence: related to t02 validate (realm healthy). - Validate: `make security-bootstrap-validate-t02` (covers audit/recovery gates incl. this). @@ -77,18 +77,18 @@ See T03 retrospective for past realm drift bumps (now partially automated via ru ## Step 3: LLDAP / Bootstrap User Creation (platform-root / king) -- Establish or recover platform-root only through the exact owner-reviewed IAM bootstrap/recovery ceremony; ordinary public registration cannot grant platform-root. -- The legacy account-creation and break-glass scripts are retired; see [recovery limits](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md). Preserve existing account/password custody pending owner verification. +- Create platform-root user in LLDAP (via create-user.sh or LLDAP admin UI at lldap.coulomb.social). +- Command example (with KUBECTL fallback): `cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap && ./create-user.sh platform-root ...` (no --admin for non-root tests; use --admin only for platform admins via king path). - Self-enroll TOTP in privacyIDEA. -- Verify MFA state: `bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh platform-root --token-file /absolute/private/diagnostic.jwt` after owner-admitted protected input. See the [diagnostic contract](../sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md#scoped-factor-state-diagnostic); the KeyCape workload credential is not a general diagnostic delivery lane. Counts do not verify user existence or an MFA login. +- Verify MFA state: `cd ../privacyidea && ./check-user-mfa-state.sh platform-root`. - Verify OIDC/KeyCape path: `cd ../keycape && ./verify-openbao-client.sh`. - Groups: net-kingdom-admins for platform-root. - Evidence: identity_account_created, identity_group_confirmed, mfa_*, oidc_login_verified. -- For non-root trials: follow Step 7 with exact owner scope and actual consumer evidence. +- For non-root tests: use 0019 dry-run (see Step 8). **Blocked if:** Actor requests net-kingdom-admins without king path; no MFA for privileged. -**Console:** `lifecycle-guide` for current owner routes. Legacy execution and inferred-claims commands exit with failure. +**Console:** `lifecycle-guide` for full flow; `onboarding-dry-run*` for tests. ## Step 4: KeyCape Deployment + Client Registration + OIDC @@ -160,24 +160,34 @@ See T02 for secret/credential path details; T03 for past claim shape / token iss See T03 for operator-state / token bumps (now in metadata + validators). -## Step 7: User lifecycle through its owners +## Step 7: User Lifecycle (Onboard / Lock / Offboard / Review) – Use 0019 Polish -Follow [the current lifecycle routes and retirement notice](legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md). -User Engine owns ordinary onboarding, account lifecycle and product memberships; -the existing identity-provisioner and IAM provider own identity and password setup. -Use only admitted clients/tenants. Platform-root bootstrap has a separate owner -ceremony and cannot be performed through public registration. +This implements the first practical flow per docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md (UX contract) + T02/ T03. -Preview the intended scope, obtain the existing authorization, and retain actual -identity/claims/access, denial and exact cleanup receipts. A group list cannot -verify issued claims or prove all sessions revoked. Never delete test accounts -by a name pattern. Preserve other tenants and global identity state. +**Always:** +- Preview effective access (actor_class, scope, groups, MFA, OpenBao policy, no root for non-king). +- Record non-secret evidence/audit (State Hub /progress/, console evidence, k8s audit). +- MFA required for privileged. +- Reversible where possible. -`lifecycle-flow-template` and `onboarding-dry-run-template` are blank evidence -worksheets. Their validators check structure; passing is not native acceptance. -The old Make/console execution commands and “User lifecycle dry-run (T06)” runbook -are retired. Group administration and independent recovery remain open in -NK-WP-0049; do not infer readiness from the earlier 0019 receipts. +**Detailed (from console lifecycle-guide + 0019):** +- Onboard scoped non-root: use `make security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run SUBJECT=... EMAIL=... DISPLAY="..."` (or direct ./dry-run-nonroot-user.sh). Internally: safe secret (k8s/env /tmp), create --test (no --admin), verify MFA/KeyCape, optional lock/offboard GraphQL, populate/validate evidence (lldap_identity_verified, keycape_oidc_claims_verified, effective_access_summary, lock_offboard_result, actor_class="user", groups=["net-kingdom-users"], no_secret_material_recorded, prevents_platform_root_grant, etc.). +- Console: `onboarding-dry-run`, `onboarding-dry-run-claims` (infers claims from groups + T01 role; warns on admins/root), `lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users --pattern t06-*`. +- Lock: remove from groups (GraphQL or LLDAP UI); reversible. +- Offboard: delete user after resource transfer + reason/date; evidence. +- Review: check-user-mfa-state, LLDAP groups, owned principals; rotate via creds tools. +- Fabric/tenant admin: same but scoped groups, no platform-root, explicit preview "will NOT be in net-kingdom-admins". +- For platform-root/king: king path only. + +**Evidence templates:** `make security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run-template`, `lifecycle-flow-template`. +**Validate:** `make security-bootstrap-validate-onboarding-dry-run`, `validate-lifecycle-flow`. +**Runbook:** "User lifecycle dry-run (T06)" in console runbooks (refs 0019 + script). + +**Blocked if:** Missing actor/scope, privileged without MFA, ordinary user gets root groups/policy. + +See 0019 workplan + dry-run script + T03 matrix for past taint/hygiene bumps (now largely automated via /tmp + evidence). + +Update console lifecycle_guide T06 section if it still shows old manual secret steps (prefer orchestrator). ## Step 8: Platform Reopen + Handoff @@ -193,7 +203,7 @@ NK-WP-0049; do not infer readiness from the earlier 0019 receipts. - Use T03 retrospective + T02 arch + this guide for future drills. - Address gaps (UE adapters per assessment, full Audit Core correlation, more T08 validators). -- Rehearse rebuild per T09 (T09 complete; see docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md for risk classification + non-destructive scripted/ns/parallel plan using 0019+creds+T08 validators; scripted/namespace first; use current owner lifecycle contracts and exact trial provenance). +- Rehearse rebuild per T09 (T09 complete; see docs/security-bootstrap-rebuild-risk-and-rehearsal.md for risk classification + non-destructive scripted/ns/parallel plan using 0019+creds+T08 validators; scripted/namespace first; use 0019 dry-run as model). ## Evidence Summary Table (Core Non-Secret) diff --git a/docs/storage-share-recovery-publication.md b/docs/storage-share-recovery-publication.md deleted file mode 100644 index f1bb687..0000000 --- a/docs/storage-share-recovery-publication.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -# Published recovery guide and accepted independent retrieval - -Accepted 2026-10-16. Owner work: NK-WP-0049-T23 and T26, both done. - -At , sign into the independently accessible -**Backup** account and navigate to `railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/`. -The following files sit beside the encrypted identity backups: - -| File | Purpose | -| --- | --- | -| `net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff-START-HERE.md` | Disaster recovery instructions | -| `net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip` | Standalone recovery tools, guides, trusted fallback receipt and per-file checksums | -| `net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip.sha256` | ZIP checksum | - -Trusted ZIP SHA256, independently recorded in this repository: - -```text -57d1940947aa25ff83d0f25ddf30090eb40595cccaab64225de882a2fd59ea2f -``` - -All three published objects passed exact readback with strong ETag, length and -content checks. Their recorded hashes match the reproducible local build. -Keep an independent copy and the trusted digest outside the identity/provider -dependency; the checksum beside the ZIP alone is not an independent trust anchor. - -The operator then retrieved the protected original identity generation using -independently held provider access, without OpenBao or SSO. The read-only -download's ETag, 109,738,344-byte size and ciphertext SHA256 matched the trusted -fallback. The human-held age key matched the registered recipient. Wrong-key -refusal, all 36 manifest hashes, SQLite integrity, original key-pair checks and -an isolated PostgreSQL 16.14 restore passed. Disposable database and temporary -plaintext cleanup passed. No private credentials were sent to the agent. - -Evidence: - -- [Publication receipt](evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-publication.json) -- [Independent transfer receipt](evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-transfer.json) -- [Archive recovery receipt](evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-recovery.json) -- [Reconciliation review](evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/actual-offline-review.json) - -The published guide is the exact pre-drill revision. This dated acceptance note -records the subsequent successful drill; it does not claim a later republication. -Production services were not deliberately stopped. The recovery path avoided -OpenBao/SSO; restored-service authentication, existing-token MFA and historical -audit-signature continuity remain separate acceptance under T15–T20. -Use the [isolated service restore packet](identity-service-restore-packet.md) -for that next stage. diff --git a/docs/tutorials/protected-system-flex-auth.md b/docs/tutorials/protected-system-flex-auth.md index b42d715..f958321 100644 --- a/docs/tutorials/protected-system-flex-auth.md +++ b/docs/tutorials/protected-system-flex-auth.md @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ back, and is refused when the caller is wrong. ## Prerequisites - **[owner: flex-auth]** A local checkout of `flex-auth` with Go, to run - `go run ./cmd/access-engine`. Read `access-engine/docs/decision-record-contract.md`. + `go run ./cmd/flex-auth`. Read `access-engine/docs/decision-record-contract.md`. - **[owner: your system's repo]** A system id and a list of the things it protects and the actions it performs on them. - **[owner: railiance-platform / package owner, ADR-0015]** A Kubernetes @@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ consumer running with caller auth in `warn` mode is not protected. fixtures covering every allow and every denial branch, including wrong tenant, unknown subject and unknown action. 4. **[owner: flex-auth]** Validate and load offline: - `go run ./cmd/access-engine validate -kind policy -file ` - then `go run ./cmd/access-engine load-registry -file `. + `go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file ` + then `go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file `. 5. **[owner: flex-auth]** Evaluate a check request locally: - `go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry -policy -request `. + `go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry -policy -request `. A request is `tenant`, `subject`, `action`, `resource` and `context`. The result is a decision envelope (`flex-auth.decision-record.v1`) with `effect`, `reason`, and a deterministic decision `id`. diff --git a/docs/verify-t06.md b/docs/verify-t06.md index 90fea18..623f3be 100644 --- a/docs/verify-t06.md +++ b/docs/verify-t06.md @@ -9,9 +9,8 @@ a fresh TOTP/HOTP code including its token PIN if required. It never reads a bootstrap bundle or Kubernetes Secret. No password, OTP or token belongs in command arguments, logs or the receipt. Do not enable shell tracing. -`--realm` and `--resolver` select an approved lookup. `--pi-url` is restricted -to the canonical provider or a literal loopback target; the CLI requires HTTPS. -The shared transport verifies system trust and refuses redirects and ambient proxies. The old positional secrets-directory argument is +`--pi-url`, `--realm`, and `--resolver` select a different approved target. +The CLI requires HTTPS. The old positional secrets-directory argument is removed; `repair-realm-live.sh` now calls this interface and propagates failure. Success requires all of these properties: diff --git a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml b/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 5cc850a..0000000 --- a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T01 example: the bind split (NK-WP-0054) as admissions. Illustrative: the executor -# (T03) and its operations do not exist yet; files are pinned at the commit named in plan.source. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1 -kind: BoundedExecutionAdmission -spec: - id: BEA-2026-0001 - title: Rotate the svc-authelia directory bind (bind-split steps 5-8, one consumer) - purpose: 'Pilot shape for NK-WP-0056-T06: generate a new bind password into OpenBao, set it in LLDAP, let ESO deliver it, - restart Authelia, prove sign-in with the synthetic journey; revert on any failed check.' - work_ref: NK-WP-0056-T01 example - risk_class: medium - window: - not_before: '2026-11-03T09:00:00Z' - not_after: '2026-11-03T11:00:00Z' - approval: - approvers: - - admin - principal_type: HUMAN - assurance: aal2 - carriers: - - approval-engine - - founder-ssh-signature - executor: - identity: service:nk-bind-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - runtime: k8s sso/serviceaccount nk-bind-executor (planned, NK-WP-0056-T03) - scope_ceiling: - - mode: OPERATE - scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia - environments: &id001 - - PRODUCTION - - mode: OPERATE - scope: lldap/people/svc-authelia - environments: *id001 - - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets - environments: *id001 - - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/authelia - environments: *id001 - blast_radius: - unit: consumer - consumers: - - authelia - max_concurrent: 1 - trust_requires: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - plan: - source: - repo: net-kingdom - commit: 15c9cdbef881 - files: - - path: bounded-executor/executor.py - sha256: d724f4f831640c92b8b542dd2adab2e77f40d87d88f46d9482bff9fdcc4f6c70 - - path: bounded-executor/operations.py - sha256: 10d0ba1a2a45edf6d5b137b0702468fb570703347eff81b7f52073dc44b92041 - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py - sha256: c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c - steps: - - id: generate - operation: openbao.kv.write-next-version - target: openbao:platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia - checks_after: - - kv-advanced - revert: restore-kv - - id: set-directory - operation: lldap.user.change-own-password-from-kv - target: lldap:svc-authelia - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: lldap/people/svc-authelia - checks_after: - - bind-signs-in - revert: restore-directory - - id: deliver - operation: eso.force-sync - target: k8s:sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets - checks_after: - - eso-synced - revert: redeliver - - id: restart - operation: k8s.rollout-restart - target: k8s:sso/deployment/authelia - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/authelia - checks_after: - - synthetic-journey - revert: restart-again - revert_steps: - - id: restore-kv - operation: openbao.kv.write-previous-value-as-next-version - target: openbao:platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia - checks_after: - - kv-advanced - - id: restore-directory - operation: lldap.user.change-own-password-from-kv - target: lldap:svc-authelia - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: lldap/people/svc-authelia - checks_after: - - bind-signs-in - - id: redeliver - operation: eso.force-sync - target: k8s:sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets - checks_after: - - eso-synced - - id: restart-again - operation: k8s.rollout-restart - target: k8s:sso/deployment/authelia - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/authelia - checks_after: - - synthetic-journey - plan_digest: sha256:df214e02c24e70c6ac799bee873862f0d24d9bd537bf77cfb845a7b880c7565b - checks: - - id: kv-advanced - description: KV svc-authelia has exactly one new version, CAS on the previous one - ref: bounded-executor/operations.py - sha256: 10d0ba1a2a45edf6d5b137b0702468fb570703347eff81b7f52073dc44b92041 - timeout_seconds: 30 - expect: pass - - id: bind-signs-in - description: the new KV value signs in to LLDAP as svc-authelia - ref: bounded-executor/operations.py - sha256: 10d0ba1a2a45edf6d5b137b0702468fb570703347eff81b7f52073dc44b92041 - timeout_seconds: 30 - expect: pass - - id: eso-synced - description: the ExternalSecret is Ready with a refresh after the step started; the executor never reads the Secret - ref: bounded-executor/operations.py - sha256: 10d0ba1a2a45edf6d5b137b0702468fb570703347eff81b7f52073dc44b92041 - timeout_seconds: 120 - expect: pass - - id: synthetic-journey - description: syn-journey signs in through KeyCape, Authelia and privacyIDEA at aal2 - ref: bounded-executor/operations.py - sha256: 10d0ba1a2a45edf6d5b137b0702468fb570703347eff81b7f52073dc44b92041 - timeout_seconds: 90 - expect: pass - stop_and_revert: - on_check_failure: revert - on_budget_exhausted: revert - on_unknown: stop - on_revert_failure: stop-and-alert - alert: founder via State Hub message and audit-core - budget: - wall_time_seconds: 1200 - attempts: 2 - cost: - compute_cpu_seconds: 120 - egress_bytes: 5000000 - currency: EUR - amount: 0.05 - consumption: - single_use: true - consume_before_first_step: true - receipt: - schema: netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt - emit_to: audit-core - retain: by-hash-no-secret-values - independent_verifier: tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval + receipt source hashes - not_authorized: - - any bind other than svc-authelia - - any LLDAP group change - - changing LLDAP's configured super-admin - - reading or changing any human account - - any change outside the sso namespace diff --git a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-create-service-accounts.yaml b/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-create-service-accounts.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 2df33f6..0000000 --- a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-create-service-accounts.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,139 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T01 example: the bind split (NK-WP-0054) as admissions. Illustrative: the executor -# (T03) and its operations do not exist yet; files are pinned at the commit named in plan.source. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1 -kind: BoundedExecutionAdmission -spec: - id: BEA-2026-0002 - title: Create the service bind accounts (bind-split step 3, root-class) - purpose: 'Create svc-authelia, svc-keycape and svc-privacyidea in LLDAP as read-only binds. Needs lldap_admin: LLDAP has - no narrower grant that can create users (SI-X6), so the founder admits this run and the executor runs it.' - work_ref: NK-WP-0056-T01 example - risk_class: high - window: - not_before: '2026-11-03T09:00:00Z' - not_after: '2026-11-03T12:00:00Z' - approval: - approvers: - - admin - principal_type: HUMAN - assurance: aal2 - carriers: - - approval-engine - - founder-ssh-signature - executor: - identity: service:nk-bind-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - runtime: k8s sso/serviceaccount nk-bind-executor (planned, NK-WP-0056-T03) - scope_ceiling: - - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - environments: &id001 - - PRODUCTION - - mode: OPERATE - scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds - environments: *id001 - blast_radius: - unit: account - consumers: - - lldap - max_concurrent: 1 - trust_requires: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - plan: - source: - repo: net-kingdom - commit: 15c9cdbef881 - files: - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - - path: tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py - sha256: 5b31b3567af07bba09530c6d3b0ed8b5c947df22bd13ac0442dc33c0d9b420c0 - steps: - - id: create-accounts - operation: lldap.user.create-read-only-binds - target: lldap:svc-authelia,svc-keycape,svc-privacyidea - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - accounts-read-only - revert: delete-accounts - - id: hold-passwords - operation: openbao.kv.write-cas0 - target: openbao:platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds - checks_after: - - accounts-sign-in - revert: destroy-kv - revert_steps: - - id: delete-accounts - operation: lldap.user.delete-created - target: lldap:svc-authelia,svc-keycape,svc-privacyidea - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - accounts-read-only - - id: destroy-kv - operation: openbao.kv.destroy-created - target: openbao:platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds - checks_after: - - accounts-sign-in - plan_digest: sha256:0005f239aa3f917eff68557f2124180d13e086adb8ead70a59b6c0168f241f87 - checks: - - id: accounts-read-only - description: each account exists in lldap_strict_readonly only and cannot write - ref: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - timeout_seconds: 60 - expect: pass - - id: accounts-sign-in - description: each KV value signs in to LLDAP as its account - ref: tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py - sha256: 5b31b3567af07bba09530c6d3b0ed8b5c947df22bd13ac0442dc33c0d9b420c0 - timeout_seconds: 60 - expect: pass - stop_and_revert: - on_check_failure: revert - on_budget_exhausted: revert - on_unknown: stop - on_revert_failure: stop-and-alert - alert: founder via State Hub message - budget: - wall_time_seconds: 900 - attempts: 1 - cost: - compute_cpu_seconds: 60 - egress_bytes: 1000000 - currency: EUR - amount: 0.02 - consumption: - single_use: true - consume_before_first_step: true - receipt: - schema: netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt - emit_to: audit-core - retain: by-hash-no-secret-values - independent_verifier: tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval + receipt source hashes - not_authorized: - - switching any consumer to the new accounts - - any human account - - changing LLDAP's configured super-admin diff --git a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-read-only-verify.yaml b/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-read-only-verify.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 7f9d927..0000000 --- a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-read-only-verify.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T01 example: the bind split (NK-WP-0054) as admissions. Illustrative: the executor -# (T03) and its operations do not exist yet; files are pinned at the commit named in plan.source. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1 -kind: BoundedExecutionAdmission -spec: - id: BEA-2026-0004 - title: Read-only verification of the directory split (bind-split steps 2, 4 and 10 verify) - purpose: 'Plan and verify reads that the founder used to do signed in as admin: account inventory, group membership, bind - identities of the consumers. No mutation, so nothing to revert.' - work_ref: NK-WP-0056-T01 example - risk_class: low - window: - not_before: '2026-11-03T09:00:00Z' - not_after: '2026-11-04T09:00:00Z' - approval: - approvers: - - admin - principal_type: HUMAN - assurance: aal2 - carriers: - - approval-engine - - founder-ssh-signature - executor: - identity: service:nk-bind-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - runtime: k8s sso/serviceaccount nk-bind-executor (planned, NK-WP-0056-T03) - scope_ceiling: - - mode: OBSERVE - scope: lldap/people - environments: &id001 - - PRODUCTION - - mode: OBSERVE - scope: k8s/sso - environments: *id001 - blast_radius: - unit: consumer - consumers: - - lldap - - authelia - - keycape - - privacyidea - max_concurrent: 4 - trust_requires: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - plan: - source: - repo: net-kingdom - commit: 15c9cdbef881 - files: - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - steps: - - id: inventory - operation: lldap.read.users-and-groups - target: lldap:people - consumer: lldap - class: delegable - mutates: false - requires: - mode: OBSERVE - scope: lldap/people - checks_after: - - split-shape - - id: consumer-binds - operation: k8s.read.bind-identities - target: k8s:sso - consumer: authelia - class: delegable - mutates: false - requires: - mode: OBSERVE - scope: k8s/sso - checks_after: - - split-shape - plan_digest: sha256:840d296ed7d27209f21c4e00500409fba80e2b85e4ce2e828663d8b0d4ca11e0 - checks: - - id: split-shape - description: every consumer binds as its own svc- account; no service binds as admin - ref: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - timeout_seconds: 60 - expect: pass - stop_and_revert: - on_check_failure: stop - on_budget_exhausted: stop - on_unknown: stop - on_revert_failure: stop-and-alert - budget: - wall_time_seconds: 300 - attempts: 3 - cost: - compute_cpu_seconds: 30 - egress_bytes: 500000 - currency: EUR - amount: 0.01 - consumption: - single_use: true - consume_before_first_step: true - receipt: - schema: netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt - emit_to: audit-core - retain: by-hash-no-secret-values - independent_verifier: tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval + receipt source hashes - not_authorized: - - any write to LLDAP, Kubernetes or OpenBao diff --git a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-switch-super-admin.yaml b/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-switch-super-admin.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 346d1c3..0000000 --- a/examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-split-switch-super-admin.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,140 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T01 example: the bind split (NK-WP-0054) as admissions. Illustrative: the executor -# (T03) and its operations do not exist yet; files are pinned at the commit named in plan.source. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1 -kind: BoundedExecutionAdmission -spec: - id: BEA-2026-0003 - title: Switch LLDAP's configured super-admin to ld-admin (bind-split step 9, root-class) - purpose: Change LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN from admin to ld-admin and restart LLDAP; admin keeps its rights through lldap_admin - membership. Changes who administers the directory, so the founder admits the run. - work_ref: NK-WP-0056-T01 example - risk_class: high - window: - not_before: '2026-11-03T09:00:00Z' - not_after: '2026-11-03T11:00:00Z' - approval: - approvers: - - admin - principal_type: HUMAN - assurance: aal2 - carriers: - - approval-engine - - founder-ssh-signature - executor: - identity: service:nk-bind-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - runtime: k8s sso/serviceaccount nk-bind-executor (planned, NK-WP-0056-T03) - scope_ceiling: - - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - environments: &id001 - - PRODUCTION - - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/lldap - environments: *id001 - blast_radius: - unit: consumer - consumers: - - lldap - max_concurrent: 1 - trust_requires: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - plan: - source: - repo: net-kingdom - commit: 15c9cdbef881 - files: - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py - sha256: c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c - steps: - - id: switch-user-dn - operation: lldap.config.set-ldap-user-dn - target: k8s:sso/secret/lldap-secrets#LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - ld-admin-administers - revert: switch-back - - id: restart-lldap - operation: k8s.rollout-restart - target: k8s:sso/deployment/lldap - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/lldap - checks_after: - - synthetic-journey - revert: restart-lldap-again - revert_steps: - - id: switch-back - operation: lldap.config.set-ldap-user-dn - target: k8s:sso/secret/lldap-secrets#LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - ld-admin-administers - - id: restart-lldap-again - operation: k8s.rollout-restart - target: k8s:sso/deployment/lldap - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/lldap - checks_after: - - synthetic-journey - plan_digest: sha256:4469ab1b15f9e8d631ca213b6b949befd2f252434f91f2e8fa5846d893d95eaf - checks: - - id: ld-admin-administers - description: ld-admin signs in and administers; admin keeps lldap_admin membership - ref: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - timeout_seconds: 60 - expect: pass - - id: synthetic-journey - description: 'all three binds still serve sign-in: syn-journey reaches aal2' - ref: sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py - sha256: c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c - timeout_seconds: 90 - expect: pass - settle_seconds: 125 - stop_and_revert: - on_check_failure: revert - on_budget_exhausted: revert - on_unknown: stop - on_revert_failure: stop-and-alert - alert: founder via State Hub message; crisis list item for ld-admin - budget: - wall_time_seconds: 900 - attempts: 1 - cost: - compute_cpu_seconds: 60 - egress_bytes: 1000000 - currency: EUR - amount: 0.02 - consumption: - single_use: true - consume_before_first_step: true - receipt: - schema: netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt - emit_to: audit-core - retain: by-hash-no-secret-values - independent_verifier: tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval + receipt source hashes - not_authorized: - - changing admin's own password - - sealing ld-admin's password (human-intrinsic, step 10) - - any service bind change diff --git a/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json b/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json deleted file mode 100644 index b8d8b30..0000000 --- a/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -{ - "status": "proposed-not-applied", - "coordination_frame": { - "ref": "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "sha256": "d15e092387f128ffdfd00b9815707a05ff77c5bb0ba4d9a428fbc37b8c440b67", - "frame_seconds": 3600, - "heartbeat_frames": 1, - "registered_wait_frames": 2, - "effective_deadline_frames": 3 - }, - "sender": "approval-engine", - "source": "approval-engine", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", - "may_read": false, - "emission_cadence_ref": "approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "emission_cadence_sha256": "cc58c8d53ebf50acf540d73b7607d579942bda7734c3e8722108e9c9204af655", - "heartbeat_classes": { - "issuance": 7200, - "use": 7200, - "supersession": 7200, - "revocation": 7200 - }, - "receiver_grace_factor": 1.5, - "effective_deadline_seconds": 10800, - "preserve_existing_credentials_and_other_registry_fields": true -} diff --git a/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md b/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9081aa8..0000000 --- a/history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,110 +0,0 @@ -# Security identity, accountable automation and agent orientation review — 2026-10-24 - -Requested by the founder during NK-WP-0054: review the NetKingdom security infrastructure, optimize the -Service Identity and Privilege standard against the security canon, optimize automation with -accountability, and make the security architecture easy for agents (Claude Code, Codex, Grok) to pick up. - -## Method and sources - -- Emergent Security orientation: package 0.2.6, digest `8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`, - card `start` **withheld** (12 of 14 sources changed since review), so its sources were read directly. -- `security-canon`: README, SCOPE, the Mode of Authority vocabulary card, and the DevOps Secrets Management - Standard `SEC-DSM` 1.0.0 (sections 4, 9, 20 to 25 read; the rest by heading). -- This repository: `SECURITY-COMPANION.md` (operative form of the accepted security layer model v0.8), - `canon/standards/`, `AGENTS.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `tools/`, the `Makefile` and the NK-WP-0054 work. -- Commit history for attribution trailers. No live service, Secret or credential was touched. - -## Findings - -**R1. The standard restated the canon.** Drafts 1 and 2 of the Service Identity and Privilege standard repeated -SEC-DSM rules (DSM-ID-001/004, DSM-AUTH-001, DSM-HUM-003, DSM-ROOT, DSM-INV, DSM-EXC, DSM-AGENT) and invented -identity "classes" beside the canon's `principal_type` and Mode of Authority. The canon's own translations -contradict one class: "break-glass" is an `activation`, not a kind of identity. They confirm the founder's model: -`backup operator → OPERATE @ backup-system`, `developer → CONSTRUCT @ product`. - -**R2. Accountability is present for commits and receipts, absent for hub writes.** Commits carry `Assistant`, -`Assistant-Session` and `Assistant-Process` trailers under the human author. Recovery receipts carry source hashes -and are checked by independent verifiers; admissions are SSH-signed. State Hub progress events and decisions carry a -free-text `author` that nothing authenticates. - -**R3. Agents act under the person's ambient authority.** A Claude Code, Codex or Grok session in the founder's -terminal can reach everything the founder's tools reach. SEC-DSM DSM-AGENT-008 counts that as the agent's -authority. There is no per-run agent identity (DSM-AGENT-002). The working practice that kept this safe in -NK-WP-0049 (the agent prepares and tests on fixtures; the person admits and runs; an independent verifier checks) -was not written down as a rule. - -**R4. The OpenBao coding-agent role presents as a service.** It binds `principal_type: service`; IAM Profile v0.3 -requires `principal_type: agent`. Recorded as finding F-1 in the standard. - -**R5. Agents could not find the security tools.** Eleven security tools exist under `tools/`. They were reachable -only through `make help` (over a hundred targets) and per-tool READMEs, with nothing saying which question each -answers or whether an agent may run it. The automatic orientation card is withheld, so a new agent session got no -guided entry. Grok has no dedicated instruction file here; `AGENTS.md` is the shared cross-agent file. - -**R6. Overlapping custody material.** `make security-bootstrap-custody-roster-template` prints a two-of-three custody -roster template, and `docs/crisis-custody-list.md` now lists custody items. They should converge rather than drift. - -## Changes made - -1. **Standard draft-3** (`canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md`, still proposed): an estate profile of - SecurityCanon. It imports `principal_type` and `MODE @ SCOPE` grants, maps draft-2's classes onto them, states the - estate identities in canon terms, and gives every rule its SEC-DSM references with only NetKingdom's additions. - New SI-15, accountable automation, with the golden path prepare, admit, execute, verify, retain. Exceptions now - carry an elimination path (DSM-EXC-004). Every founder decision and rule id is kept. -2. **Security tools index** (`tools/security-tools.json`, `make security-tools`): every security tool with the - question it answers, its run and test commands, its governing standard and whether an agent may run it (`yes`, - `fixtures-only`, `no-attended`, `no-live`). A test fails when a new tool directory is not indexed, or when a path, - standard or make target in the index does not exist. -3. **Agent quickstart** in `AGENTS.md` and `CLAUDE.md`, identical, in its own marked block beside the managed - emergent-security pilot block: find the tool, know the rules, route credentials, effective authority, leave a trail. - -## Recommendations, with owners - -| Item | Owner | -| --- | --- | -| Migrate declarations and validator to grants (NK-WP-0054-T08) | net-kingdom | -| Authenticate State Hub authorship for agents (actor, session) to meet SI-15 | state-hub | -| Per-run agent identity (DSM-AGENT-002), for example short-lived agent tokens from KeyCape | key-cape, glas-harness | -| Coding-agent role presents as `agent` (F-1) | railiance-platform | -| Refresh the withheld orientation cards; consider a card pointing at `make security-tools` | emergent-security (EMERGENT-WP-0002) | -| Confirm the mode readings in the standard §3, in particular `USE @ directory` for binds | security-canon | -| Converge the custody roster template with the crisis custody list | net-kingdom | -| Confirm which instruction file Grok reads; if not `AGENTS.md`, point it there | founder | - -## Outcome of the owner workers (same day) - -Six worker agents, one per repository, were started on the founder's instruction and told to prepare, assess or -review only: no live changes, no secrets, no pushes, local commits. Each report was checked against its repository -before being relied on. All work is local and unpushed. - -| Repo | Commits | Result | -| --- | --- | --- | -| security-canon | 5aa0a64, f844b15 | Five mode readings confirmed. Citation errors found and corrected in the standard (SI-1/7 cited anti-patterns, SI-5 rests on a SHOULD, SI-9 should cite DSM-INV-001, SI-15 goes beyond DSM-AUDIT-001). Four canon questions recorded (SECURITY-IN-0002) | -| railiance-platform | 2126457, bca66d1 | F-1 and aal2 prepared in source (`["service","agent"]` transitional; `/assurance/level: aal2`), rollback written, 7 tests. KeyCape must emit `agent` first. Nothing applied | -| key-cape | 3acc86f, 7190f5d | Agent tokens feasible with changes. `client_credentials` agent class 2 to 3 days; delegated agents need RFC 8693 token exchange, 1 to 1.5 weeks | -| glas-harness | b386b79, 8faa14a | Per-session identity and attribution feasible only for sessions the harness launches | -| state-hub | 0789f9b | Design: Option A, `X-Actor-*` into an append-only attribution table, labelled claimed/unattributed/legacy | -| emergent-security | 8c903af | Start card 0.2.7 live. An agent re-reviewed 12 sources and resealed it; a human has not reviewed it | - -**Process observation.** The emergent-security refresh followed that repository's own procedure, which needs no human -signature, yet the card steers every agent session on the machine. The standard's SI-15 asks that agents prepare and -people accept. The founder is asked to accept or withdraw the card. - -**Delegation limits that worked.** Telling workers to prepare rather than apply kept the one risky change -(role bindings on a live login path) in source with a written rollback. A worker also declined to run -`fix-consistency` where it would have touched another job's uncommitted files. - -Draft-4 of the standard applies the security-canon corrections and records the others; no founder decision changed. - -## Founder decisions, 2026-10-25 - -- **Ratified** `canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md` as v0.1 (status accepted). -- **Accepted** the emergent-security start card 0.2.7 (commit `8c903af`, digest - `22b7294e24137c0a350764b9cf37f3d4f2e9f35eb7c97a287d9c89477ef24d7a`) after reading the diff of the card text. The - acceptance is a human review of an agent-prepared change, recorded here and sent to emergent-security for its - EMERGENT-WP-0002 tracking. That commit is still local to that repository and is not pushed by net-kingdom. -- **state-hub attribution design (STATE-WP-0100), decided:** Option A is phase 1 with no `hub_core` schema change; - correlation by equal session and run id only, no commit verifier (Option B deferred); phase 3 verifies tokens in - observe mode once key-cape issues agent tokens, and enforcement is a separate later decision; existing free-text - authors are not backfilled (a read-only count may be run later to size a mapping). Hub authorship stays a declared - gap in the standard until phase 3. diff --git a/identity-provisioner/Containerfile b/identity-provisioner/Containerfile index 00f96e6..c30138f 100644 --- a/identity-provisioner/Containerfile +++ b/identity-provisioner/Containerfile @@ -3,10 +3,7 @@ FROM python:3.12-slim@sha256:d764629ce0ddd8c71fd371e9901efb324a95789d2315a47db7e RUN useradd --create-home --uid 10001 provisioner WORKDIR /app COPY --from=lldap /app/lldap_set_password /app/lldap_set_password -COPY requirements-postgres.txt /app/ -RUN python -m pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes -r /app/requirements-postgres.txt -COPY provisioner.py group_provenance.py group_provenance_postgres.py password_setup.py server.py /app/ -COPY migrations/ /app/migrations/ +COPY provisioner.py password_setup.py server.py /app/ USER 10001:10001 EXPOSE 8080 CMD ["python", "server.py"] diff --git a/identity-provisioner/group_provenance.py b/identity-provisioner/group_provenance.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4e9e809..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/group_provenance.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,179 +0,0 @@ -"""Bounded, owner-private recovery journal; never an authorization source. - -An unresolved write intent is retained indefinitely and blocks further writes. -Only the directory owner may reconcile it using independently obtained evidence. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import json -from contextlib import contextmanager -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sqlite3 -import stat -from typing import Any, Protocol -from urllib.parse import quote - - -class GroupJournalStore(Protocol): - """Owner-injected persistence only; grants no caller or native authority.""" - def check(self) -> None: ... - def reserve(self, key: str, binding: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]: ... - def get(self, key: str, binding: str) -> dict[str, Any]: ... - def claim_revoke(self, key: str, binding: str, delete_if_empty: bool) -> dict[str, Any]: ... - def save(self, receipt: dict[str, Any]) -> None: ... - - -class GroupProvenanceUnavailable(RuntimeError): - def __init__(self): - super().__init__("group_provenance_unavailable") - - -class GroupProvenance: - def __init__(self, path: str, *, capacity: int = 256, initialize: bool = False) -> None: - target = Path(path) - if not target.is_absolute() or target.parent.resolve() != target.parent or capacity < 1 or capacity > 4096: - raise ValueError("private absolute provenance path and bounded capacity required") - parent = target.parent.lstat() - if not stat.S_ISDIR(parent.st_mode) or parent.st_uid != os.geteuid() or parent.st_mode & 0o077: - raise ValueError("provenance directory must be owner-private") - # Service startup never creates a replacement for missing durable state. - flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_NOFOLLOW - if initialize: - flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL - fd = os.open(target, flags, 0o600) - try: - info = os.fstat(fd) - if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.geteuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077 or info.st_nlink != 1: - raise ValueError("provenance file must be owner-private and regular") - finally: - os.close(fd) - self.path = str(target) - self._device, self._inode = info.st_dev, info.st_ino - self.capacity = capacity - with self._db() as db: - if initialize: - db.execute("CREATE TABLE group_receipts (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, binding TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL, active INTEGER UNIQUE, body TEXT NOT NULL)") - db.execute("PRAGMA user_version=1") - if db.execute("PRAGMA user_version").fetchone()[0] != 1: - raise RuntimeError("unrecognized group provenance schema") - db.execute("SELECT key, binding, state, active, body FROM group_receipts LIMIT 0") - - def _check_file(self): - try: - target = Path(self.path) - parent = target.parent.lstat() - info = target.lstat() - if target.parent.resolve() != target.parent or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent.st_mode) or parent.st_uid != os.geteuid() or parent.st_mode & 0o077: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.geteuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077 or info.st_nlink != 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - if (info.st_dev, info.st_ino) != (self._device, self._inode): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - except OSError: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - - def check(self): - with self._db() as db: - if db.execute("PRAGMA user_version").fetchone()[0] != 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - db.execute("SELECT key FROM group_receipts LIMIT 0") - - @staticmethod - def _load(body, key, binding): - try: - if not isinstance(body, str) or len(body) > 1048576: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - value = json.loads(body) - if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get("key") != key or value.get("binding") != binding: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - if value.get("state") not in {"pending", "ensured", "revoking", "revoked", "uncertain", "refused"}: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - if not isinstance(value.get("groups"), dict) or len(value["groups"]) > 16: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - for field, limit in (("created_groups", 16), ("created_memberships", 256)): - if not isinstance(value.get(field), list) or len(value[field]) > limit or any(not isinstance(item, dict) for item in value[field]): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - if "intent" not in value or value["intent"] is not None and not isinstance(value["intent"], dict): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - for group in value["groups"].values(): - if not isinstance(group, dict) or "id" not in group or not all(isinstance(group.get(f), list) and all(isinstance(u, str) for u in group[f]) for f in ("before", "after")): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - if value["state"] in {"ensured", "revoking", "revoked"} and ( - not isinstance(value.get("requested_groups"), list) or not isinstance(value.get("ensure_correlation_id"), str) - ): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - return value - except (TypeError, ValueError): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - - @contextmanager - def _db(self): - db = None - try: - self._check_file() - db = sqlite3.connect("file:" + quote(self.path, safe="/") + "?mode=rw", uri=True, timeout=5) - self._check_file() - db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL") - with db: - yield db - except sqlite3.Error: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - finally: - if db is not None: - db.close() - - def reserve(self, key: str, binding: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]: - with self._db() as db: - db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE") - row = db.execute("SELECT binding, body FROM group_receipts WHERE key=?", (key,)).fetchone() - if row: - if row[0] != binding: - raise ValueError("ensure idempotency key is bound to another request") - return self._load(row[1], key, binding), False - if db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM group_receipts").fetchone()[0] >= self.capacity: - raise RuntimeError("provenance capacity reached; retained records require owner disposition") - receipt = {"key": key, "binding": binding, "state": "pending", "intent": None, - "groups": {}, "created_groups": [], "created_memberships": []} - try: - db.execute("INSERT INTO group_receipts VALUES (?, ?, ?, 1, ?)", - (key, binding, "pending", json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True))) - except sqlite3.IntegrityError: - raise RuntimeError("another group operation is unresolved") from None - return receipt, True - - def get(self, key: str, binding: str) -> dict[str, Any]: - with self._db() as db: - row = db.execute("SELECT binding, body FROM group_receipts WHERE key=?", (key,)).fetchone() - if not row or row[0] != binding: - raise ValueError("unknown ensure receipt or request binding mismatch") - return self._load(row[1], key, binding) - - def claim_revoke(self, key: str, binding: str, delete_if_empty: bool) -> dict[str, Any]: - with self._db() as db: - db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE") - row = db.execute("SELECT binding, body FROM group_receipts WHERE key=?", (key,)).fetchone() - if not row or row[0] != binding: - raise ValueError("unknown ensure receipt or request binding mismatch") - receipt = self._load(row[1], key, binding) - if receipt["state"] == "revoked": - if receipt["delete_if_empty"] != delete_if_empty: - raise ValueError("completed rollback options cannot change") - return receipt - if receipt["state"] != "ensured": - raise RuntimeError("group provenance unresolved; independent owner recovery required") - receipt.update(state="revoking", delete_if_empty=delete_if_empty) - try: - db.execute("UPDATE group_receipts SET state='revoking', active=1, body=? WHERE key=?", - (json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True), key)) - except sqlite3.IntegrityError: - raise RuntimeError("another group operation is unresolved") from None - return receipt - - def save(self, receipt: dict[str, Any]) -> None: - active = 1 if receipt["state"] in {"pending", "revoking", "uncertain"} else None - with self._db() as db: - written = db.execute("UPDATE group_receipts SET state=?, active=?, body=? WHERE key=? AND binding=?", - (receipt["state"], active, json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True), receipt["key"], receipt["binding"])) - if written.rowcount != 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() diff --git a/identity-provisioner/group_provenance_postgres.py b/identity-provisioner/group_provenance_postgres.py deleted file mode 100644 index f176dea..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/group_provenance_postgres.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,253 +0,0 @@ -"""Injection-only PostgreSQL implementation of the existing owner journal seam. - -Binding and continuity callbacks are supplied by a trusted owner integration, -never constructed from an HTTP payload. Neither is an authorization decision. -No server environment switch, automatic schema creation or recovery admission. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -from contextlib import contextmanager -from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass -import hashlib -import json -import re -from typing import Any, Callable, Protocol -from uuid import UUID - -from group_provenance import GroupProvenance, GroupProvenanceUnavailable - - -@dataclass(frozen=True) -class GroupJournalBinding: - tenant_scope: str - directory: str - case_digest: str - source_digest: str - principal: str - epoch: str - - def __post_init__(self): - for value in (self.tenant_scope, self.directory, self.principal): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not 1 <= len(value) <= 256 or any(ord(c) < 32 for c in value): - raise ValueError("explicit owner journal binding required") - for value in (self.case_digest, self.source_digest): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}", value): - raise ValueError("exact owner source and case digests required") - if not isinstance(self.epoch, str) or str(UUID(self.epoch)) != self.epoch: - raise ValueError("explicit canonical journal epoch required") - - @property - def digest(self): - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(asdict(self), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest() - - -def journal_genesis(epoch: str, directory: str) -> str: - """Deterministic initial marker for explicit owner migration/admission only.""" - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps({"schema": "nk-group-journal-genesis.v1", "epoch": epoch, - "directory": directory}, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest() - - -class JournalContinuity(Protocol): - """Existing independently retained owner checkpoint, outside restored SQL state. - - Implementations compare/advance exact epoch+directory+head+commit digest atomically and - durably. An in-memory implementation is a fixture only. Missing/stale or - ambiguous checkpoints must refuse; no callback grants mutation authority. - """ - def check(self, epoch: str, directory: str, head: int, digest: str) -> bool: ... - def advance(self, epoch: str, directory: str, previous: int, previous_digest: str, current: int, current_digest: str) -> bool: ... - - -class PostgresGroupProvenance: - def __init__(self, *, connect: Callable, binding: GroupJournalBinding, - continuity: JournalContinuity, capacity: int = 256): - if not callable(connect) or not isinstance(binding, GroupJournalBinding) or not 1 <= capacity <= 4096: - raise ValueError("explicit owner connector, binding and bounded capacity required") - if not callable(getattr(continuity, "check", None)) or not callable(getattr(continuity, "advance", None)): - raise ValueError("independent owner continuity callbacks required") - self.connect, self.binding, self.continuity, self.capacity = connect, binding, continuity, capacity - self._poisoned = False - - def _continuity(self, method, *args): - try: - if getattr(self.continuity, method)(self.binding.epoch, self.binding.directory, *args) is not True: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - except Exception: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - - @contextmanager - def _transaction(self): - if self._poisoned: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - connection = None - tx = None - try: - connection = self.connect() - with connection: - with connection.cursor() as cursor: - cursor.execute("SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '5s'") - cursor.execute("SET LOCAL idle_in_transaction_session_timeout = '15s'") - cursor.execute("SELECT epoch::text, directory, head, head_digest, quarantined FROM identity_provisioner.group_journal_meta WHERE singleton = true FOR UPDATE") - meta = cursor.fetchone() - if not meta or meta[0] != self.binding.epoch or meta[1] != self.binding.directory or meta[4] is not False or type(meta[2]) is not int or meta[2] < 0 or not isinstance(meta[3], str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", meta[3]): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - self._continuity("check", meta[2], meta[3]) - tx = {"cursor": cursor, "head": meta[2], "digest": meta[3], "dirty": False} - yield tx - if tx["dirty"]: - cursor.execute("UPDATE identity_provisioner.group_journal_meta SET head = head + 1, head_digest = %s WHERE singleton = true AND epoch = %s AND directory = %s AND head = %s AND head_digest = %s AND quarantined = false", - (tx["next_digest"], self.binding.epoch, self.binding.directory, tx["head"], tx["digest"])) - if cursor.rowcount != 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - # SQL commit precedes the independent checkpoint acknowledgment. - # A lost acknowledgment refuses before the next directory effect. - if tx and tx["dirty"]: - self._continuity("advance", tx["head"], tx["digest"], tx["head"] + 1, tx["next_digest"]) - except ValueError: - raise - except GroupProvenanceUnavailable: - # Caller mismatches are domain refusals. Storage/continuity failures - # poison this object; durable pending records are never rewritten - # automatically by an exception handler after ambiguous commit. - self._poisoned = True - raise - except Exception: - self._poisoned = True - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - finally: - if connection is not None: - try: - connection.close() - except Exception: - self._poisoned = True - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - - def check(self): - with self._transaction(): - pass - - def _read(self, cursor, key, request_binding): - cursor.execute("SELECT binding, version, body, context_json FROM identity_provisioner.group_receipts WHERE context_digest = %s AND key = %s", - (self.binding.digest, key)) - row = cursor.fetchone() - if row is None: - return None - if row[0] != request_binding: - raise ValueError("ensure receipt request binding mismatch") - if row[3] != json.dumps(asdict(self.binding), sort_keys=True): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - receipt = GroupProvenance._load(row[2], key, request_binding) - if type(row[1]) is not int or row[1] < 1 or type(receipt.get("_pg_version")) is not int or receipt.get("_pg_version") != row[1] or receipt.get("_pg_context") != self.binding.digest: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - return receipt - - @staticmethod - def _inputs(key, binding): - if not isinstance(key, str) or not 1 <= len(key) <= 256 or not isinstance(binding, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", binding): - raise ValueError("bounded exact journal request binding required") - - def _active(self, cursor): - cursor.execute("SELECT 1 FROM identity_provisioner.group_receipts WHERE active = true LIMIT 1") - if cursor.fetchone(): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - - def _transition(self, tx, receipt, operation): - # Bind the exact transition, not merely a counter. Two restored/forked - # copies that commit different bodies at the same next head cannot both - # match an independently retained checkpoint after reopening. - transition = {"schema": "nk-group-journal-transition.v1", "epoch": self.binding.epoch, - "directory": self.binding.directory, "prior_head": tx["head"], "prior_digest": tx["digest"], - "head": tx["head"] + 1, "operation": operation, "context": asdict(self.binding), - "key": receipt["key"], "request_binding": receipt["binding"], - "version": receipt["_pg_version"], "body": receipt} - tx["next_digest"] = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(transition, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest() - tx["dirty"] = True - - def reserve(self, key, binding): - self._inputs(key, binding) - with self._transaction() as tx: - cursor = tx["cursor"] - receipt = self._read(cursor, key, binding) - if receipt is not None: - return receipt, False - self._active(cursor) - cursor.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM identity_provisioner.group_receipts") - if cursor.fetchone()[0] >= self.capacity: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - receipt = {"key": key, "binding": binding, "state": "pending", "intent": None, "groups": {}, - "created_groups": [], "created_memberships": [], "_pg_version": 1, "_pg_context": self.binding.digest} - cursor.execute("INSERT INTO identity_provisioner.group_receipts (context_digest, context_json, key, binding, version, state, active, body) VALUES (%s, %s, %s, %s, 1, 'pending', true, %s)", - (self.binding.digest, json.dumps(asdict(self.binding), sort_keys=True), key, binding, json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True))) - if cursor.rowcount != 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - self._transition(tx, receipt, "reserve") - return receipt, True - - def get(self, key, binding): - self._inputs(key, binding) - with self._transaction() as tx: - receipt = self._read(tx["cursor"], key, binding) - if receipt is None: - raise ValueError("unknown ensure receipt or request binding mismatch") - return receipt - - def _write(self, tx, receipt, operation="save"): - self._inputs(receipt.get("key"), receipt.get("binding")) - if receipt.get("_pg_context") != self.binding.digest or type(receipt.get("_pg_version")) is not int or receipt["_pg_version"] < 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - encoded = json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True) - GroupProvenance._load(encoded, receipt["key"], receipt["binding"]) - updated = json.loads(encoded) - updated["_pg_version"] += 1 - active = True if receipt["state"] in {"pending", "revoking", "uncertain"} else None - tx["cursor"].execute("UPDATE identity_provisioner.group_receipts SET state = %s, active = %s, body = %s, version = version + 1 WHERE context_digest = %s AND key = %s AND binding = %s AND version = %s", - (receipt["state"], active, json.dumps(updated, sort_keys=True), self.binding.digest, receipt["key"], receipt["binding"], receipt["_pg_version"])) - if tx["cursor"].rowcount != 1: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - self._transition(tx, updated, operation) - return updated - - def save(self, receipt): - with self._transaction() as tx: - updated = self._write(tx, receipt) - # The provisioner keeps references to nested group pre/poststate across - # intent persistence. Replace only this backend's acknowledged version; - # _write serializes without changing the caller's mutation body. - receipt["_pg_version"] = updated["_pg_version"] - - def claim_revoke(self, key, binding, delete_if_empty): - self._inputs(key, binding) - if not isinstance(delete_if_empty, bool): - raise ValueError("delete_if_empty must be boolean") - with self._transaction() as tx: - receipt = self._read(tx["cursor"], key, binding) - if receipt is None: - raise ValueError("unknown ensure receipt or request binding mismatch") - if receipt["state"] == "revoked": - if receipt["delete_if_empty"] != delete_if_empty: - raise ValueError("completed rollback options cannot change") - return receipt - if receipt["state"] != "ensured": - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - self._active(tx["cursor"]) - receipt.update(state="revoking", delete_if_empty=delete_if_empty) - updated = self._write(tx, receipt, "claim_revoke") - return updated - - -def psycopg_connector(*, connection_info: Callable[[], dict[str, Any]]): - """Owner-provided renewable lease values stay in memory; never env/argv/logs. - - No connection happens here. Lazy import keeps disabled group endpoints free - of a runtime dependency. The admitted owner supplies TLS/host/db/role facts. - """ - if not callable(connection_info): - raise ValueError("owner connection-info callback required") - def connect(): - try: - import psycopg - values = dict(connection_info()) - return psycopg.connect(**values, connect_timeout=5) - except Exception: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - return connect diff --git a/identity-provisioner/migrations/group_journal_postgres_v1.sql b/identity-provisioner/migrations/group_journal_postgres_v1.sql deleted file mode 100644 index caf1d75..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/migrations/group_journal_postgres_v1.sql +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ --- Run only by the admitted migration role in its existing owner schema. --- Does not create a database/schema/credential, admit an epoch or clear quarantine. -CREATE TABLE identity_provisioner.group_journal_meta ( - singleton boolean PRIMARY KEY CHECK (singleton = true), - epoch uuid NOT NULL, - directory text NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(directory) BETWEEN 1 AND 1024), - head bigint NOT NULL CHECK (head >= 0), - head_digest text NOT NULL CHECK (head_digest ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'), - quarantined boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true -); -CREATE TABLE identity_provisioner.group_receipts ( - context_digest text NOT NULL CHECK (context_digest ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'), - context_json text NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(context_json) <= 16384), - key text NOT NULL CHECK (char_length(key) BETWEEN 1 AND 256), - binding text NOT NULL CHECK (binding ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'), - version bigint NOT NULL CHECK (version >= 1), - state text NOT NULL CHECK (state IN ('pending','ensured','revoking','revoked','uncertain','refused')), - active boolean UNIQUE CHECK (active IS NULL OR active = true), - body text NOT NULL CHECK (octet_length(body) <= 1048576), - PRIMARY KEY (context_digest, key) -); --- Epoch insertion, initial continuity checkpoint and admission are separate --- owner actions; this migration leaves all operations refused without them. diff --git a/identity-provisioner/password_setup.py b/identity-provisioner/password_setup.py index 1f6e66b..6104aa7 100644 --- a/identity-provisioner/password_setup.py +++ b/identity-provisioner/password_setup.py @@ -115,14 +115,12 @@ class LLDAPPasswordSetter: *, base_url: str, admin_password: str, - admin_username: str = "admin", helper: str = "/app/lldap_set_password", opener: Callable = urlopen, runner: Callable = subprocess.run, ) -> None: self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/") self.admin_password = admin_password - self.admin_username = admin_username self.helper = helper self.opener = opener self.runner = runner @@ -131,7 +129,6 @@ class LLDAPPasswordSetter: token = directory_login( base_url=self.base_url, admin_password=self.admin_password, - admin_username=self.admin_username, opener=self.opener, timeout=10, ) diff --git a/identity-provisioner/provisioner.py b/identity-provisioner/provisioner.py index a746da5..10a742a 100644 --- a/identity-provisioner/provisioner.py +++ b/identity-provisioner/provisioner.py @@ -4,15 +4,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations from dataclasses import dataclass import json -import hashlib import re import time from typing import Any, Callable from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError from urllib.request import Request, urlopen -from group_provenance import GroupJournalStore, GroupProvenanceUnavailable - @dataclass(frozen=True) class Result: @@ -22,14 +19,6 @@ class Result: resumed: bool -@dataclass(frozen=True) -class GroupResult(Result): - ensure_idempotency_key: str - ensure_correlation_id: str - created_groups: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...] - created_memberships: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...] - - @dataclass(frozen=True) class DriftResult: provider: str @@ -61,16 +50,12 @@ class LLDAPProvisioner: *, base_url: str, admin_password: str, - admin_username: str = "admin", opener: Callable = urlopen, auth_rejected_cooldown: float = 30.0, clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic, - group_provenance: GroupJournalStore | None = None, ) -> None: - self.group_provenance = group_provenance self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/") self.admin_password = admin_password - self.admin_username = admin_username self.opener = opener self.auth_rejected_cooldown = auth_rejected_cooldown self.clock = clock @@ -232,175 +217,16 @@ mutation Remove($userId: String!, $groupId: Int!) { if exc.code == "auth_rejected": self._auth_rejected_until = now + self.auth_rejected_cooldown raise - if self.group_provenance is not None: - self.group_provenance.check() - return {"status": "ready", "dependency": "directory", - "service_groups": "available" if self.group_provenance is not None else "disabled"} + return {"status": "ready", "dependency": "directory"} def _login(self, timeout: float = 10) -> str: return directory_login( base_url=self.base_url, admin_password=self.admin_password, - admin_username=self.admin_username, opener=self.opener, timeout=timeout, ) - def _group_store(self) -> GroupJournalStore: - store = self.group_provenance - if store is None: - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() - store.check() - return store - - @staticmethod - def _group_binding(groups, members, correlation_id) -> str: - # Original correlation is part of the exact ensure binding. - canonical = {"ensure_correlation_id": correlation_id, "groups": sorted(groups), "members": {g: sorted(members.get(g, [])) for g in sorted(groups)}} - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(canonical, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest() - - @staticmethod - def _group_result(receipt, *, resumed=False) -> GroupResult: - status = "groups_ensured" if receipt["state"] == "ensured" else ( - "groups_revoked_and_deleted" if receipt.get("deleted") else "groups_revoked") - return GroupResult("netkingdom-lldap", ",".join(receipt["requested_groups"]), status, resumed, - receipt["key"], receipt["ensure_correlation_id"], tuple(receipt["created_groups"]), tuple(receipt["created_memberships"])) - - def ensure_service_groups(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> GroupResult: - """Additive ensure with durable creation provenance, not new authority. - - Replays return the original result, never recreate removed state. Pending - or ambiguous calls survive restart and require independent owner recovery. - """ - groups, members = _service_group_request(payload) - store = self._group_store() - receipt, fresh = store.reserve(payload["idempotency_key"], self._group_binding(groups, members, payload["correlation_id"])) - if not fresh: - if receipt["state"] != "ensured": - raise RuntimeError("group provenance unresolved or already rolled back") - return self._group_result(receipt, resumed=True) - attempted = False - try: - token = self._login() - users, directory_groups = self._directory(token) - known = {str(u.get("id")) for u in users} - if {u for us in members.values() for u in us} - known: - raise ValueError("unknown directory users") - ids = {str(g["displayName"]): int(g["id"]) for g in directory_groups} - receipt["requested_groups"] = sorted(groups) - receipt["ensure_correlation_id"] = payload["correlation_id"] - # Complete prestate is persisted before the first directory mutation. - for name in groups: - gid = ids.get(name) - before = sorted(self._group_members(token, gid)) if gid is not None else [] - if len(before) + sum(len(g["before"]) for g in receipt["groups"].values()) > 4096: - raise ValueError("group prestate exceeds bounded provenance capacity") - receipt["groups"][name] = {"id": gid, "before": before, "after": sorted(set(before) | set(members.get(name, [])))} - store.save(receipt) - for name in groups: - state = receipt["groups"][name] - if state["id"] is None: - receipt["intent"] = {"operation": "create_group", "name": name} - store.save(receipt) - attempted = True - gid = self._ensure_group(token, directory_groups, name) - state["id"] = gid - # A successful creation response plus readback is needed. - checked = {str(g["displayName"]): int(g["id"]) for g in self._directory(token)[1]} - if checked.get(name) != gid or self._group_members(token, gid): - raise RuntimeError("created group readback differs") - receipt["created_groups"].append({"name": name, "id": gid}) - receipt["intent"] = None - store.save(receipt) - for username in members.get(name, []): - if username in state["before"]: - continue - receipt["intent"] = {"operation": "add_member", "name": name, "id": state["id"], "username": username} - store.save(receipt) - # Unlike the lifecycle helper, duplicate/racing additions are - # ambiguous, never accepted as proof that this attempt created it. - attempted = True - result = self._gql(token, "mutation Add($userId: String!, $groupId: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $userId, groupId: $groupId) { ok } }", - {"userId": username, "groupId": state["id"]}) - if result.get("addUserToGroup", {}).get("ok") is not True or username not in self._group_members(token, state["id"]): - raise RuntimeError("membership creation did not read back") - receipt["created_memberships"].append({"name": name, "id": state["id"], "username": username}) - receipt["intent"] = None - store.save(receipt) - self._check_group_postimage(token, receipt) - receipt["state"] = "ensured" - store.save(receipt) - except Exception: - receipt["state"] = "uncertain" if attempted else "refused" - receipt["failure_phase"] = "mutation_attempted" if attempted else "before_mutation" - store.save(receipt) - raise - return self._group_result(receipt) - - def _check_group_postimage(self, token, receipt) -> None: - ids = {str(g["displayName"]): int(g["id"]) for g in self._directory(token)[1]} - for name, state in receipt["groups"].items(): - if ids.get(name) != state["id"] or sorted(self._group_members(token, state["id"])) != state["after"]: - raise RuntimeError("group postimage changed; independent owner reconciliation required") - - def revoke_service_groups(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> GroupResult: - """Reverse confirmed creations from the owner journal only. - - Caller-supplied creation inventories confer no rights. This protects - preexisting state and refuses detected drift; native LLDAP has no CAS or - membership-generation token, so external writer isolation is still an - owner acceptance prerequisite (readback alone cannot exclude ABA). - """ - groups, members = _service_group_request(payload) - _required(payload, "ensure_idempotency_key", "ensure_correlation_id") - delete_if_empty = payload.get("delete_if_empty", False) - if not isinstance(delete_if_empty, bool): - raise ValueError("delete_if_empty must be true or false") - store = self._group_store() - receipt = store.claim_revoke(payload["ensure_idempotency_key"], self._group_binding(groups, members, payload["ensure_correlation_id"]), delete_if_empty) - if receipt["state"] == "revoked": - return self._group_result(receipt, resumed=True) - try: - token = self._login() - # Validate the entire operation before the first destructive call. - self._check_group_postimage(token, receipt) - for edge in receipt["created_memberships"]: - receipt["intent"] = {"operation": "remove_member", **edge} - store.save(receipt) - self._remove_group(token, edge["username"], edge["id"]) - expected = receipt["groups"][edge["name"]]["after"] - expected.remove(edge["username"]) - self._check_group_postimage(token, receipt) - receipt["intent"] = None - store.save(receipt) - receipt["deleted"] = [] - if delete_if_empty: - for group in receipt["created_groups"]: - # Only this attempt's groups, never a preexisting empty group. - self._check_group_postimage(token, receipt) - if self._group_members(token, group["id"]): - raise RuntimeError("created group is no longer empty") - receipt["intent"] = {"operation": "delete_group", **group} - store.save(receipt) - self._gql(token, "mutation Del($id: Int!) { deleteGroup(groupId: $id) { ok } }", {"id": group["id"]}) - if any(int(g["id"]) == group["id"] or g["displayName"] == group["name"] for g in self._directory(token)[1]): - raise RuntimeError("group deletion did not read back") - receipt["deleted"].append(group["name"]) - del receipt["groups"][group["name"]] - receipt["intent"] = None - store.save(receipt) - receipt["state"] = "revoked" - store.save(receipt) - except Exception: - receipt["state"] = "uncertain" - store.save(receipt) - raise - return self._group_result(receipt) - - def _group_members(self, token: str, group_id: int) -> list[str]: - value = self._gql(token, "query G($id: Int!) { group(groupId: $id) { users { id } } }", {"id": group_id}) - return [str(u["id"]) for u in (value.get("group") or {}).get("users", ())] - def _directory(self, token: str) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict]]: value = self._gql(token, "query { users { id email displayName } groups { id displayName } }", {}) return list(value["users"]), list(value["groups"]) @@ -507,13 +333,12 @@ def directory_login( *, base_url: str, admin_password: str, - admin_username: str = "admin", opener: Callable = urlopen, timeout: float = 10, ) -> str: request = Request( base_url.rstrip("/") + "/auth/simple/login", - data=json.dumps({"username": admin_username, "password": admin_password}).encode(), + data=json.dumps({"username": "admin", "password": admin_password}).encode(), headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, method="POST", ) @@ -547,62 +372,9 @@ def _discard(exc: BaseException) -> None: pass -SERVICE_GROUP = re.compile(r"[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}") -RESERVED_GROUP_PREFIXES = ("tenant", "netkingdom-", "net-kingdom-", "lldap_") -DIRECTORY_USERNAME = re.compile(r"[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{0,31}") - - -def _service_group_request(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, list[str]]]: - """Validate a service-access group request before anything is changed. - - Service-access groups gate sign-in to an internal service (SecurityCaseType - oidc-browser-relying-party). Tenant, platform identity/administration, - platform-suspension and LLDAP admin groups are reserved and can never be - touched through this path. - """ - if not isinstance(payload, dict): - raise ValueError("service group request must be an object") - _required(payload, "groups", "idempotency_key", "correlation_id") - allowed = {"groups", "members", "idempotency_key", "correlation_id", "delete_if_empty", "ensure_idempotency_key", "ensure_correlation_id"} - if set(payload) - allowed: - raise ValueError("unsupported service group request fields") - if not isinstance(payload["idempotency_key"], str) or len(payload["idempotency_key"]) > 256: - raise ValueError("invalid idempotency key") - if "ensure_idempotency_key" in payload and (not isinstance(payload["ensure_idempotency_key"], str) or not 16 <= len(payload["ensure_idempotency_key"]) <= 256): - raise ValueError("invalid ensure idempotency key") - for key in ("correlation_id", "ensure_correlation_id"): - if key in payload and (not isinstance(payload[key], str) or not 1 <= len(payload[key]) <= 256): - raise ValueError("invalid correlation identifier") - groups = payload["groups"] - if not isinstance(groups, list) or not groups or len(groups) > 16: - raise ValueError("groups must be a list of 1 to 16 names") - for name in groups: - if not isinstance(name, str) or not SERVICE_GROUP.fullmatch(name): - raise ValueError(f"invalid service group name {name!r}") - if name.startswith(RESERVED_GROUP_PREFIXES): - raise ValueError(f"group {name!r} is reserved") - members = payload.get("members", {}) - if not isinstance(members, dict): - raise ValueError("members must map group names to usernames") - total_members = 0 - for group, users in members.items(): - if group not in groups: - raise ValueError(f"members names group {group!r}, which is not in groups") - if not isinstance(users, list) or not all(isinstance(u, str) and DIRECTORY_USERNAME.fullmatch(u) for u in users): - raise ValueError(f"members of {group!r} must be directory usernames") - total_members += len(users) - if total_members > 256: - raise ValueError("at most 256 service memberships per request") - return list(dict.fromkeys(groups)), {g: list(dict.fromkeys(u)) for g, u in members.items()} - - def dispatch( provisioner: LLDAPProvisioner, path: str, payload: dict[str, Any] ) -> Result | DriftResult: - if path == "/v1/groups/ensure": - return provisioner.ensure_service_groups(payload) - if path == "/v1/groups/revoke": - return provisioner.revoke_service_groups(payload) if path == "/v1/identities/tenant-access": return provisioner.tenant_access(payload) if path == "/v1/identities/provision": @@ -622,16 +394,12 @@ def dispatch( raise KeyError(path) -# Human, service-account and service-admin names (Service Identity standard naming): never self-chosen. -RESERVED_USERNAMES = {"admin", "administrator", "platform-root", "root", "system"} - - def _username(email: str, preferred: object = None) -> str: if preferred is not None: value = str(preferred).strip().lower() if not re.fullmatch(r"[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{2,31}", value): raise ValueError("preferred_username is invalid") - if value in RESERVED_USERNAMES or value.startswith("svc-") or value.endswith("-admin"): + if value in {"admin", "administrator", "platform-root", "root", "system"}: raise ValueError("preferred_username is reserved") return value local = email.partition("@")[0].lower() diff --git a/identity-provisioner/requirements-postgres.txt b/identity-provisioner/requirements-postgres.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9e614f6..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/requirements-postgres.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -# Linux amd64 CPython3.12 runtime closure from user-engine/uv.lock. -# Build-only dependency resolution; no packages are installed at service startup. -psycopg==3.3.5 --hash=sha256:ce5aa5cdb4f9379f00f487590e5890bfa7df9a164648c969ffa628505e21af4e -psycopg-binary==3.3.5 --hash=sha256:682a17a57415c3ca1731eec018ed031f012ffcb81ba74806eb219cb396065672 -typing-extensions==4.16.0 --hash=sha256:481caa481374e813c1b176ada14e97f1f67a4539ce9cfeb3f350d78d6370c2e8 diff --git a/identity-provisioner/server.py b/identity-provisioner/server.py index 422ead5..0331795 100644 --- a/identity-provisioner/server.py +++ b/identity-provisioner/server.py @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import os from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit import secrets -from group_provenance import GroupProvenance, GroupProvenanceUnavailable from provisioner import DependencyFailure, LLDAPProvisioner, _directory_username, dispatch from password_setup import LLDAPPasswordSetter, PasswordSetupGrants @@ -24,8 +23,6 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): if path.path == "/readyz": try: return self._send(200, self.provisioner.preflight()) - except GroupProvenanceUnavailable: - return self._send(503, {"error": "dependency_unavailable", "dependency": "group_provenance"}) except DependencyFailure as exc: return self._send(503, exc.payload()) except RuntimeError: @@ -56,8 +53,6 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): return self._send(404, {"error": "not_found"}) except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc: return self._send(400, {"error": "invalid_request", "message": str(exc)}) - except GroupProvenanceUnavailable: - return self._send(503, {"error": "dependency_unavailable", "dependency": "group_provenance"}) except DependencyFailure as exc: return self._send(503, exc.payload()) except RuntimeError: @@ -114,20 +109,10 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): return -def configured_group_provenance(): - path = os.environ.get("GROUP_PROVENANCE_DB", "") - try: - return GroupProvenance(path) if path else None - except (OSError, ValueError, RuntimeError): - raise GroupProvenanceUnavailable() from None - - def main(): Handler.provisioner = LLDAPProvisioner( base_url=os.environ["LLDAP_URL"], admin_password=os.environ["LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - admin_username=os.environ.get("LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME", "admin"), - group_provenance=configured_group_provenance(), ) Handler.service_token = os.environ["PROVISIONER_SERVICE_TOKEN"].strip() if not Handler.service_token: @@ -138,7 +123,6 @@ def main(): setter=LLDAPPasswordSetter( base_url=os.environ["LLDAP_URL"], admin_password=os.environ["LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - admin_username=os.environ.get("LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME", "admin"), ), tenant_returns=json.loads(os.environ.get("PASSWORD_SETUP_TENANT_RETURNS", "{}")), ttl_seconds=int(os.environ.get("PASSWORD_SETUP_TTL_SECONDS", "900")), diff --git a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_directory_contract.py b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_directory_contract.py index e7c9dca..5f5dfb8 100644 --- a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_directory_contract.py +++ b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_directory_contract.py @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ class DirectoryContractTests(unittest.TestCase): def test_preflight_covers_login_and_directory_read(self): self.assertEqual( - {"status": "ready", "dependency": "directory", "service_groups": "disabled"}, + {"status": "ready", "dependency": "directory"}, self.provisioner.preflight(), ) self.assertEqual(1, self.state.logins) @@ -279,17 +279,6 @@ class DirectoryContractTests(unittest.TestCase): class DirectoryLoginMappingTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_login_uses_the_configured_username_and_defaults_to_admin(self): - seen = [] - - def opener(request, timeout=10): - seen.append(json.loads(request.data)["username"]) - return io.BytesIO(json.dumps({"token": "t"}).encode()) - - directory_login(base_url="http://directory", admin_password=SECRET, opener=opener) - directory_login(base_url="http://directory", admin_password=SECRET, admin_username="svc-provisioner", opener=opener) - self.assertEqual(["admin", "svc-provisioner"], seen) - def test_http_401_becomes_auth_rejected_without_body_or_cause(self): def opener(request, timeout=10): raise HTTPError( diff --git a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_group_postgres.py b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_group_postgres.py deleted file mode 100644 index adcd518..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_group_postgres.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,231 +0,0 @@ -"""Binding, CAS and ambiguous-commit refusal tests; native SQL proof is separate.""" -from dataclasses import replace -import json -from unittest.mock import Mock -import unittest - -from group_provenance import GroupProvenanceUnavailable -from group_provenance_postgres import GroupJournalBinding, PostgresGroupProvenance -from server import configured_group_provenance -from unittest.mock import patch -import os - -EPOCH = '41fbb0ed-ea3a-4682-996b-e9c94a6aa9c6' -BINDING = GroupJournalBinding('tenant:fixture:one', 'synthetic-directory', 'sha256:' + '1' * 64, - 'sha256:' + '2' * 64, 'synthetic-owner', EPOCH) -REQUEST = '3' * 64 -HEAD_DIGEST = 'a' * 64 -META = (EPOCH, 'synthetic-directory', 7, HEAD_DIGEST, False) - - -def fixture(rows=(), rowcount=1, commit_error=None): - cursor = Mock() - cursor.__enter__ = Mock(return_value=cursor) - cursor.__exit__ = Mock(return_value=False) - cursor.fetchone.side_effect = rows - cursor.rowcount = rowcount - connection = Mock() - connection.__enter__ = Mock(return_value=connection) - connection.__exit__ = Mock(return_value=False, side_effect=commit_error) - connection.cursor.return_value = cursor - connector = Mock(return_value=connection) - continuity = Mock() - continuity.check.return_value = True - continuity.advance.return_value = True - store = PostgresGroupProvenance(connect=connector, binding=BINDING, continuity=continuity) - return store, connector, connection, cursor, continuity - - -def receipt(version=4): - return {'key': 'synthetic-operation-key', 'binding': REQUEST, 'state': 'pending', 'intent': None, - 'groups': {}, 'created_groups': [], 'created_memberships': [], - '_pg_version': version, '_pg_context': BINDING.digest} - - -class PostgresSourceTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_explicit_binding_and_continuity_required_without_connecting(self): - connector = Mock() - for binding, continuity in ((None, Mock()), (BINDING, None), ({'tenant_scope': 'caller-json'}, Mock())): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - PostgresGroupProvenance(connect=connector, binding=binding, continuity=continuity) - connector.assert_not_called() - for change in ({'tenant_scope': ''}, {'principal': ''}, {'case_digest': 'unsigned'}, {'epoch': 'default'}): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - replace(BINDING, **change) - self.assertNotEqual(BINDING.digest, replace(BINDING, principal='another-owner').digest) - self.assertNotEqual(BINDING.digest, replace(BINDING, tenant_scope='another-explicit-scope').digest) - - def test_missing_environment_callback_path_keeps_production_disabled(self): - with patch.dict(os.environ, {'GROUP_POSTGRES_DSN': 'synthetic-only', 'GROUP_PROVENANCE_POSTGRES': 'true'}, clear=True): - self.assertIsNone(configured_group_provenance()) - - def test_checkpoint_mismatch_poisoned_without_receipt_query_or_effect(self): - store, connect, _, cursor, checkpoint = fixture([META]) - checkpoint.check.return_value = False - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.reserve('synthetic-operation-key', REQUEST) - self.assertFalse(any('group_receipts' in c.args[0] for c in cursor.execute.call_args_list)) - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.check() - self.assertEqual(1, connect.call_count) - checkpoint.advance.assert_not_called() - - def test_restored_epoch_or_quarantine_refused(self): - for meta in ((EPOCH, 'other-directory', 7, HEAD_DIGEST, False), (EPOCH, 'synthetic-directory', 7, HEAD_DIGEST, True), - ('98aa2b6d-a32a-44a5-a89f-b2480befc00e', 'synthetic-directory', 7, HEAD_DIGEST, False), None): - store, _, _, _, checkpoint = fixture([meta]) - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.check() - checkpoint.check.assert_not_called() - - def test_exactly_one_version_update_required_before_checkpoint_advance(self): - store, _, _, cursor, checkpoint = fixture([META], rowcount=0) - original = receipt() - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.save(original) - query, params = next(c.args for c in cursor.execute.call_args_list if c.args[0].startswith('UPDATE identity_provisioner.group_receipts')) - self.assertIn('AND version = %s', query) - self.assertEqual(4, params[-1]) - self.assertEqual(4, original['_pg_version']) - checkpoint.advance.assert_not_called() - - def test_success_acknowledges_commit_and_updates_receipt_version(self): - store, _, connection, _, checkpoint = fixture([META]) - original = receipt() - store.save(original) - self.assertEqual(5, original['_pg_version']) - connection.__exit__.assert_called_once() - args = checkpoint.advance.call_args.args - self.assertEqual((EPOCH, 'synthetic-directory', 7, HEAD_DIGEST, 8), args[:5]) - self.assertRegex(args[5], r'^[0-9a-f]{64}$') - self.assertNotEqual(HEAD_DIGEST, args[5]) - connection.close.assert_called_once() - - def test_save_preserves_nested_receipt_references_held_by_provisioner(self): - store, *_ = fixture([META]) - original = receipt() - original['groups']['forge-coulomb-owners'] = {'id': None, 'before': [], 'after': ['tegwick']} - state = original['groups']['forge-coulomb-owners'] - groups, created, memberships = original['groups'], original['created_groups'], original['created_memberships'] - original['intent'] = {'operation': 'create_group', 'name': 'forge-coulomb-owners'} - store.save(original) - self.assertIs(groups, original['groups']) - self.assertIs(state, original['groups']['forge-coulomb-owners']) - self.assertIs(created, original['created_groups']) - self.assertIs(memberships, original['created_memberships']) - state['id'] = 4 - self.assertEqual(4, original['groups']['forge-coulomb-owners']['id']) - self.assertEqual(5, original['_pg_version']) - - def test_actual_provisioner_ensure_with_postgres_save_retains_created_ids(self): - from test_service_groups import Directory, req - directory = Directory() - directory.members[3].add('tegwick') - store, _, _, cursor, _ = fixture([META] * 32) - original = receipt(version=1) - payload = req() - original['key'] = payload['idempotency_key'] - original['binding'] = directory._group_binding(payload['groups'], payload['members'], payload['correlation_id']) - # Reservation input is already covered by SQL unit/native oracles. Keep - # real save/_write/transaction and the real provisioner creation path. - store.reserve = Mock(return_value=(original, True)) - directory.group_provenance = store - result = directory.ensure_service_groups(payload) - self.assertEqual('groups_ensured', result.status) - self.assertEqual({'forge-coulomb-owners', 'forge-coulomb-readers'}, {g['name'] for g in result.created_groups}) - self.assertEqual(1, len(result.created_memberships)) - self.assertEqual({'tegwick'}, directory.members[3]) - bodies = [json.loads(c.args[1][2]) for c in cursor.execute.call_args_list - if c.args[0].startswith('UPDATE identity_provisioner.group_receipts')] - self.assertTrue(all(g['id'] is not None for g in bodies[-1]['groups'].values())) - self.assertEqual('ensured', bodies[-1]['state']) - - def test_connection_close_failure_is_sanitized_and_stops_continuation(self): - store, _, connection, _, _ = fixture([META]) - connection.close.side_effect = OSError('synthetic-private-diagnostic') - with self.assertRaisesRegex(GroupProvenanceUnavailable, '^group_provenance_unavailable$'): - store.check() - self.assertTrue(store._poisoned) - - def test_commit_failure_never_advances_owner_checkpoint_or_receipt(self): - store, _, _, _, checkpoint = fixture([META], commit_error=OSError('synthetic-secret-diagnostic')) - original = receipt() - with self.assertRaisesRegex(GroupProvenanceUnavailable, '^group_provenance_unavailable$'): - store.save(original) - self.assertEqual(4, original['_pg_version']) - checkpoint.advance.assert_not_called() - - def test_lost_checkpoint_acknowledgment_refuses_then_poisoned(self): - store, connect, _, _, checkpoint = fixture([META]) - checkpoint.advance.side_effect = OSError('synthetic-secret-diagnostic') - original = receipt() - with self.assertRaisesRegex(GroupProvenanceUnavailable, '^group_provenance_unavailable$'): - store.save(original) - self.assertEqual(4, original['_pg_version']) - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.save(original) - self.assertEqual(1, connect.call_count) - - def test_cross_case_body_or_version_cannot_be_imported(self): - for body in (dict(receipt(), _pg_context='0' * 64), dict(receipt(), _pg_version=6)): - store, _, _, _, _ = fixture([META, (REQUEST, 4, json.dumps(body), json.dumps(BINDING.__dict__, sort_keys=True))]) - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.get('synthetic-operation-key', REQUEST) - - def test_same_counter_divergent_body_or_context_yields_distinct_marker(self): - store, *_ = fixture() - markers = [] - for change in ({}, {'intent': {'operation': 'different'}}, {'key': 'another-exact-key'}, {'_pg_version': 5}): - tx = {'head': 7, 'digest': HEAD_DIGEST} - store._transition(tx, dict(receipt(), **change), 'save') - markers.append(tx['next_digest']) - self.assertEqual(4, len(set(markers))) - tx = {'head': 7, 'digest': 'b' * 64} - store._transition(tx, receipt(), 'save') - self.assertNotIn(tx['next_digest'], markers) - foreign, *_ = fixture() - foreign.binding = replace(BINDING, principal='another-owner') - tx = {'head': 7, 'digest': HEAD_DIGEST} - foreign._transition(tx, receipt(), 'save') - self.assertNotIn(tx['next_digest'], markers) - - def test_reopened_loser_clone_at_same_head_refuses_different_marker(self): - # Both DBs report head8. The independent callback accepts only winner - # digest; loser must be refused before loading any receipt or effect. - loser_digest = 'b' * 64 - store, _, _, cursor, checkpoint = fixture([(EPOCH, 'synthetic-directory', 8, loser_digest, False)]) - checkpoint.check.side_effect = lambda epoch, directory, head, digest: (head, digest) == (8, 'c' * 64) - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.check() - checkpoint.check.assert_called_once_with(EPOCH, 'synthetic-directory', 8, loser_digest) - self.assertFalse(any('group_receipts' in c.args[0] for c in cursor.execute.call_args_list)) - - def test_existing_request_mismatch_is_refused_not_rebound(self): - store, _, _, _, checkpoint = fixture([META, ('0' * 64, 4, '{}', '{}')]) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'binding mismatch'): - store.get('synthetic-operation-key', REQUEST) - checkpoint.advance.assert_not_called() - self.assertFalse(store._poisoned) - - def test_active_fence_capacity_refusal_and_no_insert(self): - for rows in ([META, None, (1,)], [META, None, None, (256,)]): - store, _, _, cursor, checkpoint = fixture(rows) - with self.assertRaises(GroupProvenanceUnavailable): - store.reserve('synthetic-operation-key', REQUEST) - self.assertFalse(any('INSERT' in c.args[0] for c in cursor.execute.call_args_list)) - checkpoint.advance.assert_not_called() - - def test_new_reservation_retains_bound_context_and_write_intent(self): - store, _, _, cursor, checkpoint = fixture([META, None, None, (0,)]) - created, fresh = store.reserve('synthetic-operation-key', REQUEST) - self.assertTrue(fresh) - self.assertEqual('pending', created['state']) - self.assertEqual(BINDING.digest, created['_pg_context']) - insert = next(c for c in cursor.execute.call_args_list if c.args[0].startswith('INSERT')) - self.assertIn('context_json', insert.args[0]) - self.assertEqual(BINDING.tenant_scope, json.loads(insert.args[1][1])['tenant_scope']) - checkpoint.advance.assert_called_once() - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_group_provenance.py b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_group_provenance.py deleted file mode 100644 index 1bcb284..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_group_provenance.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,326 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic actual provisioner/HTTP/storage proof; no live LDAP or authority.""" -import concurrent.futures -from dataclasses import asdict -from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer -import json -import os -import sqlite3 -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import threading -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch -from urllib.error import HTTPError -from urllib.request import Request, urlopen - -from group_provenance import GroupProvenance -from provisioner import LLDAPProvisioner, dispatch -from server import Handler, configured_group_provenance -from test_service_groups import Directory, req - - -def rollback(**kw): - return req(ensure_idempotency_key=req()["idempotency_key"], ensure_correlation_id=req()["correlation_id"], **kw) - - -class ProvenanceTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_inventory_excludes_preexisting_membership_and_empty_group(self): - d = Directory() - d.members[3].add("tegwick") - result = d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - self.assertEqual([{"name": "forge-coulomb-owners", "id": 4}, {"name": "forge-coulomb-readers", "id": 5}], list(result.created_groups)) - self.assertEqual([{"name": "forge-coulomb-owners", "id": 4, "username": "tegwick"}], list(result.created_memberships)) - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(delete_if_empty=True)) - self.assertEqual({"tegwick"}, d.members[3]) - self.assertIn("forge-admins", d.groups) - self.assertNotIn("forge-coulomb-owners", d.groups) - - def test_preexisting_empty_group_never_deleted(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(delete_if_empty=True)) - self.assertIn("forge-admins", d.groups) - self.assertEqual(set(), d.members[3]) - - def test_unknown_receipt_and_digest_mismatch_before_login(self): - d = Directory() - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback()) - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.calls.clear() - with patch.object(d, "_login", side_effect=AssertionError("must not login")): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(members={"forge-admins": ["agent-codex"]})) - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.ensure_service_groups(req(groups=["another-group"], members={})) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_unsigned_inventory_and_legacy_revoke_cannot_mutate(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.calls.clear() - for payload in [req(), rollback(created_groups=[{"name": "forge-admins", "id": 3}]), rollback(created_memberships=[]), rollback(provenance={})]: - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.revoke_service_groups(payload) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_shared_membership_drift_refuses_all_destructive_calls(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.members[3].add("agent-codex") - d.calls.clear() - with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "postimage"): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(delete_if_empty=True)) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - self.assertEqual({"tegwick", "agent-codex"}, d.members[3]) - - def test_replaced_group_identity_refuses_all_destructive_calls(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.groups["forge-admins"] = 10 - d.members[10] = {"tegwick"} - d.calls.clear() - with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "postimage"): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback()) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_successful_ensure_replay_never_recreates_later_removed_state(self): - d = Directory() - first = d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.members[3].clear() - d.calls.clear() - replay = d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - self.assertTrue(replay.resumed) - self.assertEqual(first.created_memberships, replay.created_memberships) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - self.assertEqual(set(), d.members[3]) - - def test_interrupted_add_persists_intent_and_blocks_restart_retry(self): - d = Directory() - original = d._gql - def lost_response(token, query, variables): - result = original(token, query, variables) - if "addUserToGroup" in query: - raise RuntimeError("synthetic lost response") - return result - d._gql = lost_response - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.group_provenance = GroupProvenance(d.group_provenance.path) - receipt = d.group_provenance.get(req()["idempotency_key"], d._group_binding(req()["groups"], req()["members"], req()["correlation_id"])) - self.assertEqual("uncertain", receipt["state"]) - self.assertEqual("add_member", receipt["intent"]["operation"]) - self.assertEqual([], receipt["created_memberships"]) - d.calls.clear() - for operation, payload in [(d.ensure_service_groups, req()), (d.revoke_service_groups, rollback()), (d.ensure_service_groups, req(idempotency_key="different-key-is-not-recovery"))]: - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - operation(payload) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_interrupted_rollback_retains_confirmed_inventory_and_pending_intent(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - original = d._remove_group - def lost_response(*args): - original(*args) - raise RuntimeError("lost remove response") - d._remove_group = lost_response - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback()) - d.group_provenance = GroupProvenance(d.group_provenance.path) - receipt = d.group_provenance.get(req()["idempotency_key"], d._group_binding(req()["groups"], req()["members"], req()["correlation_id"])) - self.assertEqual("uncertain", receipt["state"]) - self.assertEqual("remove_member", receipt["intent"]["operation"]) - self.assertEqual(2, len(receipt["created_memberships"])) - d.calls.clear() - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback()) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_unresolved_pre_call_intent_survives_hard_process_loss(self): - d = Directory() - d._gql = lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(SystemExit("process lost before response")) - with self.assertRaises(SystemExit): - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.group_provenance = GroupProvenance(d.group_provenance.path) - receipt = d.group_provenance.get(req()["idempotency_key"], d._group_binding(req()["groups"], req()["members"], req()["correlation_id"])) - self.assertEqual("pending", receipt["state"]) - self.assertEqual("add_member", receipt["intent"]["operation"]) - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - - def test_missing_config_private_permissions_and_lost_database_fail_closed(self): - with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True): - self.assertIsNone(configured_group_provenance()) - d = Directory() - path = d.group_provenance.path - with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GROUP_PROVENANCE_DB": path}): - self.assertIsInstance(configured_group_provenance(), GroupProvenance) - os.chmod(path, 0o644) - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - configured_group_provenance() - os.chmod(path, 0o600) - os.unlink(path) - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - configured_group_provenance() - self.assertFalse(Path(path).exists()) - provider = LLDAPProvisioner(base_url="https://invalid", admin_password="synthetic") - with patch.object(provider, "_login", side_effect=AssertionError("no directory")): - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - provider.ensure_service_groups(req()) - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - provider.revoke_service_groups(rollback()) - - def test_missing_intent_row_stops_before_any_directory_effect(self): - d = Directory() - store = d.group_provenance - original_save = store.save - def lose_row(receipt): - if receipt["intent"] is not None: - with sqlite3.connect(store.path) as db: - db.execute("DELETE FROM group_receipts") - original_save(receipt) - store.save = lose_row - with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "group_provenance_unavailable"): - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_live_instance_rejects_replaced_database_before_effect(self): - d = Directory() - original = d.group_provenance - replacement = str(Path(d.storage.name) / "replacement.db") - GroupProvenance(replacement, initialize=True) - os.replace(replacement, original.path) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "group_provenance_unavailable"): - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_failed_before_mutation_is_retained_without_stranding_other_keys(self): - for failure in ("unknown-user", "oversized-prestate", "directory-read-failed"): - d = Directory() - old_members = d._group_members - request = req(members={"forge-admins": ["nobody"]}) if failure == "unknown-user" else req() - if failure == "oversized-prestate": - d._group_members = lambda *_: [f"synthetic{i}" for i in range(4097)] - if failure == "directory-read-failed": - d._group_members = lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("read failed")) - with self.assertRaises((ValueError, RuntimeError)): - d.ensure_service_groups(request) - binding = d._group_binding(request["groups"], request["members"], request["correlation_id"]) - receipt = d.group_provenance.get(request["idempotency_key"], binding) - self.assertEqual("refused", receipt["state"]) - self.assertEqual("before_mutation", receipt["failure_phase"]) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - d._group_members = old_members - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - d.ensure_service_groups(request) - self.assertEqual("groups_ensured", d.ensure_service_groups(req(idempotency_key="another-valid-operation-key")).status) - - def test_current_correlations_are_bound_to_original_ensure(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - d.calls.clear() - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.ensure_service_groups(req(correlation_id="other-case")) - payload = rollback() - payload["ensure_correlation_id"] = "other-case" - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.revoke_service_groups(payload) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_readiness_separates_directory_health_from_group_capability(self): - provider = LLDAPProvisioner(base_url="https://invalid", admin_password="synthetic") - provider._login = lambda **_: "synthetic" - provider._gql = lambda *_args, **_kw: {"groups": []} - self.assertEqual("disabled", provider.preflight()["service_groups"]) - d = Directory() - provider.group_provenance = d.group_provenance - self.assertEqual("available", provider.preflight()["service_groups"]) - os.chmod(d.group_provenance.path, 0o644) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "group_provenance_unavailable"): - provider.preflight() - - def test_concurrent_sqlite_reservation_allows_one_original_attempt(self): - d = Directory() - path = d.group_provenance.path - def reserve(_): - return GroupProvenance(path).reserve("synthetic-concurrent-key", "same-binding")[1] - with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=8) as pool: - fresh = list(pool.map(reserve, range(24))) - self.assertEqual(1, sum(fresh)) - - def test_bounded_records_never_age_or_evict_into_authority(self): - d = Directory() - store = GroupProvenance(d.group_provenance.path, capacity=1) - receipt, _ = store.reserve("one", "binding") - receipt.update(state="ensured", requested_groups=[], ensure_correlation_id="test") - store.save(receipt) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "capacity"): - store.reserve("two", "binding") - self.assertFalse(store.reserve("one", "binding")[1]) - - def test_rollback_replay_and_key_reuse_do_not_recreate(self): - d = Directory() - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - first = d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(delete_if_empty=True)) - d.calls.clear() - result = d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(delete_if_empty=True)) - self.assertEqual(first.status, result.status) - self.assertTrue(result.resumed) - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - d.ensure_service_groups(req()) - with self.assertRaises(ValueError): - d.revoke_service_groups(rollback(delete_if_empty=False)) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - - def test_real_http_handler_reinitialized_from_config_retains_receipt(self): - d = Directory() - path = d.group_provenance.path - def boot(): - with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GROUP_PROVENANCE_DB": path}): - provider = LLDAPProvisioner(base_url="https://synthetic.invalid", admin_password="unused", group_provenance=configured_group_provenance()) - # Only directory transport is synthetic; actual initialized adapter, - # dispatch, HTTP authentication, configuration and SQLite are used. - for name in ("_login", "_directory", "_group_members", "_ensure_group", "_gql", "_remove_group"): - setattr(provider, name, getattr(d, name)) - class LocalHandler(Handler): - provisioner = provider - service_token = "synthetic-service-token" - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), LocalHandler) - thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) - thread.start() - return server, thread - def stop(server, thread): - server.shutdown(); server.server_close(); thread.join() - def post(server, endpoint, payload): - request = Request(f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}/v1/groups/{endpoint}", data=json.dumps(payload).encode(), - headers={"Authorization": "Bearer synthetic-service-token"}) - with urlopen(request) as response: - return json.load(response) - server, thread = boot() - try: - created = post(server, "ensure", req()) - finally: - stop(server, thread) - server, thread = boot() - try: - d.calls.clear() - replay = post(server, "ensure", req()) - self.assertTrue(replay["resumed"]) - self.assertEqual(created["created_memberships"], replay["created_memberships"]) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - revoked = post(server, "revoke", rollback(delete_if_empty=True)) - self.assertEqual("groups_revoked_and_deleted", revoked["status"]) - self.assertIn("forge-admins", d.groups) - with self.assertRaises(HTTPError) as error: - post(server, "revoke", req()) - self.assertEqual(400, error.exception.code) - d.calls.clear() - os.chmod(path, 0o644) - with self.assertRaises(HTTPError) as error: - post(server, "ensure", req(idempotency_key="different-invocation-key")) - self.assertEqual(503, error.exception.code) - self.assertEqual({"error": "dependency_unavailable", "dependency": "group_provenance"}, json.load(error.exception)) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls) - finally: - stop(server, thread) diff --git a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_platform_group_boundary.py b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_platform_group_boundary.py deleted file mode 100644 index b32cbdb..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_platform_group_boundary.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -"""Service group operations must never reach platform IAM groups.""" -import unittest -from unittest.mock import Mock - -from provisioner import LLDAPProvisioner, dispatch - - -class PlatformGroupBoundaryTests(unittest.TestCase): - # Standard library only: the CI image (python:3.12-slim) has no pytest. - def test_platform_groups_refused_before_directory_login(self): - for path in ("/v1/groups/ensure", "/v1/groups/revoke"): - for group in ("net-kingdom-admins", "net-kingdom-users", "net-kingdom-future-role"): - with self.subTest(path=path, group=group): - provider = LLDAPProvisioner( - base_url="https://directory.invalid", admin_password="synthetic-fixture", - ) - provider._login = Mock(side_effect=AssertionError("must not contact directory")) - payload = { - "groups": ["activity-core-operators", group], - "members": {group: ["agent-codex"]}, - "idempotency_key": "platform-boundary-test", - "correlation_id": "source-test", - "delete_if_empty": True, - } - with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "reserved"): - dispatch(provider, path, payload) - provider._login.assert_not_called() - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_provisioner.py b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_provisioner.py index 3644d5d..fef0caa 100644 --- a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_provisioner.py +++ b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_provisioner.py @@ -44,9 +44,6 @@ class ProvisionerTests(unittest.TestCase): _username("other@example.test", "not allowed!") with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "reserved"): _username("other@example.test", "admin") - for name in ("svc-authelia", "ld-admin", "pi-admin"): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "reserved"): - _username("other@example.test", name) def test_dispatch_requires_idempotency(self): with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "idempotency_key"): diff --git a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_service_groups.py b/identity-provisioner/tests/test_service_groups.py deleted file mode 100644 index c6dd48b..0000000 --- a/identity-provisioner/tests/test_service_groups.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,140 +0,0 @@ -import unittest -import tempfile -from pathlib import Path - -from group_provenance import GroupProvenance - -from provisioner import LLDAPProvisioner, dispatch - - -class Directory(LLDAPProvisioner): - """In-memory LLDAP: users, groups and memberships.""" - - def __init__(self): - self.storage = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.group_provenance = GroupProvenance(str(Path(self.storage.name) / "groups.db"), initialize=True) - self.users = {"tegwick", "agent-codex"} - self.groups = {"lldap_admin": 1, "tenant:trial:one:users": 2, "forge-admins": 3} - self.members = {1: {"tegwick"}, 2: set(), 3: set()} - self.calls = [] - self.drop_add = False - - def _login(self): - return "test-token" - - def _directory(self, token): - return ([{"id": u} for u in sorted(self.users)], - [{"id": i, "displayName": n} for n, i in self.groups.items()]) - - def _user(self, token, subject): - return {"id": subject, "groups": [{"id": i, "displayName": n} for n, i in self.groups.items() - if subject in self.members[i]]} - - def _ensure_group(self, token, groups, name): - if name not in self.groups: - self.calls.append(("create", name)) - self.groups[name] = max(self.groups.values()) + 1 - self.members[self.groups[name]] = set() - return self.groups[name] - - def _add_group(self, token, username, group_id): - self.calls.append(("add", username, group_id)) - if not self.drop_add: - self.members[group_id].add(username) - - def _remove_group(self, token, username, group_id): - self.calls.append(("remove", username, group_id)) - self.members[group_id].discard(username) - - def _group_members(self, token, group_id): - return sorted(self.members[group_id]) - - def _gql(self, token, query, variables): - if "addUserToGroup" in query: - self._add_group(token, variables["userId"], variables["groupId"]) - return {"addUserToGroup": {"ok": True}} - if "deleteGroup" in query: - self.calls.append(("delete", variables["id"])) - name = next(n for n, i in self.groups.items() if i == variables["id"]) - del self.groups[name] - return {"deleteGroup": {"ok": True}} - raise AssertionError(query) - - -def req(**kw): - p = {"groups": ["forge-admins", "forge-coulomb-owners", "forge-coulomb-readers"], - "members": {"forge-admins": ["tegwick"], "forge-coulomb-owners": ["tegwick"]}, - "idempotency_key": "forgejo-netkingdom-oidc-1", "correlation_id": "test"} - p.update(kw) - return p - - -class EnsureTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_creates_missing_groups_and_adds_members(self): - d = Directory() - r = dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - self.assertEqual("groups_ensured", r.status) - self.assertFalse(r.resumed) - self.assertEqual({"forge-coulomb-owners", "forge-coulomb-readers"}, - {c[1] for c in d.calls if c[0] == "create"}) - self.assertIn("tegwick", d.members[d.groups["forge-admins"]]) - self.assertIn("tegwick", d.members[d.groups["forge-coulomb-owners"]]) - - def test_idempotent_and_reports_resumed(self): - d = Directory() - dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - d.calls.clear() - r = dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - self.assertTrue(r.resumed) - self.assertEqual([], [c for c in d.calls if c[0] == "create"]) - - def test_never_removes_other_memberships(self): - d = Directory() - d.members[3].add("agent-codex") - dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - self.assertIn("agent-codex", d.members[3]) - self.assertEqual([], [c for c in d.calls if c[0] == "remove"]) - - def test_reserved_and_invalid_requests_change_nothing(self): - bad = [req(groups=["lldap_admin"]), req(groups=["tenant-x"]), req(groups=["netkingdom-suspended"]), - req(groups=["Forge Admins"]), req(groups=[]), - req(members={"not-listed": ["tegwick"]}), - req(members={"forge-admins": ["Not A User"]}), - req(members={"forge-admins": ["nobody"]})] - for payload in bad: - d = Directory() - with self.assertRaises(ValueError, msg=payload): - dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", payload) - self.assertEqual([], d.calls, payload) - - def test_failed_readback_never_reports_success(self): - d = Directory() - d.drop_add = True - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - - -class RevokeTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_removes_only_listed_memberships_and_keeps_groups_by_default(self): - d = Directory() - d.members[3].add("agent-codex") - dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - r = dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/revoke", req(ensure_idempotency_key=req()["idempotency_key"], ensure_correlation_id=req()["correlation_id"])) - self.assertEqual("groups_revoked", r.status) - self.assertEqual({"agent-codex"}, d.members[d.groups["forge-admins"]]) - self.assertIn("forge-coulomb-owners", d.groups) - - def test_deletes_only_empty_listed_groups_when_asked(self): - d = Directory() - d.members[3].add("agent-codex") - dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/ensure", req()) - r = dispatch(d, "/v1/groups/revoke", req(delete_if_empty=True, ensure_idempotency_key=req()["idempotency_key"], ensure_correlation_id=req()["correlation_id"])) - self.assertEqual("groups_revoked_and_deleted", r.status) - self.assertIn("forge-admins", d.groups) - self.assertNotIn("forge-coulomb-owners", d.groups) - self.assertNotIn("forge-coulomb-readers", d.groups) - self.assertIn("lldap_admin", d.groups) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/intakes/NET-IN-0005-single-use-setup-link-mail-handoff.md b/intakes/NET-IN-0005-single-use-setup-link-mail-handoff.md deleted file mode 100644 index f9b86d7..0000000 --- a/intakes/NET-IN-0005-single-use-setup-link-mail-handoff.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NET-IN-0005 -kind: intake -title: "Expose a recipient-bound opaque delivery handoff for provider password setup" -status: open -flavor: implementation -origin: cross-repo -origin_ref: USER-WP-0035-T02 -priority: high -owner: net-kingdom -repo: net-kingdom -requested_by: user-engine -created: "2026-10-11" -updated: "2026-10-11" -related: [EMAIL-IN-0001, NK-WP-0047] ---- - -The identity-provisioner currently generates `password_setup_url` in the -provision response. `PasswordSetupGrants` has a 900-second default lifetime, -stores only a digest, revokes the prior grant on reissue, invalidates grants on -restart and consumes before applying the password. The URL reaches User Engine's -provider-owned setup screen; there is no supported issuer-to-mail delivery -operation. Existing NK-WP-0047 proves Authelia reset-mail delivery and personal -sign-in, not this separate identity-provisioner setup grant. - -Prepare the provider side of the fixed email-connect capability requested in -EMAIL-IN-0001. Return an exact owner implementation work record and public -handoff contract. User Engine should receive a non-secret opaque receipt with -provider/request identity, expiry and accepted/uncertain/rejected status; the -single-use bearer URL should go directly from the issuer through the reviewed -recipient-bound delivery actuator. Do not add an OpenBao client, directory -credential, mailbox-admin token or password setter to User Engine. - -Bind delivery to the provider-authoritative subject/recipient and the approved -user/tenant lifecycle intent. Preserve existing authenticated provisioning and -PDP admission; a successful mail request is not new authorization. Define stable -request identity and behavior on duplicate, provider timeout, restart, reissue, -cancel and recipient mismatch. A retry must not silently issue a new grant and -invalidate the message the intended person already received. Keep the grant -single-use, expiring and provider-owned; no raw link in durable application -outboxes, audit events or work records. - -Publish synthetic and owner-reviewed native evidence for the exact handoff, -private intended-person receipt and setup completion separately. Do not claim -that invitation acceptance, registration mailbox verification or Authelia's -completed reset journey proves this path. No live changes, mail, credential or -setup-grant reads occurred in this request. This is owner preparation first, -not a per-item founder approval question or a founder-ready attended command. diff --git a/intakes/intakes.md b/intakes/intakes.md index c1f869d..811fdf9 100644 --- a/intakes/intakes.md +++ b/intakes/intakes.md @@ -73,65 +73,3 @@ updated: '2026-08-29' state_hub_intake_id: "01a06eb9-c4af-7a9e-8ff5-1bc5f845eb38" ``` - -## NET-IN-0003 — Demand-deferred workload-requested step-up interoperability - -```yaml -id: NET-IN-0003 -kind: intake -title: 'Demand-deferred workload-requested step-up interoperability' -status: open -flavor: residual -origin: residual -origin_ref: NK-WP-0042 -priority: low -owner: net-kingdom -requested_by: net-kingdom -created: '2026-10-10' -updated: '2026-10-10' -description: > - Proposed IAM v0.4 carries the acr_values strength and max_age freshness - contract, but no arbitrary-client workload-requested step-up integration - has been accepted. The founder selected optional MFA on coulomb-social - with no acr_values=aal2 switch-on (user-engine/docs/mfa-pilot-decision.md). - Keep this demand-deferred: promote only for a named workload requirement - and separately approved issuer/client policy. On promotion coordinate - KeyCape enforcement, user-engine enrollment/recovery and workload/PDP - assurance; prove no-factor refusal, enrollment return, stale AAL1 and - provider unavailability with actual-user acceptance. Existing optional - U05-U08 acceptance stays live in USER-WP-0027-T04 / USER-WP-0028-T03 - and decision cef97ccd; it is not deferred by this intake. -state_hub_intake_id: "01a12705-4400-7121-b326-1f63135bcab4" -``` - -## NET-IN-0004 — Adopt and publish the bounded Staff-evidence successor source - -```yaml -id: NET-IN-0004 -kind: intake -title: 'Adopt and publish the bounded Staff-evidence successor source' -status: open -origin: cross-repo -origin_ref: GH-WP-0004-T06 / GH-DEC-2026-025 -priority: medium -owner: net-kingdom -requested_by: gate-house -created: '2026-10-11' -updated: '2026-10-11' -description: > - The confirmed founder disposition accepts the bounded doctrine proposal, - not an entire successor standard. Proposed security-layer-model_v0.9.md - assembles only its exact section3.4/4 candidate. Obtain exact successor - source-owner/doctrine review and separate required whole-revision acceptance - before acceptance annotations, operative companion/checker repointing or - PolicyNexus owner publication. Retain acceptedv0.8 SHA3d829856 unchanged. - Existing GH-WP-0004 holds GateHouse doctrine/checker responsibilities; this - one owner intake retains source adoption/publication without a parallel plan. - Source receipt completes GateHouse handoff, not standard adoption. - INFD-IN-0007 waits for the accepted standard voice. Staff tension stays - unresolved; per-event guarantees remain owed until source-owner class-specific - reconciliation returns proof. Finished INFD-WP-0005/0007 remain historical - receipts and must not be reopened solely from stale declarations. - No deployment, credentials or runtime conformity is authorized here. -state_hub_intake_id: "01a128ba-a62b-7887-a217-419a5958da8b" -``` diff --git a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.bootstrap-recovery.md b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.bootstrap-recovery.md deleted file mode 100644 index 31321da..0000000 --- a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.bootstrap-recovery.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,184 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: capability.security.bootstrap-recovery -owner: net-kingdom -status: draft -domain: infotech -maturity: - discovery: - current: D3 - target: D5 - confidence: medium - rationale: Owner scope, neighboring responsibilities, concrete use cases and limitations - are documented; no exhaustive or generalized maturity claim. - availability: - current: A2 - target: A2 - confidence: medium - rationale: 'Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: Local identity, bootstrap console, - encrypted custody handoff and caller tools. Availability describes the delivery - form, not production acceptance. Source repairs and disposable native fixtures - do not prove estate root isolation or recovery.' -external_evidence: - completeness: - level: C1 - confidence: low - basis: Source artifacts establish a bounded capability; no independent consumer-completeness - assessment in this review. - reliability: - level: R0 - confidence: low - basis: No longitudinal consumer reliability measurement established by this review. -name: Guarded bootstrap and recovery preparation -summary: Guarded bootstrap custody, encrypted identity backup capture, independent - retrieval and isolated recovery verification. -tags: -- security -- netkingdom -- framework-reuse -- backup -- restore -- disaster-recovery -- age -- privacyidea -- lldap -- authelia -- keycape -discovery: - intent: Find and verify off-host identity recovery material before rebuilding Railiance - authentication. - includes: - - Local identity, bootstrap console, encrypted custody handoff and caller tools - - Bounded LLDAP/Authelia SQLite snapshots, KeyCape signing/config/policy and original - privacyIDEA keys plus linked PostgreSQL dump - - Public-recipient age sealing, Storage Share create/readback, separate retention - and attended independent-key archive verification - - Railiance bootstrap handoff and actual independent-provider retrieval requiring - neither OpenBao nor SSO; operator archive recovery passed on 2026-10-16 - excludes: - - Source repairs and disposable native fixtures do not prove estate root isolation - or recovery - use_cases: - - 'U10: Operator recovers identity, custody or data with independently held recovery - material' -availability: - current_level: A2 - target_level: A2 - current_artifacts: - - tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md - - tools/custody-record/README.md - - docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-offline-recovery.sh - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh - - docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md - - docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md - - docs/storage-share-recovery-publication.md - - tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -relations: - related_to: - - capability.security.practice-canon - - capability.security.doctrine-review - - capability.iam.key-cape - - capability.authorization.policy-evaluate - - capability.registry.register - - capability.railiance.bootstrap-sequencing - specializes: - - capability.security.iam-tooling-suite -evidence: - documentation: - - tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md - - tools/custody-record/README.md - - docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md - - workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md - - docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-full-recovery-review.json - - docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/activation-review.json - tests: - - tests/test_identity_bundle.py - - tests/test_identity_offsite.py - - tests/test_identity_backup_preparation.py - - tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py - - tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py - - tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py -consumer_guidance: - recommended_for: - - Operator recovers identity, custody or data with independently held recovery material - not_recommended_for: - - Source repairs and disposable native fixtures do not prove estate root isolation - or recovery - known_limitations: - - Source repairs and disposable native fixtures do not prove estate root isolation - or recovery - - 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry - entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. - - Actual privacyIDEA internal token-material readback and stored audit continuity - passed; existing-token MFA, Authelia and KeyCape authentication remain open. - - Storage Share initial destination only; no second-provider full identity copy - or autonomous bare-VM restore is established. - - Actual first full identity bundle captured, sealed and Storage Share readback - verified on2026-10-16; both scoped readers passed native identity/namespace/audience/ESO - checks. Independent human-key full archive recovery passed and daily backup/hourly - health are active. Full service authentication, existing-token MFA - and an unattended full-estate rebuild remain unproven. 56 focused implementation - checks pass. ---- - -# Guarded bootstrap and recovery preparation - -Local identity, bootstrap console, encrypted custody handoff and caller tools. - -## Reuse boundary - -Source repairs and disposable native fixtures do not prove estate root isolation or recovery. - -## Supported use cases - -- U10: Operator recovers identity, custody or data with independently held recovery material - -## Evidence and integration - -- [tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md](../../tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md) -- [tools/custody-record/README.md](../../tools/custody-record/README.md) - -Assessment: CUST-WP-0081, 2026-10-14. Relations identify interfaces to compose; they do not certify native integration. Existing external evidence levels are retained where present. New entries use conservative C1/R0 until consumer assessment exists. - -## Identity recovery and bootstrap handoff - -Start with [the recovery ceremony](../../docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md). It names the exact capture, retrieval, hidden-key verification, activation gates and remaining full-service proof. Railiance bootstrap sequences the isolated recovery and layer handoff; NetKingdom owns identity assets and native acceptance. Discovery does not authorize grants or live restore. - -For an outage, use [the Storage Share recovery guide](../../docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md) -and the self-contained kit built by `tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py`. -The private operator handoff publishes the versioned guide/kit with readback, -retrieves the protected generation using independently held provider access, -and prompts separately for the human-held age key. Actual publication/readback -and independent outage-path archive recovery passed on 2026-10-16; T23/T26 are -done. See [the published location and trusted kit digest](../../docs/storage-share-recovery-publication.md). -The [isolated service packet](../../docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md) -records the remaining service-owner admission and native tests. - -The local LLDAP stage now has a fixed-target executor with no external network, -ports or host mounts, Linux-tmpfs plaintext, original directory/key preservation, -native existing-user/wrong-password checks and cleanup. Six actual-image tests -with synthetic credentials passed, including an encrypted-bundle restore. All -five pinned service images were saved/reloaded locally. T28/T29 record that -preparation. Actual private real-backup LLDAP recovery passed on 2026-10-16; -T16 is done, with original identity rows, positive/negative native bind, -isolation and cleanup accepted. Authelia, KeyCape and existing-token MFA remain open. - -The token-material/audit stage is `run-isolated-privacyidea.sh TRANSFER_RECEIPT`, with -only a hidden backup-key prompt. Its pinned native routines check internal -token-material readback and stored audit signatures, preserve original keys, -report history exceptions and remove the isolated database/worker/tmpfs. Native -synthetic tests cover valid, tampered and unsigned history, malformed keys and -encrypted-bundle recovery. Actual owner recovery passed on 2026-10-16: five token materials read internally, -279,209 stored signatures verified, new-entry/negative checks and cleanup passed. -T20/T31 are done; existing-token MFA remains T19 and is not implied by readback. diff --git a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.case-contracts.md b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.case-contracts.md deleted file mode 100644 index 85c5898..0000000 --- a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.case-contracts.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,110 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: capability.security.case-contracts -owner: net-kingdom -status: draft -domain: infotech -maturity: - discovery: - current: D3 - target: D5 - confidence: medium - rationale: Owner scope, neighboring responsibilities, concrete use cases and limitations - are documented; no exhaustive or generalized maturity claim. - availability: - current: A2 - target: A2 - confidence: medium - rationale: 'Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: Versioned types, cases and schema - validation. Availability describes the delivery form, not production acceptance. - Type acknowledgment, case acceptance, structural materialization and native - execution are distinct.' -external_evidence: - completeness: - level: C1 - confidence: low - basis: Source artifacts establish a bounded capability; no independent consumer-completeness - assessment in this review. - reliability: - level: R0 - confidence: low - basis: No longitudinal consumer reliability measurement established by this review. -name: Security case types and instance validation -summary: Versioned types, cases and schema validation. -tags: -- security -- netkingdom -- framework-reuse -discovery: - intent: Versioned types, cases and schema validation - includes: - - Versioned types, cases and schema validation - excludes: - - Type acknowledgment, case acceptance, structural materialization and native execution - are distinct - use_cases: - - 'U01: Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and - case types' - - 'U05: Operator provisions and delivers a scoped workload credential through the - approved owner lane' - - 'U06: Operator or automation obtains a bounded SSH certificate and maintains private - connectivity' -availability: - current_level: A2 - target_level: A2 - current_artifacts: - - tools/security-case-types/README.md - - canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -relations: - related_to: - - capability.security.practice-canon - - capability.security.doctrine-review - - capability.iam.key-cape - - capability.authorization.policy-evaluate - - capability.registry.register - specializes: - - capability.security.iam-tooling-suite -evidence: - documentation: - - tools/security-case-types/README.md - - canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md -consumer_guidance: - recommended_for: - - Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and case - types - - Operator provisions and delivers a scoped workload credential through the approved - owner lane - - Operator or automation obtains a bounded SSH certificate and maintains private - connectivity - not_recommended_for: - - Type acknowledgment, case acceptance, structural materialization and native execution - are distinct - known_limitations: - - Type acknowledgment, case acceptance, structural materialization and native execution - are distinct - - 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry - entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. ---- - -# Security case types and instance validation - -Versioned types, cases and schema validation. - -## Reuse boundary - -Type acknowledgment, case acceptance, structural materialization and native execution are distinct. - -## Supported use cases - -- U01: Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and case types -- U05: Operator provisions and delivers a scoped workload credential through the approved owner lane -- U06: Operator or automation obtains a bounded SSH certificate and maintains private connectivity - -## Evidence and integration - -- [tools/security-case-types/README.md](../../tools/security-case-types/README.md) -- [canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md](../../canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md) - -Assessment: CUST-WP-0081, 2026-10-14. Relations identify interfaces to compose; they do not certify native integration. Existing external evidence levels are retained where present. New entries use conservative C1/R0 until consumer assessment exists. diff --git a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.emission-profile.md b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.emission-profile.md deleted file mode 100644 index 2766f8c..0000000 --- a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.emission-profile.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: capability.security.emission-profile -owner: net-kingdom -status: draft -domain: infotech -maturity: - discovery: - current: D3 - target: D5 - confidence: medium - rationale: Owner scope, neighboring responsibilities, concrete use cases and limitations - are documented; no exhaustive or generalized maturity claim. - availability: - current: A2 - target: A2 - confidence: medium - rationale: 'Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: Security profile over generic - emission contracts and validator. Availability describes the delivery form, - not production acceptance. Profile adoption and source completeness require - owner-native evidence.' -external_evidence: - completeness: - level: C1 - confidence: low - basis: Source artifacts establish a bounded capability; no independent consumer-completeness - assessment in this review. - reliability: - level: R0 - confidence: low - basis: No longitudinal consumer reliability measurement established by this review. -name: Security emission cadence validation -summary: Security profile over generic emission contracts and validator. -tags: -- security -- netkingdom -- framework-reuse -discovery: - intent: Security profile over generic emission contracts and validator - includes: - - Security profile over generic emission contracts and validator - excludes: - - Profile adoption and source completeness require owner-native evidence - use_cases: - - 'U08: Consumer emits security events and reconciles independently retained evidence' - - 'U09: Maintainer observes posture, prioritizes findings, coordinates work and - verifies outcomes' -availability: - current_level: A2 - target_level: A2 - current_artifacts: - - tools/emission-cadence-profile/README.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -relations: - related_to: - - capability.security.practice-canon - - capability.security.doctrine-review - - capability.iam.key-cape - - capability.authorization.policy-evaluate - - capability.registry.register - specializes: - - capability.security.iam-tooling-suite -evidence: - documentation: - - tools/emission-cadence-profile/README.md -consumer_guidance: - recommended_for: - - Consumer emits security events and reconciles independently retained evidence - - Maintainer observes posture, prioritizes findings, coordinates work and verifies - outcomes - not_recommended_for: - - Profile adoption and source completeness require owner-native evidence - known_limitations: - - Profile adoption and source completeness require owner-native evidence - - 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry - entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. ---- - -# Security emission cadence validation - -Security profile over generic emission contracts and validator. - -## Reuse boundary - -Profile adoption and source completeness require owner-native evidence. - -## Supported use cases - -- U08: Consumer emits security events and reconciles independently retained evidence -- U09: Maintainer observes posture, prioritizes findings, coordinates work and verifies outcomes - -## Evidence and integration - -- [tools/emission-cadence-profile/README.md](../../tools/emission-cadence-profile/README.md) - -Assessment: CUST-WP-0081, 2026-10-14. Relations identify interfaces to compose; they do not certify native integration. Existing external evidence levels are retained where present. New entries use conservative C1/R0 until consumer assessment exists. diff --git a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.iam-tooling-suite.md b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.iam-tooling-suite.md index ab95d6f..2064c96 100644 --- a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.iam-tooling-suite.md +++ b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.iam-tooling-suite.md @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ --- id: capability.security.iam-tooling-suite -name: NetKingdom security architecture and conformance tooling -summary: Versioned IAM, layer, tenancy and credential contracts plus validators. +name: NetKingdom Security/IAM Tooling Suite +summary: Canonical security architecture and executable reference tooling for IAM, bootstrap, posture validation, + deterministic plan-only security scenario composition, and proposal-only posture feedback. owner: net-kingdom status: draft domain: infotech @@ -10,26 +11,22 @@ tags: - iam - kubernetes - conformance -- netkingdom -- framework-reuse maturity: discovery: current: D3 target: D5 confidence: medium - rationale: SCOPE plus docs/secrets-engine-security-infrastructure-boundary.md - describe an explicit integration boundary with OpenBao, flex-auth, user-engine, - ops-warden, ops-bridge, info-tech-canon, and State Hub; canon/standards/ holds - versioned IAM v0.3, playbook capability, scenario composition, tenancy, zone, - and boundary standards that provider repos implement against. + rationale: SCOPE plus docs/secrets-engine-security-infrastructure-boundary.md describe an explicit + integration boundary with OpenBao, flex-auth, user-engine, ops-warden, ops-bridge, info-tech-canon, + and State Hub; canon/standards/ holds versioned IAM v0.3, playbook capability, scenario composition, + tenancy, zone, and boundary standards that provider repos implement against. availability: current: A2 target: A3 confidence: medium - rationale: 'Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: Versioned IAM, layer, tenancy - and credential contracts plus validators. Availability describes the delivery - form, not production acceptance. Mixed accepted and proposed standards; framework - integration remains incomplete.' + rationale: 'No top-level package manifest, but tools/ holds independently documented and runnable + conformance, posture, posture-feedback, scenario-composition, and guarded bootstrap tools; local-identity is separately + packaged and tested.' external_evidence: completeness: level: C1 @@ -37,8 +34,7 @@ external_evidence: basis: scope_vs_intent_and_consumer_expectations satisfied_expectations: - versioned canon standards already implemented by a sibling repo (key-cape) - - documented, runnable conformance, posture, composition, and bootstrap tools - under tools/ + - documented, runnable conformance, posture, composition, and bootstrap tools under tools/ broken_expectations: [] out_of_scope_expectations: [] reliability: @@ -46,47 +42,50 @@ external_evidence: confidence: low basis: consumer_quality_signals known_reliability_risks: - - no top-level packaging; each tool under tools/ has its own runtime dependencies, - no unified install path yet + - no top-level packaging; each tool under tools/ has its own runtime dependencies, no unified install + path yet discovery: - intent: Versioned IAM, layer, tenancy and credential contracts plus validators + intent: Own canonical NetKingdom security semantics and provide executable reference and conformance tooling + so provider implementations can integrate without inferred authority or hidden deployment coupling. includes: - - Versioned IAM, layer, tenancy and credential contracts plus validators + - canon/standards/ versioned IAM, tenancy, zone, credential, boundary, and composition standards + - IAM profile conformance checker + - playbook capability contract validator + - deterministic plan-only security scenario composer + - tenancy posture schema and validator + - deterministic proposal-only posture feedback evaluator + - security bootstrap console (local, non-secret-collecting) + - packaged local bootstrap identity CLI excludes: - - Mixed accepted and proposed standards; framework integration remains incomplete + - concrete IAM implementations themselves (see key-cape for lightweight mode) + - live secret value handling (bootstrap console explicitly refuses live OpenBao initialization) assumptions: [] - use_cases: - - 'U01: Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and - case types' - - 'U02: Human signs in with MFA and manages account or factor recovery' - - 'U03: Application combines identity, tenant and resource facts and enforces a - bound decision' - - 'U14: Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference - compositions' + use_cases: [] research_memos: [] availability: current_level: A2 target_level: A3 current_artifacts: - - SCOPE.md - - SECURITY-COMPANION.md + - tools/iam-profile-conformance + - tools/playbook-capability-contract + - tools/security-scenario-composer + - tools/tenancy-posture + - tools/posture-feedback + - tools/security-bootstrap-console + - local-identity target_artifacts: [] consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source + - cli + - local web ui relations: depends_on: [] supports: [] - related_to: - - capability.security.practice-canon - - capability.security.doctrine-review - - capability.iam.key-cape - - capability.authorization.policy-evaluate - - capability.registry.register + related_to: [] evidence: documentation: - - SCOPE.md - - SECURITY-COMPANION.md + - README.md + - docs/secrets-engine-security-infrastructure-boundary.md + - tools/*/README.md tests: - tools/iam-profile-conformance (pytest fixtures) consumer_feedback: [] @@ -94,40 +93,56 @@ evidence: incidents: [] consumer_guidance: recommended_for: - - Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and case - types - - Human signs in with MFA and manages account or factor recovery - - Application combines identity, tenant and resource facts and enforces a bound - decision - - Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference - compositions + - implementers needing to verify IAM/security conformance against Coulomb's canonical standards not_recommended_for: - - Mixed accepted and proposed standards; framework integration remains incomplete + - needs for a packaged, single-install security suite (currently three separate tools) known_limitations: - - Mixed accepted and proposed standards; framework integration remains incomplete - - 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry - entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. + - no unified top-level packaging across the three tools promotion_history: [] --- -# NetKingdom security architecture and conformance tooling +# NetKingdom Security/IAM Tooling Suite -Versioned IAM, layer, tenancy and credential contracts plus validators. +## Overview -## Reuse boundary +`net-kingdom` provides canonical IAM and security architecture, executable +conformance and posture checks, deterministic plan-only scenario composition, +proposal-only posture feedback, a local bootstrap identity package, and a non-secret-collecting security +bootstrap console. Provider implementations remain in sibling repositories such +as `key-cape`; the self-optimizing platform remains an intent rather than a +current delivery claim. -Mixed accepted and proposed standards; framework integration remains incomplete. +## Assessment notes -## Supported use cases +### Discovery -- U01: Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and case types -- U02: Human signs in with MFA and manages account or factor recovery -- U03: Application combines identity, tenant and resource facts and enforces a bound decision -- U14: Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference compositions +SCOPE plus docs/secrets-engine-security-infrastructure-boundary.md describe an +explicit integration boundary with OpenBao, flex-auth, user-engine, ops-warden, +ops-bridge, info-tech-canon, and State Hub. `canon/standards/` holds the current +IAM v0.3 and related boundary, posture, zone, credential, playbook, and scenario +composition standards. -## Evidence and integration +### Availability -- [SCOPE.md](../../SCOPE.md) -- [SECURITY-COMPANION.md](../../SECURITY-COMPANION.md) +No top-level package manifest exists. The independently runnable surfaces are +documented under `tools/`, and `local-identity` has its own package manifest and +test environment. -Assessment: CUST-WP-0081, 2026-10-14. Relations identify interfaces to compose; they do not certify native integration. Existing external evidence levels are retained where present. New entries use conservative C1/R0 until consumer assessment exists. +### Completeness + +First-pass honest assessment from the REUSE-WP-0017 coverage campaign +(reuse-surface). No external consumer feedback exists yet; levels reflect +scope-vs-intent documentation quality, not internal code quality. + +### Reliability + +No production consumer telemetry exists yet; reliability level is +intentionally conservative pending REUSE-WP-0019 reuse-telemetry evidence. + +## Promotion checklist + +- [x] ID follows `capability..` pattern +- [x] Maturity enums match `specs/CapabilityMaturityStandard.md` +- [x] `external_evidence` is populated separately from `maturity` +- [ ] Relations reference valid capability IDs (none yet) +- [x] Index entry added in `registry/indexes/capabilities.yaml` diff --git a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.posture-feedback.md b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.posture-feedback.md deleted file mode 100644 index 134d6c6..0000000 --- a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.posture-feedback.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,101 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: capability.security.posture-feedback -owner: net-kingdom -status: draft -domain: infotech -maturity: - discovery: - current: D3 - target: D5 - confidence: medium - rationale: Owner scope, neighboring responsibilities, concrete use cases and limitations - are documented; no exhaustive or generalized maturity claim. - availability: - current: A2 - target: A2 - confidence: medium - rationale: 'Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: CLI evaluates evidence age and - posture into owner-routed findings. Availability describes the delivery form, - not production acceptance. Proposal only; no policy changes or remediation execution.' -external_evidence: - completeness: - level: C1 - confidence: low - basis: Source artifacts establish a bounded capability; no independent consumer-completeness - assessment in this review. - reliability: - level: R0 - confidence: low - basis: No longitudinal consumer reliability measurement established by this review. -name: Deterministic posture feedback -summary: CLI evaluates evidence age and posture into owner-routed findings. -tags: -- security -- netkingdom -- framework-reuse -discovery: - intent: CLI evaluates evidence age and posture into owner-routed findings - includes: - - CLI evaluates evidence age and posture into owner-routed findings - excludes: - - Proposal only; no policy changes or remediation execution - use_cases: - - 'U09: Maintainer observes posture, prioritizes findings, coordinates work and - verifies outcomes' - - 'U14: Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference - compositions' -availability: - current_level: A2 - target_level: A2 - current_artifacts: - - tools/posture-feedback/README.md - - tools/posture-feedback/posture_feedback.py - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -relations: - related_to: - - capability.security.practice-canon - - capability.security.doctrine-review - - capability.iam.key-cape - - capability.authorization.policy-evaluate - - capability.registry.register - specializes: - - capability.security.iam-tooling-suite -evidence: - documentation: - - tools/posture-feedback/README.md - - tools/posture-feedback/posture_feedback.py -consumer_guidance: - recommended_for: - - Maintainer observes posture, prioritizes findings, coordinates work and verifies - outcomes - - Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference - compositions - not_recommended_for: - - Proposal only; no policy changes or remediation execution - known_limitations: - - Proposal only; no policy changes or remediation execution - - 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry - entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. ---- - -# Deterministic posture feedback - -CLI evaluates evidence age and posture into owner-routed findings. - -## Reuse boundary - -Proposal only; no policy changes or remediation execution. - -## Supported use cases - -- U09: Maintainer observes posture, prioritizes findings, coordinates work and verifies outcomes -- U14: Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference compositions - -## Evidence and integration - -- [tools/posture-feedback/README.md](../../tools/posture-feedback/README.md) -- [tools/posture-feedback/posture_feedback.py](../../tools/posture-feedback/posture_feedback.py) - -Assessment: CUST-WP-0081, 2026-10-14. Relations identify interfaces to compose; they do not certify native integration. Existing external evidence levels are retained where present. New entries use conservative C1/R0 until consumer assessment exists. diff --git a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.scenario-compose.md b/registry/capabilities/capability.security.scenario-compose.md deleted file mode 100644 index 769cd3f..0000000 --- a/registry/capabilities/capability.security.scenario-compose.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,101 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: capability.security.scenario-compose -owner: net-kingdom -status: draft -domain: infotech -maturity: - discovery: - current: D3 - target: D5 - confidence: medium - rationale: Owner scope, neighboring responsibilities, concrete use cases and limitations - are documented; no exhaustive or generalized maturity claim. - availability: - current: A2 - target: A2 - confidence: medium - rationale: 'Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: CLI selects pinned providers - and orders trust transitions. Availability describes the delivery form, not - production acceptance. Plan only; execution.permitted is always false.' -external_evidence: - completeness: - level: C1 - confidence: low - basis: Source artifacts establish a bounded capability; no independent consumer-completeness - assessment in this review. - reliability: - level: R0 - confidence: low - basis: No longitudinal consumer reliability measurement established by this review. -name: Deterministic security scenario composition -summary: CLI selects pinned providers and orders trust transitions. -tags: -- security -- netkingdom -- framework-reuse -discovery: - intent: CLI selects pinned providers and orders trust transitions - includes: - - CLI selects pinned providers and orders trust transitions - excludes: - - Plan only; execution.permitted is always false - use_cases: - - 'U01: Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and - case types' - - 'U14: Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference - compositions' -availability: - current_level: A2 - target_level: A2 - current_artifacts: - - tools/security-scenario-composer/README.md - - tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -relations: - related_to: - - capability.security.practice-canon - - capability.security.doctrine-review - - capability.iam.key-cape - - capability.authorization.policy-evaluate - - capability.registry.register - specializes: - - capability.security.iam-tooling-suite -evidence: - documentation: - - tools/security-scenario-composer/README.md - - tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py -consumer_guidance: - recommended_for: - - Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and case - types - - Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference - compositions - not_recommended_for: - - Plan only; execution.permitted is always false - known_limitations: - - Plan only; execution.permitted is always false - - 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry - entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. ---- - -# Deterministic security scenario composition - -CLI selects pinned providers and orders trust transitions. - -## Reuse boundary - -Plan only; execution.permitted is always false. - -## Supported use cases - -- U01: Architect composes a security deployment from explicit owner contracts and case types -- U14: Framework adopter validates and reuses selected contracts, tools and reference compositions - -## Evidence and integration - -- [tools/security-scenario-composer/README.md](../../tools/security-scenario-composer/README.md) -- [tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py](../../tools/security-scenario-composer/security_scenario_composer.py) - -Assessment: CUST-WP-0081, 2026-10-14. Relations identify interfaces to compose; they do not certify native integration. Existing external evidence levels are retained where present. New entries use conservative C1/R0 until consumer assessment exists. diff --git a/registry/indexes/capabilities.yaml b/registry/indexes/capabilities.yaml index 77da290..3a618f7 100644 --- a/registry/indexes/capabilities.yaml +++ b/registry/indexes/capabilities.yaml @@ -1,106 +1,21 @@ version: 1 -updated: '2026-10-16' +updated: '2026-08-23' domain: helix_forge capabilities: - id: capability.security.iam-tooling-suite - name: NetKingdom security architecture and conformance tooling - summary: Versioned IAM, layer, tenancy and credential contracts plus validators. + name: NetKingdom Security/IAM Tooling Suite + summary: Canonical security architecture and executable reference tooling for IAM, bootstrap, posture + validation, deterministic plan-only security scenario composition, and proposal-only posture feedback. + vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R1 domain: infotech status: draft owner: net-kingdom + path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.iam-tooling-suite.md tags: - security - iam - kubernetes - conformance - - netkingdom - - framework-reuse - vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R1 - path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.iam-tooling-suite.md consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -- id: capability.security.scenario-compose - name: Deterministic security scenario composition - summary: CLI selects pinned providers and orders trust transitions. - domain: infotech - status: draft - owner: net-kingdom - tags: - - security - - netkingdom - - framework-reuse - vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R0 - path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.scenario-compose.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -- id: capability.security.posture-feedback - name: Deterministic posture feedback - summary: CLI evaluates evidence age and posture into owner-routed findings. - domain: infotech - status: draft - owner: net-kingdom - tags: - - security - - netkingdom - - framework-reuse - vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R0 - path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.posture-feedback.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -- id: capability.security.case-contracts - name: Security case types and instance validation - summary: Versioned types, cases and schema validation. - domain: infotech - status: draft - owner: net-kingdom - tags: - - security - - netkingdom - - framework-reuse - vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R0 - path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.case-contracts.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -- id: capability.security.bootstrap-recovery - name: Guarded bootstrap and recovery preparation - summary: Guarded bootstrap custody, encrypted identity backup capture, independent - retrieval and isolated recovery verification. - domain: infotech - status: draft - owner: net-kingdom - tags: - - security - - netkingdom - - framework-reuse - - backup - - restore - - disaster-recovery - - age - - privacyidea - - lldap - - authelia - - keycape - vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R0 - path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.bootstrap-recovery.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source -- id: capability.security.emission-profile - name: Security emission cadence validation - summary: Security profile over generic emission contracts and validator. - domain: infotech - status: draft - owner: net-kingdom - tags: - - security - - netkingdom - - framework-reuse - vector: D3 / A2 / C1 / R0 - path: registry/capabilities/capability.security.emission-profile.md - consumption_modes: - - CLI - - source + - cli + - local web ui diff --git a/runbooks/protected-system-flex-auth/pack.yaml b/runbooks/protected-system-flex-auth/pack.yaml index c82aee6..2dd8d6c 100644 --- a/runbooks/protected-system-flex-auth/pack.yaml +++ b/runbooks/protected-system-flex-auth/pack.yaml @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ stages: title: Confirm the prerequisites actor: operator owner: workstation - description: "A flex-auth checkout with Go, to run go run ./cmd/access-engine (flex-auth); kubectl access to the cluster through the k3s-api tunnel (ops-bridge); the live pin runs with --caller-auth-mode enforce and its bound ServiceAccount exists (package owner, ADR-0015)." + description: "A flex-auth checkout with Go, to run go run ./cmd/flex-auth (flex-auth); kubectl access to the cluster through the k3s-api tunnel (ops-bridge); the live pin runs with --caller-auth-mode enforce and its bound ServiceAccount exists (package owner, ADR-0015)." idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: All three prerequisites hold @@ -105,11 +105,11 @@ stages: owner: flex-auth requires: [read-manifest] uses: [flexauth_home, example] - command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine validate -kind policy -file {{example}}/policy_package.md + command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file {{example}}/policy_package.md idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: validate exits 0 - command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine validate -kind policy -file {{example}}/policy_package.md + command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file {{example}}/policy_package.md expect: exit-0 - id: load-registry title: Load the registry snapshot offline @@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ stages: owner: flex-auth requires: [validate-policy] uses: [flexauth_home, example] - command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine load-registry -file {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json + command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: load-registry exits 0 - command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine load-registry -file {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json + command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json expect: exit-0 - id: check-allow title: A permitted request is allowed @@ -130,12 +130,12 @@ stages: requires: [load-registry] uses: [flexauth_home, example] command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_allow_rotate.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_allow_rotate.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: The decision is allow with reason catalog_lane_policy_matched command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_allow_rotate.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_allow_rotate.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" expect: output-contains contains: allow catalog_lane_policy_matched - id: check-wrong-tenant @@ -145,12 +145,12 @@ stages: requires: [load-registry] uses: [flexauth_home, example] command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_wrong_tenant.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_wrong_tenant.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: The decision is deny with reason wrong_tenant command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_wrong_tenant.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_wrong_tenant.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" expect: output-contains contains: deny wrong_tenant - id: check-unknown-action @@ -160,12 +160,12 @@ stages: requires: [load-registry] uses: [flexauth_home, example] command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_revoke_not_an_action.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_revoke_not_an_action.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: The decision is deny with reason unknown_action command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_revoke_not_an_action.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_revoke_not_an_action.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" expect: output-contains contains: deny unknown_action - id: check-unknown-subject @@ -175,12 +175,12 @@ stages: requires: [load-registry] uses: [flexauth_home, example] command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" idempotent: idempotent verify: done_when: The decision is deny with reason unknown_subject command: | - cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" + cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth check -registry {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json -policy {{example}}/policy_package.md -request {{example}}/check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d['effect'],d.get('reason'))" expect: output-contains contains: deny unknown_subject gates: @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ stages: downstream_risk: A policy that allows what it should deny, or denies for the wrong reason, makes the live caller tests meaningless. checks: - done_when: The policy package validates and the registry loads - command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/access-engine validate -kind policy -file {{example}}/policy_package.md && go run ./cmd/access-engine load-registry -file {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json + command: cd {{flexauth_home}} && go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file {{example}}/policy_package.md && go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file {{example}}/registry_snapshot.json expect: exit-0 - done_when: One allow and three denials (wrong tenant, unknown action, unknown subject) each gave the expected decision and reason expect: manual diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md b/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6f166ce..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -# Acknowledged OIDC browser relying-party 1.2 source package - -This package supplements the exact proposed 1.2 type and Forgejo reference design. It is source-only and unimplemented. Its examples are proposed, including Forgejo; normal admission must refuse them until the separate implemented-type and canonical-case acceptance requirements are discharged. Completing this package or acknowledging its type does not accept a canonical case or authorize native work. Immutable acknowledged 1.1 history remains unchanged. - -## Purpose - -Register exact-redirect browser OIDC relying parties through KeyCape, with groups enforced by the consumer. Confidential clients add a custody path, two reader policies, the existing KeyCape ESO role and a sixth dedicated consumer ESO reader role. consumer_namespace is explicit and independently constrained; a consuming service name does not establish its namespace or workload identity. Public clients require no secret materialization. - -## Threat model - -Exact HTTPS redirects prohibit wildcard, query, fragment and plaintext HTTP. Requested scopes always include groups, but KeyCape issues identity tokens without a per-client group gate: each consumer must enforce its required claims. MFA pinning is client configuration, not proof of a human MFA session. Secret custody parameters and reader identities cannot be overridden by case authors. - -The namespace SecretStore references a dedicated automount-disabled service account rather than forgejo/default. ESO's broadly privileged common controller remains trusted; this is routing and identity attribution, not cryptographic controller isolation. The supported v0.16.1 TokenRequest path requests a 600-second token; its legacy fallback must not acquire static tokens. The proposed OpenBao role has a 900-second maximum token TTL and no default policy. Neither rendered claims nor source tests prove native bindings, token audience, capabilities, delivery readiness or revocation. - -## Alternatives considered - -Retain 1.1 with the observed Forgejo/runner workload ServiceAccount forgejo/default: preserves existing history but does not express the dedicated reader boundary. This describes observed workload identity only; the historical 1.1 consumer OpenBao policy was unbound and no historical default-SA OpenBao reader binding is claimed. Reuse the KeyCape reader role: combines provider and consumer identities unnecessarily. Adopt a separate controller: potentially reduces shared trust but adds infrastructure outside this bounded proposal. Proposed 1.2 retains shared-controller trust explicitly while adding the sixth dedicated role; no new grant follows from this source design. - -## Known limits - -All native bound claims remain unconfirmed and execution remains false. HTTP OpenBao transport, shared ESO controller trust, legacy fallback, retained target Secrets and later dependency handling require owner verification before any separately approved session. A SecretStore/SA deletion alone does not revoke issued tokens. Recovery may remove only authenticated case-created resources with unchanged UID/ownership, must preserve preexisting exact matches, revert consumer references first and revoke issued tokens or verify expiry before declaring deactivation. Owner adapter and global verifier observations remain required. No human login, MFA, credentials, native materialization or first-case completion is claimed. - -## Verification - -Run the existing owner full-package validator against this directory, then run its tests. Tests use the existing owner validator/composer and actual declarations; they prove source schema, examples, deterministic rendering, six-object confidential versus public boundaries, refused mutation/parameters, normal admission refusal and bounded rollback ordering. They do not contact native services. - -```sh -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-type docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2 -NET_KINGDOM_ROOT=/home/worsch/net-kingdom python3 -m pytest docs/proposals/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso/package-1.2/tests -``` - -## Governance and recording - -SecurityCaseTypes section 3 requires the complete package and a separate NetKingdom source-owner review before type acknowledgment recording. Sections 4/5 require an implemented type for canonical case acceptance; section 6 requires a genuine new acknowledgment for the sixth role/authentication path. The old 1.1 acknowledgment is not inherited. Reference-migration source approval is a separate owner receipt; canonical 1.2 stays proposed without acceptance fields or phase acceptance. - -## Recorded source acknowledgment — 2026-10-11 - -Confirmed native human ACCEPT of infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1 -at2026-10-11T06:47:39Z, approval8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765, -acknowledges source architecture only. Exact reviewed proposed typeSHA -017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db is preserved -in the immutable proposal package. This copy changes type status to acknowledged -and documents that source record; it remains unimplemented. See -decision/acknowledgment.json for exact native disposition, packet, owner returns, -post-anchor review and source digests. Tests adapt only the expected type status; -examples remain proposed without acceptance fields. Current canonical1.1 type, -package and acceptedcase remain unchanged and selected by the default loader. - -This explicit version root is security-case-type-revisions/1.2; choose it only -for separate source validation/preparation using the existing --types/--types-root -option. No default loader/repoint or canonicalcase1.2 admission is introduced. -The full proposed package test/validator proof is retained; run this acknowledged -copy's package validator/tests before recording its acknowledgment. The separate -reference-migration owner design receipt is not canonical case acceptance. diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/acknowledgment.json b/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/acknowledgment.json deleted file mode 100644 index d80232d..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/acknowledgment.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -{ - "kind": "security-case-type-source-acknowledgment", - "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2", - "stable_proposal": "NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1", - "work_item": "NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T06", - "source_implementation_task": "NK-WP-0048-T06", - "memo_id": "infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1", - "memo_version": 1, - "review_id": "review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd", - "approval_id": "8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765", - "disposition_id": "disp-315d54ad-20f1-40e6-862c-6c7d2e8f0ea8", - "presentation_id": "pres-5a52f932-8c65-46cc-8054-0264f47f934a", - "actual_human_actor": { - "kind": "person", - "sub": "uid=platform-root,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" - }, - "actual_disposition_at": "2026-10-11T06:47:39Z", - "verb": "accept", - "confirmed_nonstale": true, - "exact_human_packet_manifest_sha256": "0b377d647ca748cd03c92f9792396412048055d4bde9f7bb06ff6d413f7acd68", - "submission_digest": "sha256:585cee731de30d2b37883a57abfd9eb32f023ee694e8d911989109d5caf80569", - "proposed_type_sha256": "017885bdd139cd66a5bf6d9839b1b8ec9bc08fb051d9577adc3928b76a7be6db", - "acknowledged_type_sha256": "9e60ff569fb0d860a2bbde7bbb0991a54d4b0688f62b56df0fa5d161fd624578", - "canonical_case12_source_sha256": "1c868c1da7d9077fae97bc6bc029706ec3dc418cfeaae30dc0f92b5b4ba6f2ab", - "full_render_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "version_types_root": "security-case-type-revisions/1.2", - "package_type_path": "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml", - "packet_bound_sources_edited": false, - "default_type_loader_or_11_case_repointed": false, - "current11_preserved": { - "type_path": "security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml", - "type_sha256": "f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c", - "case_path": "security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml", - "case_sha256": "bcc2c6d5bae0d28242b3cdb71e74d8ca297c2afe04766b55d53597f86893351d" - }, - "review_receipts": [ - { - "path": "docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-net-owner-final-review.md", - "sha256": "9e9b8dda889203c064b35e1bbcd4d0c62d76d4ba1935c9a10f4b2dbf1c6e8497" - }, - { - "path": "docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-human-packet-final-hash-ack.json", - "sha256": "7f2264668ad205d127bb216bc726f62a6ee447759f9899fcccc6c439b9bbefe5" - }, - { - "path": "docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-post-anchor-owner-review.json", - "sha256": "0893b8fe936c72394147bc511c6a21af8e75866c96549ceec8af5d2abd1ee100" - } - ], - "native_source_provenance": [ - { - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-outcome.json", - "sha256": "042fcc80dbd450ad6901d91624b544e2128d4bb3045ae201d570ec0bf96f5f2d" - }, - { - "path": "docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/native-authoring-receipt.json", - "sha256": "67b581d2f825d0ba10bcbf0296e7f9e63f5d78e5d6d723150b0983f067635172", - "initial_authoring_was_queued_not_disposed": true - } - ], - "scope": "Confirmed human source architecture acknowledgment only; reference-migration design approval recorded separately. No agent decision. Root requesting agent records exact actual founder disposition after verifying these staged files.", - "type_implemented": false, - "canonical_case12_status": "proposed", - "canonical_case12_acceptance_fields_present": false, - "claims_confirmed": false, - "execution_permitted": false, - "native_operation_authorized": false, - "recording_act": "Transcribe confirmed human source acknowledgment; requesting coordinator applies this exact record after independent verification. This is not an agent approval.", - "recorded_status": "source-acknowledged", - "recorded_package_validation": { - "actual_full_package_validator": "PASS acknowledged1.2", - "independent_runnable_tests": 22, - "closed_type_case_schemas": "PASS", - "ordinary_case_admission": "REFUSED unimplemented acknowledged type", - "explicit_types_root_load": "PASS", - "full_render_regenerated_digest": "sha256:c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35", - "execution_permitted": false - } -} diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml b/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 6b349fa..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: example-public-portal - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: example-owner - parameters: - client_id: example-portal - display_name: Example portal - redirect_uris: https://portal.example.invalid/auth/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: public - mfa_required: 'false' - access_groups: example-portal-users - consuming_service: example-portal - consumer_owner_repo: net-kingdom - consumer_namespace: example-portal diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml b/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 8c7c4bc..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: 'true' - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps - consumer_namespace: forgejo diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py b/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py deleted file mode 100644 index a1229f1..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -"""Source-only contract checks against the actual owner validator and declarations.""" -import copy, importlib.util, os, sys -from pathlib import Path -import pytest, yaml -PACKAGE=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -OWNER=Path(os.environ.get("NET_KINGDOM_ROOT", "/home/worsch/net-kingdom")) -VP=OWNER/"tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py" -sys.path.insert(0,str(VP.parent)) -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator",VP) -v=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);sys.modules[spec.name]=v;spec.loader.exec_module(v) -TYPE=yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"type.yaml").read_text()) -FORGEJO=yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"examples/forgejo.yaml").read_text()) -paths,discovery=v.discover_declarations(TYPE,OWNER.parent) -DECLS,loading=v.composer.load_declarations(paths) -def render(case): - issues,result=v.render_case(case,TYPE,DECLS,require_implemented=False) - assert not v.has_errors(discovery+loading+issues) - return result - -def test_full_package_and_proposed_boundary(): - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_type(TYPE,PACKAGE)) - assert TYPE["spec"]["status"]=="acknowledged" - assert FORGEJO["spec"]["status"]=="proposed" - assert "acceptance" not in FORGEJO["spec"] - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(FORGEJO,TYPE)) - -def test_acknowledged_is_still_not_implemented_admission(): - acknowledged=copy.deepcopy(TYPE);acknowledged["spec"]["status"]="acknowledged" - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(FORGEJO,acknowledged)) - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("example",sorted((PACKAGE/"examples").glob("*.yaml"))) -def test_examples_valid_deterministic_and_nonexecuting(example): - case=yaml.safe_load(example.read_text()) - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_case(case,TYPE,require_implemented=False)) - first=render(case);assert first==render(case) - assert first["execution"]["permitted"] is False - assert first["composition"]["execution"]["permitted"] is False - -def test_sixth_role_is_exact_consumer_identity_and_namespace(): - case=copy.deepcopy(FORGEJO);case["spec"]["parameters"]["consumer_namespace"]="forgejo-preview" - r=render(case);objects={x["id"]:x for x in r["materialization"]} - assert len(objects)==6 - consumer=yaml.safe_load(objects["consumer-eso-role"]["body"]) - assert consumer["bound_service_account_names"]==["forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso"] - assert consumer["bound_service_account_namespaces"]==["forgejo-preview"] - assert consumer["audience"]=="openbao" - assert consumer["token_policies"]==["workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo"] - assert consumer["token_no_default_policy"] is True - provider=yaml.safe_load(objects["eso-role"]["body"]) - assert provider["bound_service_account_names"]!=consumer["bound_service_account_names"] - -def test_original_five_structural_bodies_unchanged(): - old=yaml.safe_load((OWNER/"security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml").read_text()) - case=yaml.safe_load((OWNER/"security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml").read_text()) - issues,before=v.render_case(case,old,DECLS,require_implemented=False) - assert not v.has_errors(issues) - after={x["id"]:x["body"] for x in render(FORGEJO)["materialization"]} - for item in before["materialization"]:assert item["body"]==after[item["id"]] - -def test_public_has_no_secret_or_delivery_hooks(): - r=render(yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"examples/example-public-portal.yaml").read_text())) - assert [x["id"] for x in r["materialization"]]==["catalog-entry"] - assert not {"mint-secret","deliver-secret","deliver-consumer-secret","bind-env"}&{x["id"] for x in r["follow_through"]} - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("key,value",[("consumer_namespace",None),("consumer_namespace","default/other"),("consumer_namespace","x"*64),("consuming_service","x"*64),("redirect_uris","http://portal.invalid/callback"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/*"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/callback?x=y"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/callback#x"),("allowed_scopes","openid,email"),("consumer_reader_service_account","default"),("secret_path","other/path")]) -def test_invalid_or_unsettable_parameter_refused(key,value): - case=copy.deepcopy(FORGEJO) - if value is None:case["spec"]["parameters"].pop(key) - else:case["spec"]["parameters"][key]=value - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(case,TYPE,require_implemented=False)) - -def test_created_only_role_recovery_precedes_policy_and_needs_revocation(): - rollback=render(FORGEJO)["rollback"];ids=[x["reverses"] for x in rollback] - assert ids.index("consumer-eso-role") - --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration) - auth: operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, - and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator - session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps - of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, - authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins - and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review - R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape - check-config, key-cape c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) - before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1).' - - id: deliver-consumer-secret - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: Owner applies dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso - (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client - with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}. - Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller - RBAC before any owner-approved apply. - auth: Consumer owner contained Kubernetes deployment authority; ESO authenticates - to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} with - a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller remains - trusted - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; - dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never - Secret values. - - id: hand-over - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - entry_point: configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} - and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require - one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes - auth: the consumer owner's own deployment path - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} - returns the login page - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect - returns an OAuth error - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: client_type == confidential - check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: client_type == confidential - check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants - read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only) - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the - accepted case added - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) - requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no - secret value)' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status - only) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: mfa_required == true - check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered - client (non-secret client view) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact - dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value - read' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner - {consumer_owner_repo}) - - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: After reverting consumer secret reference, delete only authenticated created - ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and - dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared - target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is - not immediate OpenBao token revocation. - - reverses: register-client - action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id} - - reverses: bind-env - when: client_type == confidential - action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, - after register-client is reversed - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target - - reverses: mint-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret - is reversed' - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod - (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only - if no other case uses {access_groups} - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, - after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret) - - reverses: eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role - - reverses: consumer-eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, - before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or - prove expiration before declaring deactivation. - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client - acceptance: - accepted_by: - - owner - - founder - risk_class: medium diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md b/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index d811922..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -# Proposed OIDC browser relying-party 1.3 successor candidate - -Status: **proposed**. This is a source candidate for NK-WP-0048-T16. It is not -acknowledged, not implemented, and grants no execution or native authority. The -acknowledged 1.2 package (`../../1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/`) and canonical 1.1 -stay unchanged, and 1.2's acknowledgment is not inherited. - -## Purpose - -The purpose of the type is 1.2's: register exact-redirect browser OIDC relying -parties through KeyCape, with groups enforced by the consumer. 1.3 changes only two -things: - -1. `version: '1.3'` and `status: proposed`, with the examples pinned to `@1.3`. -2. A new `execution_descriptors` map naming the reviewed machine descriptor digest - for each of the seven follow-through steps. Warden's `Executor.admit` refuses any - step whose descriptor digest is not in the type's map, so this map is what would - let Warden admit the steps at all. It is generated by - `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/compose-1.2-descriptors.py --version 1.3`, and - `test_admit_1_3_type.py` checks that it equals the composed set. - -Every other byte of the type (parameters, composition, materialization, -follow-through, verification, rollback, acceptance) is 1.2's. The parameter set is -identical, so its fingerprint equals 1.2's. - -Canon `security-case-types_v0.1.md` section 6 treats a changed trust transition as -major. Allowing Warden to admit these steps is one, so 1.3 needs its own Decision -Memo and informed-decision acknowledgment by the founder, the same as a new type. - -## Threat model - -1.2's threat model applies unchanged. 1.3 adds one transition: Warden may admit a -step and dispatch its owner-supplied adapter, which runs injected owner -capabilities. Each descriptor pins its adapter's exact source closure, lane, actor, -effect, allowed created objects and revocation scopes, and admission still requires -authenticated case acceptance, ops-mason materialization, owner descriptor -acceptance, type machine-seam acceptance, catalog routing acceptance and the -caller's session. A mint is admitted only for a human caller. The adapters record -value-free evidence and roll back only objects they created. None of that removes -the need for owners to verify native bindings. - -## Alternatives considered - -- Keep 1.2 as plan-only, with no `execution_descriptors`. Every step stays manual, - and the reviewed adapters are never admitted. -- List only a subset of steps in the map, for example only the Warden-executed and - attended ones. That is open question 3 below. -- Change the kernel to read descriptors from outside the type. This is rejected: - the kernel binds the map to the acknowledged type bytes on purpose. - -## Known limits - -- The adapter set was independently reviewed at net-kingdom `ff8f597` - (the-custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-adapters-1.2-review/`, - r1–r3, all nine files approved in r3). Making ensure-groups, hand-over, - deliver-consumer-secret and the composer accept 1.3 changed their source digests, - so those descriptors need a further source review (r4) before this map can be - relied on. -- `test_admit_1_3_type.py` runs Warden's real `Executor.admit` (ops-warden `a45cf47`) - with fixture-only trust. The proposed type is refused. An acknowledged copy is - still refused, because Warden pins parameter fingerprints only for 1.1 and 1.2. - With only a 1.3 pin added in memory, all seven descriptors are admitted, and a - descriptor outside the map is refused. -- All owner capabilities in the tests are stand-ins, and no native binding is - proven. - -Open questions for owner review: - -1. **ops-warden:** add `"1.3"` to `warden/case_inputs.py` `PARAMETER_PINS` with 1.2's - fingerprint. Without it, no 1.3 case is admitted. -2. **mint-secret semantics:** the type says `warden_executes: true, attended: false`, - while the descriptor actor is `human` (founder decision 2026-10-17), and the kernel - refuses a non-human mint. Owners decide whether these are consistent (a human - caller starts an unattended Warden-executed mint) or whether the step should - become `attended: true, warden_executes: false` in this revision. -3. **Owner-run steps with descriptors:** deliver-secret, deliver-consumer-secret and - hand-over are `warden_executes: false, attended: false` (owner path), and - register-client, ensure-groups and bind-env are attended, yet all carry execution - descriptors. The kernel never reads `warden_executes`; only the plan does. Owners - decide whether Warden should admit these steps or whether the map should list only - a subset. - -## Verification - -```sh -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-type security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party -NET_KINGDOM_ROOT=$PWD python3 -m pytest security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests -cd sso-mfa/k8s/keycape && PYTHONPATH=$HOME/ops-warden/src ~/ops-warden/.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q test_admit_1_3_type.py -``` diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml b/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 517a9da..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: example-public-portal - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: example-owner - parameters: - client_id: example-portal - display_name: Example portal - redirect_uris: https://portal.example.invalid/auth/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: public - mfa_required: 'false' - access_groups: example-portal-users - consuming_service: example-portal - consumer_owner_repo: net-kingdom - consumer_namespace: example-portal diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml b/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a93715d..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: 'true' - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps - consumer_namespace: forgejo diff --git a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py b/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py deleted file mode 100644 index d00fcf4..0000000 --- a/security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_source_contract.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -"""Source-only contract checks against the actual owner validator and declarations.""" -import copy, importlib.util, os, sys -from pathlib import Path -import pytest, yaml -PACKAGE=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -OWNER=Path(os.environ.get("NET_KINGDOM_ROOT", "/home/worsch/net-kingdom")) -VP=OWNER/"tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py" -sys.path.insert(0,str(VP.parent)) -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator",VP) -v=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);sys.modules[spec.name]=v;spec.loader.exec_module(v) -TYPE=yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"type.yaml").read_text()) -FORGEJO=yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"examples/forgejo.yaml").read_text()) -paths,discovery=v.discover_declarations(TYPE,OWNER.parent) -DECLS,loading=v.composer.load_declarations(paths) -def render(case): - issues,result=v.render_case(case,TYPE,DECLS,require_implemented=False) - assert not v.has_errors(discovery+loading+issues) - return result - -def test_full_package_and_proposed_boundary(): - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_type(TYPE,PACKAGE)) - assert TYPE["spec"]["status"]=="proposed" # 1.3 is a successor candidate; 1.2's acknowledgment is not inherited - assert FORGEJO["spec"]["status"]=="proposed" - assert "acceptance" not in FORGEJO["spec"] - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(FORGEJO,TYPE)) - -def test_acknowledged_is_still_not_implemented_admission(): - acknowledged=copy.deepcopy(TYPE);acknowledged["spec"]["status"]="acknowledged" - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(FORGEJO,acknowledged)) - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("example",sorted((PACKAGE/"examples").glob("*.yaml"))) -def test_examples_valid_deterministic_and_nonexecuting(example): - case=yaml.safe_load(example.read_text()) - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_case(case,TYPE,require_implemented=False)) - first=render(case);assert first==render(case) - assert first["execution"]["permitted"] is False - assert first["composition"]["execution"]["permitted"] is False - -def test_sixth_role_is_exact_consumer_identity_and_namespace(): - case=copy.deepcopy(FORGEJO);case["spec"]["parameters"]["consumer_namespace"]="forgejo-preview" - r=render(case);objects={x["id"]:x for x in r["materialization"]} - assert len(objects)==6 - consumer=yaml.safe_load(objects["consumer-eso-role"]["body"]) - assert consumer["bound_service_account_names"]==["forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso"] - assert consumer["bound_service_account_namespaces"]==["forgejo-preview"] - assert consumer["audience"]=="openbao" - assert consumer["token_policies"]==["workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo"] - assert consumer["token_no_default_policy"] is True - provider=yaml.safe_load(objects["eso-role"]["body"]) - assert provider["bound_service_account_names"]!=consumer["bound_service_account_names"] - -def test_original_five_structural_bodies_unchanged(): - old=yaml.safe_load((OWNER/"security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml").read_text()) - case=yaml.safe_load((OWNER/"security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml").read_text()) - issues,before=v.render_case(case,old,DECLS,require_implemented=False) - assert not v.has_errors(issues) - after={x["id"]:x["body"] for x in render(FORGEJO)["materialization"]} - for item in before["materialization"]:assert item["body"]==after[item["id"]] - -def test_public_has_no_secret_or_delivery_hooks(): - r=render(yaml.safe_load((PACKAGE/"examples/example-public-portal.yaml").read_text())) - assert [x["id"] for x in r["materialization"]]==["catalog-entry"] - assert not {"mint-secret","deliver-secret","deliver-consumer-secret","bind-env"}&{x["id"] for x in r["follow_through"]} - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("key,value",[("consumer_namespace",None),("consumer_namespace","default/other"),("consumer_namespace","x"*64),("consuming_service","x"*64),("redirect_uris","http://portal.invalid/callback"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/*"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/callback?x=y"),("redirect_uris","https://portal.invalid/callback#x"),("allowed_scopes","openid,email"),("consumer_reader_service_account","default"),("secret_path","other/path")]) -def test_invalid_or_unsettable_parameter_refused(key,value): - case=copy.deepcopy(FORGEJO) - if value is None:case["spec"]["parameters"].pop(key) - else:case["spec"]["parameters"][key]=value - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_case(case,TYPE,require_implemented=False)) - -def test_created_only_role_recovery_precedes_policy_and_needs_revocation(): - rollback=render(FORGEJO)["rollback"];ids=[x["reverses"] for x in rollback] - assert ids.index("consumer-eso-role") --case-acceptance --check-config - (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration) - auth: the attended human session on lane keycape-attended-case-change, with operator - write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso (actor human, - parent-session revoked per attempt) - lane: keycape-attended-case-change - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - ready_check: after a changed registry the adapter stamps one restart of the single-replica - Recreate issuer and its status-only readiness verdict is ready (rollout 1/1/1, one restarted - Ready pod, discovery serves https://kc.coulomb.social with all endpoints); failed or uncertain - keeps the step uncertain for attended owner rollback or reconciliation (NK-WP-0048-T12) - attended_justification: 'The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, - and agents do not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended operator - session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups all attended steps - of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients at startup and keeps login, - authorization and handoff state in memory, so the restart drops in-flight logins - and sessions for every client; runs go in a quiet window (key-cape type review - R4). The rendered registry must pass KeyCape''s own startup checks (keycape - check-config, the pinned checker artifact sha256:be37738fe1c08259fb4f9ca0daf0f9301bfffc237e5bb38435525dfbf11ccff5 - built from key-cape 3c71226, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) - before the restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1). Warden''s case kernel dispatches the reviewed adapter only inside the one attended human session (descriptor actor human, lane keycape-attended-case-change, parent-session revoked per attempt); the human session is the authority and the kernel is only the dispatcher.' - - id: deliver-consumer-secret - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - when: client_type == confidential - entry_point: Reviewed adapter net-kingdom/keycape-deliver-consumer-secret, dispatched - by Warden's case kernel inside the attended consumer-owner session; the owner's - apply capability creates dedicated ServiceAccount {consumer_namespace}/{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}-eso - (automount=false, no legacy tokens), namespace SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - with serviceAccountRef and audiences [openbao], and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client - with Owner target, Retain remote deletion and only CLIENT_SECRET from workloads/keycape/{client_id}. - Admission validates actual installed ESO TokenRequest support and common controller - RBAC before any owner-approved apply. - auth: the attended consumer-owner session on lane consumer-owner-deployment (actor - human, the consumer owner's operator deployment authority, on the founder's go - for the change); ESO authenticates to OpenBao role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - with a TokenRequest for the dedicated namespaced serviceAccountRef; controller - remains trusted - lane: consumer-owner-deployment - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: The consumer owner's only deployment authority in the consumer - namespace is its operator credential, and production applies need the founder's - go per change. No contained agent deployer identity exists, and the owner does - not want a standing credential an agent could trigger. It runs in one attended - consumer-owner session together with hand-over. Warden's case kernel dispatches - the reviewed adapter only inside that session (actor human, parent-session - revoked per attempt); the human session is the authority and the kernel is only - the dispatcher. - ready_check: Namespace SecretStore and ExternalSecret both report Ready=True; - dedicated SA has no legacy token refs; status and fixed metadata only, never - Secret values. - - id: hand-over - owner: '{consumer_owner_repo}' - entry_point: The consumer owner's reviewed deployment entry wraps its own Helm - configuration and the admitted hand-over in one owner configuration transaction, - for public clients as well as confidential clients even when delivery is NO_CHANGE. - Before changing {consuming_service}, durably bind exact case, acceptance, human - principal, owner configuration source, cluster/release and before revision; - authenticate the case-created post revision under the owner's release-writer - exclusion before verification. Configure issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} - and, only for confidential clients, custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, - requiring one of {access_groups} before sign-in completes. Preserve identical - preexisting configuration as NO_CHANGE and refuse conflicts. Then the reviewed - adapter net-kingdom/keycape-hand-over, dispatched by Warden's case kernel inside - the attended consumer-owner session, verifies the four value-free probes - (member-login, non-member-refused, membership-add-grants, membership-remove-revokes) - and records the receipt. The owner wrapper's separate configuration inverse is - reachable on failure before a receipt exists and on later owner case unwind; - it does not depend on delivery-created objects or receipt creation. Missing or - ambiguous configuration provenance requires owner reconciliation, never replay. - auth: the attended consumer-owner session on lane apps-consumer-handover (actor human, - parent-session revoked per attempt); the consumer configuration itself is the - owner's own deployment path. Every configuration inverse is a distinct fresh - authorized attended owner operation, bound to operation, exact principal, case, - source, release and transaction, with its own per-attempt revocation on every - exit. Never reuse the already revoked hand-over parent session. Missing current - inverse authority retains pending owner reconciliation evidence - lane: apps-consumer-handover - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: The verification needs a real member login and a refused - non-member login, which only an attended session can perform, and it follows - the owner's own Helm change in the same consumer-owner session as - deliver-consumer-secret. Warden's case kernel dispatches the reviewed adapter - only inside that session (actor human, parent-session revoked per attempt); the - human session is the authority and the kernel is only the dispatcher. - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} - returns the login page - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect - returns an OAuth error - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: client_type == confidential - check: a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: client_type == confidential - check: policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants - read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only) - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the - accepted case added - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - check: '{consuming_service}''s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) - requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no - secret value)' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status - only) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: mfa_required == true - check: keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered - client (non-secret client view) - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-secret-delivered - when: client_type == confidential - check: '{consumer_namespace} SecretStore openbao-keycape-{client_id}-consumer - and ExternalSecret {consuming_service}-netkingdom-oidc-client Ready=True, exact - dedicated SA/audience role binding, fixed CLIENT_SECRET mapping; no Secret value - read' - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: the adapter removes only its authenticated case-created hand-over receipt. - Independently, the consumer owner's configuration transaction inverse restores - only this case's configuration change through the noted before Helm revision, - after authenticating exact case/principal/source/release binding and checking - the unchanged post revision under exclusion of all release writers. It runs - on owner unwind for public and confidential cases, including skipped or NO_CHANGE - delivery and failures before receipt creation. Preserve preexisting configuration; - drift or ambiguous provenance requires owner reconciliation. This owner inverse - is outside the receipt adapter and precedes any delivery-object removal; - receipt removal alone never proves configuration rollback. - - reverses: deliver-consumer-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: First verify the owner configuration transaction inverse and absence of - remaining consumer secret references; NO_CHANGE configuration alone is not proof of - deactivation. Do not repeat an unguarded Helm rollback inside owner_remove. - Then delete only authenticated created - ExternalSecret/owned target by UID and ownerReference, then SecretStore and - dedicated SA; preserve preexisting-matched resources and never delete a shared - target. Retain audit and ownership receipts; removing SecretStore/SA alone is - not immediate OpenBao token revocation. - - reverses: register-client - action: keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id} - - reverses: bind-env - when: client_type == confidential - action: remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, - after register-client is reversed - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target - - reverses: mint-secret - when: client_type == confidential - action: 'covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret - is reversed' - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod - (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only - if no other case uses {access_groups} - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, - after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret) - - reverses: eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role - - reverses: consumer-eso-role - when: client_type == confidential - action: Delete only this case-created role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, - before deleting consumer-reader-policy; revoke case-issued OpenBao tokens or - prove expiration before declaring deactivation. - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: client_type == confidential - action: delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client - acceptance: - accepted_by: - - owner - - founder - risk_class: medium - # Reviewed machine descriptors (NK-WP-0048-T16 successor candidate). Digests are - # generated by sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/compose-1.2-descriptors.py --version 1.3. - execution_descriptors: - bind-env: sha256:d5fcb20cf15bf7454890d2529180c582218e3df12584a99162e4b664b899caa0 - deliver-consumer-secret: sha256:36281df8139fb1ec64b226d94f80eb592de5addab7063ff54c691c641e275fc7 - deliver-secret: sha256:75aaa7346aebdea2a0eb0ba993995515b5248ffefc34caf8e713525e9b58da85 - ensure-groups: sha256:ebc9d5b9167d18e6015f4bbeb9699e8d396d64fbfaf195142781f84f4f47a70a - hand-over: sha256:1bce07a3229b7d0c7c730f35ce5b40fe471009a82de8dd53788ed970a9be1224 - mint-secret: sha256:c92957227235db04953809d92b260d32c8b947472a8e8fd17a258ade3ae8da70 - register-client: sha256:434c53e88d4dd86a0325603468c3d6618570f38155484a76ed37d2f1550d43cb diff --git a/security-case-types/_template/README.md b/security-case-types/_template/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 251f29e..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/_template/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -# SecurityCaseType template - -Copy `_template/` to `security-case-types//` and rewrite every -section. Canon: `canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md`. A type is -acknowledged through informed-decision only when this README, `type.yaml`, the -example cases and the tests are complete and green. - -## Purpose - -Which recurring use case the type serves, and the hand-built instances it -replaces or adopts (reference instances). For the template: a loopback bootstrap -identity for one operator, composed from `net-kingdom.local-identity`. - -## Threat model - -What the type protects, from whom, and how. Name the assets (credentials, -sessions, signing keys), the actors (anonymous, low-assurance operator, tenant, -compromised workload) and what each step does to prevent misuse. For the -template: the store is loopback-only and private to its owner; the signing key -is referenced from custody, never written into a case. - -## Alternatives considered - -The other shapes this pattern could have taken and why they were not chosen. -This is the part an informed-decision is mostly about. - -## Attended steps - -Every step marked `attended: true`, why it cannot run unattended, and how -ops-warden groups such steps into as few attended sessions as possible. - -## Known limits - -What the type does not cover, and when a request should become a new type or a -new major version instead of a case. - -## Verification and rollback - -How the checks in `type.yaml` prove a case is live without reading any value, -and how rollback restores the state from before the case. diff --git a/security-case-types/_template/examples/example-operator.yaml b/security-case-types/_template/examples/example-operator.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index cfc7d80..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/_template/examples/example-operator.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# Example SecurityCase for the template type. Example values only. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: example-operator - type: template-example@0.1 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: example-owner - parameters: - operator_username: bootstrap-admin - operator_fullname: Bootstrap Reference Operator - operator_email: bootstrap@example.invalid - signing_key_ref: bao:platform/workloads/example/local-identity-signing diff --git a/security-case-types/_template/tests/test_type.py b/security-case-types/_template/tests/test_type.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7a4380c..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/_template/tests/test_type.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests every SecurityCaseType carries: the type validates, its example cases -validate against it, and each example renders into a composer plan. - -Copied with the template: rename it to test__contract.py -(pytest needs unique module names) and add type-specific tests beside it. -""" - -import importlib.util -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -TYPE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TYPE_DIR.parents[1] -VALIDATOR = REPO / "tools" / "security-case-types" / "security_case_validator.py" -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator", VALIDATOR) -validator = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -sys.modules[SPEC.name] = validator -SPEC.loader.exec_module(validator) - -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "type.yaml").read_text()) -EXAMPLES = sorted((TYPE_DIR / "examples").glob("*.yaml")) -# Provider declarations live in their owning repositories, checked out side by -# side with net-kingdom (the contract's publication path). -DECLARATIONS, DISCOVERY_ISSUES = validator.discover_declarations(TYPE, REPO.parent) -# Until the type is implemented, examples are checked as if it were. -IMPLEMENTED = TYPE["spec"]["status"] == "implemented" - - -def errors(issues): - return [f"{i.path}: {i.message}" for i in issues if i.level == "ERROR"] - - -def test_type_is_complete(): - assert errors(validator.validate_type(TYPE, TYPE_DIR)) == [] - - -def test_examples_exist_and_validate(): - assert EXAMPLES - for path in EXAMPLES: - case = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - assert errors(validator.validate_case(case, TYPE, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED)) == [], path.name - - -def test_examples_render_deterministically(): - assert errors(DISCOVERY_ISSUES) == [], "provider declarations must be checked out beside net-kingdom" - declarations, load_issues = validator.composer.load_declarations(DECLARATIONS) - assert errors(load_issues) == [] - for path in EXAMPLES: - case = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - issues, first = validator.render_case(case, TYPE, declarations, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED) - assert errors(issues) == [], path.name - _, second = validator.render_case(case, TYPE, declarations, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED) - assert first["digest"] == second["digest"] - assert first["execution"] == {"permitted": False} - assert first["composition"]["execution"]["permitted"] is False diff --git a/security-case-types/_template/type.yaml b/security-case-types/_template/type.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index ded8cae..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/_template/type.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -# SecurityCaseType template (canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md). -# -# Copy this directory to security-case-types// and replace every part. -# This template is itself a valid, runnable type: it composes the checked-in -# net-kingdom.local-identity declaration (a C0 bootstrap identity), so that its -# tests prove the validator and renderer end to end. It is not for real cases. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCaseType -spec: - id: template-example - version: "0.1" - status: draft - title: "Template: local bootstrap identity for one operator" - purpose: >- - Shows every section a type must define, using a loopback bootstrap identity - as the example. A real type states which recurring use case it serves and - which hand-built instances it replaces. - - # What a case fills in. Secret values are never parameters: a secret appears - # only as a custody reference (sensitivity: secret_reference). - parameters: - - name: operator_username - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: Username of the one operator this case is for. - - name: operator_fullname - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[^\\n\\r]{1,120}$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: Display name of the operator. - - name: operator_email - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[^@\\s]+@[^@\\s]+$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: Contact address of the operator. - - name: signing_key_ref - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^bao:platform/workloads/[a-z0-9/-]+$"} - sensitivity: secret_reference - description: Custody reference for the signing key; never the key itself. - - name: store_home - type: string - case_settable: false - default: .local/local-identity - sensitivity: operational - description: Where the store lives; fixed by the type, not by cases. - - # Which declared playbook capabilities the type composes, with exact provider - # pins, and how case parameters bind to the declarations' parameters. - composition: - authority: netkingdom - initial_trust: [bare_host_trust] - capabilities: [c0.bootstrap-identity] - providers: - c0.bootstrap-identity: net-kingdom.local-identity - parameter_bindings: - net-kingdom.local-identity.bootstrap_username: operator_username - net-kingdom.local-identity.bootstrap_fullname: operator_fullname - net-kingdom.local-identity.bootstrap_email: operator_email - net-kingdom.local-identity.local_identity_home: store_home - - # What ops-mason builds per case (structure only, never values). - materialization: - - id: signing-key-path - kind: kv_path - template: "{signing_key_ref}" - - id: signing-key-policy - kind: openbao_policy - template: "local-identity-{operator_username}-read" - # A policy or role templates its rules too, not only its name; literal - # braces in HCL are doubled. Prefer a path the type derives over one a - # case sets (see oidc-browser-relying-party). - body: "read on the KV v2 data path of {signing_key_ref} only; no metadata, list, parent or sibling" - - id: catalog-entry - kind: catalog_entry - template: "local-identity-{operator_username}" - body: | - id: local-identity-{operator_username} - owner_repo: net-kingdom - warden_executes: false - path_template: {signing_key_ref} - - # What ops-warden carries out, step by step, on whose entry point. - follow_through: - - id: init-store - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "uv run --project local-identity local-identity init" - auth: "local operator shell on the target host" - lane: local-identity-operator - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - The bootstrap identity exists before any managed identity, so no - unattended principal can run it. - - # Checks that prove the case is live; never reading a secret value. - verification: - - id: discovery-serves - check: "loopback discovery document issuer matches the planned port" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: store-private - check: "store under {store_home} is not readable by other users" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - # The exact inverse of every follow-through step and materialized item. - rollback: - - reverses: init-store - action: "stop the loopback issuer and remove {store_home}" - - reverses: signing-key-path - action: "remove the KV path {signing_key_ref}" - - reverses: signing-key-policy - action: "delete policy local-identity-{operator_username}-read" - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: "remove catalog entry local-identity-{operator_username}" - - acceptance: - accepted_by: [owner] - risk_class: low diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5a38071..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,144 +0,0 @@ -# oidc-browser-relying-party 1.1 - -An internal web service signs its human users in through NetKingdom (KeyCape) -with an OIDC authorization-code client. This type covers the client -registration, the LLDAP groups that gate sign-in, and, for confidential -clients, the client secret, minted straight into OpenBao custody and readable -only by KeyCape and the consuming service. - -Canon: `canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md`. Status: **acknowledged** -(2026-10-09, informed-decision memo `nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4`, -hub decision `e418263e`). It becomes `implemented` once its first case, Forgejo, -is live and verified (NK-WP-0048-T06). - -## Purpose - -Until now every browser client was registered by its own script in -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/` (`register-coulomb-social.py`, `portal-client-rollout.py`, -`register-user-engine-portal.py`, `vergabe-client-rollout.py`, -`openbao-client-config.py`), each with its own test and an attended founder run. -The scripts share one pattern: a non-exporting merge into the live client -registry, with inspect, dry-run, apply and remove modes. net-kingdom now declares -that pattern once as the playbook capability `net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration`, -implemented by `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py`. This type composes it. - -### Reference instances and fit - -| Client | Fits 1.0 | Why not, and what would cover it | -| --- | --- | --- | -| user-engine portal | yes | — | -| vergabe-demo-company | yes | — | -| Forgejo (pending, KEY-WP-0038) | yes | first confidential case and the reference case for `implemented` | -| coulomb.social | partly | also registers plain-http loopback redirects for local development | -| openbao-admin | no | a CLI client with plain-http loopback callbacks; candidate type `oidc-cli-loopback-client` | -| informed-decision-approver | no | carries a resource `audience`, a registration-bound `tenant` and custom scopes; candidate 1.1 parameters or a separate type | - -Adopting an existing client as a case does not change its live registration -(canon section 9). - -## Threat model - -Assets: the users' sessions at the consuming service; the confidential client -secret; group memberships that decide who may sign in and with what rights. - -| Threat | Control in this type | -| --- | --- | -| Authorization code or token sent to an attacker-controlled URL | exact `redirect_uris`, https only, no wildcards, validated by the type and enforced by KeyCape | -| Anyone with a NetKingdom account gains access to the service | `access_groups` gate sign-in at the consumer; membership is explicit (`initial_members`), never implied | -| Stolen password grants admin rights | `mfa_required: "true"` is pinned on the client when the service grants administrative or owner rights, not left to the deployment default | -| Client secret leaks through git, chat or a case file | the secret never appears in a case; it is minted by the credential broker into `platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}`, a path the type derives, and only two read policies (read on that one data path) can reach it, one of them through the ESO role | -| Secret readable by a broad identity | verification includes a negative check that a default-only identity cannot read the custody path | -| Over-broad scopes leak profile data | `allowed_scopes` is a closed list; `openid` first | -| Silent drift between hand-built clients | one capability, one type, one rollback; per-client scripts retire as clients are adopted | - -Out of scope: the consuming service's own authorization model (how groups map to -roles there), token lifetime policy (KeyCape's), and federation (C5). - -## Alternatives considered - -- **Keep per-client scripts.** Rejected by the founder (2026-10-08): too much - manual work, and every script is a separate review surface. -- **Wildcard or prefix redirect URIs.** Rejected: the classic open-redirect - weakness; exact strings cost nothing. -- **Auto-create Forgejo/consumer accounts for any NetKingdom user.** Rejected: - sign-in is gated by explicit groups; the consumer decides account creation - (Forgejo: link existing accounts, no automatic creation). -- **Public clients everywhere (PKCE only).** Allowed for SPAs and native apps; - server-side services use confidential clients, so that a stolen authorization - code alone is not enough. -- **Put the client secret in the case for convenience.** Rejected: cases carry - custody references only (canon section 9). -- **Let each case choose its custody path.** Rejected (ops-mason review, - MASON-WP-0010-T01): the type derives `platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}` - and reuses the `workload-kv-read-keycape--` policy family and - `external-secrets-keycape-` role from the live CCR-2026-0033 - placement, so a case cannot add a new layout or policy family. - -## Attended steps - -`register-client` is attended: KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes -Secret, and agents do not read or write Secrets. For confidential clients, -`bind-env` is attended as well, being a change to the identity provider's -Deployment. KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret from an environment -variable at start, so the binding (and `deliver-secret` before it) must exist -before registration. `ensure-groups` is attended too (see Lanes below). ops-warden -groups the attended steps into one operator -session (WARDEN-WP-0044). The way to remove this -step is a KeyCape change: load clients from a non-secret registry and reference -confidential secrets from custody. That would be a 1.1 or 2.0 of this type. - -## Lanes, value handling and gates - -Every step ops-warden executes or groups names its catalog lane -(`keycape-client-secret-generate` is new and must exist before the first case -runs; the attended steps use the existing `key-cape-oidc-login`). "ops-warden executes" means ops-warden invokes the owner's -entry point through its caller proxy, under the caller's identity: it holds no -credential (canon section 3). `mint-secret` generates the value inside the -broker and custody (`value_handling: generated_in_custody`), so no value passes -through the run. `deliver-secret` gates `bind-env` with a status-only Ready check. -`ensure-groups` adds exactly the memberships recorded in the accepted case. It is -attended, in the same session as `register-client`, and runs inside the -provisioner pod: the provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime -token, so a caller-proxy lane would act as user-engine (ops-warden review R8). It -can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator credential of its own. - -## Known limits - -- No loopback or plain-http redirects (CLI and local development clients). -- No resource `audience`, registration-bound `tenant` or custom scopes. -- No service (`client_credentials`) clients: that is the `oidc-service-client` type. -- Groups are service-access groups only: the identity-provisioner refuses - `tenant*`, `netkingdom-*` and `lldap_*` names on this path, and never creates - users (members must already exist). -- `custody` uses the railiance-platform credential broker; that owner has not yet - declared a `c3.runtime-secrets` capability, so `mint-secret` is a follow-through - step rather than a composed capability. When it is declared, compose it. - -## Verification and rollback - -Verification proves the registration with the authorization endpoint (accepts -each registered redirect, refuses an unregistered one), checks group existence, -and for confidential clients checks custody by capabilities only: the default -identity is denied, the consumer's policy is allowed. Nothing reads a secret -value. - -Rollback is the exact inverse, in reverse order. The hand-over is removed first, -then the registration, then the secret and its policies, then the case's group -memberships. Groups are deleted only if this case created them and no other case -uses them. - -## History - -- **1.1 patch** (2026-10-10): `register-client` runs `keycape check-config` - (key-cape c528daa) through `keycape-client.py --check-config` on the live and - the proposed registry; apply refuses a registry KeyCape would refuse at start. -- **1.1** (2026-10-10, minor): verification `consumer-enforces-groups`, and - hand-over requires the consumer to enforce `access_groups`, because KeyCape has - no per-client group gate (key-cape type review R2, key-cape 6038483). No new - acknowledgment: the risk class is unchanged. The Forgejo case was re-pinned - before any apply, on the founder's go. -- **1.0 patch** (2026-10-10): R1 redirect URIs refuse `?` and `#`; R2 `groups` - scope always required; R3/R4 documentation (net-kingdom 61ab6bc). - `{client_id:env}` adopted in `bind-env` and its rollback (9a9b8e3). -- **1.0** (2026-10-09): acknowledged via informed-decision memo r4 (hub decision - `e418263e`). diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/build_intake.py b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/build_intake.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2758c37..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/build_intake.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Build the informed-decision memo intake envelope that acknowledges this type. - -Writes intake.json beside this file and validates it with informed-decision's own -intake validator, when that checkout is present beside net-kingdom. The envelope -is queued by an operator through the State Hub memo dispatcher (informed-decision -deploy/lifecycle/README.md); this script never submits anything. -""" -import hashlib -import json -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -HUB_DECISION = "e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09" -# r4 supersedes r3 (ensure-groups as a caller-proxy step; ops-warden R8), r2 -# (built before ops-warden's review) and the first memo (built before ops-mason's -# review). Each revision needs a new id: the dispatcher -# refuses new content under a delivered idempotency key. -MEMO_ID = "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4" -ITEM = f"{MEMO_ID}-packet" - -packet = (HERE / "packet.md").read_text() -digest = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(packet.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() - -envelope = { - "kind": "informed-decision.memo-intake", - "version": 1, - # State Hub requires state-hub.. (stable_idempotency_key). - "idempotency_key": f"state-hub.{HUB_DECISION}.{MEMO_ID}", - "memo_class": "decision-record", - "review_group": "net-kingdom-admins", - "drafted_by": "net-kingdom NK-WP-0048 (claude-code)", - "serves": {"hub_decision_id": HUB_DECISION, "resolves": "on-answer"}, - "approval_intent": { - "action": "acknowledge", - "principal": "net-kingdom-admins", - "purpose": "Admit oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 as a SecurityCaseType (canon security-case-types_v0.1 section 5).", - "target": {"id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0", "type": "security-case-type", "system": "net-kingdom"}, - }, - "memo": { - "id": MEMO_ID, - "version": 1, - "question": ("Acknowledge oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 as the reusable SecurityCaseType " - "for internal web services that sign humans in through NetKingdom?"), - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": ( - "NK-WP-0048-T05. Acknowledging admits the shape of browser OIDC clients for internal " - "services, so that each later client is a light SecurityCase: accepted, materialized by " - "ops-mason, followed through by ops-warden. It registers nothing and accepts no case; the " - "Forgejo case keeps its own acceptance. Supersedes memo " - "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party; answer this one. One attended operator session remains per case, " - "because KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret." - ), - "binding": { - "justification": None, - "principal": {"display_name": "Named reviewer in net-kingdom-admins", "id": "pending-human-session", - "identifiers": [], "kind": "person", "role": "reviewer"}, - "target": {"environment": "prod", "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0", - "kind": "security-case-type", "label": "SecurityCaseType oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0", - "requires_new_bind": False}, - "terms": None, - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [{"item_id": ITEM, "label": ITEM, "hash": digest}], - "highlights": [ - {"id": f"{MEMO_ID}-h1", "item_id": ITEM, "severity": "critical", "required_ack": True, - "locator": {"kind": "work_record", "workplan": "NK-WP-0048", "task": "NK-WP-0048-T05"}, - "note": ("Acknowledging changes nothing live and accepts no case. It decides the shape every " - "future browser client case will follow.")}, - {"id": f"{MEMO_ID}-h2", "item_id": ITEM, "severity": "warning", "required_ack": True, - "locator": {"kind": "work_record", "workplan": "NK-WP-0048", "task": "NK-WP-0048-T05"}, - "note": ("One attended operator session per case remains (register-client; bind-env for " - "confidential clients). Removing it needs a KeyCape change and a new type version.")}, - ], - "locale": "en", - "approval_id": None, - "approval_binding_digest": None, - "sealed": False, - }, - "packet": [{"item_id": ITEM, "media_type": "text/markdown", "content": packet}], -} - -out = HERE / "intake.json" -out.write_text(json.dumps(envelope, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n") -print(f"wrote {out.name}; packet {digest}") - -infd = HERE.parents[3] / "informed-decision" -if infd.is_dir(): - sys.path.insert(0, str(infd)) - from informed_decision import intake # noqa: E402 - - grant = intake.SubmitterGrant(submitter_id="state-hub", memo_classes=frozenset({"decision-record"}), - review_groups=frozenset({"net-kingdom-admins"})) - validated = intake.validate_submission(envelope, submitter_id="state-hub", grant=grant) - print("informed-decision intake validation: PASS", validated.memo.id) -else: - print("informed-decision checkout not found beside net-kingdom; validation skipped") - -hub = HERE.parents[3] / "state-hub" -if hub.is_dir(): - sys.path.insert(0, str(hub)) - from api.services import informed_decision_contract as contract # noqa: E402 - - contract.validate_envelope(envelope) - print("state-hub dispatcher envelope validation: PASS") -else: - print("state-hub checkout not found beside net-kingdom; dispatcher validation skipped") diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3e464c3..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -{ - "kind": "informed-decision.memo-intake", - "version": 1, - "idempotency_key": "state-hub.e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09.nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4", - "memo_class": "decision-record", - "review_group": "net-kingdom-admins", - "drafted_by": "net-kingdom NK-WP-0048 (claude-code)", - "serves": { - "hub_decision_id": "e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09", - "resolves": "on-answer" - }, - "approval_intent": { - "action": "acknowledge", - "principal": "net-kingdom-admins", - "purpose": "Admit oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 as a SecurityCaseType (canon security-case-types_v0.1 section 5).", - "target": { - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0", - "type": "security-case-type", - "system": "net-kingdom" - } - }, - "memo": { - "id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4", - "version": 1, - "question": "Acknowledge oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for internal web services that sign humans in through NetKingdom?", - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": "NK-WP-0048-T05. Acknowledging admits the shape of browser OIDC clients for internal services, so that each later client is a light SecurityCase: accepted, materialized by ops-mason, followed through by ops-warden. It registers nothing and accepts no case; the Forgejo case keeps its own acceptance. Supersedes memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party; answer this one. One attended operator session remains per case, because KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret.", - "binding": { - "justification": null, - "principal": { - "display_name": "Named reviewer in net-kingdom-admins", - "id": "pending-human-session", - "identifiers": [], - "kind": "person", - "role": "reviewer" - }, - "target": { - "environment": "prod", - "id": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0", - "kind": "security-case-type", - "label": "SecurityCaseType oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0", - "requires_new_bind": false - }, - "terms": null - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-packet", - "label": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-packet", - "hash": "sha256:452ea42168ddef64dc5498ba30ae63ff2ff47a3919f55e22f6379d668ea76c28" - } - ], - "highlights": [ - { - "id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-h1", - "item_id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-packet", - "severity": "critical", - "required_ack": true, - "locator": { - "kind": "work_record", - "workplan": "NK-WP-0048", - "task": "NK-WP-0048-T05" - }, - "note": "Acknowledging changes nothing live and accepts no case. It decides the shape every future browser client case will follow." - }, - { - "id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-h2", - "item_id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-packet", - "severity": "warning", - "required_ack": true, - "locator": { - "kind": "work_record", - "workplan": "NK-WP-0048", - "task": "NK-WP-0048-T05" - }, - "note": "One attended operator session per case remains (register-client; bind-env for confidential clients). Removing it needs a KeyCape change and a new type version." - } - ], - "locale": "en", - "approval_id": null, - "approval_binding_digest": null, - "sealed": false - }, - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4-packet", - "media_type": "text/markdown", - "content": "# Acknowledge SecurityCaseType oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0\n\nWorkplan: NK-WP-0048 (net-kingdom), task NK-WP-0048-T05\nHub decision: e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09\nCanon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md (accepted 2026-10-08), section 5\nType: security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/ (type.yaml, README.md, tests)\nMemo: nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4. It supersedes r3 (which\nmade `ensure-groups` an ops-warden caller-proxy step; ops-warden's addendum R8\nshowed the provisioner has no caller credential for that), r2 (which lacked\nops-warden's review) and the first memo (already returned). Please return any\nof r2 and r3 still open with a comment that r4 supersedes them, then answer\nthis one. All memos serve the same hub decision, and the first accept or\ndecline resolves it.\n\n## Question\n\nAcknowledge oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for\ninternal web services that sign humans in through NetKingdom?\n\n## One act\n\nMove the type from `proposed` to `acknowledged`. From then on, a browser OIDC\nclient for an internal service is a SecurityCase of this type: its owner fills in\nthe parameters, the case is accepted (owner and founder, risk class medium),\nops-mason materializes it and ops-warden follows through. The type becomes\n`implemented` only after its first case (Forgejo) is live and verified.\n\n## What acknowledging does not do\n\n- It registers no client, creates no group, mints no secret and changes nothing\n live.\n- It does not accept any case. The Forgejo case needs its own acceptance; its\n parameters were accepted in KEY-WP-0038-T01 and carry over, except custody:\n the type puts Forgejo's secret at `platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo`, not\n the request's proposed `platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client`.\n- It does not adopt the existing hand-built clients. Adoption, when it happens,\n does not change their live registrations.\n- It does not create the new catalog lane listed below\n (`keycape-client-secret-generate`, railiance-platform). It is needed before\n the first case runs (T06).\n\n## The shape being acknowledged\n\nParameters: client id, display name, exact https redirect URIs (no wildcards),\nscopes from a closed list, client type (confidential or public), MFA pin, the\nLLDAP groups that gate sign-in and their initial members, the consuming service\nand its owner. A case cannot choose where a confidential client's secret lives:\nthe type derives `platform/workloads/keycape/`, as the live\nsecrets-engine-openbao client already uses. Secrets never appear in a case.\n\nSteps, in order, each on its owner's entry point and its catalog lane:\n\n| Step | Owner | Runs | Lane | Values | Confidential only |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| ensure-groups | net-kingdom (identity-provisioner, in-pod call) | attended operator | key-cape-oidc-login | none | no |\n| mint-secret | railiance-platform (credential broker) | ops-warden | keycape-client-secret-generate (new) | generated in custody | yes |\n| deliver-secret | railiance-platform (delivery into the sso namespace) | owner; gate: Ready, status only | — | none | yes |\n| bind-env | net-kingdom (KeyCape Deployment) | attended operator | key-cape-oidc-login | none | yes |\n| register-client | net-kingdom (keycape-client.py) | attended operator | key-cape-oidc-login | none | no |\n| hand-over | the consuming service's owner | owner | — | none | no |\n\n\"ops-warden runs\" means exactly this, now written into the canon: ops-warden\ninvokes the owner's entry point through its caller proxy, under the caller's\nidentity and lane. It never holds a standing credential for the step. A secret\nis generated inside the broker and custody and never passes through the run.\n`ensure-groups` adds exactly the memberships recorded in the accepted case and\nnothing else.\n\nops-mason builds, for confidential clients, the custody path; two read policies\nin the existing family, `workload-kv-read-keycape--eso` and\n`workload-kv-read-keycape--`, each granting `read` on\nthat one data path and nothing else; and the Kubernetes-auth role\n`external-secrets-keycape-` that ESO uses to deliver the secret (its\nservice account only, 15m, no default policy). For every case it adds the\ncatalog entry `-keycape-client`, whose body the type templates\n(owner key-cape, risk high, the consumer's workload reference, path and field,\nnative delegation, rotation not automatable until a run is proven). A case adds\nno new path layout, policy family or route design.\n\nVerification never reads a value. The authorization endpoint accepts each\nregistered redirect and refuses another; the groups exist with exactly the\naccepted memberships; for confidential clients, the delivery reports Ready, a\ndefault identity is denied the custody path and the consumer's policy is allowed\nit; when MFA is pinned, the registered client shows the pin. Rollback is the\nexact inverse, in reverse order.\n\n## Why this shape (alternatives rejected)\n\n- Per-client scripts (the status quo): too much manual work, one review surface\n per client.\n- Wildcard or prefix redirect URIs: the classic open-redirect weakness.\n- Automatic accounts for every NetKingdom user: sign-in is gated by explicit\n groups; the consumer decides account creation.\n- Secrets in case files for convenience: cases carry no secrets.\n- A custody path chosen per case: every case would add its own layout and\n policy family to review (rejected in ops-mason's review).\n- One type-level catalog route instead of one entry per case: it would drop the\n consumer's workload reference that zone selection needs (ops-warden withdrew\n this proposal and agreed with ops-mason).\n- ops-warden holding a standing service token: it would become a broker, which\n ops-warden's own design rules out.\n\n## Attended steps\n\n`ensure-groups`, `register-client` (and, for confidential clients, `bind-env`)\nneed one attended operator session, grouped by ops-warden on the existing\n`key-cape-oidc-login` lane. `ensure-groups` is attended because the\nidentity-provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token and\nits NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods: a caller-proxy lane would act as\nuser-engine (ops-warden R8). It runs inside the provisioner pod, and no token is\nread. An operator credential of its own on the provisioner would make it\nunattended in a later version. KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not\nread or write Secrets. Removing this needs a KeyCape change (clients from a\nnon-secret registry, secrets referenced from custody). That would be a new\nversion of this type, with its own decision.\n\n## Known limits of 1.0\n\nNo plain-http or loopback redirects (openbao-admin, the coulomb.social dev\nURIs), no resource audience, tenant binding or custom scopes\n(informed-decision-approver), no service clients. Each of these is a later\nversion or a separate type. Of the existing hand-built browser clients,\nuser-engine portal and vergabe fit 1.0 exactly.\n\n## Evidence\n\n- Validator: tools/security-case-types/, 22 tests (bodies for policies, roles\n and catalog entries; lanes for executed or attended steps; value handling on\n every step; no generated value in an attended step)\n- This type: 14 tests, including the rendered Forgejo case (custody path, both\n policy bodies, ESO role, catalog entry body, lanes, value handling, the\n delivery gate, the MFA and delivery checks), the Forgejo case checked field by\n field against the accepted request, and a regression showing that the vergabe\n case reproduces its hand-built registration exactly\n- Entry points: identity-provisioner groups ensure/revoke (39 tests),\n keycape-client.py (15 tests)\n- Declaration net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration passes the Playbook\n Capability Contract validator\n\n## Reviews before this decision\n\nBoth executors have reviewed their sections, and everything they required is in\nthis version. ops-mason (MASON-WP-0010-T01) asked for a derived custody path,\nreuse of the existing policy family, templated policy rules, the ESO role and a\nper-case catalog entry. ops-warden (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01) asked for a catalog lane\nper step, a narrow canon meaning of \"ops-warden runs\", per-step value handling,\na Ready gate before bind-env, memberships only from the accepted case, MFA and\ndelivery checks, and a templated catalog entry body. ops-warden and ops-mason\nreport no remaining conflict.\n" - } - ] -} diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/packet.md b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/packet.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8e350a4..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/packet.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,149 +0,0 @@ -# Acknowledge SecurityCaseType oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 - -Workplan: NK-WP-0048 (net-kingdom), task NK-WP-0048-T05 -Hub decision: e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09 -Canon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md (accepted 2026-10-08), section 5 -Type: security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/ (type.yaml, README.md, tests) -Memo: nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4. It supersedes r3 (which -made `ensure-groups` an ops-warden caller-proxy step; ops-warden's addendum R8 -showed the provisioner has no caller credential for that), r2 (which lacked -ops-warden's review) and the first memo (already returned). Please return any -of r2 and r3 still open with a comment that r4 supersedes them, then answer -this one. All memos serve the same hub decision, and the first accept or -decline resolves it. - -## Question - -Acknowledge oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for -internal web services that sign humans in through NetKingdom? - -## One act - -Move the type from `proposed` to `acknowledged`. From then on, a browser OIDC -client for an internal service is a SecurityCase of this type: its owner fills in -the parameters, the case is accepted (owner and founder, risk class medium), -ops-mason materializes it and ops-warden follows through. The type becomes -`implemented` only after its first case (Forgejo) is live and verified. - -## What acknowledging does not do - -- It registers no client, creates no group, mints no secret and changes nothing - live. -- It does not accept any case. The Forgejo case needs its own acceptance; its - parameters were accepted in KEY-WP-0038-T01 and carry over, except custody: - the type puts Forgejo's secret at `platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo`, not - the request's proposed `platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client`. -- It does not adopt the existing hand-built clients. Adoption, when it happens, - does not change their live registrations. -- It does not create the new catalog lane listed below - (`keycape-client-secret-generate`, railiance-platform). It is needed before - the first case runs (T06). - -## The shape being acknowledged - -Parameters: client id, display name, exact https redirect URIs (no wildcards), -scopes from a closed list, client type (confidential or public), MFA pin, the -LLDAP groups that gate sign-in and their initial members, the consuming service -and its owner. A case cannot choose where a confidential client's secret lives: -the type derives `platform/workloads/keycape/`, as the live -secrets-engine-openbao client already uses. Secrets never appear in a case. - -Steps, in order, each on its owner's entry point and its catalog lane: - -| Step | Owner | Runs | Lane | Values | Confidential only | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| ensure-groups | net-kingdom (identity-provisioner, in-pod call) | attended operator | key-cape-oidc-login | none | no | -| mint-secret | railiance-platform (credential broker) | ops-warden | keycape-client-secret-generate (new) | generated in custody | yes | -| deliver-secret | railiance-platform (delivery into the sso namespace) | owner; gate: Ready, status only | — | none | yes | -| bind-env | net-kingdom (KeyCape Deployment) | attended operator | key-cape-oidc-login | none | yes | -| register-client | net-kingdom (keycape-client.py) | attended operator | key-cape-oidc-login | none | no | -| hand-over | the consuming service's owner | owner | — | none | no | - -"ops-warden runs" means exactly this, now written into the canon: ops-warden -invokes the owner's entry point through its caller proxy, under the caller's -identity and lane. It never holds a standing credential for the step. A secret -is generated inside the broker and custody and never passes through the run. -`ensure-groups` adds exactly the memberships recorded in the accepted case and -nothing else. - -ops-mason builds, for confidential clients, the custody path; two read policies -in the existing family, `workload-kv-read-keycape--eso` and -`workload-kv-read-keycape--`, each granting `read` on -that one data path and nothing else; and the Kubernetes-auth role -`external-secrets-keycape-` that ESO uses to deliver the secret (its -service account only, 15m, no default policy). For every case it adds the -catalog entry `-keycape-client`, whose body the type templates -(owner key-cape, risk high, the consumer's workload reference, path and field, -native delegation, rotation not automatable until a run is proven). A case adds -no new path layout, policy family or route design. - -Verification never reads a value. The authorization endpoint accepts each -registered redirect and refuses another; the groups exist with exactly the -accepted memberships; for confidential clients, the delivery reports Ready, a -default identity is denied the custody path and the consumer's policy is allowed -it; when MFA is pinned, the registered client shows the pin. Rollback is the -exact inverse, in reverse order. - -## Why this shape (alternatives rejected) - -- Per-client scripts (the status quo): too much manual work, one review surface - per client. -- Wildcard or prefix redirect URIs: the classic open-redirect weakness. -- Automatic accounts for every NetKingdom user: sign-in is gated by explicit - groups; the consumer decides account creation. -- Secrets in case files for convenience: cases carry no secrets. -- A custody path chosen per case: every case would add its own layout and - policy family to review (rejected in ops-mason's review). -- One type-level catalog route instead of one entry per case: it would drop the - consumer's workload reference that zone selection needs (ops-warden withdrew - this proposal and agreed with ops-mason). -- ops-warden holding a standing service token: it would become a broker, which - ops-warden's own design rules out. - -## Attended steps - -`ensure-groups`, `register-client` (and, for confidential clients, `bind-env`) -need one attended operator session, grouped by ops-warden on the existing -`key-cape-oidc-login` lane. `ensure-groups` is attended because the -identity-provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token and -its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods: a caller-proxy lane would act as -user-engine (ops-warden R8). It runs inside the provisioner pod, and no token is -read. An operator credential of its own on the provisioner would make it -unattended in a later version. KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not -read or write Secrets. Removing this needs a KeyCape change (clients from a -non-secret registry, secrets referenced from custody). That would be a new -version of this type, with its own decision. - -## Known limits of 1.0 - -No plain-http or loopback redirects (openbao-admin, the coulomb.social dev -URIs), no resource audience, tenant binding or custom scopes -(informed-decision-approver), no service clients. Each of these is a later -version or a separate type. Of the existing hand-built browser clients, -user-engine portal and vergabe fit 1.0 exactly. - -## Evidence - -- Validator: tools/security-case-types/, 22 tests (bodies for policies, roles - and catalog entries; lanes for executed or attended steps; value handling on - every step; no generated value in an attended step) -- This type: 14 tests, including the rendered Forgejo case (custody path, both - policy bodies, ESO role, catalog entry body, lanes, value handling, the - delivery gate, the MFA and delivery checks), the Forgejo case checked field by - field against the accepted request, and a regression showing that the vergabe - case reproduces its hand-built registration exactly -- Entry points: identity-provisioner groups ensure/revoke (39 tests), - keycape-client.py (15 tests) -- Declaration net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration passes the Playbook - Capability Contract validator - -## Reviews before this decision - -Both executors have reviewed their sections, and everything they required is in -this version. ops-mason (MASON-WP-0010-T01) asked for a derived custody path, -reuse of the existing policy family, templated policy rules, the ESO role and a -per-case catalog entry. ops-warden (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01) asked for a catalog lane -per step, a narrow canon meaning of "ops-warden runs", per-step value handling, -a Ready gate before bind-env, memberships only from the accepted case, MFA and -delivery checks, and a templated catalog entry body. ops-warden and ops-mason -report no remaining conflict. diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 5f22610..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/example-public-portal.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -# Illustrative public (PKCE-only) client. Example values only. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: example-public-portal - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: example-owner - parameters: - client_id: example-portal - display_name: Example portal - redirect_uris: https://portal.example.invalid/auth/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: public - mfa_required: "false" - access_groups: example-portal-users - consuming_service: example-portal - consumer_owner_repo: net-kingdom diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 45c4f00..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -# First KnownSecurityCase (NK-WP-0048-T06), from the request the founder accepted -# on 2026-10-08 (key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml, KEY-WP-0038-T01). -# Custody is derived by the type (platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo), not the -# request's proposed platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client path. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: "true" - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party.py b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9fac10b..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,211 +0,0 @@ -"""Type-specific tests for oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0.""" - -import copy -import importlib.util -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -TYPE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TYPE_DIR.parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - "security_case_validator", REPO / "tools" / "security-case-types" / "security_case_validator.py") -v = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -sys.modules[SPEC.name] = v -SPEC.loader.exec_module(v) - -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "type.yaml").read_text()) -FORGEJO = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "examples" / "forgejo.yaml").read_text()) -PUBLIC = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "examples" / "example-public-portal.yaml").read_text()) -DECL_PATHS, _ = v.discover_declarations(TYPE, REPO.parent) -DECLS, _ = v.composer.load_declarations(DECL_PATHS) - - -def msgs(issues): - return [f"{i.path}: {i.message}" for i in issues if i.level == "ERROR"] - - -def as_implemented(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["status"] = "implemented" - return t - - -def with_params(case, **changes): - c = copy.deepcopy(case) - for k, val in changes.items(): - if val is None: - c["spec"]["parameters"].pop(k, None) - else: - c["spec"]["parameters"][k] = val - return c - - -def test_keycape_client_record_matches_the_accepted_request(): - spec_ = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - "keycape_client", REPO / "sso-mfa" / "k8s" / "keycape" / "keycape-client.py") - kc = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec_) - spec_.loader.exec_module(kc) - accepted = yaml.safe_load((REPO.parent / "key-cape" / "docs" / "forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml").read_text()) - record = kc.client_from_case(FORGEJO) - for key in ("clientId", "redirectUris", "allowedScopes", "clientType", "mfaRequired"): - assert record[key] == accepted["client"][key], key - assert record["secretRef"] == accepted["client"]["secretRef"] - - -def test_forgejo_case_matches_the_accepted_request(): - accepted = yaml.safe_load((REPO.parent / "key-cape" / "docs" / "forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml").read_text()) - p = FORGEJO["spec"]["parameters"] - assert p["client_id"] == accepted["client"]["clientId"] - assert p["redirect_uris"].split(",") == accepted["client"]["redirectUris"] - assert p["allowed_scopes"].split(",") == accepted["client"]["allowedScopes"] - assert p["client_type"] == accepted["client"]["clientType"] - assert p["mfa_required"] == str(accepted["client"]["mfaRequired"]).lower() - assert "secret_ref" not in p # derived by the type; diverges from the request's proposed path - assert set(p["access_groups"].split(",")) == set(accepted["forgejo_mapping"]["required_claim"]["any_of"]) - - -def test_redirects_must_be_exact_https(): - t = as_implemented() - for bad in ["https://forgejo.coulomb.social/*", "http://forgejo.coulomb.social/cb", - "https://a.example/cb, https://b.example/cb", - "https://forgejo.coulomb.social/cb?x=1", "https://forgejo.coulomb.social/cb#f"]: - assert any("redirect_uris" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_case(with_params(FORGEJO, redirect_uris=bad), t))), bad - - - -def test_allowed_scopes_always_include_groups(): - t = as_implemented() - assert all("groups" in e.split(",") for e in t["spec"]["parameters"][3]["constraints"]["enum"]) - assert any("allowed_scopes" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_case(with_params(FORGEJO, allowed_scopes="openid,profile,email"), t))) - -def test_custody_path_is_derived_not_case_settable(): - t = as_implemented() - assert msgs(v.validate_case(FORGEJO, t)) == [] - assert msgs(v.validate_case(PUBLIC, t)) == [] - for chosen in ["bao:platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client", "hvs.CAESIabcdefghijklmnop"]: - assert msgs(v.validate_case(with_params(FORGEJO, secret_ref=chosen), t)), chosen - - -def test_confidential_materialization_reuses_the_keycape_family(): - issues, r = v.render_case(FORGEJO, as_implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - m = {i["id"]: i for i in r["materialization"]} - assert m["client-secret-path"]["template"] == "platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo" - assert m["keycape-reader-policy"]["template"] == "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso" - assert m["consumer-reader-policy"]["template"] == "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-forgejo" - assert m["eso-role"]["template"] == "external-secrets-keycape-forgejo" - assert m["catalog-entry"]["template"] == "forgejo-keycape-client" - for pid in ("keycape-reader-policy", "consumer-reader-policy"): - body = m[pid]["body"] - assert body.count("path ") == 1 and 'path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/forgejo" {' in body - assert 'capabilities = ["read"]' in body and "metadata" not in body and "list" not in body - assert "token_no_default_policy: true" in m["eso-role"]["body"] - assert "workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso" in m["eso-role"]["body"] - - -def test_policy_without_body_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["materialization"][1].pop("body") - assert any("body" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_scopes_are_a_closed_list(): - t = as_implemented() - assert any("allowed_scopes" in m - for m in msgs(v.validate_case(with_params(FORGEJO, allowed_scopes="openid,admin"), t))) - - -def test_public_case_renders_without_custody_steps(): - issues, r = v.render_case(PUBLIC, as_implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - assert [m["id"] for m in r["materialization"]] == ["catalog-entry"] - assert not {"mint-secret", "deliver-secret", "bind-env"} & {s["id"] for s in r["follow_through"]} - assert {c["id"] for c in r["verification"]} >= {"authorize-refuses-other-redirect"} - assert not {c["id"] for c in r["verification"]} & {"custody-denied-to-default", "custody-allowed-to-consumer"} - - -def test_confidential_case_renders_custody_delivery_and_one_attended_session(): - issues, r = v.render_case(FORGEJO, as_implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - order = [s["id"] for s in r["follow_through"]] - assert order == ["ensure-groups", "mint-secret", "deliver-secret", "bind-env", "register-client", "hand-over"] - steps = {s["id"]: s for s in r["follow_through"]} - attended = [s for s in r["follow_through"] if s.get("attended")] - assert [s["id"] for s in attended] == ["ensure-groups", "bind-env", "register-client"] - assert {s["lane"] for s in attended} == {"key-cape-oidc-login"} - assert "keycape-client.py apply" in steps["register-client"]["entry_point"] - assert "sso/keycape-forgejo-client" in steps["deliver-secret"]["entry_point"] - assert steps["mint-secret"]["entry_point"].endswith("bao:platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo") - assert steps["hand-over"]["owner"] == "railiance-apps" - plan = r["composition"] - assert plan["execution"]["permitted"] is False - assert r["execution"] == {"permitted": False} - - -def test_ops_warden_review_is_folded_in(): - issues, r = v.render_case(FORGEJO, as_implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - steps = {s["id"]: s for s in r["follow_through"]} - lanes = {k: s.get("lane") for k, s in steps.items()} - assert lanes["ensure-groups"] == lanes["register-client"] - assert steps["ensure-groups"]["attended"] and not steps["ensure-groups"]["warden_executes"] - assert lanes["mint-secret"] == "keycape-client-secret-generate" - assert lanes["bind-env"] == lanes["register-client"] == "key-cape-oidc-login" - assert steps["mint-secret"]["value_handling"] == "generated_in_custody" - assert all(s["value_handling"] == "none" for k, s in steps.items() if k != "mint-secret") - assert "Ready=True" in steps["deliver-secret"]["ready_check"] - assert "accepted case" in steps["ensure-groups"]["entry_point"] - checks = {c["id"] for c in r["verification"]} - assert {"secret-delivered", "mfa-pinned"} <= checks - entry = next(m for m in r["materialization"] if m["kind"] == "catalog_entry") - assert "workload_ref: applicable, name forgejo" in entry["body"] - assert "path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo" in entry["body"] - - -def test_public_client_without_mfa_skips_delivery_and_mfa_checks(): - _, r = v.render_case(PUBLIC, as_implemented(), DECLS) - checks = {c["id"] for c in r["verification"]} - assert not {"secret-delivered", "mfa-pinned"} & checks - - -def test_forgejo_reference_case_is_accepted_and_matches_the_example(): - # The live reference case (NK-WP-0048-T06) is the example plus its acceptance. - case = yaml.safe_load((REPO / "security-cases" / "forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml").read_text()) - assert case["spec"]["parameters"] == FORGEJO["spec"]["parameters"] - assert case["spec"]["status"] == "accepted" - assert {b["role"] for b in case["spec"]["acceptance"]["by"]} == {"owner", "founder"} - assert msgs(v.validate_case(case, TYPE, require_implemented=False)) == [] - assert msgs(v.validate_case(case, as_implemented())) == [] - - -def test_env_format_spec_renders_the_keycape_env_name(): - # {client_id:env} gives the name keycape-client.py derives (env_name): upper - # case, '-' as '_'. Adopted in 1.0 once ops-warden's planner rendered it too - # (ops-warden 23ba584, message c1df14b7). - t = as_implemented() - assert msgs(v.validate_type(t)) == [] - issues, r = v.render_case(with_params(FORGEJO, client_id="my-forge"), t, DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - steps = {s["id"]: s for s in r["follow_through"]} - assert "env KEYCAPE_MY_FORGE_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-my-forge-client" in steps["bind-env"]["entry_point"] - assert "<" not in steps["bind-env"]["entry_point"] - undo = [s for s in r["rollback"] if s["reverses"] == "bind-env"] - assert "KEYCAPE_MY_FORGE_CLIENT_SECRET" in undo[0]["action"] - - -def test_unknown_format_spec_is_rejected(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["rollback"][0]["action"] += " {client_id:shout}" - assert any("unknown format spec" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_consumer_enforces_access_groups(): - # 1.1: KeyCape has no per-client group gate, so the consumer must (key-cape R2). - issues, r = v.render_case(FORGEJO, as_implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - checks = {c["id"]: c for c in r["verification"]} - assert "forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers" in checks["consumer-enforces-groups"]["check"] - hand_over = [s for s in r["follow_through"] if s["id"] == "hand-over"][0] - assert "groups claim" in hand_over["entry_point"] diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party_contract.py b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party_contract.py deleted file mode 100644 index 19dc96e..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/tests/test_oidc_browser_relying_party_contract.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests every SecurityCaseType carries: the type validates, its example cases -validate against it, and each example renders into a composer plan. - -Copied with the template; keep it and add type-specific tests beside it. -""" - -import importlib.util -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -TYPE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TYPE_DIR.parents[1] -VALIDATOR = REPO / "tools" / "security-case-types" / "security_case_validator.py" -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator", VALIDATOR) -validator = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -sys.modules[SPEC.name] = validator -SPEC.loader.exec_module(validator) - -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "type.yaml").read_text()) -EXAMPLES = sorted((TYPE_DIR / "examples").glob("*.yaml")) -# Provider declarations live in their owning repositories, checked out side by -# side with net-kingdom (the contract's publication path). -DECLARATIONS, DISCOVERY_ISSUES = validator.discover_declarations(TYPE, REPO.parent) -# Until the type is implemented, examples are checked as if it were. -IMPLEMENTED = TYPE["spec"]["status"] == "implemented" - - -def errors(issues): - return [f"{i.path}: {i.message}" for i in issues if i.level == "ERROR"] - - -def test_type_is_complete(): - assert errors(validator.validate_type(TYPE, TYPE_DIR)) == [] - - -def test_examples_exist_and_validate(): - assert EXAMPLES - for path in EXAMPLES: - case = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - assert errors(validator.validate_case(case, TYPE, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED)) == [], path.name - - -def test_examples_render_deterministically(): - assert errors(DISCOVERY_ISSUES) == [], "provider declarations must be checked out beside net-kingdom" - declarations, load_issues = validator.composer.load_declarations(DECLARATIONS) - assert errors(load_issues) == [] - for path in EXAMPLES: - case = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - issues, first = validator.render_case(case, TYPE, declarations, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED) - assert errors(issues) == [], path.name - _, second = validator.render_case(case, TYPE, declarations, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED) - assert first["digest"] == second["digest"] - assert first["execution"] == {"permitted": False} - assert first["composition"]["execution"]["permitted"] is False diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml b/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a6dbf28..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,322 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCaseType -spec: - id: oidc-browser-relying-party - version: "1.1" - status: acknowledged - title: "Browser OIDC relying party for an internal service" - purpose: >- - Let an internal web service sign its human users in through NetKingdom - (KeyCape): an exact-redirect OIDC client, optional MFA pin, the LLDAP groups - the service maps to its own roles, and, for confidential clients, a client - secret minted straight into OpenBao custody. Replaces the per-client rollout - scripts in sso-mfa/k8s/keycape. First case: Forgejo (KEY-WP-0038). - - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape. - - name: display_name - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[^\\n\\r]{1,80}$"} - sensitivity: public - description: Name shown on the sign-in page. - - name: redirect_uris - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^https://[^*?#\\s,]+(,https://[^*?#\\s,]+)*$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - Comma-separated exact https redirect URIs. No wildcards, no plain http, no - query and no fragment: KeyCape refuses '*' and '?' at startup, and OAuth - 2.0 forbids fragments (key-cape type review R1). - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["openid,profile,email,groups", "openid,email,groups", "openid,profile,groups", "openid,groups"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - Scopes the client may request, openid first. Always includes groups, - because access_groups is required and KeyCape's UserInfo returns groups - only for that scope (key-cape type review R2). - - name: client_type - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["confidential", "public"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: confidential for server-side services that can hold a secret; public for SPAs and native apps (PKCE only). - - name: mfa_required - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["true", "false"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - "true" pins MFA on this client; required when the service grants - administrative or owner rights. "false" is not "no MFA": the client then - carries no mfaRequired field and KeyCape applies the per-user privacyIDEA - policy. A renderer must never emit an explicit mfaRequired false, which - would skip that policy (key-cape type review R3). - - name: access_groups - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: >- - Comma-separated LLDAP groups that the service maps to its roles. Created if - absent. KeyCape has no per-client group gate: it issues tokens to any - authenticated user and only carries the groups claim, so the consuming - service enforces the gate itself (for Forgejo, its required-claim setting; - key-cape type review R2). - - name: initial_members - type: string - required: false - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*(;[a-z][a-z0-9-]*=[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*(\\+[a-z][a-z0-9._-]*)*)*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: "Initial memberships as group=user+user;group=user. Usernames are directory usernames, never secrets." - - name: consuming_service - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: The service that signs users in with this client. - - name: consumer_owner_repo - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: The repository that owns the consuming service's configuration. - - name: issuer - type: string - case_settable: false - default: https://kc.coulomb.social - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type. - - composition: - authority: netkingdom - initial_trust: [runtime_secret_trust, runtime_identity_trust] - capabilities: [c1.lightweight-sso] - providers: - c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration - parameter_bindings: - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_id: client_id - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.display_name: display_name - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.redirect_uris: redirect_uris - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.client_type: client_type - net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.mfa_required: mfa_required - - materialization: - # Placement follows the live CCR-2026-0033 reference (secrets-engine-openbao, - # ops-mason plans/keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client-custody.md). The path - # is derived, not case-settable, and the policies reuse the existing - # workload-kv-read-keycape-- family (MASON-WP-0010-T01). - - id: client-secret-path - kind: kv_path - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - body: "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand" - - id: keycape-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso" - body: | - path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - description: KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access. - - id: consumer-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}" - body: | - path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - description: The consuming service reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access. - - id: eso-role - kind: openbao_role - when: "client_type == confidential" - template: "external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}" - body: | - auth: kubernetes - bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets] - bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets] - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - token_no_default_policy: true - token_ttl: 15m - token_max_ttl: 15m - description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only. - - id: catalog-entry - kind: catalog_entry - template: "{consuming_service}-keycape-client" - body: | - id: {consuming_service}-keycape-client - owner_repo: key-cape - warden_executes: false - risk: high - status: active once verification passes - workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred - path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - field: CLIENT_SECRET - delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape - rotation: mint-secret then verification; automatable false until a run has been proven - description: >- - One entry per case (ops-mason item 5, ops-warden R4'). It carries the - consumer's workload reference, which ADR-0009 needs for zone selection. - follow_through: - - id: ensure-groups - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "identity-provisioner ensure_service_groups, run inside the provisioner pod through the session's contained cluster access (groups {access_groups}; members exactly {initial_members} as recorded in the accepted case, nothing else)" - auth: "operator cluster access in the attended register-client session; the in-pod call uses the provisioner's own directory binding, and no provisioner or user-engine token is read or sent" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - The provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and - its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods. A proxy lane would act as - user-engine (ops-warden review R8; canon section 3; ops-warden ADR-0002). - Running it in the session register-client already needs adds no attended - session. It can become unattended once the provisioner has an operator - credential of its own and an admitted path. - - id: mint-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: "client_type == confidential" - entry_point: "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - auth: "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned" - lane: keycape-client-secret-generate - warden_executes: true - attended: false - value_handling: generated_in_custody - - id: deliver-secret - owner: railiance-platform - when: "client_type == confidential" - entry_point: "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - auth: "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; no value leaves custody" - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)" - - id: bind-env - owner: net-kingdom - when: "client_type == confidential" - entry_point: "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client" - auth: "operator kube credentials for namespace sso" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. It runs in the same - attended operator session as register-client, before it, because - KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails - closed if the binding is missing. - - id: register-client - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration)" - auth: "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do - not read or write Secrets. Until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry with secrets referenced from custody, one attended - operator session applies the rendered registration. ops-warden groups - all attended steps of a run into that one session. KeyCape loads clients - at startup and keeps login, authorization and handoff state in memory, so - the restart drops in-flight logins and sessions for every client; runs go - in a quiet window (key-cape type review R4). The rendered registry must - pass KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape - c528daa, which keycape-client.py runs before it patches) before the - restart: a refused entry stops the single replica and every client - loses sign-in (R1). - - id: hand-over - owner: "{consumer_owner_repo}" - entry_point: "configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id} and custody bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, and make it require one of {access_groups} in the groups claim before sign-in completes" - auth: "the consumer owner's own deployment path" - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - - verification: - - id: authorize-accepts-redirects - check: "GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and each of {redirect_uris} returns the login page" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: authorize-refuses-other-redirect - check: "GET {issuer}/authorize with client {client_id} and an unregistered redirect returns an OAuth error" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - when: "client_type == confidential" - check: "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - when: "client_type == confidential" - check: "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} (capabilities check only)" - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: groups-present - check: "LLDAP groups {access_groups} exist, with exactly the memberships of the accepted case added" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-enforces-groups - # KeyCape has no per-client group gate; only the consumer can enforce - # access_groups (key-cape type review R2, type 1.1). - check: "{consuming_service}'s OIDC source for {client_id} (owner {consumer_owner_repo}) requires one of {access_groups} in the groups claim (configuration read, no secret value)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - when: "client_type == confidential" - check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: mfa-pinned - when: "mfa_required == true" - check: "keycape-client.py inspect for {client_id} shows the MFA pin on the registered client (non-secret client view)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: "remove the OIDC source for {client_id} from {consuming_service} (owner {consumer_owner_repo})" - - reverses: register-client - action: "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}" - - reverses: bind-env - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed" - - reverses: deliver-secret - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target" - - reverses: mint-secret - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed" - - reverses: ensure-groups - action: "identity-provisioner revoke_service_groups inside the provisioner pod (attended, as ensure-groups) with the case's memberships; delete_if_empty only if no other case uses {access_groups}" - - reverses: client-secret-path - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)" - - reverses: eso-role - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}" - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role" - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - when: "client_type == confidential" - action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}" - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: "remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client" - - acceptance: - accepted_by: [owner, founder] - risk_class: medium diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/README.md b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 81c4301..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,161 +0,0 @@ -# oidc-service-client 0.2 - -An internal workload obtains short-lived KeyCape access tokens for one resource server with the `client_credentials` -grant. The type covers: - -- the client registration: audience, resource scopes, service subject, tenant, roles and lifetime; -- the client secret, minted straight into OpenBao custody and readable only by KeyCape (through ESO) and by the - consuming workload (through its own Kubernetes-auth login). - -Canon: `canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md`. Status: **proposed** (0.2, 2026-11-01): complete, tests -green, owner reviews folded in, Decision Memo r2 prepared (`decision/`, hub decision `f8044f81`). Next: -`acknowledged` by the founder through informed-decision. Its first case and -reference instance is the bounded executor's approval client (NK-WP-0056-T14, `examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml`). - -## Purpose - -KeyCape supports confidential `client_credentials` clients (`src/internal/config/validate.go`: confidential, `env:` -secretRef, `serviceSubject` and `tenant` required, no redirect URIs, lifetime 1m–1h). Every such client so far was -registered by its own script: - -- `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/approval-clients-rollout.py` (`secrets-engine-approval`, `approval-engine-operator`); -- `secrets-engine-openbao-client-rollout.py`. - -Each script hard-codes its client. The browser type (`oidc-browser-relying-party`) names service clients with a -resource audience, tenant and custom scopes as needing "a separate type". This is that type. - -Its first case is driven by a live need. approval-engine accepts `POST /v1/approvals` only when `binding.actor` -equals the token's `sub`, so the bounded executor must hold its own client to file the approval it later consumes. - -### Reference instances and fit - -| Client | Fits 0.2 | Note | -| --- | --- | --- | -| nk-bind-executor-approval (new) | yes | first case | -| secrets-engine-approval | yes | adoption would not change its live registration (canon section 9) | -| approval-engine-operator | partly | its scope list is wider than any single workload should hold; adopt only after review | - -## Threat model - -**Assets:** - -- the client secret, which lets its holder obtain tokens as `service_subject`; -- the tokens, which a resource server treats as the workload's identity: for approval-engine, the right to create - approvals with that actor and to consume them. - -**Actors:** - -- an anonymous network caller; -- another workload in the same namespace; -- a coding agent; -- an operator; -- a compromised consuming workload. - -**Controls:** - -- The secret is generated inside custody (`mint-secret`, `generated_in_custody`). It is never returned, never written - by hand and never in Git. -- Only two readers exist: KeyCape through the ESO role, and the consumer through its own role. The consumer role is - bound to one ServiceAccount in one namespace with audience `openbao`, and its policy reads one path. No metadata, - list, parent or sibling access. -- No Secret copy is made *for the consumer*: it reads natively per call. KeyCape's own ESO-delivered copy, - `keycape--client`, lives in `sso`. When the consumer also runs in `sso`, as the first case does, that copy - sits beside it. The verification `consumer-cannot-read-delivered-secret` proves with an RBAC can-i answer that the - consumer's ServiceAccount cannot get, list or watch Secrets there (ops-warden R7, ops-mason R7, railiance-platform - R7). -- Tokens last at most 15m and there is no refresh token. -- Scopes are a closed list per case. KeyCape refuses an excess scope with HTTP 400 `invalid_profile_usage` (feature - `scope`) and issues no token (key-cape R3). The type verifies that refusal. -- Service tokens carry `principal_type: service` and a fixed assurance of `aal1` (`client_secret`). A service token can - never satisfy an aal2 rule. Human approvals stay with humans (key-cape R2). -- The subject and tenant are fixed by the registration. The workload cannot choose them. -- What a compromised consumer can do is bounded by its scopes at one audience. For approval-engine that means: - - it can create approvals naming itself as actor, which still need a human entry under `human_control`; - - it can consume approvals of its tenant, which APPROVAL-WP-0007-T02 `actor_consumes` narrows. - -## Alternatives considered - -- **Keep per-client scripts.** Each repeats the custody, merge and verification logic, and each needs its own - attended founder run. This is the pattern the security case canon replaced for browser clients. -- **Extend `oidc-browser-relying-party`.** The two shapes differ in grant, required fields, the meaning of `sub`, and - how the consumer receives the secret. A combined type would carry parameters that are forbidden in one mode - (KeyCape rejects `serviceSubject` on browser clients). It would be a looser validation, which is a major change by - canon section 6. -- **ESO-deliver the secret into the consumer's namespace** (as the browser type does). Rejected for service clients: - - a long-lived Secret copy beside the workload is readable by anything that can mount Secrets there; - - the bounded executor's lanes already read natively per call (CCR-2026-0058 and CCR-2026-0059). -- **A static bearer instead of a client.** approval-engine expects KeyCape-issued tokens with `aud`, `sub`, tenant and - assurance. A stored bearer would bypass expiry and the subject binding. - -## Attended steps - -`bind-env` and `register-client` change the live identity provider: the KeyCape Deployment and its client registry, -which is a Kubernetes Secret. Agents do not read or write Secrets. Both steps run in one attended operator session -and **one rollout**: KeyCape runs one replica with strategy Recreate, so the env patch is itself a restart (key-cape -R4). `bind-env` goes first, because KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret at start and fails closed without -it. `deliver-secret` must report Ready immediately before, or the new pod cannot start and every client loses sign-in. -The restart drops in-flight logins, so runs go in a quiet window. `mint-secret` and `deliver-secret` are unattended, -but `mint-secret` needs a human aal2 login to the issuer role; an agent, including the consumer, cannot mint its own -secret (ops-warden R2). - -## Lanes, value handling and gates - -| Step | Lane | Value handling | -| --- | --- | --- | -| mint-secret | keycape-client-secret-generate (railiance-platform broker) | generated in custody, never returned | -| deliver-secret | ESO role `external-secrets-keycape-` | none | -| bind-env, register-client | key-cape-oidc-login (attended) | none | -| hand-over | the consumer's own deployment path | none; the consumer reads through role `keycape---workload-kv-read` (policy `workload-kv-read-keycape--`) | - -## Known limits - -- **One audience per case.** A workload that calls two resource servers holds two cases. -- **Scopes are not checked against the audience's own scope list.** The type admits any `resource:verb` shape; the - audience owner reviews the case. A stricter check would need the audience to publish its scopes. -- **KeyCape's client registry is still a Secret.** Registration stays attended until KeyCape loads clients from a - non-secret registry. -- **Rotation is attended and has no lane yet.** `mint-secret` only creates and refuses an existing path. A rotation - is an attended platform-admin write of the next version with CAS, then the ESO delivery Ready, then one KeyCape - restart. Until KeyCape restarts, the consumer, which reads the new value at once, gets 401 (railiance-platform R5, - ops-warden R5, key-cape R5). -- **The broker must admit the type.** railiance-platform's `keycape_client_secret_generate.py` accepts only - `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1` and a `client_type` parameter. Admitting this type is a reviewed source change that - lands after acknowledgement (railiance-platform R1, ops-warden R1). Until then `mint-secret` refuses these cases. -- **Each case still needs its CCRs.** The type replaces the shape review, not per-case approval or binding - confirmation (railiance-platform R6). For the first case: CCR-2026-0060 (KeyCape's ESO reader) and CCR-2026-0061 - (the consumer reader). -- **Claims are reported by the consumer.** `service-token-claims` is the tested party reporting on itself. KeyCape's - non-secret client view at register-client (`keycape-client.py inspect`) is the independent half (ops-warden R8). -- **Adopting `approval-engine-operator`** needs a scope review first; see the reference table. - -## Verification and rollback - -Verification never reads the secret or a token: - -- the consumer reports the claims of its own exchanges (sub, aud, tenant, principal_type, scope and lifetime); -- an excess scope is refused; -- a default identity has no access to custody; -- the consumer role admits only its ServiceAccount and audience; -- the consumer policy grants read on the one path, plus token lookup-self and revoke-self; -- the consumer cannot read Secrets in its namespace (RBAC can-i); -- ESO delivery to KeyCape reports Ready. - -Rollback reverses every follow-through step and every materialized item in dependency order: consumer configuration, -registration, env binding, delivery, custody, roles before their policies, then the catalog entry. Rollback is -complete once the consumer's tokens have expired (at most 15m) or been revoked (ops-mason R11). - -## History - -- 0.1 (2026-10-31): first version, for NK-WP-0056-T14; proposed with memo `nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r1`. -- 0.2 (2026-11-01, NK-WP-0056-T20): folds in the owner reviews (ops-mason `3c69a25`, ops-warden `95d31c3`, key-cape - `655d8d3`, railiance-platform `6858bef`): - - the ESO role gains audience and explicit max TTL; the ESO policy gains token self-lifecycle; - - the consumer role is renamed so that it differs from its policy; - - the `default` ServiceAccount and the `external-secrets` and `openbao` namespaces are refused; - - new verification `consumer-cannot-read-delivered-secret`; - - the excess-scope code corrected; rotation corrected; one rollout per case; - - the catalog entry gains lane, auth_method, `exec_capable: false` and need_keywords. - - Decided here: `consuming_service` stays `bounded-executor`, matching CCR-2026-0061 (ops-mason R9). The first case's - `consumer_owner_repo` is `rapp-bounded-executor`, where the consumer's configuration lives (ADR-0015; ops-warden - R10). Memo r2 replaces r1. diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/build_intake.py b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/build_intake.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7598cd9..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/build_intake.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Build the informed-decision memo intake envelope that acknowledges oidc-service-client 0.2. - -Writes intake.json beside this file and validates it with informed-decision's own intake validator and State Hub's -dispatcher contract, when those checkouts are present beside net-kingdom. The envelope is queued by an operator -through the State Hub memo dispatcher (informed-decision deploy/lifecycle/README.md); this script never submits -anything. -""" -import hashlib -import json -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -HUB_DECISION = "f8044f81-f94c-483a-81f9-4f2b02a60d5f" -# Each revision needs a new id: the dispatcher refuses new content under a delivered idempotency key. -MEMO_ID = "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2" # replaces r1 (0.1, before the owner reviews) -ITEM = f"{MEMO_ID}-packet" -TARGET = "oidc-service-client@0.2" - -packet = (HERE / "packet.md").read_text() -digest = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(packet.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() -locator = {"kind": "work_record", "workplan": "NK-WP-0056", "task": "NK-WP-0056-T14"} - -envelope = { - "kind": "informed-decision.memo-intake", - "version": 1, - "idempotency_key": f"state-hub.{HUB_DECISION}.{MEMO_ID}", - "memo_class": "decision-record", - "review_group": "net-kingdom-admins", - "drafted_by": "net-kingdom NK-WP-0056 (claude-code)", - "serves": {"hub_decision_id": HUB_DECISION, "resolves": "on-answer"}, - "approval_intent": { - "action": "acknowledge", - "principal": "net-kingdom-admins", - "purpose": "Admit oidc-service-client 0.2 as a SecurityCaseType (canon security-case-types_v0.1 section 5).", - "target": {"id": TARGET, "type": "security-case-type", "system": "net-kingdom"}, - }, - "memo": { - "id": MEMO_ID, - "version": 1, - "question": ("Acknowledge oidc-service-client 0.2 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for internal workloads " - "that obtain KeyCape client_credentials tokens for one resource server?"), - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": ( - "NK-WP-0056-T14/T20, r2 after the owner reviews. Acknowledging admits the shape of confidential service clients: one audience, a closed " - "list of resource scopes, a fixed service subject and tenant, at most 15m, the secret minted in custody " - "and read only by KeyCape (ESO) and the consumer's own bound role. It registers nothing and accepts no " - "case; the first case, the bounded executor's approval client, keeps its own acceptance. One attended " - "operator session and one KeyCape restart per case remain, because KeyCape's live client registry is a " - "Kubernetes Secret; rotation is attended until a lane exists." - ), - "binding": { - "justification": None, - "principal": {"display_name": "Named reviewer in net-kingdom-admins", "id": "pending-human-session", - "identifiers": [], "kind": "person", "role": "reviewer"}, - "target": {"environment": "prod", "id": TARGET, "kind": "security-case-type", - "label": "SecurityCaseType oidc-service-client 0.2", "requires_new_bind": False}, - "terms": None, - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [{"item_id": ITEM, "label": ITEM, "hash": digest}], - "highlights": [ - {"id": f"{MEMO_ID}-h1", "item_id": ITEM, "severity": "critical", "required_ack": True, - "locator": locator, - "note": ("Acknowledging changes nothing live and accepts no case. It decides the shape every future " - "service client case will follow, including who may read the client secret.")}, - {"id": f"{MEMO_ID}-h2", "item_id": ITEM, "severity": "warning", "required_ack": True, - "locator": locator, - "note": ("The consumer reads the secret natively per call (no Secret copy in its namespace); one " - "attended operator session per case remains for bind-env and register-client.")}, - ], - "locale": "en", - "approval_id": None, - "approval_binding_digest": None, - "sealed": False, - }, - "packet": [{"item_id": ITEM, "media_type": "text/markdown", "content": packet}], -} - -out = HERE / "intake.json" -out.write_text(json.dumps(envelope, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n") -print(f"wrote {out.name}; packet {digest}") - -infd = HERE.parents[3] / "informed-decision" -if infd.is_dir(): - sys.path.insert(0, str(infd)) - from informed_decision import intake # noqa: E402 - - grant = intake.SubmitterGrant(submitter_id="state-hub", memo_classes=frozenset({"decision-record"}), - review_groups=frozenset({"net-kingdom-admins"})) - validated = intake.validate_submission(envelope, submitter_id="state-hub", grant=grant) - print("informed-decision intake validation: PASS", validated.memo.id) -else: - print("informed-decision checkout not found beside net-kingdom; validation skipped") - -hub = HERE.parents[3] / "state-hub" -if hub.is_dir(): - sys.path.insert(0, str(hub)) - from api.services import informed_decision_contract as contract # noqa: E402 - - contract.validate_envelope(envelope) - print("state-hub dispatcher envelope validation: PASS") -else: - print("state-hub checkout not found beside net-kingdom; dispatcher validation skipped") diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/intake.json b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/intake.json deleted file mode 100644 index ca04f2c..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/intake.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -{ - "kind": "informed-decision.memo-intake", - "version": 1, - "idempotency_key": "state-hub.f8044f81-f94c-483a-81f9-4f2b02a60d5f.nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2", - "memo_class": "decision-record", - "review_group": "net-kingdom-admins", - "drafted_by": "net-kingdom NK-WP-0056 (claude-code)", - "serves": { - "hub_decision_id": "f8044f81-f94c-483a-81f9-4f2b02a60d5f", - "resolves": "on-answer" - }, - "approval_intent": { - "action": "acknowledge", - "principal": "net-kingdom-admins", - "purpose": "Admit oidc-service-client 0.2 as a SecurityCaseType (canon security-case-types_v0.1 section 5).", - "target": { - "id": "oidc-service-client@0.2", - "type": "security-case-type", - "system": "net-kingdom" - } - }, - "memo": { - "id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2", - "version": 1, - "question": "Acknowledge oidc-service-client 0.2 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for internal workloads that obtain KeyCape client_credentials tokens for one resource server?", - "requested_act": "approve", - "binding_level": "organizational", - "brief": "NK-WP-0056-T14/T20, r2 after the owner reviews. Acknowledging admits the shape of confidential service clients: one audience, a closed list of resource scopes, a fixed service subject and tenant, at most 15m, the secret minted in custody and read only by KeyCape (ESO) and the consumer's own bound role. It registers nothing and accepts no case; the first case, the bounded executor's approval client, keeps its own acceptance. One attended operator session and one KeyCape restart per case remain, because KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret; rotation is attended until a lane exists.", - "binding": { - "justification": null, - "principal": { - "display_name": "Named reviewer in net-kingdom-admins", - "id": "pending-human-session", - "identifiers": [], - "kind": "person", - "role": "reviewer" - }, - "target": { - "environment": "prod", - "id": "oidc-service-client@0.2", - "kind": "security-case-type", - "label": "SecurityCaseType oidc-service-client 0.2", - "requires_new_bind": false - }, - "terms": null - }, - "step_kind": "approve", - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-packet", - "label": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-packet", - "hash": "sha256:24179bcad018c3809f6dc229dcced9586800de17b5c76aea164d2416208294c9" - } - ], - "highlights": [ - { - "id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-h1", - "item_id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-packet", - "severity": "critical", - "required_ack": true, - "locator": { - "kind": "work_record", - "workplan": "NK-WP-0056", - "task": "NK-WP-0056-T14" - }, - "note": "Acknowledging changes nothing live and accepts no case. It decides the shape every future service client case will follow, including who may read the client secret." - }, - { - "id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-h2", - "item_id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-packet", - "severity": "warning", - "required_ack": true, - "locator": { - "kind": "work_record", - "workplan": "NK-WP-0056", - "task": "NK-WP-0056-T14" - }, - "note": "The consumer reads the secret natively per call (no Secret copy in its namespace); one attended operator session per case remains for bind-env and register-client." - } - ], - "locale": "en", - "approval_id": null, - "approval_binding_digest": null, - "sealed": false - }, - "packet": [ - { - "item_id": "nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2-packet", - "media_type": "text/markdown", - "content": "# Acknowledge SecurityCaseType oidc-service-client 0.2\n\nWorkplan: NK-WP-0056 (net-kingdom), tasks NK-WP-0056-T14 and T20\nMemo: nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2. It replaces r1 (0.1, before the owner reviews). If r1 was ever\nqueued, return it with a comment that r2 replaces it.\nHub decision: f8044f81-f94c-483a-81f9-4f2b02a60d5f\nCanon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md (accepted 2026-10-08), section 5\nType: security-case-types/oidc-service-client/ (type.yaml, README.md, tests)\nFirst case: examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml\n\n## Question\n\nAcknowledge oidc-service-client 0.2 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for internal workloads that obtain KeyCape\nclient_credentials tokens for one resource server?\n\n## One act\n\nMove the type from `proposed` to `acknowledged`. From then on, a confidential service client is a SecurityCase of\nthis type:\n\n- its owner fills in the parameters (audience, resource scopes, service subject, tenant, lifetime of at most 15m,\n consuming ServiceAccount);\n- the case is accepted by the owner and the founder (risk class medium);\n- ops-mason materializes it, and ops-warden follows through.\n\nThe type becomes `implemented` only after its first case is live and verified. That case is the bounded executor's\napproval client `nk-bind-executor-approval`.\n\n## Why now\n\napproval-engine accepts `POST /v1/approvals` only when `binding.actor` equals the token's `sub`. The bounded\nexecutor (NK-WP-0056) must therefore file its own approval as `service:nk-bind-executor`, which needs its own KeyCape\nclient. Every existing service client was registered by a one-off script. The browser type names service clients\nas needing \"a separate type\".\n\n## What acknowledging does not do\n\n- It registers no client, mints no secret, and changes nothing live.\n- It accepts no case. `nk-bind-executor-approval` keeps its own acceptance.\n- It does not change `oidc-browser-relying-party`.\n\n## Shape (decided here, then reused by every case)\n\n- **Grant:** `client_credentials` only. Confidential, an `env:` secretRef, `serviceSubject` and `tenant`, no\n redirect URIs. These are KeyCape's own rules. The type is stricter: a closed list of resource scopes, and at most\n 15m.\n- **Custody:** `platform/workloads/keycape/`, minted inside custody by the railiance-platform broker and\n never returned. Exactly two readers:\n - KeyCape, through ESO;\n - the consuming workload, through its own Kubernetes-auth role (one dedicated ServiceAccount, never `default`, one\n namespace, audience `openbao`, 15m, one policy).\n- **No Secret copy for the consumer.** It reads per call, as the bounded executor's lanes already do (CCR-2026-0058\n and CCR-2026-0059). KeyCape's own delivered copy lives in `sso`. If the consumer runs there too, an RBAC can-i check\n proves it cannot read Secrets.\n- **Verification reads no value:**\n - the consumer reports claims (sub, aud, tenant, principal_type, scope and lifetime);\n - an excess scope is refused with `invalid_profile_usage`;\n - the consumer cannot read Secrets in its namespace;\n - custody is denied to a default identity;\n - the consumer role admits only its ServiceAccount and audience.\n- **Rollback** covers every step and every materialized item.\n\n## Attended steps\n\nOne attended operator session and **one KeyCape restart** per case remain (`bind-env`, then `register-client`, in\none rollout), because KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret and KeyCape reads the client secret at\nstart. Rotation is also attended for now (a platform-admin write, then a KeyCape restart): the mint step only\ncreates.\n\n## What follows acknowledgement\n\n- railiance-platform admits the type in its secret broker (a reviewed source change).\n- The first case is accepted with its CCRs: CCR-2026-0060 (KeyCape's reader) and CCR-2026-0061 (the executor's\n reader).\n\n## Alternatives considered\n\n- **Keep per-client scripts:** repeats custody and verification per client.\n- **Extend the browser type:** a looser validation and a major change. KeyCape rejects `serviceSubject` on browser\n clients.\n- **ESO-deliver into the consumer's namespace:** leaves a long-lived Secret copy beside the workload.\n- **A static bearer:** bypasses expiry and the subject binding.\n\n## Reviews (done 2026-10-31, folded into 0.2)\n\n- ops-mason (`3c69a25`): materialization accepted with changes, all applied.\n- ops-warden (`95d31c3`): follow-through sound; changes applied (rotation, catalog fields, same-namespace check).\n- key-cape (`655d8d3`): field rules confirmed with `keycape check-config` and a local token test; error code and\n restart notes applied.\n- railiance-platform (`6858bef`): custody and the consumer role accepted. Role renamed; per-case CCRs drafted.\n" - } - ] -} diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/packet.md b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/packet.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6766ae1..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/decision/packet.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -# Acknowledge SecurityCaseType oidc-service-client 0.2 - -Workplan: NK-WP-0056 (net-kingdom), tasks NK-WP-0056-T14 and T20 -Memo: nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2. It replaces r1 (0.1, before the owner reviews). If r1 was ever -queued, return it with a comment that r2 replaces it. -Hub decision: f8044f81-f94c-483a-81f9-4f2b02a60d5f -Canon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md (accepted 2026-10-08), section 5 -Type: security-case-types/oidc-service-client/ (type.yaml, README.md, tests) -First case: examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml - -## Question - -Acknowledge oidc-service-client 0.2 as the reusable SecurityCaseType for internal workloads that obtain KeyCape -client_credentials tokens for one resource server? - -## One act - -Move the type from `proposed` to `acknowledged`. From then on, a confidential service client is a SecurityCase of -this type: - -- its owner fills in the parameters (audience, resource scopes, service subject, tenant, lifetime of at most 15m, - consuming ServiceAccount); -- the case is accepted by the owner and the founder (risk class medium); -- ops-mason materializes it, and ops-warden follows through. - -The type becomes `implemented` only after its first case is live and verified. That case is the bounded executor's -approval client `nk-bind-executor-approval`. - -## Why now - -approval-engine accepts `POST /v1/approvals` only when `binding.actor` equals the token's `sub`. The bounded -executor (NK-WP-0056) must therefore file its own approval as `service:nk-bind-executor`, which needs its own KeyCape -client. Every existing service client was registered by a one-off script. The browser type names service clients -as needing "a separate type". - -## What acknowledging does not do - -- It registers no client, mints no secret, and changes nothing live. -- It accepts no case. `nk-bind-executor-approval` keeps its own acceptance. -- It does not change `oidc-browser-relying-party`. - -## Shape (decided here, then reused by every case) - -- **Grant:** `client_credentials` only. Confidential, an `env:` secretRef, `serviceSubject` and `tenant`, no - redirect URIs. These are KeyCape's own rules. The type is stricter: a closed list of resource scopes, and at most - 15m. -- **Custody:** `platform/workloads/keycape/`, minted inside custody by the railiance-platform broker and - never returned. Exactly two readers: - - KeyCape, through ESO; - - the consuming workload, through its own Kubernetes-auth role (one dedicated ServiceAccount, never `default`, one - namespace, audience `openbao`, 15m, one policy). -- **No Secret copy for the consumer.** It reads per call, as the bounded executor's lanes already do (CCR-2026-0058 - and CCR-2026-0059). KeyCape's own delivered copy lives in `sso`. If the consumer runs there too, an RBAC can-i check - proves it cannot read Secrets. -- **Verification reads no value:** - - the consumer reports claims (sub, aud, tenant, principal_type, scope and lifetime); - - an excess scope is refused with `invalid_profile_usage`; - - the consumer cannot read Secrets in its namespace; - - custody is denied to a default identity; - - the consumer role admits only its ServiceAccount and audience. -- **Rollback** covers every step and every materialized item. - -## Attended steps - -One attended operator session and **one KeyCape restart** per case remain (`bind-env`, then `register-client`, in -one rollout), because KeyCape's live client registry is a Kubernetes Secret and KeyCape reads the client secret at -start. Rotation is also attended for now (a platform-admin write, then a KeyCape restart): the mint step only -creates. - -## What follows acknowledgement - -- railiance-platform admits the type in its secret broker (a reviewed source change). -- The first case is accepted with its CCRs: CCR-2026-0060 (KeyCape's reader) and CCR-2026-0061 (the executor's - reader). - -## Alternatives considered - -- **Keep per-client scripts:** repeats custody and verification per client. -- **Extend the browser type:** a looser validation and a major change. KeyCape rejects `serviceSubject` on browser - clients. -- **ESO-deliver into the consumer's namespace:** leaves a long-lived Secret copy beside the workload. -- **A static bearer:** bypasses expiry and the subject binding. - -## Reviews (done 2026-10-31, folded into 0.2) - -- ops-mason (`3c69a25`): materialization accepted with changes, all applied. -- ops-warden (`95d31c3`): follow-through sound; changes applied (rotation, catalog fields, same-namespace check). -- key-cape (`655d8d3`): field rules confirmed with `keycape check-config` and a local token test; error code and - restart notes applied. -- railiance-platform (`6858bef`): custody and the consumer role accepted. Role renamed; per-case CCRs drafted. diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 8febadc..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -# First case of oidc-service-client (NK-WP-0056-T14): the bounded executor's approval client. -# approval-engine accepts POST /v1/approvals only when binding.actor equals the token's sub, so the -# executor files its own approval request as service:nk-bind-executor, then reads and consumes it. -# Scopes follow approval-engine docs/bounded-execution-admission-carrier.md section 3. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: nk-bind-executor-approval - type: oidc-service-client@0.2 - status: proposed - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: nk-bind-executor-approval - display_name: NetKingdom bounded executor (approval-engine) - audience: approval-engine - allowed_scopes: approval:create,approval:read,approval:consume - service_subject: service:nk-bind-executor - tenant: tenant:platform - roles: bounded-executor - token_lifetime: 15m - consuming_service: bounded-executor - consumer_namespace: sso - consumer_service_account: nk-bind-executor - consumer_owner_repo: rapp-bounded-executor diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/tests/test_oidc_service_client.py b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/tests/test_oidc_service_client.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9d89e06..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/tests/test_oidc_service_client.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,156 +0,0 @@ -"""Type-specific tests for oidc-service-client 0.1 (NK-WP-0056-T14).""" - -import copy -import importlib.util -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -TYPE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TYPE_DIR.parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - "security_case_validator", REPO / "tools" / "security-case-types" / "security_case_validator.py") -v = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -sys.modules[SPEC.name] = v -SPEC.loader.exec_module(v) -KC_SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("keycape_client", REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py") -kc = importlib.util.module_from_spec(KC_SPEC) -KC_SPEC.loader.exec_module(kc) - -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "type.yaml").read_text()) -EXECUTOR = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "examples" / "nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml").read_text()) -DECL_PATHS, _ = v.discover_declarations(TYPE, REPO.parent) -DECLS, _ = v.composer.load_declarations(DECL_PATHS) - - -def msgs(issues): - return [f"{i.path}: {i.message}" for i in issues if i.level == "ERROR"] - - -def as_implemented(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["status"] = "implemented" - return t - - -def with_params(case, **changes): - c = copy.deepcopy(case) - for k, val in changes.items(): - if val is None: - c["spec"]["parameters"].pop(k, None) - else: - c["spec"]["parameters"][k] = val - return c - - -def render(case=EXECUTOR): - issues, r = v.render_case(case, as_implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - return r - - -def test_executor_case_renders_custody_and_one_attended_session(): - r = render() - order = [s["id"] for s in r["follow_through"]] - assert order == ["mint-secret", "deliver-secret", "bind-env", "register-client", "hand-over"] - attended = [s for s in r["follow_through"] if s.get("attended")] - assert [s["id"] for s in attended] == ["bind-env", "register-client"] - assert {s["lane"] for s in attended} == {"key-cape-oidc-login"} - steps = {s["id"]: s for s in r["follow_through"]} - assert steps["mint-secret"]["entry_point"].endswith("bao:platform/workloads/keycape/nk-bind-executor-approval") - assert "KEYCAPE_NK_BIND_EXECUTOR_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET" in steps["bind-env"]["entry_point"] - assert steps["hand-over"]["owner"] == "rapp-bounded-executor" - assert r["execution"] == {"permitted": False} - - -def test_consumer_reads_natively_with_its_own_bound_role(): - items = {m["id"]: m for m in render()["materialization"]} - role = yaml.safe_load(items["consumer-reader-role"]["body"]) - # role and policy names differ: the delegated applier refuses a role named like its policy (railiance-platform R4) - assert items["consumer-reader-role"]["template"] == "keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-bounded-executor-workload-kv-read" - assert items["consumer-reader-policy"]["template"] == "workload-kv-read-keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-bounded-executor" - assert role["bound_service_account_names"] == ["nk-bind-executor"] - assert role["bound_service_account_namespaces"] == ["sso"] - assert role["audience"] == "openbao" - assert role["token_policies"] == ["workload-kv-read-keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-bounded-executor"] - assert role["token_no_default_policy"] is True and role["token_ttl"] == "15m" - policy = items["consumer-reader-policy"]["body"] - assert 'path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/nk-bind-executor-approval"' in policy - assert "metadata" not in policy and "list" not in policy and "*" not in policy - - -def test_no_secret_copy_is_delivered_to_the_consumer(): - r = render() - deliveries = [s for s in r["follow_through"] if "ExternalSecret" in s["entry_point"]] - assert [s["entry_point"].split()[1] for s in deliveries] == ["sso/keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-client"] - assert not any("eso" in m["id"] and "consumer" in m["id"] for m in r["materialization"]) - - -def test_custody_path_is_derived_not_case_settable(): - assert not [p for p in TYPE["spec"]["parameters"] if "path" in p["name"] or p["name"] == "secret_ref"] - issues = v.validate_case(with_params(EXECUTOR, secret_ref="env:OTHER"), as_implemented()) - assert msgs(issues) - - -def test_case_refusals(): - for change in [dict(allowed_scopes="openid,approval:read"), dict(token_lifetime="1h"), - dict(service_subject="nk-bind-executor"), dict(tenant="platform"), dict(audience=None), - dict(consumer_service_account=None), dict(consumer_service_account="default"), - dict(consumer_namespace="openbao"), dict(consumer_namespace="external-secrets")]: - assert msgs(v.validate_case(with_params(EXECUTOR, **change), as_implemented())), change - - -def test_verification_reads_no_value_and_has_negative_checks(): - checks = render()["verification"] - assert all(c["reads_secret_value"] is False for c in checks) - assert {c["id"] for c in checks if c["expect"] == "deny"} == { - "excess-scope-refused", "custody-denied-to-default", "consumer-login-bound", - "consumer-cannot-read-delivered-secret"} - excess = next(c for c in checks if c["id"] == "excess-scope-refused")["check"] - assert "invalid_profile_usage" in excess and "invalid_scope" not in excess - - -def test_keycape_record_from_the_case(): - record = kc.client_from_case(EXECUTOR) - assert record["grantTypes"] == ["client_credentials"] and record["clientType"] == "confidential" - assert record["serviceSubject"] == "service:nk-bind-executor" and record["audience"] == "approval-engine" - assert record["allowedScopes"] == ["approval:create", "approval:read", "approval:consume"] - assert "redirectUris" not in record and record["tokenLifetime"] == "15m" - - -def test_every_step_and_item_has_a_rollback(): - reversed_ids = {r["reverses"] for r in TYPE["spec"]["rollback"]} - assert {s["id"] for s in TYPE["spec"]["follow_through"]} <= reversed_ids - assert {m["id"] for m in TYPE["spec"]["materialization"]} <= reversed_ids - - -def test_eso_role_and_policy_match_the_live_reader_shape(): - items = {m["id"]: m for m in render()["materialization"]} - role = yaml.safe_load(items["eso-role"]["body"]) - assert role["audience"] == "openbao" and role["token_explicit_max_ttl"] == "15m" # ops-mason R3 - policy = items["keycape-reader-policy"]["body"] - assert '"auth/token/lookup-self"' in policy and '"auth/token/revoke-self"' in policy # ops-mason R4 - - -def test_catalog_entry_names_no_fetch_route_and_attended_rotation(): - body = yaml.safe_load(next(m for m in render()["materialization"] if m["id"] == "catalog-entry")["body"]) - assert body["exec_capable"] is False and "fetch_command" not in body # ops-warden R6 - assert body["lane"] == "secret" and "keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-bounded-executor-workload-kv-read" in body["auth_method"] - assert "attended platform-admin" in body["rotation"] and "automatable false" in body["rotation"] # R5 - - -def test_first_case_ccrs_name_the_rendered_roles_and_policies(): - ccrs = REPO.parent / "railiance-platform" / "credential-change-requests" - found = {c.name: yaml.safe_load(c.read_text()) for c in ccrs.glob("CCR-2026-006[01]-*.yaml")} if ccrs.exists() else {} - if len(found) != 2: - import pytest - pytest.skip("railiance-platform CCR-2026-0060/0061 not checked out") - items = {m["id"]: m["template"] for m in render()["materialization"]} - auth = {name.split("-nk-")[0]: ccr["openbao"]["auth"] for name, ccr in found.items()} - eso, consumer = auth["CCR-2026-0060"], auth["CCR-2026-0061"] - assert eso["role"] == items["eso-role"] and eso["policies"] == [items["keycape-reader-policy"]] - assert consumer["role"] == items["consumer-reader-role"] - assert consumer["policies"] == [items["consumer-reader-policy"]] - assert consumer["bound_claims"] == {"service_account_names": ["nk-bind-executor"], - "service_account_namespaces": ["sso"]} diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/tests/test_oidc_service_client_contract.py b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/tests/test_oidc_service_client_contract.py deleted file mode 100644 index 19dc96e..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/tests/test_oidc_service_client_contract.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests every SecurityCaseType carries: the type validates, its example cases -validate against it, and each example renders into a composer plan. - -Copied with the template; keep it and add type-specific tests beside it. -""" - -import importlib.util -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -TYPE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TYPE_DIR.parents[1] -VALIDATOR = REPO / "tools" / "security-case-types" / "security_case_validator.py" -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator", VALIDATOR) -validator = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -sys.modules[SPEC.name] = validator -SPEC.loader.exec_module(validator) - -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / "type.yaml").read_text()) -EXAMPLES = sorted((TYPE_DIR / "examples").glob("*.yaml")) -# Provider declarations live in their owning repositories, checked out side by -# side with net-kingdom (the contract's publication path). -DECLARATIONS, DISCOVERY_ISSUES = validator.discover_declarations(TYPE, REPO.parent) -# Until the type is implemented, examples are checked as if it were. -IMPLEMENTED = TYPE["spec"]["status"] == "implemented" - - -def errors(issues): - return [f"{i.path}: {i.message}" for i in issues if i.level == "ERROR"] - - -def test_type_is_complete(): - assert errors(validator.validate_type(TYPE, TYPE_DIR)) == [] - - -def test_examples_exist_and_validate(): - assert EXAMPLES - for path in EXAMPLES: - case = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - assert errors(validator.validate_case(case, TYPE, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED)) == [], path.name - - -def test_examples_render_deterministically(): - assert errors(DISCOVERY_ISSUES) == [], "provider declarations must be checked out beside net-kingdom" - declarations, load_issues = validator.composer.load_declarations(DECLARATIONS) - assert errors(load_issues) == [] - for path in EXAMPLES: - case = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - issues, first = validator.render_case(case, TYPE, declarations, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED) - assert errors(issues) == [], path.name - _, second = validator.render_case(case, TYPE, declarations, require_implemented=IMPLEMENTED) - assert first["digest"] == second["digest"] - assert first["execution"] == {"permitted": False} - assert first["composition"]["execution"]["permitted"] is False diff --git a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/type.yaml b/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/type.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a140281..0000000 --- a/security-case-types/oidc-service-client/type.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,331 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCaseType -spec: - id: oidc-service-client - version: "0.2" - status: proposed - title: "Confidential OIDC service client (client_credentials) for an internal workload" - purpose: >- - Let an internal workload obtain short-lived KeyCape access tokens for one - resource server (client_credentials): an exact audience, a closed list of - resource scopes, a fixed service subject and tenant, and a client secret - minted straight into OpenBao custody, readable only by KeyCape (through ESO) - and by the consuming workload (through its own Kubernetes-auth login). - Replaces per-client rollout scripts such as approval-clients-rollout.py. - First case: the bounded executor's approval client (NK-WP-0056-T14). - - parameters: - - name: client_id - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: OAuth2 client_id, unique in KeyCape. - - name: display_name - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[^\\n\\r]{1,80}$"} - sensitivity: public - description: Human-readable client name. - - name: audience - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - The one resource server the tokens are for (the aud claim). One client per - audience: a workload that calls two resource servers holds two cases. - - name: allowed_scopes - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*:[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]*:[a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - Comma-separated resource scopes of the audience (for example - approval:read). OIDC identity scopes (openid, profile, email, groups) are - not admitted: a service token carries no directory user. - - name: service_subject - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^service:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - The sub KeyCape writes into every token of this client. Resource servers - compare it exactly (approval-engine: binding.actor must equal it), so it - is the workload's identity at the resource server. - - name: tenant - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^tenant:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The registration-bound tenant claim. - - name: roles - type: string - required: false - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}(,[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62})*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: Comma-separated roles carried in the token, if the resource server reads them. - - name: token_lifetime - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {enum: ["5m", "10m", "15m"]} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: Access-token lifetime, at most 15m. There is no refresh token; the workload exchanges again. - - name: consuming_service - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: The workload that uses the client. - - name: consumer_namespace - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^(?!(external-secrets|openbao)$)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: >- - Namespace of the consuming workload's ServiceAccount. Not external-secrets or openbao (ops-mason R6). If it - is sso, KeyCape's own delivered copy lives beside the consumer; verification proves the consumer cannot read - it (consumer-cannot-read-delivered-secret). - - name: consumer_service_account - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^(?!default$)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$"} - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The dedicated ServiceAccount whose openbao-audience token may read the client secret; never default (ops-mason R6). - - name: consumer_owner_repo - type: string - case_settable: true - constraints: {pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"} - sensitivity: operational - description: The repository that owns the consuming workload. - - name: issuer - type: string - case_settable: false - default: https://kc.coulomb.social - sensitivity: security_sensitive - description: The NetKingdom issuer; fixed by the type. - - composition: - authority: netkingdom - initial_trust: [runtime_secret_trust, runtime_identity_trust] - capabilities: [c1.lightweight-sso] - providers: - c1.lightweight-sso: net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration - parameter_bindings: - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.client_id: client_id - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.display_name: display_name - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.audience: audience - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.allowed_scopes: allowed_scopes - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.service_subject: service_subject - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.tenant: tenant - net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration.token_lifetime: token_lifetime - - materialization: - # Custody follows oidc-browser-relying-party (platform/workloads/keycape/, - # KeyCape reads through ESO). The consumer reads natively with its own short - # Kubernetes-auth role, as the bounded executor's lanes do (CCR-2026-0058/0059), - # so no second Secret copy exists in the consumer's namespace. - - id: client-secret-path - kind: kv_path - template: "platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - body: "field CLIENT_SECRET; minted by the credential broker, never written by hand" - - id: keycape-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso" - body: | - path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - path "auth/token/lookup-self" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - path "auth/token/revoke-self" {{ - capabilities = ["update"] - }} - description: >- - KeyCape reads its client secret only through ESO. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access; token - self-lifecycle as in CCR-2026-0041 (ops-mason R4, railiance-platform R3). - - id: eso-role - kind: openbao_role - template: "external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}" - body: | - auth: kubernetes - bound_service_account_names: [external-secrets] - bound_service_account_namespaces: [external-secrets] - audience: openbao - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso] - token_no_default_policy: true - token_ttl: 15m - token_max_ttl: 15m - token_explicit_max_ttl: 15m - description: The Kubernetes-auth role deliver-secret uses; bound to the ESO service account only (ops-mason R3). - - id: consumer-reader-policy - kind: openbao_policy - template: "workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}" - body: | - path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - path "auth/token/lookup-self" {{ - capabilities = ["read"] - }} - path "auth/token/revoke-self" {{ - capabilities = ["update"] - }} - description: The consuming workload reads the same secret. No metadata, list, parent or sibling access. - - id: consumer-reader-role - kind: openbao_role - # The delegated applier refuses a role named like its policy (railiance-platform R4). - template: "keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}-workload-kv-read" - body: | - auth: kubernetes - bound_service_account_names: [{consumer_service_account}] - bound_service_account_namespaces: [{consumer_namespace}] - audience: openbao - token_policies: [workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}] - token_no_default_policy: true - token_ttl: 15m - token_max_ttl: 15m - token_explicit_max_ttl: 15m - description: >- - Native login for the consuming workload, one role for this lane only - (railiance-platform: policies are never combined in one role). - - id: catalog-entry - kind: catalog_entry - template: "{consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}" - body: | - id: {consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id} - owner_repo: key-cape - warden_executes: false - risk: high - status: active once verification passes - workload_ref: applicable, name {consuming_service}, declaration_ref of the consumer's published declaration or the explicit unknown form, never inferred - path_template: platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} - field: CLIENT_SECRET - delegation: native, intended_owner key-cape - lane: secret - subsystem: keycape - auth_method: kubernetes role keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}-workload-kv-read (audience openbao), bound to {consumer_namespace}/{consumer_service_account} - exec_capable: false - need_keywords: [{client_id}, {audience}, {consuming_service}, keycape client secret] - rotation: >- - attended platform-admin write of the next version with CAS (mint-secret only creates and refuses an - existing path), then the ESO delivery Ready, then one KeyCape restart; automatable false, no lane yet - description: >- - One entry per case; carries the consumer's workload reference for zone selection (ADR-0009). No fetch - command: no operator fetch route is implied (ops-warden R6). - - follow_through: - - id: mint-secret - owner: railiance-platform - entry_point: "railiance-platform credential broker: generate a client secret inside custody at bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - auth: "the caller's broker grant for the case's KV path, through its lane; the value is generated in custody and never returned" - lane: keycape-client-secret-generate - warden_executes: true - attended: false - value_handling: generated_in_custody - - id: deliver-secret - owner: railiance-platform - entry_point: "ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) from bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - auth: "railiance-platform ESO delivery through role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}; no value leaves custody" - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - ready_check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only, no value read)" - - id: bind-env - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "patch Deployment sso/keycape: env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from sso/keycape-{client_id}-client" - auth: "operator kube credentials for namespace sso" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - A change to the live identity provider's Deployment. KeyCape runs one - replica with strategy Recreate, so an env patch is itself a restart - (key-cape R4): bind-env and register-client are applied in one rollout, - bind-env first, because KeyCape resolves a confidential client's secret - at start and fails closed if the binding is missing. deliver-secret must - report Ready immediately before, or the new pod cannot start and every - client loses sign-in. - - id: register-client - owner: net-kingdom - entry_point: "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file --case-acceptance --check-config (net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration)" - auth: "operator write access to the live KeyCape client registry in namespace sso" - lane: key-cape-oidc-login - warden_executes: false - attended: true - value_handling: none - attended_justification: >- - The live KeyCape client registry is a Kubernetes Secret, and agents do not - read or write Secrets. One attended operator session applies the rendered - registration together with bind-env. KeyCape loads clients at startup, so - the restart drops in-flight logins for every client; runs go in a quiet - window. The rendered registry must pass KeyCape's own startup checks - (keycape check-config) before the restart. - - id: hand-over - owner: "{consumer_owner_repo}" - entry_point: "configure {consuming_service} with issuer {issuer}, client {client_id}, audience {audience} and its OpenBao role workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}; it exchanges a fresh token per call and keeps neither the secret nor a token beyond the call" - auth: "the consumer owner's own deployment path" - warden_executes: false - attended: false - value_handling: none - - verification: - - id: service-token-claims - check: "{consuming_service} performs one client_credentials exchange per scope in {allowed_scopes} through its own lane and reports the token's sub, aud, tenant, principal_type, scope and lifetime; expected sub {service_subject}, aud {audience}, tenant {tenant}, principal_type service, lifetime at most {token_lifetime} (claims only; the verifier reads no secret and no token)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - id: excess-scope-refused - check: "{consuming_service} requests a scope outside {allowed_scopes} for client {client_id}; KeyCape answers HTTP 400 invalid_profile_usage (feature scope) and issues no token (key-cape R3)" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-denied-to-default - check: "a default-only OpenBao identity has no read capability on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-login-bound - check: "role keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}-workload-kv-read admits only {consumer_namespace}/{consumer_service_account} with audience openbao; another ServiceAccount and a wrong audience are denied (capabilities and login result only)" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: custody-allowed-to-consumer - check: "policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service} grants read on bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id} and otherwise only token lookup-self and revoke-self (capabilities check only)" - expect: allow - reads_secret_value: false - - id: consumer-cannot-read-delivered-secret - check: "an RBAC can-i check as {consumer_namespace}/{consumer_service_account} for get, list and watch on Secrets in {consumer_namespace} answers no, so KeyCape's delivered copy keycape-{client_id}-client stays out of the consumer's reach (authorization answer only; ops-warden R7, ops-mason R7)" - expect: deny - reads_secret_value: false - - id: secret-delivered - check: "the delivery for sso/keycape-{client_id}-client reports Ready=True (status only)" - expect: present - reads_secret_value: false - - rollback: - - reverses: hand-over - action: "remove client {client_id} from {consuming_service}'s configuration (owner {consumer_owner_repo})" - - reverses: register-client - action: "keycape-client.py apply --operation remove for {client_id}" - - reverses: bind-env - action: "remove env KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET from Deployment sso/keycape, after register-client is reversed" - - reverses: deliver-secret - action: "delete ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client and its target" - - reverses: mint-secret - action: "covered by client-secret-path: one metadata delete, after deliver-secret is reversed" - - reverses: client-secret-path - action: "delete metadata and all versions at platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}, after the ExternalSecret is gone (this also reverses mint-secret)" - - reverses: eso-role - action: "delete Kubernetes-auth role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}" - - reverses: keycape-reader-policy - action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso, after eso-role" - - reverses: consumer-reader-role - action: "delete Kubernetes-auth role keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}-workload-kv-read; rollback is complete once the consumer's tokens have expired (at most 15m) or been revoked (ops-mason R11)" - - reverses: consumer-reader-policy - action: "delete policy workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, after consumer-reader-role" - - reverses: catalog-entry - action: "remove catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-{client_id}" - - acceptance: - accepted_by: [owner, founder] - risk_class: medium diff --git a/security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml b/security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index b080a25..0000000 --- a/security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -# First KnownSecurityCase of oidc-browser-relying-party 1.1 (NK-WP-0048-T06). -# Parameters are the request the founder accepted on 2026-10-08 -# (key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml, KEY-WP-0038-T01); that -# acceptance carries over as this case's acceptance. One difference: custody is -# derived by the type (platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo), not the request's -# proposed platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client. The founder -# acknowledged that derivation with the type (memo r4, 2026-10-09). -# Re-pinned from 1.0 to 1.1 on 2026-10-10 on the founder's go, before any -# apply, so no 1.0 run overlaps (minor change: consumer-enforces-groups). -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: forgejo-netkingdom-oidc - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 - status: accepted - acceptance: - at: "2026-10-08" - record: "key-cape docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml (status accepted-2026-10-08, KEY-WP-0038-T01); type acknowledged via informed-decision memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, hub decision e418263e" - by: - - {role: owner, name: "founder (for railiance-apps)"} - - {role: founder, name: founder} - owner: - repo: railiance-apps - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: forgejo - display_name: Forgejo source forge - redirect_uris: https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: confidential - mfa_required: "true" - access_groups: forge-admins,forge-coulomb-owners,forge-coulomb-readers - initial_members: forge-admins=tegwick;forge-coulomb-owners=tegwick - consuming_service: forgejo - consumer_owner_repo: railiance-apps diff --git a/security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml b/security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a11be3d..0000000 --- a/security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -# KeyCape client for the synthetic MFA journey (NK-WP-0056-T09). Accepted by the founder 2026-10-31. -# Public PKCE client; the redirect URI is never served: the runner reads the code from the -# Location header. mfa_required pins MFA, and the runner also requests acr urn:netkingdom:aal2. -# access_groups is required by the type; synthetic-journey has no members and no service maps it. -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1 -kind: SecurityCase -spec: - id: nk-synthetic-journey - type: oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 - status: accepted - acceptance: - at: "2026-10-31" - record: "Founder accepted the case as proposed in session 2026-10-31 (NK-WP-0056-T09; hub decision 91323969; CCR-2026-0057 approved railiance-platform 2ac9786)" - by: - - {role: owner, name: founder} - - {role: founder, name: founder} - owner: - repo: net-kingdom - person: founder - parameters: - client_id: nk-synthetic-journey - display_name: NetKingdom synthetic journey - redirect_uris: https://journey.invalid/callback - allowed_scopes: openid,profile,email,groups - client_type: public - mfa_required: "true" - access_groups: synthetic-journey - consuming_service: synthetic-journey - consumer_owner_repo: net-kingdom diff --git a/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md b/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md index 5514d97..19f1810 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md +++ b/sso-mfa/WORKPLAN.md @@ -1,13 +1,4 @@ # SSO-MFA Platform — Stack Migration Workplan - -> Lifecycle update, 2026-10-14: the lifecycle tooling descriptions below are a -> historical snapshot, not current execution instructions. Account creation, -> pattern deletion and inferred-claims verification in the old 0019 helpers are -> retired. Their secret handling and success assertions are not accepted evidence -> of current safety or readiness. Use the [current owner routes](../docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) -> and actual native receipts. Ordinary lifecycle delivery has since advanced in -> NK-WP-0025/NK-WP-0038; independent recovery and other IAM callers remain open. - # NK-WP-0001 — Keycloak → Authelia + LLDAP + KeyCape **Updated:** 2026-03-20 (T04 BLOCKED — ImagePullBackOff; T05–T08 pending T04) @@ -46,7 +37,7 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co - [x] `k8s/privacyidea/middleware.yaml` — rate-limit + admin IP allowlist (ipWhiteList, Traefik v2) - [x] `k8s/privacyidea/ingress.yaml` — pink.coulomb.social + pink-account.coulomb.social - [x] `k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh` — extract enckey + audit keys post-start -- [x] `k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` — create/verify pi-admin (current KeyCape profile) +- [x] `k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh` — create pi-admin + trigger-admin - [x] `k8s/verify-t04.sh` — verify pod, service, middlewares, ingresses, TLS, secrets, PVCs ### BLOCKER — wrong image (2026-03-20) @@ -61,8 +52,8 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co - [ ] `./create-secrets.sh` — create privacyidea-config Secret in mfa namespace (may already exist; check first) - [ ] `kubectl apply -f pvc.yaml configmap.yaml middleware.yaml deployment.yaml ingress.yaml` - [ ] Wait for pod Running/Ready (up to 3 min — DB migrations run on first boot) -- [ ] `bash ./enckey-bootstrap.sh /absolute/private/custody` — extract enckey+auditkeys, store in KeePassXC, create DR Secrets -- [ ] `./bootstrap-admin.sh` — create/verify pi-admin (current KeyCape profile) +- [ ] `./enckey-bootstrap.sh` — extract enckey+auditkeys, store in KeePassXC, create DR Secrets +- [ ] `./bootstrap-admin.sh` — create pi-admin and trigger-admin - [ ] Log in to pink.coulomb.social, enroll TOTP for pi-admin, verify MFA challenge - [ ] Run `../verify-t04.sh` — 0 FAILs - [ ] Commit and mark T04 done @@ -70,7 +61,7 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co ### Done-criteria for T04 - privacyIDEA pod Running+Ready in mfa namespace - pink.coulomb.social and pink-account.coulomb.social reachable with valid TLS -- pi-admin exists and attended MFA acceptance is recorded; no legacy trigger account is required +- pi-admin and trigger-admin accounts exist - pi-admin has enrolled a TOTP token and MFA challenge fires on login - privacyidea-enckey and privacyidea-auditkeys Secrets exist (DR copies) - verify-t04.sh: 0 FAILs @@ -105,12 +96,12 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co ## T06 — Realm config & MFA flow (KeyCape → privacyIDEA) ### Deliverables -- [x] `k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh` — current source repairs missing `coulomb` realm/LLDAP configuration; the historical enrollment/passthrough replay is withdrawn. See the privacyIDEA README for preview/apply and owner-managed onboarding policy. +- [x] `k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh` — creates LLDAP resolver, "netkingdom" realm, enrollment + passthru policies - [x] `k8s/verify-t06.sh` — verifies realm, resolver, KeyCape→PI token, connectivity ### In Progress (this session) -- [ ] Run the reviewed configuration-preserving realm repair and functional proof (requires T04 and current owner admission; source tests are not live acceptance). -- [ ] Establish RPF-WP-0040 scoped factor delivery, then first-bootstrap `keycape/create-secrets.sh` only if config is absent (old admin-token helpers retired). +- [ ] Run `bootstrap-realm.sh` on live cluster (requires T04 applied) +- [ ] Run `keycape/create-pi-token.sh` then `keycape/create-secrets.sh` (inject real PI token) - [ ] Restart KeyCape with updated keycape-config - [ ] Enroll a TOTP token for pi-admin via pink-account.coulomb.social - [ ] Test end-to-end login via kc.coulomb.social @@ -133,19 +124,19 @@ Hostnames: kc.coulomb.social (KeyCape), auth.coulomb.social (Authelia), lldap.co - [x] `k8s/verify-t07.sh` — verifies groups, break-glass user, self-service portal, OIDC client registrations ### Pending (needs live cluster) -- [ ] Run owner-reviewed group preview/apply with explicit custody; see `k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md`. -- Retired 2026-10-14: do not run the old break-glass creator. Preserve existing custody; NK-WP-0049-T03 tracks owner recovery verification. +- [ ] Run `lldap/bootstrap-users.sh` to create groups +- [ ] Run `lldap/break-glass.sh` to create break-glass account - [ ] Add first real user via LLDAP WebUI (lldap.coulomb.social) - [ ] Register first OIDC client in `keycape/create-secrets.sh` (clients: block) - [ ] User self-enrolls TOTP at pink-account.coulomb.social -- [ ] Retain actual lifecycle/login/recovery acceptance; `verify-t07.sh` now supplies structural diagnostics only (exit 2). +- [ ] Run `verify-t07.sh` — 0 FAILs ### Done-criteria for T07 - Groups net-kingdom-users and net-kingdom-admins exist in LLDAP - break-glass user exists and is in net-kingdom-admins - At least one regular user exists - At least one OIDC client registered in KeyCape -- Historical zero-FAIL T07 results are insufficient; use actual owner lifecycle/login/recovery receipts. +- verify-t07.sh: 0 FAILs ## T08 — Backups, DR, break-glass diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/README.md b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/README.md index 1e19e0a..e73c9e4 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/README.md @@ -11,12 +11,10 @@ KeePassXC is the pre-cluster source of truth. After the K3s cluster is running, secrets migrate into HashiCorp Vault (T01 Phase 0b) and KeePassXC becomes the break-glass / dev-local backup. -## Historical KeePassXC layout +## KeePassXC database structure -This early layout is historical; Keycloak is backlog, not a current runtime -requirement. Use existing independently held custody and the current asset -manifest. Do not generate replacement credentials or enroll a new recovery key -merely to make this layout match a failed recovery. +Create a new `.kdbx` database. Use a strong master password stored in your +personal password manager (Bitwarden, 1Password, etc.). Recommended group structure: @@ -51,18 +49,17 @@ chmod +x gen-secrets.sh ./gen-secrets.sh ./secrets ``` -This writes `.env` files to `./secrets/` (gitignored). Handle them only through -the private custody procedure; never print them or copy values into chat. +This writes `.env` files to `./secrets/` (gitignored). Inspect each file, +then copy each value into the appropriate KeePassXC entry. -### Step 2 — Confirm independent custody and the registered recipient +### Step 2 — Create the age encryption key (one-time) -Use the existing independently registered public recipient in `keys/age.pub`. -Encryption needs only that public file. Do not generate, discover or install a -permanent private key as part of bootstrap. The matching private key stays in -its independently held password-safe/offline custody; temporary attended unlock -uses the [custody procedure](../../docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md). -If it is unavailable, stop and resolve custody through the owner rather than -create a new key that cannot decrypt existing backups. +```bash +age-keygen -o ~/net-kingdom-ops-bundle.key +``` + +The public key prints to stdout. The private key is in the `.key` file. +Store the `.key` file somewhere safe (NOT in this repo; NOT in the secrets/ dir). ### Step 3 — Create the encrypted ops bundle @@ -72,10 +69,6 @@ chmod +x pack-bundle.sh ``` Store `ops-bundle.tar.age` offsite (cloud storage, external drive, separate location). -The destination must be new. Inputs must be owned private regular files, without -links, special files or age private keys. There is no plaintext tar staging file. -Independently verify recovery and service-file coverage before source cleanup; -bundle creation alone proves neither current credential validity nor recovery. ### Step 4 — Shred the generated files @@ -84,15 +77,25 @@ find ./secrets -type f -exec shred -u {} \; rm -rf ./secrets ``` -### Step 5 — privacyIDEA encryption and audit keys +### Step 5 — PI_ENCFILE (after privacyIDEA container is running — T04) -Follow the current [key recovery procedure](../k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md). -Export the verified existing PVC encryption key and matching audit pair through -`enckey-bootstrap.sh` into owned private custody. Missing recovery keys are not -regenerated. Creating an audit pair is an explicit first-bootstrap-only action, -not recovery. The old unconditional `pi-manage create_enckey`, raw `kubectl cp` -and `PI_ENCFILE` Secret recipes are withdrawn; they could destroy continuity or -misrepresent the application's actual PVC key path. +```bash +# Generate the encryption key inside the running container: +kubectl exec -n mfa -- pi-manage create_enckey + +# Extract it: +kubectl cp -n mfa :/etc/privacyidea/enckey ./pi.enc + +# Store as a binary attachment in KeePassXC → net-kingdom/privacyIDEA/PI_ENCFILE + +# Create the K8s Secret: +kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-enckey \ + --from-file=PI_ENCFILE=./pi.enc \ + --namespace mfa + +# Shred the local copy: +shred -u ./pi.enc +``` ## Notes on secret reuse @@ -107,82 +110,11 @@ Use KeePassXC references (`{REF:P@T:UUID}`) to avoid maintaining two copies. ## Phase 0b — HashiCorp Vault (after T02, once K3s is running) -Current OpenBao configuration, ESO delivery and custody belong to -`railiance-platform`; use its exact reviewed procedure. Legacy bootstrap -references do not authorize live initialization, a new root, or replaying old -service values into existing workloads. - -## Current bootstrap and recovery handoff - -`make creds-agent-init` is now attended and public-recipient based. Register -`keys/age.pub` from independently established custody first. No root private key -is generated or discovered by bootstrap. `--dry-run` is a non-mutating plan. -`make creds-emergency-reprint` prints only the non-secret recovery guide. - -For a resume that needs decryption, use the custody unlock helper below. After -apply, the operator must store and independently verify the fresh encrypted ops -bundle before acknowledging its handoff. Source tests use disposable keys and a -simulated cluster; native acceptance remains NK-WP-0049. - -## Service Secret creation and explicit rotation - -The PostgreSQL, privacyIDEA, LLDAP and Authelia `create-secrets.sh` entry points -use `apply-service-secrets.py`. Under the current approved bootstrap/maintenance -procedure, pass the private generator directory as their first argument. The -helper requires Python 3, kubectl and OpenSSL; Authelia also requires Python -bcrypt. Input directories/files must be owned, private and free of symlinks or -hard-linked files. Generated env files are parsed as literal data, never sourced. - -Absent Secrets are created. Existing Secrets must match the supplied values; -ordinary reapplication cannot rotate them. Objects with owner references or ESO management labels, immutable Secrets, -and mismatched target objects are refused. Unknown data keys, labels -and unrelated annotations are preserved. Any stored last-applied annotation is -removed under the same guarded update to stop retaining duplicate secret values. -Writes use stdin and captured diagnostics. Updates test the original object UID, -resource version and data; conflicts fail without retry. Returned API state is -checked before reporting success. A lost/failed response can leave the remote -outcome unknown; inspect through approved metadata-only tooling before retrying. - -For an already reviewed rotation, the explicit interface is: - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/create-secrets.sh /absolute/private/secrets --rotate-key PI_SECRET_KEY -``` - -Only these component/field pairs are accepted: - -| Component | Rotation selector | Updated Secret field | -| --- | --- | --- | -| PostgreSQL | `PI_DB_PASSWORD` | `password` | -| privacyIDEA | `PI_DB_PASSWORD` | `PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI` | -| privacyIDEA | `PI_SECRET_KEY` | `PI_SECRET_KEY` | -| LLDAP | `LLDAP_JWT_SECRET` | `LLDAP_JWT_SECRET` | -| Authelia | `AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET` | `session_secret` | - -The selector describes an operation; it grants no authority. All other supplied -fields must still match. Rotation requires the target Secret to exist. The -guided caller passes these selectors and updates both the CNPG application -Secret and privacyIDEA URI during database password rotation. SQL, Secret writes -and restarts are separate steps, not an atomic transaction. Native database -reconciliation, predecessor denial and consumer acceptance remain required; -failure preserves the local candidate and does not record completed rotation. -The legacy LDAP/Authelia/KeyCape coordinated replacement path refuses before -mutation in both attended and unattended modes, as do KeyCape RSA/client-secret -replacement paths. Implement and review retained rollback custody and scoped -consumer updates before using a replacement procedure (NK-WP-0049-T02). - -For first Authelia creation, an explicit `AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE` must be -an absolute path to a private owned RSA key. Without it, the helper preserves or -atomically creates `authelia/oidc_private_key.pem` under the private input root. -A new key survives API failure for recovery. Existing deployments retain their -current issuer key; missing local custody never triggers a replacement key. -An explicitly supplied differing key is refused. Existing bcrypt hashes are -verified against the supplied client value and preserved, not regenerated. -Independent signing-key backup remains part of the owner recovery ceremony. - -`creds-apply.sh` captures delegated output and records a component only after -its helper succeeds. Batch application is not atomic: earlier components may -already be applied when a later one fails. File status is not native acceptance. +See `../vault/` (created in T01 Phase 0b) for: +- Vault Helm chart values +- ESO (External Secrets Operator) configuration +- Vault secret path layout +- Migration procedure: KeePassXC → Vault ## Custody Age Key Unlock @@ -204,14 +136,3 @@ make sops-custody-shell ``` Exit the shell when finished so the temporary key file is removed. - - -For repository SOPS files, use `make sops-encrypt FILE=...` with private untracked -JSON/YAML plaintext. Inside the approved custody handoff, `make sops-decrypt -FILE=... OUTPUT=...` creates a new private file outside Git, and `make sops-edit -FILE=... INPUT=...` replaces encrypted content from a private file outside Git. -Remove recovered/replacement plaintext after use. `make sops-rotate FILE=...` -rotates only the data key; recipient migration requires a separately reviewed -procedure. Edit/rotate require the explicit matching key and exactly the registered -recipient. See [the custody contract](../../docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md) -for input restrictions, failure handling and concurrency limits. diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9281bd9..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,256 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Private service Secret creation, exact-match verification and named rotation. - -No credential is accepted on argv, evaluated as shell code, or printed. This -helper is not an authority grant or a multi-service rotation transaction. -""" -import base64 -import contextlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import secrets -import stat -import subprocess -import sys - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -TARGETS = { - 'postgresql': ('databases', 'net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app', ('privacyidea',)), - 'privacyidea': ('mfa', 'privacyidea-config', ('privacyidea',)), - 'lldap': ('sso', 'lldap-secrets', ('lldap',)), - 'authelia': ('sso', 'authelia-secrets', ('authelia', 'lldap')), - 'identity-provisioner': ('sso', 'identity-provisioner-ldap', ('lldap',)), -} -ROTATIONS = { - 'postgresql': {'PI_DB_PASSWORD': 'password'}, - 'privacyidea': {'PI_SECRET_KEY': 'PI_SECRET_KEY', 'PI_DB_PASSWORD': 'PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'}, - 'lldap': {'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET': 'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS': 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS'}, - 'authelia': {'AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET': 'session_secret', 'LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS': 'ldap_password'}, -} -ANNOTATION = 'kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration' - - -def private(info, directory=False): - kind = stat.S_ISDIR if directory else stat.S_ISREG - if not kind(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused() - if not directory and info.st_nlink != 1: - raise Refused() - - -@contextlib.contextmanager -def custody(root, components): - root = Path(os.path.abspath(root)) - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (root, *root.parents)): raise Refused() - descriptors = [] - try: - flags = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW - fd = os.open(root, flags); descriptors.append(fd); private(os.fstat(fd), True) - children = {} - for component in components: - child = os.open(component, flags, dir_fd=fd) - descriptors.append(child); private(os.fstat(child), True) - children[component] = child - yield children - finally: - for fd in reversed(descriptors): os.close(fd) - - -def read_private(parent, name): - fd = os.open(name, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=parent) - try: - private(os.fstat(fd)) - raw = os.read(fd, 65537) - if len(raw) > 65536: raise Refused() - return raw - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -def read_env(parent): - values = {} - for line in read_private(parent, 'secrets.env').decode().splitlines(): - if not line.strip() or line.lstrip().startswith('#'): continue - name, separator, value = line.partition('=') - if not separator or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*', name) or name in values: - raise Refused() - values[name] = value - return values - - -def literal(values, name): - value = values.get(name, '') - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', value): raise Refused() - return value - - -def run(args, payload=None): - completed = subprocess.run(args, input=payload, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60, check=False) - if completed.returncode or len(completed.stdout) > 2 * 1024 * 1024: raise Refused() - return completed.stdout - - -def decode_secret(raw, namespace, name): - obj = json.loads(raw) - if not isinstance(obj, dict) or obj.get('kind') != 'Secret' or obj.get('apiVersion') != 'v1': - raise Refused() - meta = obj.get('metadata') - if not isinstance(meta, dict) or meta.get('name') != name or meta.get('namespace') != namespace: - raise Refused() - if (not isinstance(meta.get('uid'), str) or not isinstance(meta.get('resourceVersion'), str) - or not re.fullmatch(r'[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,128}', meta['uid']) - or not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9]{1,128}', meta['resourceVersion'])): - raise Refused() - if (meta.get('ownerReferences') or obj.get('immutable') - or obj.get('type') not in (('Opaque', 'kubernetes.io/basic-auth') - if name == 'net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app' else ('Opaque',))): - raise Refused() - annotations = meta.get('annotations', {}) - labels = meta.get('labels', {}) - if not isinstance(annotations, dict) or not isinstance(labels, dict): raise Refused() - if any(not isinstance(v, str) for v in (*annotations.values(), *labels.values())): raise Refused() - if any(k.startswith(('external-secrets.io/', 'reconcile.external-secrets.io/')) for k in labels): raise Refused() - if not isinstance(obj.get('data'), dict) or not obj['data']: raise Refused() - for key, value in obj['data'].items(): - if not isinstance(key, str) or not isinstance(value, str): raise Refused() - base64.b64decode(value, validate=True) - return obj - - -def read_key(parent, configured, existing): - if configured: - path = Path(configured) - if not path.is_absolute() or any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path, *path.parents)): - raise Refused() - fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) - try: - private(os.fstat(fd), True) - key = read_private(fd, path.name) - finally: - os.close(fd) - else: - try: - key = read_private(parent, 'oidc_private_key.pem') - except FileNotFoundError: - if existing is not None: - key = base64.b64decode(existing['data']['oidc_issuer_private_key'], validate=True) - else: - key = run(['openssl', 'genrsa', '2048']) - run(['openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-noout'], key) - temp = '.issuer-' + secrets.token_hex(12) - fd = os.open(temp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600, dir_fd=parent) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as file: - file.write(key); file.flush(); os.fsync(file.fileno()) - os.link(temp, 'oidc_private_key.pem', src_dir_fd=parent, dst_dir_fd=parent, follow_symlinks=False) - os.fsync(parent) - finally: - os.unlink(temp, dir_fd=parent) - run(['openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-noout'], key) - return key.decode() - - -def service_values(component, values): - # Validate all required literals before any cluster call or local key creation. - if component == 'postgresql': - return {'username': 'privacyidea', 'password': literal(values['privacyidea'], 'PI_DB_PASSWORD')} - if component == 'privacyidea': - env = values['privacyidea']; password = literal(env, 'PI_DB_PASSWORD') - return {'PI_SECRET_KEY': literal(env, 'PI_SECRET_KEY'), 'PI_PEPPER': literal(env, 'PI_PEPPER'), - 'PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI': 'postgresql://privacyidea:' + password + - '@net-kingdom-pg-rw.databases.svc.cluster.local:5432/privacyidea_db'} - if component == 'lldap': - return {key: literal(values['lldap'], key) for key in ('LLDAP_JWT_SECRET', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS')} - if component == 'identity-provisioner': - return {'username': 'svc-provisioner', 'password': literal(values['lldap'], 'LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS')} - env = values['authelia'] - return {'jwt_secret': literal(env, 'AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET'), - 'session_secret': literal(env, 'AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET'), - 'storage_encryption_key': literal(env, 'AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY'), - 'oidc_hmac_secret': literal(env, 'AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET'), - 'ldap_password': literal(values['lldap'], 'LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS')} - - -def publish(namespace, name, desired, old, allowed): - encoded = {k: base64.b64encode(v.encode() if isinstance(v, str) else v).decode() - for k, v in desired.items()} - if old is None: - if allowed: raise Refused() # Rotation may not silently create missing state. - obj = {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'Secret', 'type': 'Opaque', - 'metadata': {'namespace': namespace, 'name': name}, 'data': encoded} - result = run(['kubectl', 'create', '-o', 'json', '-f', '-'], json.dumps(obj).encode()) - expected = encoded; outcome = 'created' - else: - if not set(encoded).issubset(old['data']): raise Refused() - different = {k for k, value in encoded.items() if old['data'][k] != value} - if different - allowed: raise Refused() - annotations = old['metadata'].get('annotations', {}) - if not different and ANNOTATION not in annotations: return 'verified' - patch = [{'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': old['metadata']['uid']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': old['metadata']['resourceVersion']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/data', 'value': old['data']}] - patch.extend({'op': 'replace', 'path': '/data/' + key, 'value': encoded[key]} for key in sorted(different)) - if ANNOTATION in annotations: - patch.append({'op': 'remove', 'path': '/metadata/annotations/kubectl.kubernetes.io~1last-applied-configuration'}) - result = run(['kubectl', 'patch', 'secret', name, '-n', namespace, '--type=json', - '--patch-file=/dev/stdin', '-o', 'json'], json.dumps(patch).encode()) - expected = {**old['data'], **{k: encoded[k] for k in different}} - outcome = 'updated' - readback = decode_secret(result, namespace, name) - if readback['data'] != expected or ANNOTATION in readback['metadata'].get('annotations', {}): raise Refused() - if old is not None: - if readback['metadata']['uid'] != old['metadata']['uid'] or readback['type'] != old['type']: raise Refused() - expected_annotations = {k: v for k, v in old['metadata'].get('annotations', {}).items() if k != ANNOTATION} - if readback['metadata'].get('annotations', {}) != expected_annotations: raise Refused() - if readback['metadata'].get('labels', {}) != old['metadata'].get('labels', {}): raise Refused() - return outcome - - -def main(): - if len(sys.argv) not in (2, 3, 5): raise Refused() - component = sys.argv[1] - if component not in TARGETS: raise Refused() - namespace, name, inputs = TARGETS[component] - root = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) >= 3 else Path(__file__).resolve().parent / 'secrets' - rotation = None - if len(sys.argv) == 5: - if sys.argv[3] != '--rotate-key' or sys.argv[4] not in ROTATIONS[component]: raise Refused() - rotation = ROTATIONS[component][sys.argv[4]] - with custody(root, inputs) as directories: - values = {c: read_env(directories[c]) for c in inputs} - desired = service_values(component, values) - if component == 'authelia': - import bcrypt - client = literal(values['authelia'], 'AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET').encode() - if len(client) > 72: raise Refused() - raw = run(['kubectl', 'get', 'secret', name, '-n', namespace, '--ignore-not-found', '-o', 'json']) - old = decode_secret(raw, namespace, name) if raw.strip() else None - if rotation and old is None: raise Refused() - if component == 'authelia': - if old is None: - hashed = bcrypt.hashpw(client, bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12)) - else: - hashed = base64.b64decode(old['data']['keycape_client_secret_hash'], validate=True) - if not bcrypt.checkpw(client, hashed): raise Refused() - desired['keycape_client_secret_hash'] = hashed.decode() - desired['oidc_issuer_private_key'] = read_key(directories['authelia'], - values['authelia'].get('AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE', ''), old) - outcome = publish(namespace, name, desired, old, {rotation} if rotation else set()) - print('Service Secret ' + outcome + '; native consumer acceptance remains required.') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - main() - except (Refused, OSError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError, ImportError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - print('ERROR: service Secret operation refused or failed. Check private inputs, current ownership ' - 'and the named rotation through approved metadata-only diagnostics. A failed write has an ' - 'unverified remote outcome; reconcile before retry. Local recovery keys are retained.', file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh index 684c3ba..ba8a395 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-apply.sh @@ -10,23 +10,17 @@ # 2. lldap (needs: secrets/lldap/secrets.env) # 3. authelia (needs: lldap/secrets.env → LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) # 4. privacyidea (needs: secrets/privacyidea/secrets.env) -# 5. keycape SKIPPED — requires owner-established RPF-WP-0040 factor delivery. -# create-secrets.sh is first-creation only, never live replacement. +# 5. keycape SKIPPED — requires PI_ADMIN_TOKEN from post-T04 bootstrap. +# Run sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-pi-token.sh, then +# sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh manually. # -# After each successful component create/verification, creds-state.yaml is updated. -# Differing existing values require a separate named rotation; this is not a batch rotation. +# After each successful component, creds-state.yaml is updated. -set +x set -euo pipefail -umask 077 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" -if (( $# > 1 )); then - echo "ERROR: expected one private secrets directory." >&2 - exit 1 -fi -SECRETS_DIR="$(realpath -sm -- "${1:-$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets}")" +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets}" STATE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/creds-state.yaml" K8S_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/sso-mfa/k8s" @@ -51,7 +45,7 @@ fi echo "=== creds-apply — net-kingdom SSO/MFA secrets ===" echo "Secrets dir : $SECRETS_DIR" -echo "Cluster connectivity checked; use only the context admitted by the current procedure." +echo "Cluster : $(kubectl config current-context 2>/dev/null || echo '(unknown)')" echo "" # ── Helper: run a component's create-secrets.sh ─────────────────────────────── @@ -69,11 +63,7 @@ run_component() { exit 1 fi - if ! (cd "$script_dir" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") >/dev/null 2>&1; then - echo "ERROR: component create/verification failed; earlier components may already be applied." >&2 - echo "Use metadata-only reconciliation before retry; no native acceptance is claimed." >&2 - exit 1 - fi + (cd "$script_dir" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") # Update state file if [[ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]]; then @@ -103,20 +93,21 @@ if [[ ! -f "$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" ]]; then fi run_component "privacyidea" "privacyidea" -# ── Step 5: KeyCape — SKIPPED (requires scoped factor delivery) ────────────────────── +# ── Step 5: KeyCape — SKIPPED (requires PI_ADMIN_TOKEN) ────────────────────── echo "──────────────────────────────────────────────" -echo "SKIPPED: keycape (requires RPF-WP-0040 scoped factor delivery)" +echo "SKIPPED: keycape (requires PI_ADMIN_TOKEN from post-T04 bootstrap)" echo "" echo " After privacyIDEA is Running and bootstrapped:" -echo " 1. Export existing keys from the verified Ready privacyIDEA pod:" -echo " bash $K8S_DIR/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh $SECRETS_DIR" +echo " 1. TIME-SENSITIVE: run enckey-bootstrap.sh while pod is live:" +echo " bash $K8S_DIR/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh" echo "" echo " 2. Create the pi-admin user:" echo " bash $K8S_DIR/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh" echo "" -echo " 3. Establish scoped factor custody and ESO delivery through railiance-platform RPF-WP-0040." +echo " 3. Generate the PI admin token for KeyCape:" +echo " bash $K8S_DIR/keycape/create-pi-token.sh" echo "" -echo " 4. Create KeyCape bootstrap secrets only if keycape-config is absent:" +echo " 4. Apply KeyCape secrets:" echo " bash $K8S_DIR/keycape/create-secrets.sh $SECRETS_DIR" echo "" echo " 5. Update state:" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh index a5086f1..817b005 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# creds-bootstrap-agent.sh — attended bootstrap with public-recipient encryption +# creds-bootstrap-agent.sh — fully automated credential bootstrap (NK-WP-0005) # # Usage: -# bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh [--dry-run] [--resume] [--initialize-audit-keys] +# bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh [--dry-run] [--resume] # make creds-agent-init # -# Runs in the operator terminal and ends at the encrypted recovery handoff -# acknowledgment. Each phase updates creds-state.yaml so interrupted runs resume +# Runs end-to-end without human input until the emergency bundle confirmation +# gate. Each phase updates creds-state.yaml so interrupted runs resume # automatically from where they left off. # # Prerequisites: @@ -14,38 +14,19 @@ # - kubectl with a reachable cluster (KUBECONFIG set or ~/.kube/config) # - git (configured with commit access) # - openssl -# - keys/age.pub — independently registered public recipient -# - temporary NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE only when resuming encrypted input +# - ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt — age private key (generated here if missing) -set +x set -euo pipefail -umask 077 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" K8S_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/sso-mfa/k8s" SECRETS_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets" STATE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/creds-state.yaml" -AGE_KEY="${NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE:-}" +AGE_KEY="$HOME/.config/sops/age/keys.txt" DRY_RUN=false -AUDIT_ARGS=() -for arg in "$@"; do - case "$arg" in - --dry-run) DRY_RUN=true ;; - --initialize-audit-keys) AUDIT_ARGS=(--initialize-audit-keys) ;; - --resume) ;; # Phase state already controls resume. - *) printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: unsupported bootstrap argument.' >&2; exit 2 ;; - esac -done - -# A plan must neither discover credentials nor contact a cluster or change state. -if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then - printf '%s\n' 'Plan only: validate registered public recipient; generate or attended-decrypt service files; encrypt; apply/verify; create encrypted ops bundle; acknowledge off-host recovery; clean plaintext.' - printf '%s\n' 'No files, credentials, cluster state or historical custody receipts were inspected or changed.' - exit 0 -fi -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: bootstrap requires an attended terminal; use --dry-run for the non-mutating plan.' >&2; exit 2; } +for arg in "$@"; do [[ "$arg" == "--dry-run" ]] && DRY_RUN=true; done # ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -71,11 +52,7 @@ state_get_nested() { grep -E "^ $1:" "$STATE_FILE" | sed 's/^[^:]*: *//' | sed state_set() { local key="$1" value="$2" if [[ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]]; then - if grep -q "^$key:" "$STATE_FILE"; then - sed -i "s|^$key: .*|$key: $value|" "$STATE_FILE" - else - printf '%s: %s\n' "$key" "$value" >> "$STATE_FILE" - fi + sed -i "s|^$key: .*|$key: $value|" "$STATE_FILE" fi } @@ -97,20 +74,32 @@ command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "git not found" command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "openssl not found" ok "required tools present" -# Encryption needs only the registered public recipient. Never auto-generate -# or discover a private key in HOME. Custody source is independently held. -[[ -f "$REPO_ROOT/keys/age.pub" ]] || die "registered keys/age.pub is missing" -AGE_PUBKEY=$(grep -m1 '^age1' "$REPO_ROOT/keys/age.pub" || true) -[[ -n "$AGE_PUBKEY" ]] || die "registered public age recipient is missing" -printf '' | age -r "$AGE_PUBKEY" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "registered public age recipient is invalid" +# Age key — generate if missing +if [[ ! -f "$AGE_KEY" ]]; then + log "age key not found at $AGE_KEY — generating..." + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$AGE_KEY")" + if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then + age-keygen -o "$AGE_KEY" 2>/dev/null + chmod 600 "$AGE_KEY" + ok "age key generated: $AGE_KEY" + log "Public key: $(grep 'public key:' "$AGE_KEY" | awk '{print $NF}')" + else + echo " [dry-run] would run: age-keygen -o $AGE_KEY" + fi +fi -# Refuse an encrypted resume before cluster activity unless the owner explicitly -# supplied a temporary key through the custody helper. No ambient key fallback. -if [[ "$(state_get secrets_generated)" == "true" && ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then - [[ -n "$AGE_KEY" && -f "$AGE_KEY" ]] || die "encrypted resume requires the attended custody unlock helper" - DERIVED_RECIPIENT=$(age-keygen -y "$AGE_KEY" 2>/dev/null) || die "custody key validation failed" - [[ "$DERIVED_RECIPIENT" == "$AGE_PUBKEY" ]] || die "custody key does not match the registered recipient" - unset DERIVED_RECIPIENT +if [[ -f "$AGE_KEY" ]]; then + AGE_PUBKEY=$(grep 'public key:' "$AGE_KEY" | awk '{print $NF}') + [[ -z "$AGE_PUBKEY" ]] && die "could not read public key from $AGE_KEY" + ok "age key ready: ${AGE_PUBKEY:0:20}…" + state_set "age_key_present" "true" +elif [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then + # Dry-run on a machine without the age key (key generation was skipped + # above): continue with a placeholder recipient so later phases can render. + AGE_PUBKEY="age1dryrunplaceholderrecipient" + ok "age key absent — dry-run continues with placeholder recipient" +else + die "could not read public key from $AGE_KEY" fi # Cluster reachability @@ -119,8 +108,6 @@ if ! kubectl cluster-info &>/dev/null; then fi KUBE_CTX=$(kubectl config current-context 2>/dev/null || echo '(unknown)') ok "cluster reachable: $KUBE_CTX" -state_set "age_public_recipient_ready" "true" -state_set "bootstrap_complete" "false" # ── Phase 1: Generate secrets ───────────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -129,8 +116,12 @@ step "1 — Generate secrets" if [[ "$(state_get secrets_generated)" == "true" ]]; then ok "secrets already generated — skipping" else - # Existing custody may be the only rollback copy after a partial run. - [[ ! -e "$SECRETS_DIR" && ! -L "$SECRETS_DIR" ]] || die "existing service custody requires owner reconciliation; never remove it to regenerate" + # Clean up any partial generation from a failed prior run + if [[ -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then + warn "leftover secrets/ found from previous run — removing" + find "$SECRETS_DIR" -type f -exec shred -u {} \; 2>/dev/null || true + rm -rf "$SECRETS_DIR" + fi log "running gen-secrets.sh..." if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then @@ -150,7 +141,8 @@ step "2 — Encrypt secrets to secrets.enc/ and commit" if [[ "$(state_get secrets_generated)" == "true" && ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then log "secrets/ absent (was shredded) — decrypting from secrets.enc/ for re-apply..." if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then - (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash decrypt-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_KEY") + (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash decrypt-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$HOME/.config/net-kingdom/age.key" 2>/dev/null) \ + || (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash decrypt-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_KEY") else echo " [dry-run] would decrypt secrets.enc/ → secrets/" fi @@ -159,7 +151,7 @@ fi # Always (re-)encrypt in case secrets were just regenerated if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then log "encrypting secrets → secrets.enc/ ..." - (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash encrypt-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_PUBKEY" --no-shred) + (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash encrypt-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_KEY" --no-shred) ok "secrets encrypted to secrets.enc/" # Commit the encrypted secrets @@ -262,7 +254,7 @@ else # Run enckey bootstrap if [[ "$(state_get enckey_bootstrapped)" != "true" ]]; then log "running enckey-bootstrap.sh..." - (cd "$K8S_DIR/privacyidea" && bash enckey-bootstrap.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "${AUDIT_ARGS[@]}") + (cd "$K8S_DIR/privacyidea" && bash enckey-bootstrap.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") state_set "enckey_bootstrapped" "true" ok "enckey bootstrapped" else @@ -285,18 +277,22 @@ fi # ── Phase 6: Apply keycape secrets ──────────────────────────────────────────── -step "6 — Create KeyCape bootstrap secrets (requires scoped factor delivery)" +step "6 — Apply KeyCape secrets (requires pi-admin)" if [[ "$(state_get_nested keycape)" == "true" ]]; then ok "keycape secrets already applied — skipping" else if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then + log "fetching PI admin token..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/keycape" && bash create-pi-token.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + ok "PI admin token fetched" + log "applying keycape secrets..." (cd "$K8S_DIR/keycape" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") state_set_nested "keycape" "true" ok "keycape secrets applied" else - echo " [dry-run] would verify RPF-WP-0040 delivery and create first-bootstrap keycape-config" + echo " [dry-run] would run create-pi-token.sh + keycape/create-secrets.sh" fi fi @@ -306,7 +302,7 @@ step "7 — Final verification (all components)" if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash creds-verify.sh) - ok "expected Secret names present; native service and recovery acceptance remain separate" + ok "all secrets verified" else echo " [dry-run] would run: bash creds-verify.sh" fi @@ -332,7 +328,7 @@ if kubectl get namespace openbao &>/dev/null; then if [[ -d "$SECRETS_DIR/openbao" ]]; then log "encrypting OpenBao init material → secrets.enc/ ..." (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash encrypt-secrets.sh \ - "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_PUBKEY" --no-shred) + "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_KEY" --no-shred) cd "$REPO_ROOT" git add sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/ \ sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-state.yaml @@ -340,7 +336,8 @@ if kubectl get namespace openbao &>/dev/null; then "chore(creds): encrypted OpenBao init material [agent]" fi else - die "OpenBao init/unseal not verified; retain all private custody and reconcile through the owner before cleanup or retry" + warn "OpenBao init/unseal did not complete — see output" + warn "(gate unselected or pod not ready; bootstrap continues)" fi else echo " [dry-run] would run: openbao-init-unseal.sh $SECRETS_DIR" @@ -353,25 +350,46 @@ fi step "8 — Create ops bundle (age-encrypted snapshot)" -BUNDLE_PATH="$REPO_ROOT/ops-bundle-$(date +%Y%m%dT%H%M%S)-$(python3 -c 'import uuid; print(uuid.uuid4().hex)').tar.age" +BUNDLE_NAME="ops-bundle-$(date +%Y%m%dT%H%M%S).tar.age" +BUNDLE_PATH="$REPO_ROOT/$BUNDLE_NAME" -# Always snapshot the current service files after apply. An old phase boolean -# must not cause a newly generated/rotated file to be omitted from recovery. -[[ -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]] || die "service files absent; cannot create recovery bundle" -(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash pack-bundle.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_PUBKEY" "$BUNDLE_PATH") -BUNDLE_DIGEST=$(sha256sum "$BUNDLE_PATH" | cut -d ' ' -f 1) -state_set "ops_bundle_created" "true" -state_set "ops_bundle_location" "\"$BUNDLE_PATH\"" -state_set "recovery_handoff_confirmed" "false" +if [[ "$(state_get ops_bundle_created)" == "true" ]]; then + EXISTING_LOC="$(state_get ops_bundle_location)" + ok "ops bundle already created: ${EXISTING_LOC:-} — skipping" +else + if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then + [[ -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]] || die "secrets/ not found — cannot create ops bundle (re-run from phase 1)" + log "creating ops bundle → $BUNDLE_PATH" + (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash pack-bundle.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" "$AGE_PUBKEY" "$BUNDLE_PATH") + state_set "ops_bundle_created" "true" + state_set "ops_bundle_location" "\"$BUNDLE_PATH\"" + ok "ops bundle created: $BUNDLE_PATH" + else + echo " [dry-run] would run: bash pack-bundle.sh $SECRETS_DIR $AGE_PUBKEY $BUNDLE_PATH" + fi +fi -# ── Phase 9: Encrypted recovery handoff ────────────────────────────────────── -step "9 — Encrypted recovery handoff (operator acknowledgment required)" -printf 'Encrypted bundle: %s\nSHA256: %s\n' "$BUNDLE_PATH" "$BUNDLE_DIGEST" -bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/emergency-bundle.sh" --confirm -state_set "recovery_handoff_confirmed" "true" -state_set "recovery_handoff_bundle_sha256" "\"$BUNDLE_DIGEST\"" -state_set "recovery_handoff_confirmed_at" "\"$(date -Iseconds)\"" -# Historical emergency_bundle_delivered fields are preserved, never reinterpreted. +# ── Phase 9: Emergency bundle ───────────────────────────────────────────────── + +step "9 — Emergency bundle (human confirmation required)" + +if [[ "$(state_get emergency_bundle_delivered)" == "true" ]]; then + ok "emergency bundle already delivered — skipping" +else + if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then + log "assembling emergency bundle..." + OPS_LOC="$(state_get ops_bundle_location | tr -d '"')" + (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && bash emergency-bundle.sh \ + --age-key "$AGE_KEY" \ + --secrets-dir "$SECRETS_DIR" \ + --ops-bundle "${OPS_LOC:-$BUNDLE_PATH}") + state_set "emergency_bundle_delivered" "true" + state_set "emergency_bundle_delivered_at" "\"$(date -Iseconds)\"" + ok "emergency bundle delivered and confirmed" + else + echo " [dry-run] would run: bash emergency-bundle.sh ..." + fi +fi # ── Phase 10: Cleanup + finalise ────────────────────────────────────────────── diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh index 4da9b51..fb450f2 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh @@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ # automatically (--non-interactive) # 5. After completion, updates creds-state.yaml -set +x set -euo pipefail -umask 077 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" @@ -30,47 +28,17 @@ POSITIONAL_ARGS=() for arg in "$@"; do if [[ "$arg" == "--non-interactive" ]]; then NON_INTERACTIVE=true - elif [[ "$arg" == --* ]]; then - echo "ERROR: unknown rotation option." >&2 - exit 1 else POSITIONAL_ARGS+=("$arg") fi done -if (( ${#POSITIONAL_ARGS[@]} > 1 )); then - echo "ERROR: expected one private secrets directory." >&2 - exit 1 -fi -SECRETS_DIR="$(realpath -sm -- "${POSITIONAL_ARGS[0]:-$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets}")" +SECRETS_DIR="${POSITIONAL_ARGS[0]:-$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets}" SECRET="${SECRET:-}" rnd_hex() { openssl rand -hex "$1"; } rnd_b64() { openssl rand -base64 "$1" | tr -d '\n/+=' | head -c "$2"; } -# Suppress all child diagnostics: service tools may echo credentials on failure. -quiet() { - if ! "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; then - echo "ERROR: rotation step failed; inspect service state through approved metadata-only tooling." >&2 - echo "The private local file may contain the candidate value; rotation is not marked complete." >&2 - return 1 - fi -} - -prepare_value() { - local component="$1" format="$2" - ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/$component/secrets.env" - python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/rotation-env.py" check "$SECRETS_DIR" "$component" "$SECRET" - if [[ "$format" == hex ]]; then NEW_VAL="$(rnd_hex 32 2>/dev/null)" - else NEW_VAL="$(rnd_b64 32 40 2>/dev/null)"; fi - echo "Candidate generated; values are never printed." -} - -store_value() { - printf '%s' "$NEW_VAL" | python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/rotation-env.py" update "$SECRETS_DIR" "$1" "$SECRET" - echo "Candidate stored in the selected private service secrets.env file." -} - confirm() { local prompt="${1:-Continue?}" if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == true ]]; then @@ -106,15 +74,14 @@ update_last_rotated() { post_rotation_reminder() { echo "" - echo "Complete native authentication/consumer verification and custody handoff before removing local plaintext." if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == false ]]; then echo "Post-rotation checklist:" - echo " - Transfer the candidate from the private local file into approved custody" - echo " - Run: make creds-bundle (refresh offsite backup)" - echo " - Run: make creds-verify (confirm cluster state)" + echo " ✓ Update your personal password manager entry for this secret" + echo " ✓ Run: make creds-bundle (refresh offsite backup)" + echo " ✓ Run: make creds-verify (confirm cluster state)" else echo "Post-rotation (agent mode):" - echo " - Script steps succeeded; this timestamp is not native credential validation" + echo " ✓ creds-state.yaml updated with last_rotated timestamp" echo " Run: make creds-bundle (refresh offsite backup)" echo " Run: make creds-verify (confirm cluster state)" fi @@ -129,15 +96,18 @@ PI_SECRET_KEY) echo "Impact: Flask/privacyIDEA app secret — rotates all active PI sessions." echo " All privacyIDEA users will be logged out." echo "" - prepare_value privacyidea hex + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_hex 32)" + echo " PI_SECRET_KEY=$NEW_VAL" confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 echo "" - store_value privacyidea + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^PI_SECRET_KEY=.*|PI_SECRET_KEY=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" echo " 1. Updating K8s Secret privacyidea-config (namespace: mfa)..." - (cd "$K8S_DIR/privacyidea" && quiet bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" --rotate-key "$SECRET") + (cd "$K8S_DIR/privacyidea" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") echo " 2. Restarting privacyIDEA pod..." - quiet kubectl rollout restart deployment privacyidea -n mfa - quiet kubectl rollout status deployment privacyidea -n mfa + kubectl rollout restart deployment privacyidea -n mfa + kubectl rollout status deployment privacyidea -n mfa update_last_rotated "PI_SECRET_KEY" post_rotation_reminder ;; @@ -160,36 +130,35 @@ PI_PEPPER) PI_DB_PASSWORD) header echo "" - echo "Impact: privacyIDEA database password — coordinated updates are required in:" + echo "Impact: privacyIDEA database password — must be updated atomically in:" echo " 1. PostgreSQL (CNPG) — ALTER USER privacyidea WITH PASSWORD '...';" - echo " 2. CNPG application Secret and privacyidea-config (PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI)" - echo " These are separate steps; preserve the candidate and reconcile any partial failure." + echo " 2. K8s Secret privacyidea-config (PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI)" + echo " Privacyidea pod must be restarted after both are updated." echo "" - prepare_value privacyidea b64 + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" + echo " PI_DB_PASSWORD=$NEW_VAL" confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 echo "" - echo " 1. Locating PostgreSQL before changing the private file..." - if ! PG_POD=$(command kubectl get pod -n databases -l postgresql=net-kingdom-pg -o name 2>/dev/null); then - echo "ERROR: PostgreSQL discovery failed; rotation stopped." >&2 - exit 1 + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^PI_DB_PASSWORD=.*|PI_DB_PASSWORD=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" + echo " 1. Updating PostgreSQL password..." + PG_POD=$(kubectl get pod -n databases -l postgresql=net-kingdom-pg -o name 2>/dev/null | head -1) + if [[ -n "$PG_POD" ]]; then + kubectl exec -n databases "$PG_POD" -- \ + psql -U postgres -c "ALTER USER privacyidea WITH PASSWORD '$NEW_VAL';" + echo " ✔ PostgreSQL password updated" + else + echo " WARN: Could not find PostgreSQL pod — update manually:" + echo " kubectl exec -n databases -- psql -U postgres -c \"ALTER USER privacyidea WITH PASSWORD '$NEW_VAL';\"" fi - # Ambiguous discovery is not permission to change an arbitrary database pod. - if [[ ! "$PG_POD" =~ ^pod/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]*$ ]]; then - echo "ERROR: expected exactly one PostgreSQL pod; rotation stopped before mutation." >&2 - exit 1 - fi - store_value privacyidea - printf "ALTER USER privacyidea WITH PASSWORD '%s';\n" "$NEW_VAL" | \ - quiet kubectl exec -i -n databases "$PG_POD" -- psql -U postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 - echo " PostgreSQL password update command succeeded." echo "" - echo " 2. Updating PostgreSQL application credential Secret and privacyidea-config..." - (cd "$K8S_DIR/postgresql" && quiet bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" --rotate-key "$SECRET") - (cd "$K8S_DIR/privacyidea" && quiet bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" --rotate-key "$SECRET") + echo " 2. Updating K8s Secret privacyidea-config..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/privacyidea" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") echo "" echo " 3. Restarting privacyIDEA pod..." - quiet kubectl rollout restart deployment privacyidea -n mfa - quiet kubectl rollout status deployment privacyidea -n mfa + kubectl rollout restart deployment privacyidea -n mfa + kubectl rollout status deployment privacyidea -n mfa update_last_rotated "PI_DB_PASSWORD" post_rotation_reminder ;; @@ -199,22 +168,57 @@ LLDAP_JWT_SECRET) echo "" echo "Impact: LLDAP JWT signing key — all LLDAP sessions will be invalidated." echo "" - prepare_value lldap hex + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_hex 32)" + echo " LLDAP_JWT_SECRET=$NEW_VAL" confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 - store_value lldap + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^LLDAP_JWT_SECRET=.*|LLDAP_JWT_SECRET=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" echo " Updating K8s Secret lldap-secrets (namespace: sso)..." - (cd "$K8S_DIR/lldap" && quiet bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" --rotate-key "$SECRET") + (cd "$K8S_DIR/lldap" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") echo " Restarting LLDAP pod..." - quiet kubectl rollout restart deployment lldap -n sso - quiet kubectl rollout status deployment lldap -n sso + kubectl rollout restart deployment lldap -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment lldap -n sso update_last_rotated "LLDAP_JWT_SECRET" post_rotation_reminder ;; LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) - echo "ERROR: coordinated LDAP/Authelia/KeyCape rotation requires an owner-reviewed procedure with rollback and native acceptance (NK-WP-0049-T02)." >&2 - echo "The legacy manual-server/full-config-replacement path is retired before any credential changes." >&2 - exit 1 + header + echo "" + echo "Impact: LLDAP admin + LDAP bind password — used by Authelia and KeyCape." + echo " All three must be updated atomically:" + echo " 1. LLDAP admin password (via LLDAP web UI or API)" + echo " 2. Authelia K8s Secret (ldap_password)" + echo " 3. KeyCape K8s Secret (config.yaml lldap.bindPW)" + echo " Restart all three pods after updating." + echo "" + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" + echo " LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=$NEW_VAL" + confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=.*|LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" + echo " 1. Updating LLDAP admin password via API..." + echo " WARN: Automated LLDAP password update not implemented." + if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == false ]]; then + echo " Log in to https://lldap.coulomb.social and change the admin password manually." + confirm "Confirm you have updated the LLDAP admin password?" || { echo "Aborting."; exit 1; } + else + echo " [non-interactive] Skipping LLDAP web UI step — update manually:" + echo " Log in to https://lldap.coulomb.social and set admin password to: $NEW_VAL" + fi + echo " 2. Updating Authelia secrets..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/authelia" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + echo " 3. Updating KeyCape secrets..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/keycape" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + echo " 4. Restarting Authelia and KeyCape pods..." + kubectl rollout restart deployment authelia -n sso + kubectl rollout restart deployment keycape -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment authelia -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment keycape -n sso + update_last_rotated "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" + post_rotation_reminder ;; AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET) @@ -223,46 +227,105 @@ AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET) echo "Impact: Authelia session cookie encryption key." echo " All active Authelia sessions will be invalidated (users re-prompted)." echo "" - prepare_value authelia hex + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_hex 32)" + echo " AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET=$NEW_VAL" confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 - store_value authelia - (cd "$K8S_DIR/authelia" && quiet bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR" --rotate-key "$SECRET") - quiet kubectl rollout restart deployment authelia -n sso - quiet kubectl rollout status deployment authelia -n sso + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/authelia/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET=.*|AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" + (cd "$K8S_DIR/authelia" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + kubectl rollout restart deployment authelia -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment authelia -n sso update_last_rotated "AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET" post_rotation_reminder ;; AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET) - echo "ERROR: legacy KeyCape replacement rotation is retired; no credentials were changed." >&2 - echo "Use an owner-reviewed configuration-preserving rotation with rollback and consumer acceptance (NK-WP-0049-T02)." >&2 - exit 1 + header + echo "" + echo "Impact: Authelia↔KeyCape OIDC client secret." + echo " Must be updated atomically in:" + echo " 1. Authelia K8s Secret (bcrypt hash of the new plaintext)" + echo " 2. KeyCape K8s Secret (plaintext, stored as authelia.clientSecret)" + echo " Both pods must be restarted before the new secret takes effect." + echo "" + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" + echo " AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET=$NEW_VAL" + confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/authelia/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET=.*|AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" + echo " Updating Authelia secrets (bcrypt hash)..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/authelia" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + echo " Updating KeyCape secrets (plaintext)..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/keycape" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + echo " Restarting Authelia and KeyCape..." + kubectl rollout restart deployment authelia -n sso + kubectl rollout restart deployment keycape -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment authelia -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment keycape -n sso + update_last_rotated "AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET" + post_rotation_reminder ;; KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY) - echo "ERROR: legacy KeyCape replacement rotation is retired; no credentials were changed." >&2 - echo "Use an owner-reviewed configuration-preserving rotation with rollback and consumer acceptance (NK-WP-0049-T02)." >&2 - exit 1 + header + echo "" + echo " ⚠ WARNING: Rotating the KeyCape RSA signing key immediately invalidates" + echo " ALL issued JWT tokens. This causes a brief authentication outage." + echo " All downstream applications will reject existing tokens until they" + echo " refresh against the new JWKS endpoint." + echo "" + echo " Coordination required:" + echo " 1. Notify downstream application owners of the planned outage window." + echo " 2. Delete secrets/keycape/key.pem to trigger regeneration." + echo " 3. Re-run keycape/create-secrets.sh." + echo " 4. Restart KeyCape pod." + echo " 5. Confirm downstream apps recover (they should auto-refresh JWKS)." + echo "" + confirm "Proceed with RSA key rotation? (causes auth outage)" || exit 0 + KEY_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/keycape/key.pem" + if [[ -f "$KEY_FILE" ]]; then + shred -u "$KEY_FILE" + echo " Old key shredded." + fi + echo " Regenerating RSA-2048 signing key..." + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$KEY_FILE")" + openssl genrsa -out "$KEY_FILE" 2048 2>/dev/null + chmod 600 "$KEY_FILE" + echo " Updating KeyCape secrets..." + (cd "$K8S_DIR/keycape" && bash create-secrets.sh "$SECRETS_DIR") + echo " Restarting KeyCape pod..." + kubectl rollout restart deployment keycape -n sso + kubectl rollout status deployment keycape -n sso + echo "" + if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == false ]]; then + echo " ✔ RSA key rotated. Store the new key in your password manager: net-kingdom/KeyCape/jwt-signing-key" + else + echo " ✔ RSA key rotated." + fi + update_last_rotated "KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY" + post_rotation_reminder ;; BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD) header echo "" - echo "Impact: break-glass emergency access; verify the current recovery consumer after rotation." + echo "Impact: Break-glass emergency access password. Low blast radius." + echo " Rotate freely — no downstream dependencies." echo "" - prepare_value breakglass b64 + echo "New value:" + NEW_VAL="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" + echo " BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD=$NEW_VAL" confirm "Apply rotation?" || exit 0 - store_value breakglass + ENV_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/breakglass/secrets.env" + [[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] && sed -i "s|^BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD=.*|BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD=$NEW_VAL|" "$ENV_FILE" echo " Updating break-glass K8s Secret (namespace: sso)..." BG_SECRET="break-glass" - if ! command kubectl create secret generic "$BG_SECRET" \ + kubectl create secret generic "$BG_SECRET" \ --namespace=sso \ - --from-env-file="$ENV_FILE" \ - --dry-run=client -o yaml 2>/dev/null | \ - command kubectl apply --server-side --field-manager=netkingdom-rotation -f - >/dev/null 2>&1; then - echo "ERROR: break-glass Secret update failed; local candidate retained, rotation not marked complete." >&2 - exit 1 - fi + --from-literal=BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD="$NEW_VAL" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - echo "" if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == false ]]; then echo " Update your password manager: net-kingdom/Break-glass/break-glass" @@ -272,14 +335,14 @@ BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD) ;; *) - echo "ERROR: unknown secret selector." + echo "ERROR: Unknown secret: '$SECRET'" echo "" echo "Known secrets:" echo " PI_SECRET_KEY Flask/PI app secret (session rotation)" echo " PI_PEPPER Password hashing pepper (PERMANENT — read help)" echo " PI_DB_PASSWORD privacyIDEA database password" echo " LLDAP_JWT_SECRET LLDAP JWT signing key" - echo " LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS ld-admin, LLDAP configured super-admin (refused here)" + echo " LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS LLDAP admin + LDAP bind password (3-way coordinated)" echo " AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET Authelia session cookie key" echo " AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET Authelia↔KeyCape OIDC client secret" echo " KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY KeyCape JWT signing key (causes auth outage)" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh index adea5ad..5dec16d 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-status.sh @@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -STATE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/creds-state.yaml" -[[ "${1:-}" == "--v2" || $# -eq 0 ]] || STATE_FILE="$1" +STATE_FILE="${1:-$SCRIPT_DIR/creds-state.yaml}" # --v2 flag forces v2 display regardless of schema_version field FORCE_V2=false @@ -50,22 +49,16 @@ if [[ "$SCHEMA_VER" == "2" || "$FORCE_V2" == "true" ]]; then emerg_at="$(top_val emergency_bundle_delivered_at)" bootstrap_complete="$(top_val bootstrap_complete)" - printf " %-32s %s\n" "historical age key present:" "$(status_icon "$age_key")" + printf " %-32s %s\n" "age key present:" "$(status_icon "$age_key")" printf " %-32s %s\n" "secrets generated:" "$(status_icon "$secrets_gen")" printf " %-32s %s %s\n" "ops bundle created:" \ "$(status_icon "$ops_bundle")" \ "$([ "$ops_bundle" = "true" ] && echo "${ops_loc:-}" || true)" - printf " %-32s %s %s\n" "historical emergency delivery:" \ + printf " %-32s %s %s\n" "emergency bundle delivered:" \ "$(status_icon "$emerg_delivered")" \ "$([ "$emerg_delivered" = "true" ] && echo "at ${emerg_at:-}" || echo "(pending human confirmation)")" echo "" - recovery="$(top_val recovery_handoff_confirmed || true)" - digest="$(top_val recovery_handoff_bundle_sha256 || true)" - printf " %-32s %s\n" "current recovery acknowledgment:" "$(status_icon "$recovery")" - printf " %-32s %s\n" "acknowledged bundle SHA256:" "${digest:-not recorded}" - echo " Acknowledgment does not establish native recovery readiness." - echo "" echo " Secrets applied:" for component in postgres lldap authelia privacyidea keycape; do val="$(nested_val "$component")" @@ -106,7 +99,7 @@ else val="$(nested_val "$component")" note="" [[ "$component" == "keycape" && "$val" == "false" ]] && \ - note=" (requires RPF-WP-0040 scoped factor delivery)" + note=" (requires PI_ADMIN_TOKEN — post-T04)" printf " %-28s %s%s\n" "$component" "$(status_icon "$val")" "$note" done echo "" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh index dfa8618..c061a5c 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# creds-verify.sh — observe Secret presence only; no credential/native acceptance. +# creds-verify.sh — check all expected K8s secrets exist and update creds-state.yaml. # # Usage: # bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-verify.sh @@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ # mfa/privacyidea-config → secrets_applied.privacyidea # sso/keycape-config → secrets_applied.keycape # mfa/privacyidea-enckey → enckey_bootstrapped -# sso/keycape-factor-read → current owner-managed factor delivery +# sso/keycape-pi-token → pi_admin_created -set +x set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" @@ -31,10 +30,19 @@ secret_exists() { kubectl get secret "$name" --namespace="$ns" --ignore-not-found -o name 2>/dev/null | grep -q . } -# Presence cannot establish application, issuance, effective MFA or recovery. -# Historical applied/verification state is not rewritten by this diagnostic. -update_state_top() { :; } -update_state_nested() { :; } +update_state_top() { + local key="$1" value="$2" + if [[ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]]; then + sed -i "s|^$key: .*|$key: $value|" "$STATE_FILE" + fi +} + +update_state_nested() { + local key="$1" value="$2" + if [[ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]]; then + sed -i "s|^ $key: .*| $key: $value|" "$STATE_FILE" + fi +} # ── Results table ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pass=0 @@ -82,15 +90,15 @@ check "enckey (privacyidea-enckey)" \ mfa privacyidea-enckey \ update_state_top enckey_bootstrapped -check "scoped factor reader (keycape-factor-read)" \ - sso keycape-factor-read \ - update_state_top factor_delivery_present +check "pi-admin token (keycape-pi-token)" \ + sso keycape-pi-token \ + update_state_nested keycape echo "" echo "Results: $pass present, $fail missing" if [[ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]]; then - echo "Historical state preserved; presence is not native consumer or recovery acceptance." + echo "State file updated: $STATE_FILE" fi [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]] diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/decrypt-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/decrypt-secrets.sh index 8e0cb74..84774a5 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/decrypt-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/decrypt-secrets.sh @@ -1,65 +1,62 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Explicit attended custody input only. Publish plaintext only after all files -# decrypt successfully into a private staging directory; never emit values. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -umask 077 +# decrypt-secrets.sh — decrypt secrets.enc/ to secrets/ using age +# +# Usage: +# ./decrypt-secrets.sh [OUTPUT_DIR] [AGE_KEY_FILE] +# +# OUTPUT_DIR where to write plaintext secrets (default: ./secrets) +# AGE_KEY_FILE age private key file (default: ~/.config/net-kingdom/age.key) +# +# Decrypts all *.age files in secrets.enc/ to OUTPUT_DIR for use by +# create-secrets.sh scripts. Shred OUTPUT_DIR when done: +# find secrets/ -type f -exec shred -u {} \; && rm -rf secrets/ +# +# The age key must be present on the machine. Keep it outside the repo: +# ~/.config/net-kingdom/age.key + +set -euo pipefail -fail() { printf 'ERROR: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1; } OUTPUT_DIR="${1:-./secrets}" -AGE_KEY="${2:-${NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE:-}}" -[[ $# -le 2 ]] || fail "unsupported decrypt argument" -[[ -n "$AGE_KEY" && -f "$AGE_KEY" ]] || fail "explicit temporary custody key required" -# Validate an owned, private, non-linked age identity before passing it to age. -# No HOME/plugin/SSH identity discovery is admitted by this recovery path. -python3 - "$AGE_KEY" 2>/dev/null <<'PYKEY' || fail "custody key must be an owned private regular age identity" -import os, pathlib, stat, sys -p = pathlib.Path(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[1])) -if any(x.is_symlink() for x in (p, *p.parents)): raise ValueError() -fd = os.open(p, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK) -try: - st = os.fstat(fd) - if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) or st.st_uid != os.getuid() or st.st_mode & 0o077 or st.st_nlink != 1 or st.st_size > 16384: - raise ValueError() - data = os.read(fd, 16385).decode('ascii') - values = [x for x in data.splitlines() if x and not x.startswith('#')] - if len(values) != 1 or not values[0].startswith('AGE-SECRET-KEY-1'): raise ValueError() -finally: os.close(fd) -PYKEY +AGE_KEY="${2:-$HOME/.config/net-kingdom/age.key}" ENC_DIR="$(dirname "$OUTPUT_DIR")/secrets.enc" -[[ -d "$ENC_DIR" && ! -L "$ENC_DIR" ]] || fail "encrypted source directory unavailable" -[[ ! -e "$OUTPUT_DIR" && ! -L "$OUTPUT_DIR" ]] || fail "output already exists" -[[ -d "$(dirname "$OUTPUT_DIR")" ]] || fail "output parent unavailable" -STAGING=$(mktemp -d "$(dirname "$OUTPUT_DIR")/.netkingdom-decrypt.XXXXXXXX") -cleanup() { - if [[ -d "$STAGING" ]]; then - find "$STAGING" -type f -exec shred -u {} \; 2>/dev/null || true - rm -rf -- "$STAGING" - fi -} -trap cleanup EXIT -trap 'exit 129' HUP -trap 'exit 130' INT -trap 'exit 143' TERM +if [[ ! -d "$ENC_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: encrypted secrets directory not found: $ENC_DIR" >&2 + echo "Expected secrets.enc/ next to the output directory." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [[ ! -f "$AGE_KEY" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: age key not found: $AGE_KEY" >&2 + echo "Copy your age key to $AGE_KEY or pass the path as the second argument." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [[ -e "$OUTPUT_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $OUTPUT_DIR already exists. Remove it first or choose a different path." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Decrypting $ENC_DIR → $OUTPUT_DIR/" +echo "" count=0 -for component_dir in "$ENC_DIR"/*; do - [[ -e "$component_dir" || -L "$component_dir" ]] || continue - [[ -d "$component_dir" && ! -L "$component_dir" ]] || fail "unexpected encrypted component" +for component_dir in "$ENC_DIR"/*/; do component=$(basename "$component_dir") - mkdir "$STAGING/$component" - for file in "$component_dir"/*.age; do - [[ -e "$file" || -L "$file" ]] || continue - [[ -f "$file" && ! -L "$file" ]] || fail "unexpected encrypted input" - name=$(basename "${file%.age}") - age -d -i "$AGE_KEY" -o "$STAGING/$component/$name" "$file" 2>/dev/null || fail "decryption failed; partial plaintext removed" + mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR/$component" + for f in "$component_dir"*.age; do + [[ -f "$f" ]] || continue + fname=$(basename "${f%.age}") + out="$OUTPUT_DIR/$component/$fname" + age -d -i "$AGE_KEY" -o "$out" "$f" + echo " decrypted: secrets.enc/$component/$(basename "$f") → $component/$fname" count=$((count + 1)) done done -[[ "$count" -gt 0 ]] || fail "no encrypted files found" -# Never replace an output created by another process during decryption. -mv -Tn -- "$STAGING" "$OUTPUT_DIR" || fail "could not publish private output" -[[ ! -d "$STAGING" ]] || fail "output appeared during decryption" -printf '%s file(s) decrypted to private output; remove plaintext after the approved operation.\n' "$count" + +echo "" +echo "$count file(s) decrypted to $OUTPUT_DIR/" +echo "" +echo "Use create-secrets.sh scripts, then shred:" +echo " find $OUTPUT_DIR -type f -exec shred -u {} \\; && rm -rf $OUTPUT_DIR" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh index d85c6cb..2b22ac1 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh @@ -1,45 +1,147 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Compatibility entry point: metadata-only recovery guide; never export roots. -set +x +# emergency-bundle.sh — assemble and display the net-kingdom emergency credential bundle +# +# Usage: +# bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/emergency-bundle.sh \ +# --age-key (default: ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt) +# --secrets-dir (default: ./secrets) +# --ops-bundle (path to the .tar.age ops bundle) +# [--reprint] (reprint a previously-delivered bundle without +# requiring all secrets to be present) +# +# Displays the emergency bundle on stdout, optionally writes a temp file +# for 60 seconds, then prompts for human confirmation. +# Sets emergency_bundle_delivered: true in creds-state.yaml after confirmation. + set -euo pipefail -CONFIRM=false -case "${1:-}" in - ""|--reprint|--help) [[ $# -le 1 ]] || exit 2 ;; - --confirm) [[ $# -eq 1 ]] || exit 2; CONFIRM=true ;; - *) printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: secret-export arguments are retired; see docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md.' >&2; exit 2 ;; -esac +SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" +STATE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/creds-state.yaml" -if [[ "$CONFIRM" == true && ( ! -t 0 || ! -t 1 ) ]]; then - printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: recovery acknowledgment requires an attended terminal.' >&2 - exit 2 +AGE_KEY="$HOME/.config/sops/age/keys.txt" +SECRETS_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets" +OPS_BUNDLE="" +REPRINT=false + +# ── Argument parsing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do + case "$1" in + --age-key) AGE_KEY="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --secrets-dir) SECRETS_DIR="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --ops-bundle) OPS_BUNDLE="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --reprint) REPRINT=true; shift ;; + *) echo "Unknown argument: $1" >&2; exit 1 ;; + esac +done + +# ── Read helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +read_env_val() { + local file="$1" key="$2" + grep -E "^${key}=" "$file" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed "s/^${key}=//" || echo "" +} + +read_env() { + local component="$1" key="$2" + local f="$SECRETS_DIR/$component/secrets.env" + if [[ -f "$f" ]]; then + read_env_val "$f" "$key" + else + echo "" + fi +} + +# ── Collect values ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +# Age private key +if [[ -f "$AGE_KEY" ]]; then + AGE_PRIVATE_KEY=$(cat "$AGE_KEY") + AGE_PUBKEY=$(grep 'public key:' "$AGE_KEY" | awk '{print $NF}' || echo "") +else + AGE_PRIVATE_KEY="" + AGE_PUBKEY="" fi -cat <<'GUIDE' -NetKingdom recovery guide (non-secret) +# Break-glass passwords +PI_ADMIN_PASS="$(read_env privacyidea PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD)" +LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS="$(read_env lldap LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS)" +PG_ROOT_PASS="$(read_env postgres PG_ROOT_PASSWORD)" +BG_PASS="$(read_env breakglass BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD)" -The private age key stays in the operator password safe or offline custody. -This command never reads, generates or displays that key or any password. -The encrypted ops bundle holds service recovery material; it does not hold -its own decryption key. Preserve an off-host copy and keep the key separately. - -Before acknowledging a newly created bundle: -1. Store the exact encrypted bundle off-host. -2. In the approved isolated recovery workspace, use the custody unlock helper - to verify that the independently held key can decrypt that bundle. -3. Confirm the needed service recovery files are present without printing them. -4. Remove decrypted drill files and retain only the non-secret drill receipt. - -For an actual incident, use the scoped owner recovery procedure. An old -bootstrap snapshot may contain superseded passwords. Guide output or a human -acknowledgment is not a native restore test or evidence of current credentials. -See docs/security-bootstrap-age-custody.md and docs/security-bootstrap-king-credential-kit.md. -GUIDE - -if [[ "$CONFIRM" == true ]]; then - printf '%s' 'After completing those steps, type STORED AND VERIFIED: ' >&2 - IFS= read -r answer || exit 2 - [[ "$answer" == 'STORED AND VERIFIED' ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: custody acknowledgment not received.' >&2; exit 2; } - unset answer - printf '%s\n' 'Recovery handoff acknowledged by the operator; retain the independent drill receipt.' +# Ops bundle info +OPS_BUNDLE_LOCATION="${OPS_BUNDLE:-}" +if [[ -n "$AGE_PUBKEY" ]]; then + DECRYPT_CMD="age -d -i ops-bundle-.tar.age" +else + DECRYPT_CMD="age -d -i ops-bundle-.tar.age" fi + +GENERATED_DATE="$(date -Iseconds)" + +# ── Temp file (shredded automatically) ─────────────────────────────────────── + +TMPFILE="$(mktemp --suffix=-emergency-bundle.txt)" +cleanup_tmp() { shred -u "$TMPFILE" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$TMPFILE"; } +trap cleanup_tmp EXIT + +# ── Assemble bundle text ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +BUNDLE_TEXT="$(cat < "$TMPFILE" +chmod 600 "$TMPFILE" + +# ── Display ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +echo "" +echo "$BUNDLE_TEXT" +echo "" +echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━" +echo " A copy has been written to: $TMPFILE" +echo " It will be shredded automatically when you confirm below." +echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━" +echo "" +echo " Store the above in your personal password manager now." +echo " (1Password, Bitwarden, KeePassXC, paper — your choice.)" +echo "" +read -rp " Press Enter when you have stored the bundle (this clears the screen and shreds the temp file): " + +# Shred temp file (trap handles it but do it explicitly here first) +shred -u "$TMPFILE" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$TMPFILE" +trap - EXIT + +# Clear screen to remove secrets from terminal scrollback +clear 2>/dev/null || printf '\033c' +echo "" +echo " ✔ Emergency bundle confirmed. Temp file shredded." +echo "" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/encrypt-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/encrypt-secrets.sh index a9ca449..9a150c2 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/encrypt-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/encrypt-secrets.sh @@ -2,11 +2,12 @@ # encrypt-secrets.sh — encrypt secrets/ directory to secrets.enc/ using age # # Usage: -# ./encrypt-secrets.sh [SECRETS_DIR] [AGE_PUBLIC_RECIPIENT_OR_FILE] +# ./encrypt-secrets.sh [SECRETS_DIR] [AGE_RECIPIENT_OR_KEY_FILE] # # SECRETS_DIR plaintext secrets directory (default: ./secrets) -# AGE_PUBLIC_RECIPIENT_OR_FILE age public recipient or public-recipient file -# (default: registered keys/age.pub) +# AGE_RECIPIENT_OR_KEY_FILE age public key, public-key file, or private-key +# file with public-key comment +# (default: ~/.config/net-kingdom/age.key) # # Encrypts each *.env file (and pi.enc if present) to # secrets.enc//.age. Prefer passing a public age recipient @@ -18,18 +19,15 @@ # Run after gen-secrets.sh to store secrets safely in the repo. # Commit secrets.enc/ to git. -set +x set -euo pipefail -umask 077 SECRETS_DIR="${1:-./secrets}" -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" -AGE_RECIPIENT_OR_KEY="${2:-$SCRIPT_DIR/../../keys/age.pub}" +AGE_RECIPIENT_OR_KEY="${2:-$HOME/.config/net-kingdom/age.key}" NO_SHRED=false for arg in "$@"; do [[ "$arg" == "--no-shred" ]] && NO_SHRED=true; done if [[ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then - echo "ERROR: source secrets directory is unavailable." >&2 + echo "ERROR: secrets directory not found: $SECRETS_DIR" >&2 echo "Run gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 exit 1 fi @@ -41,27 +39,33 @@ resolve_recipient() { return 0 fi if [[ ! -f "$source" ]]; then - echo "ERROR: public recipient file is unavailable." >&2 + echo "ERROR: age recipient/key file not found: $source" >&2 echo "Pass an age public recipient such as age1... or a file containing it." >&2 return 1 fi - # Never derive public metadata by loading private custody material. - if grep -q 'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' "$source"; then - echo "ERROR: encryption requires a public recipient, never a private-key file." >&2 - return 1 - fi local recipient recipient=$(grep -m1 '^age1' "$source" || true) if [[ -n "$recipient" ]]; then printf '%s\n' "$recipient" return 0 fi - echo "ERROR: public recipient is missing from the supplied file." >&2 + recipient=$(grep -m1 'public key:' "$source" | awk '{print $NF}' || true) + if [[ -n "$recipient" ]]; then + printf '%s\n' "$recipient" + return 0 + fi + if grep -q 'AGE-SECRET-KEY-1' "$source"; then + recipient=$(age-keygen -y "$source" 2>/dev/null || true) + if [[ -n "$recipient" ]]; then + printf '%s\n' "$recipient" + return 0 + fi + fi + echo "ERROR: could not resolve an age public recipient from $source" >&2 return 1 } PUBKEY=$(resolve_recipient "$AGE_RECIPIENT_OR_KEY") -printf '' | age -r "$PUBKEY" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ERROR: invalid public recipient." >&2; exit 1; } ENC_DIR="$(dirname "$SECRETS_DIR")/secrets.enc" mkdir -p "$ENC_DIR" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh index 4c2f815..64bb959 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh @@ -13,18 +13,16 @@ # # PI_ENCFILE is NOT generated here — it must be produced inside the privacyIDEA # container after deployment: -# Follow ../k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md; do not generate missing recovery keys. +# kubectl exec -n mfa -- pi-manage create_enckey # Extract the resulting file, store it in KeePassXC as a binary attachment on the # privacyIDEA/PI_ENCFILE entry, then create the k8s secret from it. -set +x set -euo pipefail -umask 077 OUT_DIR="${1:-./secrets}" -if [[ -e "$OUT_DIR" || -L "$OUT_DIR" ]]; then - echo "ERROR: $OUT_DIR already exists. Preserve it for reconciliation or choose a new path." >&2 +if [[ -e "$OUT_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $OUT_DIR already exists. Delete it first or choose a different path." >&2 exit 1 fi @@ -60,8 +58,8 @@ PI_DB_PASSWORD=$PI_DB_PASS PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$PI_ADMIN_PASS # PI_ENCFILE: generate with: -# Follow ../k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md; do not generate missing recovery keys. -# Export existing keys with enckey-bootstrap.sh and an explicit private custody root. +# kubectl exec -n mfa -- pi-manage create_enckey +# kubectl cp -n mfa :/etc/privacyidea/enckey ./secrets/privacyidea/pi.enc # Then store pi.enc as a binary attachment in KeePassXC → net-kingdom/privacyIDEA/PI_ENCFILE EOF @@ -81,29 +79,18 @@ EOF # ── LLDAP ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── LLDAP_JWT_SECRET="$(rnd_hex 32)" # 64 hex chars — LLDAP JWT signing key -LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # 40 printable chars — ld-admin, LLDAP's configured super-admin (sealed fallback) -# Per-consumer directory accounts (Service Identity SI-3, NK-WP-0054-T05). The human `admin` -# password is personal and is never generated into custody. -LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # svc-authelia, read-only bind -LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # svc-keycape, read-only bind -LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # svc-privacyidea, read-only resolver bind -LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # svc-provisioner, lldap_admin (exception SI-X6) +LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # 40 printable chars — LLDAP admin + Authelia/KeyCape bind password cat > "$OUT_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" < "$OUT_DIR/keycape/secrets.env" < "$OUT_DIR/breakglass/secrets.env" </.local/security-bootstrap.json) +# OPENBAO_RUN_CONFIGURE_INITIAL 1 = run platform configure-initial after unseal +# RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR path to railiance-platform checkout +# (default: sibling of this repo) + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -exec python3 "$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/openbao-lab.py" "$@" + +SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" +REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" + +DRY_RUN=false +SECRETS_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/secrets" +for arg in "$@"; do + case "$arg" in + --dry-run) DRY_RUN=true ;; + *) SECRETS_DIR="$arg" ;; + esac +done + +NAMESPACE="${OPENBAO_NAMESPACE:-openbao}" +RELEASE="${OPENBAO_RELEASE:-openbao}" +POD="${RELEASE}-0" +KEY_SHARES="${OPENBAO_KEY_SHARES:-3}" +KEY_THRESHOLD="${OPENBAO_KEY_THRESHOLD:-2}" +CONSOLE_METADATA="${OPENBAO_CONSOLE_METADATA:-$REPO_ROOT/.local/security-bootstrap.json}" +RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR="${RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR:-$(dirname "$REPO_ROOT")/railiance-platform}" +OPENBAO_SECRETS="$SECRETS_DIR/openbao" +INIT_FILE="$OPENBAO_SECRETS/init.json" + +log() { echo " [openbao] $*"; } +die() { echo " [openbao] ERROR: $*" >&2; exit 1; } + +evidence() { + # NON-SECRET evidence only: booleans, counts, model, namespace. + python3 - "$@" <<'PY' +import json, sys +keys = [a.split("=", 1) for a in sys.argv[1:]] +def coerce(v): + if v in ("true", "false"): + return v == "true" + try: + return int(v) + except ValueError: + return v +print("EVIDENCE " + json.dumps({k: coerce(v) for k, v in keys}, sort_keys=True)) +PY +} + +# ── Custody model gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +# Only sops-held-automation may be automated. attended-ceremony and +# auto-unseal-transit must never reach `bao operator init/unseal` from here. +MODEL="" +PROFILE="" +if [[ -f "$CONSOLE_METADATA" ]]; then + MODEL=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1])).get("openbao_unseal_custody_model") or "")' "$CONSOLE_METADATA") + PROFILE=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1])).get("deployment_profile") or "")' "$CONSOLE_METADATA") +fi +if [[ "$PROFILE" == "production" ]]; then + die "deployment profile is 'production' — sops-held automation is blocked. + Use the attended ceremony (docs/openbao-attended-ceremony-runbook.md) or + auto-unseal-transit, or reselect: select-deployment-profile --profile lab" +fi +if [[ "$MODEL" != "sops-held-automation" ]]; then + die "unseal custody model is '${MODEL:-unselected}' — automation requires 'sops-held-automation'. + Select it first (see docs/openbao-unseal-custody-models.md): + python3 tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py \\ + select-openbao-unseal-custody-model --model sops-held-automation \\ + --metadata $CONSOLE_METADATA" +fi +log "custody model gate passed: $MODEL" + +command -v kubectl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "kubectl not found" +command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "python3 not found" + +kubectl get namespace "$NAMESPACE" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || die "namespace '$NAMESPACE' not found — deploy OpenBao first (railiance-platform: make openbao-deploy)" +kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get pod "$POD" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || die "pod '$POD' not found in namespace '$NAMESPACE'" + +# ── Status probe ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +# `bao status` exits 2 when sealed — capture output regardless of exit code. +bao_status() { + kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" exec "$POD" -- bao status -format=json 2>/dev/null || true +} + +STATUS_JSON="$(bao_status)" +[[ -n "$STATUS_JSON" ]] || die "could not read bao status from $NAMESPACE/$POD" +INITIALIZED=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(str(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("initialized", False)).lower())' <<<"$STATUS_JSON") +SEALED=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(str(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("sealed", True)).lower())' <<<"$STATUS_JSON") +log "status: initialized=$INITIALIZED sealed=$SEALED" + +# ── Init (only when uninitialized) ──────────────────────────────────────────── +DID_INIT=false +if [[ "$INITIALIZED" != "true" ]]; then + if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then + log "[dry-run] would run: bao operator init -key-shares=$KEY_SHARES -key-threshold=$KEY_THRESHOLD" + else + log "initializing OpenBao ($KEY_SHARES shares, threshold $KEY_THRESHOLD)..." + mkdir -p "$OPENBAO_SECRETS" + chmod 700 "$OPENBAO_SECRETS" + umask 077 + kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" exec "$POD" -- \ + bao operator init -key-shares="$KEY_SHARES" -key-threshold="$KEY_THRESHOLD" -format=json \ + > "$INIT_FILE" + chmod 600 "$INIT_FILE" + DID_INIT=true + log "init material written to $INIT_FILE (plaintext — encrypt + shred via encrypt-secrets.sh)" + fi + STATUS_JSON="$(bao_status)" + SEALED=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(str(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("sealed", True)).lower())' <<<"$STATUS_JSON") +fi + +# ── Unseal (when sealed) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +if [[ "$SEALED" == "true" ]]; then + if [[ ! -f "$INIT_FILE" ]]; then + die "OpenBao is sealed but $INIT_FILE is missing. + Decrypt SOPS-held custody first: bash decrypt-secrets.sh $SECRETS_DIR" + fi + if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then + log "[dry-run] would replay $KEY_THRESHOLD unseal share(s) from $INIT_FILE via stdin" + else + SHARE_COUNT=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(len(json.load(open(sys.argv[1])).get("unseal_keys_b64") or []))' "$INIT_FILE") + [[ "$SHARE_COUNT" -gt 0 ]] || die "no unseal shares found in $INIT_FILE" + log "replaying unseal shares (have $SHARE_COUNT)..." + for idx in $(seq 0 $((SHARE_COUNT - 1))); do + # Share travels stdin→stdin; never argv, never logs. + # `bao operator unseal -` does not read stdin (needs a TTY or the + # share in argv), so use the sys/unseal API with key=- instead. + python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["unseal_keys_b64"][int(sys.argv[2])])' "$INIT_FILE" "$idx" \ + | kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" exec -i "$POD" -- bao write sys/unseal key=- >/dev/null + STATUS_JSON="$(bao_status)" + SEALED=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(str(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("sealed", True)).lower())' <<<"$STATUS_JSON") + log "unseal share $((idx + 1)) applied (sealed=$SEALED)" + [[ "$SEALED" == "false" ]] && break + done + fi +fi + +# ── Post-unseal verification ────────────────────────────────────────────────── +VERIFIED=false +if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then + log "[dry-run] would verify post-unseal status" +else + STATUS_JSON="$(bao_status)" + INITIALIZED=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(str(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("initialized", False)).lower())' <<<"$STATUS_JSON") + SEALED=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(str(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("sealed", True)).lower())' <<<"$STATUS_JSON") + if [[ "$INITIALIZED" == "true" && "$SEALED" == "false" ]]; then + VERIFIED=true + log "post-unseal verified: initialized, unsealed" + else + die "post-unseal verification failed: initialized=$INITIALIZED sealed=$SEALED" + fi +fi + +evidence \ + "custody_model=$MODEL" \ + "namespace=$NAMESPACE" \ + "pod=$POD" \ + "openbao_initialized=$([[ "$INITIALIZED" == "true" || "$DID_INIT" == "true" ]] && echo true || echo false)" \ + "openbao_did_init_this_run=$DID_INIT" \ + "openbao_post_unseal_verified=$VERIFIED" \ + "dry_run=$DRY_RUN" + +# ── Platform handoff (railiance-platform owns post-unseal configuration) ───── +if [[ "${OPENBAO_RUN_CONFIGURE_INITIAL:-0}" == "1" && "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then + [[ -d "$RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR" ]] || die "railiance-platform not found at $RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR" + log "running railiance-platform post-unseal configuration..." + make -C "$RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR" openbao-configure-initial +else + log "next (railiance-platform): make -C $RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_DIR openbao-configure-initial" +fi + +if [[ "$DID_INIT" == true ]]; then + log "REMINDER: encrypt + shred the new init material now:" + log " bash $SCRIPT_DIR/encrypt-secrets.sh $SECRETS_DIR && commit secrets.enc/" +fi diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/openbao-lab.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/openbao-lab.py deleted file mode 100644 index 32d4183..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/openbao-lab.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,148 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Contained lab-only init/unseal. Production uses the Platform custody ceremony. - -The local model selection is a scope check, not an authorization grant. Caller -must supply an owner-admitted lab kubeconfig and independently observed cluster -UID. Private init output is retained for reconciliation after any unknown write. -""" -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import subprocess -import sys - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('private_service_files', Path(__file__).with_name('apply-service-secrets.py')) -private = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(private) - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def run(arguments, payload=None, allowed=(0,)): - # Inherit only routing/executable inputs, never ambient bearer credentials or - # shell hooks. Diagnostics and command output remain inside this process. - env = {k: os.environ[k] for k in ('PATH', 'HOME', 'KUBECONFIG') if k in os.environ} - result = subprocess.run(['kubectl', *arguments], input=payload, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60, env=env) - if result.returncode not in allowed or len(result.stdout) > 1024 * 1024: - raise Refused() - return result.stdout - - -def status(namespace, pod): - data = json.loads(run(['-n', namespace, 'exec', pod, '--', 'bao', 'status', '-format=json'], allowed=(0, 2))) - if not isinstance(data, dict) or type(data.get('initialized')) is not bool or type(data.get('sealed')) is not bool: - raise Refused() - return data - - -def init_material(raw): - value = json.loads(raw) - shares = value.get('unseal_keys_b64') - if (not isinstance(shares, list) or not shares or len(shares) > 16 - or any(not isinstance(x, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{16,256}', x) for x in shares) - or len(set(shares)) != len(shares) - or not isinstance(value.get('root_token'), str) or not value['root_token']): - raise Refused() - return shares - - -def main(args): - if args == ['--dry-run']: - print('Plan only: validate explicit lab custody and cluster UID; retain private init material; unseal and verify. No files or cluster state inspected.') - return - if len(args) > 1 or (args and args[0].startswith('-')): - raise Refused() - root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] - metadata = Path(os.environ.get('OPENBAO_CONSOLE_METADATA', str(root / '.local/security-bootstrap.json'))) - model = json.loads(metadata.read_bytes()) - if model.get('deployment_profile') != 'lab' or model.get('openbao_unseal_custody_model') != 'sops-held-automation': - raise Refused() - expected = os.environ.get('OPENBAO_EXPECTED_CLUSTER_UID', '') - if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,128}', expected) or not os.environ.get('KUBECONFIG'): - raise Refused() - if os.environ.get('OPENBAO_RUN_CONFIGURE_INITIAL', '0') != '0': - raise Refused() # Platform configuration is a separate owner operation. - namespace = os.environ.get('OPENBAO_NAMESPACE', 'openbao') - release = os.environ.get('OPENBAO_RELEASE', 'openbao') - if any(not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?', x) for x in (namespace, release)): - raise Refused() - shares = int(os.environ.get('OPENBAO_KEY_SHARES', '3')) - threshold = int(os.environ.get('OPENBAO_KEY_THRESHOLD', '2')) - if not 2 <= threshold <= shares <= 16: - raise Refused() - # Pin the actual target before credential input or any mutation. - obj = json.loads(run(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'json'])) - if obj.get('metadata', {}).get('uid') != expected: - raise Refused() - pod = release + '-0' - target = json.loads(run(['-n', namespace, 'get', 'pod', pod, '-o', 'json'])) - pod_uid = target.get('metadata', {}).get('uid') - if (not isinstance(pod_uid, str) or not pod_uid or target.get('metadata', {}).get('namespace') != namespace - or target.get('metadata', {}).get('name') != pod): - raise Refused() - directory = args[0] if args else str(Path(__file__).parent / 'secrets') - did_init = False - with private.custody(directory, ()) as _: - parent = Path(directory) / 'openbao' - try: - parent.mkdir(mode=0o700) - except FileExistsError: - pass - with private.custody(directory, ('openbao',)) as fds: - fd = fds['openbao'] - before = status(namespace, pod) - if not before['initialized']: - # Refuse prior custody material before sending init. An exclusive - # owner window is necessary; Kubernetes exec cannot CAS pod UID. - try: - os.stat('init.json', dir_fd=fd, follow_symlinks=False) - except FileNotFoundError: - pass - else: - raise Refused() - pinned = json.loads(run(['-n', namespace, 'get', 'pod', pod, '-o', 'json'])) - if pinned.get('metadata', {}).get('uid') != pod_uid: - raise Refused() - raw = run(['-n', namespace, 'exec', pod, '--', 'bao', 'operator', 'init', - '-key-shares=' + str(shares), '-key-threshold=' + str(threshold), '-format=json']) - # Preserve even a malformed successful response privately: the - # remote initialization cannot be undone or blindly retried. - output = os.open('init.json', os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, dir_fd=fd) - with os.fdopen(output, 'wb') as dest: - dest.write(raw); dest.flush(); os.fsync(dest.fileno()) - os.fsync(fd) - init_material(raw) - did_init = True - observed = status(namespace, pod) - if observed['sealed']: - material = init_material(private.read_private(fd, 'init.json')) - for share in material: - pinned = json.loads(run(['-n', namespace, 'get', 'pod', pod, '-o', 'json'])) - if pinned.get('metadata', {}).get('uid') != pod_uid: - raise Refused() - run(['-n', namespace, 'exec', '-i', pod, '--', 'bao', 'write', 'sys/unseal', 'key=-'], - (share + '\n').encode()) - observed = status(namespace, pod) - if not observed['sealed']: - break - if not observed['initialized'] or observed['sealed']: - raise Refused() - print('EVIDENCE ' + json.dumps({'custody_model': 'sops-held-automation', 'namespace': namespace, - 'pod': pod, 'cluster_uid': expected, 'pod_uid': pod_uid, 'openbao_initialized': True, - 'openbao_did_init_this_run': did_init, 'openbao_post_unseal_verified': True, - 'recovery_custody_verified': False, 'dry_run': False}, sort_keys=True)) - print('Retain init material in protected custody; encrypt and independently verify recovery. Platform configuration remains a separate owner operation.') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - main(sys.argv[1:]) - except (Refused, private.Refused, OSError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - print('ERROR: lab init/unseal refused or failed; diagnostics suppressed. Remote outcome may be unknown. Preserve private init material and reconcile through the owner before retry.', file=sys.stderr) - raise SystemExit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/pack-bundle.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/pack-bundle.sh index ab39929..e935555 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/pack-bundle.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/pack-bundle.sh @@ -1,61 +1,51 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Encrypt a private service-file snapshot without a plaintext tar intermediate. -# Usage: pack-bundle.sh SECRETS_DIR PUBLIC_AGE_RECIPIENT [NEW_OUTPUT_FILE] -# Use the independently registered recipient; private age keys never belong in -# the payload. Run under owner-exclusive custody maintenance (no same-UID writers). -set +x +# pack-bundle.sh — create an age-encrypted ops bundle from the secrets directory +# +# Usage: +# ./pack-bundle.sh SECRETS_DIR RECIPIENT_PUBKEY [OUTPUT_FILE] +# +# RECIPIENT_PUBKEY is the age public key to encrypt to. +# Generate one with: age-keygen -o ops-bundle.key (store key safely) +# The public key appears on stdout and in the .key file header. +# +# OUTPUT_FILE defaults to ops-bundle-.tar.age in the current directory. +# +# Example: +# age-keygen -o ~/ops-bundle.key +# ./pack-bundle.sh ./secrets "age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p" + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -fail() { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: bundle refused or failed; no new recovery artifact published.' >&2; exit 1; } -[[ $# -ge 2 && $# -le 3 ]] || fail + +if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then + echo "Usage: $0 SECRETS_DIR RECIPIENT_PUBKEY [OUTPUT_FILE]" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + SECRETS_DIR="${1%/}" RECIPIENT="$2" -OUTPUT="${3:-ops-bundle-$(date +%Y%m%dT%H%M%S)-$RANDOM.tar.age}" -[[ "$RECIPIENT" == age1* ]] || fail -printf '' | age -r "$RECIPIENT" >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail -[[ ! -e "$OUTPUT" && ! -L "$OUTPUT" ]] || fail -PARENT="$(dirname -- "$OUTPUT")" -[[ -d "$PARENT" ]] || fail -STAGING=$(mktemp -d "$PARENT/.netkingdom-bundle-XXXXXXXX") || fail -trap 'rm -rf -- "$STAGING"' EXIT -trap 'exit 129' HUP -trap 'exit 130' INT -trap 'exit 143' TERM -# Emit only member names to a private local list. Never follow links or include -# special/hardlinked files, permissive custody inputs or age private material. -if ! python3 - "$SECRETS_DIR" "$OUTPUT" > "$STAGING/members" 2>/dev/null <<'PY' -import os, pathlib, stat, sys -root = pathlib.Path(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[1])) -output = pathlib.Path(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[2])) -for path in (root, *root.parents, output.parent, *output.parent.parents): - if path.is_symlink(): raise ValueError() -if root == output or root in output.parents: raise ValueError() -count = 0 -for path in [root, *sorted(root.rglob('*'))]: - info = path.lstat() - if info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: raise ValueError() - if stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode): continue - if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_nlink != 1 or info.st_size > 32 * 1024 * 1024: - raise ValueError() - with path.open('rb') as source: - if b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' in source.read(): raise ValueError() - name = str(path.relative_to(root.parent)) - if any(ord(c) < 32 for c in name): raise ValueError() - sys.stdout.buffer.write(name.encode() + b'\0') - count += 1 -if not count: raise ValueError() -PY -then fail; fi -# Source/root are data arguments; member names are NUL delimited and verbatim. -if ! tar -C "$(dirname -- "$SECRETS_DIR")" --null --verbatim-files-from \ - --no-recursion -T "$STAGING/members" -cf - 2>/dev/null \ - | age -r "$RECIPIENT" -o "$STAGING/ciphertext" 2>/dev/null; then fail; fi -python3 - "$STAGING/ciphertext" 2>/dev/null <<'PYSYNC' || fail -import os, sys -fd=os.open(sys.argv[1], os.O_RDONLY) -try: os.fsync(fd) -finally: os.close(fd) -PYSYNC -# Hard-link publication atomically refuses an output created concurrently. -ln -T -- "$STAGING/ciphertext" "$OUTPUT" 2>/dev/null || fail -printf '%s\n' 'Encrypted bundle published privately; retain it off-host and independently verify recovery before removing source custody.' +TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%dT%H%M%S)" +OUTPUT="${3:-ops-bundle-${TIMESTAMP}.tar.age}" + +if [[ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $SECRETS_DIR is not a directory." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if ! command -v age &>/dev/null; then + echo "ERROR: age is not installed. Install with: apt install age" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +TMPTAR="$(mktemp --suffix=.tar)" +trap 'shred -u "$TMPTAR" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$TMPTAR"' EXIT + +echo "Packing: $SECRETS_DIR → (tar) → (age encrypt) → $OUTPUT" +tar -C "$(dirname "$SECRETS_DIR")" -cf "$TMPTAR" "$(basename "$SECRETS_DIR")" +age -r "$RECIPIENT" -o "$OUTPUT" "$TMPTAR" + +echo "Bundle written: $OUTPUT" +echo "Recipient key : $RECIPIENT" +echo "" +echo "Store $OUTPUT offsite (cloud, external drive, second location)." +echo "Decrypt with:" +echo " age -d -i -o secrets.tar $OUTPUT && tar xf secrets.tar" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py deleted file mode 100755 index a0074b8..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Reconcile custody AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET with the live value (NK-WP-0056-T04). - -Reads the plaintext KeyCape uses (sso/keycape-config, config.yaml authelia.clientSecret) -and accepts it only if it matches Authelia's live bcrypt hash (sso/authelia-secrets, -keycape_client_secret_hash). Without --apply it reports value-free whether custody -matches. With --apply it writes the live value into the decrypted custody copy through -rotation-env.py (stdin only) and re-checks custody against the hash. No cluster writes. - -Usage: reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py [--apply] -Needs KUBECONFIG with read access to Secrets in namespace sso. -""" -import base64 -import json -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys - -import bcrypt -import yaml - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -KEY = 'AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET' - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def secret_data(name, key): - raw = subprocess.run(['kubectl', 'get', 'secret', name, '-n', 'sso', '-o', 'json'], - check=True, capture_output=True).stdout - data = json.loads(raw).get('data', {}) - if key not in data: raise Refused() - return base64.b64decode(data[key], validate=True) - - -def custody_value(root): - sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE)) - import importlib.util - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('custody_io', HERE / 'apply-service-secrets.py') - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(module) - with module.custody(root, ['authelia']) as dirs: - return module.literal(module.read_env(dirs['authelia']), KEY).encode() - - -def main(): - args = sys.argv[1:] - apply = '--apply' in args - roots = [a for a in args if a != '--apply'] - if len(roots) != 1: - print(__doc__.strip().splitlines()[-2], file=sys.stderr) - return 2 - root = roots[0] - phase = 'custody' - try: - custody_value(root) # fail first, and distinctly, if the decrypted copy is absent - phase = 'cluster' - hashed = secret_data('authelia-secrets', 'keycape_client_secret_hash') - config = yaml.safe_load(secret_data('keycape-config', 'config.yaml')) - live = str(config['authelia']['clientSecret']).encode() - phase = 'live-pair' - if not bcrypt.checkpw(live, hashed): raise Refused() # live pair must agree first - before = bcrypt.checkpw(custody_value(root), hashed) - report = {'live_keycape_matches_authelia_hash': True, 'custody_matched_before': before, - 'values_recorded': False} - if apply and not before: - phase = 'write' - subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(HERE / 'rotation-env.py'), 'update', root, 'authelia', KEY], - input=live + b'\n', check=True, capture_output=True) - phase = 'readback' - if not bcrypt.checkpw(custody_value(root), hashed): raise Refused() - report['custody_updated'] = True - report['custody_matches_live'] = bcrypt.checkpw(custody_value(root), hashed) - print(json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True)) - return 0 if report['custody_matches_live'] or not apply else 1 - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as error: - # Class and exit code only: messages and kubectl stderr may carry values. - detail = {'error': type(error).__name__} - if isinstance(error, subprocess.CalledProcessError): detail['exit_code'] = error.returncode - print(json.dumps({'result': 'unverified', 'phase': phase, - 'partial_changes_possible': phase in ('write', 'readback'), **detail}), file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/rotation-env.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/rotation-env.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6471a54..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/rotation-env.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,83 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Validate and atomically update a private generated credential file. - -The caller supplies the new value on stdin, never argv. This protects the -handoff/output boundary; it does not isolate a hostile process with the same UID. -""" -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import secrets -import stat -import sys - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def private(info, directory=False): - kind = stat.S_ISDIR if directory else stat.S_ISREG - if not kind(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused() - if not directory and info.st_nlink != 1: - raise Refused() - - -def main(): - if len(sys.argv) != 5 or sys.argv[1] not in ('check', 'update'): - raise Refused() - action, root_arg, component, key = sys.argv[1:] - if component not in ('privacyidea', 'lldap', 'authelia', 'breakglass'): - raise Refused() - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+', key): - raise Refused() - root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_arg)) - # Refuse symlink ancestors rather than resolving them silently. - for part in (root, *root.parents): - if part.is_symlink(): raise Refused() - root_fd = parent_fd = file_fd = None - temporary = None - try: - flags = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW - root_fd = os.open(root, flags) - private(os.fstat(root_fd), directory=True) - parent_fd = os.open(component, flags, dir_fd=root_fd) - private(os.fstat(parent_fd), directory=True) - file_fd = os.open('secrets.env', os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=parent_fd) - original = os.fstat(file_fd) - private(original) - raw = os.read(file_fd, 65537) - if len(raw) > 65536: raise Refused() - lines = raw.decode('utf-8').splitlines(keepends=True) - matches = [i for i, line in enumerate(lines) if line.startswith(key + '=')] - if len(matches) != 1: raise Refused() - if action == 'check': return - value = sys.stdin.buffer.read(257).decode('ascii').strip() - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', value): raise Refused() - lines[matches[0]] = key + '=' + value + '\n' - temporary = '.rotation-' + secrets.token_hex(12) - output_fd = os.open(temporary, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, dir_fd=parent_fd) - with os.fdopen(output_fd, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as output: - output.writelines(lines); output.flush(); os.fsync(output.fileno()) - current = os.stat('secrets.env', dir_fd=parent_fd, follow_symlinks=False) - if (current.st_dev, current.st_ino, current.st_mtime_ns, current.st_size) != ( - original.st_dev, original.st_ino, original.st_mtime_ns, original.st_size): - raise Refused() - os.replace(temporary, 'secrets.env', src_dir_fd=parent_fd, dst_dir_fd=parent_fd) - temporary = None - os.fsync(parent_fd) - finally: - if temporary is not None and parent_fd is not None: - os.unlink(temporary, dir_fd=parent_fd) - for fd in (file_fd, parent_fd, root_fd): - if fd is not None: os.close(fd) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - main() - except (Refused, OSError, ValueError, UnicodeError): - print('ERROR: private credential file validation/update failed; no values are logged.', file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/authelia/secrets.env.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/authelia/secrets.env.age index fe6ce4e..07426ae 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/authelia/secrets.env.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/authelia/secrets.env.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/breakglass/secrets.env.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/breakglass/secrets.env.age index f0c80c1..1e291cb 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/breakglass/secrets.env.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/breakglass/secrets.env.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/key.pem.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/key.pem.age index 8cc97d7..d4b9448 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/key.pem.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/key.pem.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/pi_admin_token.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/pi_admin_token.age index 2dff9ee..60b66ae 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/pi_admin_token.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/pi_admin_token.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/secrets.env.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/secrets.env.age index e9c0073..662c0b0 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/secrets.env.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/keycape/secrets.env.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/lldap/secrets.env.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/lldap/secrets.env.age index 9e8934d..56ca13d 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/lldap/secrets.env.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/lldap/secrets.env.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/postgres/secrets.env.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/postgres/secrets.env.age index f22d5ce..c889ca9 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/postgres/secrets.env.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/postgres/secrets.env.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/pi.enc.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/pi.enc.age index 242d0c7..acb57d1 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/pi.enc.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/pi.enc.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/private.pem.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/private.pem.age index bc9dde5..a21323a 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/private.pem.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/private.pem.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/public.pem.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/public.pem.age index 87d33fe..3ee0710 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/public.pem.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/public.pem.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/secrets.env.age b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/secrets.env.age index f28cbd5..bb5be21 100644 Binary files a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/secrets.env.age and b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets.enc/privacyidea/secrets.env.age differ diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-fd.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-fd.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6b1643d..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-fd.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended custody through a sealed anonymous Linux descriptor, never a key path.""" -import argparse -import fcntl -import getpass -import os -import re -import subprocess -import sys -import warnings - -SEALS=fcntl.F_SEAL_WRITE|fcntl.F_SEAL_GROW|fcntl.F_SEAL_SHRINK|fcntl.F_SEAL_SEAL - -class Refused(Exception):pass - -def sealed_key(material): - if not isinstance(material,bytes) or not 1<=len(material)<=16384 or not re.fullmatch(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-1[A-Z0-9]+\n?',material):raise Refused() - fd=os.memfd_create('netkingdom-custody',os.MFD_CLOEXEC|os.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) - try: - os.fchmod(fd,0o600) - with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd),'wb') as out:out.write(material);out.flush() - os.lseek(fd,0,os.SEEK_SET) - fcntl.fcntl(fd,fcntl.F_ADD_SEALS,SEALS) - if fcntl.fcntl(fd,fcntl.F_GET_SEALS)!=SEALS:raise Refused() - return fd - except BaseException:os.close(fd);raise - -def run(material,recipient,command): - if not re.fullmatch(r'age1[023456789acdefghjklmnpqrstuvwxyz]{58}',recipient) or not command:raise Refused() - fd=sealed_key(material) - try: - result=subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-y',f'/proc/self/fd/{fd}'],pass_fds=(fd,),stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=10) - if result.returncode or result.stdout.strip()!=recipient.encode():raise Refused() - # The key must not compete with any ambient custody source. Children - # receive only this exact inherited descriptor, with close-on-exec elsewhere. - env={k:v for k,v in os.environ.items() if k not in ('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE','NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD','SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE','SOPS_AGE_KEY','SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD')} - env['NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD']=str(fd) - return subprocess.run(command,env=env,pass_fds=(fd,)).returncode - finally:os.close(fd) - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--expected-recipient',required=True);p.add_argument('command',nargs=argparse.REMAINDER);args=p.parse_args() - command=args.command[1:] if args.command[:1]==['--'] else args.command - try: - if (not all(os.isatty(fd) for fd in (0,1,2)) or not command - or not re.fullmatch(r'age1[023456789acdefghjklmnpqrstuvwxyz]{58}',args.expected_recipient)):raise Refused() - with warnings.catch_warnings(): - warnings.simplefilter('error',getpass.GetPassWarning) - material=getpass.getpass('Paste custody age private key line (input hidden): ').encode()+b'\n' - return run(material,args.expected_recipient,command) - except Exception: - print('ERROR: sealed custody input or execution refused; private diagnostics suppressed.',file=sys.stderr);return 1 - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh index fd88e49..8e622e3 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ # The private age key is supplied only for this invocation, validated against an # expected public recipient, written to a 0600 temp file, and removed on exit. -set +x set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" @@ -14,7 +13,6 @@ EXPECTED_RECIPIENT="${EXPECTED_AGE_RECIPIENT:-}" SOURCE_FILE="" INPUT_MODE="" CHECK_ONLY=false -SEALED_FD=false COMMAND=() usage() { @@ -28,7 +26,6 @@ Options: --from-stdin Read custody age key material from stdin. --prompt Prompt for one AGE-SECRET-KEY-1... line. --check-only Validate the supplied key and exit. - --sealed-fd Hidden prompt, explicit command, no named key file. -h, --help Show this help. Examples: @@ -64,31 +61,23 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do ;; --from-file) [[ $# -ge 2 ]] || fail "--from-file requires a path" - [[ -z "$INPUT_MODE" ]] || fail "choose exactly one custody input mode" SOURCE_FILE="$2" INPUT_MODE="file" shift 2 ;; --from-file=*) - [[ -z "$INPUT_MODE" ]] || fail "choose exactly one custody input mode" SOURCE_FILE="${1#*=}" INPUT_MODE="file" shift ;; --from-stdin) - [[ -z "$INPUT_MODE" ]] || fail "choose exactly one custody input mode" INPUT_MODE="stdin" shift ;; --prompt) - [[ -z "$INPUT_MODE" ]] || fail "choose exactly one custody input mode" INPUT_MODE="prompt" shift ;; - --sealed-fd) - SEALED_FD=true - shift - ;; --check-only) CHECK_ONLY=true shift @@ -103,7 +92,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do break ;; *) - fail "unknown custody argument" + fail "unknown argument: $1" ;; esac done @@ -119,19 +108,10 @@ if [[ -z "$INPUT_MODE" ]]; then if [[ -t 0 ]]; then INPUT_MODE="prompt" else - fail "noninteractive input requires explicit --from-stdin or --from-file" + INPUT_MODE="stdin" fi fi -if [[ "$CHECK_ONLY" == false && ${#COMMAND[@]} -eq 0 && ! -t 0 ]]; then - fail "an interactive custody shell requires a terminal; supply an explicit command" -fi - -if [[ "$SEALED_FD" == true ]]; then - [[ "$INPUT_MODE" == prompt && "$CHECK_ONLY" == false && ${#COMMAND[@]} -gt 0 ]] || fail "sealed descriptor mode requires --prompt and an explicit command" - exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/sops-custody-fd.py" --expected-recipient "$EXPECTED_RECIPIENT" -- "${COMMAND[@]}" -fi - TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/netkingdom-sops-age.XXXXXX")" KEY_FILE="$TMP_DIR/keys.txt" cleanup() { @@ -144,16 +124,13 @@ cleanup() { fi rmdir "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true } -trap cleanup EXIT -trap 'exit 129' HUP -trap 'exit 130' INT -trap 'exit 143' TERM +trap cleanup EXIT HUP INT TERM umask 077 case "$INPUT_MODE" in file) - [[ -f "$SOURCE_FILE" ]] || fail "custody age key source is unavailable" - cp "$SOURCE_FILE" "$KEY_FILE" 2>/dev/null || fail "custody key copy failed" + [[ -f "$SOURCE_FILE" ]] || fail "custody age key file not found: $SOURCE_FILE" + cp "$SOURCE_FILE" "$KEY_FILE" chmod 600 "$KEY_FILE" ;; stdin) @@ -185,6 +162,8 @@ DERIVED_RECIPIENT="$(age-keygen -y "$KEY_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)" if [[ "$DERIVED_RECIPIENT" != "$EXPECTED_RECIPIENT" ]]; then printf 'ERROR: custody key does not match expected recipient\n' >&2 + printf ' expected: %s\n' "$EXPECTED_RECIPIENT" >&2 + printf ' derived : %s\n' "$DERIVED_RECIPIENT" >&2 exit 1 fi @@ -195,8 +174,6 @@ if [[ "$CHECK_ONLY" == true ]]; then exit 0 fi -# The supplied key must not compete with an ambient inline key or key command. -unset SOPS_AGE_KEY SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD export SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE="$KEY_FILE" export NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE="$KEY_FILE" diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py deleted file mode 100644 index c67d4a3..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,228 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Age-only SOPS recovery to a new private file; no plaintext process output.""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import json -import fcntl -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import shutil -import signal -import stat -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import uuid - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -RECIPIENT = re.compile(r'age1[023456789acdefghjklmnpqrstuvwxyz]{58}\Z') - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def public_recipient(): - lines = (ROOT / 'keys/age.pub').read_text().splitlines() - values = [line.strip() for line in lines if line.strip() and not line.startswith('#')] - if len(values) != 1 or not RECIPIENT.fullmatch(values[0]): - raise Refused('registered public recipient is invalid') - result = subprocess.run(['age', '-r', values[0]], input=b'', stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if result.returncode: - raise Refused('registered public recipient is invalid') - return values[0] - - -def unique_object(pairs): - result = {} - for key, value in pairs: - if key in result: - raise Refused('duplicate encrypted document key') - result[key] = value - return result - - -def parse_document(raw, suffix): - if suffix == '.json': - data = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=unique_object) - kind = 'json' - elif suffix in {'.yaml', '.yml'}: - import yaml - class UniqueLoader(yaml.SafeLoader): - def construct_mapping(self, node, deep=False): - self.flatten_mapping(node) - return unique_object((self.construct_object(key, deep=deep), - self.construct_object(value, deep=deep)) - for key, value in node.value) - try: - data = yaml.load(raw, Loader=UniqueLoader) - except yaml.YAMLError: - raise Refused('invalid encrypted YAML input') from None - kind = 'yaml' - else: - raise Refused('age recovery supports SOPS JSON/YAML input') - return data, kind - - -def age_document(source, recipient, *, raw=None): - # Inspect ciphertext metadata before giving a credential to any subprocess. - # This repository's admitted SOPS profile is age-only, not arbitrary cloud - # KMS, key services, SSH identities or executable age plugins. - if raw is None: - with source.open("rb") as encrypted: - raw = encrypted.read(8 * 1024 * 1024 + 1) - if len(raw) > 8 * 1024 * 1024: - raise Refused('encrypted input is too large') - data, kind = parse_document(raw, source.suffix) - metadata = data.get('sops') if isinstance(data, dict) else None - if not isinstance(metadata, dict): - raise Refused('SOPS metadata is missing') - known = {'age', 'kms', 'gcp_kms', 'azure_kv', 'hc_vault', 'hckms', 'pgp', - 'key_groups', 'shamir_threshold', 'lastmodified', 'mac', 'version', - 'unencrypted_suffix', 'encrypted_suffix', 'unencrypted_regex', - 'encrypted_regex', 'unencrypted_comment_regex', 'encrypted_comment_regex', - 'mac_only_encrypted'} - if set(metadata) - known or metadata.get('key_groups'): - raise Refused('unsupported SOPS custody profile') - if any(metadata.get(key) for key in ('kms', 'gcp_kms', 'azure_kv', 'hc_vault', 'hckms', 'pgp')): - raise Refused('recovery requires age-only metadata') - recipients = metadata.get('age') - if not isinstance(recipients, list) or not recipients: - raise Refused('age recipient metadata is missing') - if any(not isinstance(row, dict) or not RECIPIENT.fullmatch(str(row.get('recipient', ''))) - for row in recipients): - raise Refused('unsupported age recipient') - if recipient not in [row['recipient'] for row in recipients]: - raise Refused('document does not include the registered recipient') - return raw, kind - - -def private_key_fd(): - inherited = os.environ.get('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD', '') - name = os.environ.get('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE', '') - if inherited: - if name or not re.fullmatch(r'[1-9][0-9]{0,8}',inherited) or int(inherited)<3: - raise Refused('ambiguous custody descriptor') - fd=os.dup(int(inherited)) - try: - info=os.fstat(fd) - required=fcntl.F_SEAL_WRITE|fcntl.F_SEAL_GROW|fcntl.F_SEAL_SHRINK|fcntl.F_SEAL_SEAL - if (not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=os.getuid() or info.st_mode&0o077 - or info.st_nlink!=0 or not 0 16384: - os.close(fd) - raise Refused('custody key must be an owned private regular file') - return fd - - -def decrypt(recipient): - source_name = os.environ.get('NK_SOPS_FILE', '') - output_name = os.environ.get('NK_SOPS_OUTPUT', '') - if not source_name or not output_name: - raise Refused('supply FILE and OUTPUT; plaintext stdout is disabled') - source = Path(source_name).resolve(strict=True) - output = Path(output_name).absolute() - parent = output.parent.resolve(strict=True) - if any((p / '.git').is_file() or (p / '.git/HEAD').is_file() - or ((p / 'HEAD').is_file() and (p / 'objects').is_dir() and (p / 'refs').is_dir()) - for p in [parent, *parent.parents]): - raise Refused('plaintext output must be outside Git worktrees') - raw, kind = age_document(source, recipient) - binary = shutil.which('sops') - if binary is None: - raise Refused('sops executable is unavailable') - directory = os.open(parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) - temporary = '.netkingdom-sops-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - keyfd = None - try: - info = os.fstat(directory) - if info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused('OUTPUT requires an owned private parent directory') - try: - os.stat(output.name, dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - except FileNotFoundError: - pass - else: - raise Refused('OUTPUT already exists') - keyfd = private_key_fd() - derived = subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-y', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], - stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, - pass_fds=(keyfd,), timeout=10) - if derived.returncode or derived.stdout.strip() != recipient.encode(): - raise Refused('custody key does not match the registered recipient') - fd = os.open(temporary, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, dir_fd=directory) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as plain, tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='netkingdom-sops-home-') as isolated: - # HOME/XDG isolation matters: SOPS loads ambient keys in addition to - # an explicit key file. No inline keys, SSH keys, key commands, - # proxies or remote keyservice configuration are inherited. - env = {'PATH': os.environ.get('PATH', os.defpath), 'HOME': isolated, - 'XDG_CONFIG_HOME': isolated, 'GNUPGHOME': isolated, - 'SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE': f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}', - 'AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED': 'true'} - result = subprocess.run([binary, '--decrypt', '--input-type', kind, - '--output-type', kind, '/dev/stdin'], - input=raw, stdout=plain, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, - env=env, cwd=isolated, pass_fds=(keyfd,), timeout=30) - if result.returncode: - raise Refused('SOPS decryption failed; no plaintext published') - plain.flush() - os.fsync(plain.fileno()) - # Atomic no-overwrite publication within the private directory. - os.link(temporary, output.name, src_dir_fd=directory, dst_dir_fd=directory, - follow_symlinks=False) - os.unlink(temporary, dir_fd=directory) - os.fsync(directory) - finally: - if keyfd is not None: - os.close(keyfd) - try: - os.unlink(temporary, dir_fd=directory) - except FileNotFoundError: - pass - os.close(directory) - print('Decrypted to the requested private file. Remove it after the approved operation.') - - -def interrupted(_signum, _frame): - raise Refused('operation interrupted') - - -def main(): - for sig in (signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP, signal.SIGINT): - signal.signal(sig, interrupted) - try: - if len(sys.argv) != 2 or sys.argv[1] not in {'setup', 'decrypt'}: - raise Refused('unsupported custody operation') - recipient = public_recipient() - if sys.argv[1] == 'setup': - print('Registered public recipient validated. No private key was read, copied or generated.') - else: - decrypt(recipient) - return 0 - except Refused as exc: - print('ERROR: ' + str(exc), file=sys.stderr) - except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, ImportError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - # Parser, filesystem and tool errors can include user data. Never echo. - print('ERROR: custody operation failed; input and tool diagnostics suppressed.', file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py b/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py deleted file mode 100644 index 1bbe4ed..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-write.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,188 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Private SOPS writes for the independently registered single-age profile. - -Edit consumes an explicitly prepared private plaintext file. No editor or shell -is launched, and subprocess plaintext output is discarded, never forwarded. -""" -import contextlib -import fcntl -import importlib.util -import os -from pathlib import Path -import shutil -import signal -import stat -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import uuid - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('sops_private', Path(__file__).with_name('sops-private.py')) -base = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(base) -Refused = base.Refused -LIMIT = 8 * 1024 * 1024 -POLICY = ('unencrypted_suffix', 'encrypted_suffix', 'unencrypted_regex', 'encrypted_regex', - 'unencrypted_comment_regex', 'encrypted_comment_regex') - - -def in_git(parent): - return any((p / '.git').is_file() or (p / '.git/HEAD').is_file() - or ((p / 'HEAD').is_file() and (p / 'objects').is_dir() and (p / 'refs').is_dir()) - for p in (parent, *parent.parents)) - - -@contextlib.contextmanager -def snapshot(name, *, plaintext=False, replacement=False, lock=False): - if not name: raise Refused('explicit FILE or INPUT is required') - path = Path(os.path.abspath(name)) - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path, *path.parents)): - raise Refused('file paths must not contain symlinks') - directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) - fd = None - try: - parent = os.fstat(directory) - if parent.st_uid != os.getuid() or parent.st_mode & (0o077 if replacement else 0o022): - raise Refused('file directory ownership/mode refused') - if replacement and in_git(path.parent): - raise Refused('private replacement input must be outside Git') - fd = os.open(path.name, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=directory) - info = os.fstat(fd) - if (not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_nlink != 1 - or info.st_mode & (0o077 if plaintext else 0o022)): - raise Refused('file ownership/type/mode refused') - if lock: fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB) - with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd), 'rb') as stream: - raw = stream.read(LIMIT + 1) - if len(raw) > LIMIT: raise Refused('input exceeds the supported size') - yield path, directory, info, raw - finally: - if fd is not None: os.close(fd) - os.close(directory) - - -def plain_document(raw, suffix): - data, kind = base.parse_document(raw, suffix) - if not isinstance(data, dict) or not data or 'sops' in data: - raise Refused('plaintext must be a nonempty JSON/YAML mapping without SOPS metadata') - return kind - - -def encrypted_document(raw, path, recipient): - _, kind = base.age_document(path, recipient, raw=raw) - data, _ = base.parse_document(raw, path.suffix) - metadata = data['sops'] - # Document recipient metadata is not an independent admission of another - # recipient. Never rewrap a data key to an injected or unreviewed identity. - if len(metadata['age']) != 1 or metadata['age'][0]['recipient'] != recipient: - raise Refused('write requires exactly the independently registered recipient') - return kind, metadata - - -def sops(binary, arguments, raw, env, isolated, keyfd=None, *, discard=False): - result = subprocess.run([binary, *arguments, '/dev/stdin'], input=raw, - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL if discard else subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, cwd=isolated, env=env, - pass_fds=() if keyfd is None else (keyfd,), timeout=30) - if result.returncode: raise Refused('SOPS operation failed; no replacement published') - if not discard and (not result.stdout or len(result.stdout) > LIMIT): - raise Refused('SOPS output was empty or oversized') - return None if discard else result.stdout - - -def publish(path, directory, original, encrypted): - temporary = '.netkingdom-sops-write-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - try: - fd = os.open(temporary, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600, dir_fd=directory) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as file: - file.write(encrypted); file.flush(); os.fsync(file.fileno()) - current = os.stat(path.name, dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - fields = ('st_dev', 'st_ino', 'st_size', 'st_mtime_ns', 'st_ctime_ns') - if any(getattr(current, key) != getattr(original, key) for key in fields): - raise Refused('source changed during operation; replacement refused') - os.replace(temporary, path.name, src_dir_fd=directory, dst_dir_fd=directory) - os.fsync(directory) - finally: - try: os.unlink(temporary, dir_fd=directory) - except FileNotFoundError: pass - - -def write(action, recipient): - binary = shutil.which('sops') - if binary is None: raise Refused('sops executable is unavailable') - with snapshot(os.environ.get('NK_SOPS_FILE', ''), plaintext=action == 'encrypt', lock=True) as target: - path, directory, original, raw = target - if action == 'encrypt': - kind = plain_document(raw, path.suffix) - if in_git(path.parent): - tracked = subprocess.run(['git', '-C', str(path.parent), 'ls-files', '--error-unmatch', '--', path.name], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if tracked.returncode != 1: - raise Refused('tracked plaintext or unverifiable Git index requires incident review') - metadata = {} - else: - kind, metadata = encrypted_document(raw, path, recipient) - keyfd = None - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='netkingdom-sops-write-home-') as isolated: - env = {'PATH': os.environ.get('PATH', os.defpath), 'HOME': isolated, 'XDG_CONFIG_HOME': isolated, - 'GNUPGHOME': isolated, 'AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED': 'true'} - if action != 'encrypt': - keyfd = base.private_key_fd() - derived = subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-y', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], - stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, - pass_fds=(keyfd,), timeout=10) - if derived.returncode or derived.stdout.strip() != recipient.encode(): - raise Refused('custody key does not match registered recipient') - env['SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE'] = f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}' - formats = ['--input-type', kind, '--output-type', kind] - if action == 'rotate': - encrypted = sops(binary, ['--rotate', *formats], raw, env, isolated, keyfd) - else: - options = [] - if action == 'edit': - # MAC verification must precede replacement of even a - # syntactically valid encrypted document. - sops(binary, ['--decrypt', *formats], raw, env, isolated, keyfd, discard=True) - with snapshot(os.environ.get('NK_SOPS_INPUT', ''), plaintext=True, replacement=True) as replacement: - plain = replacement[3] - if plain_document(plain, replacement[0].suffix) != kind: - raise Refused('replacement format must match the encrypted document') - for name in POLICY: - value = metadata.get(name) - if value: - if not isinstance(value, str): raise Refused('invalid encryption policy') - options.extend(['--' + name.replace('_', '-'), value]) - if metadata.get('mac_only_encrypted'): - options.append('--mac-only-encrypted') - else: - plain = raw - encrypted = sops(binary, ['--encrypt', '--age', recipient, *formats, *options], - plain, env, isolated, keyfd) - encrypted_document(encrypted, path, recipient) - if keyfd is not None: - sops(binary, ['--decrypt', *formats], encrypted, env, isolated, keyfd, discard=True) - if base.public_recipient() != recipient: - raise Refused('registered recipient changed during operation') - publish(path, directory, original, encrypted) - finally: - if keyfd is not None: os.close(keyfd) - print('Encrypted file updated; no plaintext was printed. Retain approved independent recovery custody.') - - -def main(): - for sig in (signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP, signal.SIGINT): signal.signal(sig, base.interrupted) - try: - if len(sys.argv) != 2 or sys.argv[1] not in {'encrypt', 'rotate', 'edit'}: - raise Refused('unsupported SOPS write operation') - write(sys.argv[1], base.public_recipient()) - return 0 - except Refused as exc: - print('ERROR: ' + str(exc), file=sys.stderr) - except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError, ImportError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - print('ERROR: SOPS write refused or failed; input and tool diagnostics suppressed.', file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/README.md index 241a548..e8586ee 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/README.md @@ -65,21 +65,6 @@ and current owner runbooks to prepare recovery. A database-only drill does not prove restoration of LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA and its matching encryption material, or all identity database state. -CoulombCore identity cutover and retained cluster deletion completed on -2026-10-15 under the recorded approval and passing restart gate in -[NK-WP-0022](../../workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md). -Railiance01 is authoritative. Recover through current owner runbooks and -protected independent backups; the old cluster and its local PVCs are gone. - - -### Identity-provisioner service group provenance - -The [owner storage and request migration contract](../../docs/service-group-provenance.md) -describes the durable journal required by governed service-group ensure/revoke. -The existing reference identity-provisioner Deployment has a read-only root -filesystem, UID10001 and no provenance volume. The implemented SQLite backend -is local/disposable only. Accepted ADR-0015 rejects SQLite-on-a-PVC for production; -native journal storage requires the CNPG/`rapp-postgres` consumer contract or an -explicit governed exception, plus owner-admitted image/storage/caller and writer -isolation. Keep production group operations disabled pending that admission. -This guidance does not apply or authorize a native volume change. +CoulombCore identity cutover is complete; final retained-resource deletion +remains gated by [NK-WP-0022](../../workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md). +Expiration of the retention minimum does not authorize deletion. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/README.md index fa7304b..bb5f012 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/README.md @@ -92,13 +92,9 @@ apps — the edge already calls Authelia `/api/verify`. | | `keycape_client_secret_hash` | Bcrypt hash of `AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET` | `create-secrets.sh` reads plaintext values from `secrets/authelia/secrets.env` and -`secrets/lldap/secrets.env` as private literal input (requires Python 3 + bcrypt). -First creation stores a new signing key privately in `authelia/oidc_private_key.pem` -unless an explicit private absolute key path is supplied. Existing deployments -preserve their issuer key and matching bcrypt hash. Normal reapplication verifies -matching values; session rotation must explicitly select `AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET`. -See [service Secret custody and rotation](../../bootstrap/README.md#service-secret-creation-and-explicit-rotation) -for conflict handling, recovery custody and native acceptance limits. +`secrets/lldap/secrets.env`. It generates the bcrypt hash on the fly (requires +`python3+bcrypt` or `apache2-utils`). The RSA OIDC private key is generated +automatically if `AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE` is not set. ## Storage diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/bind-eso.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/bind-eso.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index fcdc4bf..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/bind-eso.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04, railiance-platform CCR-2026-0053 (second lane after the svc-provisioner pilot). -# Projects only the svc-authelia bind password from platform custody into the key -# ldap_password of the existing Secret sso/authelia-secrets (created by apply-service-secrets.py). -# Merge keeps every other key (session, storage, OIDC) and the Secret's ownership; Retain -# leaves the working Secret in place if this ExternalSecret is removed. Authelia reads the -# file only at start-up, so an identical projection needs no restart. -# Apply only after `tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py setup svc-authelia` reports equal custody. ---- -apiVersion: v1 -kind: ServiceAccount -metadata: - name: net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso - namespace: sso -automountServiceAccountToken: false ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: SecretStore -metadata: - name: net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind - namespace: sso -spec: - provider: - vault: - server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200 - path: platform - version: v2 - auth: - kubernetes: - mountPath: kubernetes - role: net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso - serviceAccountRef: - name: net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso - audiences: [openbao] ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: ExternalSecret -metadata: - name: authelia-secrets - namespace: sso -spec: - refreshInterval: 1h - secretStoreRef: - kind: SecretStore - name: net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind - target: - # Explicit target metadata stops ESO copying this object's kubectl - # last-applied annotation onto the Secret (refused by reject-secret-last-applied). - template: - metadata: {} - name: authelia-secrets - creationPolicy: Merge - deletionPolicy: Retain - data: - - secretKey: ldap_password - remoteRef: - key: workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia - property: LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml index 8f29245..3699ea3 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml @@ -58,15 +58,14 @@ data: additional_users_dn: ou=people # Accept either the stable uid or the user's mail address. Authelia's # official LLDAP integration recommends this OR filter; the resolved - # identity still uses uid as its stable username. Service binds (svc-*) and the sealed - # directory admin (ld-admin) never sign in through Authelia (SI-3, SI-5; NK-WP-0054-T05). - users_filter: "(&(|({username_attribute}={input})({mail_attribute}={input}))(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(!({username_attribute}=svc-*))(!({username_attribute}=ld-admin)))" + # identity still uses uid as its stable username. + users_filter: "(&(|({username_attribute}={input})({mail_attribute}={input}))(objectClass=inetOrgPerson))" additional_groups_dn: ou=groups groups_filter: "(member={dn})" group_name_attribute: cn mail_attribute: mail display_name_attribute: displayName - user: uid=svc-authelia,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local + user: uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local # password: injected via AUTHELIA_AUTHENTICATION_BACKEND_LDAP_PASSWORD_FILE session: diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/create-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/create-secrets.sh index 393fbae..9be7fa8 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/create-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/create-secrets.sh @@ -1,7 +1,113 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Private creation or exact-match verification; rotations require --rotate-key. -set +x +# create-secrets.sh — create the authelia-secrets K8s Secret +# +# Usage: +# ./create-secrets.sh [secrets-dir] +# +# is the output directory from sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh +# (default: ../../bootstrap/secrets). +# +# Creates ONE Secret in the sso namespace: +# authelia-secrets — all Authelia sensitive values as named files: +# jwt_secret ← AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET_FILE +# session_secret ← AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET_FILE +# storage_encryption_key ← AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE +# ldap_password ← AUTHELIA_AUTHENTICATION_BACKEND_LDAP_PASSWORD_FILE +# oidc_hmac_secret ← AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_PROVIDERS_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET_FILE +# oidc_issuer_private_key ← AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_PROVIDERS_OIDC_ISSUER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE +# keycape_client_secret_hash ← AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_PROVIDERS_OIDC_CLIENTS_0_SECRET_FILE +# +# The keycape_client_secret_hash is the bcrypt hash of AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET +# from secrets/authelia/secrets.env. The plaintext is stored in KeyCape's secret. +# +# Requires: kubectl, openssl, python3 (for bcrypt hash generation) + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" authelia "$@" + +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +AUTHELIA_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/authelia/secrets.env" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" + +for f in "$AUTHELIA_ENV" "$LLDAP_ENV"; do + if [[ ! -f "$f" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $f not found" >&2 + echo "Run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 + fi +done + +read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } + +AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET) +AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET) +AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY) +AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET) +AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE) +AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET) +LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) + +# Validate required values +REQUIRED=(AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY + AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) +for var in "${REQUIRED[@]}"; do + if [[ -z "${!var}" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $var is empty — re-run gen-secrets.sh" >&2 + exit 1 + fi +done + +# The OIDC issuer private key is stored as a file path in secrets.env. +# Read the actual PEM content from the path referenced there. +AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE) +if [[ -z "$AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH" ]]; then + # Fall back: generate a new RSA key on the fly (dev only) + echo "WARN: AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE not set — generating a new RSA-2048 key." + echo " Store the generated key in KeePassXC as net-kingdom/Authelia/oidc-private-key." + TMP_KEY=$(mktemp) + openssl genrsa -out "$TMP_KEY" 2048 2>/dev/null + AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_CONTENT=$(cat "$TMP_KEY") + shred -u "$TMP_KEY" +elif [[ -f "$AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH" ]]; then + AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_CONTENT=$(cat "$AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH") +else + echo "ERROR: OIDC private key file not found: $AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Hash the Authelia-KeyCape client secret with bcrypt (cost 12). +# Authelia requires the bcrypt hash for OIDC client secrets. +echo "Hashing KeyCape client secret with bcrypt (this may take a moment)..." +if command -v python3 &>/dev/null && python3 -c "import bcrypt" 2>/dev/null; then + KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET_HASH=$(python3 -c " +import bcrypt, sys +pw = sys.argv[1].encode() +print(bcrypt.hashpw(pw, bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12)).decode()) +" "$AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET") +elif command -v htpasswd &>/dev/null; then + KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET_HASH=$(htpasswd -nbBC 12 "" "$AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET" | cut -d: -f2) +else + echo "ERROR: bcrypt hash generation requires python3+bcrypt or apache2-utils (htpasswd)" >&2 + echo " Install: pip3 install bcrypt OR apt install apache2-utils" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Creating K8s Secret: authelia-secrets (namespace: sso)" +kubectl create secret generic authelia-secrets \ + --namespace=sso \ + --from-literal=jwt_secret="$AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET" \ + --from-literal=session_secret="$AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET" \ + --from-literal=storage_encryption_key="$AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY" \ + --from-literal=ldap_password="$LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" \ + --from-literal=oidc_hmac_secret="$AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET" \ + --from-literal=oidc_issuer_private_key="$AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_CONTENT" \ + --from-literal=keycape_client_secret_hash="$KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET_HASH" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +echo "" +echo "Done. Secret authelia-secrets created in namespace: sso" +echo "" +echo "Next:" +echo " Apply deployment.yaml, then ingress.yaml." +echo " The plaintext Authelia-KeyCape client secret is in secrets/authelia/secrets.env" +echo " as AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET. This value goes into keycape/create-secrets.sh" +echo " as the authelia.clientSecret in the KeyCape config." diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/deployment.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/deployment.yaml index 7bfad83..2847789 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/deployment.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/deployment.yaml @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ spec: resources: requests: - cpu: "5m" - memory: "64Mi" + cpu: "50m" + memory: "128Mi" limits: cpu: "500m" memory: "256Mi" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md index b1d8225..432bdb0 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md @@ -1,10 +1,6 @@ # Disaster Recovery Runbook — net-kingdom SSO/MFA Platform -Procedure status: legacy examples were withdrawn in the 2026-10-15 custody -review. Use current owner procedures below. Historical exercise receipts do not -prove current recovery or independent custody. See the -[procedure inventory](../../../docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md) and -[NK-WP-0049 recovery ceremony](../../../docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md). +Exercise status: unknown for the procedures in this runbook; no per-procedure successful-run receipt with operator attribution was established in the 2026-09-05 review. See [procedure inventory](../../../docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md). **Stack:** LLDAP + Authelia + KeyCape (sso namespace) + privacyIDEA (mfa namespace) **PostgreSQL:** Managed separately by CNPG (`postgresql/scheduled-backup.yaml`) @@ -17,21 +13,34 @@ prove current recovery or independent custody. See the |----------|--------|----------| | Pod crash / OOM | Stateless pods (KeyCape) recover automatically. Stateful pods (LLDAP, Authelia, PI) restart and reload from PVC. | K8s self-heals. Verify with `verify-t05.sh`. | | PVC data corruption | Users/sessions/tokens lost. | Restore from SQLite backup (see below). | -| Node failure (single-node K3s) | All pods lost; PVC survival must be checked. | Owner-reviewed host/workload recovery with exact retained data and current declarations. | +| Node failure (single-node K3s) | All pods lost. PVCs intact on host. | Re-apply all manifests (idempotent). Pods re-attach to PVCs. | | Node total loss (disk gone) | Everything lost. | Full restore from backup + KeePassXC. | | Stack locked out (SSO broken, can't log in) | No user access to OIDC-protected apps. | Use break-glass account. | -| enckey lost (privacyIDEA) | Enrolled token secrets cannot be decrypted without the matching key. | Restore the original encryption/audit key set and prove native token/audit continuity; never auto-generate a substitute. | +| enckey lost (privacyIDEA) | All enrolled MFA tokens invalid. Users must re-enroll. | Restore from enckey backup or re-enroll all tokens. | --- -## Independent operator access +## Break-glass access -Confirm an existing provider console/rescue path and independently held custody -before any recovery change. An LLDAP account or `kubectl exec` depends on the -service or cluster being reachable; neither alone is independent recovery. -Preserve existing break-glass credentials. Use the IAM owner's approved procedure -and record actual login/MFA results, without passwords, tokens or OTP values. -Do not rerun the retired account/password helpers or disable MFA as a test. +When the SSO stack is broken and no user can authenticate: + +```bash +# 1. Access LLDAP admin UI directly (requires VPN / IP-allowlisted access) +# URL: https://lldap.coulomb.social +# Username: break-glass +# Password: from KeePassXC → net-kingdom/Break-glass/break-glass +# +# 2. Or access LLDAP via kubectl exec (no network required) +kubectl exec -n sso deployment/lldap -- /bin/sh +# Inside container: use ldapwhoami / ldapsearch to verify directory state + +# 3. Access privacyIDEA admin UI +# URL: https://pink.coulomb.social +# Username: pi-admin +# Password: from KeePassXC → net-kingdom/privacyIDEA/pi-admin +# NOTE: pi-admin has MFA enrolled — if privacyIDEA MFA is down, use: +kubectl exec -n mfa deployment/privacyidea -- pi-manage admin list +``` --- @@ -50,52 +59,141 @@ at startup: privacyIDEA needs PostgreSQL, KeyCape needs all three. --- -## SQLite recovery +## Restore from SQLite backup (PVC data corruption) -The former unpinned `sqlite3:latest` examples piped an in-pod dump into a local -shell's SQLite process; they were not a valid in-PVC restore procedure. Do not -run them. Under the exact owner-reviewed isolated ceremony, retrieve an identified -off-host database copy, verify its checksum and SQLite integrity in private -staging, stop only an explicitly approved target, and restore into its exact -pinned helper/PVC. Preserve the original files and their UIDs/ownership for -reconciliation. Restart and verify actual service behavior. Production restore -is a separate maintenance operation, not part of the local transport check. +### LLDAP -### privacyIDEA encryption and audit keys +```bash +# 1. Scale down LLDAP +kubectl scale deployment/lldap -n sso --replicas=0 -Use the [privacyIDEA key custody/PVC recovery procedure](../privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md). -The authoritative paths are on `privacyidea-data`, not a mounted Secret. Restore -all three files from the matching independent backup into that PVC with the app -stopped, then perform native database/token/audit acceptance. The DR Secret field -is `enckey`; `PI_ENCFILE` names the application config setting and historic safe -entry. The previous Secret-only restart instructions are withdrawn. Never generate -a fresh encryption key as an automatic response to a missing recovery key. +# 2. Start a restore pod on the lldap-data PVC +kubectl run -n sso lldap-restore --image=nouchka/sqlite3:latest \ + --restart=Never \ + --overrides='{"spec":{"volumes":[{"name":"data","persistentVolumeClaim":{"claimName":"lldap-data"}}],"containers":[{"name":"lldap-restore","image":"nouchka/sqlite3:latest","command":["sleep","3600"],"volumeMounts":[{"name":"data","mountPath":"/data"}]}]}}' + +# 3. Copy backup file into the pod (or it's already on the PVC under /data/backups/) +kubectl exec -n sso lldap-restore -- ls /data/backups/ + +# 4. Restore from the chosen backup +kubectl exec -n sso lldap-restore -- \ + sqlite3 /data/backups/users.backup.YYYY-MM-DD ".dump" | \ + sqlite3 /data/users.db + +# 5. Clean up and restart +kubectl delete pod -n sso lldap-restore +kubectl scale deployment/lldap -n sso --replicas=1 +kubectl rollout status deployment/lldap -n sso --timeout=120s +``` + +### Authelia + +```bash +# On single-node k3s (local-path PVCs are hostPath-backed), a restore pod can mount +# authelia-data alongside the running Authelia pod. Scale down only if you need to +# replace the live db.sqlite3 in-place (Authelia must be stopped to avoid corruption). +kubectl scale deployment/authelia -n sso --replicas=0 +kubectl run -n sso authelia-restore --image=nouchka/sqlite3:latest \ + --restart=Never \ + --overrides='{"spec":{"volumes":[{"name":"data","persistentVolumeClaim":{"claimName":"authelia-data"}}],"containers":[{"name":"authelia-restore","image":"nouchka/sqlite3:latest","command":["sleep","3600"],"volumeMounts":[{"name":"data","mountPath":"/data"}]}]}}' +kubectl exec -n sso authelia-restore -- ls /data/backups/ +kubectl exec -n sso authelia-restore -- \ + sqlite3 /data/backups/authelia.backup.YYYY-MM-DD ".dump" | \ + sqlite3 /data/db.sqlite3 +kubectl delete pod -n sso authelia-restore +kubectl scale deployment/authelia -n sso --replicas=1 +kubectl rollout status deployment/authelia -n sso --timeout=120s +``` + +### privacyIDEA enckey + +```bash +# If the enckey is lost, restore it from KeePassXC binary attachment PI_ENCFILE. +# Extract it to a local file first, then: +kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-enckey \ + --from-file=PI_ENCFILE=./pi.enc \ + --namespace mfa \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +# Restart privacyIDEA to pick up the restored key +kubectl rollout restart deployment/privacyidea -n mfa + +# If the enckey is truly lost and unrecoverable: +# All enrolled MFA tokens are invalid. +# Generate a new enckey with: kubectl exec -n mfa ... -- pi-manage create_enckey +# All users must re-enroll their TOTP/hardware tokens. +``` --- ## Full node restore (new host) -Prepare with the Railiance infrastructure, database and IAM owners. Obtain an -exact target inventory, immutable recovery images independent of the failed -registry, matching off-host database/key/config snapshots and retained original -state. Follow current owner deployment declarations, restore order above and -[privacyIDEA key recovery](../privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md). Do not recursively -apply this historical tree or use fresh generated values in place of matching -recovery material. KeyCape's clients, issuer/signing keys and scoped factor -reader delivery must be preserved. Current package boundaries are recorded in -[the deployment guide](../README.md). +```bash +# Prerequisites on new host: +# - K3s installed +# - Traefik ingress (bundled with K3s) +# - cert-manager installed (helm install cert-manager ...) +# - DNS records pointing to new node IP +# - KeePassXC vault accessible (offline copy or age-encrypted bundle) -The whole-node restart proof and historical migration restore are supporting -receipts with their own scope; neither proves a fresh full identity restore. +# 1. Restore PostgreSQL from CNPG backup +# (See CNPG documentation for cluster restore from barmanObjectStore) + +# 2. Re-apply all manifests in order +cd sso-mfa/k8s +kubectl apply -f namespaces/namespaces.yaml +kubectl apply -f network-policies/ +kubectl apply -f cert-manager/issuers.yaml + +# 3. Restore secrets from KeePassXC +# Run each create-secrets.sh in order: +cd postgresql && ./create-secrets.sh && cd .. +cd privacyidea && ./create-secrets.sh && cd .. +cd lldap && ./create-secrets.sh && cd .. +cd authelia && ./create-secrets.sh && cd .. +cd keycape && ./create-secrets.sh && cd .. + +# 4. Apply workloads in restore order +kubectl apply -f postgresql/cluster.yaml +kubectl apply -f privacyidea/{pvc.yaml,configmap.yaml,deployment.yaml,middleware.yaml,ingress.yaml} +kubectl apply -f lldap/{pvc.yaml,deployment.yaml,middleware.yaml,ingress.yaml} +kubectl apply -f authelia/{pvc.yaml,configmap.yaml,deployment.yaml,ingress.yaml} +kubectl apply -f keycape/{deployment.yaml,middleware.yaml,ingress.yaml} + +# 5. Wait for everything to be Ready +kubectl rollout status deployment/privacyidea -n mfa --timeout=300s +kubectl rollout status deployment/lldap -n sso --timeout=120s +kubectl rollout status deployment/authelia -n sso --timeout=120s +kubectl rollout status deployment/keycape -n sso --timeout=60s + +# 6. Re-run bootstrap scripts if PVC data was lost +cd privacyidea && ./enckey-bootstrap.sh && ./bootstrap-admin.sh && ./bootstrap-realm.sh +cd ../lldap && ./bootstrap-users.sh && ./break-glass.sh +cd ../keycape && ./create-pi-token.sh && ./create-secrets.sh +kubectl rollout restart deployment/keycape -n sso + +# 7. Verify +./verify-t04.sh && ./verify-t05.sh && ./verify-t06.sh --user platform-root && ./verify-t07.sh && ./verify-t08.sh +``` + +--- ## Backup offsite export -Use the existing Platform/backup owner's reviewed encrypted transport with the -registered public recipient. No private age key is needed to encrypt. The former -example read a permanent HOME key just to find its public recipient, wrote -plaintext databases into predictable `/tmp` paths, and encrypted only one of its -two exports; it is withdrawn. Verify actual transfer and retrieval for every -required asset, preserve prior good points and independently held key custody. -Scaleway and Storage Share provider presence alone does not establish coverage -of LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA keys/database, KeyCape configuration or a current -bootstrap bundle. Do not use an upload-only share as a retrieval credential. +The SQLite backup files land on the PVCs but are not offsite until exported. +Run this on the node host to pull them out and encrypt for offsite storage: + +```bash +# Pull backup files from pods +kubectl exec -n sso deployment/lldap -- \ + cat /data/backups/users.backup.$(date +%Y-%m-%d) > /tmp/lldap-backup.db +kubectl exec -n sso deployment/authelia -- \ + cat /data/backups/authelia.backup.$(date +%Y-%m-%d) > /tmp/authelia-backup.db + +# Encrypt with age and send offsite (same key as the ops bundle) +age -r "$(cat ~/net-kingdom-ops-bundle.key | grep 'public key' | awk '{print $NF}')" \ + -o /tmp/lldap-backup.db.age /tmp/lldap-backup.db + +# Shred plaintext copies +shred -u /tmp/lldap-backup.db /tmp/authelia-backup.db +``` diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/T10-LANES-RUNBOOK.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/T10-LANES-RUNBOOK.md deleted file mode 100644 index 2c18a47..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/T10-LANES-RUNBOOK.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -# T10 runbook: executor standing objects and OpenBao lanes (founder-run) - -NK-WP-0056-T10. Three steps, about 15 minutes. Nothing here starts a Job or touches the svc-authelia value. The -bind write role (CCR-2026-0058) is **not** created: it exists only inside an admitted window. - -| Step | Where | What changes | -| --- | --- | --- | -| 1 | `~/rapp-bounded-executor` | creates ServiceAccount `nk-bind-executor`, its Role and RoleBinding, and NetworkPolicy `bounded-executor` in `sso` | -| 2 | `~/railiance-platform` | records `binding_confirmed` in CCR-2026-0058 and CCR-2026-0059 | -| 3 | `~/net-kingdom` | OpenBao: both policies, `cas_required` on the svc-authelia key, the standing journey-read role, and proof | - -## 1. Standing objects (rapp) - -```bash -cd ~/rapp-bounded-executor && git pull --ff-only -K="kubectl --kubeconfig $HOME/.kube/config-railiance01" -make server-dry-run KUBECTL="$K" # 4 objects "serverside-applied (server dry run)" -make deploy KUBECTL="$K" # the same 4 objects, without "(server dry run)" -make verify-live KUBECTL="$K" # {"role_matches_ceiling": true, "standing_objects_present": true, ...} -``` - -The pod runs nothing yet: no Job exists until `make run` under an admission. - -## 2. Confirm the binding (railiance-platform) - -The CCRs bind `service_account_names: [nk-bind-executor]` in `sso`, audience `openbao`. Confirm that this -ServiceAccount now exists, as declared: - -```bash -cd ~/railiance-platform && git pull --ff-only -UID_SA=$($K -n sso get serviceaccount nk-bind-executor -o jsonpath='{.metadata.uid}'); echo "$UID_SA" -for C in CCR-2026-0058 CCR-2026-0059; do - scripts/credential-change.py confirm-binding "$C" --reviewer platform-owner --comment \ - "Binding confirmed: ServiceAccount nk-bind-executor in namespace sso only (uid $UID_SA), audience openbao, from rapp-bounded-executor." -done -git status --short # exactly the two CCR files modified -``` - -## 3. OpenBao lanes (attended platform-admin) - -```bash -cd ~/net-kingdom && git pull --ff-only -bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=platform-admin # MFA; the tool fails closed without it -W=$(sha256sum ~/railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0058-*.yaml | cut -d' ' -f1) -J=$(sha256sum ~/railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0059-*.yaml | cut -d' ' -f1) -E=docs/evidence/$(date +%F)-nk56-t10-executor-lanes; mkdir -p "$E" - -python3 tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py setup --write-ccr-sha256 "$W" --journey-ccr-sha256 "$J" \ - --receipt "$E/01-setup.json" # {"status": "lanes_prepared", "phase": "done"} -python3 tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py verify --write-ccr-sha256 "$W" --journey-ccr-sha256 "$J" \ - --kubeconfig "$HOME/.kube/config-railiance01" --receipt "$E/02-verify.json" # {"status": "lanes_verified", ...} -``` - -`setup` is idempotent: it creates what is missing and refuses on any drift. It never changes the coding-agent fence, -because CCR-2026-0053 and CCR-2026-0057 established it; it only proves the fence. Receipts hold no values. `verify` -reads the journey entry into memory only to check its field names. - -If a step stops, the receipt's `phase` and `reason` say where: - -| `reason` | Meaning, next step | -| --- | --- | -| `write:ccr_digest` / `journey:ccr_digest` | the CCR changed after `W`/`J` were computed; compute them again | -| `*:binding_unconfirmed` | step 2 not done (or not saved) | -| `attended_platform_admin_required` | no `bao login` as platform-admin, or a root token | -| `agent_fence_missing` | the boundary policy lacks a deny line for one of the two paths; stop and hand to claude-code | -| `command_failed` in phase `cas_required` | platform-admin may not patch KV metadata; hand to claude-code | -| `write_role_exists_outside_a_window` | someone created the window-scoped write role; delete it, or stop | -| `*:policy_drift` | a policy of that name exists with other text; stop | -| `negative_login_accepted` / `journey_capabilities` | the role is wider than approved; delete the journey role and stop | - -## 4. Afterwards - -Tell claude-code. It commits the two CCRs and the receipts, moves CCR-2026-0059 on, and records T10 progress. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index f17108d..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -# Bounded executor identity in sso (NK-WP-0056-T03). PREPARED IN SOURCE, NOT APPLIED. -# -# The ServiceAccount the executor runs as, with exactly the pilot's Kubernetes authority (T06: rotate the -# svc-authelia bind): force-sync one ExternalSecret and restart one Deployment. No Secret, ConfigMap or Pod -# access, no create/delete, no wildcard, no cluster scope. Its OpenBao and LLDAP credentials are declared in -# tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml; all of it acts only under a consumed admission -# (canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md). Packaging and apply belong to rapp-bounded-executor -# (ADR-0015, founder decision 6d1adce9). Tests: sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_rbac.py. -apiVersion: v1 -kind: ServiceAccount -metadata: - name: nk-bind-executor - namespace: sso - labels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: bounded-executor - app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa -automountServiceAccountToken: false # the executor pod mounts a projected, audience-bound token instead ---- -apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 -kind: Role -metadata: - name: nk-bind-executor - namespace: sso - labels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: bounded-executor -rules: - # restart: kubectl rollout restart patches the pod template annotation; rollout status reads and watches - - apiGroups: ["apps"] - resources: ["deployments"] - resourceNames: ["authelia"] - verbs: ["get", "watch", "patch"] - # deliver: force-sync annotation, then read status (Ready, refreshTime) as the check; never the Secret - - apiGroups: ["external-secrets.io"] - resources: ["externalsecrets"] - resourceNames: ["authelia-secrets"] - verbs: ["get", "patch"] ---- -apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 -kind: RoleBinding -metadata: - name: nk-bind-executor - namespace: sso - labels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: bounded-executor -roleRef: - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io - kind: Role - name: nk-bind-executor -subjects: - - kind: ServiceAccount - name: nk-bind-executor - namespace: sso diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_netpol.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_netpol.py deleted file mode 100644 index 72a3a9d..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_netpol.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -"""The sso namespace admits the bounded executor exactly where its pilot steps go (NK-WP-0056). No cluster.""" - -import pathlib -import unittest - -import yaml - -NETPOL = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "network-policies" / "netpol-sso.yaml" -EXECUTOR = {"app.kubernetes.io/name": "bounded-executor"} -EXPECTED = {("lldap", 17170), ("keycape", 8080), ("authelia", 9091)} - - -def policies(): - return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(NETPOL.read_text()) if d] - - -def executor_ingress(): - for pol in policies(): - for rule in pol["spec"].get("ingress", []): - if any(peer.get("podSelector", {}).get("matchLabels") == EXECUTOR for peer in rule["from"]): - yield pol, rule - - -class ExecutorIngress(unittest.TestCase): - def test_exactly_the_pilot_paths(self): # in particular never LDAP :3890 - found = set() - for pol, rule in executor_ingress(): - target = pol["spec"]["podSelector"]["matchLabels"]["app.kubernetes.io/name"] - found |= {(target, p["port"]) for p in rule["ports"]} - self.assertEqual(found, EXPECTED) - - def test_peers_are_in_namespace_executor_pods_only(self): - for pol, rule in executor_ingress(): - self.assertEqual(pol["metadata"]["namespace"], "sso") - self.assertEqual(pol["spec"]["policyTypes"], ["Ingress"]) - for peer in rule["from"]: - self.assertEqual(peer, {"podSelector": {"matchLabels": EXECUTOR}}) - - def test_default_deny_is_kept(self): - deny = [p for p in policies() if p["metadata"]["name"] == "default-deny-all"] - self.assertEqual(deny[0]["spec"], {"podSelector": {}, "policyTypes": ["Ingress", "Egress"]}) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_rbac.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_rbac.py deleted file mode 100644 index 64a3e78..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/test_rbac.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -"""The bounded executor's Kubernetes authority is exactly the pilot's (NK-WP-0056-T03). Source only, no cluster.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import pathlib -import unittest - -import yaml - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -ROOT = HERE.parents[2] -DOCS = list(yaml.safe_load_all((HERE / "rbac.yaml").read_text())) -DECLARATION = yaml.safe_load((ROOT / "tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml").read_text()) -PILOT = yaml.safe_load((ROOT / "examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml").read_text()) -KIND_SCOPE = {("apps", "deployments"): "deployment", ("external-secrets.io", "externalsecrets"): "externalsecret"} -FORBIDDEN_RESOURCES = {"secrets", "configmaps", "pods", "pods/exec", "pods/log", "serviceaccounts", "serviceaccounts/token", - "roles", "rolebindings", "clusterroles", "clusterrolebindings", "*"} - - -def by_kind(kind): - return [d for d in DOCS if d["kind"] == kind] - - -def role_scopes(): - (role,) = by_kind("Role") - return {f"k8s/sso/{KIND_SCOPE[(group, resource)]}/{name}" - for rule in role["rules"] for group in rule["apiGroups"] for resource in rule["resources"] - for name in rule["resourceNames"]} - - -class RbacTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_only_namespaced_objects_in_sso(self): - self.assertEqual(sorted(d["kind"] for d in DOCS), ["Role", "RoleBinding", "ServiceAccount"]) - self.assertTrue(all(d["metadata"]["namespace"] == "sso" for d in DOCS)) - - def test_service_account_does_not_automount(self): - (sa,) = by_kind("ServiceAccount") - self.assertEqual(sa["metadata"]["name"], "nk-bind-executor") - self.assertIs(sa["automountServiceAccountToken"], False) - - def test_every_rule_is_named_and_narrow(self): - (role,) = by_kind("Role") - for rule in role["rules"]: - with self.subTest(rule=rule["resources"]): - self.assertTrue(rule.get("resourceNames"), "every rule names its objects") - for field in ("apiGroups", "resources", "verbs", "resourceNames"): - self.assertNotIn("*", rule[field]) - self.assertLessEqual(set(rule["verbs"]), {"get", "watch", "patch"}) - self.assertFalse(set(rule["resources"]) & FORBIDDEN_RESOURCES) - self.assertTrue(set(rule["resources"]) <= {r for _, r in KIND_SCOPE}) - - def test_binding_binds_only_the_executor(self): - (binding,) = by_kind("RoleBinding") - self.assertEqual(binding["roleRef"], {"apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io", "kind": "Role", "name": "nk-bind-executor"}) - self.assertEqual(binding["subjects"], [{"kind": "ServiceAccount", "name": "nk-bind-executor", "namespace": "sso"}]) - - def test_role_equals_declaration_equals_pilot_ceiling(self): - (sa_identity,) = [i for i in DECLARATION["identities"] if i["name"] == "nk-bind-executor"] - declared = {g["scope"] for g in sa_identity["grants"]} - ceiling = {g["scope"] for g in PILOT["spec"]["scope_ceiling"] if g["scope"].startswith("k8s/")} - self.assertEqual(role_scopes(), declared) - self.assertEqual(declared, ceiling) - self.assertEqual(PILOT["spec"]["executor"]["identity"], sa_identity["executor_subject"]) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/bind-eso.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/bind-eso.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index b085745..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/bind-eso.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04 pilot, railiance-platform CCR-2026-0052. -# Projects only the svc-provisioner bind password from platform custody into the -# existing Secret sso/identity-provisioner-ldap (created by apply-service-secrets.py). -# Merge keeps the Secret's username key and ownership; Retain leaves the working -# Secret in place if this ExternalSecret is removed. -# Apply only after `tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py setup` reports equal custody. ---- -apiVersion: v1 -kind: ServiceAccount -metadata: - name: net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso - namespace: sso -automountServiceAccountToken: false ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: SecretStore -metadata: - name: net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind - namespace: sso -spec: - provider: - vault: - server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200 - path: platform - version: v2 - auth: - kubernetes: - mountPath: kubernetes - role: net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso - serviceAccountRef: - name: net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso - audiences: [openbao] ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: ExternalSecret -metadata: - name: identity-provisioner-ldap - namespace: sso -spec: - refreshInterval: 1h - secretStoreRef: - kind: SecretStore - name: net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind - target: - # Explicit target metadata stops ESO copying this object's kubectl - # last-applied annotation onto the Secret (refused by reject-secret-last-applied). - template: - metadata: {} - name: identity-provisioner-ldap - creationPolicy: Merge - deletionPolicy: Retain - data: - - secretKey: password - remoteRef: - key: workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-provisioner - property: LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/create-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/create-secrets.sh deleted file mode 100644 index 3ec81ff..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/create-secrets.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Private creation or exact-match verification; rotations require --rotate-key. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" identity-provisioner "$@" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml index 131bc72..188d432 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml @@ -24,18 +24,14 @@ spec: seccompProfile: {type: RuntimeDefault} containers: - name: provisioner - image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:6d1f3632221e6f9d3f5ea41fea1c7e143033f34d2f8777a29af967cfbc9e4199 + image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:ffacd5d790a5b7800e0535f3aa95b7de52c7a68e4f575b9192c3e1622fa672c2 imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent ports: [{name: http, containerPort: 8080}] env: - {name: LLDAP_URL, value: "http://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:17170"} - # Own directory account svc-provisioner (lldap_admin, exception SI-X6), not the human admin. - - name: LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME - valueFrom: - secretKeyRef: {name: identity-provisioner-ldap, key: username} - name: LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD valueFrom: - secretKeyRef: {name: identity-provisioner-ldap, key: password} + secretKeyRef: {name: lldap-secrets, key: LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS} - name: PROVISIONER_SERVICE_TOKEN valueFrom: secretKeyRef: {name: identity-provisioner-token, key: token} @@ -49,7 +45,7 @@ spec: capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]} readOnlyRootFilesystem: true resources: - requests: {cpu: 5m, memory: 32Mi} + requests: {cpu: 25m, memory: 32Mi} limits: {cpu: 250m, memory: 128Mi} readinessProbe: httpGet: {path: /readyz, port: http} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md index 52ebb4c..d9a9795 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/README.md @@ -64,52 +64,68 @@ After building, update `deployment.yaml` line: image: keycape:v0.1 # replace with your actual tag ``` -## First-bootstrap creation and factor custody +## Apply order -KeyCape uses the scoped `keycape-factor-reader` provider identity. Railiance -Platform RPF-WP-0040 owns its renewable credential, the `keycape-factor-read` -ExternalSecret, and the mounted `/etc/keycape-factor/admin-token` file. See the -[owner custody contract](../../../../railiance-platform/docs/net-kingdom-credential-custody-contract.md). -Neither a personal pi-admin JWT nor a local `pi_admin_token` file belongs in -KeyCape configuration. `create-pi-token.sh` and `refresh-pi-token-live.sh` are -retired refusal entry points; they perform no login or changes. +```bash +# 1. Create Secrets (config.yaml + key.pem) +# Run this AFTER T04 bootstrap if you want the privacyIDEA token included. +# If T04 is not yet done, run it now and re-run after create-pi-token.sh. +cd sso-mfa/k8s/keycape +chmod +x create-secrets.sh create-pi-token.sh +bash ./create-secrets.sh -Under an approved first-bootstrap procedure, establish owner factor delivery -before running `bash sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh /absolute/private/secrets`. -The helper requires Python 3 with PyYAML, OpenSSL and kubectl; owned private -directories/files; literal generator-format LLDAP and Authelia credentials; -Ready factor delivery; and an absent -`keycape-config`. It preserves an existing valid private RSA key or atomically -creates a missing one. It sends Secret data only over kubectl stdin, suppresses -child output, and uses API creation without a last-applied annotation. Existing -configuration is refused; concurrent creation cannot overwrite it. A failed API -call can have an unknown remote outcome: reconcile metadata before retrying. -Retain any newly generated private key for recovery, including after a failure. +# 2. Apply manifests +kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml +kubectl apply -f middleware.yaml +kubectl apply -f ingress.yaml -The helper does not restart workloads or establish native login acceptance. -Deployment and fresh factor/login checks belong to the reviewed bootstrap or -recovery ceremony. Do not use it to restore an existing installation: preserve -its current clients, policy, signing key and independently held backup. +# 3. Wait for pod to be ready +kubectl rollout status deployment/keycape -n sso --timeout=60s +``` -## Factor credential renewal and recovery +## Post-deploy: inject privacyIDEA admin token -For expired factor credentials or `mfa check error`, use the owner renewal and -recovery procedure in the custody contract: inspect the renewer and ESO status, -repair the underlying provider/custody failure, then verify mounted delivery and -native factor acceptance. A fresh credential is not predecessor revocation. -Never restore the retired personal-admin-token path, change realm/MFA policy as -part of a token refresh, or replace the full KeyCape configuration. +If T04 was not complete when you ran `create-secrets.sh`, the privacyIDEA admin +token is a placeholder. After T04 bootstrap is done: + +```bash +# 1. Fetch the token from privacyIDEA and store it +chmod +x create-pi-token.sh +./create-pi-token.sh + +# 2. Re-run create-secrets.sh to update keycape-config with the real token +bash ./create-secrets.sh + +# 3. Restart KeyCape to pick up the new Secret +kubectl rollout restart deployment/keycape -n sso +``` + +If the browser flow reaches the KeyCape OTP screen and then reports +`mfa check error`, refresh the live privacyIDEA token without printing it: + +```bash +cd sso-mfa/k8s/keycape +KEYCAPE_PI_REALM=coulomb KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" \ + bash ./refresh-pi-token-live.sh platform-root +``` + +The helper prompts for the `pi-admin` password, writes the token only into +Kubernetes Secrets, and restarts KeyCape. The current live privacyIDEA realm is +`coulomb`; use `KEYCAPE_PI_REALM=netkingdom` only for an explicit future realm +migration. The helper also restores `privacyidea.requireForAll: true`, which +keeps KeyCape from using the admin token-list API as the MFA-required check. ## OIDC client registration -`bootstrap-config.json` is the initial configuration only. The helper fills its -empty LLDAP/Authelia credential fields in memory and serializes ordinary YAML -for KeyCape and the scoped configuration update tools. Its registrations are not -a complete inventory of current clients. -Live client changes require a scoped owner procedure that preserves the rest of -the configuration and verifies the affected consumer. The legacy client-secret -and RSA replacement rotations refuse before mutation; coordinated rotation, -rollback custody and native multi-consumer acceptance remain NK-WP-0049-T02 work. +Downstream applications are registered in the `clients:` block in +`keycape/create-secrets.sh`. The NetKingdom bootstrap console and Railiance +OpenBao admin clients are code-defined there; operators should not create +those clients manually in a separate UI. After changing the block: + +```bash +bash ./create-secrets.sh # regenerates keycape-config Secret +kubectl rollout restart deployment/keycape -n sso +``` The `openbao-admin` client is intentionally a public PKCE client for the current operator flow. It registers the OpenBao CLI callback URIs and the @@ -123,9 +139,8 @@ http://127.0.0.1:18200/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback The browser UI callback is paired with the named Railiance Platform operator tunnel at `http://127.0.0.1:18200`. The public `bao.coulomb.social` callbacks -were retired with that name on 2026-09-15; `openbao-client-config.py` enforces -the retired-callback restriction. `verify-t07.sh` now checks LDAP structure only -and cannot prove client registration. The preferred browser auth +were retired with that name on 2026-09-15; `openbao-client-config.py` and +`verify-t07.sh` fail if either is registered again. The preferred browser auth mount is `netkingdom`; `keycape` remains a compatibility alias. Keep the CLI callbacks unless there is a separate decision to retire CLI login. @@ -135,8 +150,7 @@ existing live `keycape-config` Secret in place: ```bash cd sso-mfa/k8s/keycape -# Legacy patch-openbao-client.sh is retired; use the owner-reviewed -# KeyCape registration/rollout adapter with exact revision and object guards. +bash ./patch-openbao-client.sh kubectl rollout restart deployment/keycape -n sso kubectl rollout status deployment/keycape -n sso --timeout=60s bash ./verify-openbao-client.sh @@ -151,9 +165,7 @@ After the live KeyCape client is present, configure Railiance OpenBao to trust KeyCape: ```bash -# Legacy configure-openbao-oidc.sh is retired. -# Prepare the exact railiance-platform-owned change and run its governed admin operation -# through warden access openbao-platform-admin-login; do not supply a root token here. +bash ./configure-openbao-oidc.sh ``` That script enables and configures the OpenBao `netkingdom` and compatibility @@ -229,27 +241,13 @@ and denial checks (KEY-WP-0037-T04). Rollback reverses it: `--operation remove`, restart, then drop the env binding. The image pin for that rollout is not yet chosen; see NK-WP-0046. -### Other registry helpers - -- `authentication-policy-rollout.py` is for initial activation only. It migrates - the two reviewed baseline registrations and is kept for a greenfield or - recovery rebuild of the issuer. Later policy changes use the authenticated - policy journey. -- `create-secrets.py` creates the first-bootstrap config from private inputs. - It never replaces an existing Secret, mints a provider token or rotates a - signing key. Greenfield only. -- `openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py` adds `signInDiagnosis: true` to the - existing `openbao-admin` registration (NK-WP-0051-T02, KEY-WP-0041-T02). -- `restart-readiness.py` is a source candidate for a bounded post-registration - restart and readiness check (NK-WP-0048-T12). It is not wired in yet. - ## Secrets managed | Secret name | Keys | Purpose | |-------------|------|---------| -| `keycape-config` | `config.yaml` | KeyCape configuration (LLDAP credentials, Authelia client secret, privacyIDEA URL + scoped credential-file reference, OIDC clients) | +| `keycape-config` | `config.yaml` | Full KeyCape configuration (LLDAP URL + creds, Authelia URL + client secret, privacyIDEA URL + admin token, OIDC clients) | | | `key.pem` | RSA-2048 private key for signing OIDC tokens issued to downstream applications | -| `keycape-factor-read` | `admin-token` | Scoped provider JWT delivered by owner-managed ESO; mounted and reloaded by KeyCape | +| `keycape-pi-token` | `pi_admin_token` | privacyIDEA admin JWT — created by `create-pi-token.sh`, referenced in `config.yaml` | Store `key.pem` in KeePassXC as a binary attachment. If it is lost, all active sessions become invalid (tokens cannot be verified) and all applications must diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-env-adapter.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-env-adapter.md deleted file mode 100644 index 30ea7cd..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-env-adapter.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -# Bind-env adapter source candidate (NK-WP-0048-T27) - -Status: **unexercised source candidate**. Not reviewed, pinned, admitted or run. - -`bind-env-adapter.py` adds one `env` entry to the `keycape` container of the -`sso/keycape` Deployment, binding the helper-derived name -(`KEYCAPE__CLIENT_SECRET`) to `valueFrom.secretKeyRef` on the delivered -secret reference (`keycape--client`, key `client-secret`). It handles -references only: a binding carrying `value`, or an existing entry of that name -bound to anything else (including a literal), is refused. - -- Case parsing reuses `keycape-client.py` (`client_from_case`, `env_binding`), so - canonical `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1` stays the default; public clients - and `allow_unimplemented` are refused. -- `read`/`write` are injected capabilities; `write` is compare-and-swap on the - observed `resourceVersion`. No kubectl, credential or secret value is used. -- `build(...)` returns a closed Warden v1 `Adapter` (T13 pattern). It pins the - owner source digest over the full local import closure (`bind-env-adapter.py`, - `keycape-client.py`, `portal-client-rollout.py`, `openbao-client-config.py`, - `register-user-engine-portal.py` — closure checked by - `test_adapter_source_closure.py`), the - descriptor digest (`Pins.adapter`), case source and acceptance digests, and the - admitted invocation (step `bind-env`, actor `human`, lane `keycape-attended-case-change`, - created object `keycape-env-binding`, not retry-safe, `parent-session` scope). - Every attempt is rebound to that invocation and re-checks source drift. -- `publish`, `authenticate` and `revoke_session` are mandatory injected - capabilities. The parent session is revoked in `finally`, also on refusal; a - missing revocation or invalid/reused evidence identifier is never success. - Evidence payload is closed metadata (`netkingdom.keycape-bind-env.attempt.v1`: - invocation, source, outcome, env name, before/after revision) with no values. -- An identical existing binding is `no-change` and is not rollbackable. -- Rollback removes only the entry this process created, whose evidence still - authenticates (a fresh process has no creation authority), and only while the - Deployment is still at the revision that creation produced; otherwise owner - reconciliation is required. - -Tests: `PYTHONPATH=~/ops-warden/src ~/ops-warden/.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q -test_bind_env_adapter.py` (synthetic only). - -Not supplied: kernel-level admission/dispatch tests with fixture trust (as in T13), -owner confirmation of the proposed step/lane/schema/object names, NetKingdom -runtime owner source review before pinning, the real owner evidence and -revocation capabilities, and any native action. Those remain separate gates. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-env-adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-env-adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 53d4792..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-env-adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,221 +0,0 @@ -"""Unexercised, injection-only bind-env seam for Warden's v1 kernel (NK-WP-0048-T27). - -Given an admitted oidc-browser-relying-party case (canonical 1.1 by default via the -maintained helper), add exactly one `env` entry to the `keycape` container of the -issuer Deployment: name from the helper, valueFrom.secretKeyRef to the delivered -secret *reference*. No CLI, kubectl, credential, or value handling lives here; -read/write are injected capabilities with compare-and-swap on resourceVersion. -Only an entry this process created, authenticated and still byte-identical, may -be rolled back. Owner publication/authentication and parent-session revocation -are mandatory injected capabilities; no evidence trust root is installed here. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import copy -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, contained_output, digest, IDENTIFIER -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REFERENCE = 'net-kingdom/keycape-bind-env@v1' -# keycape-client.py loads portal-client-rollout.py at import, which loads -# openbao-client-config.py and register-user-engine-portal.py; all of them run. -SOURCE_FILES = ('bind-env-adapter.py', 'keycape-client.py', - 'portal-client-rollout.py', 'openbao-client-config.py', - 'register-user-engine-portal.py') -CREATED = 'keycape-env-binding' -_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('bind_env_owner_helper', ROOT / 'keycape-client.py') -helper = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec) -_spec.loader.exec_module(helper) - - -def _container(deployment): - if (deployment.get('kind') != 'Deployment' - or deployment.get('metadata', {}).get('name') != 'keycape' - or deployment.get('metadata', {}).get('namespace') != 'sso'): - raise Refused('issuer deployment sso/keycape required') - found = [c for c in deployment['spec']['template']['spec'].get('containers', []) - if c.get('name') == 'keycape'] - if len(found) != 1: - raise Refused('exactly one keycape container required') - return found[0] - - -def binding_for_case(case, *, allow_unimplemented=False): - if allow_unimplemented: - raise Refused('allow-unimplemented admission is not supported') - client = helper.client_from_case(case) - if client.get('clientType') != 'confidential': - raise Refused('public client has no secret reference to bind') - return helper.env_binding(client) - - -def _check_reference_only(entry): - if 'value' in entry or set(entry) != {'name', 'valueFrom'} or set(entry['valueFrom']) != {'secretKeyRef'}: - raise Refused('reference-only env binding required') - - -def plan(deployment, binding): - """Return (new_deployment, created). Never reads or emits a secret value.""" - _check_reference_only(binding) - new = copy.deepcopy(deployment) - env = _container(new).setdefault('env', []) - same = [e for e in env if e.get('name') == binding['name']] - if len(same) > 1: - raise Refused('duplicate env name present') - if same: - if same[0] != binding: - raise Refused('env name already bound to a different source') - return new, False - env.append(copy.deepcopy(binding)) - return new, True - - -def source_digest(): - """Pin adapter plus the complete local helper import closure, in filename order.""" - composition = {'files': {name: digest((ROOT / name).read_bytes()) for name in SOURCE_FILES}} - return digest(json.dumps(composition, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def descriptor(): - return Descriptor('warden.case.execution.v1', 'bind-env', 'net-kingdom', REFERENCE, - source_digest(), 'human', 'keycape-attended-case-change', 'client_id', 'change', - (CREATED,), False, ('parent-session',)) - - -def build(*, admitted: Invocation, case_source: bytes, expected_resource_version: str, - case_acceptance: str, read, write, publish, authenticate, revoke_session, - allow_unimplemented=False): - """Bind one admitted case and observed revision; return a closed kernel Adapter. - - read()->deployment dict; write(deployment, expected_rv)->new rv (CAS, raises - on conflict). publish(bytes)->identifier retains only the closed metadata - payload; authenticate(identifier, bytes)->True verifies owner custody; - revoke_session(invocation)->identifier revokes this attempt's parent session. - Process loss, readback ambiguity and publication/revocation failure require - owner reconciliation; none are converted to retry-safe failures. - """ - reviewed_source = source_digest() - desc = descriptor() - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(value, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(value) - for value in (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, - admitted.actor, admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - if (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != ( - desc.step, desc.owner, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('bind-env invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - # Pins.adapter is the descriptor digest, not the owner source digest. - descriptor_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(descriptor_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - if not all(isinstance(x, str) and 0 < len(x) <= 192 - for x in (expected_resource_version, case_acceptance)): - raise Refused('observed resourceVersion and acceptance required') - if digest(case_acceptance.encode()) != admitted.pins.acceptance: - raise Refused('acceptance evidence binding differs') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (read, write, publish, authenticate, revoke_session)): - raise Refused('read/write, owner evidence and revocation capabilities required') - with contained_output(): - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - client = helper.client_from_case(case) - binding = binding_for_case(case, allow_unimplemented=allow_unimplemented) - if admitted.target != client['clientId']: - raise Refused('case target differs') - records = {} - creation = None - - def bound(inv, operation): - if (type(inv) is not Invocation - or replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != operation or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest() != reviewed_source: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - - def add(): - current = read() - before = current['metadata'].get('resourceVersion') - if before != expected_resource_version: - raise Refused('deployment revision differs from observed') - new, created = plan(current, binding) - if not created: - return Outcome.NO_CHANGE, (), before, before - after = write(new, before) - back = read() - if (not isinstance(after, str) or not 0 < len(after) <= 192 - or back['metadata'].get('resourceVersion') != after or plan(back, binding)[1]): - raise Refused('readback ambiguous; owner reconciliation required') - return Outcome.SUCCESS, (CREATED,), before, after - - def remove(created): - if created != (CREATED,) or creation is None or not verify(*creation): - raise Refused('no authenticated case-created binding') - created_rv = json.loads(records[creation[1].evidence][1])['after'] - current = read() - before = current['metadata'].get('resourceVersion') - if before != created_rv: - raise Refused('deployment changed since creation; owner reconciliation required') - new = copy.deepcopy(current) - env = _container(new).get('env', []) - matches = [i for i, e in enumerate(env) if e == binding] - if len(matches) != 1 or [e for e in env if e.get('name') == binding['name']] != [binding]: - raise Refused('created binding not found unchanged') - del env[matches[0]] - after = write(new, before) - back = read() - if (not isinstance(after, str) or back['metadata'].get('resourceVersion') != after - or any(e.get('name') == binding['name'] for e in _container(back).get('env', []))): - raise Refused('rollback readback ambiguous; owner reconciliation required') - return Outcome.ROLLED_BACK, (), before, after - - def execute(inv, operation, created=()): - nonlocal creation - try: - with contained_output(): - bound(inv, 'run' if operation == 'add' else 'rollback') - outcome, objects, before, after = add() if operation == 'add' else remove(created) - finally: - # Even failure must end the parent session; failures propagate to the - # kernel as uncertain, never safe to replay. - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(inv) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-bind-env.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed_source, 'outcome': outcome.value, - 'created': objects, 'env_name': binding['name'], 'before': before, 'after': after, - 'values_emitted': False, 'session_revocation': revocation}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, revocation, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, result) - if objects: - creation = (inv, result) - elif operation == 'remove': - creation = None - return result - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - return authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed_source, lambda inv: execute(inv, 'add'), - verify, lambda inv, created: execute(inv, 'remove', created)) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-eso.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-eso.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index b145ad5..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-eso.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T04, railiance-platform CCR-2026-0054. -# Creates the dedicated Secret sso/keycape-lldap-bind (key password) from platform custody. -# KeyCape (image with key-cape KEY-WP-0046) reads it as KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW; until -# bindPW is cleared from keycape-config both carry the same value, and KeyCape refuses -# to start if they differ. ESO is the only writer of this Secret (creationPolicy Owner); -# Retain leaves it in place if this ExternalSecret is removed. -# Apply only after `tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py setup svc-keycape` reports equal custody. ---- -apiVersion: v1 -kind: ServiceAccount -metadata: - name: net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind-eso - namespace: sso -automountServiceAccountToken: false ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: SecretStore -metadata: - name: net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind - namespace: sso -spec: - provider: - vault: - server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200 - path: platform - version: v2 - auth: - kubernetes: - mountPath: kubernetes - role: net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind-eso - serviceAccountRef: - name: net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind-eso - audiences: [openbao] ---- -apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1 -kind: ExternalSecret -metadata: - name: keycape-lldap-bind - namespace: sso -spec: - refreshInterval: 1h - secretStoreRef: - kind: SecretStore - name: net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind - target: - # Explicit target metadata stops ESO copying this object's kubectl - # last-applied annotation onto the Secret (refused by reject-secret-last-applied). - template: - metadata: {} - name: keycape-lldap-bind - creationPolicy: Owner - deletionPolicy: Retain - data: - - secretKey: password - remoteRef: - key: workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-keycape - property: LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bootstrap-config.json b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bootstrap-config.json deleted file mode 100644 index 5bb3431..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bootstrap-config.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,123 +0,0 @@ -{ - "issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social", - "port": 8080, - "tokenLifetime": "15m", - "privateKeyPem": "/etc/keycape/key.pem", - "environment": "production", - "lldap": { - "url": "ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890", - "bindDN": "uid=svc-keycape,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local", - "bindPW": "", - "baseDN": "dc=netkingdom,dc=local", - "userOU": "ou=people", - "groupOU": "ou=groups" - }, - "authelia": { - "baseURL": "http://authelia.sso.svc.cluster.local:9091", - "browserBaseURL": "https://auth.coulomb.social", - "tokenBaseURL": "http://authelia.sso.svc.cluster.local:9091", - "clientId": "keycape", - "clientSecret": "", - "redirectURI": "https://kc.coulomb.social/authorize/callback" - }, - "privacyidea": { - "baseURL": "http://privacyidea.mfa.svc.cluster.local:8080", - "realm": "coulomb", - "requireForAll": true, - "adminTokenFile": "/etc/keycape-factor/admin-token" - }, - "clients": [ - { - "clientId": "demo-app", - "displayName": "Demo Application", - "redirectUris": [ - "http://localhost:3000/callback", - "http://127.0.0.1:8876/oidc/callback", - "http://localhost:8876/oidc/callback", - "https://demo.coulomb.social/callback" - ], - "allowedScopes": [ - "openid", - "profile", - "email", - "groups" - ], - "grantTypes": [ - "authorization_code" - ], - "clientType": "public" - }, - { - "clientId": "user-engine-portal", - "displayName": "User Engine Portal", - "redirectUris": [ - "https://users.92-205-62-239.nip.io/oidc/callback", - "https://users.coulomb.social/oidc/callback" - ], - "allowedScopes": [ - "openid", - "profile", - "email", - "groups" - ], - "grantTypes": [ - "authorization_code" - ], - "clientType": "public" - }, - { - "clientId": "netkingdom-bootstrap-console", - "displayName": "NetKingdom Bootstrap Console", - "redirectUris": [ - "http://127.0.0.1:8876/oidc/callback", - "http://localhost:8876/oidc/callback" - ], - "allowedScopes": [ - "openid", - "profile", - "email", - "groups" - ], - "grantTypes": [ - "authorization_code" - ], - "clientType": "public" - }, - { - "clientId": "openbao-admin", - "displayName": "Railiance OpenBao Admin", - "redirectUris": [ - "http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback", - "http://127.0.0.1:8250/oidc/callback", - "http://127.0.0.1:18200/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback" - ], - "allowedScopes": [ - "openid", - "profile", - "email", - "groups" - ], - "grantTypes": [ - "authorization_code" - ], - "clientType": "public" - }, - { - "clientId": "rapp-qonto-client", - "displayName": "rapp-qonto workload", - "allowedScopes": [ - "qonto:read" - ], - "grantTypes": [ - "client_credentials" - ], - "clientType": "confidential", - "secretRef": "env:KEYCAPE_RAPP_QONTO_CLIENT_SECRET", - "serviceSubject": "rapp-qonto", - "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky", - "roles": [ - "qonto-reader" - ] - } - ] -} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/client-profiles/forgejo-public-build.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/client-profiles/forgejo-public-build.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 4ffc903..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/client-profiles/forgejo-public-build.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# Temporary build profile; activation requires the exact CUST80-FORGEJO-PUBLIC-BUILD-20261018 approval. -# The accepted confidential-client case remains the target; full acceptance is CUST-WP-0082-T20. -clientId: forgejo -displayName: Forgejo source forge -redirectUris: -- https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback -allowedScopes: -- openid -- profile -- email -- groups -grantTypes: -- authorization_code -clientType: public -mfaRequired: true diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/compose-1.2-descriptors.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/compose-1.2-descriptors.py deleted file mode 100644 index ec2c011..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/compose-1.2-descriptors.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,268 +0,0 @@ -"""Compose the seven-step source descriptor set for oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2. - -Source candidate for NK-WP-0048-T30. Read-only: it loads the 1.2 type only -through the validator's explicit version-root selection, asks each step adapter -for its descriptor, closes each one through Warden's own Descriptor.decode, and -checks step, owner and lane against the 1.2 follow_through. It refuses a partial -map, a duplicate or unknown step, any mismatch, and any change to canonical 1.1. - -Nothing here writes a type file, pins a descriptor, admits anything or touches -a live system. A composed map is a successor candidate that needs a reviewed -revision under canon section 6 and owner review (T16) before any pinning. - -Generalised (NK-WP-0048) to a selectable successor version via --version -('1.2' default, or '1.3' = 1.2 content plus execution_descriptors). The type is -loaded from security-case-type-revisions// through the explicit version -root, and each version-aware adapter must expose SELECTABLE_TYPES[]. -The file name is kept so review targets do not move; with the default the -output is byte-identical to the 1.2-only composer. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -from dataclasses import asdict -import argparse -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import sys - -from warden.case_run import Descriptor, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = ROOT.parents[2] -DEFAULT_ROOT = REPO / 'security-case-types' -REVISIONS = REPO / 'security-case-type-revisions' -SUCCESSOR_VERSIONS = ('1.2', '1.3') -DEFAULT_VERSION = '1.2' -VERSION_ROOTS = {'1.2': REVISIONS / '1.2'} -TYPE_ID = 'oidc-browser-relying-party' -TYPE_REF = f'{TYPE_ID}@1.2' -CANONICAL_REF = f'{TYPE_ID}@1.1' -SECTION6 = ('successor candidate only: new descriptor bytes need a reviewed successor ' - 'revision under canon section 6 and owner review (NK-WP-0048-T16) before pinning') - -# step -> (adapter file, needs explicit 1.2 version-root support) -ADAPTERS = { - 'ensure-groups': ('ensure-groups-adapter.py', True), - 'mint-secret': ('mint-secret-adapter.py', False), - 'deliver-secret': ('deliver-secret-adapter.py', False), - 'bind-env': ('bind-env-adapter.py', False), - 'register-client': ('keycape-registration-adapter.py', False), - 'deliver-consumer-secret': ('deliver-consumer-secret-adapter.py', False), - 'hand-over': ('handover-adapter.py', True), -} - -# Names (T25-T29) that the type does not fix. Worker-proposed, then confirmed by -# the founder on 2026-10-17; the artifact records them as names_confirmed. -NAMES_CONFIRMED = {'by': 'founder', 'on': '2026-10-17'} -PROPOSED = { - # Actor 'human' (founder, 2026-10-17): the kernel refuses agent mint; only the schema is open. - 'mint-secret': {'task': 'NK-WP-0048-T25', - 'schema': 'railiance-platform.custody-mint.v1'}, - 'deliver-secret': {'task': 'NK-WP-0048-T26', 'lane': 'platform-secret-delivery', - 'schema': 'netkingdom.deliver-secret.v1'}, - 'bind-env': {'task': 'NK-WP-0048-T27', 'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-bind-env.attempt.v1'}, - 'deliver-consumer-secret': {'task': 'NK-WP-0048-T28', 'lane': 'consumer-owner-deployment', - 'schema': 'netkingdom.consumer-secret-delivery.v1'}, - 'hand-over': {'task': 'NK-WP-0048-T29', 'lane': 'apps-consumer-handover', - 'schema': 'netkingdom.apps-handover.attempt.v1'}, -} - - -def _load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -def _validator(): - return _load('security_case_validator', - REPO / 'tools' / 'security-case-types' / 'security_case_validator.py') - - -def encode(desc: Descriptor) -> bytes: - return json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - - -def _version(version): - if version not in SUCCESSOR_VERSIONS: - raise Refused(f'unsupported successor version {version!r}; allowed {list(SUCCESSOR_VERSIONS)}') - return version - - -def _type_ref(version): - return f'{TYPE_ID}@{_version(version)}' - - -def load_types(default_root=DEFAULT_ROOT, version_roots=None, version=DEFAULT_VERSION): - """Return ( spec, canonical 1.1 file digest) via explicit selection only.""" - version, type_ref = _version(version), _type_ref(version) - if version_roots is None: - root = REVISIONS / version - if not root.is_dir(): - raise Refused(f'revision directory security-case-type-revisions/{version} absent') - version_roots = {version: root} - v = _validator() - roots = dict(version_roots) - if set(roots) != {version}: - raise Refused(f'only an explicit {version} version root may be selected') - issues, data, _ = v.load_type(Path(default_root), type_ref, version_roots=roots) - if issues or str(data['spec'].get('version')) != version: - raise Refused(f'{version} type not loadable through explicit version-root selection') - issues, default_12, _ = v.load_type(Path(default_root), type_ref) - if not issues: - raise Refused(f'{version} is reachable by default; canonical 1.1 default changed') - issues, canonical, type_dir = v.load_type(Path(default_root), CANONICAL_REF) - if issues or str(canonical['spec'].get('version')) != '1.1': - raise Refused('canonical 1.1 default not loadable') - return data['spec'], digest((type_dir / 'type.yaml').read_bytes()) - - -def _resolve(value, params): - try: - return value.format(**params) if isinstance(value, str) else value - except (KeyError, IndexError, ValueError): - raise Refused('type owner template has no bound parameter') from None - - -def adapter_descriptors(check_config_digest, consumer_owner, version=DEFAULT_VERSION): - """Ask every step adapter for its descriptor; T13 needs the checker digest.""" - type_ref = _type_ref(version) - out = [] - for step, (filename, needs_12) in ADAPTERS.items(): - m = _load(f'compose_{step.replace("-", "_")}', ROOT / filename) - if needs_12 and getattr(m, 'SELECTABLE_TYPES', {}).get(version) != type_ref: - raise Refused(f'{step}: adapter has no explicit {version} version-root path') - if step == 'register-client': - desc, source = m.descriptor(check_config_digest), m.source_digest(check_config_digest) - elif step in ('deliver-consumer-secret', 'hand-over'): - desc, source = m.descriptor(consumer_owner), m.source_digest() - else: - desc, source = m.descriptor(), m.source_digest() - if desc.adapter_source != source: - raise Refused(f'{step}: descriptor does not pin its own source digest') - out.append((step, desc)) - return out - - -def compose(type_spec, candidates, params, canonical_digest_before, *, default_root=DEFAULT_ROOT, - version=DEFAULT_VERSION, version_roots=None): - """Return {step: descriptor digest} for the complete set, or raise Refused.""" - steps = [s['id'] for s in type_spec.get('follow_through', ())] - if len(steps) != 7 or len(set(steps)) != 7: - raise Refused(f'{version} type does not declare exactly seven distinct steps') - by_step, sources = {}, {} - for step, desc in candidates: - if step in by_step: - raise Refused(f'duplicate step {step!r}') - if step not in steps: - raise Refused(f'unknown step {step!r}') - try: - source = encode(desc) - Descriptor.decode(source) - except (TypeError, ValueError, Refused): - raise Refused(f'{step}: descriptor refused by the Warden v1 kernel') from None - if desc.step != step: - raise Refused(f'{step}: descriptor names step {desc.step!r}') - by_step[step], sources[step] = desc, source - missing = [s for s in steps if s not in by_step] - if missing: - raise Refused(f'partial descriptor map; missing {missing}') - for entry in type_spec['follow_through']: - desc = by_step[entry['id']] - if desc.owner != _resolve(entry['owner'], params): - raise Refused(f"{entry['id']}: owner {desc.owner!r} does not match the {version} type") - if 'lane' in entry and desc.lane != entry['lane']: - raise Refused(f"{entry['id']}: lane {desc.lane!r} does not match the {version} type") - _, after = load_types(default_root, version_roots, version) - if after != canonical_digest_before: - raise Refused('canonical 1.1 type changed during composition') - return {s: digest(sources[s]) for s in steps} - - -def review(type_spec, candidates, params, version=DEFAULT_VERSION): - """Per-step findings without stopping at the first refusal (for the artifact).""" - entries = {e['id']: e for e in type_spec.get('follow_through', ())} - rows = [] - for step, desc in candidates: - entry, findings = entries.get(step), [] - source = encode(desc) - try: - Descriptor.decode(source) - except Refused: - findings.append('refused by Warden v1 Descriptor.decode') - if entry is None: - findings.append(f'step not in {version} type') - else: - try: - owner = _resolve(entry['owner'], params) - except Refused as exc: - owner = None - findings.append(str(exc)) - if owner is not None and desc.owner != owner: - findings.append(f'owner {desc.owner!r} != type owner {owner!r}') - if 'lane' in entry and desc.lane != entry['lane']: - findings.append(f"lane {desc.lane!r} != type lane {entry['lane']!r}") - proposed = dict(PROPOSED.get(step, {})) - if entry is not None and 'lane' not in entry: - proposed.setdefault('lane', desc.lane) - rows.append({'step': step, 'descriptor': asdict(desc), - 'candidate_descriptor_digest': digest(source), - 'type_owner': entry and entry['owner'], 'type_lane': entry and entry.get('lane'), - 'findings': findings, - 'owner_confirmation_required': None, - 'names_confirmed': dict(proposed, **NAMES_CONFIRMED) if proposed else None}) - return rows - - -def artifact(check_config_digest, params, version=DEFAULT_VERSION): - type_spec, canonical = load_types(version=version) - candidates = adapter_descriptors(check_config_digest, params['consumer_owner_repo'], version) - try: - composed, refusal = compose(type_spec, candidates, params, canonical, version=version), None - except Refused as exc: - composed, refusal = None, str(exc) - return { - 'schema': 'netkingdom.descriptor-composition-candidate.v1', - 'task': 'NK-WP-0048-T30', - 'type': _type_ref(version), - 'selection': (f'explicit version root {version}=security-case-type-revisions/{version}; ' - 'default root unchanged'), - 'canonical_default': {'type': CANONICAL_REF, 'type_yaml_digest': canonical, - 'unchanged': True}, - 'status': 'not_an_admission', - 'review_requirement': SECTION6, - 'check_config_digest': check_config_digest, - 'params': params, - 'complete_executable_descriptor_set': composed is not None, - 'execution_descriptors': composed, - 'refusal': refusal, - 'steps': review(type_spec, candidates, params, version), - 'owner_review': False, 'admitted': False, 'dispatch_permitted': False, - } - - -def main(argv=None): - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - p.add_argument('--check-config-digest', required=True) - p.add_argument('--consumer-owner-repo', required=True) - p.add_argument('--out', type=Path) - p.add_argument('--version', choices=SUCCESSOR_VERSIONS, default=DEFAULT_VERSION) - a = p.parse_args(argv) - try: - doc = artifact(a.check_config_digest, {'consumer_owner_repo': a.consumer_owner_repo}, a.version) - except Refused as exc: - sys.stderr.write(f'refused: {exc}\n') - return 3 - text = json.dumps(doc, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + '\n' - if a.out: - a.out.write_text(text) - else: - sys.stdout.write(text) - return 0 if doc['complete_executable_descriptor_set'] else 2 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh index 1780b40..4a4b4be 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh @@ -1,5 +1,63 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Legacy root-token pod prompt withdrawn under NK-WP-0049. -set +x -printf '%s\n' 'Retired: use railiance-platform declarations and its governed OpenBao administration operation through warden access openbao-platform-admin-login. Prepare the exact owner-reviewed config change first. No token, auth mount or role is read or changed here.' >&2 -exit 2 +# Configure Railiance OpenBao to trust KeyCape for platform-admin OIDC login. +# The OpenBao token is prompted inside the pod TTY and is never placed on the +# local command line or stored by this script. + +set -euo pipefail + +KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" +OPENBAO_NAMESPACE="${OPENBAO_NAMESPACE:-openbao}" +OPENBAO_POD="${OPENBAO_POD:-openbao-0}" + +"$KUBECTL" exec -it -n "$OPENBAO_NAMESPACE" "$OPENBAO_POD" -- sh -lc ' + set -eu + + restore_tty() { stty echo 2>/dev/null || true; } + trap restore_tty EXIT INT TERM + + printf "OpenBao root/sudo token: " >&2 + stty -echo + read -r BAO_TOKEN + stty echo + printf "\n" >&2 + export BAO_TOKEN + + # OpenBao requires oidc_client_secret for OIDC auth config. The current + # KeyCape openbao-admin profile is public PKCE and does not validate this + # downstream client-secret field, so this compatibility value is not a + # protected secret. Replace this with a real managed client secret when + # KeyCape supports confidential downstream clients. + OPENBAO_OIDC_MOUNTS="netkingdom keycape" + + # The platform-admin role (policies, callbacks, bound claims) is owned and + # declared by railiance-platform at + # openbao/auth/netkingdom-platform-admin-role.json. This script never writes + # the role: it configures the OIDC mount and requires the declared role to + # exist. Additional allowances belong in that central declaration. + for mount in $OPENBAO_OIDC_MOUNTS; do + bao auth enable -path="$mount" oidc >/tmp/openbao-${mount}-auth-enable.out 2>/tmp/openbao-${mount}-auth-enable.err || { + if grep -q "path is already in use" /tmp/openbao-${mount}-auth-enable.err; then + printf "auth/%s already exists\n" "$mount" >&2 + else + cat /tmp/openbao-${mount}-auth-enable.err >&2 + exit 1 + fi + } + + bao write "auth/${mount}/config" \ + oidc_discovery_url="https://kc.coulomb.social" \ + oidc_client_id="openbao-admin" \ + oidc_client_secret="keycape-public-pkce-compatibility-value" \ + default_role="platform-admin" + + if ! bao read "auth/${mount}/role/platform-admin" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + printf "auth/%s/role/platform-admin is missing; apply the railiance-platform declaration (openbao/auth/netkingdom-platform-admin-role.json)\n" "$mount" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + bao write "sys/auth/${mount}/tune" listing_visibility=unauth + printf "configured auth/%s (role preserved) and listing_visibility=unauth\n" "$mount" >&2 + done + + rm -f /tmp/openbao-*-auth-enable.out /tmp/openbao-*-auth-enable.err + unset BAO_TOKEN +' diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-pi-token.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-pi-token.sh index d72871b..2b00b03 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-pi-token.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-pi-token.sh @@ -1,6 +1,118 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Retired: KeyCape uses the scoped, renewable factor-reader lane. -set +x +# create-pi-token.sh — fetch a privacyIDEA admin JWT and store it for KeyCape +# +# Usage: +# ./create-pi-token.sh [secrets-dir] +# +# Run this script AFTER T04 bootstrap (privacyIDEA admin account created). +# It authenticates to the privacyIDEA API, fetches a long-lived admin JWT, +# and writes it to secrets/keycape/pi_admin_token. +# +# After running this script, re-run create-secrets.sh to update the +# keycape-config K8s Secret with the real token, then restart KeyCape: +# ./create-secrets.sh +# kubectl rollout restart deployment/keycape -n sso +# +# The privacyIDEA admin token may expire depending on the live privacyIDEA +# policy/configuration. Refresh it if KeyCape reports "mfa check error". +# Store the current token in KeePassXC as: +# net-kingdom/KeyCape/pi-admin-token +# +# Requires: kubectl, curl, jq + set -euo pipefail -printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: personal privacyIDEA admin-token delivery is retired.' 'Use railiance-platform RPF-WP-0040 scoped factor custody, ESO delivery and renewal recovery.' 'This helper performs no login, credential read, Secret change or restart.' >&2 -exit 1 + +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +PI_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" +TOKEN_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/keycape/pi_admin_token" + +if [[ ! -f "$PI_ENV" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $PI_ENV not found — run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } +PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(read_env "$PI_ENV" PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD) + +if [[ -z "$PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD is empty in $PI_ENV" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Fetch token by exec-ing into the privacyIDEA pod (localhost call, bypasses +# NetworkPolicy which restricts external ingress to the service). +PI_POD=$(kubectl get pod -n mfa \ + -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea \ + --field-selector=status.phase=Running \ + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null || echo "") + +if [[ -z "$PI_POD" ]]; then + # Fall back to public hostname if pod is not directly accessible + PI_POD="" +fi + +echo "Fetching privacyIDEA admin token..." + +if [[ -n "$PI_POD" ]]; then + echo " Method: kubectl exec into $PI_POD (avoids NetworkPolicy restriction)" + # Pass the password via env var. Retry up to 3 times — the PostgreSQL connection + # pool can return 500 if the idle SSL connection was dropped; it recovers on retry. + TOKEN="" + for _ATTEMPT in 1 2 3; do + TOKEN=$(kubectl exec -n mfa "$PI_POD" -- \ + env PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD="${PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD}" \ + python3 -c ' +import urllib.request, urllib.parse, json, os, sys +pw = os.environ["PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD"] +data = urllib.parse.urlencode({"username": "pi-admin", "password": pw}).encode() +req = urllib.request.Request("http://localhost:8080/auth", data=data) +try: + with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r: + body = json.load(r) + print(body["result"]["value"]["token"]) +except Exception as e: + print(str(e), file=__import__("sys").stderr) + sys.exit(1) +' 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ -n "$TOKEN" ]]; then break; fi + echo " Attempt $_ATTEMPT failed (likely transient DB connection drop) — retrying in 5s..." + sleep 5 + done +else + echo " Method: public URL https://pink.coulomb.social" + TOKEN=$(curl -sf \ + -X POST "https://pink.coulomb.social/auth" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ + -d "username=pi-admin&password=${PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD}" \ + | python3 -c "import sys,json; data=json.load(sys.stdin); print(data['result']['value']['token'])" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") +fi + +if [[ -z "$TOKEN" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: failed to fetch token from privacyIDEA." >&2 + echo " Verify that privacyIDEA is Running and the pi-admin account exists." >&2 + echo " Check: kubectl logs -n mfa \$(kubectl get pod -n mfa -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea -o name | head -1)" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +mkdir -p "$(dirname "$TOKEN_FILE")" +echo -n "$TOKEN" > "$TOKEN_FILE" +chmod 600 "$TOKEN_FILE" + +# Create the keycape-pi-token K8s Secret (KeyCape reads it at startup) +echo "Creating K8s Secret: keycape-pi-token (namespace: sso)" +kubectl create secret generic keycape-pi-token \ + --namespace=sso \ + --from-literal=token="$TOKEN" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - +echo " Done." + +echo "" +echo "Token written to: $TOKEN_FILE" +echo "" +echo "IMPORTANT: Store this token in KeePassXC → net-kingdom/KeyCape/pi-admin-token" +echo " as a password entry. It cannot be recovered without re-authenticating." +echo "" +echo "Next steps:" +echo " 1. Re-run create-secrets.sh to update keycape-config with the real token." +echo " 2. Restart KeyCape: kubectl rollout restart deployment/keycape -n sso" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.py deleted file mode 100644 index d7b2da9..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,137 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Create first-bootstrap config with private inputs and scoped factor delivery. - -Never replace an existing Secret, mint a provider token or rotate a signing key. -Child output is captured, including Kubernetes error bodies containing Secret data. -""" -import base64 -import contextlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import secrets -import stat -import subprocess -import sys - -import yaml - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def private(info, directory=False): - kind = stat.S_ISDIR if directory else stat.S_ISREG - if not kind(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused() - if not directory and info.st_nlink != 1: - raise Refused() - - -@contextlib.contextmanager -def custody(root): - root = Path(os.path.abspath(root)) - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (root, *root.parents)): - raise Refused() - descriptors = [] - try: - flags = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW - fd = os.open(root, flags); descriptors.append(fd) - private(os.fstat(fd), True) - children = {} - for name in ('lldap', 'authelia', 'keycape'): - child = os.open(name, flags, dir_fd=fd); descriptors.append(child) - private(os.fstat(child), True) - children[name] = child - yield children - finally: - for fd in reversed(descriptors): os.close(fd) - - -def read_file(parent, name): - fd = os.open(name, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=parent) - try: - private(os.fstat(fd)) - raw = os.read(fd, 65537) - if len(raw) > 65536: raise Refused() - return raw - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -def env_value(parent, name): - values = [line.split('=', 1)[1] for line in read_file(parent, 'secrets.env').decode().splitlines() - if line.startswith(name + '=')] - # Consume the generator's literal format, never execute a shell env file. - if len(values) != 1 or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', values[0]): - raise Refused() - return values[0] - - -def run(args, payload=None): - result = subprocess.run(args, input=payload, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60, check=False) - if result.returncode or len(result.stdout) > 65536: raise Refused() - return result.stdout - - -def signing_key(parent): - try: - key = read_file(parent, 'key.pem') - except FileNotFoundError: - key = run(['openssl', 'genrsa', '2048']) - run(['openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-noout'], key) - # Publish atomically without replacement, so concurrent creation cannot - # overwrite a pre-existing key. Keep this private key after API failure. - temp = '.key-' + secrets.token_hex(12) - fd = os.open(temp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600, dir_fd=parent) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as file: - file.write(key); file.flush(); os.fsync(file.fileno()) - os.link(temp, 'key.pem', src_dir_fd=parent, dst_dir_fd=parent, follow_symlinks=False) - os.fsync(parent) - finally: - os.unlink(temp, dir_fd=parent) - run(['openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-noout'], key) - return key - - -def main(): - if len(sys.argv) > 2: raise Refused() - here = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - root = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) == 2 else here / '../../bootstrap/secrets' - with custody(root) as dirs: - bind_password = env_value(dirs['lldap'], 'LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS') - client_secret = env_value(dirs['authelia'], 'AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET') - config = json.loads((here / 'bootstrap-config.json').read_text()) - config['lldap']['bindPW'] = bind_password - config['authelia']['clientSecret'] = client_secret - # Existence is not an update grant. API create also closes the race - # between this preflight and publication; AlreadyExists stays a failure. - existing = run(['kubectl', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '-n', 'sso', '--ignore-not-found', '-o', 'name']) - if existing.strip(): raise Refused() - ready = run(['kubectl', 'get', 'externalsecret', 'keycape-factor-read', '-n', 'sso', - '-o', 'jsonpath={.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}']) - factor = run(['kubectl', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-factor-read', '-n', 'sso', '-o', 'name']) - if ready.strip() != b'True' or factor.strip() != b'secret/keycape-factor-read': raise Refused() - key = signing_key(dirs['keycape']) - data = {'config.yaml': yaml.safe_dump(config, sort_keys=False).encode(), 'key.pem': key} - manifest = {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'Secret', 'type': 'Opaque', - 'metadata': {'name': 'keycape-config', 'namespace': 'sso'}, - 'data': {name: base64.b64encode(value).decode() for name, value in data.items()}} - response = run(['kubectl', 'create', '-o', 'name', '-f', '-'], json.dumps(manifest).encode()) - if response.strip() != b'secret/keycape-config': raise Refused() - print('KeyCape bootstrap Secret created with mounted factor credential configuration.') - print('Preserve the private signing key in approved custody. Native login and factor acceptance remain required.') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - main() - except (Refused, OSError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - print('ERROR: KeyCape bootstrap refused or failed. Existing configuration is never replaced; ' - 'check private inputs and RPF-WP-0040 delivery using metadata-only diagnostics. ' - 'If creation was attempted, its remote outcome must be reconciled before retry.', file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh index 37e5a7b..54ae5e4 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh @@ -1,7 +1,175 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# First creation only. Existing KeyCape configuration requires a scoped owner update. -set +x +# create-secrets.sh — create the keycape-config K8s Secret +# +# Usage: +# ./create-secrets.sh [secrets-dir] +# +# Creates ONE Secret in the sso namespace: +# keycape-config — config.yaml (full KeyCape config) + key.pem (RSA signing key) +# +# The privacyIDEA admin token is a separate Secret (keycape-pi-token) created +# by create-pi-token.sh AFTER privacyIDEA is bootstrapped (T04 complete). +# The PI admin token is read from that Secret at startup via config.yaml. +# +# Re-run this script to: +# - Rotate the Authelia client secret (update secrets/authelia/secrets.env first) +# - Add or modify OIDC client registrations (edit CLIENTS block below) +# - Rotate the RSA signing key (delete and regenerate secrets/keycape/key.pem) + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/create-secrets.py" "$@" + +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +KEYCAPE_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/keycape/secrets.env" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" +AUTHELIA_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/authelia/secrets.env" +KEY_FILE="$SECRETS_DIR/keycape/key.pem" + +for f in "$KEYCAPE_ENV" "$LLDAP_ENV" "$AUTHELIA_ENV"; do + if [[ ! -f "$f" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $f not found — run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 + fi +done + +read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } + +LLDAP_BIND_PW=$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) +AUTHELIA_CLIENT_SECRET=$(read_env "$AUTHELIA_ENV" AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET) + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_BIND_PW" || -z "$AUTHELIA_CLIENT_SECRET" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: could not read LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS or AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# The privacyIDEA admin token is read from a separate Secret at runtime. +# Placeholder here — create-pi-token.sh populates the real value. +PI_ADMIN_TOKEN="PENDING_create-pi-token.sh" +if [[ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/keycape/pi_admin_token" ]]; then + PI_ADMIN_TOKEN=$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/keycape/pi_admin_token") + echo "INFO: Using privacyIDEA admin token from $SECRETS_DIR/keycape/pi_admin_token" +fi + +# ── RSA signing key ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +if [[ ! -f "$KEY_FILE" ]]; then + echo "Generating RSA-2048 signing key for KeyCape JWT tokens..." + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$KEY_FILE")" + openssl genrsa -out "$KEY_FILE" 2048 2>/dev/null + chmod 600 "$KEY_FILE" + echo " Generated: $KEY_FILE" + echo " IMPORTANT: Store this key in KeePassXC → net-kingdom/KeyCape/jwt-signing-key" + echo " as a binary attachment. It cannot be recovered if lost." +else + echo "INFO: Using existing key: $KEY_FILE" +fi +KEY_CONTENT=$(cat "$KEY_FILE") + +# ── Build config.yaml ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +# Edit the OIDC clients block below to register downstream applications. +# Re-run this script after any change. +CONFIG_YAML=$(cat <receipt and owner_remove(inv, created)->receipt are - consumer-owner capabilities (never command strings). Receipts carry status and - fixed metadata only; any value-bearing key is refused. Only objects the owner - reports as created in this attempt (uid-bound) are recorded and may be removed; - preexisting-matched objects are never deleted. - """ - reviewed = source_digest() - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(v, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(v) - for v in (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, admitted.actor, - admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - desc = descriptor(admitted.owner) - if (admitted.step, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != (desc.step, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('delivery invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(desc_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (owner_apply, owner_remove, publish, authenticate, revoke_session)): - raise Refused('owner capabilities required') - with contained_output(): - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - spec = case.get('spec') if isinstance(case, dict) else None - params = spec.get('parameters') if isinstance(spec, dict) else None - if not isinstance(params, dict) or spec.get('type') not in ACCEPTED_TYPES: - raise Refused('type 1.2 or 1.3 case required; canonical 1.1 has no delivery step') - if params.get('client_type') != 'confidential': - raise Refused('delivery applies to confidential clients only') - for key in ('client_id', 'consuming_service', 'consumer_namespace', 'consumer_owner_repo'): - if not isinstance(params.get(key), str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(params[key]): - raise Refused('bounded case parameter required') - if admitted.target != params['client_id'] or admitted.owner != params['consumer_owner_repo']: - raise Refused('case target or owner differs') - want = expected(params) - records, state = {}, {'created': None} - - def binding(inv, operation): - if (replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != operation or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest() != reviewed: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - - def check(receipt, operation, scope): - if (type(receipt) is not dict or set(receipt) != RECEIPT_KEYS or not _value_free(receipt) - or receipt['schema'] != 'netkingdom.consumer-secret-delivery.v1' - or receipt['operation'] != operation or receipt['values_emitted'] is not False - or type(receipt['objects']) is not dict or set(receipt['objects']) != set(scope)): - raise Refused('owner delivery receipt contract differs') - created = [] - for name in scope: - obj = receipt['objects'][name] - if type(obj) is not dict or set(obj) != {'uid', 'created', 'metadata'}: - raise Refused('owner object receipt differs') - if not isinstance(obj['uid'], str) or not 0 < len(obj['uid']) <= 64: - raise Refused('object uid binding required') - if operation == 'apply': - if obj['metadata'] != want[name] or type(obj['created']) is not bool: - raise Refused('delivered metadata differs from case') - if obj['created']: - created.append(name) - return {n: receipt['objects'][n]['uid'] for n in scope}, tuple(created) - - def execute(inv, operation, created=()): - try: - with contained_output(): - if operation == 'apply': - binding(inv, 'run') - uids, objects = check(owner_apply(inv, want), 'apply', OBJECTS) - outcome = Outcome.SUCCESS if objects else Outcome.NO_CHANGE - else: - binding(inv, 'rollback') - prior = state['created'] - if prior is None or not created or set(created) != set(prior[1]) or not verify(*prior[0]): - raise Refused('no authenticated case-created delivery objects') - order = tuple(n for n in ROLLBACK_ORDER if n in created) - receipt = owner_remove(inv, {n: prior[1][n] for n in order}) - if type(receipt) is dict and receipt.get('consumer_reference_reverted') is not True: - raise Refused('consumer secret reference must be reverted first') - uids, _ = check(receipt, 'remove', order) - if uids != {n: prior[1][n] for n in order}: - raise Refused('removed object uid differs from created') - objects, outcome = (), Outcome.ROLLED_BACK - finally: - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(inv) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.consumer-secret-delivery.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed, 'outcome': outcome.value, - 'created': objects, 'uids': uids, 'session_revocation': revocation}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, revocation, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, result) - if operation == 'apply' and objects: - state['created'] = ((inv, result), {n: uids[n] for n in objects}) - elif operation == 'remove': - state['created'] = None - return result - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - return authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed, lambda inv: execute(inv, 'apply'), verify, - lambda inv, created: execute(inv, 'remove', created)) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deliver-secret-adapter.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deliver-secret-adapter.md deleted file mode 100644 index be64dab..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deliver-secret-adapter.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -# Deliver-secret adapter source candidate (NK-WP-0048-T26) - -Status: **source candidate, unexercised.** Not reviewed, not pinned, not admitted. -Modelled on the T13 registration adapter (`keycape-registration-adapter.py`). - -## What it is - -`deliver-secret-adapter.py` is an injection-only Warden v1 kernel adapter for the -Platform-owned delivery seam (ESO/custody). Descriptor: step `deliver-secret`, -owner `railiance-platform`, lane `platform-secret-delivery`, target parameter -`client_id`, allowed created object `delivered-secret`, `retry_safe: false`, -revocation scope `parent-session`. - -It binds one admitted invocation to one Secret reference. `build()` takes -`case_source` and refuses unless its digest equals `admitted.pins.case`, the -case is `client_type: confidential`, and its `client_id` equals the admitted -target (as `mint-secret` and `bind-env` do). The reference is then derived from -the admitted target per type 1.2, never chosen by the caller: ExternalSecret -`sso/keycape-{client_id}-client`, key `client-secret`, from custody -`platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}` (NK48-R2-F2). Owner receipts must name -that same reference. It never reads, mints or templates a value. -Delivery, removal, evidence publication/authentication and parent-session -revocation are injected owner capabilities; the module itself has no CLI and -calls no kubectl, OpenBao or registry. - -## Value-free evidence contract - -Owner receipts must have exactly the fields `schema, operation, namespace, name, -custody_reference, key_names, values_emitted, changed, before, after`, with -`values_emitted: false` and `before`/`after` limited to `{uid, resource_version}`. -Any extra field (for example a value) is refused before evidence is published. -The parent session is revoked even when the owner capability fails. - -## Rollback: created-only - -Only a delivery this process verified as created (`before: null`, `changed: true`, -evidence authenticated by the owner) may be rolled back, and rollback must remove -exactly the created revision. A pre-existing Secret is `NO_CHANGE` and is never -removed. Failures are not converted to retry-safe outcomes. - -## Tests - -`PYTHONPATH=~/ops-warden/src python3 -m pytest -q test_deliver_secret_adapter.py` -— synthetic positive and refusal fixtures only. - -## Not supplied by this candidate - -Canonical 1.1 stays the default; no `--allow-unimplemented` admission. Platform -owner source review before pinning, the real ESO/custody capability -implementations, and any native action remain separate owner gates. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deliver-secret-adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deliver-secret-adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index babf2a8..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deliver-secret-adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@ -"""Unexercised, injection-only deliver-secret seam (NK-WP-0048-T26) for Warden's v1 kernel. - -Platform-owned delivery evidence (ESO/custody), value-free. No CLI, credential, -kubectl, OpenBao or registry access lives here: delivery, removal, evidence -publication/authentication and parent-session revocation are injected owner -capabilities. Receipts must match an exact metadata-only field set, so a -capability that returns a value (or any unexpected field) is refused. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import json -import re -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, contained_output, digest, IDENTIFIER -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -SOURCE_FILES = ('deliver-secret-adapter.py',) -REFERENCE = 'net-kingdom/deliver-secret@v1' -CREATED = 'delivered-secret' -NAMESPACE = 'sso' -KEY_NAMES = ('client-secret',) -RECEIPT_FIELDS = {'schema', 'operation', 'namespace', 'name', 'custody_reference', - 'key_names', 'values_emitted', 'changed', 'before', 'after'} - - -def source_digest(): - files = {name: digest((ROOT / name).read_bytes()) for name in SOURCE_FILES} - return digest(json.dumps({'files': files}, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def descriptor(): - return Descriptor('warden.case.execution.v1', 'deliver-secret', 'railiance-platform', - REFERENCE, source_digest(), 'human', 'platform-secret-delivery', - 'client_id', 'change', (CREATED,), False, ('parent-session',)) - - -def _revision(value): - return (isinstance(value, dict) and set(value) == {'uid', 'resource_version'} - and all(isinstance(v, str) and 0 < len(v) <= 192 for v in value.values())) - - -def secret_name(client_id): - return 'keycape-' + client_id + '-client' - - -def custody_path(client_id): - return 'platform/workloads/keycape/' + client_id - - -def build(*, admitted: Invocation, case_source: bytes, case_acceptance: str, - deliver, remove, publish, authenticate, revoke_session): - """Bind one admitted confidential-client case; return a kernel Adapter. - - The Secret reference is derived from the admitted target per type 1.2: - ExternalSecret sso/keycape-{client_id}-client (key client-secret) from - bao:platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}. No caller chooses a reference. - - deliver(inv, binding)->receipt and remove(inv, binding, after)->receipt are - owner capabilities (e.g. ESO sync with readback); receipts carry metadata only. - Only a delivery verified as created in this process may be rolled back. - """ - reviewed = source_digest() - desc = descriptor() - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(v, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(v) for v in - (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, admitted.actor, - admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - if (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != ( - desc.step, desc.owner, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('delivery invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(desc_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - if not (isinstance(case_acceptance, str) and 0 < len(case_acceptance) <= 192 - and digest(case_acceptance.encode()) == admitted.pins.acceptance): - raise Refused('acceptance evidence binding differs') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (deliver, remove, publish, authenticate, revoke_session)): - raise Refused('owner delivery, evidence and revocation capabilities required') - with contained_output(): - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - params = (case or {}).get('spec', {}).get('parameters', {}) if isinstance(case, dict) else {} - if not isinstance(params, dict) or params.get('client_type') != 'confidential': - raise Refused('deliver-secret applies only to confidential clients') - if params.get('client_id') != admitted.target: - raise Refused('case target differs') - namespace, name = NAMESPACE, secret_name(admitted.target) - custody_reference, key_names = custody_path(admitted.target), KEY_NAMES - if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?', name): - raise Refused('bounded secret reference required') - binding_ref = {'namespace': namespace, 'name': name, 'custody_reference': custody_reference, - 'key_names': list(key_names), 'client_id': admitted.target} - records = {} - creation = None - - def check(inv, operation): - if (replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != operation or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest() != reviewed: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - - def execute(inv, operation, created=()): - nonlocal creation - try: - with contained_output(): - check(inv, 'run' if operation == 'deliver' else 'rollback') - if operation == 'deliver': - receipt = deliver(inv, dict(binding_ref)) - else: - if created != (CREATED,) or creation is None or not verify(*creation): - raise Refused('no authenticated case-created delivery') - prior = json.loads(records[creation[1].evidence][1])['after'] - receipt = remove(inv, dict(binding_ref), dict(prior)) - if not (isinstance(receipt, dict) and set(receipt) == RECEIPT_FIELDS - and receipt['schema'] == 'netkingdom.deliver-secret.v1' - and receipt['operation'] == operation - and (receipt['namespace'], receipt['name'], receipt['custody_reference']) - == (namespace, name, custody_reference) - and receipt['key_names'] == list(key_names) - and receipt['values_emitted'] is False - and type(receipt['changed']) is bool): - raise Refused('owner delivery receipt contract differs') - if operation == 'deliver': - if not _revision(receipt['after']) or not ( - receipt['before'] is None or _revision(receipt['before'])): - raise Refused('owner revision contract differs') - if receipt['changed'] != (receipt['before'] is None): - raise Refused('pre-existing secret must not be claimed as created') - elif not (receipt['changed'] is True and receipt['after'] is None - and receipt['before'] == prior): - raise Refused('rollback must remove exactly the created revision') - changed = receipt['changed'] - outcome = (Outcome.ROLLED_BACK if operation == 'remove' else - Outcome.SUCCESS if changed else Outcome.NO_CHANGE) - objects = (CREATED,) if operation == 'deliver' and changed else () - finally: - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(inv) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.deliver-secret.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed, 'outcome': outcome.value, - 'created': objects, 'binding': binding_ref, 'before': receipt['before'], - 'after': receipt['after'], 'session_revocation': revocation}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, revocation, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, result) - if objects: - creation = (inv, result) - elif operation == 'remove': - creation = None - return result - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - return authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed, lambda inv: execute(inv, 'deliver'), - verify, lambda inv, created: execute(inv, 'remove', created)) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml index d4ca75c..693de7e 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml @@ -51,12 +51,10 @@ spec: containers: - name: keycape # Image published to the self-hosted Forgejo OCI registry (KEY-WP-0002). - # key-cape@e2b5fa1 (main-e2b5fa1, KEY-WP-0046): reads the directory bind - # password from KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW; also carries the opt-in token status - # (67a0869..e2c5a94, inactive while tokenStatus is unset) and identity-facts. - # Rollback: sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010 - # (af3b1b0, sign-in diagnosis page) together with removing KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW. - image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:9e082dca78f65a4af3e92d3de3705b99e49ca9b298d9562ad0d37511c4306f8d + # key-cape@1164f65: explicit railiance-admins group maps to + # railiance-admin; retains the 8be8065 split-horizon discovery fix. + # Rollback: sha256:61b5f222a35c6ee1dc0273ea581bdad3d8d98e58b2c37327ac169639252e8ef5 + image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:6f79a2af1c695d39480173fad013facd84d21e7732860366af519302a2c496b8 imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent ports: @@ -65,12 +63,6 @@ spec: protocol: TCP env: - # secrets-engine-openbao service client (NK-WP-0046, live go caafe4be, 2026-10-07). - - name: KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET - valueFrom: - secretKeyRef: - name: keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client - key: client-secret - name: KEYCAPE_POLICY_PATH value: /var/lib/keycape-policy/policy.json - name: KEYCAPE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL_URL @@ -79,13 +71,6 @@ spec: value: https://auth.coulomb.social/logout - name: KEYCAPE_CONFIG value: /etc/keycape/config.yaml - # svc-keycape directory bind from OpenBao via ESO (NK-WP-0056-T04, CCR-2026-0054). - # KeyCape refuses to start if this differs from lldap.bindPW in keycape-config. - - name: KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW - valueFrom: - secretKeyRef: - name: keycape-lldap-bind - key: password - name: KEYCAPE_RAPP_QONTO_CLIENT_SECRET valueFrom: secretKeyRef: @@ -138,7 +123,7 @@ spec: resources: requests: - cpu: "5m" + cpu: "25m" memory: "32Mi" limits: cpu: "200m" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/descriptor-composition-1.2.candidate.json b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/descriptor-composition-1.2.candidate.json deleted file mode 100644 index 82ea9a3..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/descriptor-composition-1.2.candidate.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,252 +0,0 @@ -{ - "admitted": false, - "canonical_default": { - "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1", - "type_yaml_digest": "sha256:f705c64e4875e9b8e18a912fb51c135e77898926d6a451f5cb74ab3c0cbe4d1c", - "unchanged": true - }, - "check_config_digest": "sha256:be37738fe1c08259fb4f9ca0daf0f9301bfffc237e5bb38435525dfbf11ccff5", - "complete_executable_descriptor_set": false, - "dispatch_permitted": false, - "execution_descriptors": null, - "owner_review": false, - "params": { - "consumer_owner_repo": "railiance-apps" - }, - "refusal": "ensure-groups: lane 'keycape-attended-case-change' does not match the 1.2 type", - "review_requirement": "successor candidate only: new descriptor bytes need a reviewed successor revision under canon section 6 and owner review (NK-WP-0048-T16) before pinning", - "schema": "netkingdom.descriptor-composition-candidate.v1", - "selection": "explicit version root 1.2=security-case-type-revisions/1.2; default root unchanged", - "status": "not_an_admission", - "steps": [ - { - "candidate_descriptor_digest": "sha256:ebc9d5b9167d18e6015f4bbeb9699e8d396d64fbfaf195142781f84f4f47a70a", - "descriptor": { - "actor": "human", - "adapter": "net-kingdom/ensure-groups@v1", - "adapter_source": "sha256:f93e68e1932c7ca293c9e69e2d0e1843d58d06a8d4892158fe7d1e0393a21ba0", - "allowed_created": [ - "service-group", - "service-group-membership" - ], - "effect": "change", - "lane": "keycape-attended-case-change", - "owner": "net-kingdom", - "retry_safe": false, - "revocation_scopes": [ - "parent-session" - ], - "step": "ensure-groups", - "target_parameter": "client_id", - "version": "warden.case.execution.v1" - }, - "findings": [ - "lane 'keycape-attended-case-change' != type lane 'key-cape-oidc-login'" - ], - "names_confirmed": null, - "owner_confirmation_required": null, - "step": "ensure-groups", - "type_lane": "key-cape-oidc-login", - "type_owner": "net-kingdom" - }, - { - "candidate_descriptor_digest": "sha256:c92957227235db04953809d92b260d32c8b947472a8e8fd17a258ade3ae8da70", - "descriptor": { - "actor": "human", - "adapter": "net-kingdom/keycape-mint-secret@v1", - "adapter_source": "sha256:34f79944204a2cf5b2a22baecbee4bde77cbdc0e3f9fc87bc98fa12a9c2c0bc1", - 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"lane": "apps-consumer-handover", - "owner": "railiance-apps", - "retry_safe": false, - "revocation_scopes": [ - "parent-session" - ], - "step": "hand-over", - "target_parameter": "client_id", - "version": "warden.case.execution.v1" - }, - "findings": [], - "names_confirmed": { - "by": "founder", - "lane": "apps-consumer-handover", - "on": "2026-10-17", - "schema": "netkingdom.apps-handover.attempt.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0048-T29" - }, - "owner_confirmation_required": null, - "step": "hand-over", - "type_lane": "apps-consumer-handover", - "type_owner": "{consumer_owner_repo}" - } - ], - "task": "NK-WP-0048-T30", - "type": "oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3" -} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6b3b76a..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,248 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Switch KeyCape's LLDAP bind from the human admin to svc-keycape (NK-WP-0054-T05). - -Edits exactly two scalars in `lldap` of `config.yaml` in sso/keycape-config: `bindDN` and `bindPW`. -`--operation switch` sets `uid=svc-keycape,...` and the password from the private custody copy -(`lldap/secrets.env`, key LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS); `--operation revert` sets `uid=admin,...` back and -takes the admin password at a hidden prompt. `--operation clear-password` (NK-WP-0056-T04) empties -`bindPW` while the bind stays `svc-keycape`, and only when the keycape Deployment already takes -KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW from the ESO Secret keycape-lldap-bind; `switch` puts the custody password back. -The signing key, every client and every other config byte -are preserved and checked by re-parsing. - -Modes default to non-mutating, as in openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py: `inspect` reads and plans, -`dry-run` sends a server-side dry-run patch, `apply` writes and needs `--attended` plus the observed -uid/resourceVersion. KeyCape reads the change after `kubectl -n sso rollout restart deploy/keycape`. -No Secret value, parser message or Kubernetes error text leaves the process. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import copy -import getpass -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def module(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - result = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(result) - return result - - -# Reuse the owner lane's contained kubectl, refusal type and cluster pin. -lane = module("portal_rollout", ROOT / "portal-client-rollout.py") -pin = lane.pin -Refused = lane.Refused -require = lane.require -custody = module( - "keycape_bind_custody", ROOT.parents[1] / "bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" -) - -SERVICE_DN = "uid=svc-keycape,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" -HUMAN_DN = "uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" -BIND_ENV = { - "name": "KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW", - "valueFrom": {"secretKeyRef": {"name": "keycape-lldap-bind", "key": "password"}}, -} - - -def env_delivered(deployment): - """True only if the keycape container takes the bind password from the ESO Secret.""" - containers = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"] - keycape = [c for c in containers if c.get("name") == "keycape"] - require(len(keycape) == 1, "keycape_container_required") - return BIND_ENV in keycape[0].get("env", []) - - -def service_password(root): - with custody.custody(Path(root), ["lldap"]) as directories: - return custody.literal( - custody.read_env(directories["lldap"]), "LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS" - ) - - -def _lldap(secret): - raw = base64.b64decode(secret["data"]["config.yaml"], validate=True).decode("utf-8") - if any( - isinstance(t, (yaml.tokens.AnchorToken, yaml.tokens.AliasToken)) - for t in yaml.scan(raw) - ): - raise Refused("yaml_alias_or_anchor") - config = yaml.load(raw, Loader=pin.UniqueLoader) - require( - isinstance(config, dict) and isinstance(config.get("lldap"), dict), - "lldap_mapping_required", - ) - node = next(v for k, v in yaml.compose(raw).value if k.value == "lldap") - fields = {k.value: v for k, v in node.value} - for name in ("bindDN", "bindPW"): - require( - isinstance(fields.get(name), yaml.nodes.ScalarNode), "bind_scalars_required" - ) - return raw, config, fields - - -def replace(secret, dn, password): - """Return (base64 config, changed, prior) with only bindDN and bindPW replaced.""" - raw, config, fields = _lldap(secret) - current = config["lldap"]["bindDN"] - prior = ( - "service" - if current == SERVICE_DN - else "human" - if current == HUMAN_DN - else "other" - ) - require(prior != "other", "unexpected_bind_dn_requires_reconciliation") - if current == dn and config["lldap"]["bindPW"] == password: - return secret["data"]["config.yaml"], False, prior - # Replace later spans first so earlier indexes stay valid. - spans = sorted( - ((fields["bindDN"], dn), (fields["bindPW"], password)), - key=lambda p: p[0].start_mark.index, - reverse=True, - ) - updated = raw - for scalar, value in spans: - updated = ( - updated[: scalar.start_mark.index] - + json.dumps(value) - + updated[scalar.end_mark.index :] - ) - expected = copy.deepcopy(config) - expected["lldap"].update(bindDN=dn, bindPW=password) - require( - yaml.load(updated, Loader=pin.UniqueLoader) == expected, - "unrelated_configuration_changed", - ) - return base64.b64encode(updated.encode()).decode(), True, prior - - -def run(args, kubectl=None, prompt=getpass.getpass): - kubectl = kubectl or lane.kubectl - cluster = kubectl(["get", "namespace", "kube-system", "-o", "json"]) - require(cluster["metadata"]["uid"] == lane.CLUSTER_UID, "cluster_identity_changed") - before = kubectl(["-n", "sso", "get", "secret", "keycape-config", "-o", "json"]) - require(not before["metadata"].get("ownerReferences"), "controller_owned_secret") - metadata = pin.safe_metadata(before) - if args.operation == "switch": - dn, password = SERVICE_DN, service_password(args.custody_root) - elif args.operation == "clear-password": - require(_lldap(before)[1]["lldap"]["bindDN"] == SERVICE_DN, "clear_requires_service_bind") - deployment = kubectl(["-n", "sso", "get", "deployment", "keycape", "-o", "json"]) - require(env_delivered(deployment), "bind_env_not_delivered") - dn, password = SERVICE_DN, "" - else: - dn, password = ( - HUMAN_DN, - prompt("Human admin password for the KeyCape bind rollback: "), - ) - require(bool(password) and "\n" not in password, "password_required") - encoded, changed, prior = replace(before, dn, password) - receipt = { - "schema": "netkingdom.keycape-directory-bind.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0056-T04" if args.operation == "clear-password" else "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "target": "sso/keycape-config", - "before": metadata, - "operation": args.operation, - "prior_bind": prior, - "change_needed": changed, - "mode": args.mode, - "values_emitted": False, - "changed": False, - } - if args.mode == "inspect": - return receipt - if args.mode == "apply": - require(args.attended, "attended_operator_required") - require( - metadata - == { - "uid": args.expected_uid, - "resource_version": args.expected_resource_version, - }, - "observed_revision_changed", - ) - if changed: - patch = [ - {"op": "test", "path": "/metadata/uid", "value": metadata["uid"]}, - { - "op": "test", - "path": "/metadata/resourceVersion", - "value": metadata["resource_version"], - }, - {"op": "replace", "path": "/data/config.yaml", "value": encoded}, - ] - command = [ - "-n", - "sso", - "patch", - "secret", - "keycape-config", - "--type=json", - "--patch-file=/dev/stdin", - "-o", - "json", - ] - if args.mode == "dry-run": - command += ["--dry-run=server"] - result = kubectl(command, patch) - require( - result["data"] == dict(before["data"], **{"config.yaml": encoded}), - "patch_response_mismatch", - ) - if args.mode == "apply": - after = kubectl(["-n", "sso", "get", "secret", "keycape-config", "-o", "json"]) - require( - after["metadata"]["uid"] == metadata["uid"] - and after["data"] == dict(before["data"], **{"config.yaml": encoded}), - "readback_mismatch_stop_without_stale_replay", - ) - receipt.update( - changed=changed, after=pin.safe_metadata(after), restart_required=changed - ) - receipt.update( - unrelated_config_bytes_preserved=True, other_secret_data_unchanged=True - ) - return receipt - - -def main(argv=None, kubectl=None, prompt=getpass.getpass): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument( - "mode", nargs="?", default="inspect", choices=["inspect", "dry-run", "apply"] - ) - parser.add_argument("--operation", default="switch", choices=["switch", "revert", "clear-password"]) - parser.add_argument( - "--custody-root", help="private custody copy; required for switch" - ) - parser.add_argument("--expected-uid") - parser.add_argument("--expected-resource-version") - parser.add_argument("--attended", action="store_true", help="required for apply") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - if args.operation == "switch": - require(bool(args.custody_root), "custody_root_required") - print(json.dumps(run(args, kubectl, prompt), sort_keys=True)) - return 0 - except (Refused, custody.Refused) as error: - print(json.dumps({"status": "refused", "reason": str(error) or "refused"})) - except pin.IssuerPinError as error: - print(json.dumps({"status": "refused", "reason": str(error)})) - except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - contain any error that could carry Secret material - # Parser and Kubernetes errors can contain full Secret material. - print(json.dumps({"status": "failed", "reason": "contained_operation_failed"})) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ensure-groups-adapter.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ensure-groups-adapter.md deleted file mode 100644 index d9f01da..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ensure-groups-adapter.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -# Ensure-groups adapter source candidate (NK-WP-0048-T24) - -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter. It is -unexercised against any live system and is not pinned, admitted or reviewed. - -## Binding - -- `build()` takes an admitted `ensure-groups` invocation, the exact case bytes, - an injected provisioner, owner `publish`/`authenticate` evidence - capabilities and `revoke_session(invocation) -> identifier`. -- The descriptor declares revocation scope `parent-session` (the Warden v1 - kernel refuses an empty scope set). `revoke_session` runs in a `finally` block - on every run and rollback, including failed ones, so the parent session always - ends; a missing or malformed revocation identifier refuses before publication. - The identifier is recorded in the evidence payload and returned as - `session_revocation_evidence` with `revoked=True`. -- Group creation binds to the T14/T21 journal seam. The provisioner's - `group_provenance` must be a `PostgresGroupProvenance`. Its `GroupJournalBinding` - must name this case pin, the reviewed adapter source digest and the admitted - principal. A missing journal, a local SQLite journal or a differing binding is - refused before any call. -- By default the case must be canonical `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1`. - `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2` is accepted only when `build` is called with - an explicit `version_root='1.2'` (as in `handover-adapter.py`), and successor - `@1.3` only with `version_root='1.3'`; an unknown root - or a case type that differs from the selected root is refused. The 1.2 - revision leaves the ensure-groups step and its `access_groups` / - `initial_members` parameters unchanged, so both roots share one parser. - `access_groups` and `initial_members` are parsed exactly, and members outside - `access_groups` are refused. This is a source path only; it admits nothing. -- The journal binding is computed by the adapter's public `group_binding`, - which a test pins byte-identical to the provisioner's private - `LLDAPProvisioner._group_binding`; the adapter no longer calls the private - method. Promoting it to a public provisioner API is an identity-provisioner - owner change, not made here. -- The idempotency key and correlation id are derived from the case pin, so - every attempt resumes the same journal receipt. A replay returns `no_change` - and never recreates removed state. -- The source digest pins the adapter plus `provisioner.py`, - `group_provenance.py` and `group_provenance_postgres.py`. - -## Rollback - -Rollback calls `revoke_service_groups` against the original journal receipt. -It accepts only `service-group`/`service-group-membership` created objects. -The journal, not the caller, decides what was created, and preexisting or -shared state is preserved. `delete_created_if_empty` defaults to `false`. -Enabling it requires an owner fact that no other case uses the groups. This -adapter does not supply that fact. - -`verify` requires the authenticated owner evidence and a journal readback -state (`ensured` / `revoked`) matching the outcome. It fails closed on any -journal error. - -## Not supplied here - -- NetKingdom (directory) owner source review before pinning. -- Native CNPG journal admission, trusted continuity/checkpoint callbacks and - protected `GroupJournalBinding` construction (T14). -- Writer isolation or CAS against external LDAP writers. -- Any native action. - -Tests use synthetic fakes only (no SQL, no LLDAP): -`PYTHONPATH=~/ops-warden/src ~/ops-warden/.venv/bin/python -m pytest sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_ensure_groups_adapter.py` diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ensure-groups-adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ensure-groups-adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3adea79..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/ensure-groups-adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,217 +0,0 @@ -"""Unexercised, injection-only ensure-groups seam for Warden's v1 kernel (T24). - -Source candidate only. No CLI, credentials, LLDAP session, SQL connection or -evidence trust root is installed here. Group creation is bound to T14's -journal/provenance seam: the injected provisioner must carry a -PostgresGroupProvenance whose GroupJournalBinding names this exact case, -principal and reviewed adapter source, with independent continuity callbacks. -SQLite/local journals, a missing journal or a differing binding are refused. -Owner source review and every native action remain separate gates. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import hashlib -import json -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, contained_output, digest, IDENTIFIER -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -PROVISIONER = ROOT.parents[2] / 'identity-provisioner' -SOURCE_FILES = (('sso-mfa/k8s/keycape', 'ensure-groups-adapter.py'), - ('identity-provisioner', 'provisioner.py'), - ('identity-provisioner', 'group_provenance.py'), - ('identity-provisioner', 'group_provenance_postgres.py')) -REFERENCE = 'net-kingdom/ensure-groups@v1' -CASE_TYPE = 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1' # canonical 1.1 stays the default -# 1.2 and 1.3 are reachable only by explicit version-root selection, never by default. -# Its ensure-groups step and access_groups/initial_members parameters are -# unchanged from 1.1, so the same request parsing applies to both. -SELECTABLE_TYPES = {'1.1': CASE_TYPE, '1.2': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2', - '1.3': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3'} -CREATED = ('service-group', 'service-group-membership') - -if str(PROVISIONER) not in sys.path: - sys.path.insert(0, str(PROVISIONER)) -from group_provenance_postgres import PostgresGroupProvenance # noqa: E402 (no I/O on import) - - -def source_digest(): - """Pin adapter plus the provisioner/journal import closure, in path order.""" - base = ROOT.parents[2] - files = {f'{d}/{n}': digest((base / d / n).read_bytes()) for d, n in SOURCE_FILES} - return digest(json.dumps({'files': files}, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def descriptor(): - return Descriptor('warden.case.execution.v1', 'ensure-groups', 'net-kingdom', REFERENCE, - source_digest(), 'human', 'keycape-attended-case-change', 'client_id', 'change', - CREATED, False, ('parent-session',)) - - -def group_binding(groups, members, correlation_id) -> str: - """Public form of the provisioner's exact ensure binding (journal key binding). - - Must stay byte-identical to identity-provisioner's Provisioner._group_binding; - the test suite pins that equality so drift fails closed in review. - """ - canonical = {'ensure_correlation_id': correlation_id, 'groups': sorted(groups), - 'members': {g: sorted(members.get(g, [])) for g in sorted(groups)}} - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(canonical, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()).hexdigest() - - -def _request(case, version_root='1.1'): - spec = case.get('spec') if isinstance(case, dict) else None - expected = SELECTABLE_TYPES.get(version_root) if isinstance(version_root, str) else None - if expected is None or not isinstance(spec, dict) or spec.get('type') != expected: - raise Refused('case type differs from selected version root') - params = spec.get('parameters') - if not isinstance(params, dict) or not isinstance(params.get('access_groups'), str): - raise Refused('access_groups required') - groups = params['access_groups'].split(',') - if len(set(groups)) != len(groups): - raise Refused('duplicate access group') - members = {} - raw = params.get('initial_members', '') - if not isinstance(raw, str): - raise Refused('initial_members must be a string') - for entry in filter(None, raw.split(';')): - group, _, users = entry.partition('=') - if group not in groups or group in members or not users: - raise Refused('initial_members names a group outside access_groups') - members[group] = users.split('+') - return params.get('client_id'), groups, members - - -def build(*, admitted: Invocation, case_source: bytes, provisioner, publish, authenticate, - revoke_session, delete_created_if_empty: bool = False, version_root: str = '1.1'): - """Bind one admitted case to the owner journal; return a closed kernel Adapter. - - provisioner exposes ensure_service_groups/revoke_service_groups and carries - the trusted owner journal as group_provenance. publish(bytes)->identifier and - authenticate(identifier, bytes)->True are owner evidence capabilities. - revoke_session(invocation)->identifier revokes this attempt's parent session; - it runs in a finally block, so even a failed attempt ends the session. - - The idempotency key and correlation derive from the case pin, so every - attempt resumes the one journal receipt and never recreates removed state. - version_root selects the accepted case type: '1.1' (default, canonical) or - '1.2' / '1.3' only when passed explicitly. Unknown roots are refused. - - Rollback reverses only journal-confirmed creations; preexisting/shared - groups and memberships are preserved. Ambiguity propagates as uncertain. - """ - reviewed = source_digest() - desc = descriptor() - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(v, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(v) - for v in (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, - admitted.actor, admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - if (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != ( - desc.step, desc.owner, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('ensure-groups invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - descriptor_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(descriptor_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - journal = getattr(provisioner, 'group_provenance', None) - if type(journal) is not PostgresGroupProvenance: - raise Refused('trusted owner journal callbacks required') - binding = journal.binding - if (binding.case_digest, binding.source_digest, binding.principal) != ( - admitted.pins.case, reviewed, admitted.principal): - raise Refused('owner journal binding differs from this case') - if not all(callable(getattr(provisioner, m, None)) for m in ('ensure_service_groups', 'revoke_service_groups')): - raise Refused('owner group operations required') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (publish, authenticate, revoke_session)) or type(delete_created_if_empty) is not bool: - raise Refused('owner evidence capabilities required') - if version_root not in SELECTABLE_TYPES: - raise Refused('unknown version root') - with contained_output(): - client_id, groups, members = _request(yaml.safe_load(case_source), version_root) - if client_id != admitted.target: - raise Refused('case target differs') - key = 'warden-ensure:' + admitted.pins.case - request = {'groups': groups, 'members': members, 'correlation_id': admitted.pins.case} - journal_binding = group_binding(groups, members, admitted.pins.case) - records = {} - - def check_attempt(inv, operation): - if (replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != operation or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest() != reviewed: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - - def execute(inv, rollback, created=()): - try: - with contained_output(): - check_attempt(inv, 'rollback' if rollback else 'run') - if rollback: - if not created or set(created) - set(CREATED): - raise Refused('only journal-confirmed creations may be rolled back') - result = provisioner.revoke_service_groups(dict( - request, idempotency_key=key + ':revoke', ensure_idempotency_key=key, - ensure_correlation_id=admitted.pins.case, delete_if_empty=delete_created_if_empty)) - expected = {'groups_revoked', 'groups_revoked_and_deleted'} - else: - result = provisioner.ensure_service_groups(dict(request, idempotency_key=key)) - expected = {'groups_ensured'} - finally: - # Even failure must end the parent session; failures propagate to the - # kernel as uncertain, never safe to replay. - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(inv) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - if (result.status not in expected or result.ensure_idempotency_key != key - or result.ensure_correlation_id != admitted.pins.case - or result.external_subject != ','.join(sorted(groups))): - raise Refused('owner journal result contract differs') - objects = tuple(name for name, items in zip(CREATED, (result.created_groups, result.created_memberships)) if items) - if rollback: - outcome = Outcome.ROLLED_BACK - elif result.resumed or not objects: - outcome, objects = Outcome.NO_CHANGE, () - else: - outcome = Outcome.SUCCESS - # Names and ids only: the journal holds no secret values. - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.ensure-groups.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed, 'outcome': outcome.value, - 'created': objects, 'journal_key': key, 'status': result.status, - 'created_groups': list(result.created_groups), - 'created_memberships': list(result.created_memberships), - 'session_revocation': revocation}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - owner = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, revocation, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, owner) - return owner - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - try: - state = journal.get(key, journal_binding)['state'] - except Exception: - return False - want = 'revoked' if result.outcome is Outcome.ROLLED_BACK else 'ensured' - return state == want and authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed, lambda inv: execute(inv, False), verify, - lambda inv, created: execute(inv, True, created)) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/handover-adapter.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/handover-adapter.md deleted file mode 100644 index ce63167..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/handover-adapter.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -# Apps hand-over adapter (source candidate, NK-WP-0048-T29) - -`handover-adapter.py` is an unexercised, injection-only seam for Warden's v1 -kernel, modelled on the T13 registration adapter. It covers step (f), -Apps-owned consumer verification and the hand-over receipt. - -- **Descriptor:** `descriptor(owner)` — step `hand-over`, owner is a parameter - (type 1.2 declares `{consumer_owner_repo}`; the T30 composer passes it, e.g. - `railiance-apps`), actor `human`, lane `apps-consumer-handover`, target - `client_id`, effect `change`, allowed created object `handover-receipt`, not - retry-safe, revocation scope `parent-session` (the Warden v1 kernel refuses an - empty scope set). `build()` derives the descriptor from `admitted.owner`; a 1.2 - case must carry a bounded `consumer_owner_repo` equal to it. The lane name is - still a candidate value for Apps owner review. -- **Case binding:** canonical `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1` is the default; - `@1.2` is reached only through an explicit `version_root='1.2'` selection, and - successor `@1.3` (1.2 plus `execution_descriptors`) only through - `version_root='1.3'`, with the same `consumer_owner_repo` owner handling. - No `--allow-unimplemented` admission exists. Case, descriptor and acceptance - pins are checked; `access_groups` must be non-empty, because 1.1 hand-over - requires the consumer to enforce them (`consumer-enforces-groups`). -- **Injected capabilities (required, never strings or case parameters):** - `verify_consumer(client_id, groups)` must return exactly `client_id`, - `enforces_groups=True`, the case's `groups`, `login_verified=True` and - `observations` (RAPPS-1.3-C2): a value-free list of `{probe, evidence}` records, - one each for `member-login`, `non-member-refused`, `membership-add-grants` and - `membership-remove-revokes`, evidence an owner evidence identifier (IDENTIFIER - pattern). Missing, extra, duplicate or unknown probes and any other key are - refused; the observation digest covers the records in canonical probe order; - `record_handover(client_id, observation_digest) -> (identifier, created)`; - `remove_handover(identifier) -> True`; `publish(bytes) -> identifier` and - `authenticate(identifier, bytes) -> True` for owner evidence; - `revoke_session(invocation) -> identifier`, called in a `finally` block on - every run and rollback (even failed ones) so the parent session always ends. - A missing or malformed revocation identifier refuses before publication; the - identifier is recorded in the evidence payload and returned as - `session_revocation_evidence` with `revoked=True`. -- **Rollback is created-only:** only a receipt this process created and whose - evidence the owner authenticates may be removed. An existing receipt is - `no_change` and never rolled back; unconfirmed removal refuses and keeps the - creation. Process loss and ambiguity stay for owner reconciliation (T31/T15). - -Tests: `python3 -m pytest sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_handover_adapter.py` -(synthetic fixtures only; no consumer, store or credential is touched). - -Not supplied here: Apps owner source review before pinning, actual consumer -verifier and receipt store, admission, and any native action. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/handover-adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/handover-adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 0659a67..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/handover-adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,219 +0,0 @@ -"""Unexercised, injection-only Apps-owned hand-over seam for Warden's v1 kernel. - -Source candidate for NK-WP-0048-T29. No CLI, credentials, consumer access or -live receipt store is installed here. Consumer verification, hand-over receipt -recording/removal and owner evidence publication/authentication are mandatory -injected capabilities. Apps owner source review precedes any pinning. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import json -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, contained_output, digest, IDENTIFIER -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -SOURCE_FILES = ('handover-adapter.py',) -REFERENCE = 'net-kingdom/apps-handover@v1' -CANONICAL_TYPE = 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1' -# 1.2 and 1.3 are reachable only by explicit version-root selection, never by default. -# 1.3 is 1.2 plus execution_descriptors, so 1.2 owner handling applies to it. -SELECTABLE_TYPES = {'1.1': CANONICAL_TYPE, '1.2': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2', - '1.3': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3'} -OWNER_ROOTS = frozenset({'1.2', '1.3'}) -RECEIPT = 'handover-receipt' -# Value-free probe records verify_consumer must report, each exactly once (RAPPS-1.3-C2). -PROBES = frozenset({'member-login', 'non-member-refused', 'membership-add-grants', - 'membership-remove-revokes'}) -SEEN_KEYS = frozenset({'client_id', 'enforces_groups', 'groups', 'login_verified', 'observations'}) - - -def _observations(value): - """Return the probe records in canonical order, or None if the contract differs.""" - if not isinstance(value, list) or len(value) != len(PROBES): - return None - records = [] - for rec in value: - if not (isinstance(rec, dict) and set(rec) == {'probe', 'evidence'} - and isinstance(rec['probe'], str) and rec['probe'] in PROBES - and isinstance(rec['evidence'], str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(rec['evidence'])): - return None - records.append({'probe': rec['probe'], 'evidence': rec['evidence']}) - if {r['probe'] for r in records} != PROBES: - return None - return sorted(records, key=lambda r: r['probe']) - - -def source_digest(): - composition = {'files': {name: digest((ROOT / name).read_bytes()) for name in SOURCE_FILES}} - return digest(json.dumps(composition, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def descriptor(owner): - """The owner is the case's consumer_owner_repo (type 1.2 '{consumer_owner_repo}').""" - if not isinstance(owner, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(owner): - raise Refused('bounded consumer owner required') - return Descriptor('warden.case.execution.v1', 'hand-over', owner, REFERENCE, - source_digest(), 'human', 'apps-consumer-handover', 'client_id', - 'change', (RECEIPT,), False, ('parent-session',)) - - -def _case(case_source, version_root): - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - spec = case.get('spec') if isinstance(case, dict) else None - params = spec.get('parameters') if isinstance(spec, dict) else None - if not isinstance(params, dict) or spec.get('type') != SELECTABLE_TYPES.get(version_root): - raise Refused('case type differs from selected version root') - client_id, groups = params.get('client_id'), params.get('access_groups') - if not isinstance(client_id, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(client_id): - raise Refused('bounded client_id required') - groups = tuple(sorted(g.strip() for g in groups.split(','))) if isinstance(groups, str) else () - if not groups or not all(IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(g) for g in groups): - raise Refused('hand-over requires access_groups the consumer enforces') - owner = params.get('consumer_owner_repo') - if version_root in OWNER_ROOTS and (not isinstance(owner, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(owner)): - raise Refused('1.2/1.3 hand-over requires a bounded consumer_owner_repo') - return client_id, groups, owner if version_root in OWNER_ROOTS else None - - -def build(*, admitted: Invocation, case_source: bytes, case_acceptance: str, - verify_consumer, record_handover, remove_handover, publish, authenticate, - revoke_session, version_root: str = '1.1'): - """Bind one admitted case; return a closed kernel Adapter. - - verify_consumer(client_id, groups)->dict observes the consumer and must report - {'client_id', 'enforces_groups', 'groups', 'login_verified', 'observations'} for - exactly this case; 'observations' is a value-free list of {probe, evidence} - records, one per probe in PROBES, evidence an owner evidence IDENTIFIER. The - observation digest covers the whole report, observations included. record_handover(client_id, observation_digest)->(identifier, created) - durably records the hand-over receipt; remove_handover(identifier) removes only - that receipt. publish/authenticate are owner evidence capabilities. - revoke_session(invocation)->identifier revokes this attempt's parent session - in a finally block, so even a failed attempt ends the session. - - The descriptor owner is admitted.owner; a 1.2 case must name the same - consumer_owner_repo. A 1.1 case carries no such parameter and is bound to - the admitted owner alone. - - Only a receipt verifiably created by this process may be rolled back. Process - loss, ambiguity or publication failure require owner reconciliation. - """ - reviewed = source_digest() - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(v, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(v) for v in - (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, admitted.actor, - admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - desc = descriptor(admitted.owner) - if (admitted.step, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != (desc.step, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('hand-over invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(desc_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - if not isinstance(case_acceptance, str) or digest(case_acceptance.encode()) != admitted.pins.acceptance: - raise Refused('acceptance evidence binding differs') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (verify_consumer, record_handover, remove_handover, publish, authenticate, - revoke_session)): - raise Refused('owner verification, receipt and evidence capabilities required') - with contained_output(): - client_id, groups, owner = _case(case_source, version_root) - if admitted.target != client_id: - raise Refused('case target differs') - if owner is not None and owner != admitted.owner: - raise Refused('case consumer_owner_repo differs from admitted owner') - records = {} - creation = None - - def binding(inv, operation): - if (replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != operation or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest() != reviewed: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - - def finish(inv, outcome, objects, body, revocation): - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.apps-handover.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed, - 'outcome': outcome.value, 'created': objects, - 'session_revocation': revocation, **body}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, revocation, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, result) - return result - - def invoke(inv): - binding(inv, 'run') - with contained_output(): - seen = verify_consumer(client_id, groups) - if not (isinstance(seen, dict) and set(seen) == SEEN_KEYS - and seen['client_id'] == client_id and seen['enforces_groups'] is True - and seen['login_verified'] is True and tuple(sorted(seen['groups'] or ())) == groups): - raise Refused('consumer verification contract differs') - probes = _observations(seen['observations']) - if probes is None: - raise Refused('consumer observation records differ') - seen = {'client_id': client_id, 'enforces_groups': True, 'groups': list(groups), - 'login_verified': True, 'observations': probes} - observation = digest(json.dumps(seen, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - with contained_output(): - receipt = record_handover(client_id, observation) - if not (isinstance(receipt, tuple) and len(receipt) == 2 and isinstance(receipt[0], str) - and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(receipt[0]) and type(receipt[1]) is bool): - raise Refused('hand-over receipt contract differs') - ref, created = receipt - objects = (RECEIPT,) if created else () - return (Outcome.SUCCESS if created else Outcome.NO_CHANGE, objects, - {'observation': observation, 'receipt': ref}, ref if created else None) - - def rollback(inv, created): - binding(inv, 'rollback') - if created != (RECEIPT,) or creation is None or not verify(*creation[:2]): - raise Refused('no authenticated case-created hand-over receipt') - ref = creation[2] - with contained_output(): - removed = remove_handover(ref) - if removed is not True: - raise Refused('hand-over receipt removal unconfirmed') - return Outcome.ROLLED_BACK, (), {'removed_receipt': ref}, None - - def execute(inv, operation, created=()): - nonlocal creation - try: - outcome, objects, body, ref = (invoke(inv) if operation == 'run' - else rollback(inv, created)) - finally: - # Even failure must end the parent session; failures propagate to the - # kernel as uncertain, never safe to replay. - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(inv) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - result = finish(inv, outcome, objects, body, revocation) - if ref is not None: - creation = (inv, result, ref) - elif operation == 'rollback': - creation = None - return result - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - return authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed, lambda inv: execute(inv, 'run'), verify, - lambda inv, created: execute(inv, 'rollback', created)) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/kernel-catalog.fixture.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/kernel-catalog.fixture.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index d9f8d06..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/kernel-catalog.fixture.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,128 +0,0 @@ -# TEST ONLY: synthetic subset shaped after ops-warden 5abde817 catalog. -# Four draft entries are hypothetically active; Apps session_lane remains unresolved. -# Not an authenticated owner catalog, promotion, login choice or native authority. -entries: -- id: key-cape-oidc-login - risk: standard - owner_repo: key-cape - warden_executes: false - reviewed: '2026-06-27' - status: active - delegation: - mode: interim - intended_owner: key-cape - reviewed: '2026-09-08' - blocked_on: fixture-only; no native authority - lane: login - title: Synthetic key-cape-oidc-login - need_keywords: - - key-cape-oidc-login - subsystem: synthetic source test - wiki_ref: fixture-only - canon_ref: fixture-only - workload_ref: - applicability: not-applicable - reason: Synthetic source test; no workload or native authority. -- id: keycape-client-secret-generate - risk: high - owner_repo: railiance-platform - warden_executes: false - reviewed: '2026-10-10' - status: active - delegation: - mode: native - intended_owner: railiance-platform - reviewed: '2026-10-10' - lane: secret - title: Synthetic keycape-client-secret-generate - need_keywords: - - keycape-client-secret-generate - subsystem: synthetic source test - wiki_ref: fixture-only - canon_ref: fixture-only - workload_ref: - applicability: not-applicable - reason: Synthetic source test; no workload or native authority. -- id: keycape-attended-case-change - lane: attended-change - session_lane: key-cape-oidc-login - risk: high - owner_repo: key-cape/net-kingdom - warden_executes: false - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - status: active - delegation: - mode: interim - intended_owner: key-cape - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - blocked_on: fixture-only; no native authority - title: Synthetic keycape-attended-case-change - need_keywords: - - keycape-attended-case-change - subsystem: synthetic source test - wiki_ref: fixture-only - canon_ref: fixture-only - workload_ref: - applicability: not-applicable - reason: Synthetic source test; no workload or native authority. -- id: platform-secret-delivery - risk: high - owner_repo: railiance-platform - warden_executes: false - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - status: active - delegation: - mode: native - intended_owner: railiance-platform - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - title: Synthetic platform-secret-delivery - need_keywords: - - platform-secret-delivery - subsystem: synthetic source test - wiki_ref: fixture-only - canon_ref: fixture-only - workload_ref: - applicability: not-applicable - reason: Synthetic source test; no workload or native authority. -- id: consumer-owner-deployment - lane: attended-change - session_lane: pending-owner-confirmation - risk: high - owner_repo: railiance-apps - warden_executes: false - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - status: active - delegation: - mode: native - intended_owner: railiance-apps - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - title: Synthetic consumer-owner-deployment - need_keywords: - - consumer-owner-deployment - subsystem: synthetic source test - wiki_ref: fixture-only - canon_ref: fixture-only - workload_ref: - applicability: not-applicable - reason: Synthetic source test; no workload or native authority. -- id: apps-consumer-handover - lane: attended-change - session_lane: pending-owner-confirmation - risk: high - owner_repo: railiance-apps - warden_executes: false - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - status: active - delegation: - mode: native - intended_owner: railiance-apps - reviewed: '2026-10-17' - title: Synthetic apps-consumer-handover - need_keywords: - - apps-consumer-handover - subsystem: synthetic source test - wiki_ref: fixture-only - canon_ref: fixture-only - workload_ref: - applicability: not-applicable - reason: Synthetic source test; no workload or native authority. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3ffc9e8..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,361 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Register or remove exactly one KeyCape client from a SecurityCase, without exporting Secret values. - -Entry point of the playbook capability net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration, -composed by the SecurityCaseType oidc-browser-relying-party -(security-case-types/, canon security-case-types_v0.1). It generalizes the -per-client helpers in this directory (portal-client-rollout, -register-coulomb-social, vergabe-client-rollout, -secrets-engine-openbao-client-rollout) and keeps their safeguards: - -- contained kubectl, cluster-identity pin and verified upstream issuer pin -- byte-preserving merge: only this client's lines change; every other config - byte, the signing key and unrelated clients are preserved -- exact match: absent -> add; identical -> noop; drift, duplicates or a shared - secretRef -> refuse (update = remove, then add, each accepted) -- compare-and-swap on the Secret's uid and resourceVersion, then read-back -- confidential clients: the KeyCape Deployment must already bind the client's - secret env var (delivered from custody), or the next pod start fails closed -- KeyCape's own startup checks (keycape check-config, key-cape c528daa) on the - live and the proposed registry, fed on stdin and never written to disk; apply - refuses a registry that would stop the single replica at its next start -- no Secret value, parser message or Kubernetes error text leaves the process - -Modes: inspect (default), dry-run (server-side), apply. apply requires the -case's acceptance record instead of a per-client founder decision id: the case -was accepted under an acknowledged type. - - keycape-client.py client-from-case - keycape-client.py inspect --client-file client.yaml [--operation remove] - keycape-client.py apply --client-file client.yaml --case-acceptance \\ - --check-config --expected-uid --expected-resource-version -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -import re -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def module(name, filename): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, ROOT / filename) - result = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(result) - return result - - -lane = module('portal_rollout', 'portal-client-rollout.py') -pin = lane.pin -Refused = lane.Refused -require = lane.require - -CASE_TYPE = re.compile(r'^oidc-browser-relying-party@1\.\d+$') -SERVICE_CASE_TYPE = re.compile(r'^oidc-service-client@0\.\d+$') -AUDIENCE = re.compile(r'^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$') -RESOURCE_SCOPE = re.compile(r'^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*:[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$') -SERVICE_SUBJECT = re.compile(r'^service:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$') -TENANT = re.compile(r'^tenant:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$') -ROLE = re.compile(r'^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$') -LIFETIMES = {'5m', '10m', '15m'} -CLIENT_ID = re.compile(r'^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$') -# KeyCape refuses '*' and '?' at startup; OAuth 2.0 forbids fragments. -REDIRECT = re.compile(r'^https://[^*?#\s,]+$') -SCOPES = {'openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups'} - - -def env_name(client_id): - return 'KEYCAPE_' + client_id.upper().replace('-', '_') + '_CLIENT_SECRET' - - -def env_secret_name(client_id): - return f'keycape-{client_id}-client' - - -def client_from_params(params): - """The KeyCape client record for a case of oidc-browser-relying-party.""" - missing = {'client_id', 'display_name', 'redirect_uris', 'allowed_scopes', 'client_type', 'mfa_required'} - set(params) - require(not missing, 'missing_parameters') - cid = params['client_id'] - require(CLIENT_ID.fullmatch(cid or '') is not None, 'invalid_client_id') - redirects = [r for r in params['redirect_uris'].split(',')] - require(redirects and all(REDIRECT.fullmatch(r) for r in redirects), 'redirect_uris_must_be_exact_https') - scopes = params['allowed_scopes'].split(',') - require(scopes[0] == 'openid' and set(scopes) <= SCOPES and len(set(scopes)) == len(scopes), - 'allowed_scopes_invalid') - # KeyCape has no per-client group gate; the consumer reads groups, and UserInfo - # returns them only for the groups scope. - require(not params.get('access_groups') or 'groups' in scopes, 'access_groups_require_groups_scope') - require(params['client_type'] in ('confidential', 'public'), 'client_type_invalid') - # The type derives custody at platform/workloads/keycape/; a case cannot choose it. - require('secret_ref' not in params, 'secret_ref_is_derived_by_the_type') - require(params['mfa_required'] in ('true', 'false'), 'mfa_required_invalid') - client = { - 'clientId': cid, - 'displayName': params['display_name'], - 'redirectUris': redirects, - 'allowedScopes': scopes, - 'grantTypes': ['authorization_code'], - 'clientType': params['client_type'], - } - if params['client_type'] == 'confidential': - client['secretRef'] = 'env:' + env_name(cid) - if params['mfa_required'] == 'true': - client['mfaRequired'] = True - return client - - -def service_client_from_params(params): - """The KeyCape client record for a case of oidc-service-client (client_credentials). Field rules follow - key-cape src/internal/config/validate.go: confidential, env secretRef, serviceSubject and tenant, no redirect URIs; - the type is stricter (closed resource scopes, at most 15m).""" - missing = {'client_id', 'display_name', 'audience', 'allowed_scopes', 'service_subject', 'tenant', - 'token_lifetime'} - set(params) - require(not missing, 'missing_parameters') - cid = params['client_id'] - require(CLIENT_ID.fullmatch(cid or '') is not None, 'invalid_client_id') - require(AUDIENCE.fullmatch(params.get('audience') or '') is not None, 'audience_invalid') - scopes = (params.get('allowed_scopes') or '').split(',') - require(all(RESOURCE_SCOPE.fullmatch(s) for s in scopes) and len(set(scopes)) == len(scopes), - 'allowed_scopes_must_be_distinct_resource_scopes') - require(SERVICE_SUBJECT.fullmatch(params.get('service_subject') or '') is not None, 'service_subject_invalid') - require(TENANT.fullmatch(params.get('tenant') or '') is not None, 'tenant_invalid') - require(params.get('token_lifetime') in LIFETIMES, 'token_lifetime_invalid') - for key in ('redirect_uris', 'client_type', 'mfa_required', 'secret_ref'): - require(key not in params, key + '_not_admitted_for_service_clients') - client = { - 'clientId': cid, - 'displayName': params['display_name'], - 'audience': params['audience'], - 'allowedScopes': scopes, - 'grantTypes': ['client_credentials'], - 'clientType': 'confidential', - 'secretRef': 'env:' + env_name(cid), - 'serviceSubject': params['service_subject'], - 'tenant': params['tenant'], - } - if params.get('roles'): - roles = params['roles'].split(',') - require(all(ROLE.fullmatch(r) for r in roles) and len(set(roles)) == len(roles), 'roles_invalid') - client['roles'] = roles - client['tokenLifetime'] = params['token_lifetime'] - return client - - -def client_from_case(case): - spec = case.get('spec') or {} - case_type = str(spec.get('type', '')) - if SERVICE_CASE_TYPE.fullmatch(case_type): - return service_client_from_params(spec.get('parameters') or {}) - require(CASE_TYPE.fullmatch(case_type) is not None, 'case_type_not_a_keycape_client_type') - return client_from_params(spec.get('parameters') or {}) - - -def env_binding(client): - return {'name': env_name(client['clientId']), 'valueFrom': { - 'secretKeyRef': {'name': env_secret_name(client['clientId']), 'key': 'client-secret'}}} - - -def _client_node(raw): - root = yaml.compose(raw) - node = next(value for key, value in root.value if key.value == 'clients') - require(isinstance(node, yaml.nodes.SequenceNode) and not node.flow_style, - 'block_client_sequence_required') - return node - - -def _line_start(raw, index): - start = raw.rfind('\n', 0, index) + 1 - return start if not raw[start:index].strip() else index - - -def _inspect(secret, client): - raw, config, _ = pin.issuer_document(secret) - require(config['authelia'].get('issuer') == pin.VERIFIED_UPSTREAM_ISSUER, 'verified_issuer_pin_required') - clients = config.get('clients') - require(isinstance(clients, list) and clients, 'client_sequence_required') - require(all(isinstance(c, dict) and 'clientId' in c for c in clients), 'client_shape_unexpected') - ids = [c['clientId'] for c in clients] - require(len(ids) == len(set(ids)), 'duplicate_client_id') - if 'secretRef' in client: - others = [c for c in clients if c['clientId'] != client['clientId']] - require(all(c.get('secretRef') != client['secretRef'] for c in others), 'secret_ref_already_bound') - return raw, config, ids - - -def replacement(secret, client): - """Return (base64 config, changed) with only this client added.""" - raw, config, ids = _inspect(secret, client) - if client['clientId'] in ids: - require(config['clients'][ids.index(client['clientId'])] == client, - 'existing_registration_differs_requires_reconciliation') - return secret['data']['config.yaml'], False - node = _client_node(raw) - index = _line_start(raw, node.end_mark.index) - indent = ' ' * node.start_mark.column - fragment = yaml.safe_dump([client], sort_keys=False, width=120) - fragment = ''.join(indent + line if line.strip() else line for line in fragment.splitlines(True)) - if index and raw[index - 1] != '\n': - fragment = '\n' + fragment - updated = raw[:index] + fragment + raw[index:] - expected = copy.deepcopy(config) - expected['clients'].append(client) - require(yaml.load(updated, Loader=pin.UniqueLoader) == expected, 'unrelated_configuration_changed') - return base64.b64encode(updated.encode()).decode(), True - - -def removal(secret, client): - """Rollback: return (base64 config, changed) with only this exact client removed.""" - raw, config, ids = _inspect(secret, client) - if client['clientId'] not in ids: - return secret['data']['config.yaml'], False - position = ids.index(client['clientId']) - require(config['clients'][position] == client, 'existing_registration_differs_requires_reconciliation') - require(len(ids) > 1, 'removal_would_empty_client_sequence') - node = _client_node(raw) - item = node.value[position] - start = raw.rfind('\n', 0, item.start_mark.index) + 1 - require(raw[start:item.start_mark.index].strip() == '-', 'unexpected_item_layout') - if position + 1 < len(node.value): - end = raw.rfind('\n', 0, node.value[position + 1].start_mark.index) + 1 - else: - end = _line_start(raw, node.end_mark.index) - updated = raw[:start] + raw[end:] - expected = copy.deepcopy(config) - del expected['clients'][position] - require(yaml.load(updated, Loader=pin.UniqueLoader) == expected, 'unrelated_configuration_changed') - return base64.b64encode(updated.encode()).decode(), True - - -def deployment_bound(deployment, client): - """Whether the live Deployment carries exactly this client's secret binding.""" - if 'secretRef' not in client: - return None - containers = deployment['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'] - container = next(c for c in containers if c['name'] == 'keycape') - matches = [e for e in container.get('env', []) if e.get('name') == env_name(client['clientId'])] - require(len(matches) <= 1 and all(e == env_binding(client) for e in matches), 'env_binding_drift') - return bool(matches) - - -def check_config(binary, config_text, env_names, policy_store, *, executable_fd=None): - """KeyCape's startup checks on one registry: names and messages only, no values.""" - executable = str(Path(binary).resolve()) if executable_fd is None else f'/proc/self/fd/{executable_fd}' - command = [executable, 'check-config', '--config', '/dev/stdin', '--env-names', ','.join(env_names)] - if policy_store: - command.append('--policy-store') - result = subprocess.run(command, input=config_text.encode(), capture_output=True, timeout=60, env={}, - pass_fds=() if executable_fd is None else (executable_fd,)) - report = json.loads(result.stdout) - require(isinstance(report, dict) and isinstance(report.get('valid'), bool) - and report['valid'] == (result.returncode == 0), 'check_config_output_shape') - return {'valid': report['valid'], 'clients': report.get('clients'), - 'errors': [str(e) for e in report.get('errors') or []]} - - -def deployment_env_names(deployment): - containers = deployment['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'] - container = next(c for c in containers if c['name'] == 'keycape') - return sorted(e['name'] for e in container.get('env', [])) - - -def run(args, client): - kubectl = lane.kubectl - cluster = kubectl(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'json']) - require(cluster['metadata']['uid'] == lane.CLUSTER_UID, 'cluster_identity_changed') - before = kubectl(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '-o', 'json']) - require(not before['metadata'].get('ownerReferences'), 'controller_owned_secret') - metadata = pin.safe_metadata(before) - encoded, changed = (replacement if args.operation == 'add' else removal)(before, client) - bound = deployment = None - if 'secretRef' in client or args.check_config: - deployment = kubectl(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'deployment', 'keycape', '-o', 'json']) - bound = deployment_bound(deployment, client) - checks = None - if args.check_config: - names = deployment_env_names(deployment) - policy_store = 'KEYCAPE_POLICY_PATH' in names - checker_options = ({'executable_fd': args.check_config_fd} - if getattr(args, 'check_config_fd', None) is not None else {}) - checks = {stage: check_config(args.check_config, base64.b64decode(config).decode(), names, policy_store, **checker_options) - for stage, config in (('live', before['data']['config.yaml']), ('proposed', encoded))} - receipt = {'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-client.v1', 'target': 'sso/keycape-config', - 'before': metadata, 'operation': args.operation, 'client_id': client['clientId'], - 'client_type': client['clientType'], 'change_needed': changed, 'mode': args.mode, - 'deployment_env_bound': bound, 'check_config': checks, 'values_emitted': False, 'changed': False} - if args.mode == 'inspect': - return receipt - if args.mode == 'apply': - require(bool(args.case_acceptance), 'case_acceptance_record_required') - receipt['case_acceptance'] = args.case_acceptance - require(checks is not None, 'keycape_check_config_required') - require(checks['proposed']['valid'], 'proposed_registry_fails_keycape_check_config') - if args.operation == 'add' and bound is not None: - require(bound, 'deployment_env_binding_required_first') - require(metadata == {'uid': args.expected_uid, 'resource_version': args.expected_resource_version}, - 'observed_revision_changed') - if changed: - patch = [ - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': metadata['uid']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': metadata['resource_version']}, - {'op': 'replace', 'path': '/data/config.yaml', 'value': encoded}, - ] - command = ['-n', 'sso', 'patch', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '--type=json', - '--patch-file=/dev/stdin', '-o', 'json'] - if args.mode == 'dry-run': - command += ['--dry-run=server'] - result = kubectl(command, patch) - require(result['data'] == dict(before['data'], **{'config.yaml': encoded}), 'patch_response_mismatch') - if args.mode == 'apply': - after = kubectl(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '-o', 'json']) - require(after['metadata']['uid'] == metadata['uid'] - and after['data'] == dict(before['data'], **{'config.yaml': encoded}), - 'readback_mismatch_stop_without_stale_replay') - receipt.update(changed=changed, after=pin.safe_metadata(after), restart_required=changed) - receipt.update(unrelated_config_bytes_preserved=True, other_secret_data_unchanged=True) - return receipt - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split('\n', 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument('mode', nargs='?', default='inspect', - choices=['inspect', 'dry-run', 'apply', 'client-from-case']) - parser.add_argument('case', nargs='?', help='case file, for client-from-case') - parser.add_argument('--client-file', help='KeyCape client record (output of client-from-case)') - parser.add_argument('--operation', default='add', choices=['add', 'remove']) - parser.add_argument('--expected-uid') - parser.add_argument('--expected-resource-version') - parser.add_argument('--case-acceptance', help='the case acceptance record; required for apply') - parser.add_argument('--check-config', help='a keycape binary with check-config (key-cape c528daa or later); required for apply') - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - if args.mode == 'client-from-case': - require(bool(args.case), 'case_file_required') - print(yaml.safe_dump(client_from_case(yaml.safe_load(Path(args.case).read_text())), sort_keys=False), end='') - return 0 - require(bool(args.client_file), 'client_file_required') - client = yaml.safe_load(Path(args.client_file).read_text()) - require(isinstance(client, dict) and 'clientId' in client, 'client_file_shape') - print(json.dumps(run(args, client), sort_keys=True)) - return 0 - except Refused as error: - print(json.dumps({'status': 'refused', 'reason': str(error)})) - except pin.IssuerPinError as error: - print(json.dumps({'status': 'refused', 'reason': str(error)})) - except Exception: - # Parser and Kubernetes errors can contain full Secret material. - print(json.dumps({'status': 'failed', 'reason': 'contained_operation_failed'})) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 522ce3b..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,325 +0,0 @@ -"""Unexercised, injection-only attended registration seam for Warden's v1 kernel. - -No CLI, credentials, evidence trust root or live registration is installed here. -Owner publication/authentication and parent-session revocation are mandatory -injected capabilities. The kernel must independently admit both evidence kinds. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -from contextlib import contextmanager -import fcntl -import os -import stat -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import json -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, contained_output, digest, IDENTIFIER, DIGEST -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -SOURCE_FILES = ('keycape-registration-adapter.py', 'keycape-client.py', - 'portal-client-rollout.py', 'openbao-client-config.py', - 'register-user-engine-portal.py', 'restart-readiness.py') -REFERENCE = 'net-kingdom/keycape-registration@v1' - -# Importing the maintained helper performs no tooling operation. -_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('registration_owner_helper', ROOT / 'keycape-client.py') -helper = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec) -_spec.loader.exec_module(helper) -_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('registration_restart', ROOT / 'restart-readiness.py') -restart_readiness = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec) -_spec.loader.exec_module(restart_readiness) -RESTART_KEYS = frozenset({'read', 'write', 'observe', 'sleep', 'issuer'}) -# KeyCape loads clients at startup: a changed registry is not in effect until the -# issuer restarts. Bounded wait: 60 x 5 s. -RESTART_ATTEMPTS, RESTART_INTERVAL = 60, 5 - - -@contextmanager -def checker_snapshot(path, expected_digest): - """Execute only verified immutable bytes, independent of later path changes. - - Linux sealed memfd and procfs are required. This is a per-attempt executable - snapshot, not native owner storage custody or process/credential isolation. - """ - if not isinstance(expected_digest, str) or not DIGEST.fullmatch(expected_digest): - raise Refused('exact reviewed checker digest required') - source_fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_CLOEXEC | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK) - with os.fdopen(source_fd, 'rb') as source: - metadata = os.fstat(source.fileno()) - if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode): - raise Refused('regular checker artifact required') - if metadata.st_size > 64 * 1024 * 1024: - raise Refused('checker artifact exceeds snapshot limit') - data = source.read(64 * 1024 * 1024 + 1) - if len(data) > 64 * 1024 * 1024 or digest(data) != expected_digest: - raise Refused('check-config binary changed or exceeds snapshot limit') - fd = os.memfd_create('keycape-reviewed-checker', os.MFD_CLOEXEC | os.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) - try: - with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd), 'wb') as output: - output.write(data) - os.fchmod(fd, 0o500) - seals = fcntl.F_SEAL_WRITE | fcntl.F_SEAL_GROW | fcntl.F_SEAL_SHRINK | fcntl.F_SEAL_SEAL - fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_ADD_SEALS, seals) - if fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_GET_SEALS) != seals: - raise Refused('immutable checker snapshot required') - yield fd - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -def source_digest(check_config_digest): - """Pin adapter plus the complete local helper import closure, in filename order.""" - if not isinstance(check_config_digest, str) or not DIGEST.fullmatch(check_config_digest): - raise Refused('exact reviewed checker digest required') - composition = {'files': {name: digest((ROOT / name).read_bytes()) for name in SOURCE_FILES}, - 'check_config_binary': check_config_digest} - return digest(json.dumps(composition, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def descriptor(check_config_digest): - return Descriptor('warden.case.execution.v1', 'register-client', 'net-kingdom', - REFERENCE, source_digest(check_config_digest), 'human', 'keycape-attended-case-change', - 'client_id', 'change', ('keycape-client',), False, - ('parent-session',)) - - -def build(*, admitted: Invocation, case_source: bytes, expected_uid: str, - expected_resource_version: str, case_acceptance: str, - check_config: Path, check_config_digest: str, publish, authenticate, - revoke_session, restart, holder=None, observe=None): - """Bind one admitted case and observed revision; return a closed kernel Adapter. - - publish(bytes)->identifier durably retains only the closed metadata payload. - authenticate(identifier, bytes)->True must verify independent owner custody. - revoke_session(invocation)->identifier must revoke this attempt's parent - session; Warden independently authenticates it using its own evidence verifier. - These callbacks are capabilities, never command strings or case parameters. - - restart is a mapping of read()->Deployment, write(Deployment, expected_rv)->rv - (CAS), observe()->(Deployment, pods, discovery), sleep(seconds) and the - expected issuer URL. After any apply that changed the registry, the step - stamps one restart of the single-replica issuer and waits for the reviewed - readiness verdict (restart-readiness.py, NK-WP-0048-T12). Anything but - `ready` raises, so the kernel keeps the step uncertain for attended owner - rollback or reconciliation; it is never retried here. - - holder(original_attempt_id)->[(identifier, bytes)] and observe()->secret are - optional read-only capabilities, injected together or not at all. With them - the Adapter gains reconcile_original: it confirms a creation only from one - authenticated original created-only record whose post-creation revision and - exact client entry still hold. It never adds or removes; anything missing, - ambiguous or changed raises so Warden keeps the step uncertain. Choosing the - real authenticated holder is an owner gate outside this source. - - Only a verified creation in this process may be rolled back. Process loss, - write/readback ambiguity, publication/revocation failure and source drift - require owner reconciliation; none are converted to retry-safe failures. - """ - reviewed_source = source_digest(check_config_digest) - desc = descriptor(check_config_digest) - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(value, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(value) - for value in (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, - admitted.actor, admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - if desc.adapter_source != reviewed_source: - raise Refused('owner source changed during binding') - if (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != ( - desc.step, desc.owner, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('registration invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - # Pins.adapter is the descriptor digest, not the owner source digest. - descriptor_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(descriptor_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - if not all(isinstance(x, str) and 0 < len(x) <= 192 for x in - (expected_uid, expected_resource_version, case_acceptance)): - raise Refused('bounded attended binding required') - if digest(case_acceptance.encode()) != admitted.pins.acceptance: - raise Refused('acceptance evidence binding differs') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (publish, authenticate, revoke_session)): - raise Refused('owner evidence and revocation capabilities required') - if (not isinstance(restart, dict) or set(restart) != RESTART_KEYS - or not all(callable(restart[k]) for k in RESTART_KEYS - {'issuer'}) - or not isinstance(restart['issuer'], str) or not restart['issuer'].startswith('https://')): - raise Refused('issuer restart and readiness capabilities required') - if (holder is None) != (observe is None) or not all( - x is None or callable(x) for x in (holder, observe)): - raise Refused('original-attempt holder and readback must be injected together') - with contained_output(): - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - client = helper.client_from_case(case) - if admitted.target != client['clientId']: - raise Refused('case target differs') - check_config = Path(check_config) - records = {} - creation = None - - def binding(inv, operation): - if (replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != operation or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest(check_config_digest) != reviewed_source: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - - def restart_issuer(inv): - stamp = 'case-' + digest(inv.attempt_id.encode()).split(':', 1)[1][:32] - deployment = restart['read']() - revision = deployment.get('metadata', {}).get('resourceVersion') - planned = restart_readiness.plan_restart(deployment, stamp, revision) - written = restart['write'](planned, revision) - if not isinstance(written, str) or not 0 < len(written) <= 192: - raise Refused('restart write ambiguous; owner reconciliation required') - receipt = restart_readiness.wait_ready(restart['observe'], restart['sleep'], stamp=stamp, - expected_issuer=restart['issuer'], attempts=RESTART_ATTEMPTS, interval=RESTART_INTERVAL) - if receipt['verdict'] != 'ready': - raise Refused(f"issuer restart {receipt['verdict']}; owner reconciliation required") - return {'stamp': stamp, 'before': revision, 'after': written, - 'verdict': receipt['verdict'], 'attempts': receipt['attempts']} - - def execute(inv, operation, created=()): - nonlocal creation - try: - with contained_output(): - binding(inv, 'run' if operation == 'add' else 'rollback') - uid, revision = expected_uid, expected_resource_version - if operation == 'remove': - if (created != ('keycape-client',) or creation is None - or not verify(*creation)): - raise Refused('no authenticated case-created client') - original_payload = json.loads(records[creation[1].evidence][1]) - uid, revision = original_payload['after']['uid'], original_payload['after']['resource_version'] - args = argparse.Namespace(mode='apply', operation=operation, - expected_uid=uid, expected_resource_version=revision, - case_acceptance=case_acceptance, check_config=str(check_config)) - with checker_snapshot(check_config, check_config_digest) as checker_fd: - args.check_config_fd = checker_fd - receipt = helper.run(args, client) - # The helper has completed CAS, whole-data readback and preservation. - # Never retain check-config diagnostics or arbitrary helper fields. - if not (receipt['schema'] == 'netkingdom.keycape-client.v1' - and receipt['target'] == 'sso/keycape-config' - and receipt['client_id'] == admitted.target - and receipt['mode'] == 'apply' and receipt['operation'] == operation - and receipt['values_emitted'] is False - and type(receipt['changed']) is bool - and receipt['unrelated_config_bytes_preserved'] is True - and receipt['other_secret_data_unchanged'] is True - and receipt['before'] == {'uid': uid, 'resource_version': revision} - and receipt['after']['uid'] == uid - and receipt['check_config']['proposed']['valid'] is True): - raise Refused('owner readback contract differs') - after = receipt['after'] - if (set(after) != {'uid', 'resource_version'} or - not all(isinstance(v, str) and 0 < len(v) <= 192 for v in after.values())): - raise Refused('owner revision contract differs') - changed = receipt['changed'] - outcome = (Outcome.ROLLED_BACK if operation == 'remove' else - Outcome.SUCCESS if changed else Outcome.NO_CHANGE) - objects = ('keycape-client',) if operation == 'add' and changed else () - restarted = restart_issuer(inv) if changed else None - finally: - # Even helper failure must end the parent session. Failures propagate - # contained to the kernel and become uncertain, never safe to replay. - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(inv) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-registration.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed_source, - 'outcome': outcome.value, 'created': objects, 'before': receipt['before'], - 'after': after, 'issuer_restart': restarted, 'session_revocation': revocation}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, revocation, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, result) - if operation == 'add' and changed: - creation = (inv, result) - elif operation == 'remove': - creation = None - return result - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - return authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - def contained(fn, *args): - # Callback output is discarded; refusals below stay this adapter's own. - with contained_output(): - return fn(*args) - - def reconcile_original(ctx): - """Read-only confirmation of a restarted/lost-receipt add; never replays or undoes.""" - o, attempt = ctx.original.invocation, ctx.attempt - try: - if (o.operation != 'run' or attempt.operation != 'reconcile' - or o.attempt_id == attempt.attempt_id - or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(o.attempt_id) - or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(attempt.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('original intent not separate from reconcile attempt') - for inv in (o, attempt): - if replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted: - raise Refused('invocation differs from admitted case') - if ctx.original.source != reviewed_source or source_digest(check_config_digest) != reviewed_source: - raise Refused('original source differs') - try: - found = list(contained(holder, o.attempt_id)) - except Exception: - raise Refused('original-attempt holder unavailable') from None - if len(found) != 1: - raise Refused('original record missing or ambiguous') - ref, raw = found[0] - if type(raw) is not bytes or contained(authenticate, ref, raw) is not True: - raise Refused('original record unauthenticated') - record = json.loads(raw) - if (record.get('schema') != 'netkingdom.keycape-registration.attempt.v1' - or record.get('invocation') != json.loads(json.dumps(asdict(o))) - or record.get('source') != reviewed_source): - raise Refused('original record belongs to another attempt/case/source/principal') - if record.get('outcome') != Outcome.SUCCESS.value or record.get('created') != ['keycape-client']: - raise Refused('original record is not created-only provenance') - secret = contained(observe) - meta = secret['metadata'] - if {'uid': meta['uid'], 'resource_version': meta['resourceVersion']} != record['after']: - raise Refused('native revision changed since creation') - if contained(helper.replacement, secret, client)[1] is not False: - raise Refused('exact client entry absent') - finally: - with contained_output(): - revocation = revoke_session(attempt) - if not isinstance(revocation, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(revocation): - raise Refused('session revocation evidence missing') - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-registration.reconcile.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(attempt), 'original': ref, 'source': reviewed_source, - 'outcome': Outcome.SUCCESS.value, 'created': ('keycape-client',), - 'after': record['after'], 'session_revocation': revocation}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(Outcome.SUCCESS, evidence, ('keycape-client',), True, revocation, - attempt_id=attempt.attempt_id, operation='reconcile') - # Recorded for verify only; never a creation this process may roll back. - records[evidence] = (attempt, payload, result) - return result - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed_source, lambda inv: execute(inv, 'add'), - verify, lambda inv, created: execute(inv, 'remove', created), - reconcile_original=reconcile_original if holder is not None else None) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/mint-secret-adapter.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/mint-secret-adapter.md deleted file mode 100644 index bae111f..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/mint-secret-adapter.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -# Mint-secret adapter (source candidate, NK-WP-0048-T25) - -`mint-secret-adapter.py` is an unexercised, injection-only seam for the type 1.2 -`mint-secret` step (owner `railiance-platform`, lane -`keycape-client-secret-generate`, `value_handling: generated_in_custody`). It is -modelled on the T13 registration adapter. - -- **No secret values.** The secret is generated inside custody by an injected - Platform `mint(path)` capability. Receipts must be exactly - `{schema, path, operation, version, created, values_emitted: false}`; any other - field (including a value) is refused before evidence is published. -- **Value-free evidence.** Published evidence carries invocation, source digest, - custody path, version number and both revocation identifiers. -- **Created-only rollback.** Only a version this adapter minted and can - authenticate is destroyed, by exact version; otherwise rollback is refused. -- **Revocation.** Descriptor effect `mint` with scopes `parent-session` and - `broker-grant`; both are revoked after every attempt, including failures. - Each revocation is attempted independently: if one raises, the other is still - called, and the attempt is refused rather than reported as success. -- Confidential clients only; case, descriptor, acceptance and attempt pins bound - as in T13. Not retry-safe. - -Not supplied here: Platform owner source review before pinning, Warden admission, -type 1.2 selection (canonical 1.1 stays default; no `--allow-unimplemented`), and -any native mint. Tests: `PYTHONPATH=~/ops-warden/src python3 -m pytest test_mint_secret_adapter.py`. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/mint-secret-adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/mint-secret-adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3714ba1..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/mint-secret-adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,159 +0,0 @@ -"""Unexercised, injection-only mint-secret seam (type 1.2 step `mint-secret`). - -Source candidate for Platform owner review; not pinned, admitted or run. The -client secret is generated inside custody by an injected Platform capability. -This module never receives, reads, templates or returns a secret value: owner -receipts are closed value-free metadata and any other field is refused. -Canonical 1.1 stays the default; nothing here selects 1.2 or bypasses admission. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import json -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, contained_output, digest, IDENTIFIER -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -SOURCE_FILES = ('mint-secret-adapter.py',) -REFERENCE = 'net-kingdom/keycape-mint-secret@v1' -RECEIPT_SCHEMA = 'railiance-platform.custody-mint.v1' -RECEIPT_KEYS = {'schema', 'path', 'operation', 'version', 'created', 'values_emitted'} -CREATED = ('custody-secret-version',) - - -def source_digest(): - composition = {'files': {n: digest((ROOT / n).read_bytes()) for n in SOURCE_FILES}} - return digest(json.dumps(composition, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def descriptor(): - return Descriptor('warden.case.execution.v1', 'mint-secret', 'railiance-platform', - REFERENCE, source_digest(), 'human', 'keycape-client-secret-generate', - 'client_id', 'mint', CREATED, False, ('parent-session', 'broker-grant')) - - -def custody_path(client_id): - return 'platform/workloads/keycape/' + client_id - - -def build(*, admitted: Invocation, case_source: bytes, case_acceptance: str, - mint, destroy, publish, authenticate, revoke_session, revoke_grant): - """Bind one admitted confidential-client case; return a closed kernel Adapter. - - mint(path)->receipt generates a new secret version in custody, value never returned. - destroy(path, version)->receipt removes exactly that version (created-only rollback). - publish(bytes)->identifier, authenticate(identifier, bytes)->True: owner evidence. - revoke_session(inv)/revoke_grant(inv)->identifier end this attempt's parent - session and broker grant. All are capabilities, never command strings. - """ - reviewed = source_digest() - desc = descriptor() - if type(admitted) is not Invocation or not all( - isinstance(v, str) and IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(v) - for v in (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.target, - admitted.actor, admitted.principal, admitted.lane)): - raise Refused('bounded invocation required') - if (admitted.step, admitted.owner, admitted.actor, admitted.lane) != ( - desc.step, desc.owner, desc.actor, desc.lane): - raise Refused('mint invocation boundary differs') - if admitted.operation != 'admission' or admitted.attempt_id: - raise Refused('expected admission invocation') - if type(case_source) is not bytes or len(case_source) > 262144 or digest(case_source) != admitted.pins.case: - raise Refused('case source pin differs') - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if admitted.pins.adapter != digest(desc_bytes): - raise Refused('descriptor pin differs') - if not isinstance(case_acceptance, str) or digest(case_acceptance.encode()) != admitted.pins.acceptance: - raise Refused('acceptance evidence binding differs') - if not all(callable(x) for x in (mint, destroy, publish, authenticate, revoke_session, revoke_grant)): - raise Refused('owner custody, evidence and revocation capabilities required') - with contained_output(): - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - params = (case or {}).get('spec', {}).get('parameters', {}) if isinstance(case, dict) else {} - if params.get('client_type') != 'confidential': - raise Refused('mint-secret applies only to confidential clients') - if params.get('client_id') != admitted.target: - raise Refused('case target differs') - path = custody_path(admitted.target) - records, creation = {}, None - - def check(receipt, operation, version=None): - if (type(receipt) is not dict or set(receipt) != RECEIPT_KEYS - or receipt['schema'] != RECEIPT_SCHEMA or receipt['path'] != path - or receipt['operation'] != operation or receipt['values_emitted'] is not False - or type(receipt['created']) is not bool - or type(receipt['version']) is not int or receipt['version'] < 1 - or (version is not None and receipt['version'] != version)): - raise Refused('owner value-free receipt contract differs') - - def execute(inv, operation, created=()): - nonlocal creation - receipt = None - try: - with contained_output(): - if (replace(inv, attempt_id='', operation='admission') != admitted - or inv.operation != ('run' if operation == 'mint' else 'rollback') - or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(inv.attempt_id)): - raise Refused('attempt binding differs') - if source_digest() != reviewed: - raise Refused('owner source changed') - if operation == 'mint': - receipt = mint(path) - check(receipt, 'mint') - if not receipt['created']: - raise Refused('custody did not create a version') - else: - if created != CREATED or creation is None or not verify(*creation): - raise Refused('no authenticated case-created version') - version = json.loads(records[creation[1].evidence][1])['version'] - receipt = destroy(path, version) - check(receipt, 'destroy', version) - finally: - # Each revocation is attempted independently: a failing session - # revocation must not leave the broker grant alive, or the reverse. - # The first failure is re-raised only after both were attempted. - with contained_output(): - session = grant = failure = None - try: - session = revoke_session(inv) - except BaseException as exc: - failure = exc - try: - grant = revoke_grant(inv) - except BaseException as exc: - failure = failure or exc - if failure is not None: - raise failure - for ref in (session, grant): - if not isinstance(ref, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(ref): - raise Refused('revocation evidence missing') - outcome = Outcome.SUCCESS if operation == 'mint' else Outcome.ROLLED_BACK - objects = CREATED if operation == 'mint' else () - payload = json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-mint-secret.attempt.v1', - 'invocation': asdict(inv), 'source': reviewed, 'outcome': outcome.value, - 'created': objects, 'path': path, 'version': receipt['version'], - 'values_emitted': False, 'session_revocation': session, 'grant_revocation': grant}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - with contained_output(): - evidence = publish(payload) - if not isinstance(evidence, str) or not IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(evidence) or evidence in records: - raise Refused('owner evidence identifier invalid or reused') - result = OwnerResult(outcome, evidence, objects, True, session, grant, - attempt_id=inv.attempt_id, operation=inv.operation) - records[evidence] = (inv, payload, result) - creation = (inv, result) if operation == 'mint' else None - return result - - def verify(inv, result): - record = records.get(result.evidence) if type(result) is OwnerResult else None - if record is None or record[0] != inv or record[2] != result: - return False - with contained_output(): - return authenticate(result.evidence, record[1]) is True - - return Adapter(REFERENCE, reviewed, lambda inv: execute(inv, 'mint'), - verify, lambda inv, created: execute(inv, 'rollback', created)) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-client-config.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-client-config.py index b123627..9ed3562 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-client-config.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-client-config.py @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ def load_config() -> dict[str, Any]: try: config_text = base64.b64decode(encoded_config).decode("utf-8") except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - concise operator error - raise SystemExit("could not decode private config; diagnostics suppressed") from None + raise SystemExit(f"could not decode data.config.yaml: {exc}") from exc config = yaml.safe_load(config_text) or {} if not isinstance(config, dict): raise SystemExit("KeyCape config.yaml must decode to a YAML mapping") @@ -271,7 +271,11 @@ def enforce_lldap_defaults(config: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]: def render_patch(config: dict[str, Any]) -> None: - raise SystemExit("Retired: raw registry patch output is disabled; use the reviewed owner rollout adapter.") + updated = enforce_lldap_defaults(upsert_client(upsert_client(config, OPENBAO_CLIENT), RAPP_QONTO_CLIENT)) + config_text = yaml.safe_dump(updated, sort_keys=False) + encoded = base64.b64encode(config_text.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii") + json.dump({"data": {"config.yaml": encoded}}, sys.stdout, separators=(",", ":")) + sys.stdout.write("\n") def verify(config: dict[str, Any]) -> None: @@ -291,13 +295,11 @@ def main() -> None: args = parser.parse_args() if args.mode.startswith('issuer-'): raise SystemExit(issuer_main(args)) + config = load_config() if args.mode == "patch": - render_patch({}) # Refuse before reading secret-bearing stdin. - try: - config = load_config() + render_patch(config) + else: verify(config) - except (ValueError, TypeError, KeyError, AttributeError, yaml.YAMLError): - raise SystemExit("KeyCape verification failed; private input diagnostics suppressed.") from None if __name__ == "__main__": diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md deleted file mode 100644 index 292dc7b..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-route.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,217 +0,0 @@ -# KEY39 node-local OpenBao route prerequisite - -Source-only successor `KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v9-ready-input` of frozen -v5. No native preflight, port-forward, login, Secret access or execution has run. -Previous v5 source and every review remain unchanged. The new executor and -health endpoint need fresh exact source-owner acknowledgments and a founder -native decision; previous v5 agreement is historical compatibility only. - -The child runs on railiance01 and uses the explicit node k3s kubeconfig. -The environment orientation's port 18200 is a **workstation** address. The -installed `openbao-ui-railiance01` routing metadata is `direction: local`, local -port 18200, node destination `10.43.5.152:8080`. OpsBridge's supported local -forward builds `-L 127.0.0.1:18200:10.43.5.152:8080`; its listener belongs to the -machine invoking Bridge. It does not establish a node-local listener. No current -node DNS evidence establishes that `openbao.openbao.svc` resolves there. Do not -infer node reachability from workstation role observations or Bridge status. - -OpsBridge supports named `up`, `down`, `status`, `check`, and local/reverse -configurations. There is no existing named KEY39 node-local reverse route in the -inspected routing metadata. Do not invent `bridge forward`, silently modify the -shared workstation tunnel, repurpose its port, or request a new SSH certificate -for this preparation. A new Bridge-managed route needs its own owner-reviewed -configuration and authority; this source does not create one. - -## Proposed founder-held route on the child node - -The Platform source publishes Service `openbao/openbao-ui-gateway`, port 8080, -which proxies the OpenBao API. The proposed attended route uses this existing -service and node loopback; it requires no pod DNS or hardcoded ClusterIP: - -```bash -# Proposed only: run in a dedicated founder terminal ON railiance01, after exact -# route/session authority and current cluster/service identity are confirmed. -# Lifetime is capped at 25 minutes, including preparation/action/cleanup. -timeout --foreground 1500s kubectl --kubeconfig=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml --request-timeout=20s -n openbao port-forward --address=127.0.0.1 --pod-running-timeout=20s service/openbao-ui-gateway 18200:8080 >/dev/null 2>&1 -``` - -Keep that exact foreground process alive through issuer restoration, removed -client refusal and Secret absence verification. Stop only the new process with -Ctrl-C when those obligations are verified; timeout also stops it. Do not kill -an arbitrary existing listener, run `bridge down` against shared tunnels, or -restart a shared gateway. Port conflict, unavailable service, route loss or -non-ready OpenBao means stop and retain any pending custody for separately -approved recovery. Recovery requires re-establishing the same admitted node -route under its own founder recovery decision; no automatic tunnel is opened. -The lifetime estimate is a finite preparation ceiling, not an authority grant. - -## Public preflight and exact envelope pin - -The separate diagnostic command reads only the exact unauthenticated health -endpoint, never Kubernetes, Secrets, a token producer or a credential. Run from -the same founder-owned node execution context as the intended child: - -```bash -python3 /OWNER-PINNED-PATH/openbao-negative-session.py route-preflight --bao-addr http://127.0.0.1:18200 --receipt /OWNER-PRIVATE-PATH/key39-node-route.json -``` - -The receipt is exclusive and mode 0600. It records only booleans and SHA256 of -public `cluster_id`; `probe_location=current_process_only` expressly avoids -claiming that an arbitrary workstation run proves node readiness. It accepts -only HTTP 200 with strictly boolean initialized=true, sealed=false, -standby=false, performance_standby=false when supplied, and a nonempty bounded -cluster identity. The official endpoint defines these health states: -[OpenBao health API](https://openbao.org/api-docs/system/health/). - -Then run the existing founder preflight with the explicit same Bao origin: - -```bash -python3 /OWNER-PINNED-PATH/openbao-negative-session.py founder-preflight --confirm 'FOUNDER ATTENDED KEY39 PREFLIGHT' --bao-addr http://127.0.0.1:18200 --receipt /OWNER-PRIVATE-PATH/key39-preflight.json -``` - -This retains all previous runtime/registry/headroom/quiet-window obligations. -Copy its `bao_health_identity_sha256` into the exact reviewed execute/recovery -envelope. The attending founder/Platform owner must verify the route target and -provider identity against their authoritative facts. Public health is not -cryptographic service authentication, role/policy proof or execution admission; -its hash detects accidental provider changes and does not replace that review. - -Execute probes this pinned health identity before protected token input/native -object reads, then again after dry-runs immediately before the first temporary -Secret create. Recovery probes it before native object/Secret reads. A missing -pin, changed identity, redirect, unreachable/oversized/malformed response or -inactive provider refuses. The existing no-proxy/no-redirect/byte/total-elapsed -bounds and exception abort obligations apply to this new GET too. No local -helper opens or repairs the route. Loss after the first mutation still invokes -the existing bounded owner cleanup path; unproved cleanup stays pending. - -The admitted human/coding-agent private stdin producer and all Platform/Mason/ -Secrets Engine native acceptance prerequisites remain unresolved separately. -This preflight never fetches or produces those tokens and closes no owner task. - -## V7 actual entrypoint sequencing correction - -V6's statement that health preceded private token input was too broad: its -`main` read private stdin before calling `execute`, though health still preceded -all native reads/mutations. Platform identified that exact source/documentation -mismatch. V6 and its reviews remain immutable history. - -V7 `main` verifies the exact approval/source envelope, starts the bounded action -window and checks the approved public health identity before reading private -stdin. On route failure, stdin is never read and no native access occurs. After -input arrives, `execute` revalidates source/authority and expiry, preserving the -original pre-input monotonic deadline rather than restarting it; its existing -health checks before native access and immediately before mutation remain. -Recovery never reads private stdin and still checks the same public health pin -before native Secret/config/deployment reads. Public route-preflight likewise -consumes no private input. These are separately tested through the actual `main` -entrypoint, with synthetic data and zero native/network calls. - -## V8 bounded private JSON receive correction - -V7 health preceded private stdin but `stdin.read()` had no byte or elapsed bound. -That issuer-owner finding remains history; exporter write bounds do not bound a -consumer read. V8 reads binary chunks of at most 4096 bytes, at most 65536 total -bytes, and requires actual EOF before decoding the exact two-token JSON object. -Each token is capped at 16384 UTF-8 bytes. The entire receive has a Linux main- -thread total timer capped at 15 seconds and clipped to the original remaining -wall-clock/monotonic action window; waiting never renews that window. Expiry is -checked before receiving, after EOF, and after decoding. Empty, oversized, -incomplete, invalid, stalled or late input cannot reach native execution. -Receipts contain only fixed failure codes/booleans, never bytes or parser errors. - -This child-side read gate still does not establish producer-side readiness. -Before ANY token bytes enter a pipe/SSH transport, a separately reviewed trusted -launcher/exporter must receive an exact-child source/approval/public-health ready -acknowledgment bound to that pipe session and window. The current producer v1 -has no such protocol; the producer consumer review requests it. V8 supplies no -handshake, launcher admission or native readiness and must not be piped to the -old exporter as though its health-before-read check prevents early transmission. - -## V9 private ready protocol and concrete node wrapper - -The old producer v1 refusal remains history: a child checking health before -reading stdin cannot prevent an exporter from buffering or transmitting tokens -earlier. V9 execute therefore requires `--ready-fd`, `--session-nonce` and -`--ready-envelope-sha256` before it will read private input. The ready FD is a -locally inherited writable FIFO >=3 whose inode/device differs from every stdio -endpoint; stdout/stderr aliases, regular files and missing FDs refuse. - -After source/approval validation, original-window start and approved public -health, the child emits one <=4096-byte newline JSON marker to that private FD -and closes it. Emission has a total two-second cap clipped to the original -action window. Child stdout and stderr remain quiet. Exact marker fields are: - -```json -{ - "schema": "key39-private-input-ready/v1", - "session_nonce": "", - "proposal_id": "KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v9-ready-input", - "target": "sso/keycape", - "executor_sha256": "", - "envelope_sha256": "", - "bao_health_identity_sha256": "", - "valid_until_epoch": 0, - "receive_budget_seconds": 0 -} -``` - -Zeros/placeholders illustrate keys only and are never a valid marker. Epoch is -the exact finite nonboolean approved envelope expiry, still future; receive -budget is finite positive <=15 and clipped at emission to the original action -window. The exporter clips its already-running deadline to the advertised -budget and *current* approval remainder. It must not reset a deadline or demand -that a budget measured at emission equal the smaller remainder after transport. - -`openbao-negative-node-wrapper.py` is the concrete node-local relay. The trusted -launcher supplies nonsecret exact child/envelope paths and SHA256 pins, a new -nonce and exclusive receipt destination. Wrapper envelope must be owner UID, -mode0600, single-link regular file, stable bounded bytes; its child/wrapper -source paths must be included in the exact envelope's native source hash map. -This is reconstruction of the caller's review context, not authenticated human -approval: assertions in JSON cannot create a grant. The founder must separately -admit the exact source/profile, target and SSH peer under the applicable lane. - -The wrapper creates an **ordinary local pipe on the node**, starts the pinned -Python child with that write endpoint passed locally, and reads its bounded -marker plus EOF. The child's private stdin is inherited directly from the SSH -input stream: wrapper never reads, copies, logs or writes token bytes. No extra -file descriptor is forwarded by SSH or OpsBridge. Within one five-second total -preparation deadline, the wrapper validates all marker keys/nonce/pins/window and -forwards exactly one value-free marker line on its own stdout control pipe. -The admitted workstation launcher must own/capture that SSH stdout separately -from its private stdin data pipe, never display/tee/log it, validate the exact -marker and then allow the KeyCape adapter to load/consume caller files or write -ANY token bytes. The control stream stays open while the child runs; the -exporter stops marker reception at newline, not SSH EOF. Missing, partial, -wrong-nonce, stale, oversized or pin-mismatched markers mean zero token file -reads/writes and retained caller files. The old v1 adapter is incompatible. - -This wrapper emits control stdout and therefore **cannot run inside the -warden attended command lane that rejects all child output**. It requires a -separately admitted founder-owned direct SSH profile with no PTY, captured -stdin/stdout/stderr, pinned peer/host identity, exact wrapper/source/receipt paths -and no agent credential access. No such runtime admission is supplied here. -A bare marker, caller boolean or downloaded ready file cannot authenticate a -peer, source execution or founder decision. A trusted reviewed launcher owning -that transport and verifying the context is a prerequisite. - -The wrapper waits only through the original approval remainder plus 300 seconds -cleanup. Any child stdout/stderr is captured with bounded reads and refused, -never forwarded. Failure terminates the exact launched child with bounded five- -second TERM then two-second kill/wait fallback; capture closes have 20 ms caps. -No retry or replay occurs. Interruption, partial private delivery, emitted ready -followed by child death, unconfirmed revoke or interrupted native cleanup remains -unknown/pending owner reconciliation using the separately approved recovery -path. Wrapper exit zero is not owner/native acceptance; the child receipt still -requires actual owner acceptance. No persistent file/copy on the node is added -for token material, and Unix/Python memory cleanup is not secure zeroization. - -Human browser issuance and admitted coding-agent custody remain distinct owner -choices. Any new files must be produced by the pinned verified owner CLI under -continuous exclusive tmpfs custody after the separately admitted route preflight. -They must be prepared before launching this short-lived private receive window; -the child cannot wait for a five-minute browser login after emitting ready. -Fresh registered-client/MFA/custody evidence, exact independent KeyCape/Platform -reviews and the founder's complete route/transport/private-file/native decision -remain required. No native handshake, SSH, credential or route was exercised. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-wrapper.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-wrapper.py deleted file mode 100644 index f53ad40..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-node-wrapper.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Founder-admitted node wrapper: private local child-ready pipe -> SSH control stdout. -No token read/copy, login, tunnel or approval authentication. Parent must capture -stdout over its admitted authenticated SSH peer; never use the silent warden lane. -""" -import argparse -import contextlib -import hashlib -import json -import math -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import stat -import subprocess -import sys -import threading -import time - -SCHEMA='key39-private-input-ready/v1' -PROPOSAL='KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v9-ready-input' -TARGET='sso/keycape' -MAX_READY=4096 -MAX_ENVELOPE=65536 -READY_TOTAL_SECONDS=5 - -class Refused(Exception):pass - -def need(ok,code): - if not ok:raise Refused(code) - -def finite(value): - try:return type(value) in (int,float) and math.isfinite(value) - except OverflowError:return False - -def hash_bytes(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() - -def hex_pin(value):return isinstance(value,str) and len(value)==64 and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in value) - -@contextlib.contextmanager -def deadline(seconds): - need(finite(seconds) and 00,'wrapper_control_write_failed') - offset+=written - -def run(args): - proc=None;read_fd=None;write_fd=None - try: - need(hex_pin(args.session_nonce),'wrapper_nonce_required') - with deadline(READY_TOTAL_SECONDS): - child=pinned_file(args.child,args.child_sha256,256*1024) - envelope_raw=pinned_file(args.envelope,args.envelope_sha256,MAX_ENVELOPE,private=True) - envelope=decode(envelope_raw) - need(envelope.get('proposal_id')==PROPOSAL and envelope.get('target')==TARGET - and envelope.get('disposition')=='approved' and envelope.get('founder_decision_id'), - 'wrapper_exact_owner_envelope_required') - need(envelope.get('source_hashes',{}).get(str(Path(args.child)))==args.child_sha256 - and envelope.get('source_hashes',{}).get(str(Path(__file__).resolve()))==hash_bytes(Path(__file__).read_bytes()), - 'wrapper_child_and_wrapper_pins_required') - expiry=envelope['valid_until_epoch'];maximum=envelope['maximum_session_seconds'] - need(finite(expiry) and type(maximum) is int and 420<=maximum<=900 - and 00,'wrapper_session_window_expired') - with deadline(remaining): - rc=proc.wait(timeout=remaining) - # Bounded captures: even accidental child output is never forwarded. - unexpected=proc.stdout.read(MAX_READY+1) or proc.stderr.read(MAX_READY+1) - need(not unexpected,'wrapper_child_output_refused') - return 0 if rc==0 else 1 - except BaseException: - return 1 - finally: - for fd in (read_fd,write_fd): - if fd is not None: - try:os.close(fd) - except OSError:pass - if proc is not None: - if proc.poll() is None: - # Unknown/partial native outcomes remain owner recovery, never retry. - try: - with deadline(5): - proc.terminate();proc.wait(timeout=5) - except Exception: - try: - with deadline(2): - proc.kill();proc.wait(timeout=2) - except Exception:pass - for stream in (proc.stdout,proc.stderr): - if stream is not None: - try: - with deadline(0.02):stream.close() - except Exception:pass - -def main(): - parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - for name in ('child','child-sha256','envelope','envelope-sha256','receipt','session-nonce'): - parser.add_argument('--'+name,required=True) - return run(parser.parse_args()) - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py deleted file mode 100644 index d360df7..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-negative-session.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,860 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Founder-attended KEY39 lifecycle. Silent; private values never leave memory/K8s. - -inspect is metadata-only (no Secret read). execute requires an exact approved -envelope, source/runtime pins and founder-held private tokens on stdin. No login, -custody fetch, production credential, role or policy mutation is implemented. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -import copy -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import math -import fcntl -import stat -import os -from pathlib import Path -import secrets -import signal -import subprocess -import threading -import time -from contextlib import contextmanager -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -import urllib.error - -import yaml - -CLUSTER = 'a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786' -TARGET = 'sso/keycape' -PROPOSAL = 'KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v9-ready-input' -IDS = ['openbao-probe-' + c for c in ['aud', 'sub', 'tenant', 'roles', 'scope', 'expiry']] -ENVS = ['KEYCAPE_' + c.upper().replace('-', '_') + '_CLIENT_SECRET' for c in IDS] -TEMP = 'keycape-openbao-negative-key39' -BAO_ORIGINS = {'http://127.0.0.1:18200', 'http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200'} -REQUEST_DEADLINE = None -BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None -CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None -CLEANING = False -MAX_RESPONSE = 256 * 1024 -HTTP_TOTAL_SECONDS = 15 -CLEANUP_TOTAL_SECONDS = 300 -HTTP_ABORT_SECONDS = 0.02 -PRIVATE_INPUT_MAX_BYTES = 65536 -PRIVATE_TOKEN_MAX_BYTES = 16384 -PRIVATE_INPUT_TOTAL_SECONDS = 15 -READY_SCHEMA = 'key39-private-input-ready/v1' -READY_MAX_BYTES = 4096 - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def require(ok, reason): - if not ok: - raise Refused(reason) - - -def digest(data): - return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest() - - -def canonical(value): - return digest(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()) - - -def finite_number(value): - try: - return type(value) in (int, float) and math.isfinite(value) - except OverflowError: - return False - - -def read_json(raw): - def reject_constant(_): - raise Refused('nonfinite_json_constant') - return json.loads(raw, parse_constant=reject_constant) - - -def begin_cleanup(): - global CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE - if CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE is None: - CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = time.monotonic() + CLEANUP_TOTAL_SECONDS - - -def check_deadline(): - if CLEANING: - require(CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE is not None - and time.monotonic() < CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, 'cleanup_budget_expired') - return - if REQUEST_DEADLINE is not None and not CLEANING: - require(finite_number(REQUEST_DEADLINE), 'approved_window_invalid') - require(time.time() < REQUEST_DEADLINE, 'approved_window_expired') - if BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE is not None: - require(time.monotonic() < BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, 'session_business_budget_expired') - - -def request_budget(cap, cleanup=False): - require(finite_number(cap) and 0 < cap <= 30, 'request_timeout_invalid') - budget = float(cap) - if cleanup or CLEANING: - if CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE is not None: - budget = min(budget, CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE - time.monotonic()) - else: - check_deadline() - if REQUEST_DEADLINE is not None: - budget = min(budget, REQUEST_DEADLINE - time.time()) - if BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE is not None: - budget = min(budget, BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE - time.monotonic()) - require(budget > 0 and math.isfinite(budget), 'request_window_exhausted') - return budget - - -@contextmanager -def total_timeout(seconds): - """Linux main-thread hard elapsed bound, including blocking headers/body reads.""" - require(finite_number(seconds) and 0 < seconds <= 30, 'request_timeout_invalid') - require(threading.current_thread() is threading.main_thread() - and hasattr(signal, 'setitimer'), 'main_thread_linux_timer_required') - previous_timer = signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL) - require(previous_timer == (0.0, 0.0), 'existing_alarm_timer_refused') - previous_handler = signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM) - def expired(*_): - raise Refused('request_total_timeout') - started = time.monotonic() - signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, expired) - signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, seconds) - try: - yield - require(time.monotonic() - started <= seconds, 'request_total_timeout') - finally: - signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 0) - signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, previous_handler) - - -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs): - return None - - -class SessionTransport: - """Fixed origins, no ambient proxy, bounded reads, same guards in cleanup.""" - def __init__(self, bao_origin, receipt=None): - require(bao_origin in BAO_ORIGINS, 'bao_origin_invalid') - self.bao_origin = bao_origin - self.receipt = receipt if receipt is not None else {} - self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirect()) - - def request(self, url, *, data=None, headers=None, method='POST', timeout=15): - allowed = {'https://kc.coulomb.social/token', - 'https://kc.coulomb.social/.well-known/openid-configuration', - self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/keycape-services/login', - self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/token/revoke-self', - self.bao_origin + '/v1/sys/health'} - require(url in allowed, 'http_target_not_reviewed') - require(method == ('GET' if url.endswith(('/.well-known/openid-configuration', '/v1/sys/health')) else 'POST'), - 'http_method_not_reviewed') - cleanup = url.endswith('/v1/auth/token/revoke-self') - budget = request_budget(min(timeout, HTTP_TOTAL_SECONDS), cleanup=cleanup) - total_deadline = time.monotonic() + budget - req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers or {}, method=method) - response, status, raw = None, None, None - try: - with total_timeout(budget): - try: - response = self.opener.open(req, timeout=budget) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - response = error - except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError): - if url == self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/keycape-services/login': - self.receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown'] = True - return None, b'' - status = response.getcode() - raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE + 1) - require(len(raw) <= MAX_RESPONSE, 'http_response_oversized') - response.close() - response = None - if not cleanup: - check_deadline() - return status, raw - except Refused: - if url == self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/keycape-services/login' and status in (None, 200): - # A late response cannot pass; preserve acquired-token cleanup when available. - if raw is not None and status == 200: - self.revoke_late_session(raw) - else: - self.receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown'] = True - raise - except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError): - if url == self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/keycape-services/login': - if raw is not None and status == 200: - self.revoke_late_session(raw) - else: - self.receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown'] = True - return None, b'' - except Exception: - if url == self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/keycape-services/login': - if raw is not None and status == 200: - self.revoke_late_session(raw) - else: - self.receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown'] = True - raise Refused('http_response_failed') from None - finally: - if response is not None: - self.abort_response(response, total_deadline) - - def abort_response(self, response, original_deadline): - """One bounded exceptional close; never retry or reset the cleanup clock.""" - self.receipt['http_abort_close_attempted'] = False - self.receipt['http_abort_close_succeeded'] = False - begin_cleanup() - try: - cap = request_budget(HTTP_ABORT_SECONDS, cleanup=True) - remaining = original_deadline - time.monotonic() - if remaining > 0: - cap = min(cap, remaining) - self.receipt['http_abort_close_attempted'] = True - with total_timeout(cap): - response.close() - self.receipt['http_abort_close_succeeded'] = True - except Exception: - self.receipt['http_response_abort_unconfirmed'] = True - raise Refused('http_response_abort_unconfirmed') from None - - def revoke_late_session(self, raw): - self.receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_attempted'] = False - self.receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_succeeded'] = False - try: - token = read_json(raw)['auth']['client_token'] - require(isinstance(token, str) and token, 'late_session_response_invalid') - except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, Refused): - self.receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown'] = True - return - begin_cleanup() - self.receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_attempted'] = True - try: - status, _ = self.post(self.bao_origin + '/v1/auth/token/revoke-self', - body={}, headers={'X-Vault-Token': token}) - self.receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_succeeded'] = status == 204 - except Exception: - self.receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_succeeded'] = False - finally: - del token - - def post(self, url, form=None, body=None, headers=None, timeout=15): - headers = dict(headers or {}) - if form is not None: - data = urllib.parse.urlencode(form).encode() - headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' - else: - data = json.dumps(body or {}).encode() - headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json' - return self.request(url, data=data, headers=headers, timeout=timeout) - - def health_identity(self): - # Public endpoint only: no token/header, login, Secret or route creation. - status, raw = self.request(self.bao_origin + '/v1/sys/health', method='GET') - require(status == 200, 'bao_public_health_unavailable') - try: - body = read_json(raw) - require(isinstance(body, dict) and body.get('initialized') is True - and body.get('sealed') is False and body.get('standby') is False - and body.get('performance_standby', False) is False, - 'bao_public_health_not_active') - cluster_id = body.get('cluster_id') - require(isinstance(cluster_id, str) and 0 < len(cluster_id) <= 128, - 'bao_public_health_identity_required') - return digest(cluster_id.encode()) - except (TypeError, ValueError): - raise Refused('bao_public_health_invalid') from None - - def discovery(self): - status, raw = self.request('https://kc.coulomb.social/.well-known/openid-configuration', method='GET') - require(status == 200, 'discovery_failed') - return json.loads(raw) - - -def k(arguments, payload=None): - # Execute on railiance01 in the founder's session, never workstation defaults. - check_deadline() - budget = request_budget(30) - with total_timeout(budget): - result = subprocess.run(['kubectl', '--kubeconfig=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml', - '--request-timeout=20s', *arguments], - input=None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload), - text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=budget) - check_deadline() - require(result.returncode == 0, 'kubernetes_operation_failed') - return json.loads(result.stdout) if result.stdout.strip() else None - - -def get(kind, name): - return k(['-n', 'sso', 'get', kind, name, '-o', 'json']) - - -def meta(obj): - return {key: obj['metadata'][key] for key in ['uid', 'resourceVersion']} - - -def patch(kind, obj, path, value, dry=False): - ops = [{'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/' + key, 'value': val} - for key, val in meta(obj).items()] - ops.append({'op': 'replace', 'path': path, 'value': value}) - args = ['-n', 'sso', 'patch', kind, obj['metadata']['name'], '--type=json', - '--patch-file=/dev/stdin', '-o', 'json'] - if dry: - args += ['--dry-run=server'] - return k(args, ops) - - -def registrations(): - reference = {'displayName': 'Temporary KEY39 negative probe', - 'allowedScopes': ['openbao:login'], 'grantTypes': ['client_credentials'], - 'clientType': 'confidential', 'serviceSubject': 'service:secrets-engine', - 'tenant': 'tenant:platform', 'roles': ['secrets-engine'], 'tokenLifetime': '1m'} - result = [] - for index, client_id in enumerate(IDS): - c = dict(reference, clientId=client_id, secretRef='env:' + ENVS[index]) - if index: - c['audience'] = 'secrets-engine-openbao' - if index == 1: - c['serviceSubject'] = 'service:openbao-probe' - if index == 2: - c['tenant'] = 'tenant:openbao-probe' - if index == 3: - c['roles'] = ['openbao-probe'] - if index == 4: - c['allowedScopes'] = ['openbao:probe'] - result.append(c) - return result - - -class UniqueLoader(yaml.SafeLoader): - pass - - -def unique(loader, node): - result = {} - for key_node, value_node in node.value: - key = loader.construct_object(key_node) - require(key not in result, 'duplicate_yaml_key') - result[key] = loader.construct_object(value_node) - return result - - -UniqueLoader.add_constructor(yaml.resolver.BaseResolver.DEFAULT_MAPPING_TAG, unique) - - -def candidate_config(raw): - config = yaml.load(raw, Loader=UniqueLoader) - clients = config['clients'] - require(isinstance(clients, list) and clients, 'clients_required') - ids = [c['clientId'] for c in clients] - require(len(ids) == len(set(ids)) and not set(ids).intersection(IDS), 'existing_probe_or_duplicate') - require(not {c.get('secretRef') for c in clients}.intersection('env:' + e for e in ENVS), - 'probe_secretref_collision') - production = [c for c in clients if c['clientId'] == 'secrets-engine-openbao'] - require(len(production) == 1, 'production_client_missing') - expected = registrations()[-1] - for field in ['allowedScopes', 'grantTypes', 'clientType', 'serviceSubject', 'tenant', 'roles']: - require(production[0].get(field) == expected[field], 'production_claim_contract_drift') - require(production[0].get('audience', production[0]['clientId']) == 'secrets-engine-openbao', - 'production_audience_drift') - nodes = yaml.compose(raw) - node = next(v for key, v in nodes.value if key.value == 'clients') - require(isinstance(node, yaml.nodes.SequenceNode) and not node.flow_style, - 'block_client_sequence_required') - index = node.end_mark.index - start = raw.rfind('\n', 0, index) + 1 - if not raw[start:index].strip(): - index = start - fragment = yaml.safe_dump(registrations(), sort_keys=False) - fragment = ''.join(' ' * node.start_mark.column + line if line.strip() else line - for line in fragment.splitlines(True)) - if index and raw[index - 1] != '\n': - fragment = '\n' + fragment - updated = raw[:index] + fragment + raw[index:] - intended = copy.deepcopy(config) - intended['clients'].extend(registrations()) - require(yaml.load(updated, Loader=UniqueLoader) == intended, 'unrelated_config_changed') - return updated - - -def candidate_spec(spec): - result = copy.deepcopy(spec) - require(result.get('replicas', 1) == 1 and result['strategy']['type'] == 'Recreate', - 'single_replica_recreate_required') - container = next(c for c in result['template']['spec']['containers'] if c['name'] == 'keycape') - env = container['env'] - require(not {e['name'] for e in env}.intersection(ENVS), 'probe_env_collision') - env.extend({'name': e, 'valueFrom': {'secretKeyRef': {'name': TEMP, 'key': c}}} - for c, e in zip(IDS, ENVS)) - return result - - -def ready(spec, timeout=150): - deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout - while time.monotonic() < deadline: - dep = get('deployment', 'keycape') - require(dep['spec'] == spec, 'deployment_drift_during_readiness') - status = dep.get('status', {}) - if (status.get('observedGeneration') == dep['metadata']['generation'] - and all(status.get(key) == 1 for key in - ['updatedReplicas', 'readyReplicas', 'availableReplicas', 'replicas'])): - return True - time.sleep(3) - raise Refused('readiness_timeout') - - -def verify_sources(envelope, recovery=False): - require(envelope.get('proposal_id') == PROPOSAL and envelope.get('target') == TARGET, - 'proposal_target_mismatch') - require(envelope.get('disposition') == ('recovery-approved' if recovery else 'approved') - and envelope.get('founder_decision_id'), - 'founder_exact_go_required') - require(envelope.get('source_hashes') and - str(Path(__file__).resolve()) in envelope['source_hashes'], 'executor_pin_required') - for filename, expected in envelope['source_hashes'].items(): - require(digest(Path(filename).read_bytes()) == expected, 'reviewed_source_changed') - required = ['net-kingdom', 'key-cape', 'railiance-platform'] - require(all(envelope.get('owner_acknowledgments', {}).get(owner) for owner in required), - 'owner_acknowledgments_required') - expiry = envelope['valid_until_epoch'] - maximum = envelope['maximum_session_seconds'] - require(finite_number(expiry) and type(maximum) is int and - 420 <= maximum <= 900 and 0 < expiry - time.time() <= maximum, - 'attended_window_invalid') - if recovery: - return None - role = envelope['role_observation'] - require(role['mount'] == 'keycape-services' and role['role'] == 'secrets-engine-openbao' - and role['issuer'] == 'https://kc.coulomb.social' and role['algorithm'] == 'RS256' - and role['bindings_exact'] is True and role['policy_exact'] is True, - 'role_owner_observation_required') - leeway = role['raw_expiration_leeway'] - require(type(leeway) is int and -1 <= leeway <= 150, 'leeway_outside_session_bound') - effective = 0 if leeway == -1 else leeway or 150 - require(role['effective_expiration_leeway'] == effective, 'leeway_normalization_mismatch') - observed = role['observed_at_epoch'] - require(finite_number(observed) and 0 <= time.time() - observed <= 300, - 'role_observation_stale_or_future') - require(envelope['bao_addr'] in BAO_ORIGINS, 'bao_origin_invalid') - return effective - - -def load_probe(path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('key39_reviewed_probe', path) - result = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(result) - return result - - -def removed_client_denied(status, raw): - try: - body = json.loads(raw) - return status == 401 and body.get('error') == 'invalid_profile_usage' and body.get('feature') == 'client_id' - except (ValueError, AttributeError, TypeError): - return False - - -def recovered_config(raw): - config = yaml.load(raw, Loader=UniqueLoader) - clients = config['clients'] - ids = [c['clientId'] for c in clients] - present = set(ids).intersection(IDS) - require(len(ids) == len(set(ids)) and present in [set(), set(IDS)], 'partial_probe_registry') - if not present: - return raw - require(clients[-6:] == registrations(), 'recovery_registration_drift') - node = next(v for key, v in yaml.compose(raw).value if key.value == 'clients') - first = node.value[-6].start_mark.index - start = raw.rfind('\n', 0, first) + 1 - end = node.end_mark.index - line_start = raw.rfind('\n', 0, end) + 1 - if not raw[line_start:end].strip(): - end = line_start - restored = raw[:start] + raw[end:] - require(candidate_config(restored) == raw, 'recovery_byte_roundtrip_failed') - return restored - - -def recovered_spec(spec): - restored = copy.deepcopy(spec) - container = next(c for c in restored['template']['spec']['containers'] if c['name'] == 'keycape') - env = container['env'] - expected = [{'name': e, 'valueFrom': {'secretKeyRef': {'name': TEMP, 'key': c}}} - for c, e in zip(IDS, ENVS)] - matches = [e for e in env if e['name'] in ENVS] - require(matches in [[], expected], 'partial_or_drifted_probe_env') - container['env'] = [e for e in env if e['name'] not in ENVS] - return restored - - -def delete_temporary(created): - # The exact raw API delete needs the same aggregate/per-request guards as patches. - k(['delete', '--raw=/api/v1/namespaces/sso/secrets/' + TEMP, '-f', '/dev/stdin'], - {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'DeleteOptions', 'preconditions': meta(created)}) - require(k(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', TEMP, '--ignore-not-found', '-o', 'json']) is None, - 'temporary_secret_still_present') - - -def verify_bao_route(transport, envelope, receipt): - expected = envelope.get('bao_health_identity_sha256') - require(isinstance(expected, str) and len(expected) == 64 - and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in expected), - 'approved_bao_health_identity_required') - require(transport.health_identity() == expected, 'bao_public_health_identity_changed') - receipt['bao_public_route_verified'] = True - - -def recover(envelope, receipt): - global REQUEST_DEADLINE, BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, CLEANING - verify_sources(envelope, recovery=True) - # Separately approved recovery obligations are cleanup, never business writes. - REQUEST_DEADLINE = None - BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None - CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None - begin_cleanup() - CLEANING = True - transport = SessionTransport(envelope['bao_addr'], receipt=receipt) - verify_bao_route(transport, envelope, receipt) - require(k(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'json'])['metadata']['uid'] == CLUSTER, - 'cluster_identity_changed') - config = get('secret', 'keycape-config') - dep = get('deployment', 'keycape') - raw = base64.b64decode(config['data']['config.yaml'], validate=True).decode() - restored = recovered_config(raw) - spec = recovered_spec(dep['spec']) - require(config['metadata']['uid'] == envelope['config_metadata']['uid'] - and dep['metadata']['uid'] == envelope['deployment_metadata']['uid'] - and digest(restored.encode()) == envelope['registry_sha256'] - and canonical(spec) == envelope['deployment_spec_sha256'], 'recovery_baseline_drift') - temp = get('secret', TEMP) - require(set(temp.get('data', {})) == set(IDS) - and temp['metadata']['uid'] == envelope['temporary_secret_uid'], 'recovery_custody_identity_required') - values = {c: base64.b64decode(temp['data'][c], validate=True).decode() for c in IDS} - if raw != restored: - patch('secret', config, '/data/config.yaml', base64.b64encode(restored.encode()).decode()) - if dep['spec'] != spec: - patch('deployment', dep, '/spec', spec) - ready(spec) - after = get('secret', 'keycape-config') - require(after['data'] == dict(config['data'], **{'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(restored.encode()).decode()}), - 'recovery_readback_failed') - require(envelope['runner_path'] in envelope['source_hashes'], 'runner_pin_required') - probe = load_probe(envelope['runner_path']) - for client, value in values.items(): - basic = base64.b64encode((client + ':' + value).encode()).decode() - status, body = transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', - form={'grant_type': 'client_credentials', 'scope': 'openbao:login'}, - headers={'Authorization': 'Basic ' + basic}) - require(removed_client_denied(status, body), 'removed_client_denial_unconfirmed') - observed = get('secret', TEMP) - require(observed['data'] == temp['data'] and observed['metadata']['uid'] == temp['metadata']['uid'], - 'recovery_temporary_secret_drift') - delete_temporary(observed) - receipt.update(cleanup_verified=True, recovery_only=True) - - -def emit_private_ready(fd, nonce, expected_envelope_sha256, envelope_sha256, envelope, receipt): - # A value-free synchronization marker, never authentication or a grant. - require(type(fd) is int and fd >= 3, 'private_ready_pipe_required') - require(isinstance(nonce, str) and len(nonce) == 64 - and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in nonce), 'ready_nonce_required') - require(expected_envelope_sha256 == envelope_sha256, 'ready_envelope_pin_changed') - validated = False - try: - current = os.fstat(fd) - require(stat.S_ISFIFO(current.st_mode) - and fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_GETFL) & os.O_ACCMODE == os.O_WRONLY, - 'private_ready_pipe_required') - identity = (current.st_dev, current.st_ino) - require(all(identity != (os.fstat(other).st_dev, os.fstat(other).st_ino) - for other in (0, 1, 2)), 'private_ready_stdio_alias_refused') - validated = True - check_deadline() - marker = {'schema': READY_SCHEMA, 'session_nonce': nonce, - 'proposal_id': PROPOSAL, 'target': TARGET, - 'executor_sha256': digest(Path(__file__).read_bytes()), - 'envelope_sha256': envelope_sha256, - 'bao_health_identity_sha256': envelope['bao_health_identity_sha256'], - 'valid_until_epoch': envelope['valid_until_epoch'], - 'receive_budget_seconds': request_budget(PRIVATE_INPUT_TOTAL_SECONDS)} - payload = json.dumps(marker, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() + b'\n' - require(len(payload) <= READY_MAX_BYTES, 'private_ready_oversized') - with total_timeout(request_budget(2)): - offset = 0 - while offset < len(payload): - written = os.write(fd, payload[offset:]) - require(type(written) is int and written > 0, 'private_ready_delivery_failed') - offset += written - check_deadline() - receipt['private_ready_emitted'] = True - except Refused: - raise - except Exception: - raise Refused('private_ready_delivery_failed') from None - finally: - if validated: - os.close(fd) - - -def read_private_input(stream): - # Complete private JSON plus EOF, within this original approved action window. - # No unbounded read, text buffering, token logging or renewed deadline. - check_deadline() - budget = request_budget(PRIVATE_INPUT_TOTAL_SECONDS) - binary = getattr(stream, 'buffer', None) - require(binary is not None, 'private_binary_input_required') - chunks, size = [], 0 - with total_timeout(budget): - while True: - chunk = binary.read(min(4096, PRIVATE_INPUT_MAX_BYTES + 1 - size)) - require(isinstance(chunk, bytes), 'private_binary_input_required') - if not chunk: - break - size += len(chunk) - require(size <= PRIVATE_INPUT_MAX_BYTES, 'private_input_oversized') - chunks.append(chunk) - check_deadline() - require(size > 0, 'private_input_empty') - try: - private = read_json(b''.join(chunks)) - require(isinstance(private, dict) - and set(private) == {'human_token', 'coding_agent_token'} - and all(isinstance(value, str) and - 0 < len(value.encode('utf-8')) <= PRIVATE_TOKEN_MAX_BYTES - for value in private.values()), 'private_input_invalid') - except (TypeError, ValueError, UnicodeError, Refused): - raise Refused('private_input_invalid') from None - check_deadline() - return private - - -def start_execution_window(envelope): - global REQUEST_DEADLINE, BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, CLEANING - REQUEST_DEADLINE = envelope['valid_until_epoch'] - BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = time.monotonic() + min( - REQUEST_DEADLINE - time.time(), envelope['maximum_session_seconds'] - 180) - CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None - CLEANING = False - - -def execute(envelope, private, receipt, checkpoint=lambda: None, window_started=False): - global CLEANING - leeway = verify_sources(envelope) - if not window_started: - start_execution_window(envelope) - else: - # main already began this exact window before consuming private stdin. - # Preserve its original monotonic budget; input waiting cannot renew it. - require(REQUEST_DEADLINE == envelope['valid_until_epoch'] - and BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE is not None and not CLEANING, - 'preinput_execution_window_required') - check_deadline() - runner_path = envelope['runner_path'] - require(runner_path in envelope['source_hashes'], 'runner_pin_required') - probe = load_probe(runner_path) - transport = SessionTransport(envelope['bao_addr'], receipt=receipt) - discovery = transport.discovery() - require(discovery.get('issuer') == 'https://kc.coulomb.social' and - discovery.get('token_endpoint') == 'https://kc.coulomb.social/token', - 'issuer_discovery_changed') - verify_bao_route(transport, envelope, receipt) - require(isinstance(private.get('human_token'), str) and private['human_token'] - and isinstance(private.get('coding_agent_token'), str) and private['coding_agent_token'], - 'founder_private_tokens_required') - require(k(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'json'])['metadata']['uid'] == CLUSTER, - 'cluster_identity_changed') - before = get('secret', 'keycape-config') - deployment = get('deployment', 'keycape') - require(not before['metadata'].get('ownerReferences'), 'controller_owned_config') - require(meta(before) == envelope['config_metadata'] - and meta(deployment) == envelope['deployment_metadata'] - and canonical(deployment['spec']) == envelope['deployment_spec_sha256'], - 'approved_runtime_revision_changed') - raw = base64.b64decode(before['data']['config.yaml'], validate=True).decode() - require(digest(raw.encode()) == envelope['registry_sha256'], 'approved_registry_changed') - updated = base64.b64encode(candidate_config(raw).encode()).decode() - intended_data = dict(before['data'], **{'config.yaml': updated}) - candidate = candidate_spec(deployment['spec']) - ready(deployment['spec']) - # Exact GET existence is tested via create (never adopt/delete an existing Secret). - values = {c: secrets.token_urlsafe(48) for c in IDS} - temporary = {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'Secret', 'metadata': {'namespace': 'sso', 'name': TEMP}, - 'type': 'Opaque', 'data': {c: base64.b64encode(v.encode()).decode() for c, v in values.items()}} - patch('secret', before, '/data/config.yaml', updated, dry=True) - patch('deployment', deployment, '/spec', candidate, dry=True) - k(['create', '-f', '/dev/stdin', '--dry-run=server', '-o', 'json'], temporary) - created = None - mutations_attempted = False - began = time.monotonic() - try: - # Set before API call: uncertain response must still trigger reconciliation. - check_deadline() - verify_bao_route(transport, envelope, receipt) - mutations_attempted = True - created = k(['create', '-f', '/dev/stdin', '-o', 'json'], temporary) - receipt['temporary_secret_uid'] = created['metadata']['uid'] - checkpoint() - patch('secret', before, '/data/config.yaml', updated) - patch('deployment', deployment, '/spec', candidate) - ready(candidate) - require(get('secret', 'keycape-config')['data'] == intended_data, 'registry_drift') - require(time.monotonic() - began < 300, 'probe_start_too_late') - # Current admitted agent token stays founder-owned; no existing secret fetched. - original_exchange = probe.exchange - def exchange(post, endpoint, client, secret, scope): - if client == 'codex-railiance-platform': - return private['coding_agent_token'] - return original_exchange(post, endpoint, client, secret, scope) - probe.exchange = exchange - supplied = dict(values, **{'codex-railiance-platform': 'founder-held-token'}) - def bounded_post(*args, **kwargs): - if not args[0].endswith('/v1/auth/token/revoke-self'): - require(time.monotonic() - began < envelope['maximum_session_seconds'] - 180, - 'session_cleanup_reserve_reached') - return transport.post(*args, **kwargs) - def bounded_sleep(seconds): - while seconds > 0: - check_deadline() - require(time.monotonic() - began < envelope['maximum_session_seconds'] - 180, - 'session_cleanup_reserve_reached') - part = min(seconds, 3) - time.sleep(part) - seconds -= part - result = probe.run(bounded_post, supplied, 'https://kc.coulomb.social/token', - envelope['bao_addr'], 'keycape-services', 'secrets-engine-openbao', - human_token=private['human_token'], leeway=leeway, sleep=bounded_sleep) - receipt['negative_probe'] = result - checkpoint() - check_deadline() - require(time.monotonic() - began <= envelope['maximum_session_seconds'], 'session_window_exceeded') - require(result['all_refused'], 'negative_proof_incomplete') - finally: - if mutations_attempted: - begin_cleanup() - CLEANING = True - # Never restore over an unrelated edit; keep custody for owner recovery on drift. - now = get('secret', 'keycape-config') - require(now['metadata']['uid'] == before['metadata']['uid'] and - now['data'] in [before['data'], intended_data], 'cleanup_registry_drift') - if now['data'] == intended_data: - patch('secret', now, '/data/config.yaml', before['data']['config.yaml']) - now = get('deployment', 'keycape') - require(now['metadata']['uid'] == deployment['metadata']['uid'] and - now['spec'] in [deployment['spec'], candidate], 'cleanup_deployment_drift') - if now['spec'] == candidate: - patch('deployment', now, '/spec', deployment['spec']) - ready(deployment['spec']) - require(get('secret', 'keycape-config')['data'] == before['data'], 'cleanup_readback_failed') - # No fresh JWT is minted: deleted clients must fail at the issuer. - for client in IDS: - basic = base64.b64encode((client + ':' + values[client]).encode()).decode() - status, body = transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', - form={'grant_type': 'client_credentials', 'scope': 'openbao:login'}, - headers={'Authorization': 'Basic ' + basic}) - require(removed_client_denied(status, body), - 'removed_client_denial_unconfirmed') - if created is None: - # A timed-out create may have succeeded; compare generated bytes before delete. - observed = get('secret', TEMP) - require(observed.get('data') == temporary['data'], 'temporary_secret_identity_unconfirmed') - created = observed - observed = get('secret', TEMP) - require(observed['metadata']['uid'] == created['metadata']['uid'] - and observed.get('data') == temporary['data'], 'temporary_secret_drift') - delete_temporary(observed) - receipt['cleanup_verified'] = True - - -def main(): - ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - ap.add_argument('mode', choices=['inspect', 'route-preflight', 'founder-preflight', 'execute', 'recover']) - ap.add_argument('--envelope') - ap.add_argument('--bao-addr', choices=sorted(BAO_ORIGINS)) - ap.add_argument('--ready-fd', type=int) - ap.add_argument('--session-nonce') - ap.add_argument('--ready-envelope-sha256') - ap.add_argument('--confirm') - ap.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - args = ap.parse_args() - receipt = {'proposal_id': PROPOSAL, 'target': TARGET, 'native_accepted': False, - 'values_emitted': False, 'cleanup_verified': False} - # Do not truncate or follow a link; protected receipts cannot overwrite credentials. - fd = os.open(args.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - def checkpoint(): - os.lseek(fd, 0, os.SEEK_SET) - os.ftruncate(fd, 0) - os.write(fd, json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True, indent=2).encode()) - os.fsync(fd) - rc = 1 - try: - if args.mode == 'route-preflight': - require(args.bao_addr is not None, 'bao_origin_required') - transport = SessionTransport(args.bao_addr, receipt=receipt) - receipt.update(bao_health_identity_sha256=transport.health_identity(), - bao_public_route_verified=True, mode='public_route_preflight', - probe_location='current_process_only') - elif args.mode in ['inspect', 'founder-preflight']: - require(k(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'json'])['metadata']['uid'] == CLUSTER, - 'cluster_identity_changed') - dep = get('deployment', 'keycape') - receipt.update(deployment_metadata=meta(dep), deployment_spec_sha256=canonical(dep['spec']), - image=next(c['image'] for c in dep['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'] - if c['name'] == 'keycape'), mode='metadata_only') - if args.mode == 'founder-preflight': - require(args.confirm == 'FOUNDER ATTENDED KEY39 PREFLIGHT', 'founder_attendance_required') - require(args.bao_addr is not None, 'bao_origin_required') - transport = SessionTransport(args.bao_addr, receipt=receipt) - receipt.update(bao_health_identity_sha256=transport.health_identity(), - bao_public_route_verified=True) - config = get('secret', 'keycape-config') - require(not config['metadata'].get('ownerReferences'), 'controller_owned_config') - raw = base64.b64decode(config['data']['config.yaml'], validate=True).decode() - candidate_config(raw) - candidate_spec(dep['spec']) - require(k(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', TEMP, '--ignore-not-found', '-o', 'json']) is None, - 'temporary_secret_already_exists') - ready(dep['spec']) - receipt.update(config_metadata=meta(config), registry_sha256=digest(raw.encode()), - baseline_ready=True, mode='founder_protected_preflight', - probe_ids_absent=True, probe_env_absent=True, temporary_secret_absent=True) - else: - require(args.envelope is not None, 'approval_envelope_required') - envelope_raw = Path(args.envelope).read_bytes() - envelope = read_json(envelope_raw) - envelope_sha256 = digest(envelope_raw) - require(Path(args.envelope).stat().st_mode & 0o022 == 0, 'approval_envelope_writable') - signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(Refused('session_interrupted'))) - if args.mode == 'recover': - recover(envelope, receipt) - else: - # Public route/source readiness precedes private token consumption. - verify_sources(envelope) - start_execution_window(envelope) - transport = SessionTransport(envelope['bao_addr'], receipt=receipt) - verify_bao_route(transport, envelope, receipt) - emit_private_ready(args.ready_fd, args.session_nonce, args.ready_envelope_sha256, - envelope_sha256, envelope, receipt) - private = read_private_input(__import__('sys').stdin) - execute(envelope, private, receipt, checkpoint=checkpoint, window_started=True) - receipt['negative_and_cleanup_verified'] = True - rc = 0 - except Refused as error: - receipt.update(status='incomplete_requires_owner_review', reason=str(error)) - except BaseException: - # Fixed outcome only: exception text may contain protected Kubernetes/HTTP data. - receipt['status'] = 'incomplete_requires_owner_review' - finally: - checkpoint() - os.close(fd) - return rc - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2fa9a44..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,176 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Turn on KeyCape's sign-in diagnosis page for the openbao-admin client. - -NK-WP-0051-T02 / KEY-WP-0041-T02. Adds one line, `signInDiagnosis: true`, to -the existing openbao-admin registration in sso/keycape-config. The field -contract is docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md; the image that honours the flag is -key-cape sha256:cdec9dd7 (source 8c6c071), live since 2026-10-15. - -Modes default to non-mutating. `inspect` reads and plans; `dry-run` sends a -server-side dry-run patch; `apply` writes and is reserved for the attended -operator with `--attended` and the observed uid/resourceVersion. `--operation -remove` is the rollback: it removes only that one line. Either way the issuer -reads the change only after `kubectl -n sso rollout restart deploy/keycape`. - -Exact-match edit: flag absent -> add; already true -> noop; any other value, -a missing or duplicated openbao-admin client -> fail closed. The signing key, -every other client and every other config byte are preserved. No Secret value, -parser message or Kubernetes error text leaves the process. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def module(name, filename): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, ROOT / filename) - result = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(result) - return result - - -# Reuse the owner lane's contained kubectl, refusal type and cluster pin. -lane = module('portal_rollout', 'portal-client-rollout.py') -pin = lane.pin -Refused = lane.Refused -require = lane.require - -CLIENT_ID = 'openbao-admin' -FLAG = 'signInDiagnosis' -LINE = FLAG + ': true' - - -def _inspect(secret): - raw, config, _ = pin.issuer_document(secret) - require(config['authelia'].get('issuer') == pin.VERIFIED_UPSTREAM_ISSUER, - 'verified_issuer_pin_required') - clients = config.get('clients') - require(isinstance(clients, list) and clients, 'client_sequence_required') - require(all(isinstance(c, dict) and 'clientId' in c for c in clients), 'client_shape_unexpected') - ids = [c['clientId'] for c in clients] - require(len(ids) == len(set(ids)), 'duplicate_client_id') - require(CLIENT_ID in ids, 'openbao_client_missing') - position = ids.index(CLIENT_ID) - value = clients[position].get(FLAG, None) - require(value in (None, True), 'existing_flag_differs_requires_reconciliation') - root = yaml.compose(raw) - sequence = next(v for k, v in root.value if k.value == 'clients') - require(isinstance(sequence, yaml.nodes.SequenceNode) and not sequence.flow_style, - 'block_client_sequence_required') - item = sequence.value[position] - require(isinstance(item, yaml.nodes.MappingNode) and not item.flow_style, - 'block_client_mapping_required') - return raw, config, position, item - - -def _line_end(raw, index): - end = raw.find('\n', index) - return len(raw) if end < 0 else end + 1 - - -def enable(secret): - """Return (base64 config, changed) with only the flag line added.""" - raw, config, position, item = _inspect(secret) - if config['clients'][position].get(FLAG) is True: - return secret['data']['config.yaml'], False - key, value = item.value[0] - require(isinstance(value, yaml.nodes.ScalarNode) - and key.start_mark.line == value.end_mark.line, 'unexpected_item_layout') - index = _line_end(raw, value.end_mark.index) - prefix = '' if raw[index - 1:index] == '\n' else '\n' - updated = raw[:index] + prefix + ' ' * key.start_mark.column + LINE + '\n' + raw[index:] - expected = copy.deepcopy(config) - expected['clients'][position][FLAG] = True - require(yaml.load(updated, Loader=pin.UniqueLoader) == expected, 'unrelated_configuration_changed') - return base64.b64encode(updated.encode()).decode(), True - - -def disable(secret): - """Rollback: return (base64 config, changed) with only the flag line removed.""" - raw, config, position, item = _inspect(secret) - if FLAG not in config['clients'][position]: - return secret['data']['config.yaml'], False - key = next(k for k, _ in item.value if k.value == FLAG) - require(key is not item.value[0][0], 'unexpected_item_layout') - start = raw.rfind('\n', 0, key.start_mark.index) + 1 - end = _line_end(raw, key.start_mark.index) - require(raw[start:end].strip() == LINE, 'unexpected_item_layout') - updated = raw[:start] + raw[end:] - expected = copy.deepcopy(config) - del expected['clients'][position][FLAG] - require(yaml.load(updated, Loader=pin.UniqueLoader) == expected, 'unrelated_configuration_changed') - return base64.b64encode(updated.encode()).decode(), True - - -def run(args, kubectl=None): - kubectl = kubectl or lane.kubectl - cluster = kubectl(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'json']) - require(cluster['metadata']['uid'] == lane.CLUSTER_UID, 'cluster_identity_changed') - before = kubectl(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '-o', 'json']) - require(not before['metadata'].get('ownerReferences'), 'controller_owned_secret') - metadata = pin.safe_metadata(before) - encoded, changed = (enable if args.operation == 'add' else disable)(before) - receipt = {'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-openbao-signin-diagnosis.v1', - 'target': 'sso/keycape-config', 'before': metadata, 'operation': args.operation, - 'client_id': CLIENT_ID, 'flag': FLAG, 'change_needed': changed, 'mode': args.mode, - 'values_emitted': False, 'changed': False} - if args.mode == 'inspect': - return receipt - if args.mode == 'apply': - require(args.attended, 'attended_operator_required') - require(metadata == {'uid': args.expected_uid, 'resource_version': args.expected_resource_version}, - 'observed_revision_changed') - if changed: - patch = [ - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': metadata['uid']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': metadata['resource_version']}, - {'op': 'replace', 'path': '/data/config.yaml', 'value': encoded}, - ] - command = ['-n', 'sso', 'patch', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '--type=json', - '--patch-file=/dev/stdin', '-o', 'json'] - if args.mode == 'dry-run': - command += ['--dry-run=server'] - result = kubectl(command, patch) - require(result['data'] == dict(before['data'], **{'config.yaml': encoded}), 'patch_response_mismatch') - if args.mode == 'apply': - after = kubectl(['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config', '-o', 'json']) - require(after['metadata']['uid'] == metadata['uid'] - and after['data'] == dict(before['data'], **{'config.yaml': encoded}), - 'readback_mismatch_stop_without_stale_replay') - receipt.update(changed=changed, after=pin.safe_metadata(after), restart_required=changed) - receipt.update(unrelated_config_bytes_preserved=True, other_secret_data_unchanged=True) - return receipt - - -def main(argv=None, kubectl=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split('\n', 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument('mode', nargs='?', default='inspect', choices=['inspect', 'dry-run', 'apply']) - parser.add_argument('--operation', default='add', choices=['add', 'remove']) - parser.add_argument('--expected-uid') - parser.add_argument('--expected-resource-version') - parser.add_argument('--attended', action='store_true', help='required for apply') - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - print(json.dumps(run(args, kubectl), sort_keys=True)) - return 0 - except Refused as error: - print(json.dumps({'status': 'refused', 'reason': str(error)})) - except pin.IssuerPinError as error: - print(json.dumps({'status': 'refused', 'reason': str(error)})) - except Exception: - # Parser and Kubernetes errors can contain full Secret material. - print(json.dumps({'status': 'failed', 'reason': 'contained_operation_failed'})) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/patch-openbao-client.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/patch-openbao-client.sh index d007f38..3ce2ac3 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/patch-openbao-client.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/patch-openbao-client.sh @@ -1,5 +1,19 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Legacy unguarded registry mutation withdrawn under NK-WP-0049. -set +x -printf '%s\n' 'Retired: use the reviewed KeyCape client registration/rollout adapter with exact source, object/version checks, contained diagnostics and owner authorization. No registry or credential is read or changed here.' >&2 -exit 2 +# Patch the live KeyCape config Secret with non-secret code-defined settings: +# the OpenBao admin client, browser auth mount callbacks, and LLDAP OU lookup +# paths. +# This does not require decrypted bootstrap secrets and does not print existing +# Secret values. + +set -euo pipefail + +NAMESPACE="${KEYCAPE_NAMESPACE:-sso}" +SECRET="${KEYCAPE_CONFIG_SECRET:-keycape-config}" +KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" +SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" + +"$KUBECTL" get secret "$SECRET" -n "$NAMESPACE" -o json \ + | python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/openbao-client-config.py" patch \ + | "$KUBECTL" patch secret "$SECRET" -n "$NAMESPACE" --type merge --patch-file /dev/stdin + +echo "Patched $NAMESPACE/$SECRET with the openbao-admin client and LLDAP OU lookup settings." diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-activation.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-activation.py deleted file mode 100644 index 211e7fb..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-activation.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,236 +0,0 @@ -"""Private, digest-bound Playwright registry/Deployment patch preparation. - -No CLI or Kubernetes client: the existing protected owner execution path must -provide fresh objects, an independently approved proposal digest, admitted -custody, exclusive maintenance, and readiness/login verification. Proposal and -patch bodies contain private registry data; never log or serialize them to chat. -Only summary() is an output receipt. This library grants no execution authority. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import base64 -import copy -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import re -import subprocess - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('playwright_registration', Path(__file__).with_name('playwright-registration.py')) -registration = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(registration) -require = registration.require -Refused = registration.Refused - - -def digest(value): - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), - allow_nan=False).encode()).hexdigest() - - -def target(obj, kind, name): - require(obj.get('kind') == kind and obj.get('metadata', {}).get('name') == name - and obj['metadata'].get('namespace') == 'sso', 'unexpected_target') - require(not obj['metadata'].get('deletionTimestamp') and - not obj['metadata'].get('ownerReferences'), 'target_not_independently_available') - return registration.registry.pin.safe_metadata(obj) - - -def container(specification): - items = specification['template']['spec']['containers'] - matches = [item for item in items if item.get('name') == 'keycape'] - require(len(matches) == 1, 'keycape_container_required') - return matches[0] - - -def stopped(specification): - result = copy.deepcopy(specification) - result['replicas'] = 0 - return result - - -def build(secret, deployment, identities, source_revision): - secret_meta = target(secret, 'Secret', 'keycape-config') - deploy_meta = target(deployment, 'Deployment', 'keycape') - require(not secret.get('immutable'), 'mutable_registry_required') - require(re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', source_revision or '') is not None, 'exact_source_revision_required') - original = deployment['spec'] - require(original.get('replicas') == 1 and original.get('strategy', {}).get('type') == 'Recreate' - and not original.get('paused'), 'single_recreate_issuer_required') - current = container(original) - require(re.fullmatch(r'forgejo\.coulomb\.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}', - current.get('image', '')) is not None, 'immutable_owner_image_required') - require(not current.get('envFrom'), 'explicit_env_bindings_required') - env = current.get('env', []) - require(isinstance(env, list) and all(isinstance(e, dict) and isinstance(e.get('name'), str) for e in env), - 'env_shape_invalid') - names = [e['name'] for e in env] - require(len(names) == len(set(names)), 'duplicate_env_name') - require([e for e in env if e['name'] == 'KEYCAPE_CONFIG'] == - [{'name': 'KEYCAPE_CONFIG', 'value': '/etc/keycape/config.yaml'}], 'config_path_drift') - volumes = original['template']['spec'].get('volumes', []) - mounts = current.get('volumeMounts', []) - expected = [v['name'] for v in volumes if v.get('secret', {}).get('secretName') == 'keycape-config'] - require(len(expected) == 1 and any(m.get('name') == expected[0] and - m.get('mountPath') == '/etc/keycape' and m.get('readOnly') is True and - not m.get('subPath') and not m.get('subPathExpr') for m in mounts), 'registry_mount_drift') - encoded, created = registration.prepare_registry(secret, identities) - proposed_data = dict(secret['data'], **{'config.yaml': encoded}) - proposed_spec = copy.deepcopy(original) - proposed_env = container(proposed_spec).setdefault('env', []) - added_env = [] - records = registration.clients(identities) - for record in records[1:]: - binding = registration.registry.env_binding(record) - target_ref = binding['valueFrom']['secretKeyRef'] - for entry in proposed_env: - reference = entry.get('valueFrom', {}).get('secretKeyRef', {}) - require(entry['name'] == binding['name'] or - (reference.get('name'), reference.get('key')) != (target_ref['name'], target_ref['key']), - 'delivery_secret_already_bound') - existing = [e for e in proposed_env if e['name'] == binding['name']] - require(not existing or existing == [binding], 'existing_binding_requires_reconciliation') - if not existing: - proposed_env.append(binding) - added_env.append(binding['name']) - return {'schema': 'netkingdom.playwright-activation.v1', 'source_revision': source_revision, - 'secret_identity': secret_meta, 'deployment_identity': deploy_meta, - 'before_data': copy.deepcopy(secret['data']), 'after_data': proposed_data, - 'before_spec': copy.deepcopy(original), 'after_spec': proposed_spec, - 'identity_inventory': copy.deepcopy(identities), 'created_client_ids': created, - 'created_env_names': added_env} - - -def summary(proposal): - changed = proposal['before_data'] != proposal['after_data'] or proposal['before_spec'] != proposal['after_spec'] - return {'schema': proposal['schema'], 'proposal_digest': digest(proposal), - 'source_revision': proposal['source_revision'], - 'created_client_ids': proposal['created_client_ids'], - 'created_env_names': proposal['created_env_names'], - 'change_needed': changed, 'maintenance_required': changed, - 'live_activated': False, 'custody_admitted': False} - - -def check_registry(proposal, binary, expected_binary_sha256): - """Run the exact admitted native verifier, no ambient env or raw diagnostics.""" - path = Path(binary) - require(path.is_file() and not path.is_symlink() and - hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() == expected_binary_sha256, - 'native_verifier_digest_mismatch') - for stage in ('before', 'after'): - env_names = [e['name'] for e in container(proposal[stage + '_spec']).get('env', [])] - command = [str(path), 'check-config', '--config', '/dev/stdin', '--env-names', - ','.join(env_names) or '__NO_ENV_NAMES__'] - if 'KEYCAPE_POLICY_PATH' in env_names: - command.append('--policy-store') - try: - result = subprocess.run(command, input=base64.b64decode(proposal[stage + '_data']['config.yaml'], validate=True), - capture_output=True, timeout=60, env={'PATH': '/usr/bin:/bin'}) - report = json.loads(result.stdout) - valid = result.returncode == 0 and report.get('valid') is True and not report.get('errors') - except Exception: - valid = False - require(valid, 'native_registry_check_failed') - return {'original_registry_valid': True, 'proposed_registry_valid': True, - 'verifier_sha256': expected_binary_sha256} - - -def quiescent(deployment, pods): - """Caller supplies an unfiltered complete sso PodList from the same cluster.""" - status = deployment.get('status', {}) - require(status.get('observedGeneration') == deployment['metadata'].get('generation') - and deployment['spec'].get('replicas') == 0 and - all(status.get(k, 0) == 0 for k in ['replicas', 'readyReplicas', 'availableReplicas', 'updatedReplicas']), - 'issuer_not_stopped') - require(pods.get('kind') == 'PodList' and not pods.get('metadata', {}).get('continue') - and isinstance(pods.get('items'), list), 'complete_namespace_pod_list_required') - # Terminating pods are still consumers. Do not infer quiescence from readiness. - for pod in pods['items']: - require(pod.get('metadata', {}).get('namespace') == 'sso', 'pod_inventory_namespace_mismatch') - pod_spec = pod.get('spec', {}) - uses_registry = any(v.get('secret', {}).get('secretName') == 'keycape-config' or - any(s.get('secret', {}).get('name') == 'keycape-config' - for s in v.get('projected', {}).get('sources', [])) - for v in pod_spec.get('volumes', [])) - for c in pod_spec.get('containers', []) + pod_spec.get('initContainers', []) + pod_spec.get('ephemeralContainers', []): - uses_registry = uses_registry or any(e.get('secretRef', {}).get('name') == 'keycape-config' - for e in c.get('envFrom', [])) or any( - e.get('valueFrom', {}).get('secretKeyRef', {}).get('name') == 'keycape-config' - for e in c.get('env', [])) - require(not uses_registry, 'registry_consumer_still_present') - - -def propose_step(proposal, approved_digest, phase, secret, deployment, pods): - """Return one private CAS patch or None for an exact no-op; never execute it. - - The caller must freshly read BOTH objects before EACH phase, verify every - response, and stop on unknown outcomes. The digest binds content, not authority. - Kubernetes has no cross-object transaction; exclusive maintenance is required. - """ - require(digest(proposal) == approved_digest, 'proposal_revision_changed') - secret_meta = target(secret, 'Secret', 'keycape-config') - deploy_meta = target(deployment, 'Deployment', 'keycape') - require(secret_meta['uid'] == proposal['secret_identity']['uid'] and - deploy_meta['uid'] == proposal['deployment_identity']['uid'], 'target_identity_changed') - old_data, new_data = proposal['before_data'], proposal['after_data'] - old_spec, new_spec = proposal['before_spec'], proposal['after_spec'] - data, current = secret['data'], deployment['spec'] - require(data == old_data or data == new_data, 'registry_drift_stop_without_stale_replay') - require(any(current == item for item in [old_spec, new_spec, stopped(old_spec), stopped(new_spec)]), - 'deployment_drift_stop_without_stale_replay') - require(phase in ('stop', 'registry', 'bindings', 'resume', 'rollback-stop', - 'rollback-registry', 'rollback-bindings', 'rollback-resume'), 'phase_invalid') - if phase.startswith('rollback-') and data == old_data and current == old_spec: - return None - if old_data == new_data and old_spec == new_spec: - require(data == old_data and current == old_spec, 'noop_state_changed') - return None - if phase == 'stop': - require(secret_meta == proposal['secret_identity'] and deploy_meta == proposal['deployment_identity'] - and data == old_data and current == old_spec, 'initial_revision_changed') - status = deployment.get('status', {}) - require(status.get('observedGeneration') == deployment['metadata'].get('generation') and - all(status.get(k) == 1 for k in ['replicas', 'readyReplicas', 'availableReplicas', 'updatedReplicas']), - 'initial_issuer_not_ready') - obj, field, wanted = deployment, 'spec', stopped(old_spec) - elif phase == 'rollback-stop': - obj, field, wanted = deployment, 'spec', stopped(current) - else: - quiescent(deployment, pods) - if phase == 'registry': - require(current == stopped(old_spec) and data == old_data, 'registry_phase_out_of_order') - obj, field, wanted = secret, 'data', new_data - elif phase == 'bindings': - require(current == stopped(old_spec) and data == new_data, 'bindings_phase_out_of_order') - obj, field, wanted = deployment, 'spec', stopped(new_spec) - elif phase == 'resume': - require(current == stopped(new_spec) and data == new_data, 'resume_phase_out_of_order') - obj, field, wanted = deployment, 'spec', new_spec - elif phase == 'rollback-registry': - obj, field, wanted = secret, 'data', old_data - elif phase == 'rollback-bindings': - require(data == old_data, 'restore_registry_before_bindings') - obj, field, wanted = deployment, 'spec', stopped(old_spec) - else: - require(data == old_data and current == stopped(old_spec), 'rollback_resume_out_of_order') - obj, field, wanted = deployment, 'spec', old_spec - if obj[field] == wanted: - return None - metadata = registration.registry.pin.safe_metadata(obj) - patch = [{'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': metadata['uid']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': metadata['resource_version']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/' + field, 'value': copy.deepcopy(obj[field])}, - {'op': 'replace', 'path': '/' + field, 'value': copy.deepcopy(wanted)}] - return {'kind': obj['kind'], 'namespace': 'sso', 'name': obj['metadata']['name'], - 'uid': metadata['uid'], 'field': field, 'expected': copy.deepcopy(wanted), - 'proposal_digest': approved_digest, 'phase': phase, 'patch': patch} - - -def verify_response(operation, obj): - """Also use on a fresh GET after an acknowledged patch; failures stop the caller.""" - metadata = target(obj, operation['kind'], operation['name']) - require(metadata['uid'] == operation['uid'] and obj.get(operation['field']) == operation['expected'], - 'mutation_readback_mismatch') - return {'phase': operation['phase'], 'proposal_digest': operation['proposal_digest'], - 'uid': metadata['uid'], 'resource_version': metadata['resource_version'], 'readback_matches': True} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-registration.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-registration.py deleted file mode 100644 index 0f78edd..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-registration.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Prepare Playwright client records; no credential access or live mutation. - -The registry adapter below is for an owner-controlled activation ceremony. Its -encoded result contains the original private registry and must stay in memory. -The CLI emits only newly constructed non-secret client/binding proposals. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import copy -from decimal import Decimal -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import re -import sys - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('playwright_registry', Path(__file__).with_name('keycape-client.py')) -registry = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(registry) -require = registry.require -Refused = registry.Refused -AUDIENCE = 'playwright-kubernetes' -SCOPE = 'playwright:connect' -CALLBACK = 'http://127.0.0.1:18764/callback' -ISSUER = 'https://kc.coulomb.social' -SLUG = re.compile(r'[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,39}\Z') -IDENTIFIER = re.compile(r'[a-z0-9][a-z0-9:._-]{0,159}\Z') - - -def public_client(): - return {'clientId': 'playwright-cli', 'audience': AUDIENCE, - 'displayName': 'Playwright platform consumer CLI', - 'redirectUris': [CALLBACK], - 'allowedScopes': ['openid', 'profile', 'groups', SCOPE], - 'grantTypes': ['authorization_code'], 'clientType': 'public'} - - -def agent_client(identity): - """Reference an existing registered identity; never manufacture its subject/tenant.""" - require(isinstance(identity, dict) and set(identity) == - {'agent_id', 'service_subject', 'tenant', 'identity_record'}, 'agent_identity_fields_required') - require(all(isinstance(v, str) for v in identity.values()), 'agent_identity_strings_required') - require(SLUG.fullmatch(identity['agent_id']) is not None, 'agent_id_invalid') - require(identity['service_subject'].startswith('service:') and - IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(identity['service_subject']) is not None and - len(identity['service_subject']) > len('service:'), 'registered_service_subject_required') - require(identity['tenant'].startswith('tenant:') and - IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(identity['tenant']) is not None and - len(identity['tenant']) > len('tenant:'), 'registered_tenant_required') - # This is a reference for owner review, not proof that registration exists. - reference = identity['identity_record'] - require(1 <= len(reference) <= 512 and all(32 < ord(c) < 127 for c in reference), - 'identity_record_reference_required') - cid = 'playwright-agent-' + identity['agent_id'] - return {'clientId': cid, 'audience': AUDIENCE, - 'displayName': 'Playwright agent ' + identity['agent_id'], - 'allowedScopes': [SCOPE], 'grantTypes': ['client_credentials'], - 'clientType': 'confidential', 'secretRef': 'env:' + registry.env_name(cid), - 'serviceSubject': identity['service_subject'], 'tenant': identity['tenant'], - 'roles': ['coding-agent'], 'tokenLifetime': '15m'} - - -def clients(identities): - require(isinstance(identities, list) and len(identities) <= 100, 'agent_inventory_invalid') - result = [public_client()] + [agent_client(identity) for identity in identities] - for field in ['clientId', 'serviceSubject', 'secretRef']: - values = [c[field] for c in result if field in c] - require(len(values) == len(set(values)), 'duplicate_agent_identity_or_binding') - return result - - -def human_lifetime(config): - """Bound the existing issuer setting; do not alter all humans' token lifetime.""" - raw = config.get('tokenLifetime') - require(isinstance(raw, str) and 0 < len(raw) <= 128, 'explicit_human_token_lifetime_required') - units = {'h': Decimal(3600), 'm': Decimal(60), 's': Decimal(1), - 'ms': Decimal('.001'), 'us': Decimal('.000001'), - 'µs': Decimal('.000001'), 'μs': Decimal('.000001'), 'ns': Decimal('.000000001')} - parts = re.findall(r'([0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]*)?|\.[0-9]+)(ns|us|µs|μs|ms|s|m|h)', raw) - require(parts and ''.join(value + unit for value, unit in parts) == raw, - 'human_token_lifetime_invalid') - seconds = sum((Decimal(value) * units[unit] for value, unit in parts), Decimal(0)) - require(1 <= seconds <= 3600, 'human_token_lifetime_outside_cluster_bound') - return seconds - - -def prepare_registry(secret, identities, operation='add'): - """Byte-preserving proposal only. Caller owns CAS, check-config and readback. - - Refuse drift before constructing any result. A missing client during removal - is an idempotent no-op. Removal does not revoke issued tokens/connections. - """ - require(operation in ('add', 'remove'), 'operation_invalid') - wanted = clients(identities) - _, config, _ = registry.pin.issuer_document(secret) - require(config.get('issuer') == ISSUER, 'keycape_issuer_mismatch') - human_lifetime(config) - require(isinstance(config.get('clients'), list), 'client_sequence_required') - for existing in config['clients']: - require(isinstance(existing, dict), 'client_shape_unexpected') - if (existing.get('audience') or existing.get('clientId')) == AUDIENCE: - require(existing in wanted, 'unreviewed_playwright_audience_registration') - # Preflight every record against the same original, including collisions. - for client in wanted: - _, current, _ = registry._inspect(secret, client) - if 'serviceSubject' in client: - for other in current['clients']: - if other['clientId'] != client['clientId'] and (other.get('audience') or other.get('clientId')) == AUDIENCE: - require(other.get('serviceSubject') != client['serviceSubject'], - 'playwright_subject_already_registered') - matching = [c for c in current['clients'] if c['clientId'] == client['clientId']] - require(not matching or matching == [client], 'existing_registration_differs_requires_reconciliation') - candidate = copy.deepcopy(secret) - changed_ids = [] - merge = registry.replacement if operation == 'add' else registry.removal - for client in wanted: - encoded, changed = merge(candidate, client) - candidate['data']['config.yaml'] = encoded - if changed: - changed_ids.append(client['clientId']) - return candidate['data']['config.yaml'], changed_ids - - -def unique_object(pairs): - result = {} - for key, value in pairs: - require(key not in result, 'duplicate_input_field') - result[key] = value - return result - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split('\n', 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument('--agents', help='Non-secret JSON array of existing agent identity references') - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - identities = [] - if args.agents: - with Path(args.agents).open('rb') as stream: - raw = stream.read(65537) - require(len(raw) <= 65536, 'agent_inventory_too_large') - identities = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=unique_object) - records = clients(identities) - print(json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.playwright-registration.v1', - 'status': 'source_proposal', 'clients': records, - 'identity_references': {c['clientId']: identity['identity_record'] - for c, identity in zip(records[1:], identities)}, - 'deployment_env': [registry.env_binding(c) for c in records if 'secretRef' in c], - 'identity_evidence_verified': False, - 'custody_admitted': False, 'live_activated': False}, indent=2)) - return 0 - except Refused as error: - print(json.dumps({'status': 'refused', 'reason': str(error)})) - except Exception: - print(json.dumps({'status': 'refused', 'reason': 'invalid_registration_input'})) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh index d72871b..db5071c 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh @@ -1,6 +1,180 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Retired: KeyCape uses the scoped, renewable factor-reader lane. -set +x +# refresh-pi-token-live.sh — refresh KeyCape's privacyIDEA admin token. +# +# This is an attended repair for "mfa check error" when the privacyIDEA admin +# JWT embedded in keycape-config has expired. It prompts for the pi-admin +# password, fetches a fresh token inside the privacyIDEA pod, updates the +# keycape-pi-token Secret, patches keycape-config without printing secrets, and +# restarts KeyCape. +# +# Usage: +# bash refresh-pi-token-live.sh [username] +# +# Optional environment: +# KUBECTL=/path/to/kubectl +# KEYCAPE_PI_REALM=coulomb|netkingdom # defaults to coulomb, the live privacyIDEA realm +# KEYCAPE_PI_REQUIRE_FOR_ALL=true|false # defaults to true to avoid admin token-list checks + set -euo pipefail -printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: personal privacyIDEA admin-token delivery is retired.' 'Use railiance-platform RPF-WP-0040 scoped factor custody, ESO delivery and renewal recovery.' 'This helper performs no login, credential read, Secret change or restart.' >&2 -exit 1 + +USERNAME="${1:-platform-root}" +KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" +SSO_NAMESPACE="${SSO_NAMESPACE:-sso}" +MFA_NAMESPACE="${MFA_NAMESPACE:-mfa}" +KEYCAPE_DEPLOYMENT="${KEYCAPE_DEPLOYMENT:-keycape}" +KEYCAPE_SECRET="${KEYCAPE_SECRET:-keycape-config}" +KEYCAPE_TOKEN_SECRET="${KEYCAPE_TOKEN_SECRET:-keycape-pi-token}" + +if [[ -r /dev/tty ]]; then + printf "privacyIDEA pi-admin password: " > /dev/tty + IFS= read -r -s PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD < /dev/tty + printf "\n" > /dev/tty +else + printf "privacyIDEA pi-admin password: " >&2 + IFS= read -r -s PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD + printf "\n" >&2 +fi +if [[ -z "$PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD" ]]; then + echo "[FAIL] Empty pi-admin password." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +PI_POD="$( + "$KUBECTL" get pod -n "$MFA_NAMESPACE" \ + -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea \ + --field-selector=status.phase=Running \ + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null || true +)" +if [[ -z "$PI_POD" ]]; then + echo "[FAIL] No running privacyIDEA pod in namespace $MFA_NAMESPACE." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Fetching fresh privacyIDEA admin token inside pod $PI_POD ..." +PI_TOKEN="$( + "$KUBECTL" exec -n "$MFA_NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + env PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD="$PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD" \ + python3 -c ' +import json +import os +import sys +import urllib.parse +import urllib.request + +payload = urllib.parse.urlencode({ + "username": "pi-admin", + "password": os.environ["PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], +}).encode() +req = urllib.request.Request("http://localhost:8080/auth", data=payload) +try: + with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as response: + body = json.load(response) + print(body["result"]["value"]["token"]) +except Exception as exc: + print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +' 2>/dev/null +)" +unset PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD + +if [[ -z "$PI_TOKEN" ]]; then + echo "[FAIL] Could not fetch a privacyIDEA admin token." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)" +cleanup() { + rm -rf "$tmpdir" +} +trap cleanup EXIT + +current_config="$( + "$KUBECTL" get secret "$KEYCAPE_SECRET" -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + -o jsonpath='{.data.config\.yaml}' | base64 -d +)" +current_realm="$( + CONFIG_YAML="$current_config" python3 -c ' +import os +import sys + +try: + import yaml +except ImportError: + print("PyYAML is required: install python3-yaml", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) + +config = yaml.safe_load(os.environ["CONFIG_YAML"]) or {} +privacyidea = config.get("privacyidea") or {} +if not isinstance(privacyidea, dict): + print("") +else: + print(str(privacyidea.get("realm") or "").strip()) +' +)" + +selected_realm="${KEYCAPE_PI_REALM:-coulomb}" +selected_require_for_all="${KEYCAPE_PI_REQUIRE_FOR_ALL:-true}" +if [[ -z "${KEYCAPE_PI_REALM:-}" && -n "$current_realm" && "$current_realm" != "$selected_realm" ]]; then + echo "[WARN] KeyCape currently points privacyIDEA at realm '$current_realm'; repairing to '$selected_realm'." >&2 +fi + +if [[ "$selected_realm" != "coulomb" && "$selected_realm" != "netkingdom" ]]; then + echo "[FAIL] Refusing unsupported privacyIDEA realm: $selected_realm" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +if [[ "$selected_require_for_all" != "true" && "$selected_require_for_all" != "false" ]]; then + echo "[FAIL] KEYCAPE_PI_REQUIRE_FOR_ALL must be true or false." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Selected privacyIDEA realm for KeyCape: $selected_realm" +echo "Selected privacyIDEA requireForAll for KeyCape: $selected_require_for_all" + +"$KUBECTL" get secret "$KEYCAPE_SECRET" -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + -o jsonpath='{.data.key\.pem}' | base64 -d > "$tmpdir/key.pem" +chmod 600 "$tmpdir/key.pem" + +CONFIG_YAML="$current_config" PI_TOKEN="$PI_TOKEN" PI_REALM="$selected_realm" PI_REQUIRE_FOR_ALL="$selected_require_for_all" \ + python3 -c ' +import os +import sys +try: + import yaml +except ImportError: + print("PyYAML is required: install python3-yaml", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) + +config = yaml.safe_load(os.environ["CONFIG_YAML"]) or {} +if not isinstance(config, dict): + print("KeyCape config.yaml must decode to a YAML mapping.", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +privacyidea = config.setdefault("privacyidea", {}) +if not isinstance(privacyidea, dict): + print("KeyCape privacyidea config must decode to a YAML mapping.", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +privacyidea["adminToken"] = os.environ["PI_TOKEN"] +privacyidea["realm"] = os.environ["PI_REALM"] +privacyidea["requireForAll"] = os.environ["PI_REQUIRE_FOR_ALL"] == "true" +sys.stdout.write(yaml.safe_dump(config, sort_keys=False)) +' > "$tmpdir/config.yaml" + +echo "Applying refreshed KeyCape config Secret ..." +"$KUBECTL" create secret generic "$KEYCAPE_TOKEN_SECRET" \ + --namespace="$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + --from-literal=token="$PI_TOKEN" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | "$KUBECTL" apply -f - + +"$KUBECTL" create secret generic "$KEYCAPE_SECRET" \ + --namespace="$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + --from-file=config.yaml="$tmpdir/config.yaml" \ + --from-file=key.pem="$tmpdir/key.pem" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | "$KUBECTL" apply -f - + +unset PI_TOKEN + +echo "Restarting KeyCape ..." +"$KUBECTL" rollout restart "deployment/$KEYCAPE_DEPLOYMENT" -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" +"$KUBECTL" rollout status "deployment/$KEYCAPE_DEPLOYMENT" -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" --timeout=90s + +echo "" +echo "[OK] KeyCape privacyIDEA token refreshed. Retry the OIDC login with a fresh URL." diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.py index 624fac5..88ffae1 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.py @@ -36,8 +36,34 @@ CLIENT = { def main() -> None: - print("Retired: use the owner-reviewed KeyCape client registration adapter; raw registry output is disabled.", file=sys.stderr) - raise SystemExit(2) + secret = json.load(sys.stdin) + encoded = secret.get("data", {}).get("config.yaml") + if not encoded: + raise SystemExit("keycape-config does not contain config.yaml") + config = yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(encoded)) + clients = config.setdefault("clients", []) + existing = next( + ( + index + for index, client in enumerate(clients) + if client.get("clientId") == CLIENT_ID + ), + None, + ) + if existing is None: + clients.append(CLIENT) + else: + # Preserve any extra fields operators may have set; overwrite known keys. + merged = dict(clients[existing]) + merged.update(CLIENT) + clients[existing] = merged + rendered = yaml.safe_dump(config, sort_keys=False).encode() + secret["data"]["config.yaml"] = base64.b64encode(rendered).decode() + secret.pop("status", None) + metadata = secret.get("metadata", {}) + for key in ("creationTimestamp", "managedFields", "resourceVersion", "uid"): + metadata.pop(key, None) + json.dump(secret, sys.stdout, separators=(",", ":")) if __name__ == "__main__": diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh index d007f38..09c6864 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.sh @@ -1,5 +1,20 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Legacy unguarded registry mutation withdrawn under NK-WP-0049. -set +x -printf '%s\n' 'Retired: use the reviewed KeyCape client registration/rollout adapter with exact source, object/version checks, contained diagnostics and owner authorization. No registry or credential is read or changed here.' >&2 -exit 2 +# Register coulomb.social as a public KeyCape OIDC client (idempotent). +# Never prints Secret values. +set -euo pipefail + +NAMESPACE="${KEYCAPE_NAMESPACE:-sso}" +SECRET="${KEYCAPE_CONFIG_SECRET:-keycape-config}" +KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" +SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" + +"$KUBECTL" get secret "$SECRET" -n "$NAMESPACE" -o json \ + | python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/register-coulomb-social.py" \ + | "$KUBECTL" apply -f - + +echo "Registered coulomb-social client in $NAMESPACE/$SECRET" + +# KeyCape loads config at process start. +"$KUBECTL" -n "$NAMESPACE" rollout restart deploy/keycape +"$KUBECTL" -n "$NAMESPACE" rollout status deploy/keycape --timeout=120s +echo "KeyCape rolled out." diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/registration-adapter.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/registration-adapter.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8b0a834..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/registration-adapter.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -# Attended registration adapter candidate - -Exercise status: unexercised - -This is a source-only, injection-only adapter for the existing Warden closed -kernel. It installs no command, runtime dispatcher, credential provider, evidence -trust root or new service. NetKingdom type/case status and bytes remain unchanged. -The generated descriptor is a proposal; it is not owner acknowledgment. - -`keycape-registration-adapter.py` wraps maintained `keycape-client.run` in apply -mode. A fixed invocation binds principal, human actor, lane, case/type/descriptor/ -catalog/acceptance/run-sheet digests and target. The descriptor pins this adapter -and its complete local helper import closure together with the exact reviewed -`check-config` executable digest. Changing that digest changes the descriptor -source pin and descriptor bytes, requiring independently reviewed admission. -The selected artifact path is rehashed before each attempt. Before helper access, -the adapter also reads that regular file with final-component symlinks refused, -checks the descriptor's exact digest, and copies at most 64 MiB into a Linux -memfd sealed against write, shrink, growth and seal removal. Both live and -proposed checks execute this same snapshot through `/proc/self/fd`, inherited -only by the checker subprocess with an empty environment. The descriptor still -binds the original artifact digest and adapter/helper composition, never an -ephemeral fd pathname. Changing the selected file after snapshot creation cannot -change executed bytes. Snapshot/seal/exec failures close the fd, revoke the parent -session through the existing boundary and cannot create a success receipt. -Linux memfd seals, executable memfds and accessible procfs are required; unsupported -runtime policy fails closed. This does not prove trusted native storage, -protect against a compromised interpreter/kernel or supply process isolation. The helper resolves the -selected file to an absolute executable path and supplies an empty checker -environment, so ambient PATH and KeyCape URL overrides cannot select another -executable or alter validation of supplied bytes. Standalone helper path selection still does not establish immutable storage. -Native executable custody and runtime admission remain separate requirements. The caller constructs the -proposed invocation from exact source inputs, installs the fixed adapter once, -and calls normal `Executor.admit`; independently derived admission must match. -No callable replacement after admission is required or supported by this recipe. - -The operation uses existing cluster/issuer checks, byte-preserving merge, -Deployment secret-env prerequisite, config validation, UID/resourceVersion CAS -and whole-data readback. Only closed metadata is passed to the injected durable -owner publisher. The owner authenticator must independently authenticate those -exact bytes. The session-revocation capability must end the same attempt's -parent session; Warden separately verifies its exact revocation evidence. -These capabilities are owner-selected callables, never case-supplied commands. -No implementation of these native capabilities is supplied or implied here. - -An identical existing client returns no change and creates no rollback authority. -Removal requires this process's independently authenticated successful creation -receipt, exact created-object label, unchanged postcreation UID/resourceVersion, -and the original exact client record. External drift, a lost readback, receipt -publication/revocation failure or process loss requires owner reconciliation. -No uncertainty is labeled retry-safe. No automatic reconciliation is installed. -Rollback after restart intentionally remains unavailable until an owner supplies -independently authenticated durable creation provenance and reviews recovery. - -The source tests execute actual maintained helper CAS/readback against synthetic -Kubernetes objects. Three checks exercise actual Warden admission/run/rollback -and uncertainty transitions with synthetic owner trust. Warden d97652a's exact -published producer source pins apply unchanged through actual BrowserInputs. -This is a source compatibility fixture, not acknowledgment, owner provenance, -normal native admission or deployment acceptance. - -## Original-intent reconciliation (NK-WP-0048-T15 source) - -`build(..., holder=, observe=)` takes two optional read-only capabilities, -injected together or not at all. With them the Adapter installs -`reconcile_original` for Warden's `ReconcileContext` (ops-warden `a45cf47`): the -original `run` intent must be separate from the `reconcile` attempt and both must -match the admitted case and reviewed source; `holder(original_attempt_id)` must -return exactly one record that `authenticate` accepts, naming that invocation and -source with a created-only `success`; and `observe()` must show the recorded -post-creation uid/resourceVersion with the exact client entry. The parent session -is revoked either way, and a `netkingdom.keycape-registration.reconcile.v1` -record is published; `verify` accepts that result like any other owner record. -It never adds or removes: holder outage, missing/ambiguous/unauthenticated or -foreign records, a no-change original, and changed revision or entry all raise, -so Warden keeps the step uncertain. Rollback after restart stays refused, since a -reconciled creation is not a creation this process verified, until an owner -rollback contract exists. Which authenticated holder backs `holder` is an owner -gate; the tests use an in-memory stand-in only. - -Remaining work belongs in live work records before T12 closure: - -- Warden owns global evidence admission and exact native evidence/session - capabilities. Published d97652a refreshes BrowserInputs producer pins for - NetKingdom 015694ee; that source assent does not attest this new adapter. -- NetKingdom owns separately reviewed descriptor/type pin selection, the env - binding/config/restart steps, and group ensure/revoke provenance. Current group - ensure does not report newly added memberships; current revoke can remove - memberships that predate the case. Wrapping these as reversible creation would - be unsound. Preserve them until a reviewed created-only contract exists. -- Platform owns structural/mint/broker and secret delivery evidence; Apps owns - actual consumer login and group enforcement. No assent is supplied here. -- Attended use still requires existing owner authorization, current caller - identity, native source/config/image pins, native receipts and cleanup proof. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/restart-readiness.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/restart-readiness.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5a8f81e..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/restart-readiness.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ -"""Bounded KeyCape restart and post-restart readiness check (NK-WP-0048-T12). - -`keycape-client.py apply` reports `restart_required` because KeyCape loads its -client registry at startup. This module supplies the missing step after a -registration: plan one restart of the single-replica Recreate issuer, then -decide from observed state whether the new instance came up and serves the -expected issuer. It is a source candidate, not wired into a SecurityCaseType or -Warden kernel; the coordinator decides 1.3 placement during the T16 re-freeze. - -No CLI, kubectl or credential handling lives here. read/write/discovery are -injected; pods are inspected for status only, never env or Secret data. A -refused restart (crash loop, failed container) stops sign-in for every client, -so it is reported as `failed` for attended owner rollback, never retried. A -deadline without a decision is `uncertain` and needs owner reconciliation; it -is never converted to success. -""" -import copy - -ANNOTATION = 'keycape.netkingdom/restarted-at' -FAILED_REASONS = {'CrashLoopBackOff', 'Error', 'CreateContainerConfigError', - 'ImagePullBackOff', 'ErrImagePull', 'RunContainerError'} - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def _issuer_deployment(deployment): - meta = deployment.get('metadata', {}) - if (deployment.get('kind') != 'Deployment' or meta.get('name') != 'keycape' - or meta.get('namespace') != 'sso'): - raise Refused('issuer deployment sso/keycape required') - spec = deployment.get('spec', {}) - if spec.get('replicas') != 1 or spec.get('strategy', {}).get('type') != 'Recreate': - raise Refused('single-replica Recreate issuer required') - return spec - - -def plan_restart(deployment, stamp, expected_resource_version): - """Return the restarted Deployment; the caller writes it with CAS on the observed revision.""" - if not isinstance(stamp, str) or not 0 < len(stamp) <= 64: - raise Refused('bounded restart stamp required') - if deployment.get('metadata', {}).get('resourceVersion') != expected_resource_version: - raise Refused('deployment revision differs from observed') - _issuer_deployment(deployment) - new = copy.deepcopy(deployment) - annotations = new['spec']['template'].setdefault('metadata', {}).setdefault('annotations', {}) - if annotations.get(ANNOTATION) == stamp: - raise Refused('restart stamp already applied') - annotations[ANNOTATION] = stamp - return new - - -def _condition(obj, kind): - return next((c.get('status') for c in obj.get('status', {}).get('conditions', []) - if c.get('type') == kind), None) - - -def _container_failure(pod): - for status in pod.get('status', {}).get('containerStatuses', []): - if status.get('name') != 'keycape': - continue - state = status.get('state', {}) - reason = (state.get('waiting') or {}).get('reason') or (state.get('terminated') or {}).get('reason') - if reason in FAILED_REASONS: - return reason - return None - - -def assess(deployment, pods, discovery, *, stamp, expected_issuer): - """Return (verdict, reasons) with verdict in ready, pending, failed.""" - spec = _issuer_deployment(deployment) - if spec['template'].get('metadata', {}).get('annotations', {}).get(ANNOTATION) != stamp: - return 'failed', ['restart stamp missing from template; deployment changed by another writer'] - reasons = [] - meta, status = deployment['metadata'], deployment.get('status', {}) - if status.get('observedGeneration', -1) < meta.get('generation', 0): - reasons.append('generation not yet observed') - if any(status.get(k) != 1 for k in ('updatedReplicas', 'readyReplicas', 'availableReplicas')): - reasons.append('replica counts not 1/1/1') - live = [p for p in pods if not p.get('metadata', {}).get('deletionTimestamp')] - new = [p for p in live if p.get('metadata', {}).get('annotations', {}).get(ANNOTATION) == stamp] - for pod in new: - failure = _container_failure(pod) - if failure: - return 'failed', [f'restarted keycape container {failure}'] - if len(new) != 1 or len(live) != 1: - reasons.append(f'expected exactly one restarted pod, saw {len(new)} of {len(live)}') - elif new[0].get('status', {}).get('phase') != 'Running' or _condition(new[0], 'Ready') != 'True': - reasons.append('restarted pod not Running/Ready') - if discovery is None: - reasons.append('issuer discovery not yet served') - elif discovery.get('issuer') != expected_issuer: - return 'failed', ['discovery issuer differs from expected'] - elif not all(discovery.get(k) for k in ('authorization_endpoint', 'token_endpoint', 'jwks_uri')): - return 'failed', ['discovery document incomplete'] - return ('pending', reasons) if reasons else ('ready', []) - - -def wait_ready(observe, sleep, *, stamp, expected_issuer, attempts, interval): - """Poll observe()->(deployment, pods, discovery) until a decision or the bound. - - Returns a status-only receipt. observe errors propagate (uncertain to the caller). - """ - if not isinstance(attempts, int) or not 0 < attempts <= 120: - raise Refused('bounded attempts required') - reasons = [] - for attempt in range(1, attempts + 1): - verdict, reasons = assess(*observe(), stamp=stamp, expected_issuer=expected_issuer) - if verdict != 'pending': - break - if attempt < attempts: - sleep(interval) - else: - verdict = 'uncertain' - return {'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-restart-readiness.v1', 'verdict': verdict, - 'attempts': attempt, 'reasons': reasons, 'stamp': stamp, - 'issuer': expected_issuer, 'values_emitted': False, - 'owner_reconciliation_required': verdict in ('failed', 'uncertain')} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_adapter_source_closure.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_adapter_source_closure.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6b6da3d..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_adapter_source_closure.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -"""Every adapter's source_digest must cover every local file it executes. - -Each *-adapter.py is imported in a fresh interpreter with -importlib.util.spec_from_file_location instrumented; the local .py files -actually loaded (sys.modules __file__ under the repo plus every -spec_from_file_location target) must be a subset of its SOURCE_FILES. -""" -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -import unittest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = ROOT.parents[2] - -PROBE = r''' -import importlib.util, json, sys -from pathlib import Path -root, repo, adapter = Path(sys.argv[1]), Path(sys.argv[2]), sys.argv[3] -seen = set() -_orig = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location -def _spy(name, location=None, *a, **k): - if location is not None: - seen.add(str(Path(location).resolve())) - return _orig(name, location, *a, **k) -importlib.util.spec_from_file_location = _spy -spec = _orig('adapter_under_probe', root / adapter) -mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(mod) -for m in list(sys.modules.values()): - f = getattr(m, '__file__', None) - if f: - seen.add(str(Path(f).resolve())) -local = sorted(p for p in seen - if p.endswith('.py') and Path(p).is_relative_to(repo) - and '.venv' not in Path(p).parts and 'site-packages' not in Path(p).parts) -local.append(str((root / adapter).resolve())) -pinned = [] -for entry in mod.SOURCE_FILES: - pinned.append(str((repo / entry[0] / entry[1]).resolve()) if isinstance(entry, tuple) - else str((root / entry).resolve())) -print(json.dumps({'loaded': sorted(set(local)), 'pinned': sorted(pinned)})) -''' - -# Adapters outside this fix's scope that fail the check (reported, not fixed). -KNOWN_FAILING = set() - - -def _probe_env(): - # The probe runs with cwd=ROOT, so a relative PYTHONPATH entry would stop - # pointing where the caller meant it to; resolve entries against our cwd. - env = dict(os.environ) - if env.get('PYTHONPATH'): - env['PYTHONPATH'] = os.pathsep.join( - str(Path(p).resolve()) for p in env['PYTHONPATH'].split(os.pathsep) if p) - return env - - -def probe(adapter): - out = subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-c', PROBE, str(ROOT), str(REPO), adapter], - capture_output=True, text=True, env=_probe_env(), cwd=ROOT) - if out.returncode: - raise AssertionError(f'{adapter} probe failed: {out.stderr[-2000:]}') - return json.loads(out.stdout.strip().splitlines()[-1]) - - -def unpinned(adapter): - r = probe(adapter) - return sorted(set(r['loaded']) - set(r['pinned'])) - - -class AdapterSourceClosure(unittest.TestCase): - pass - - -def _make(adapter): - def test(self): - missing = unpinned(adapter) - self.assertEqual(missing, [], f'{adapter} loads files its source_digest does not pin') - if adapter in KNOWN_FAILING: - test = unittest.expectedFailure(test) - return test - - -for _p in sorted(ROOT.glob('*-adapter.py')): - setattr(AdapterSourceClosure, 'test_' + _p.stem.replace('-', '_'), _make(_p.name)) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_admit_1_3_type.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_admit_1_3_type.py deleted file mode 100644 index e0ca44b..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_admit_1_3_type.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,195 +0,0 @@ -"""Kernel admission against the real 1.3 successor type (NK-WP-0048-T16 candidate). - -The committed-map tests use security-case-type-revisions/1.3 unchanged. One -separate fixture-map test acknowledges only an agent-actor mint descriptor digest -to reach the independent kernel mint prohibition after map validation. The type -is `proposed`, so the kernel must refuse it as it stands. Warden's BrowserInputs also pins each type version's parameter -fingerprint and knows only 1.1 and 1.2 (ops-warden case_inputs.PARAMETER_PINS), so an -acknowledged 1.3 is still refused until ops-warden adds a 1.3 pin. That is an -ops-warden owner change, and it is not made here. The tests show that 1.3's -parameters carry 1.2's pinned fingerprint, and that with only that one pin added in -memory the five resolvable steps admit. The two Apps attended steps remain refused -because their establishing login is unresolved in the synthetic catalog. Four real -draft lane shapes are hypothetically active in that fixture; no catalog is promoted. -Trust is fixture-only, nothing is dispatched, and none of this is owner admission -or an acknowledgment. -""" -from dataclasses import replace -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest -from unittest import mock - -import yaml - -from warden.case_run import Adapter, Executor, Journal, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Refused -import warden.case_inputs as inputs - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -REPO = ROOT.parents[2] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('compose_13_admit', ROOT / 'compose-1.2-descriptors.py') -c = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(c) - -TYPE_DIR = REPO / 'security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party' -TYPE_BYTES = (TYPE_DIR / 'type.yaml').read_bytes() -ARTIFACT = json.loads((ROOT / 'descriptor-composition-1.3.candidate.json').read_text()) -CATALOG = (ROOT / 'kernel-catalog.fixture.yaml').read_bytes() -UNRESOLVED_APPS = {'deliver-consumer-secret', 'hand-over'} -EVIDENCE = {'fixture-acceptance', 'fixture-materialization', 'fixture-descriptor', 'fixture-session'} - - -def unused(*_): - raise AssertionError('admission must not dispatch') - - -def parameter_fingerprint(type_bytes): - params = yaml.safe_load(type_bytes)['spec']['parameters'] - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(params, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()).hexdigest() - - -def pinned_13(): - """Warden's parameter pins plus the one 1.3 entry ops-warden would have to add.""" - return mock.patch.dict(inputs.PARAMETER_PINS, {'1.3': parameter_fingerprint(TYPE_BYTES)}) - - -def with_status(status): - """The committed 1.3 type with only its status changed.""" - typ = yaml.safe_load(TYPE_BYTES) - typ['spec']['status'] = status - return yaml.safe_dump(typ).encode() - - -class Admit13TypeTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup) - case = yaml.safe_load((TYPE_DIR / 'examples/forgejo.yaml').read_bytes()) - case['spec'].update(status='materialized', acceptance={ - 'at': '2026-10-17', 'record': 'fixture-only acceptance, not an owner record', - 'by': [{'name': 'fixture', 'role': 'owner'}, {'name': 'fixture', 'role': 'founder'}]}) - self.case_source = yaml.safe_dump(case).encode() - self.descriptors = dict(c.adapter_descriptors(ARTIFACT['check_config_digest'], - ARTIFACT['params']['consumer_owner_repo'], - version='1.3')) - - def admit(self, desc, type_source, *, actor=None, lane=None, agent_id=None, catalog=CATALOG): - desc_bytes = c.encode(desc) - adapter = Adapter(desc.adapter, desc.adapter_source, unused, unused) - executor = Executor(Journal(Path(self.temp.name) / desc.step), - {adapter.reference: adapter}, - lambda purpose, source, evidence: (evidence in EVIDENCE and - (purpose != 'catalog-routing-acceptance' or source == digest(CATALOG))), - browser_inputs=inputs.BrowserInputs(REPO)) - with mock.patch.dict(os.environ): - if agent_id is None: - os.environ.pop('WARDEN_AGENT_ID', None) - else: - os.environ['WARDEN_AGENT_ID'] = agent_id - return executor.admit(self.case_source, type_source, desc_bytes, - catalog, principal='founder', actor=actor or desc.actor, - lane=lane or desc.lane, - acceptance_evidence='fixture-acceptance', - materialization_evidence='fixture-materialization', - descriptor_evidence='fixture-descriptor', session_evidence='fixture-session') - - def test_committed_map_is_exactly_the_composed_set(self): - committed = yaml.safe_load(TYPE_BYTES)['spec']['execution_descriptors'] - composed = {s: digest(c.encode(d)) for s, d in self.descriptors.items()} - self.assertEqual(len(composed), 7) - self.assertEqual(committed, composed) - self.assertEqual(committed, ARTIFACT['execution_descriptors']) - - def test_proposed_type_is_refused_as_it_stands(self): - self.assertEqual(yaml.safe_load(TYPE_BYTES)['spec']['status'], 'proposed') - for step, desc in self.descriptors.items(): - with self.subTest(step=step), self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'type is not acknowledged'): - self.admit(desc, TYPE_BYTES) - - def test_warden_has_no_1_3_parameter_pin_yet(self): - self.assertNotIn('1.3', inputs.PARAMETER_PINS) - # 1.3 keeps 1.2's parameters, so the missing pin is 1.2's fingerprint. - self.assertEqual(parameter_fingerprint(TYPE_BYTES), inputs.PARAMETER_PINS['1.2']) - acknowledged = with_status('acknowledged') - for step, desc in self.descriptors.items(): - if step in UNRESOLVED_APPS: - continue # The attended session gate correctly precedes parameter validation. - with self.subTest(step=step), self.assertRaisesRegex( - Refused, 'failed exact-version validation'): - self.admit(desc, acknowledged) - - def test_committed_map_conditionally_admits_five_resolvable_steps(self): - acknowledged = with_status('acknowledged') - for step, desc in self.descriptors.items(): - if step in UNRESOLVED_APPS: - continue - with self.subTest(step=step), pinned_13(): - admitted, invocation, _ = self.admit(desc, acknowledged) - self.assertEqual(admitted, desc) - self.assertEqual((invocation.step, invocation.actor, invocation.target), - (desc.step, desc.actor, 'forgejo')) - - def test_unresolved_apps_sessions_refused_even_once_acknowledged_and_pinned(self): - for step in sorted(UNRESOLVED_APPS): - with self.subTest(step=step), pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex( - Refused, 'does not resolve to an active, reviewed login lane'): - self.admit(self.descriptors[step], with_status('acknowledged')) - - def test_catalog_evidence_is_bound_to_exact_fixture_bytes(self): - mint = self.descriptors['mint-secret'] - with pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'independent owner evidence not verified'): - self.admit(mint, with_status('acknowledged'), catalog=CATALOG + b'\n# changed source\n') - - def test_descriptor_outside_the_map_is_refused(self): - acknowledged = with_status('acknowledged') - mint = self.descriptors['mint-secret'] - for changed in (replace(mint, lane='other-lane'), replace(mint, retry_safe=True), - replace(mint, actor='agent')): - with self.subTest(changed=changed), pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex( - Refused, 'no exact acknowledged machine descriptor'): - self.admit(changed, acknowledged) - - def test_mint_secret_admits_only_a_human_actor(self): - # Moved from test_admit_1_2_adapter_descriptors.py (NK48-R1-F1) in r5. - acknowledged = with_status('acknowledged') - mint = self.descriptors['mint-secret'] - self.assertEqual((mint.effect, mint.actor), ('mint', 'human')) - with pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'principal actor or lane mismatch'): - self.admit(mint, acknowledged, actor='agent') - - def test_agent_mint_is_refused_after_fixture_map_acknowledges_descriptor(self): - # A committed-map mismatch cannot exercise the independent mint guard. - mint = replace(self.descriptors['mint-secret'], actor='agent') - typ = yaml.safe_load(with_status('acknowledged')) - typ['spec']['execution_descriptors']['mint-secret'] = digest(c.encode(mint)) - with pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'agent mint is forbidden'): - self.admit(mint, yaml.safe_dump(typ).encode()) - - def test_human_mint_is_refused_with_agent_runtime_identity(self): - mint = self.descriptors['mint-secret'] - self.assertEqual(mint.actor, 'human') - with pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'agent mint is forbidden'): - self.admit(mint, with_status('acknowledged'), agent_id='fixture-agent') - - def test_wrong_lane_is_refused(self): - # Moved from test_admit_1_2_adapter_descriptors.py in r5. - acknowledged = with_status('acknowledged') - for step, desc in self.descriptors.items(): - with self.subTest(step=step), pinned_13(), self.assertRaisesRegex( - Refused, 'principal actor or lane mismatch'): - self.admit(desc, acknowledged, lane='wrong-lane') - - def test_earlier_versions_carry_no_execution_map(self): - for version in ('1.2',): - path = REPO / f'security-case-type-revisions/{version}/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml' - with self.subTest(version=version): - self.assertNotIn('execution_descriptors', yaml.safe_load(path.read_bytes())['spec']) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_bind_env_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_bind_env_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index db23090..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_bind_env_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,211 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic-only tests for the T27 bind-env candidate; no cluster, no values.""" -import copy -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import json -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -from warden.case_run import Invocation, OwnerResult, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('bind_env_adapter', ROOT / 'bind-env-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('bind_env_fixture', ROOT / 'test_keycape_client.py') -f = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(f) - -CASE = {'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1', 'parameters': f.FORGEJO_PARAMS}} - - -def deployment(env=None): - return {'kind': 'Deployment', 'metadata': {'name': 'keycape', 'namespace': 'sso', 'resourceVersion': '1'}, - 'spec': {'template': {'spec': {'containers': [ - {'name': 'keycape', 'env': list(env or [{'name': 'KEYCAPE_CONFIG', 'value': '/etc/keycape/config.yaml'}])}]}}}} - - -class Store: - def __init__(self, d): - self.d, self.writes = d, [] - - def read(self): - return copy.deepcopy(self.d) - - def write(self, new, rv): - if rv != self.d['metadata']['resourceVersion']: - raise RuntimeError('conflict') - self.d = copy.deepcopy(new) - self.d['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = str(int(rv) + 1) - self.writes.append(self.d) - return self.d['metadata']['resourceVersion'] - - -class BindEnvTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.case = yaml.safe_dump(CASE).encode() - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(self.case), digest(b'type'), digest(desc_bytes), - digest(b'catalog'), digest(b'case-acceptance:test'), digest(b'run sheet')) - self.admitted = Invocation('bind-env', 'net-kingdom', 'forgejo', 'human', - 'founder', 'keycape-attended-case-change', pins) - self.inv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.undo = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - self.evidence, self.revocations = {}, [] - - def publish(self, payload): - self.assertNotIn(b'synthetic', payload) - ref = 'owner-evidence:attempt-' + str(len(self.evidence)) - self.evidence[ref] = payload - return ref - - def revoke(self, inv): - self.revocations.append(inv) - return 'revocation:' + inv.attempt_id - - def adapter(self, store, **kw): - args = dict(admitted=self.admitted, case_source=self.case, expected_resource_version='1', - case_acceptance='case-acceptance:test', read=store.read, write=store.write, - publish=self.publish, authenticate=lambda r, p: self.evidence.get(r) == p, - revoke_session=self.revoke) - args.update(kw) - return a.build(**args) - - def env(self, store): - return store.d['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['env'] - - def test_binding_is_reference_only(self): - b = a.binding_for_case(CASE) - self.assertEqual(b['name'], 'KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET') - self.assertEqual(b['valueFrom']['secretKeyRef'], {'name': 'keycape-forgejo-client', 'key': 'client-secret'}) - self.assertNotIn('value', b) - - def test_run_verify_then_created_only_rollback(self): - s = Store(deployment()) - ad = self.adapter(s) - self.assertEqual((ad.reference, ad.source), (a.REFERENCE, a.source_digest())) - r = ad.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual((r.outcome, r.created, r.session_revocation_evidence), (Outcome.SUCCESS, (a.CREATED,), 'revocation:attempt-one')) - self.assertTrue(ad.verify(self.inv, r)) - payload = json.loads(self.evidence[r.evidence]) - self.assertEqual((payload['before'], payload['after'], payload['values_emitted']), ('1', '2', False)) - self.assertEqual(len(self.env(s)), 2) - u = ad.rollback(self.undo, (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertEqual(u.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(self.env(s), deployment()['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['env']) - self.assertEqual(self.revocations, [self.inv, self.undo]) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(replace(self.undo, attempt_id='attempt-three'), (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revocations), 3) - - def test_existing_identical_binding_is_no_change_and_not_rollbackable(self): - s = Store(deployment([a.binding_for_case(CASE)])) - ad = self.adapter(s) - self.assertEqual(ad.invoke(self.inv).outcome, Outcome.NO_CHANGE) - self.assertEqual(s.writes, []) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(self.undo, (a.CREATED,)) - - def test_refusals_still_revoke_session(self): - other = dict(a.binding_for_case(CASE), valueFrom={'secretKeyRef': {'name': 'x', 'key': 'client-secret'}}) - literal = {'name': 'KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET', 'value': 'synthetic'} - for env in ([other], [literal]): - s = Store(deployment(env)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(s).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(s.writes, []) - s = Store(deployment()) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(s, expected_resource_version='0').invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual((s.writes, len(self.revocations), self.evidence), ([], 3, {})) - public = {'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1', - 'parameters': dict(f.FORGEJO_PARAMS, client_type='public', mfa_required='false')}} - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.binding_for_case(public) - with self.assertRaises(Exception): - a.binding_for_case({'spec': {'type': 'other@1', 'parameters': f.FORGEJO_PARAMS}}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.plan(dict(deployment(), metadata={'name': 'keycape', 'namespace': 'other'}), a.binding_for_case(CASE)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.plan(deployment(), dict(a.binding_for_case(CASE), value='synthetic')) - - def test_build_pins_and_capabilities_required(self): - s = Store(deployment()) - pins = self.admitted.pins - for kw in (dict(allow_unimplemented=True), - dict(case_source=self.case + b' '), - dict(case_acceptance='case-acceptance:other'), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(pins, adapter=digest(b'x')))), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, step='register-client')), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, target='other')), - dict(admitted=self.inv), - dict(publish=None), dict(revoke_session='cmd'), dict(write=None)): - with self.assertRaises(Exception, msg=kw): - self.adapter(s, **kw) - - def test_rebinding_and_source_drift_refused_before_write(self): - s = Store(deployment()) - ad = self.adapter(s) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.invoke(replace(self.inv, principal='someone-else')) - with patch.object(a, 'source_digest', return_value=digest(b'drift')): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(s.writes, []) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revocations), 2) - - def test_source_digest_covers_executed_helper_closure(self): - # NK48-R2-F3: keycape-client.py executes portal-client-rollout.py, - # which executes openbao-client-config.py and register-user-engine-portal.py. - import shutil, tempfile - before = a.source_digest() - for name in ('portal-client-rollout.py', 'openbao-client-config.py', - 'register-user-engine-portal.py'): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: - for f in a.ROOT.glob('*.py'): - shutil.copy(f, Path(tmp) / f.name) - with open(Path(tmp) / name, 'a') as fh: - fh.write('\n# drift\n') - with patch.object(a, 'ROOT', Path(tmp)): - self.assertNotEqual(a.source_digest(), before, name) - - def test_tampered_or_unauthenticated_evidence_never_authorizes_undo(self): - s = Store(deployment()) - ad = self.adapter(s) - r = ad.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(ad.verify(self.undo, r)) - self.assertFalse(ad.verify(self.inv, replace(r, evidence='owner-evidence:forged'))) - self.evidence[r.evidence] = b'tampered' - self.assertFalse(ad.verify(self.inv, r)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(self.undo, (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertEqual(len(self.env(s)), 2) - - def test_process_loss_does_not_reconstruct_created_authority(self): - s = Store(deployment()) - self.adapter(s).invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(s, expected_resource_version='2').rollback(self.undo, (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertEqual(len(self.env(s)), 2) - - def test_revocation_or_publication_failure_is_never_success(self): - for kw in (dict(revoke_session=lambda inv: None), dict(publish=lambda p: 'bad id!')): - s = Store(deployment()) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(s, **kw).invoke(self.inv) - - def test_rollback_refused_after_drift(self): - s = Store(deployment()) - ad = self.adapter(s) - ad.invoke(self.inv) - s.d['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = '9' - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(self.undo, (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertEqual(len(self.env(s)), 2) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_compose_1_2_descriptors.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_compose_1_2_descriptors.py deleted file mode 100644 index bc15e8f..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_compose_1_2_descriptors.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic positive and refusal fixtures for the T30 1.2 descriptor composer.""" -from dataclasses import replace -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest - -from warden.case_run import Descriptor -from warden.case_receipt_state import Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('compose_12', ROOT / 'compose-1.2-descriptors.py') -c = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(c) - -CHECKER = 'sha256:' + 'b' * 64 -PARAMS = {'consumer_owner_repo': 'railiance-apps'} - - -def synthetic(type_spec): - """One kernel-valid descriptor per 1.2 step, owner/lane taken from the type.""" - out = [] - for entry in type_spec['follow_through']: - out.append((entry['id'], Descriptor( - 'warden.case.execution.v1', entry['id'], entry['owner'].format(**PARAMS), - f"net-kingdom/{entry['id']}@v1", 'sha256:' + 'a' * 64, 'human', - entry.get('lane', 'proposed-lane'), 'client_id', 'change', ('created',), - False, ('parent-session',)))) - return out - - -class ComposeTests(unittest.TestCase): - @classmethod - def setUpClass(cls): - cls.spec, cls.canonical = c.load_types() - cls.good = synthetic(cls.spec) - - def compose(self, candidates, canonical=None): - return c.compose(self.spec, candidates, PARAMS, canonical or self.canonical) - - def test_complete_seven_step_map(self): - composed = self.compose(self.good) - self.assertEqual(list(composed), [e['id'] for e in self.spec['follow_through']]) - self.assertEqual(len(composed), 7) - self.assertTrue(all(v.startswith('sha256:') for v in composed.values())) - - def test_partial_map_refused(self): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'partial'): - self.compose(self.good[:-1]) - - def test_duplicate_step_refused(self): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'duplicate'): - self.compose(self.good + [self.good[0]]) - - def test_unknown_step_refused(self): - bogus = ('rotate-secret', replace(self.good[0][1], step='rotate-secret')) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'unknown'): - self.compose(self.good[:-1] + [bogus]) - - def test_step_name_mismatch_refused(self): - bad = [(s, replace(d, step='bind-env') if s == 'ensure-groups' else d) - for s, d in self.good] - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'names step'): - self.compose(bad) - - def test_owner_mismatch_refused(self): - bad = [(s, replace(d, owner='apps') if s == 'hand-over' else d) for s, d in self.good] - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'owner'): - self.compose(bad) - - def test_lane_mismatch_refused(self): - bad = [(s, replace(d, lane='other-lane') if s == 'register-client' else d) - for s, d in self.good] - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'lane'): - self.compose(bad) - - def test_kernel_invalid_descriptor_refused(self): - bad = [(s, replace(d, revocation_scopes=()) if s == 'ensure-groups' else d) - for s, d in self.good] - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'kernel'): - self.compose(bad) - - def test_canonical_change_refused(self): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, '1.1'): - self.compose(self.good, canonical='sha256:' + '0' * 64) - - def test_only_explicit_12_root(self): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'explicit 1.2'): - c.load_types(version_roots={'1.1': c.VERSION_ROOTS['1.2']}) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'explicit 1.2'): - c.load_types(version_roots={}) - - def test_version_selection(self): - for bad in ('1.1', '1.4', '', None): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - c.load_types(version=bad) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # a 1.2 root cannot be selected as 1.3 - c.load_types(version='1.3', version_roots={'1.2': c.VERSION_ROOTS['1.2']}) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as missing, self.assertRaises(Refused): - c.load_types(version='1.3', version_roots={'1.3': Path(missing) / 'absent'}) - type_spec, _ = c.load_types(version='1.3') # the 1.3 successor candidate exists now - self.assertEqual(type_spec['version'], '1.3') - with self.assertRaises(SystemExit): - c.main(['--check-config-digest', 'x', '--consumer-owner-repo', 'y', '--version', '1.1']) - - def test_canonical_default_bytes_untouched(self): - path = c.DEFAULT_ROOT / c.TYPE_ID / 'type.yaml' - before = path.read_bytes() - c.artifact(CHECKER, PARAMS) - self.assertEqual(path.read_bytes(), before) - - def test_1_2_composition_is_refused_on_the_r5_lanes(self): - # r5 (OW-1.3-C1) moved three net-kingdom steps to keycape-attended-case-change, - # which the acknowledged 1.2 type does not declare. 1.2 stays plan-only. - doc = c.artifact(CHECKER, PARAMS) - self.assertFalse(doc['complete_executable_descriptor_set']) - self.assertIsNone(doc['execution_descriptors']) - findings = {r['step']: r['findings'] for r in doc['steps'] if r['findings']} - self.assertEqual(findings, {step: ["lane 'keycape-attended-case-change' != type lane " - "'key-cape-oidc-login'"] - for step in ('ensure-groups', 'bind-env', 'register-client')}) - - def test_current_adapters_compose_for_1_3(self): - doc = c.artifact(CHECKER, PARAMS, version='1.3') - self.assertTrue(doc['complete_executable_descriptor_set']) - self.assertEqual(len(doc['execution_descriptors']), 7) - self.assertIsNone(doc['refusal']) - self.assertFalse(doc['admitted'] or doc['owner_review'] or doc['dispatch_permitted']) - self.assertEqual({r['step'] for r in doc['steps'] if r['findings']}, set()) - by_step = {r['step']: r['descriptor'] for r in doc['steps']} - self.assertEqual({s: d['actor'] for s, d in by_step.items()}, - {s: 'human' for s in by_step}) # RAPPS-1.3-C1: no agent step remains - self.assertEqual({s: d['lane'] for s, d in by_step.items()}, { - 'ensure-groups': 'keycape-attended-case-change', - 'bind-env': 'keycape-attended-case-change', - 'register-client': 'keycape-attended-case-change', - 'mint-secret': 'keycape-client-secret-generate', - 'deliver-secret': 'platform-secret-delivery', - 'deliver-consumer-secret': 'consumer-owner-deployment', - 'hand-over': 'apps-consumer-handover'}) - self.assertEqual(by_step['hand-over']['owner'], PARAMS['consumer_owner_repo']) - self.assertFalse(any(r['owner_confirmation_required'] for r in doc['steps'])) - - def test_committed_1_3_artifact_matches_regeneration(self): - import json - committed = json.loads((ROOT / 'descriptor-composition-1.3.candidate.json').read_text()) - regenerated = c.artifact(committed['check_config_digest'], committed['params'], version='1.3') - self.assertEqual(json.loads(json.dumps(regenerated)), committed) - - def test_committed_artifact_matches_regeneration(self): - import json - committed = json.loads((ROOT / 'descriptor-composition-1.2.candidate.json').read_text()) - regenerated = c.artifact(committed['check_config_digest'], committed['params']) - self.assertEqual(json.loads(json.dumps(regenerated)), committed) - - def test_adapters_need_bounded_inputs(self): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - c.adapter_descriptors('not-a-digest', 'railiance-apps') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_deliver_consumer_secret_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_deliver_consumer_secret_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 70ca64c..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_deliver_consumer_secret_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,150 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic positive/refusal fixtures for the deliver-consumer-secret seam. No live calls.""" -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest - -import yaml -from warden.case_run import Invocation, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('delivery_adapter', ROOT / 'deliver-consumer-secret-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) - -PARAMS = {'client_id': 'forgejo', 'client_type': 'confidential', 'consuming_service': 'forgejo', - 'consumer_namespace': 'forgejo', 'consumer_owner_repo': 'forgejo-ops'} - - -class DeliveryTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.case = self.case_bytes() - self.effects, self.published = [], {} - self.created = {n: True for n in a.OBJECTS} - self.reverted = True - self.admitted = self.invocation(self.case) - self.inv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.rinv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - - def case_bytes(self, type_='oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2', **over): - return yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': type_, 'parameters': {**PARAMS, **over}}}).encode() - - def invocation(self, case, owner='forgejo-ops'): - desc = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor(owner)), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(case), digest(b'type'), digest(desc), digest(b'catalog'), - digest(b'acceptance'), digest(b'run sheet')) - return Invocation('deliver-consumer-secret', owner, 'forgejo', 'human', 'founder', - 'consumer-owner-deployment', pins) - - def receipt(self, operation, names, want=None): - objs = {n: {'uid': f'uid-{n}', 'created': self.created[n], - 'metadata': copy.deepcopy(want[n]) if want else {}} for n in names} - return {'schema': 'netkingdom.consumer-secret-delivery.v1', 'operation': operation, - 'objects': objs, 'values_emitted': False, 'consumer_reference_reverted': self.reverted} - - def adapter(self, case=None, admitted=None, apply=None): - def owner_apply(inv, want): - self.effects.append('apply') - return apply(want) if apply else self.receipt('apply', a.OBJECTS, want) - - def owner_remove(inv, targets): - self.effects.append(('remove', tuple(targets))) - return self.receipt('remove', tuple(targets)) - - def publish(payload): - ident = f'evidence-{len(self.published)}' - self.published[ident] = payload - return ident - - return a.build(admitted=admitted or self.admitted, case_source=case or self.case, - owner_apply=owner_apply, owner_remove=owner_remove, publish=publish, - authenticate=lambda i, p: self.published.get(i) == p, - revoke_session=lambda inv: f'revoked-{inv.attempt_id}') - - def test_positive_apply_verify_and_created_only_rollback(self): - self.created['consumer-eso-sa'] = False # preexisting-matched: must be preserved - ad = self.adapter() - result = ad.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.assertEqual(result.created, ('consumer-secretstore', 'consumer-externalsecret')) - self.assertTrue(ad.verify(self.inv, result)) - payload = self.published[result.evidence].decode() - self.assertNotIn('CLIENT_SECRET', payload) - back = ad.rollback(self.rinv, result.created) - self.assertEqual(back.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(self.effects[-1], ('remove', ('consumer-externalsecret', 'consumer-secretstore'))) - - def test_no_change_has_nothing_to_roll_back(self): - self.created = {n: False for n in a.OBJECTS} - ad = self.adapter() - self.assertEqual(ad.invoke(self.inv).outcome, Outcome.NO_CHANGE) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(self.rinv, ('consumer-externalsecret',)) - self.assertNotIn('remove', [e[0] for e in self.effects if isinstance(e, tuple)]) - - def test_accepts_exactly_1_2_and_1_3(self): - self.assertEqual(a.ACCEPTED_TYPES, {'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2', 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3'}) - case = self.case_bytes('oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3') - admitted = self.invocation(case) - result = self.adapter(case=case, admitted=admitted).invoke( - replace(admitted, attempt_id=self.inv.attempt_id, operation=self.inv.operation)) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - for t in ('oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1', 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.4', 'other@1.3'): - case = self.case_bytes(t) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(case=case, admitted=self.invocation(case)) - - def test_refuses_canonical_11_public_and_bad_binding(self): - for case in (self.case_bytes('oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1'), - self.case_bytes(client_type='public')): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(case=case, admitted=self.invocation(case)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(case=self.case + b'\n#drift') - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter(admitted=self.invocation(self.case, owner='other-owner')) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - self.adapter().invoke(replace(self.inv, target='other')) - self.assertEqual(self.effects, []) - - def test_refuses_value_bearing_or_mismatched_receipts(self): - def value(want): - r = self.receipt('apply', a.OBJECTS, want) - r['objects']['consumer-externalsecret']['metadata']['data'] = {'CLIENT_SECRET': 'x'} - return r - - def drift(want): - r = self.receipt('apply', a.OBJECTS, want) - r['objects']['consumer-externalsecret']['metadata']['keys'] = ['CLIENT_SECRET', 'OTHER'] - return r - - def automount(want): - r = self.receipt('apply', a.OBJECTS, want) - r['objects']['consumer-eso-sa']['metadata']['automount'] = True - return r - - def emitted(want): - return {**self.receipt('apply', a.OBJECTS, want), 'values_emitted': True} - - for bad in (value, drift, automount, emitted): - ad = self.adapter(apply=bad) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.invoke(self.inv) - - def test_rollback_requires_reverted_reference_and_exact_created_set(self): - ad = self.adapter() - result = ad.invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(self.rinv, ('consumer-externalsecret',)) - self.reverted = False - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - ad.rollback(self.rinv, result.created) - forged = replace(result, evidence='evidence-forged') - self.assertFalse(ad.verify(self.inv, forged)) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_deliver_secret_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_deliver_secret_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index a973b3d..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_deliver_secret_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,169 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic, value-free fixtures for the T26 deliver-secret seam. No live calls.""" -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest - -from warden.case_run import Invocation, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('deliver_secret_adapter', ROOT / 'deliver-secret-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) - -KEYS = ('client-secret',) -EXAMPLES = ROOT.parents[2] / 'security-case-type-revisions' / '1.2' / 'oidc-browser-relying-party' / 'examples' -CASE = (EXAMPLES / 'forgejo.yaml').read_bytes() -PUBLIC_CASE = (EXAMPLES / 'example-public-portal.yaml').read_bytes() -SECRET_NAME = 'keycape-forgejo-client' -CUSTODY = 'platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo' -AFTER = {'uid': 'uid-1', 'resource_version': '3'} - - -class DeliverSecretTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - desc = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(CASE), digest(b'type'), digest(desc), digest(b'catalog'), - digest(b'case-acceptance:test'), digest(b'run sheet')) - self.admitted = Invocation('deliver-secret', 'railiance-platform', 'forgejo', 'human', - 'founder', 'platform-secret-delivery', pins) - self.inv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.rb = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - self.evidence, self.calls, self.revoked = {}, [], [] - self.before = None - self.kw = dict(admitted=self.admitted, case_source=CASE, - case_acceptance='case-acceptance:test', - deliver=self.deliver, remove=self.remove, publish=self.publish, - authenticate=lambda ref, p: self.evidence.get(ref) == p, - revoke_session=lambda inv: self.revoked.append(inv) or 'revocation-' + inv.attempt_id) - - def receipt(self, operation, changed, before, after, **extra): - r = {'schema': 'netkingdom.deliver-secret.v1', 'operation': operation, 'namespace': 'sso', - 'name': SECRET_NAME, 'custody_reference': CUSTODY, - 'key_names': list(KEYS), 'values_emitted': False, 'changed': changed, - 'before': before, 'after': after} - r.update(extra) - return r - - def deliver(self, inv, binding): - self.calls.append(('deliver', binding)) - return self.receipt('deliver', self.before is None, self.before, - self.before or dict(AFTER)) - - def remove(self, inv, binding, after): - self.calls.append(('remove', after)) - return self.receipt('remove', True, after, None) - - def publish(self, payload): - ref = 'owner-evidence-' + str(len(self.evidence)) - self.evidence[ref] = payload - return ref - - def test_created_delivery_verifies_and_rolls_back(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual((result.outcome, result.created), (Outcome.SUCCESS, (a.CREATED,))) - self.assertTrue(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - self.assertNotIn(b'secret-value', b''.join(self.evidence.values())) - undone = adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertEqual(undone.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(self.calls[-1], ('remove', AFTER)) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revoked), 2) - - def test_pre_existing_secret_is_no_change_and_never_rolled_back(self): - self.before = dict(AFTER) - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual((result.outcome, result.created), (Outcome.NO_CHANGE, ())) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.CREATED,)) - self.assertNotIn('remove', [c[0] for c in self.calls]) - - def test_receipt_carrying_value_is_refused_and_session_still_revoked(self): - self.deliver = lambda inv, b: self.receipt('deliver', True, None, dict(AFTER), data='secret-value') - self.kw['deliver'] = self.deliver - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revoked), 1) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - - def test_values_emitted_or_wrong_reference_refused(self): - for bad in (dict(values_emitted=True), dict(name='other'), dict(key_names=['x'])): - self.kw['deliver'] = lambda inv, b, bad=bad: self.receipt('deliver', True, None, dict(AFTER), **bad) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - - def test_build_refusals(self): - cases = [dict(case_acceptance='other'), dict(case_source=CASE.decode()), dict(publish=None), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, lane='other-lane')), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, adapter=digest(b'x'))))] - for change in cases: - with self.subTest(change=change), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, **change}) - - def test_reference_derived_from_admitted_target_per_type(self): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(self.calls[0], ('deliver', { - 'namespace': 'sso', 'name': SECRET_NAME, 'custody_reference': CUSTODY, - 'key_names': list(KEYS), 'client_id': 'forgejo'})) - for caller_ref in ('namespace', 'name', 'custody_reference', 'key_names'): - with self.subTest(caller_ref=caller_ref), self.assertRaises(TypeError): - a.build(**{**self.kw, caller_ref: 'x'}) - - def test_reviewer_demo_admitted_forgejo_grafana_delivery_refused(self): - grafana = CASE.replace(b'client_id: forgejo', b'client_id: grafana') - # Same admitted forgejo case, grafana case source: pin differs. - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'case_source': grafana}) - # Admission re-pinned to the grafana source but still targeting forgejo. - repinned = replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(grafana))) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'admitted': repinned, 'case_source': grafana}) - # A grafana-shaped receipt under the forgejo admission is refused. - self.kw['deliver'] = lambda inv, b: self.receipt( - 'deliver', True, None, dict(AFTER), name='keycape-grafana-client', - custody_reference='platform/workloads/keycape/grafana') - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - - def test_public_client_case_refused(self): - admitted = replace(self.admitted, target='example-portal', - pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(PUBLIC_CASE))) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted, 'case_source': PUBLIC_CASE}) - - def test_case_pin_mismatch_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'case_source': CASE + b'\n# edited\n'}) - self.assertEqual(self.calls, []) - - def test_attempt_binding_and_reused_evidence_refused(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(replace(self.inv, target='other')) - self.kw['publish'] = lambda payload: 'same-ref' - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-three')) - - def test_unverified_or_foreign_creation_cannot_roll_back(self): - self.kw['authenticate'] = lambda ref, p: False - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.CREATED,)) - adapter = a.build(**{**self.kw, 'authenticate': lambda ref, p: True}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.CREATED,)) - - def test_descriptor_keeps_non_retry_safe_and_parent_session_scope(self): - d = a.descriptor() - self.assertEqual((d.step, d.owner, d.retry_safe, d.revocation_scopes), - ('deliver-secret', 'railiance-platform', False, ('parent-session',))) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_ensure_groups_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_ensure_groups_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7f4bcf9..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_ensure_groups_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,261 +0,0 @@ -"""Ensure-groups adapter against synthetic journal and provisioner fakes only. - -No SQL connection, LLDAP session or native action happens here; the fake -connector raises if anything tries to open it. -""" -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch -import uuid - -from warden.case_run import Descriptor, Invocation, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('ensure_groups_adapter', ROOT / 'ensure-groups-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) -from group_provenance_postgres import GroupJournalBinding, PostgresGroupProvenance # noqa: E402 -from group_provenance import GroupProvenance # noqa: E402 -from provisioner import GroupResult, LLDAPProvisioner # noqa: E402 - - -class Continuity: - def check(self, *args): - return True - - def advance(self, *args): - return True - - -def no_connect(): - raise AssertionError('no SQL connection in source tests') - - -class FakeProvisioner: - _group_binding = staticmethod(LLDAPProvisioner._group_binding) - - def __init__(self, journal): - self.group_provenance = journal - self.calls = [] - self.state = None - self.created_groups = ({'name': 'forgejo-users', 'id': 7},) - self.created_memberships = ({'group': 'forgejo-users', 'user': 'alice'},) - - def _result(self, payload, status, resumed): - return GroupResult('netkingdom-lldap', ','.join(sorted(payload['groups'])), status, resumed, - payload.get('ensure_idempotency_key', payload['idempotency_key']), - payload.get('ensure_correlation_id', payload['correlation_id']), - self.created_groups, self.created_memberships) - - def ensure_service_groups(self, payload): - self.calls.append(('ensure', payload)) - resumed = self.state == 'ensured' - self.state = 'ensured' - return self._result(payload, 'groups_ensured', resumed) - - def revoke_service_groups(self, payload): - self.calls.append(('revoke', payload)) - if self.state != 'ensured': - raise RuntimeError('group provenance unresolved') - self.state = 'revoked' - return self._result(payload, 'groups_revoked', False) - - -class EnsureGroupsTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.case = yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1', 'parameters': { - 'client_id': 'forgejo', 'access_groups': 'forgejo-users,forgejo-admins', - 'initial_members': 'forgejo-users=alice'}}}).encode() - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(self.case), digest(b'type'), digest(desc_bytes), - digest(b'catalog'), digest(b'acceptance'), digest(b'run sheet')) - self.admitted = Invocation('ensure-groups', 'net-kingdom', 'forgejo', 'human', - 'founder', 'keycape-attended-case-change', pins) - self.inv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.journal = self.make_journal() - self.prov = FakeProvisioner(self.journal) - self.evidence, self.revoked = {}, [] - self.kw = dict(admitted=self.admitted, case_source=self.case, provisioner=self.prov, - publish=self.publish, authenticate=lambda r, p: self.evidence.get(r) == p, - revoke_session=self.revoke) - get = patch.object(PostgresGroupProvenance, 'get', lambda s, k, b: {'state': self.prov.state}) - get.start() - self.addCleanup(get.stop) - - def make_journal(self, **override): - values = dict(tenant_scope='platform', directory='netkingdom-lldap', - case_digest=digest(self.case), source_digest=a.source_digest(), - principal='founder', epoch=str(uuid.uuid4())) - values.update(override) - return PostgresGroupProvenance(connect=no_connect, binding=GroupJournalBinding(**values), - continuity=Continuity()) - - def revoke(self, inv): - self.revoked.append(inv) - return 'session-revocation:' + inv.attempt_id - - def publish(self, payload): - ref = 'owner-evidence:' + str(len(self.evidence)) - self.evidence[ref] = payload - return ref - - def test_run_creates_verifies_and_rolls_back_only_creations(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.assertEqual(result.created, ('service-group', 'service-group-membership')) - self.assertTrue(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - ensure = self.prov.calls[0][1] - self.assertEqual(ensure['idempotency_key'], 'warden-ensure:' + digest(self.case)) - self.assertEqual(ensure['members'], {'forgejo-users': ['alice']}) - rb_inv = replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - rolled = adapter.rollback(rb_inv, result.created) - self.assertEqual(rolled.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - revoke = self.prov.calls[1][1] - self.assertEqual(revoke['ensure_idempotency_key'], ensure['idempotency_key']) - self.assertIs(revoke['delete_if_empty'], False) - self.assertTrue(adapter.verify(rb_inv, rolled)) - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) # journal now says revoked - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [self.inv, rb_inv]) - for res, inv in ((result, self.inv), (rolled, rb_inv)): - self.assertIs(res.revoked, True) - self.assertEqual(res.session_revocation_evidence, 'session-revocation:' + inv.attempt_id) - self.assertIn(res.session_revocation_evidence.encode(), self.evidence[res.evidence]) - - def test_descriptor_decodes_in_warden_kernel(self): - desc = a.descriptor() - self.assertEqual(desc.revocation_scopes, ('parent-session',)) - raw = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - self.assertEqual(Descriptor.decode(raw), desc) - - def test_parent_session_revoked_even_when_attempt_fails(self): - def boom(payload): - raise RuntimeError('owner journal unavailable') - self.prov.ensure_service_groups = boom - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # contained as 'owner callback failed' - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - rb_inv = replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(rb_inv, ('foreign-object',)) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [self.inv, rb_inv]) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - - def test_missing_revocation_evidence_refused_before_publication(self): - for bad in (None, '', 'bad id', 7): - with self.subTest(bad=bad), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'revoke_session': lambda inv, b=bad: b}).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'revoke_session': None}) - - def test_replay_resumes_without_creation(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - again = adapter.invoke(replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-two')) - self.assertEqual((again.outcome, again.created), (Outcome.NO_CHANGE, ())) - - def test_refuses_untrusted_or_differing_journal(self): - for journal in (None, GroupProvenance.__new__(GroupProvenance), - self.make_journal(case_digest=digest(b'other')), - self.make_journal(principal='someone-else'), - self.make_journal(source_digest=digest(b'other source'))): - self.prov.group_provenance = journal - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw) - - def test_refuses_case_and_invocation_drift(self): - bad = [dict(case_source=self.case + b'\n'), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, target='gitea')), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, step='mint-secret')), - dict(publish=None), - dict(delete_created_if_empty='yes')] - for override in bad: - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, **override}) - - def test_refuses_non_canonical_or_malformed_case(self): - for params, kind in (({'client_id': 'forgejo', 'access_groups': 'g'}, 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2'), - ({'client_id': 'forgejo', 'access_groups': 'g', 'initial_members': 'h=alice'}, None), - ({'client_id': 'forgejo'}, None)): - case = yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': kind or a.CASE_TYPE, 'parameters': params}}).encode() - pins = replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case)) - self.prov.group_provenance = self.make_journal(case_digest=digest(case)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'case_source': case, 'admitted': replace(self.admitted, pins=pins)}) - - def _rebind(self, kind): - case = yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': kind, 'parameters': { - 'client_id': 'forgejo', 'access_groups': 'forgejo-users,forgejo-admins', - 'initial_members': 'forgejo-users=alice'}}}).encode() - self.prov.group_provenance = self.make_journal(case_digest=digest(case)) - return {**self.kw, 'case_source': case, - 'admitted': replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case)))} - - def test_explicit_version_root_selects_1_2(self): - kw = self._rebind('oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2') - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**kw) # default stays canonical 1.1 - adapter = a.build(**kw, version_root='1.2') - result = adapter.invoke(replace(kw['admitted'], attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run')) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.assertEqual(self.prov.calls[0][1]['members'], {'forgejo-users': ['alice']}) - - def test_explicit_version_root_selects_1_3(self): - kw = self._rebind('oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3') - for root in (None, '1.2'): # default 1.1 and a different successor root refuse - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**kw) if root is None else a.build(**kw, version_root=root) - adapter = a.build(**kw, version_root='1.3') - result = adapter.invoke(replace(kw['admitted'], attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run')) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - - def test_version_root_must_match_case_type_and_be_known(self): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw, version_root='1.2') # 1.1 case under 1.2 root - for root in ('2.0', '', None, 1.2): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw, version_root=root) - - def test_public_group_binding_matches_provisioner(self): - groups, members = ['b-group', 'a-group'], {'a-group': ['bob', 'alice']} - self.assertEqual(a.group_binding(groups, members, 'corr'), - LLDAPProvisioner._group_binding(groups, members, 'corr')) - - def test_rollback_refuses_unconfirmed_or_foreign_objects(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - rb_inv = replace(self.inv, operation='rollback') - for created in ((), ('keycape-client',)): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(rb_inv, created) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # journal has no ensured receipt (contained owner failure) - adapter.rollback(rb_inv, ('service-group',)) - self.assertEqual([c[0] for c in self.prov.calls], ['revoke']) - - def test_attempt_binding_and_contract_drift(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(replace(self.inv, principal='other')) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(replace(self.inv, operation='rollback')) - self.prov.ensure_service_groups = lambda p: GroupResult( - 'netkingdom-lldap', 'x', 'groups_ensured', False, 'k', 'c', (), ()) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - - def test_verify_fails_closed_on_journal_or_evidence_failure(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.evidence.clear() - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - with patch.object(PostgresGroupProvenance, 'get', side_effect=RuntimeError): - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_handover_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_handover_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 63a0ffc..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_handover_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,250 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic positive and refusal fixtures for the T29 hand-over candidate.""" -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest - -from warden.case_run import Descriptor, Invocation, OwnerResult, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('handover_adapter', ROOT / 'handover-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) - -PARAMS = {'client_id': 'forgejo', 'access_groups': 'forge-users,forge-admins'} - - -def case_bytes(type_=a.CANONICAL_TYPE, params=PARAMS): - return yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': type_, 'parameters': params}}).encode() - - -class HandoverTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.case = case_bytes() - desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor('apps')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(self.case), digest(b'type'), digest(desc_bytes), digest(b'catalog'), - digest(b'case-acceptance:test'), digest(b'run sheet')) - self.admitted = Invocation('hand-over', 'apps', 'forgejo', 'human', 'founder', - 'apps-consumer-handover', pins) - self.inv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.rb = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - self.evidence, self.receipts, self.revoked = {}, set(), [] - self.observed = {'client_id': 'forgejo', 'enforces_groups': True, - 'groups': ['forge-admins', 'forge-users'], 'login_verified': True, - 'observations': [{'probe': p, 'evidence': 'apps-probe:' + p} - for p in ('member-login', 'non-member-refused', - 'membership-add-grants', 'membership-remove-revokes')]} - self.recorded = [] - self.kw = dict(admitted=self.admitted, case_source=self.case, case_acceptance='case-acceptance:test', - verify_consumer=lambda c, g: dict(self.observed), record_handover=self.record, - remove_handover=self.remove, publish=self.publish, - authenticate=lambda ref, payload: self.evidence.get(ref) == payload, - revoke_session=self.revoke) - - def revoke(self, inv): - self.revoked.append(inv) - return 'session-revocation:' + inv.attempt_id - - def publish(self, payload): - ref = 'owner-evidence:' + str(len(self.evidence)) - self.evidence[ref] = payload - return ref - - def record(self, client_id, observation): - self.recorded.append(observation) - ref = 'handover:' + client_id - created = ref not in self.receipts - self.receipts.add(ref) - return ref, created - - def remove(self, ref): - self.receipts.discard(ref) - return True - - def test_positive_handover_verify_and_created_only_rollback(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual((result.outcome, result.created), (Outcome.SUCCESS, (a.RECEIPT,))) - self.assertTrue(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - self.assertNotIn(b'synthetic', self.evidence[result.evidence]) - back = adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.RECEIPT,)) - self.assertEqual(back.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(self.receipts, set()) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [self.inv, self.rb]) - for res, inv in ((result, self.inv), (back, self.rb)): - self.assertIs(res.revoked, True) - self.assertEqual(res.session_revocation_evidence, 'session-revocation:' + inv.attempt_id) - self.assertIn(res.session_revocation_evidence.encode(), self.evidence[res.evidence]) - - def test_descriptor_decodes_in_warden_kernel_with_parameter_owner(self): - for owner in ('apps', 'railiance-apps'): - desc = a.descriptor(owner) - self.assertEqual((desc.owner, desc.revocation_scopes), (owner, ('parent-session',))) - raw = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - self.assertEqual(Descriptor.decode(raw), desc) - for owner in (None, '', 'bad owner', 3): - with self.subTest(owner=owner), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.descriptor(owner) - - def test_parent_session_revoked_even_when_attempt_fails(self): - self.observed['login_verified'] = False - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [self.inv]) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # nothing created: rollback refused, session still revoked - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.RECEIPT,)) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [self.inv, self.rb]) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - - def test_missing_revocation_evidence_refused_before_publication(self): - for bad in (None, '', 'bad id', 7): - with self.subTest(bad=bad), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'revoke_session': lambda inv, b=bad: b}).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'revoke_session': None}) - - def test_existing_receipt_is_no_change_and_not_rollbackable(self): - self.receipts.add('handover:forgejo') - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual((result.outcome, result.created), (Outcome.NO_CHANGE, ())) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.RECEIPT,)) - self.assertEqual(self.receipts, {'handover:forgejo'}) - - def test_rollback_refuses_unauthenticated_creation(self): - adapter = a.build(**{**self.kw, 'authenticate': lambda ref, payload: False}) - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.RECEIPT,)) - self.assertEqual(self.receipts, {'handover:forgejo'}) - - def test_consumer_verification_refusals(self): - for change in ({'enforces_groups': False}, {'login_verified': False}, {'groups': ['forge-users']}, - {'client_id': 'other'}, {'extra': 1}): - self.observed = {**dict(self.observed), **change} - with self.subTest(change=change), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - self.observed = {k: v for k, v in self.observed.items() if k != 'extra'} - self.setUp() - self.assertEqual(self.receipts, set()) - - def test_observation_record_refusals(self): - obs = self.observed['observations'] - cases = { - 'missing-field': None, - 'not-a-list': {'member-login': 'apps-probe:x'}, - 'missing-probe': obs[:3], - 'extra-probe': obs + [{'probe': 'admin-login', 'evidence': 'apps-probe:y'}], - 'duplicate-probe': obs[:3] + [dict(obs[0])], - 'unknown-probe': obs[:3] + [{'probe': 'admin-login', 'evidence': 'apps-probe:y'}], - 'value-bearing-key': [{**obs[0], 'value': 'secret'}] + obs[1:], - 'missing-evidence': [{'probe': 'member-login'}] + obs[1:], - 'evidence-not-identifier': [{'probe': 'member-login', 'evidence': 'has space/x'}] + obs[1:], - 'evidence-not-string': [{'probe': 'member-login', 'evidence': 7}] + obs[1:], - 'record-not-dict': ['member-login'] + obs[1:], - } - for name, value in cases.items(): - self.setUp() - if value is None: - del self.observed['observations'] - else: - self.observed['observations'] = value - with self.subTest(name=name), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(self.receipts, set()) - - def test_observations_bound_into_digest_order_independent(self): - def run(mutate): - self.setUp() - mutate(self.observed['observations']) - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - return self.recorded[-1] - base = run(lambda o: None) - self.assertEqual(base, run(lambda o: o.reverse())) - self.assertNotEqual(base, run(lambda o: o[0].update(evidence='apps-probe:changed'))) - - def test_canonical_default_and_explicit_selection_only(self): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'version_root': '1.0'}) - case12 = case_bytes(a.SELECTABLE_TYPES['1.2']) - pins = replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case12)) - admitted12 = replace(self.admitted, pins=pins) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # 1.2 never reached by default - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted12, 'case_source': case12}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # 1.2 case must name consumer_owner_repo - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted12, 'case_source': case12, 'version_root': '1.2'}) - case12 = case_bytes(a.SELECTABLE_TYPES['1.2'], {**PARAMS, 'consumer_owner_repo': 'railiance-apps'}) - desc = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor('railiance-apps')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - admitted12 = replace(self.admitted, owner='railiance-apps', - pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case12), adapter=digest(desc))) - kw12 = {**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted12, 'case_source': case12, 'version_root': '1.2'} - inv = replace(admitted12, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.assertEqual(a.build(**kw12).invoke(inv).outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # admitted owner differs from the case's consumer_owner_repo - a.build(**{**kw12, 'admitted': replace(admitted12, owner='apps')}) - - def test_1_3_explicit_selection_with_1_2_owner_handling(self): - case13 = case_bytes(a.SELECTABLE_TYPES['1.3']) - admitted13 = replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case13))) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # 1.3 never reached by default - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted13, 'case_source': case13}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # 1.3 case must name consumer_owner_repo - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted13, 'case_source': case13, 'version_root': '1.3'}) - case13 = case_bytes(a.SELECTABLE_TYPES['1.3'], {**PARAMS, 'consumer_owner_repo': 'railiance-apps'}) - desc = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor('railiance-apps')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - admitted13 = replace(self.admitted, owner='railiance-apps', - pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case13), adapter=digest(desc))) - kw13 = {**self.kw, 'admitted': admitted13, 'case_source': case13, 'version_root': '1.3'} - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # a 1.3 case under the 1.2 root - a.build(**{**kw13, 'version_root': '1.2'}) - inv = replace(admitted13, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.assertEqual(a.build(**kw13).invoke(inv).outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # admitted owner differs from the case's consumer_owner_repo - a.build(**{**kw13, 'admitted': replace(admitted13, owner='apps')}) - - def test_binding_refusals(self): - bad = [{'case_acceptance': 'other'}, {'case_source': self.case + b'\n#'}, - {'admitted': replace(self.admitted, owner='net-kingdom')}, - {'admitted': replace(self.admitted, target='other')}, - {'admitted': replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, adapter=digest(b'x')))}, - {'publish': None}] - for change in bad: - with self.subTest(change=list(change)), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, **change}) - no_groups = case_bytes(params={'client_id': 'forgejo'}) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'case_source': no_groups, - 'admitted': replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(no_groups)))}) - - def test_attempt_and_contract_refusals(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - for inv in (replace(self.inv, principal='other'), replace(self.inv, operation='rollback'), - replace(self.inv, attempt_id='')): - with self.subTest(inv=inv), self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(inv) - for receipt in (('handover:forgejo', 'yes'), 'handover:forgejo', ('', True)): - with self.subTest(receipt=receipt), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**{**self.kw, 'record_handover': lambda c, o, r=receipt: r}).invoke(self.inv) - reuse = a.build(**{**self.kw, 'publish': lambda p: 'owner-evidence:0'}) - reuse.invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # evidence identifier reuse - reuse.invoke(replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-three')) - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(self.inv, OwnerResult(Outcome.SUCCESS, 'forged'))) - - def test_removal_unconfirmed_keeps_creation(self): - adapter = a.build(**{**self.kw, 'remove_handover': lambda ref: None}) - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, (a.RECEIPT,)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.rb, ()) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_checker_environment.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_checker_environment.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6e73810..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_checker_environment.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -"""Opt-in real-checker boundary regressions; no production inputs or checker stub. - -Set KEYCAPE_TEST_CHECKER_BINARY and KEYCAPE_TEST_CHECKER_SHA256 to an independently -built artifact. Ordinary helper-only runs skip this class when none is supplied. -""" -from contextlib import chdir -import hashlib -import os -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -from test_keycape_client import kc - -VALID = '''issuer: https://issuer.example.invalid -port: 8080 -privateKeyPem: /nonexistent/synthetic-key.pem -clients: - - clientId: synthetic-client - displayName: Synthetic client - redirectUris: [https://client.example.invalid/cb] - allowedScopes: [openid] - grantTypes: [authorization_code] - clientType: public -''' - - -class RealCheckerEnvironmentTests(unittest.TestCase): - @classmethod - def setUpClass(cls): - source = os.environ.get('KEYCAPE_TEST_CHECKER_BINARY') - if not source: - raise unittest.SkipTest('exact real checker artifact not supplied') - data = Path(source).read_bytes() - expected = os.environ.get('KEYCAPE_TEST_CHECKER_SHA256') - if expected != 'sha256:' + hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest(): - raise ValueError('real checker artifact digest differs') - cls.directory = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - cls.addClassCleanup(cls.directory.cleanup) - cls.binary = Path(cls.directory.name) / 'keycape' - cls.binary.write_bytes(data) - cls.binary.chmod(0o700) - - def check(self, raw, binary=None): - return kc.check_config(str(binary or self.binary), raw, [], False) - - def test_ambient_overrides_cannot_reject_supplied_valid_config(self): - with patch.dict(os.environ, {'KEYCAPE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL_URL': 'http://polluted.example.invalid', - 'KEYCAPE_BROWSER_LOGOUT_URL': 'http://polluted.example.invalid/logout'}): - self.assertTrue(self.check(VALID)['valid']) - - def test_ambient_overrides_cannot_admit_supplied_invalid_config(self): - invalid = VALID + 'accountPortalURL: http://invalid.example.invalid\nbrowserLogoutURL: http://invalid.example.invalid/logout\n' - with patch.dict(os.environ, {'KEYCAPE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL_URL': 'https://polluted.example.invalid', - 'KEYCAPE_BROWSER_LOGOUT_URL': 'https://polluted.example.invalid/logout'}): - self.assertFalse(self.check(invalid)['valid']) - - def test_relative_selected_artifact_is_not_replaced_by_path_decoy(self): - decoy = Path(self.directory.name) / 'decoy' - decoy.mkdir() - trap = decoy / 'keycape' - trap.write_text('#!/bin/sh\nexit 27\n') - trap.chmod(0o700) - with chdir(self.directory.name), patch.dict(os.environ, {'PATH': str(decoy)}): - self.assertTrue(self.check(VALID, binary=Path('keycape'))['valid']) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_checker_snapshot.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_checker_snapshot.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2dbb394..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_checker_snapshot.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ -"""Linux executable-byte custody fixtures; no credentials or native authority.""" -import fcntl -import hashlib -import mmap -import os -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -from test_keycape_registration_adapter import a -from test_keycape_checker_environment import VALID - - -class SnapshotTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup) - self.source = Path(self.temp.name) / 'checker' - self.source.write_bytes(b'synthetic artifact') - self.expected = a.digest(self.source.read_bytes()) - - def test_snapshot_bytes_sealed_and_descriptor_closed_on_exit(self): - with a.checker_snapshot(self.source, self.expected) as fd: - self.assertEqual(Path(f'/proc/self/fd/{fd}').read_bytes(), self.source.read_bytes()) - for action in (lambda: os.write(fd, b'x'), lambda: os.ftruncate(fd, 0), - lambda: os.ftruncate(fd, 128)): - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - action() - # Even if this process restores write permission, seals forbid writes. - os.fchmod(fd, 0o700) - reopened = os.open(f'/proc/self/fd/{fd}', os.O_RDWR) - try: - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - os.write(reopened, b'x') - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - mmap.mmap(reopened, len(b'synthetic artifact'), access=mmap.ACCESS_WRITE) - finally: - os.close(reopened) - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - os.fstat(fd) - - def test_hash_mismatch_refused_before_memfd(self): - self.source.write_bytes(b'changed') - with patch.object(a.os, 'memfd_create') as create: - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): - with a.checker_snapshot(self.source, self.expected): - self.fail('unexpected snapshot') - create.assert_not_called() - - def test_source_symlink_refused(self): - link = self.source.with_name('link') - link.symlink_to(self.source) - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - with a.checker_snapshot(link, self.expected): - self.fail('unexpected snapshot') - - def test_fifo_refused_without_blocking(self): - fifo = self.source.with_name('fifo') - os.mkfifo(fifo) - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): - with a.checker_snapshot(fifo, self.expected): - self.fail('unexpected snapshot') - - def test_sealing_failure_closes_snapshot(self): - original = a.os.memfd_create - opened = [] - def create(*args): - fd = original(*args) - opened.append(fd) - return fd - with patch.object(a.os, 'memfd_create', side_effect=create), patch.object(a.fcntl, 'fcntl', side_effect=OSError('synthetic failure')): - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - with a.checker_snapshot(self.source, self.expected): - self.fail('unexpected snapshot') - with self.assertRaises(OSError): - os.fstat(opened[0]) - - def test_seal_readback_mismatch_refused(self): - original = a.fcntl.fcntl - def invoke(fd, command, *args): - return 0 if command == fcntl.F_GET_SEALS else original(fd, command, *args) - with patch.object(a.fcntl, 'fcntl', side_effect=invoke): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): - with a.checker_snapshot(self.source, self.expected): - self.fail('unexpected snapshot') - - -class RealSnapshotTests(unittest.TestCase): - @classmethod - def setUpClass(cls): - source = os.environ.get('KEYCAPE_TEST_CHECKER_BINARY') - if not source: - raise unittest.SkipTest('exact real checker artifact not supplied') - cls.data = Path(source).read_bytes() - cls.expected = os.environ.get('KEYCAPE_TEST_CHECKER_SHA256') - if cls.expected != 'sha256:' + hashlib.sha256(cls.data).hexdigest(): - raise ValueError('real checker artifact digest differs') - - def test_real_checker_executes_pinned_snapshot_after_selected_path_replaced(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - source = Path(directory) / 'keycape' - source.write_bytes(self.data) - source.chmod(0o700) - with a.checker_snapshot(source, self.expected) as fd: - replacement = source.with_name('replacement') - replacement.write_text('#!/bin/sh\nexit 27\n') - replacement.chmod(0o700) - replacement.replace(source) - result = a.helper.check_config(source, VALID, [], False, executable_fd=fd) - self.assertTrue(result['valid']) - invalid = VALID + 'accountPortalURL: http://invalid.example.invalid\n' - self.assertFalse(a.helper.check_config(source, invalid, [], False, executable_fd=fd)['valid']) - - def test_real_checker_ignores_in_place_source_overwrite_after_snapshot(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - source = Path(directory) / 'keycape' - source.write_bytes(self.data) - with a.checker_snapshot(source, self.expected) as fd: - source.write_bytes(b'no executable remains at the selected path') - with patch.dict(os.environ, {'KEYCAPE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL_URL': 'http://polluted.example.invalid'}): - self.assertTrue(a.helper.check_config(source, VALID, [], False, executable_fd=fd)['valid']) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_client.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_client.py deleted file mode 100644 index bf975d6..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_client.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,314 +0,0 @@ -import argparse -import base64 -import contextlib -import copy -import importlib.util -import io -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest - -import yaml - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('keycape_client', Path(__file__).with_name('keycape-client.py')) -kc = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(kc) - -vspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('vergabe_rollout', Path(__file__).with_name('vergabe-client-rollout.py')) - -UID = '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001' -EXISTING = [ - {'clientId': 'openbao-admin', 'clientType': 'public', - 'redirectUris': ['http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback']}, - {'clientId': 'secrets-engine-approval', 'clientType': 'confidential', - 'secretRef': 'env:KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET'}, -] -FORGEJO_PARAMS = { - 'client_id': 'forgejo', 'display_name': 'Forgejo source forge', - 'redirect_uris': 'https://forgejo.coulomb.social/user/oauth2/netkingdom/callback', - 'allowed_scopes': 'openid,profile,email,groups', 'client_type': 'confidential', - 'mfa_required': 'true', -} -FORGEJO = kc.client_from_params(FORGEJO_PARAMS) - - -def fixture(clients=None, tail='tokenLifetime: 15m\n'): - # Synthetic marker values only; no live Secret is loaded by this suite. - raw = ('# preserve this comment\nissuer: https://kc.coulomb.social\n' - 'authelia:\n issuer: https://auth.coulomb.social\n clientSecret: synthetic-marker\n' - 'clients:\n' + yaml.safe_dump(json.loads(json.dumps(EXISTING if clients is None else clients)), - sort_keys=False) + tail) - secret = {'metadata': {'uid': UID, 'resourceVersion': '7'}, - 'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode(), - 'signing-key.pem': base64.b64encode(b'synthetic-signing-key').decode()}} - return secret, raw - - -def decode(encoded): - return base64.b64decode(encoded).decode() - - -class ClientRecordTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_confidential_record_binds_env_secret_and_pins_mfa(self): - self.assertEqual(FORGEJO['secretRef'], 'env:KEYCAPE_FORGEJO_CLIENT_SECRET') - self.assertIs(FORGEJO['mfaRequired'], True) - self.assertEqual(FORGEJO['grantTypes'], ['authorization_code']) - self.assertEqual(kc.env_binding(FORGEJO)['valueFrom']['secretKeyRef']['name'], 'keycape-forgejo-client') - - def test_public_record_has_no_secret(self): - params = dict(FORGEJO_PARAMS, client_type='public', mfa_required='false') - client = kc.client_from_params(params) - self.assertNotIn('secretRef', client) - self.assertNotIn('mfaRequired', client) - - def test_invalid_params_refused(self): - for change in [dict(redirect_uris='https://x.example/*'), dict(redirect_uris='http://x.example/cb'), - dict(allowed_scopes='profile,openid'), dict(allowed_scopes='openid,admin'), - dict(client_type='weird'), dict(secret_ref='bao:platform/workloads/forgejo/x'), dict(client_id='Bad_Id')]: - with self.subTest(change=change), self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.client_from_params(dict(FORGEJO_PARAMS, **change)) - - def test_vergabe_case_reproduces_the_hand_built_registration(self): - vergabe = importlib.util.module_from_spec(vspec) - vspec.loader.exec_module(vergabe) - derived = kc.client_from_params({ - 'client_id': 'vergabe-demo-company', 'display_name': 'Vergabe Demo Company', - 'redirect_uris': vergabe.CLIENT['redirectUris'][0], - 'allowed_scopes': ','.join(vergabe.CLIENT['allowedScopes']), - 'client_type': 'public', 'mfa_required': 'false'}) - self.assertEqual(derived, vergabe.CLIENT) - - def test_client_from_case_requires_the_type(self): - case = {'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.0', 'parameters': FORGEJO_PARAMS}} - self.assertEqual(kc.client_from_case(case), FORGEJO) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.client_from_case({'spec': {'type': 'other@1.0', 'parameters': FORGEJO_PARAMS}}) - - def test_redirects_keycape_would_refuse_at_startup_are_refused(self): - # key-cape type review R1: a refused entry stops the single replica. - for bad in ['https://forgejo.example/cb?x=1', 'https://forgejo.example/cb#frag']: - with self.subTest(redirect=bad), self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.client_from_params(dict(FORGEJO_PARAMS, redirect_uris=bad)) - - def test_access_groups_require_groups_scope(self): - # key-cape type review R2: UserInfo returns groups only for that scope. - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.client_from_params(dict(FORGEJO_PARAMS, access_groups='forge-admins', - allowed_scopes='openid,profile,email')) - - -EXECUTOR_CASE = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / 'security-case-types/oidc-service-client/examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml' -KEYCAPE_EXAMPLE = Path('/home/worsch/key-cape/config/service-clients.example.yaml') -SERVICE_PARAMS = { - 'client_id': 'nk-bind-executor-approval', 'display_name': 'NetKingdom bounded executor (approval-engine)', - 'audience': 'approval-engine', 'allowed_scopes': 'approval:create,approval:read,approval:consume', - 'service_subject': 'service:nk-bind-executor', 'tenant': 'tenant:platform', 'roles': 'bounded-executor', - 'token_lifetime': '15m', 'consuming_service': 'bounded-executor', 'consumer_namespace': 'sso', - 'consumer_service_account': 'nk-bind-executor', 'consumer_owner_repo': 'net-kingdom', -} - - -class ServiceClientTests(unittest.TestCase): - """oidc-service-client (NK-WP-0056-T14): client_credentials records in key-cape's canonical shape.""" - - def test_executor_case_renders_the_service_record(self): - case = yaml.safe_load(EXECUTOR_CASE.read_text()) - self.assertEqual(kc.client_from_case(case), { - 'clientId': 'nk-bind-executor-approval', 'displayName': 'NetKingdom bounded executor (approval-engine)', - 'audience': 'approval-engine', 'allowedScopes': ['approval:create', 'approval:read', 'approval:consume'], - 'grantTypes': ['client_credentials'], 'clientType': 'confidential', - 'secretRef': 'env:KEYCAPE_NK_BIND_EXECUTOR_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET', - 'serviceSubject': 'service:nk-bind-executor', 'tenant': 'tenant:platform', 'roles': ['bounded-executor'], - 'tokenLifetime': '15m'}) - - def test_adopting_secrets_engine_approval_reproduces_key_capes_record(self): - if not KEYCAPE_EXAMPLE.exists(): - self.skipTest('key-cape checkout absent') - live = next(c for c in yaml.safe_load(KEYCAPE_EXAMPLE.read_text())['clients'] - if c['clientId'] == 'secrets-engine-approval') - params = {'client_id': live['clientId'], 'display_name': live['displayName'], 'audience': live['audience'], - 'allowed_scopes': ','.join(live['allowedScopes']), 'service_subject': live['serviceSubject'], - 'tenant': live['tenant'], 'roles': ','.join(live['roles']), 'token_lifetime': live['tokenLifetime']} - self.assertEqual(kc.service_client_from_params(params), live) - - def test_refusals(self): - for change in [dict(allowed_scopes='openid,approval:read'), dict(allowed_scopes='approval:read,approval:read'), - dict(token_lifetime='30m'), dict(service_subject='nk-bind-executor'), - dict(tenant='platform'), dict(audience='Approval Engine'), dict(roles='Bad Role'), - dict(redirect_uris='https://x.example/cb'), dict(client_type='public'), - dict(mfa_required='true'), dict(secret_ref='env:OTHER')]: - with self.subTest(change=change), self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.service_client_from_params(dict(SERVICE_PARAMS, **change)) - - def test_case_type_selects_the_builder(self): - case = {'spec': {'type': 'oidc-service-client@0.1', 'parameters': SERVICE_PARAMS}} - self.assertEqual(kc.client_from_case(case)['grantTypes'], ['client_credentials']) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): # service parameters under the browser type - kc.client_from_case({'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1', 'parameters': SERVICE_PARAMS}}) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.client_from_case({'spec': {'type': 'oidc-service-client@1.0', 'parameters': SERVICE_PARAMS}}) - - def test_merge_adds_a_service_client_and_refuses_a_shared_secret_ref(self): - service = kc.service_client_from_params(SERVICE_PARAMS) - secret, raw = fixture() - encoded, changed = kc.replacement(secret, service) - self.assertTrue(changed) - expected = yaml.safe_load(raw) - expected['clients'].append(service) - self.assertEqual(yaml.safe_load(decode(encoded)), expected) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.replacement(fixture(EXISTING + [dict(EXISTING[0], clientId='x', secretRef=service['secretRef'])])[0], - service) - - -class MergeTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_add_appends_only_this_client_and_preserves_bytes(self): - secret, raw = fixture() - before = copy.deepcopy(secret) - encoded, changed = kc.replacement(secret, FORGEJO) - updated = decode(encoded) - self.assertTrue(changed) - head = raw[:raw.index('tokenLifetime:')] - self.assertTrue(updated.startswith(head)) - expected = yaml.safe_load(raw) - expected['clients'].append(FORGEJO) - self.assertEqual(yaml.safe_load(updated), expected) - self.assertEqual(secret, before) - - def test_identical_is_noop_and_drift_refused(self): - secret, _ = fixture(EXISTING + [FORGEJO]) - self.assertEqual(kc.replacement(secret, FORGEJO), (secret['data']['config.yaml'], False)) - for change in [dict(redirectUris=['https://evil.example/cb']), dict(clientType='public'), - dict(allowedScopes=['openid'])]: - with self.subTest(change=change), self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.replacement(fixture(EXISTING + [dict(FORGEJO, **change)])[0], FORGEJO) - - def test_shared_secret_ref_and_duplicates_refused(self): - other = dict(EXISTING[1], secretRef=FORGEJO['secretRef']) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.replacement(fixture([EXISTING[0], other])[0], FORGEJO) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.replacement(fixture(EXISTING + [EXISTING[0]])[0], FORGEJO) - - def test_removal_removes_exactly_this_client(self): - secret, raw = fixture(EXISTING + [FORGEJO]) - encoded, changed = kc.removal(secret, FORGEJO) - self.assertTrue(changed) - self.assertEqual(yaml.safe_load(decode(encoded))['clients'], EXISTING) - self.assertEqual(kc.removal(fixture()[0], FORGEJO), (fixture()[0]['data']['config.yaml'], False)) - - -class FakeKube: - def __init__(self, secret, bound=True): - self.secret = secret - self.bound = bound - self.patches = [] - - def __call__(self, arguments, payload=None): - if arguments[:2] == ['get', 'namespace']: - return {'metadata': {'uid': kc.lane.CLUSTER_UID}} - if 'deployment' in arguments: - env = [kc.env_binding(FORGEJO)] if self.bound else [] - return {'spec': {'template': {'spec': {'containers': [{'name': 'keycape', 'env': env}]}}}} - if 'patch' in arguments: - self.patches.append(arguments) - data = dict(self.secret['data'], **{'config.yaml': payload[2]['value']}) - if '--dry-run=server' not in arguments: - self.secret = dict(self.secret, data=data) - return {'data': data} - return copy.deepcopy(self.secret) - - -def args(mode, **kw): - base = dict(mode=mode, operation='add', expected_uid=UID, expected_resource_version='7', case_acceptance=None, - check_config='keycape') - base.update(kw) - return argparse.Namespace(**base) - - -class FakeCheck: - """Stands in for keycape check-config; refuses registries naming a client in `refuse`.""" - def __init__(self, refuse=()): - self.refuse = refuse - self.calls = [] - - def __call__(self, binary, config_text, env_names, policy_store): - self.calls.append((binary, env_names, policy_store)) - ids = [c['clientId'] for c in yaml.safe_load(config_text)['clients']] - errors = [f'client {i!r}: refused' for i in ids if i in self.refuse] - return {'valid': not errors, 'clients': len(ids), 'errors': errors} - - -class RunTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.original = kc.lane.kubectl, kc.check_config - kc.check_config = FakeCheck() - - def tearDown(self): - kc.lane.kubectl, kc.check_config = self.original - - def test_apply_needs_keycape_check_config(self): - kc.lane.kubectl = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.run(args('apply', case_acceptance='decision:x', check_config=None), FORGEJO) - - def test_apply_refuses_a_registry_keycape_would_refuse(self): - fake = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - kc.lane.kubectl = fake - kc.check_config = FakeCheck(refuse=('forgejo',)) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.run(args('apply', case_acceptance='decision:x'), FORGEJO) - self.assertEqual([], fake.patches) - - def test_inspect_reports_live_and_proposed_checks_with_deployment_env(self): - kc.lane.kubectl = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - kc.check_config = FakeCheck(refuse=('forgejo',)) - receipt = kc.run(args('inspect'), FORGEJO) - self.assertTrue(receipt['check_config']['live']['valid']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['check_config']['proposed']['valid']) - self.assertEqual([kc.env_name('forgejo')], kc.check_config.calls[0][1]) - - def test_inspect_changes_nothing_and_emits_no_values(self): - fake = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - kc.lane.kubectl = fake - receipt = kc.run(args('inspect'), FORGEJO) - self.assertTrue(receipt['change_needed']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['values_emitted']) - self.assertEqual([], fake.patches) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic-marker', json.dumps(receipt)) - - def test_apply_needs_case_acceptance(self): - kc.lane.kubectl = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.run(args('apply'), FORGEJO) - - def test_apply_needs_env_binding_for_confidential_clients(self): - kc.lane.kubectl = FakeKube(fixture()[0], bound=False) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.run(args('apply', case_acceptance='decision:x'), FORGEJO) - - def test_apply_refuses_a_changed_revision(self): - kc.lane.kubectl = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - with self.assertRaises(kc.Refused): - kc.run(args('apply', case_acceptance='decision:x', expected_resource_version='6'), FORGEJO) - - def test_apply_patches_reads_back_and_records_acceptance(self): - fake = FakeKube(fixture()[0]) - kc.lane.kubectl = fake - receipt = kc.run(args('apply', case_acceptance='decision:x'), FORGEJO) - self.assertTrue(receipt['changed']) - self.assertTrue(receipt['restart_required']) - self.assertEqual('decision:x', receipt['case_acceptance']) - self.assertEqual(1, len(fake.patches)) - self.assertIn(FORGEJO, yaml.safe_load(decode(fake.secret['data']['config.yaml']))['clients']) - - def test_main_contains_failures(self): - out = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): - code = kc.main(['inspect']) - self.assertEqual(1, code) - self.assertEqual('refused', json.loads(out.getvalue())['status']) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_registration_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_registration_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 80d9816..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_keycape_registration_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,419 +0,0 @@ -"""Actual helper/CAS execution against synthetic Kubernetes objects only.""" -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -from warden.case_run import Invocation, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('registration_adapter', ROOT / 'keycape-registration-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('registration_fixture', ROOT / 'test_keycape_client.py') -f = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(f) - - -ISSUER = 'https://kc.coulomb.social' - - -class FakeIssuer: - """Single-replica Recreate issuer; becomes Ready once a restart stamp is written.""" - - def __init__(self, outcome='ready'): - self.outcome, self.writes, self.sleeps = outcome, [], [] - self.deployment = {'kind': 'Deployment', - 'metadata': {'name': 'keycape', 'namespace': 'sso', 'resourceVersion': '40', 'generation': 3}, - 'spec': {'replicas': 1, 'strategy': {'type': 'Recreate'}, - 'template': {'spec': {'containers': [{'name': 'keycape'}]}}}, - 'status': {'observedGeneration': 3, 'updatedReplicas': 1, 'readyReplicas': 1, 'availableReplicas': 1}} - - def read(self): - return copy.deepcopy(self.deployment) - - def write(self, deployment, expected): - assert expected == self.deployment['metadata']['resourceVersion'] - self.writes.append(copy.deepcopy(deployment)) - self.deployment = copy.deepcopy(deployment) - self.deployment['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = str(int(expected) + 1) - self.deployment['metadata']['generation'] += 1 - self.deployment['status']['observedGeneration'] += 1 - return self.deployment['metadata']['resourceVersion'] - - def observe(self): - stamp = self.deployment['spec']['template'].get('metadata', {}).get('annotations', {}).get( - a.restart_readiness.ANNOTATION) - state = {'waiting': {'reason': 'CrashLoopBackOff'}} if self.outcome == 'crash' else {'running': {}} - ready = 'False' if self.outcome in ('crash', 'stuck') else 'True' - pod = {'metadata': {'annotations': {a.restart_readiness.ANNOTATION: stamp}}, - 'status': {'phase': 'Running', 'conditions': [{'type': 'Ready', 'status': ready}], - 'containerStatuses': [{'name': 'keycape', 'state': state}]}} - discovery = {'issuer': ISSUER, 'authorization_endpoint': ISSUER + '/authorize', - 'token_endpoint': ISSUER + '/token', 'jwks_uri': ISSUER + '/jwks'} - return copy.deepcopy(self.deployment), [pod], discovery if ready == 'True' else None - - def capabilities(self): - return {'read': self.read, 'write': self.write, 'observe': self.observe, - 'sleep': self.sleeps.append, 'issuer': ISSUER} - - -class RegistrationTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.binary = Path(self.temp.name) / 'keycape' - self.binary.write_bytes(b'synthetic checker binary') - self.case = yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1', - 'parameters': f.FORGEJO_PARAMS}}).encode() - desc = a.descriptor(digest(self.binary.read_bytes())) - self.desc_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(desc), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(self.case), digest(b'type'), digest(self.desc_bytes), - digest(b'catalog'), digest(b'case-acceptance:test'), digest(b'run sheet')) - self.admitted = Invocation('register-client', 'net-kingdom', 'forgejo', 'human', - 'founder', 'keycape-attended-case-change', pins) - self.inv = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.secret, self.raw = f.fixture() - self.effects = [] - self.evidence = {} - self.revocations = [] - self.kw = dict(admitted=self.admitted, case_source=self.case, - expected_uid=f.UID, expected_resource_version='7', case_acceptance='case-acceptance:test', - check_config=self.binary, check_config_digest=digest(self.binary.read_bytes()), - publish=self.publish, authenticate=lambda ref, payload: self.evidence.get(ref) == payload, - revoke_session=self.revoke, restart=None) - self.issuer = FakeIssuer() - self.kw['restart'] = self.issuer.capabilities() - self.check_patch = patch.object(a.helper, 'check_config', return_value={'valid': True}) - self.kube_patch = patch.object(a.helper.lane, 'kubectl', side_effect=self.kube) - self.check_patch.start() - self.kube_patch.start() - self.addCleanup(self.check_patch.stop) - self.addCleanup(self.kube_patch.stop) - self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup) - - def publish(self, payload): - ref = 'owner-evidence:attempt-' + str(len(self.evidence)) - self.evidence[ref] = payload - return ref - - def revoke(self, inv): - self.revocations.append(inv) - return 'session-revoked:' + inv.operation + ':' + inv.attempt_id - - def kube(self, args, payload=None): - if args[:3] == ['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system']: - return {'metadata': {'uid': a.helper.lane.CLUSTER_UID}} - if args[:5] == ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config']: - return copy.deepcopy(self.secret) - if args[:5] == ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'deployment', 'keycape']: - return {'spec': {'template': {'spec': {'containers': [{'name': 'keycape', - 'env': [a.helper.env_binding(f.FORGEJO)]}]}}}} - if args[:5] == ['-n', 'sso', 'patch', 'secret', 'keycape-config']: - self.assertEqual(payload[:2], [ - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': self.secret['metadata']['uid']}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': self.secret['metadata']['resourceVersion']}]) - self.effects.append(copy.deepcopy(payload)) - self.secret['data']['config.yaml'] = payload[2]['value'] - self.secret['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = str(int(self.secret['metadata']['resourceVersion']) + 1) - return copy.deepcopy(self.secret) - raise AssertionError('unexpected tooling operation') - - def test_original_reconcile_capabilities_are_optional_but_paired(self): - self.assertIsNone(a.build(**self.kw).reconcile_original) - for extra in ({'holder': lambda attempt: []}, {'observe': lambda: {}}, - {'holder': 'cmd', 'observe': lambda: {}}): - with self.subTest(extra=sorted(extra)), self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'together'): - a.build(**dict(self.kw, **extra)) - adapter = a.build(**dict(self.kw, holder=lambda attempt: [], observe=lambda: {})) - self.assertTrue(callable(adapter.reconcile_original)) - - def test_actual_add_and_created_only_rollback_preserve_original_bytes(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - original = copy.deepcopy(self.secret['data']) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.assertEqual(result.created, ('keycape-client',)) - self.assertTrue(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - undone = adapter.rollback(replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback'), result.created) - self.assertEqual(undone.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(self.secret['data'], original) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 2) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revocations), 2) - for payload in self.evidence.values(): - self.assertNotIn(b'synthetic-marker', payload) - self.assertNotIn(b'config.yaml', payload) - self.assertNotIn(b'signing-key', payload) - - def test_changed_registry_restarts_issuer_and_records_ready_verdict(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.assertEqual(len(self.issuer.writes), 1) - payload = json.loads(self.evidence[result.evidence]) - self.assertEqual(payload['issuer_restart']['verdict'], 'ready') - self.assertEqual(payload['issuer_restart']['before'], '40') - undone = adapter.rollback(replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback'), result.created) - self.assertEqual(undone.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(len(self.issuer.writes), 2) - - def test_no_change_does_not_restart_issuer(self): - self.secret, _ = f.fixture(f.EXISTING + [f.FORGEJO]) - result = a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.NO_CHANGE) - self.assertFalse(self.issuer.writes) - self.assertIsNone(json.loads(self.evidence[result.evidence])['issuer_restart']) - - def test_failed_or_stuck_restart_is_uncertain_and_revokes_session(self): - for outcome in ('crash', 'stuck'): - with self.subTest(outcome=outcome): - self.setUp() - self.issuer = FakeIssuer(outcome) - adapter = a.build(**dict(self.kw, restart=self.issuer.capabilities())) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(len(self.issuer.writes), 1) - self.assertFalse(self.evidence) - self.assertEqual(self.revocations, [self.inv]) - if outcome == 'stuck': - self.assertEqual(len(self.issuer.sleeps), a.RESTART_ATTEMPTS - 1) - - def test_restart_capabilities_are_required_and_bounded(self): - caps = self.issuer.capabilities() - for bad in (None, {}, dict(caps, issuer='http://kc.coulomb.social'), - dict(caps, write='not-callable'), dict(caps, extra=print)): - with self.subTest(bad=bad if not isinstance(bad, dict) else sorted(bad)): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'restart'): - a.build(**dict(self.kw, restart=bad)) - - def test_adapter_refuses_symlink_fifo_and_oversized_source_before_helper(self): - symlink = self.binary.with_name('symlink') - symlink.symlink_to(self.binary) - fifo = self.binary.with_name('fifo') - os.mkfifo(fifo) - oversized = self.binary.with_name('oversized') - with oversized.open('wb') as output: - output.truncate(64 * 1024 * 1024 + 1) - for source in (symlink, fifo, oversized): - with self.subTest(source=source.name), patch.object(a.helper, 'run') as run: - adapter = a.build(**dict(self.kw, check_config=source)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - run.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(self.revocations, [self.inv] * 3) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - self.assertFalse(self.evidence) - - def test_snapshot_unavailable_refuses_before_tooling_and_revokes_session(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with patch.object(a.os, 'memfd_create', side_effect=OSError('synthetic policy denial')): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - self.assertFalse(self.evidence) - self.assertEqual(self.revocations, [self.inv]) - - def test_identical_client_is_no_change_and_cannot_be_removed(self): - self.secret, _ = f.fixture(f.EXISTING + [f.FORGEJO]) - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.NO_CHANGE) - self.assertEqual(result.created, ()) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(replace(self.inv, operation='rollback'), ('keycape-client',)) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - - def test_existing_drift_refused_and_session_revoked(self): - self.secret, _ = f.fixture(f.EXISTING + [dict(f.FORGEJO, displayName='Drift')]) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - self.assertEqual(self.revocations, [self.inv]) - - def test_invocation_rebinding_refused_before_tooling(self): - for changes in ({'target': 'other'}, {'principal': 'other'}, {'actor': 'agent'}, - {'lane': 'other'}, {'operation': 'rollback'}, {'attempt_id': ''}, - {'pins': replace(self.inv.pins, case=digest(b'other'))}): - with self.subTest(changes=changes), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(replace(self.inv, **changes)) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - - def test_initial_case_descriptor_and_target_pins_are_required(self): - for changes in ({'case_source': b'{}'}, {'case_acceptance': 'other'}, {'admitted': replace(self.admitted, target='other')}, - {'admitted': replace(self.admitted, actor='agent')}, - {'admitted': replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, adapter=digest(b'wrong')))}): - with self.subTest(changes=changes), self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**dict(self.kw, **changes)) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - - def test_binary_or_source_drift_refused_before_tooling(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - self.binary.write_bytes(b'changed') - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.binary.write_bytes(b'synthetic checker binary') - with patch.object(a, 'source_digest', return_value=digest(b'changed')): - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - - def test_substituting_caller_selected_checker_under_same_descriptor_is_refused(self): - substitute = Path(self.temp.name) / 'other-checker' - substitute.write_bytes(b'caller-selected executable') - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, 'descriptor pin differs'): - a.build(**dict(self.kw, check_config=substitute, - check_config_digest=digest(substitute.read_bytes()))) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - - def test_stale_revision_refuses_mutation(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - self.secret['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = '8' - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(self.effects) - - def test_rollback_requires_exact_provenance_and_postcreation_revision(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - rollback = replace(self.inv, attempt_id='attempt-two', operation='rollback') - for created in ((), ('other',), ('keycape-client', 'other')): - with self.subTest(created=created), self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(rollback, created) - self.secret['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = '9' - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(rollback, result.created) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 1) - - def test_missing_or_tampered_evidence_never_verifies_or_authorizes_undo(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(replace(self.inv, attempt_id='other'), result)) - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(self.inv, replace(result, revoked=False))) - self.evidence[result.evidence] = b'forged' - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(self.inv, result)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(replace(self.inv, operation='rollback'), result.created) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 1) - - def test_process_loss_does_not_reconstruct_created_authority(self): - result = a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.inv) - fresh = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - fresh.rollback(replace(self.inv, operation='rollback'), result.created) - self.assertIsNone(fresh.reconcile) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 1) - - def test_failed_readback_is_uncertain_and_never_provides_creation(self): - original_kube = self.kube - def lost(args, payload=None): - if self.effects and args[:5] == ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config']: - raise RuntimeError('synthetic sensitive detail') - return original_kube(args, payload) - with patch.object(a.helper.lane, 'kubectl', side_effect=lost): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, '^owner callback failed$'): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 1) - self.assertFalse(self.evidence) - self.assertEqual(self.revocations, [self.inv]) - - def test_revocation_or_publication_failure_cannot_produce_verified_success(self): - for capability in ('publish', 'revoke_session'): - self.secret, _ = f.fixture() - with self.subTest(capability=capability): - kw = dict(self.kw, **{capability: lambda *args: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError('private'))}) - adapter = a.build(**kw) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(Refused, '^owner callback failed$'): - adapter.invoke(self.inv) - self.assertFalse(self.evidence) - - def kernel_fixture(self): - # Fixture-only proposed type/case; canonical files are never edited. - # Warden's published producer pins apply unchanged. Owner trust and - # proposed descriptor/type/case are fixture-only, never native admission. - import warden.case_inputs as inputs - from warden.case_run import Executor, Journal - root = ROOT.parents[2] - case = yaml.safe_load((root / 'security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml').read_bytes()) - case['spec']['status'] = 'materialized' - case_source = yaml.safe_dump(case).encode() - typ = yaml.safe_load((root / 'security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/type.yaml').read_bytes()) - typ['spec']['execution_descriptors'] = {'register-client': digest(self.desc_bytes)} - # Fixture-only successor lane for the adapter's current descriptor. - # Canonical 1.1 still names the earlier login lane and is not edited. - typ['spec']['follow_through'] = [ - dict(step, lane=self.admitted.lane) if step['id'] == 'register-client' else step - for step in typ['spec']['follow_through']] - type_source = yaml.safe_dump(typ).encode() - catalog = (ROOT / 'kernel-catalog.fixture.yaml').read_bytes() - sheet = json.dumps(['register-client', 'net-kingdom', 'forgejo', 'human', - 'founder', 'keycape-attended-case-change', 'fixture-acceptance', 'fixture-materialization', - 'fixture-descriptor', 'fixture-session'], separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(case_source), digest(type_source), digest(self.desc_bytes), - digest(catalog), digest(b'fixture-acceptance'), digest(sheet)) - invocation = replace(self.admitted, pins=pins) - adapter = a.build(**dict(self.kw, admitted=invocation, case_source=case_source, - case_acceptance='fixture-acceptance')) - def fixture_verifier(purpose, source, evidence): - if purpose == 'catalog-routing-acceptance': - return source == digest(catalog) and evidence == 'fixture-descriptor' - if purpose.startswith('session-revocation:'): - _, lane, operation, attempt = purpose.split(':') - return source == digest(case_source) and lane == invocation.lane and evidence == ( - 'session-revoked:' + operation + ':' + attempt) - return evidence in {'fixture-acceptance', 'fixture-materialization', - 'fixture-descriptor', 'fixture-session'} - executor = Executor(Journal(Path(self.temp.name) / 'private'), - {adapter.reference: adapter}, fixture_verifier, browser_inputs=inputs.BrowserInputs(root)) - admitted = executor.admit(case_source, type_source, self.desc_bytes, catalog, - principal='founder', actor='human', lane=invocation.lane, - acceptance_evidence='fixture-acceptance', materialization_evidence='fixture-materialization', - descriptor_evidence='fixture-descriptor', session_evidence='fixture-session') - self.assertEqual(admitted[1], invocation) - return executor, admitted - - def test_actual_kernel_admission_dispatch_and_rollback_with_fixture_only_trust(self): - executor, admitted = self.kernel_fixture() - result = executor.run(*admitted) - self.assertEqual(result.last.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.assertEqual(result.last.created, ('keycape-client',)) - undone = executor.rollback(*admitted) - self.assertEqual(undone.last.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 2) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revocations), 2) - - def test_kernel_lost_readback_retains_uncertain_and_refuses_replay_and_undo(self): - executor, admitted = self.kernel_fixture() - original_kube = self.kube - def lost(args, payload=None): - if self.effects and args[:5] == ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', 'keycape-config']: - raise RuntimeError('synthetic sensitive detail') - return original_kube(args, payload) - with patch.object(a.helper.lane, 'kubectl', side_effect=lost): - result = executor.run(*admitted) - self.assertEqual(result.last.outcome, Outcome.UNCERTAIN) - self.assertFalse(result.last.created) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - executor.run(*admitted, retry=True) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - executor.rollback(*admitted) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 1) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revocations), 1) - - def test_kernel_external_revision_change_retains_uncertain_rollback(self): - executor, admitted = self.kernel_fixture() - self.assertEqual(executor.run(*admitted).last.outcome, Outcome.SUCCESS) - self.secret['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = '9' - self.assertEqual(executor.rollback(*admitted).last.outcome, Outcome.ROLLBACK_UNCERTAIN) - self.assertEqual(len(self.effects), 1) - self.assertEqual(len(self.revocations), 2) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_mint_secret_adapter.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_mint_secret_adapter.py deleted file mode 100644 index 31749f2..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_mint_secret_adapter.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,168 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic custody capabilities only; no secret value exists anywhere in these tests.""" -from dataclasses import asdict, replace -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest - -from warden.case_run import Invocation, digest -from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Refused -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('mint_secret_adapter', ROOT / 'mint-secret-adapter.py') -a = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(a) -PATH = 'platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo' - - -def receipt(op, version=3, **over): - r = {'schema': a.RECEIPT_SCHEMA, 'path': PATH, 'operation': op, 'version': version, - 'created': op == 'mint', 'values_emitted': False} - r.update(over) - return r - - -class MintSecretTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.case = yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'type': 'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2', 'parameters': - {'client_id': 'forgejo', 'client_type': 'confidential'}}}).encode() - desc = json.dumps(asdict(a.descriptor()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - pins = Pins(digest(self.case), digest(b'type'), digest(desc), digest(b'catalog'), - digest(b'case-acceptance:test'), digest(b'run sheet')) - self.admitted = Invocation('mint-secret', 'railiance-platform', 'forgejo', 'human', - 'founder', 'keycape-client-secret-generate', pins) - self.run = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='run') - self.back = replace(self.admitted, attempt_id='attempt-one', operation='rollback') - self.calls, self.evidence, self.revoked = [], {}, [] - self.mint_receipt = receipt('mint') - self.kw = dict(admitted=self.admitted, case_source=self.case, - case_acceptance='case-acceptance:test', mint=self.mint, destroy=self.destroy, - publish=self.publish, authenticate=lambda ref, p: self.evidence.get(ref) == p, - revoke_session=lambda inv: self.revoke('session', inv), - revoke_grant=lambda inv: self.revoke('grant', inv)) - - def mint(self, path): - self.calls.append(('mint', path)) - return self.mint_receipt - - def destroy(self, path, version): - self.calls.append(('destroy', path, version)) - return receipt('destroy', version) - - def publish(self, payload): - ref = 'owner-evidence:' + str(len(self.evidence)) - self.evidence[ref] = payload - return ref - - def revoke(self, kind, inv): - self.revoked.append((kind, inv.operation)) - return kind + '-revoked:' + inv.attempt_id - - def test_descriptor_is_mint_with_both_revocations(self): - d = a.descriptor() - self.assertEqual((d.effect, d.revocation_scopes, d.retry_safe), - ('mint', ('parent-session', 'broker-grant'), False)) - - def test_mint_records_value_free_evidence_and_verifies(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.run) - self.assertEqual((result.outcome, result.created), (Outcome.SUCCESS, a.CREATED)) - self.assertTrue(adapter.verify(self.run, result)) - payload = json.loads(self.evidence[result.evidence]) - self.assertEqual((payload['path'], payload['version'], payload['values_emitted']), (PATH, 3, False)) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [('session', 'run'), ('grant', 'run')]) - self.assertNotIn('value', json.dumps(payload).replace('values_emitted', '')) - - def test_created_only_rollback_destroys_exact_version(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - adapter.invoke(self.run) - result = adapter.rollback(self.back, a.CREATED) - self.assertEqual(result.outcome, Outcome.ROLLED_BACK) - self.assertEqual(self.calls[-1], ('destroy', PATH, 3)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): # second rollback has nothing case-created - adapter.rollback(replace(self.back, attempt_id='attempt-two'), a.CREATED) - - def test_rollback_without_creation_refused_and_revokes(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.rollback(self.back, a.CREATED) - self.assertEqual([c[0] for c in self.calls], []) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [('session', 'rollback'), ('grant', 'rollback')]) - - def _failing(self, kind): - def revoke(inv): - self.revoked.append((kind, inv.operation)) - raise RuntimeError(kind + ' revocation unavailable') - return revoke - - def test_failing_session_revocation_still_revokes_grant(self): - self.kw['revoke_session'] = self._failing('session') - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Exception): - adapter.invoke(self.run) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [('session', 'run'), ('grant', 'run')]) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) # never published as success - - def test_failing_grant_revocation_still_revokes_session(self): - self.kw['revoke_grant'] = self._failing('grant') - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Exception): - adapter.invoke(self.run) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [('session', 'run'), ('grant', 'run')]) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - - def test_both_revocations_failing_attempts_both_and_refuses(self): - self.kw['revoke_session'] = self._failing('session') - self.kw['revoke_grant'] = self._failing('grant') - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Exception): - adapter.rollback(self.back, a.CREATED) - self.assertEqual(self.revoked, [('session', 'rollback'), ('grant', 'rollback')]) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - - def test_receipt_with_value_or_extra_field_refused(self): - for bad in (receipt('mint', value='x'), receipt('mint', values_emitted=True), - receipt('mint', path='platform/workloads/keycape/other'), - receipt('mint', created=False), receipt('mint', version='3'), 'opaque'): - self.mint_receipt = bad - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**self.kw).invoke(self.run) - self.assertEqual(self.evidence, {}) - - def test_public_client_and_target_mismatch_refused(self): - for params in ({'client_id': 'forgejo', 'client_type': 'public'}, - {'client_id': 'other', 'client_type': 'confidential'}): - case = yaml.safe_dump({'spec': {'parameters': params}}).encode() - pins = replace(self.admitted.pins, case=digest(case)) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**dict(self.kw, case_source=case, admitted=replace(self.admitted, pins=pins))) - - def test_binding_refusals(self): - cases = [dict(case_source=self.case + b'#'), dict(case_acceptance='other'), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, lane='key-cape-oidc-login')), - dict(admitted=replace(self.admitted, pins=replace(self.admitted.pins, adapter=digest(b'x')))), - dict(admitted=self.run), dict(mint='bao kv put')] - for over in cases: - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - a.build(**dict(self.kw, **over)) - - def test_attempt_binding_and_reused_evidence_refused(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(replace(self.run, target='other')) - self.kw['publish'] = lambda payload: 'owner-evidence:fixed' - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - adapter.invoke(self.run) - with self.assertRaises(Refused): - adapter.invoke(replace(self.run, attempt_id='attempt-two')) - - def test_verify_rejects_foreign_result(self): - adapter = a.build(**self.kw) - result = adapter.invoke(self.run) - self.assertFalse(adapter.verify(replace(self.run, attempt_id='attempt-two'), result)) - self.assertFalse(a.build(**self.kw).verify(self.run, result)) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py deleted file mode 100644 index a0fc7cb..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_negative_session.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,605 +0,0 @@ -import base64 -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import time -import io -import os -import urllib.error -import signal -import threading -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('session', Path(__file__).with_name('openbao-negative-session.py')) -s = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(s) - - -def baseline(): - reference = dict(s.registrations()[-1], clientId='secrets-engine-openbao', - secretRef='env:PRODUCTION', tokenLifetime='15m') - return '# preserve this comment\nclients:\n' + s.yaml.safe_dump([reference], sort_keys=False) + 'other: unchanged\n' - - -def envelope(): - return {'proposal_id': s.PROPOSAL, 'target': s.TARGET, 'disposition': 'approved', - 'founder_decision_id': 'fixture-decision', - 'source_hashes': {str(Path(s.__file__).resolve()): s.digest(Path(s.__file__).read_bytes())}, - 'owner_acknowledgments': {o: 'fixture-owner-review' for o in - ['net-kingdom', 'key-cape', 'railiance-platform']}, - 'valid_until_epoch': time.time() + 900, 'maximum_session_seconds': 900, - 'bao_addr': 'http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', - 'bao_health_identity_sha256': s.digest(b'fixture-health-cluster'), - 'role_observation': {'mount': 'keycape-services', 'role': 'secrets-engine-openbao', - 'issuer': 'https://kc.coulomb.social', 'algorithm': 'RS256', - 'bindings_exact': True, 'policy_exact': True, 'raw_expiration_leeway': 0, - 'effective_expiration_leeway': 150, 'observed_at_epoch': time.time()}} - - -class Tests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = None - s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None - s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = None - s.CLEANING = False - def test_preserve_original_bytes(self): - raw = baseline() - result = s.candidate_config(raw) - start = result.index('clientId: openbao-probe-aud') - self.assertIn('# preserve this comment', result[:start]) - parsed = s.yaml.safe_load(result) - self.assertEqual(parsed['clients'][:-6], s.yaml.safe_load(raw)['clients']) - self.assertEqual(parsed['other'], 'unchanged') - - def test_isolation_and_sixth_matching_expiry(self): - clients = s.registrations() - self.assertNotIn('audience', clients[0]) - for c in clients[1:]: - self.assertEqual(c['audience'], 'secrets-engine-openbao') - for key in ['roles', 'tenant', 'serviceSubject', 'allowedScopes']: - self.assertEqual(clients[-1][key], s.yaml.safe_load(baseline())['clients'][0][key]) - - def test_preexisting_probe_refused(self): - raw = baseline().replace('other: unchanged', '- clientId: openbao-probe-aud\nother: unchanged') - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.candidate_config(raw) - - def test_duplicate_yaml_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.candidate_config(baseline() + 'other: shadow\n') - - def test_production_drift_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.candidate_config(baseline().replace('tenant:platform', 'tenant:other')) - - def test_env_collision_refused(self): - spec = {'replicas': 1, 'strategy': {'type': 'Recreate'}, 'template': {'spec': {'containers': [ - {'name': 'keycape', 'env': [{'name': s.ENVS[0], 'value': 'fixture'}]}]}}} - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.candidate_spec(spec) - - def test_recovery_roundtrip_preserves_every_baseline_byte(self): - raw = baseline() - self.assertEqual(s.recovered_config(s.candidate_config(raw)), raw) - self.assertEqual(s.recovered_config(raw), raw) - - def test_recovery_claim_drift_and_partial_registration_refused(self): - raw = s.candidate_config(baseline()) - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.recovered_config(raw.replace('service:openbao-probe', 'service:changed')) - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.recovered_config(raw.replace('clientId: openbao-probe-aud', 'clientId: different-probe')) - - def test_recovery_env_roundtrip(self): - spec = {'replicas': 1, 'strategy': {'type': 'Recreate'}, 'template': {'spec': {'containers': [ - {'name': 'keycape', 'env': [{'name': 'ORIGINAL', 'value': 'fixture'}]}]}}} - self.assertEqual(s.recovered_spec(s.candidate_spec(spec)), spec) - - def test_approval_is_not_optional(self): - e = envelope() - del e['founder_decision_id'] - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_source_change_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['source_hashes'][str(Path(s.__file__).resolve())] = '0' * 64 - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_owner_missing_refused(self): - e = envelope() - del e['owner_acknowledgments']['net-kingdom'] - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_leeway_default_and_disabled(self): - e = envelope() - self.assertEqual(s.verify_sources(e), 150) - e['role_observation'].update(raw_expiration_leeway=-1, effective_expiration_leeway=0) - self.assertEqual(s.verify_sources(e), 0) - - def test_stale_role_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['role_observation']['observed_at_epoch'] -= 301 - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_wrong_effective_leeway_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['role_observation']['effective_expiration_leeway'] = 0 - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_bao_credentials_in_origin_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['bao_addr'] = 'https://user:password@example.invalid' - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_future_role_observation_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['role_observation']['observed_at_epoch'] = time.time() + 60 - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_arbitrary_https_origin_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['bao_addr'] = 'https://attacker.invalid' - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_hostile_proxy_is_disabled(self): - build = s.urllib.request.build_opener - with patch.dict(os.environ, {'HTTPS_PROXY':'http://hostile-proxy.invalid:8000', - 'HTTP_PROXY':'http://hostile-proxy.invalid:8000'}), \ - patch.object(s.urllib.request, 'build_opener', wraps=build) as observed: - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - handlers = observed.call_args.args - self.assertIsInstance(handlers[0], s.urllib.request.ProxyHandler) - self.assertEqual(handlers[0].proxies, {}) - self.assertIsInstance(handlers[1], s.NoRedirect) - self.assertIsNone(handlers[1].redirect_request(None, None, 302, '', {}, 'https://hostile.invalid')) - - def test_redirect_never_follows_or_counts_as_refusal(self): - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - response = urllib.error.HTTPError('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', 302, - 'redirect', {}, io.BytesIO(b'{}')) - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', side_effect=response) as observed: - status, raw = transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', form={}) - self.assertEqual(status, 302) - self.assertEqual(observed.call_count, 1) - - def test_oversized_http_body_is_closed_and_refused(self): - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - response = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 200, - 'read':lambda self, size: b'x' * size, 'close':lambda self: setattr(self, 'closed', True)})() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'http_response_oversized'): - transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', form={}) - self.assertTrue(response.closed) - - def test_expired_window_prevents_protected_kubernetes_and_http(self): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = time.time() - 1 - with patch.object(s.subprocess, 'run') as backend: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'approved_window_expired'): - s.k(['create', '-f', '/dev/stdin'], {}) - backend.assert_not_called() - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open') as backend: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'approved_window_expired'): - transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', form={}) - backend.assert_not_called() - - def test_cleanup_revoke_allowed_after_window_expiry(self): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = time.time() - 1 - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - response = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 204, - 'read':lambda self, size: b'', 'close':lambda self: None})() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - self.assertEqual(transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/token/revoke-self'), (204, b'')) - - def test_http_read_has_finite_size(self): - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - sizes = [] - response = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 200, - 'read':lambda self, size: sizes.append(size) or b'{}', 'close':lambda self: None})() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token') - self.assertEqual(sizes, [s.MAX_RESPONSE + 1]) - - def test_nonfinite_and_boolean_timestamps_refused(self): - for value in [float('inf'), float('-inf'), float('nan'), True, False, 'Infinity', 10 ** 1000]: - for field in ['valid_until_epoch', 'observed_at_epoch']: - with self.subTest(field=field, value_type=type(value).__name__): - e = envelope() - if field == 'valid_until_epoch': - e[field] = value - else: - e['role_observation'][field] = value - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_finite_far_future_and_noninteger_window_refused(self): - e = envelope() - e['valid_until_epoch'] = time.time() + 86400 - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - for value in [True, 900.0, float('inf'), float('nan'), '900']: - e = envelope() - e['maximum_session_seconds'] = value - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e) - - def test_recovery_also_requires_finite_typed_window(self): - e = envelope() - e['disposition'] = 'recovery-approved' - e['valid_until_epoch'] = float('inf') - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.verify_sources(e, recovery=True) - - def test_nonfinite_json_constants_refused(self): - for constant in ['Infinity', '-Infinity', 'NaN']: - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.read_json('{"valid_until_epoch":' + constant + '}') - self.assertFalse(s.finite_number(s.read_json('{"valid_until_epoch":1e999}')['valid_until_epoch'])) - - def test_hard_timer_covers_slow_trickle_body_and_closes_response(self): - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - class Trickle: - def getcode(self): - return 200 - def read(self, size): - for _ in range(100): - time.sleep(0.01) - return b'{}' - def close(self): - self.closed = True - response = Trickle() - previous = signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM) - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'request_total_timeout'): - transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token', timeout=0.04) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.25) - self.assertTrue(response.closed) - self.assertIs(signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM), previous) - self.assertEqual(signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL), (0.0, 0.0)) - - def test_hard_timer_spans_headers_and_clips_to_business_window(self): - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = time.time() + 60 - s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = time.monotonic() + 0.04 - def slow_headers(*args, **kwargs): - time.sleep(1) - raise AssertionError('inactivity timeout would have permitted this') - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', side_effect=slow_headers): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'request_total_timeout'): - transport.post('https://kc.coulomb.social/token') - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.25) - - def test_late_full_acceptance_is_revoked_then_refused(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - token = 'not-a-real-late-token' - class Late: - def getcode(self): - return 200 - def read(self, size): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = time.time() - 1 - return json.dumps({'auth': {'client_token': token}}).encode() - def close(self): - pass - revoke = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 204, - 'read':lambda self, size: b'', 'close':lambda self: None})() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', side_effect=[Late(), revoke]) as calls: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'approved_window_expired'): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login') - self.assertEqual(calls.call_count, 2) - self.assertEqual(calls.call_args_list[1].args[0].full_url, - 'http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/token/revoke-self') - self.assertTrue(receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_attempted']) - self.assertTrue(receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_succeeded']) - self.assertNotIn(token, json.dumps(receipt)) - - def test_late_acceptance_failed_revoke_remains_unconfirmed(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - class Late: - def getcode(self): - return 200 - def read(self, size): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = time.time() - 1 - return b'{"auth":{"client_token":"fake-token"}}' - def close(self): - pass - failed = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 403, - 'read':lambda self, size: b'{}', 'close':lambda self: None})() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', side_effect=[Late(), failed]): - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login') - self.assertTrue(receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_attempted']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['late_acceptance_revoke_succeeded']) - - def test_partial_accepted_response_timeout_retains_unknown_outcome(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - response = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 200, - 'read':lambda self, size: time.sleep(1), 'close':lambda self: None})() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'request_total_timeout'): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login', timeout=0.04) - self.assertTrue(receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown']) - - def test_cleanup_has_finite_aggregate_deadline_and_restoration(self): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE = time.time() - 1 - s.begin_cleanup() - first = s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE - s.begin_cleanup() - self.assertEqual(s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, first) - s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = time.monotonic() - 1 - s.CLEANING = True - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'cleanup_budget_expired'): - s.check_deadline() - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open') as backend: - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/token/revoke-self') - backend.assert_not_called() - - def test_expired_cleanup_cannot_issue_native_secret_delete(self): - s.CLEANING = True - s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = time.monotonic() - 1 - obj = {'metadata': {'uid':'temporary', 'resourceVersion':'7'}} - with patch.object(s.subprocess, 'run') as native: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'cleanup_budget_expired'): - s.delete_temporary(obj) - native.assert_not_called() - - def test_secret_delete_total_timeout_clipped_to_cleanup_budget(self): - s.CLEANING = True - s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = time.monotonic() + 0.04 - obj = {'metadata': {'uid':'temporary', 'resourceVersion':'7'}} - captured = {} - def slow_delete(args, **kwargs): - captured.update(kwargs) - time.sleep(1) - return type('Result', (), {'returncode':0, 'stdout':'{}'})() - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(s.subprocess, 'run', side_effect=slow_delete): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'request_total_timeout'): - s.delete_temporary(obj) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.25) - self.assertLessEqual(captured['timeout'], 0.04) - self.assertEqual(json.loads(captured['input'])['preconditions'], {'uid':'temporary', 'resourceVersion':'7'}) - - def test_early_read_failure_slow_close_is_bounded_once(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - class Response: - closes = 0 - def getcode(self): - return 200 - def read(self, size): - raise s.Refused('synthetic_read_failure') - def close(self): - self.closes += 1 - time.sleep(0.07) - response = Response() - previous = signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM) - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'http_response_abort_unconfirmed'): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login', timeout=0.01) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.05) - self.assertEqual(response.closes, 1) - self.assertTrue(receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown']) - self.assertTrue(receipt['http_abort_close_attempted']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['http_abort_close_succeeded']) - self.assertTrue(receipt['http_response_abort_unconfirmed']) - self.assertIs(signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM), previous) - self.assertEqual(signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL), (0.0, 0.0)) - - def test_total_read_timeout_then_slow_close_uses_only_abort_cap(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - class Response: - closes = 0 - def getcode(self): - return 200 - def read(self, size): - time.sleep(0.1) - def close(self): - self.closes += 1 - time.sleep(0.1) - response = Response() - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'http_response_abort_unconfirmed'): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login', timeout=0.01) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.06) - self.assertEqual(response.closes, 1) - self.assertTrue(receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['http_abort_close_succeeded']) - - def test_oversized_body_slow_abort_remains_unproved_and_bounded(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - response = type('Response', (), {'getcode':lambda self: 200, - 'read':lambda self, size: b'x' * size, - 'close':lambda self: time.sleep(0.1)})() - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'http_response_abort_unconfirmed'): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login', timeout=0.01) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.05) - self.assertTrue(receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['http_abort_close_succeeded']) - - def test_raising_normal_close_then_slow_abort_is_private_bounded_unknown(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - class Response: - closes = 0 - def getcode(self): - return 200 - def read(self, size): - return b'{}' - def close(self): - self.closes += 1 - if self.closes == 1: - raise RuntimeError('private protected error must not escape') - time.sleep(0.1) - response = Response() - previous = signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM) - started = time.monotonic() - with patch.object(transport.opener, 'open', return_value=response): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, '^http_response_abort_unconfirmed$'): - transport.post('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200/v1/auth/keycape-services/login', timeout=0.01) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - started, 0.05) - self.assertEqual(response.closes, 2) - self.assertTrue(receipt['openbao_login_outcome_unknown']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['http_abort_close_succeeded']) - self.assertIs(signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM), previous) - self.assertEqual(signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL), (0.0, 0.0)) - - def test_expired_cleanup_never_attempts_exceptional_close_or_resets(self): - receipt = {} - transport = s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200', receipt=receipt) - deadline = time.monotonic() - 1 - s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE = deadline - response = type('Response', (), {'close':lambda self: self.fail('must not close')})() - with patch.object(response, 'close') as closes: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'http_response_abort_unconfirmed'): - transport.abort_response(response, time.monotonic() - 1) - closes.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE, deadline) - self.assertFalse(receipt['http_abort_close_attempted']) - self.assertTrue(receipt['http_response_abort_unconfirmed']) - - def test_thread_or_existing_timer_refused_without_overwrite(self): - results = [] - def in_thread(): - try: - with s.total_timeout(0.1): - results.append('unreachable') - except s.Refused: - results.append('refused') - thread = threading.Thread(target=in_thread) - thread.start() - thread.join() - self.assertEqual(results, ['refused']) - signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 1) - try: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused, 'existing_alarm_timer_refused'): - with s.total_timeout(0.1): - pass - self.assertGreater(signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL)[0], 0.5) - finally: - signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 0) - - def test_cleanup_refuses_concurrent_registry_change(self): - self.lifecycle(drift=True) - - def test_deleted_client_contract_is_specific(self): - self.assertTrue(s.removed_client_denied(401, b'{"error":"invalid_profile_usage","feature":"client_id"}')) - for status, body in [(503, b'{}'), (401, b'{"error":"invalid_profile_usage","feature":"Authorization"}'), - (401, b'{"error":"invalid_client"}'), (401, b'not-json')]: - self.assertFalse(s.removed_client_denied(status, body)) - - def test_cleanup_even_when_probe_fails(self): - self.lifecycle(probe_pass=False) - - def test_complete_lifecycle(self): - self.lifecycle() - - def lifecycle(self, drift=False, probe_pass=True): - raw = baseline() - dep_spec = {'replicas': 1, 'strategy': {'type': 'Recreate'}, 'template': {'spec': {'containers': [ - {'name': 'keycape', 'image': 'fixture@sha256:abc', 'env': []}]}}} - objects = {'keycape-config': {'metadata': {'name': 'keycape-config', 'uid': 'cfg', 'resourceVersion': '1'}, - 'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode(), - 'key.pem': 'FAKE_KEY_NOT_READ'}}, - 'keycape': {'metadata': {'name': 'keycape', 'uid': 'dep', 'resourceVersion': '1'}, - 'spec': dep_spec}} - original = copy.deepcopy(objects) - e = envelope() - e.update(runner_path='fake-runner', config_metadata=s.meta(objects['keycape-config']), - deployment_metadata=s.meta(objects['keycape']), deployment_spec_sha256=s.canonical(dep_spec), - registry_sha256=s.digest(raw.encode())) - e['source_hashes']['fake-runner'] = 'fixture' - receipt = {'cleanup_verified': False} - class Probe: - def exchange(self, *args): - return 'fixture-token' - def http_post(self, *args, **kwargs): - return 401, b'{"error":"invalid_profile_usage","feature":"client_id"}' - def run(self, *args, **kwargs): - if drift: - objects['keycape-config']['data']['unrelated'] = 'concurrent-owner-change' - return {'all_refused': probe_pass} - def kube(args, payload=None): - if args[0] == 'get': - return {'metadata': {'uid': s.CLUSTER}} - if args[0] == 'create': - if '--dry-run=server' in args: - return copy.deepcopy(payload) - created = copy.deepcopy(payload) - created['metadata'].update(uid='temp', resourceVersion='1') - objects[s.TEMP] = created - return created - if args[0] == 'delete': - self.assertEqual(payload['preconditions'], {'uid':'temp', 'resourceVersion':'1'}) - del objects[s.TEMP] - return {'kind':'Status', 'status':'Success'} - if '--ignore-not-found' in args: - return objects.get(s.TEMP) - raise AssertionError('unexpected kube call') - def patched(kind, obj, path, value, dry=False): - result = copy.deepcopy(obj) - if path == '/spec': - result['spec'] = copy.deepcopy(value) - else: - result['data']['config.yaml'] = value - if not dry: - objects[obj['metadata']['name']] = result - return result - def delete(*args, **kwargs): - del objects[s.TEMP] - return type('Result', (), {'returncode': 0})() - class Discovery: - def __enter__(self): - import io - return io.StringIO('{"issuer":"https://kc.coulomb.social","token_endpoint":"https://kc.coulomb.social/token"}') - def __exit__(self, *args): - pass - with patch.object(s, 'verify_sources', return_value=150), patch.object(s, 'load_probe', return_value=Probe()), \ - patch.object(s, 'SessionTransport') as transport_factory, \ - patch.object(s, 'k', side_effect=kube), patch.object(s, 'get', side_effect=lambda kind, name: copy.deepcopy(objects[name])), \ - patch.object(s, 'patch', side_effect=patched), patch.object(s, 'ready', return_value=True), \ - patch.object(s.subprocess, 'run', side_effect=delete): - transport_factory.return_value.discovery.return_value = { - 'issuer':'https://kc.coulomb.social', 'token_endpoint':'https://kc.coulomb.social/token'} - transport_factory.return_value.health_identity.return_value = e['bao_health_identity_sha256'] - transport_factory.return_value.post.side_effect = Probe().http_post - if drift or not probe_pass: - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused): - s.execute(e, {'human_token': 'fake', 'coding_agent_token': 'fake'}, receipt) - else: - s.execute(e, {'human_token': 'fake', 'coding_agent_token': 'fake'}, receipt) - if drift: - self.assertFalse(receipt['cleanup_verified']) - self.assertIn(s.TEMP, objects) - self.assertEqual(objects['keycape-config']['data']['unrelated'], 'concurrent-owner-change') - else: - self.assertTrue(receipt['cleanup_verified']) - self.assertNotIn(s.TEMP, objects) - self.assertEqual(objects['keycape-config']['data'], original['keycape-config']['data']) - self.assertEqual(objects['keycape']['spec'], original['keycape']['spec']) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py deleted file mode 100644 index df99444..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_node_route.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -"""Offline route readiness: public responses and lifecycle mocks only.""" -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch -import copy -import time -import tempfile -import sys -import signal -import io - -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('fixtures',Path(__file__).with_name('test_openbao_negative_session.py')) -f=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(f);s=f.s -HEALTH={'initialized':True,'sealed':False,'standby':False,'performance_standby':False,'cluster_id':'synthetic-public-cluster'} -PIN=s.digest(HEALTH['cluster_id'].encode()) - -class NodeRouteTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - s.CLEANING=False;s.REQUEST_DEADLINE=None - s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None;s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None - - def test_public_health_get_has_no_authentication_and_only_digest_retained(self): - transport=s.SessionTransport('http://127.0.0.1:18200');receipt={} - response=type('Response',(),{'getcode':lambda self:200,'read':lambda self,size:json.dumps(HEALTH).encode(),'close':lambda self:None})() - with patch.object(transport.opener,'open',return_value=response) as calls: - s.verify_bao_route(transport,{'bao_health_identity_sha256':PIN},receipt) - req=calls.call_args.args[0] - self.assertEqual(req.full_url,'http://127.0.0.1:18200/v1/sys/health') - self.assertEqual(req.method,'GET');self.assertEqual(req.headers,{}) - self.assertEqual(receipt,{'bao_public_route_verified':True}) - self.assertNotIn(HEALTH['cluster_id'],json.dumps(receipt)) - - def test_unreachable_redirect_sealed_standby_uninitialized_and_malformed_health_refuse(self): - transport=s.SessionTransport('http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200') - cases=[(None,b''),(302,b'{}'),(503,json.dumps(HEALTH).encode()),(200,b'not-json'), - (200,b'[]'),(200,json.dumps(dict(HEALTH,sealed=True)).encode()), - (200,json.dumps(dict(HEALTH,initialized=False)).encode()), - (200,json.dumps(dict(HEALTH,standby=True)).encode()), - (200,json.dumps(dict(HEALTH,sealed=0)).encode()), - (200,json.dumps(dict(HEALTH,cluster_id='')).encode())] - for status,body in cases: - with self.subTest(status=status,body_length=len(body)),patch.object(transport,'request',return_value=(status,body)): - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused):transport.health_identity() - - def test_identity_drift_or_missing_approved_pin_refuse(self): - transport=s.SessionTransport('http://127.0.0.1:18200') - with patch.object(transport,'health_identity',return_value=PIN) as health: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'bao_public_health_identity_changed'): - s.verify_bao_route(transport,{'bao_health_identity_sha256':'0'*64},{}) - health.reset_mock() - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'approved_bao_health_identity_required'): - s.verify_bao_route(transport,{}, {}) - health.assert_not_called() - - def setup_execute(self): - raw=f.baseline() - spec={'replicas':1,'strategy':{'type':'Recreate'},'template':{'spec':{'containers':[{'name':'keycape','env':[]}]}}} - config={'metadata':{'name':'keycape-config','uid':'cfg','resourceVersion':'1'},'data':{'config.yaml':s.base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode()}} - dep={'metadata':{'name':'keycape','uid':'dep','resourceVersion':'1'},'spec':spec} - e=f.envelope();e.update(runner_path='fixture-runner',bao_health_identity_sha256=PIN, - config_metadata=s.meta(config),deployment_metadata=s.meta(dep),registry_sha256=s.digest(raw.encode()),deployment_spec_sha256=s.canonical(spec)) - e['source_hashes']['fixture-runner']='fixture' - return e,config,dep - - def test_unavailable_initial_node_route_stops_before_any_native_or_secret_access(self): - e,config,dep=self.setup_execute() - with patch.object(s,'verify_sources',return_value=150),patch.object(s,'load_probe'), \ - patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory,patch.object(s,'k') as k,patch.object(s,'get') as get: - factory.return_value.discovery.return_value={'issuer':'https://kc.coulomb.social','token_endpoint':'https://kc.coulomb.social/token'} - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=s.Refused('bao_public_health_unavailable') - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'bao_public_health_unavailable'): - s.execute(e,{'human_token':'synthetic','coding_agent_token':'synthetic'}, {}) - k.assert_not_called();get.assert_not_called() - - def test_route_loss_after_dry_runs_stops_before_temporary_create_or_restarts(self): - e,config,dep=self.setup_execute() - with patch.object(s,'verify_sources',return_value=150),patch.object(s,'load_probe'), \ - patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory, \ - patch.object(s,'k',return_value={'metadata':{'uid':s.CLUSTER}}) as k, \ - patch.object(s,'get',side_effect=[config,dep]),patch.object(s,'patch') as patches,patch.object(s,'ready',return_value=True): - factory.return_value.discovery.return_value={'issuer':'https://kc.coulomb.social','token_endpoint':'https://kc.coulomb.social/token'} - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=[PIN,s.Refused('bao_public_health_unavailable')] - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'bao_public_health_unavailable'): - s.execute(e,{'human_token':'synthetic','coding_agent_token':'synthetic'}, {}) - self.assertEqual(factory.return_value.health_identity.call_count,2) - self.assertTrue(all(c.kwargs.get('dry') is True for c in patches.call_args_list)) - self.assertTrue(all(c.args[0][0]!='create' or '--dry-run=server' in c.args[0] for c in k.call_args_list)) - - def test_recovery_route_refusal_precedes_native_reads(self): - e,config,dep=self.setup_execute();e['disposition']='recovery-approved' - with patch.object(s,'verify_sources',return_value=None),patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory, \ - patch.object(s,'k') as k,patch.object(s,'get') as get: - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=s.Refused('bao_public_health_unavailable') - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'bao_public_health_unavailable'): - s.recover(e,{}) - k.assert_not_called();get.assert_not_called() - - def test_public_health_uses_total_elapsed_limit(self): - transport=s.SessionTransport('http://127.0.0.1:18200') - class Slow: - def getcode(self):return 200 - def read(self,size):time.sleep(0.5);return json.dumps(HEALTH).encode() - def close(self):pass - started=time.monotonic() - with patch.object(s,'HTTP_TOTAL_SECONDS',0.008),patch.object(transport.opener,'open',return_value=Slow()): - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'request_total_timeout'):transport.health_identity() - self.assertLess(time.monotonic()-started,0.08) - - def test_public_route_mode_has_no_native_secret_or_private_input(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - receipt=Path(folder)/'receipt.json' - argv=['session','route-preflight','--bao-addr','http://127.0.0.1:18200','--receipt',str(receipt)] - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory, \ - patch.object(s,'k') as k,patch.object(s,'get') as get,patch.object(sys,'stdin') as stdin: - factory.return_value.health_identity.return_value=PIN - self.assertEqual(s.main(),0) - k.assert_not_called();get.assert_not_called();stdin.read.assert_not_called() - data=json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - self.assertEqual(data['bao_health_identity_sha256'],PIN) - self.assertEqual(data['probe_location'],'current_process_only') - self.assertFalse(data['native_accepted']) - - def main_fixture(self,folder,mode): - envelope=f.envelope() - envelope['bao_health_identity_sha256']=PIN - if mode=='recover':envelope['disposition']='recovery-approved' - path=Path(folder)/'approved.json';path.write_text(json.dumps(envelope));path.chmod(0o600) - receipt=Path(folder)/'receipt.json' - argv=['session',mode,'--envelope',str(path),'--receipt',str(receipt)] - return envelope,receipt,argv - - def test_actual_main_health_failure_never_reads_private_stdin_execute_or_recover(self): - previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGTERM) - try: - for mode in ['execute','recover']: - with self.subTest(mode=mode),tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - e,receipt,argv=self.main_fixture(folder,mode) - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory, \ - patch.object(sys,'stdin') as stdin,patch.object(s,'k') as k,patch.object(s,'get') as get: - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=s.Refused('bao_public_health_unavailable') - self.assertEqual(s.main(),1) - stdin.read.assert_not_called();stdin.buffer.read.assert_not_called();k.assert_not_called();get.assert_not_called() - data=json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - self.assertEqual(data['reason'],'bao_public_health_unavailable') - self.assertFalse(data['cleanup_verified']) - s.CLEANING=False;s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None - finally:signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,previous) - - def test_actual_main_missing_approved_health_pin_never_reads_stdin(self): - previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGTERM) - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - e,receipt,argv=self.main_fixture(folder,'execute') - del e['bao_health_identity_sha256'] - Path(argv[3]).write_text(json.dumps(e)) - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(sys,'stdin') as stdin, \ - patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory,patch.object(s,'k') as k: - self.assertEqual(s.main(),1) - stdin.read.assert_not_called();stdin.buffer.read.assert_not_called();factory.return_value.health_identity.assert_not_called();k.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(json.loads(receipt.read_text())['reason'],'approved_bao_health_identity_required') - finally:signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,previous) - - def test_actual_main_health_succeeds_before_stdin_and_preserves_started_window(self): - previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGTERM);events=[];started={} - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - e,receipt,argv=self.main_fixture(folder,'execute') - def health(): - events.append('health');started['deadline']=s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE;return PIN - payloads=iter([b'{"human_token":"synthetic","coding_agent_token":"synthetic"}',b'']) - def private_read(size): - if 'stdin' not in events:events.append('stdin') - self.assertGreater(size,0);return next(payloads) - def execute(*args,**kwargs): - events.append('execute');self.assertTrue(kwargs['window_started']) - self.assertEqual(s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE,started['deadline']) - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory, \ - patch.object(sys,'stdin') as stdin,patch.object(s,'emit_private_ready'),patch.object(s,'execute',side_effect=execute), \ - patch.object(s,'k') as k: - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=health - stdin.buffer.read.side_effect=private_read - self.assertEqual(s.main(),0);k.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(events,['health','stdin','execute']) - finally:signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,previous) - - def test_execute_does_not_renew_expired_preinput_monotonic_window(self): - e=f.envelope();s.start_execution_window(e) - original=s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE - with patch.object(s.time,'monotonic',return_value=original+0.01),patch.object(s,'load_probe') as load, \ - patch.object(s,'k') as k: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'session_business_budget_expired'): - s.execute(e,{'human_token':'synthetic','coding_agent_token':'synthetic'}, {},window_started=True) - load.assert_not_called();k.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE,original) - -if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main(verbosity=2) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_input.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_input.py deleted file mode 100644 index cdf9670..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_input.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -"""Actual main bounded private receive; synthetic local binary pipes only.""" -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -import io -import json -import os -import signal -import sys -import tempfile -import time -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('routes',Path(__file__).with_name('test_openbao_node_route.py')) -r=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(r);s=r.s;f=r.f -PAYLOAD=b'{"human_token":"synthetic-human","coding_agent_token":"synthetic-agent"}' - -class PrivateInputTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - s.CLEANING=False;s.REQUEST_DEADLINE=None - s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None;s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None - - def main_with(self,stream,*,lifetime=0.05,health=None): - previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGTERM) - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - envelope=f.envelope();envelope['valid_until_epoch']=time.time()+lifetime - envelope['bao_health_identity_sha256']=r.PIN - path=Path(folder)/'approved.json';path.write_text(json.dumps(envelope));path.chmod(0o600) - receipt=Path(folder)/'receipt.json' - argv=['session','execute','--envelope',str(path),'--receipt',str(receipt)] - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(sys,'stdin',stream), \ - patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory,patch.object(s,'emit_private_ready'),patch.object(s,'execute') as execute, \ - patch.object(s,'k') as k,patch.object(s,'get') as get: - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=health - factory.return_value.health_identity.return_value=r.PIN - rc=s.main() - k.assert_not_called();get.assert_not_called() - return rc,json.loads(receipt.read_text()),execute.call_args,execute.call_count - finally:signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,previous) - - def test_actual_main_real_pipe_stall_has_original_window_total_bound(self): - read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe() - binary=os.fdopen(read_fd,'rb',buffering=0) - stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':binary})() - started=time.monotonic();previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM) - try: - rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream,lifetime=0.02) - finally:os.close(write_fd);binary.close() - self.assertEqual(rc,1);self.assertEqual(count,0) - self.assertEqual(receipt['reason'],'request_total_timeout') - self.assertLess(time.monotonic()-started,0.15) - self.assertEqual(signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL),(0.0,0.0)) - self.assertEqual(signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM),previous) - - def test_actual_main_complete_json_without_eof_still_refuses(self): - read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe();os.write(write_fd,PAYLOAD) - binary=os.fdopen(read_fd,'rb',buffering=0);stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':binary})() - try:rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream,lifetime=0.02) - finally:os.close(write_fd);binary.close() - self.assertEqual(rc,1);self.assertEqual(count,0) - self.assertEqual(receipt['reason'],'request_total_timeout') - - def test_actual_main_oversized_receive_refuses_without_execution(self): - stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':io.BytesIO(b'x'*(s.PRIVATE_INPUT_MAX_BYTES+1))})() - rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream) - self.assertEqual(rc,1);self.assertEqual(count,0) - self.assertEqual(receipt['reason'],'private_input_oversized') - - def test_actual_main_empty_partial_invalid_or_excessive_token_refuses(self): - inputs=[(b'','private_input_empty'),(b'{"human_token":','private_input_invalid'), - (b'not-json','private_input_invalid'),(b'{"human_token":true,"coding_agent_token":"a"}','private_input_invalid'), - (json.dumps({'human_token':'x'*(s.PRIVATE_TOKEN_MAX_BYTES+1),'coding_agent_token':'a'}).encode(),'private_input_invalid')] - for raw,reason in inputs: - with self.subTest(reason=reason,length=len(raw)): - stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':io.BytesIO(raw)})() - rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream) - self.assertEqual(rc,1);self.assertEqual(count,0);self.assertEqual(receipt['reason'],reason) - - def test_actual_main_expiry_after_health_never_starts_private_receive(self): - stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':io.BytesIO(PAYLOAD)})() - def late_health(): - s.REQUEST_DEADLINE=time.time()-1 - return r.PIN - with patch.object(stream.buffer,'read',wraps=stream.buffer.read) as read: - rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream,health=late_health) - self.assertEqual(rc,1);self.assertEqual(count,0) - self.assertEqual(receipt['reason'],'approved_window_expired');read.assert_not_called() - - def test_actual_main_late_eof_never_decodes_or_executes(self): - class LateInput: - reads=0 - def read(self,size): - self.reads+=1 - if self.reads==1:return PAYLOAD - s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=time.monotonic()-1 - return b'' - stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':LateInput()})() - rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream) - self.assertEqual(rc,1);self.assertEqual(count,0) - self.assertEqual(receipt['reason'],'session_business_budget_expired') - - def test_actual_main_complete_bounded_json_plus_eof_reaches_execution_once(self): - stream=type('Input',(),{'buffer':io.BytesIO(PAYLOAD)})() - rc,receipt,args,count=self.main_with(stream) - self.assertEqual(rc,0);self.assertEqual(count,1) - self.assertEqual(args.args[1],json.loads(PAYLOAD)) - self.assertTrue(args.kwargs['window_started']) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic-human',json.dumps(receipt)) - -if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main(verbosity=2) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_ready.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_ready.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7a23c00..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_private_ready.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,165 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic ready FD/control transport tests; no SSH/native/credentials.""" -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -import fcntl -import io -import json -import os -import signal -import sys -import tempfile -import time -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('routes',Path(__file__).with_name('test_openbao_node_route.py')) -r=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(r);s=r.s;f=r.f -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('wrapper',Path(__file__).with_name('openbao-negative-node-wrapper.py')) -w=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(w) -NONCE='a'*64 - -class ReadyTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - s.CLEANING=False;s.REQUEST_DEADLINE=None;s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None;s.CLEANUP_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=None - def marker(self,envelope=None): - e=envelope or f.envelope() - return {'schema':s.READY_SCHEMA,'session_nonce':NONCE,'proposal_id':s.PROPOSAL,'target':s.TARGET, - 'executor_sha256':s.digest(Path(s.__file__).read_bytes()),'envelope_sha256':'b'*64, - 'bao_health_identity_sha256':e['bao_health_identity_sha256'],'valid_until_epoch':e['valid_until_epoch'], - 'receive_budget_seconds':15} - - def test_emit_exact_ready_marker_to_distinct_local_pipe_and_close_endpoint(self): - e=f.envelope();s.start_execution_window(e);read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe();receipt={} - s.emit_private_ready(write_fd,NONCE,'b'*64,'b'*64,e,receipt) - raw=os.read(read_fd,4097);self.assertEqual(os.read(read_fd,1),b'');os.close(read_fd) - obj=json.loads(raw) - self.assertEqual(set(obj),set(self.marker(e))) - self.assertEqual(obj['session_nonce'],NONCE) - self.assertEqual(obj['executor_sha256'],s.digest(Path(s.__file__).read_bytes())) - self.assertTrue(receipt['private_ready_emitted']) - self.assertNotIn('human_token',obj);self.assertNotIn('coding_agent_token',obj) - - def test_stdout_alias_pipe_fd_above_two_refused_without_marker(self): - e=f.envelope();s.start_execution_window(e);read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe();saved=os.dup(1);alias=None - try: - os.dup2(write_fd,1);alias=os.dup(1) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'private_ready_stdio_alias_refused'): - s.emit_private_ready(alias,NONCE,'b'*64,'b'*64,e,{}) - finally: - os.dup2(saved,1);os.close(saved);os.close(write_fd) - if alias is not None:os.close(alias) - self.assertEqual(os.read(read_fd,4096),b'');os.close(read_fd) - - def test_nonce_or_envelope_binding_failure_emits_no_ready(self): - e=f.envelope();s.start_execution_window(e) - for nonce,pin in [('wrong','b'*64),(NONCE,'c'*64)]: - read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe() - try: - with self.assertRaises(s.Refused):s.emit_private_ready(write_fd,nonce,pin,'b'*64,e,{}) - finally: - try:os.close(write_fd) - except OSError:pass - self.assertEqual(os.read(read_fd,4096),b'');os.close(read_fd) - - def test_actual_full_ack_pipe_write_times_out_inside_original_window(self): - e=f.envelope();s.start_execution_window(e) - s.BUSINESS_MONOTONIC_DEADLINE=time.monotonic()+0.015 - read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe();fcntl.fcntl(write_fd,fcntl.F_SETPIPE_SZ,4096) - flags=fcntl.fcntl(write_fd,fcntl.F_GETFL);fcntl.fcntl(write_fd,fcntl.F_SETFL,flags|os.O_NONBLOCK) - try: - while True:os.write(write_fd,b'x'*4096) - except BlockingIOError:pass - fcntl.fcntl(write_fd,fcntl.F_SETFL,flags) - started=time.monotonic();handler=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(s.Refused,'request_total_timeout'): - s.emit_private_ready(write_fd,NONCE,'b'*64,'b'*64,e,{}) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic()-started,0.15);os.close(read_fd) - self.assertEqual(signal.getsignal(signal.SIGALRM),handler) - self.assertEqual(signal.getitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL),(0.0,0.0)) - - def test_actual_main_health_ready_then_private_read_exact_order(self): - previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGTERM);read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe();events=[];received={} - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - e=f.envelope();path=Path(folder)/'approved.json';path.write_text(json.dumps(e));path.chmod(0o600) - pin=s.digest(path.read_bytes());receipt=Path(folder)/'receipt.json' - argv=['session','execute','--envelope',str(path),'--receipt',str(receipt),'--ready-fd',str(write_fd), - '--session-nonce',NONCE,'--ready-envelope-sha256',pin] - class Input: - first=True - def read(self,size): - if not self.first:return b'' - self.first=False - received.update(json.loads(os.read(read_fd,4096))) - self_test.assertEqual(received['envelope_sha256'],pin) - events.append('private-read') - return b'{"human_token":"synthetic","coding_agent_token":"synthetic"}' - self_test=self;stream=type('Stream',(),{'buffer':Input()})() - def health():events.append('health');return e['bao_health_identity_sha256'] - def execute(*args,**kwargs):events.append('execute');self.assertTrue(kwargs['window_started']) - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(sys,'stdin',stream), \ - patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory,patch.object(s,'execute',side_effect=execute),patch.object(s,'k') as k: - factory.return_value.health_identity.side_effect=health - self.assertEqual(s.main(),0);k.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(events,['health','private-read','execute']) - self.assertEqual(received['session_nonce'],NONCE) - finally: - signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,previous);os.close(read_fd) - try:os.close(write_fd) - except OSError:pass - - def test_actual_main_missing_ack_fd_never_reads_private_input(self): - previous=signal.getsignal(signal.SIGTERM) - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - e=f.envelope();path=Path(folder)/'approved.json';path.write_text(json.dumps(e));path.chmod(0o600) - receipt=Path(folder)/'receipt.json';argv=['session','execute','--envelope',str(path),'--receipt',str(receipt)] - with patch.object(sys,'argv',argv),patch.object(sys,'stdin') as stdin,patch.object(s,'SessionTransport') as factory,patch.object(s,'k') as k: - factory.return_value.health_identity.return_value=e['bao_health_identity_sha256'] - self.assertEqual(s.main(),1);stdin.buffer.read.assert_not_called();k.assert_not_called() - self.assertEqual(json.loads(receipt.read_text())['reason'],'private_ready_pipe_required') - finally:signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,previous) - - def test_wrapper_marker_pin_nonce_fields_and_window_failures_refuse(self): - e=f.envelope();marker=self.marker(e) - for key,value in [('session_nonce','c'*64),('executor_sha256','c'*64),('envelope_sha256','c'*64), - ('target','other'),('proposal_id','other'),('bao_health_identity_sha256','c'*64), - ('valid_until_epoch',True),('receive_budget_seconds',True),('receive_budget_seconds',float('inf'))]: - bad=dict(marker,**{key:value}) - with self.subTest(key=key),self.assertRaises(w.Refused): - w.validate_marker(json.dumps(bad).encode()+b'\n',nonce=NONCE,executor_pin=marker['executor_sha256'],envelope_pin='b'*64,envelope=e) - with self.assertRaises(w.Refused): - w.validate_marker(json.dumps(dict(marker,extra=True)).encode()+b'\n',nonce=NONCE,executor_pin=marker['executor_sha256'],envelope_pin='b'*64,envelope=e) - - def test_wrapper_ready_pipe_no_eof_is_bounded(self): - read_fd,write_fd=os.pipe();os.write(write_fd,b'{"incomplete":true}') - started=time.monotonic() - try: - with self.assertRaisesRegex(w.Refused,'wrapper_timeout'): - with w.deadline(0.015):w.read_ready(read_fd) - finally:os.close(write_fd);os.close(read_fd) - self.assertLess(time.monotonic()-started,0.15) - - def test_wrapper_pinned_node_child_launch_is_local_pipe_not_ssh_fd_forward(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - child=Path(folder)/'child.py';child.write_text('# synthetic child, never executed\n') - envelope=f.envelope();envelope['source_hashes']={str(child):w.hash_bytes(child.read_bytes()),str(Path(w.__file__).resolve()):w.hash_bytes(Path(w.__file__).read_bytes())} - env=Path(folder)/'approved.json';env.write_text(json.dumps(envelope));env.chmod(0o600) - args=type('Args',(),{'child':str(child),'child_sha256':w.hash_bytes(child.read_bytes()),'envelope':str(env),'envelope_sha256':w.hash_bytes(env.read_bytes()),'receipt':str(Path(folder)/'receipt.json'),'session_nonce':NONCE})() - class Process: - stdout=io.BytesIO();stderr=io.BytesIO() - def wait(self,timeout):return 0 - def poll(self):return 0 - def launch(command,**kwargs): - self.assertEqual(command[0],sys.executable) - self.assertEqual(command[1],str(child));self.assertNotIn('ssh',command) - self.assertEqual(kwargs['stdin'],sys.stdin.buffer) - fd=int(command[command.index('--ready-fd')+1]);self.assertEqual(kwargs['pass_fds'],(fd,)) - marker=self.marker(envelope);marker.update(executor_sha256=args.child_sha256,envelope_sha256=args.envelope_sha256) - os.write(fd,json.dumps(marker).encode()+b'\n') - return Process() - with patch.object(w.subprocess,'Popen',side_effect=launch),patch.object(w,'forward_ready') as forward: - self.assertEqual(w.run(args),0);self.assertEqual(forward.call_count,1) - self.assertNotIn('human_token',json.loads(forward.call_args.args[0])) - -if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main(verbosity=2) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_signin_diagnosis_rollout.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_signin_diagnosis_rollout.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9877c40..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_openbao_signin_diagnosis_rollout.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,156 +0,0 @@ -import base64 -import contextlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -from pathlib import Path -import unittest - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - 'openbao_signin_diagnosis_rollout', Path(__file__).with_name('openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py')) -module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(module) - -UID = '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001' -CLUSTER = {'metadata': {'uid': module.lane.CLUSTER_UID}} -OPENBAO = (' - clientId: openbao-admin\n' - ' displayName: Railiance OpenBao Admin\n' - ' redirectUris:\n' - ' - http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback\n' - ' clientType: public\n') -OTHER = (' - clientId: user-engine-portal\n' - ' clientType: public\n') - - -def fixture(clients=OTHER + OPENBAO, tail='tokenLifetime: 15m\n'): - # Synthetic marker values only; no live Secret is loaded by this suite. - raw = ('# preserve this comment\nissuer: https://kc.coulomb.social\n' - 'authelia:\n issuer: https://auth.coulomb.social\n clientSecret: synthetic\n' - 'clients:\n' + clients + tail) - secret = {'metadata': {'uid': UID, 'resourceVersion': '7'}, - 'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode(), - 'signing-key.pem': base64.b64encode(b'synthetic').decode()}} - return secret, raw - - -def decode(encoded): - return base64.b64decode(encoded).decode() - - -class EditTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_enable_adds_exactly_one_line_after_client_id(self): - secret, raw = fixture() - encoded, changed = module.enable(secret) - self.assertTrue(changed) - expected = raw.replace(' - clientId: openbao-admin\n', - ' - clientId: openbao-admin\n signInDiagnosis: true\n') - self.assertEqual(decode(encoded), expected) - - def test_enable_is_noop_when_already_true(self): - secret, _ = fixture(OPENBAO.replace('clientType: public', 'clientType: public\n signInDiagnosis: true')) - encoded, changed = module.enable(secret) - self.assertFalse(changed) - self.assertEqual(encoded, secret['data']['config.yaml']) - - def test_other_flag_value_fails_closed(self): - secret, _ = fixture(OPENBAO + ' signInDiagnosis: false\n') - for operation in (module.enable, module.disable): - with self.assertRaises(module.Refused): - operation(secret) - - def test_missing_or_duplicate_client_fails_closed(self): - for clients in (OTHER, OPENBAO + OPENBAO): - with self.assertRaises(module.Refused): - module.enable(fixture(clients)[0]) - - def test_unverified_upstream_issuer_refused(self): - secret, raw = fixture() - raw = raw.replace('https://auth.coulomb.social', 'https://evil.test') - secret['data']['config.yaml'] = base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode() - with self.assertRaises(module.Refused): - module.enable(secret) - - def test_rollback_restores_exact_bytes(self): - secret, raw = fixture() - enabled, _ = module.enable(secret) - secret['data']['config.yaml'] = enabled - restored, changed = module.disable(secret) - self.assertTrue(changed) - self.assertEqual(decode(restored), raw) - - def test_rollback_absent_is_noop(self): - secret, _ = fixture() - encoded, changed = module.disable(secret) - self.assertFalse(changed) - self.assertEqual(encoded, secret['data']['config.yaml']) - - -class RunTests(unittest.TestCase): - """Drive run() against a fake kubectl; nothing reaches a cluster.""" - - def setUp(self): - self.secret, _ = fixture() - self.calls = [] - - def fake(self, arguments, payload=None): - self.calls.append((arguments, payload)) - if arguments[:2] == ['get', 'namespace']: - return CLUSTER - if 'patch' in arguments: - data = dict(self.secret['data'], **{'config.yaml': payload[-1]['value']}) - if '--dry-run=server' not in arguments: - self.secret = {'metadata': {'uid': UID, 'resourceVersion': '8'}, 'data': data} - return {'data': data} - return self.secret - - def main(self, *argv): - out = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): - code = module.main(list(argv), kubectl=self.fake) - return code, out.getvalue() - - def patches(self): - return [c for c in self.calls if 'patch' in c[0]] - - def test_default_is_inspect_and_never_patches(self): - code, out = self.main() - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - receipt = json.loads(out) - self.assertTrue(receipt['change_needed']) - self.assertEqual(receipt['before'], {'uid': UID, 'resource_version': '7'}) - self.assertEqual(self.patches(), []) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic', out) - - def test_dry_run_requires_observed_revision_and_is_server_side(self): - code, out = self.main('dry-run') - self.assertEqual((code, json.loads(out)['reason']), (1, 'observed_revision_changed')) - code, out = self.main('dry-run', '--expected-uid', UID, '--expected-resource-version', '7') - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - self.assertIn('--dry-run=server', self.patches()[-1][0]) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic', out) - - def test_apply_requires_attended_and_reports_restart(self): - code, out = self.main('apply', '--expected-uid', UID, '--expected-resource-version', '7') - self.assertEqual((code, json.loads(out)['reason']), (1, 'attended_operator_required')) - self.assertEqual(self.patches(), []) - code, out = self.main('apply', '--attended', '--expected-uid', UID, '--expected-resource-version', '7') - receipt = json.loads(out) - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - self.assertTrue(receipt['changed'] and receipt['restart_required']) - self.assertEqual(receipt['after']['resource_version'], '8') - self.assertEqual(self.patches()[-1][1][:2], [ - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': UID}, - {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': '7'}]) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic', out) - - def test_failures_never_print_secret_material(self): - def broken(arguments, payload=None): - raise RuntimeError('synthetic value leaked in error text') - out = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): - self.assertEqual(module.main([], kubectl=broken), 1) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic', out.getvalue()) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_playwright_activation.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_playwright_activation.py deleted file mode 100644 index 056223a..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_playwright_activation.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,228 +0,0 @@ -import base64 -import copy -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import tempfile -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -import jsonpatch - -ROOT = Path(__file__).parent -def load(name, filename): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, ROOT / filename) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module -a = load('activation', 'playwright-activation.py') -f = load('registration_fixture', 'test_playwright_registration.py') -REVISION = '5dd74dfbdf3fd38adb1bfc1bdc1326181435f0e9' -IDENTITIES = [f.IDENTITY, dict(f.IDENTITY, agent_id='second', service_subject='service:second')] - - -def fixtures(): - secret, raw = f.fixture() - secret.update(kind='Secret', apiVersion='v1') - secret['metadata'].update(name='keycape-config', namespace='sso', uid='00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001') - deployment = {'apiVersion': 'apps/v1', 'kind': 'Deployment', 'metadata': { - 'name': 'keycape', 'namespace': 'sso', 'uid': '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002', - 'resourceVersion': '12', 'generation': 5}, 'spec': {'replicas': 1, 'strategy': {'type': 'Recreate'}, - 'template': {'metadata': {'labels': {'app': 'keycape'}}, 'spec': { - 'containers': [{'name': 'keycape', 'image': 'forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:' + 'a' * 64, - 'env': [{'name': 'KEYCAPE_CONFIG', 'value': '/etc/keycape/config.yaml'}], - 'volumeMounts': [{'name': 'registry', 'mountPath': '/etc/keycape', 'readOnly': True}]}], - 'volumes': [{'name': 'registry', 'secret': {'secretName': 'keycape-config'}}]}}}} - controller(deployment) - return secret, deployment - - -def controller(deployment): - # Simulates observed controller completion, separate from patch admission. - replicas = deployment['spec']['replicas'] - deployment['status'] = {'observedGeneration': deployment['metadata']['generation'], - **{k: replicas for k in ['replicas', 'readyReplicas', 'availableReplicas', 'updatedReplicas']}} - - -class World: - def __init__(self, secret, deployment): - self.secret, self.deployment = copy.deepcopy(secret), copy.deepcopy(deployment) - self.pods = {'kind': 'PodList', 'metadata': {}, 'items': []} - self.history = [] - - def step(self, proposal, phase, observe=True): - operation = a.propose_step(proposal, a.digest(proposal), phase, self.secret, self.deployment, self.pods) - if operation is None: return None - attr = 'secret' if operation['kind'] == 'Secret' else 'deployment' - # Independent RFC 6902 implementation verifies actual generated CAS tests. - updated = jsonpatch.apply_patch(getattr(self, attr), operation['patch'], in_place=False) - updated['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = str(int(updated['metadata']['resourceVersion']) + 1) - if attr == 'deployment': updated['metadata']['generation'] += 1 - self.history.append(phase) - setattr(self, attr, updated) - receipt = a.verify_response(operation, updated) - if attr == 'deployment' and observe: controller(updated) - return receipt - - -class ActivationTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.secret, self.deployment = fixtures() - self.proposal = a.build(self.secret, self.deployment, IDENTITIES, REVISION) - - def test_exact_sequence_keeps_original_source_and_returns_safe_receipts(self): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - original = copy.deepcopy((self.secret, self.deployment)) - for phase in ['stop', 'registry', 'bindings', 'resume']: - receipt = world.step(self.proposal, phase) - self.assertTrue(receipt['readback_matches']) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic-private-marker', json.dumps(receipt)) - self.assertEqual(world.deployment['spec']['replicas'], 1) - self.assertEqual(world.secret['data'], self.proposal['after_data']) - self.assertEqual((self.secret, self.deployment), original) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic-private-marker', json.dumps(a.summary(self.proposal))) - - def test_rollback_preserves_preexisting_public_and_agent_registrations(self): - encoded, _ = a.registration.prepare_registry(self.secret, [IDENTITIES[0]]) - self.secret['data']['config.yaml'] = encoded - binding = a.registration.registry.env_binding(a.registration.agent_client(IDENTITIES[0])) - a.container(self.deployment['spec'])['env'].append(binding) - proposal = a.build(self.secret, self.deployment, IDENTITIES, REVISION) - self.assertEqual(proposal['created_client_ids'], ['playwright-agent-second']) - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - for phase in ['stop', 'registry', 'bindings', 'resume', 'rollback-stop', - 'rollback-registry', 'rollback-bindings', 'rollback-resume']: - world.step(proposal, phase) - self.assertEqual(world.secret['data'], self.secret['data']) - self.assertEqual(world.deployment['spec'], self.deployment['spec']) - - def test_each_partial_state_recovers_without_removing_original_entries(self): - phases = ['stop', 'registry', 'bindings', 'resume'] - for count in range(5): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - for phase in phases[:count]: world.step(self.proposal, phase) - for phase in ['rollback-stop', 'rollback-registry', 'rollback-bindings', 'rollback-resume']: - world.step(self.proposal, phase) - self.assertEqual(world.secret['data'], self.secret['data']) - self.assertEqual(world.deployment['spec'], self.deployment['spec']) - - def test_identical_complete_registration_is_noop_without_outage(self): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - for phase in ['stop', 'registry', 'bindings', 'resume']: world.step(self.proposal, phase) - proposal = a.build(world.secret, world.deployment, IDENTITIES, REVISION) - self.assertFalse(a.summary(proposal)['change_needed']) - before = len(world.history) - for phase in ['stop', 'registry', 'bindings', 'resume']: self.assertIsNone(world.step(proposal, phase)) - self.assertEqual(len(world.history), before) - - def test_rollback_before_any_execution_never_stops_the_issuer(self): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - for phase in ['rollback-stop', 'rollback-registry', 'rollback-bindings', 'rollback-resume']: - self.assertIsNone(world.step(self.proposal, phase)) - self.assertEqual(world.history, []) - - def test_reordered_phases_and_unobserved_controller_are_refused(self): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - for phase in ['registry', 'bindings', 'resume']: - with self.subTest(phase=phase), self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, phase) - world.step(self.proposal, 'stop', observe=False) - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, 'registry') - controller(world.deployment) - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, 'resume') - - def test_terminating_direct_projected_and_env_consumers_prevent_registry_write(self): - specs = [{'volumes': [{'secret': {'secretName': 'keycape-config'}}]}, - {'volumes': [{'projected': {'sources': [{'secret': {'name': 'keycape-config'}}]}}]}, - {'containers': [{'envFrom': [{'secretRef': {'name': 'keycape-config'}}]}]}, - {'initContainers': [{'env': [{'valueFrom': {'secretKeyRef': {'name': 'keycape-config'}}}]}]}] - for spec in specs: - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment); world.step(self.proposal, 'stop') - world.pods['items'] = [{'metadata': {'namespace': 'sso', 'deletionTimestamp': 'synthetic'}, 'spec': spec}] - with self.subTest(spec=spec), self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, 'registry') - - def test_partial_pod_inventory_refused(self): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment); world.step(self.proposal, 'stop') - world.pods['metadata']['continue'] = 'another-page' - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, 'registry') - - def test_original_revision_and_proposal_digest_are_bound(self): - for attr in ['secret', 'deployment']: - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - getattr(world, attr)['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = '999' - with self.subTest(attr=attr), self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, 'stop') - changed = copy.deepcopy(self.proposal); changed['after_data']['other'] = 'changed' - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): - a.propose_step(changed, a.digest(self.proposal), 'stop', self.secret, self.deployment, {'kind': 'PodList', 'items': []}) - - def test_independent_jsonpatch_rejects_racing_version_or_spec(self): - operation = a.propose_step(self.proposal, a.digest(self.proposal), 'stop', - self.secret, self.deployment, {'kind': 'PodList', 'items': []}) - for field in ['version', 'spec']: - raced = copy.deepcopy(self.deployment) - if field == 'version': raced['metadata']['resourceVersion'] = '999' - else: raced['spec']['replicas'] = 2 - with self.subTest(field=field), self.assertRaises(jsonpatch.JsonPatchTestFailed): - jsonpatch.apply_patch(raced, operation['patch']) - - def test_private_registry_patch_checks_complete_data_and_uid(self): - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment); world.step(self.proposal, 'stop') - operation = a.propose_step(self.proposal, a.digest(self.proposal), 'registry', world.secret, world.deployment, world.pods) - for field in ['data', 'uid']: - raced = copy.deepcopy(world.secret) - if field == 'data': raced['data']['other'] = 'racing-write' - else: raced['metadata']['uid'] = 'recreated' - with self.subTest(field=field), self.assertRaises(jsonpatch.JsonPatchTestFailed): - jsonpatch.apply_patch(raced, operation['patch']) - - def test_unrelated_registry_or_deployment_drift_refuses_rollback(self): - for field in ['data', 'spec']: - world = World(self.secret, self.deployment) - for phase in ['stop', 'registry', 'bindings']: world.step(self.proposal, phase) - if field == 'data': world.secret['data']['unrelated-new-field'] = 'keep' - else: world.deployment['spec']['template']['metadata']['labels']['new'] = 'keep' - with self.subTest(field=field), self.assertRaises(a.Refused): world.step(self.proposal, 'rollback-registry') - - def test_readback_mismatch_refused_without_raw_output(self): - operation = a.propose_step(self.proposal, a.digest(self.proposal), 'stop', self.secret, self.deployment, {}) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(a.Refused, '^mutation_readback_mismatch$'): - a.verify_response(operation, self.deployment) - - def test_unsupported_deployment_and_binding_drift_refused(self): - changes = [lambda d: d['spec'].update(replicas=2), - lambda d: d['spec']['strategy'].update(type='RollingUpdate'), - lambda d: a.container(d['spec']).update(image='unreviewed:latest'), - lambda d: a.container(d['spec']).update(envFrom=[{'secretRef': {'name': 'other'}}]), - lambda d: a.container(d['spec'])['env'].append({'name': 'KEYCAPE_CONFIG', 'value': 'other'}), - lambda d: a.container(d['spec'])['env'].append({'name': 'KEYCAPE_PLAYWRIGHT_AGENT_TEST_AGENT_CLIENT_SECRET', 'value': 'synthetic-private-marker'})] - for change in changes: - deployment = copy.deepcopy(self.deployment); change(deployment) - with self.subTest(change=change), self.assertRaises(a.Refused): - a.build(self.secret, deployment, IDENTITIES, REVISION) - - def test_native_verifier_is_pinned_contained_and_ignores_ambient_environment(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as folder: - binary = Path(folder) / 'verifier'; binary.write_bytes(b'synthetic-binary') - sha = hashlib.sha256(binary.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - with patch.object(a.subprocess, 'run') as run: - run.return_value = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, b'{"valid": true, "errors": []}', b'') - self.assertTrue(a.check_registry(self.proposal, binary, sha)['proposed_registry_valid']) - self.assertEqual(run.call_count, 2) - self.assertEqual(run.call_args.kwargs['env'], {'PATH': '/usr/bin:/bin'}) - self.assertIn('synthetic-private-marker', run.call_args.kwargs['input'].decode()) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic-private-marker', str(run.call_args.args)) - run.return_value = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 1, b'{"valid": false, "errors": ["synthetic-private-marker"]}', b'synthetic-private-marker') - with self.assertRaisesRegex(a.Refused, '^native_registry_check_failed$'): - a.check_registry(self.proposal, binary, sha) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(a.Refused, '^native_verifier_digest_mismatch$'): - a.check_registry(self.proposal, binary, 'wrong') - - def test_other_env_name_cannot_alias_a_proposed_agent_secret(self): - binding = a.registration.registry.env_binding(a.registration.agent_client(IDENTITIES[0])) - binding['name'] = 'OTHER_CLIENT_SECRET' - a.container(self.deployment['spec'])['env'].append(binding) - with self.assertRaisesRegex(a.Refused, 'delivery_secret_already_bound'): - a.build(self.secret, self.deployment, IDENTITIES, REVISION) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_playwright_registration.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_playwright_registration.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2ac03fc..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_playwright_registration.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -import base64 -import contextlib -import copy -import importlib.util -import io -import json -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest - -import yaml - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('playwright_registration', Path(__file__).with_name('playwright-registration.py')) -p = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(p) -IDENTITY = {'agent_id': 'test-agent', 'service_subject': 'service:test-agent:platform', - 'tenant': 'tenant:test', 'identity_record': 'synthetic/agent-record.json'} - - -def fixture(): - raw = ('# preserve the issuer and existing clients\nissuer: https://kc.coulomb.social\n' - 'port: 8080\nprivateKeyPem: /synthetic/key.pem\ntokenLifetime: 15m\n' - 'authelia:\n issuer: https://auth.coulomb.social\n clientSecret: synthetic-private-marker\n' - 'clients:\n - clientId: existing\n clientType: public\n' - ' redirectUris: [https://example.test/callback]\n' - ' allowedScopes: [openid]\n grantTypes: [authorization_code]\n' - '# trailing configuration comment\nlogLevel: info\n') - return {'metadata': {'uid': 'synthetic', 'resourceVersion': '7'}, - 'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode(), 'other': 'preserve'}}, raw - - -def decode(value): - return base64.b64decode(value).decode() - - -def altered(secret, change): - result = copy.deepcopy(secret) - config = yaml.safe_load(decode(result['data']['config.yaml'])) - change(config) - result['data']['config.yaml'] = base64.b64encode(yaml.safe_dump(config, sort_keys=False).encode()).decode() - return result - - -class RegistrationTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_public_matches_platform_and_agent_has_distinct_delivery(self): - client = p.public_client() - self.assertEqual(client['redirectUris'], ['http://127.0.0.1:18764/callback']) - self.assertNotIn('tokenLifetime', client) - self.assertNotIn('secretRef', client) - agent = p.agent_client(IDENTITY) - self.assertEqual(agent['allowedScopes'], ['playwright:connect']) - self.assertEqual(agent['roles'], ['coding-agent']) - self.assertEqual(agent['tenant'], IDENTITY['tenant']) - self.assertEqual(agent['serviceSubject'], IDENTITY['service_subject']) - self.assertEqual(agent['tokenLifetime'], '15m') - self.assertEqual(p.registry.env_binding(agent)['valueFrom']['secretKeyRef'], - {'name': 'keycape-playwright-agent-test-agent-client', 'key': 'client-secret'}) - - def test_unknown_or_missing_identity_fields_refused(self): - for identity in [{}, [], dict(IDENTITY, secret='not-emitted'), dict(IDENTITY, tenant=''), - dict(IDENTITY, service_subject='human:someone'), - dict(IDENTITY, identity_record='bad\nreference'), - dict(IDENTITY, agent_id='bad_$agent'), dict(IDENTITY, tenant=True)]: - with self.subTest(identity=identity), self.assertRaises(p.Refused): - p.agent_client(identity) - - def test_duplicate_agent_or_subject_refused(self): - for second in [IDENTITY, dict(IDENTITY, agent_id='second'), - dict(IDENTITY, service_subject='service:second')]: - with self.subTest(second=second), self.assertRaises(p.Refused): - p.clients([IDENTITY, second]) - - def test_go_lifetimes_are_bounded_without_global_change(self): - for value in ['15m', '1h', '1h0m0s', '3599.5s', '1000ms', '1.5m', '.5m']: - with self.subTest(value=value): p.human_lifetime({'tokenLifetime': value}) - for value in [None, 900, '', '0s', '-1m', '1h1ns', '0.5s', 'NaN', '15mgarbage', '1d']: - with self.subTest(value=value), self.assertRaises(p.Refused): - p.human_lifetime({'tokenLifetime': value}) - - def test_add_preserves_bytes_and_is_repeatable_then_exact_remove(self): - secret, raw = fixture() - original = copy.deepcopy(secret) - encoded, changed = p.prepare_registry(secret, [IDENTITY]) - self.assertEqual(changed, ['playwright-cli', 'playwright-agent-test-agent']) - updated = decode(encoded) - prefix, suffix = raw.split('logLevel:') - self.assertTrue(updated.startswith(prefix)) - self.assertTrue(updated.endswith('logLevel:' + suffix)) - self.assertEqual(secret, original) - current = copy.deepcopy(secret); current['data']['config.yaml'] = encoded - self.assertEqual(p.prepare_registry(current, [IDENTITY]), (encoded, [])) - restored, removed = p.prepare_registry(current, [IDENTITY], 'remove') - self.assertEqual(decode(restored), raw) - self.assertEqual(removed, changed) - self.assertEqual(p.prepare_registry(secret, [IDENTITY], 'remove'), - (secret['data']['config.yaml'], [])) - - def test_refuses_drift_conflicts_and_unreviewed_audience(self): - base, _ = fixture() - public = p.public_client(); agent = p.agent_client(IDENTITY) - cases = [lambda c: c.update(issuer='https://other.test'), - lambda c: c.update(tokenLifetime='2h'), - lambda c: c['clients'].append(dict(public, allowedScopes=['openid'])), - lambda c: c['clients'].append(dict(public, clientId='other-consumer')), - lambda c: c['clients'].append(dict(agent, clientId='duplicate-subject')), - lambda c: c['clients'].append({'clientId': 'other', 'secretRef': agent['secretRef']}), - lambda c: c['clients'].append(copy.deepcopy(c['clients'][0]))] - for change in cases: - for operation in ['add', 'remove']: - with self.subTest(change=change, operation=operation), self.assertRaises(p.Refused): - p.prepare_registry(altered(base, change), [IDENTITY], operation) - - def test_same_agent_can_keep_separate_existing_openbao_client(self): - base, _ = fixture() - existing = dict(p.agent_client(IDENTITY), clientId='existing-openbao-agent', - audience='openbao', allowedScopes=['openbao:login'], - secretRef='env:EXISTING_OPENBAO_SECRET') - secret = altered(base, lambda c: c['clients'].append(existing)) - encoded, _ = p.prepare_registry(secret, [IDENTITY]) - self.assertIn(existing, yaml.safe_load(decode(encoded))['clients']) - - def test_default_audience_client_id_cannot_bypass_dedicated_inventory(self): - base, _ = fixture() - default_audience = dict(p.public_client(), clientId=p.AUDIENCE) - del default_audience['audience'] - secret = altered(base, lambda c: c['clients'].append(default_audience)) - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused): - p.prepare_registry(secret, [IDENTITY]) - - def test_cli_outputs_only_proposal_and_no_false_admission(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - path = Path(directory) / 'agents.json'; path.write_text(json.dumps([IDENTITY])) - out = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): code = p.main(['--agents', str(path)]) - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - result = json.loads(out.getvalue()) - self.assertEqual(result['status'], 'source_proposal') - for flag in ['identity_evidence_verified', 'custody_admitted', 'live_activated']: - self.assertFalse(result[flag]) - self.assertEqual(len(result['clients']), 2) - self.assertEqual(result['identity_references']['playwright-agent-test-agent'], - IDENTITY['identity_record']) - - def test_cli_contains_invalid_private_or_duplicate_input(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - path = Path(directory) / 'input.json' - for raw in ['synthetic-private-marker', '[{"agent_id":"a","agent_id":"b"}]', - json.dumps([dict(IDENTITY, secret='synthetic-private-marker')]), 'x' * 65537]: - path.write_text(raw) - out = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): code = p.main(['--agents', str(path)]) - self.assertEqual(code, 1) - self.assertNotIn('synthetic-private-marker', out.getvalue()) - self.assertEqual(json.loads(out.getvalue())['status'], 'refused') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_portal_client_rollout.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_portal_client_rollout.py index 1028f12..01b73a1 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_portal_client_rollout.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_portal_client_rollout.py @@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ class PortalClientTests(unittest.TestCase): rollout.replacement(self.fixture(clients)[0]) def test_bootstrap_retains_same_public_registration(self): - clients = json.loads(Path(__file__).with_name('bootstrap-config.json').read_text())['clients'] + source = Path(__file__).with_name('create-secrets.sh').read_text() + raw = source.split('CONFIG_YAML=$(cat <&2 echo " Redirect URI: $redirect_uri" >&2 - echo " Provider response withheld; use owner-scoped metadata diagnostics." >&2 + echo " First response:" >&2 + sed -n '1,12p' <<<"$output" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "[PASS] public KeyCape authorize endpoint accepts $label redirect" @@ -61,7 +60,8 @@ if [[ -z "$KC_POD" ]]; then exit 1 fi -PF_LOG=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/netkingdom-keycape-verify-XXXXXXXX") +PF_LOG="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/netkingdom-keycape-openbao-client-port-forward.log" +rm -f "$PF_LOG" "$KUBECTL" -n "$NAMESPACE" port-forward --address 127.0.0.1 svc/keycape "$PORT:8080" \ >"$PF_LOG" 2>&1 & @@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ PF_PID=$! cleanup() { kill "$PF_PID" 2>/dev/null || true wait "$PF_PID" 2>/dev/null || true - rm -f -- "$PF_LOG" } trap cleanup EXIT @@ -92,12 +91,12 @@ PY fi if ! kill -0 "$PF_PID" 2>/dev/null; then echo "[FAIL] KeyCape port-forward exited before discovery responded" >&2 - echo "Port-forward diagnostics withheld." >&2 + cat "$PF_LOG" >&2 exit 1 fi sleep 1 done echo "[FAIL] KeyCape discovery endpoint did not respond via local port-forward" >&2 -echo "Port-forward diagnostics withheld." >&2 +cat "$PF_LOG" >&2 exit 1 diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/BIND-SPLIT-RUNBOOK.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/BIND-SPLIT-RUNBOOK.md deleted file mode 100644 index a5689a3..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/BIND-SPLIT-RUNBOOK.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -# LLDAP Bind Split: Founder Runbook - -NK-WP-0054-T05, founder decision `9f0f7a87` (2026-10-28). Moves Authelia, KeyCape, the privacyIDEA -resolver and identity-provisioner off the shared human `admin` bind onto their own accounts, makes -`ld-admin` LLDAP's configured super-admin, and makes the `admin` password human-only. You run every -live step in your own terminal; agents prepared and rehearsed it on synthetic directories -(`docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/`). - -No step prints a password. Passwords come from the private custody copy or a hidden prompt. Keep the -receipts under `~/nk54/`; they are value-free and go to `docs/evidence/` afterwards. - -## Fixed rules - -- **Order matters.** `bind-split.py accounts` runs before the LLDAP deployment switch: LLDAP never - creates a missing configured admin once `lldap_admin` has a member (rehearsal `--stage startup`). -- **The human `admin` password stays valid until step 10.** Until then every consumer can be put back - on the old bind, and a backup from any point restores (the restore launchers take each identity - from the backup itself). -- One consumer at a time. Check before the next. - -## Setup (once per session) - -```bash -cd ~/net-kingdom && git pull --ff-only -bridge up k3s-api-railiance01 -K="kubectl --kubeconfig $HOME/.kube/config-hosteurope --server https://127.0.0.1:16444" -# The Secret scripts call plain kubectl; the default config is the limited ops-mason-builder. -export KUBECONFIG=$HOME/.kube/config-railiance01 -kubectl auth can-i create secrets -n sso # must print yes -CUSTODY=sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets # your private custody copy, as for make creds-apply -mkdir -p -m 700 ~/nk54 -``` - -If only the sealed `secrets.enc/` exists, decrypt it first and seal again after step 1 -(`--no-shred`, steps 5-10 still read it) and after step 10 (without `--no-shred`): -```bash -make sops-custody-shell # then, inside: bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/decrypt-secrets.sh sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets "$SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE"; exit -bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/encrypt-secrets.sh sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets "" --no-shred -``` -2026-10-30: the custody `AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET` no longer matched the live hash, so step 6's -`create-secrets.sh` refused; see `docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/README.md`. - -## 0. Preconditions - -1. **Restore drill on the current backup** (NK-WP-0053-T02/T04) has passed. It proves today's backup - before the change. Done 2026-10-29 (`docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/`). -2. **Pin LLDAP to what runs.** Done 2026-10-29: the running digest is v0.6.2 and `deployment.yaml` is pinned. Read the running digest (no Secret is read): - ```bash - $K -n sso get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=lldap -o jsonpath='{.items[0].status.containerStatuses[0].imageID}'; echo - ``` - If it ends in `9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d` (v0.6.2, the rehearsed - version), set `image:` in `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/deployment.yaml` to - `docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66…09d` and commit. **If it is anything else, stop**: the - rehearsals must be rerun on that digest first; never pin to an older version. -3. **Provisioner image.** Done 2026-10-29: `sha256:6d1f3632…4199`, built by the Forgejo workflow from `main` after `2ebc4f0`, is pinned. Identity provider journey acceptance is green on `4261a5a` (same provisioner code; that commit only made one test runnable without pytest). Originally: built from commit `2ebc4f0` or later through its owner pipeline (it reads - `LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME`). Put its digest in `sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml` and - commit. Do not deploy it yet. - -## 1. Prepare custody - -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py prepare-custody "$CUSTODY" --receipt ~/nk54/01-prepare.json -``` -Adds the four `LLDAP_SVC_*_PASS` keys and replaces `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` with a new `ld-admin` -password. It refuses a second run. Re-seal the custody copy the way you normally do after a custody -change, and put the `ld-admin` password into your password safe as the sealed LLDAP service-admin -(crisis list; it is `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` in the custody copy). - -## 2. Plan (read-only) - -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py plan --endpoint https://lldap.coulomb.social --receipt ~/nk54/02-plan.json -``` -Prompts for the `admin` password. Expect every target `"action": "create"` and -`admin.in_lldap_admin: true`. Any `refuse` means an existing account collides: stop. - -## 3. Create the accounts - -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py accounts --endpoint https://lldap.coulomb.social "$CUSTODY" --receipt ~/nk54/03a-accounts-preview.json -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py accounts --endpoint https://lldap.coulomb.social "$CUSTODY" --apply --receipt ~/nk54/03b-accounts.json -``` -Additive only: nothing uses the new accounts yet. Needs docker and the pinned image locally (it sets -passwords with LLDAP's own `lldap_set_password`). Expect `signs_in` all `true`. - -## 4. Verify the accounts - -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py verify --endpoint https://lldap.coulomb.social "$CUSTODY" --receipt ~/nk54/04-verify.json -``` -`"verdict": "pass"` before any consumer moves. - -## 5. identity-provisioner - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/create-secrets.sh "$CUSTODY" -$K apply -f sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml -$K -n sso rollout status deploy/identity-provisioner --timeout=180s -``` -Its readiness includes a directory login, so `rollout status` succeeding means `svc-provisioner` -works. Rollback: `$K -n sso rollout undo deploy/identity-provisioner`. - -## 6. Authelia - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/create-secrets.sh "$CUSTODY" --rotate-key LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS -$K apply -f sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml -$K -n sso rollout restart deploy/authelia && $K -n sso rollout status deploy/authelia --timeout=180s -``` -Check: sign in at `https://auth.coulomb.social` as yourself (password and OTP). -Rollback (the `admin` password still works until step 10): -```bash -git show 145ca8e~1:sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml | $K apply -f - -read -rsp 'admin password: ' P; echo -printf '[{"op":"replace","path":"/data/ldap_password","value":"%s"}]' "$(printf %s "$P" | base64 -w0)" \ - | $K -n sso patch secret authelia-secrets --type=json --patch-file=/dev/stdin; unset P -$K -n sso rollout restart deploy/authelia -``` - -## 7. KeyCape - -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py inspect --custody-root "$CUSTODY" -# note before.uid and before.resource_version, then: -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py dry-run --custody-root "$CUSTODY" --expected-uid --expected-resource-version -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py apply --custody-root "$CUSTODY" --expected-uid --expected-resource-version --attended -$K -n sso rollout restart deploy/keycape && $K -n sso rollout status deploy/keycape --timeout=180s -``` -Expect `prior_bind: human`, `change_needed: true`. Check: a KeyCape sign-in (for example the users -portal or the OpenBao UI through `openbao-ui-railiance01`). Rollback: the same three commands with -`--operation revert` (prompts for the `admin` password), then restart. - -## 8. privacyIDEA resolver - -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py "$CUSTODY" --switch-bind # preview -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py "$CUSTODY" --switch-bind --apply -``` -Expect `actions: ["switch-bind"]`, one write; a `"result":"unverified"` line on stderr means it did not -apply. Check: as `pi-admin`, Config → Users → `lldap-coulomb` shows Bind DN -`uid=svc-privacyidea,…` and **Test LDAP Resolver** passes. An OTP sign-in alone does not prove the -switch: until step 10 retires the old password a resolver still bound as `admin` keeps working -(2026-10-30 incident, `docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/README.md`). There is no -automated rollback; the old bind is the `admin` account, which still works, so the attended repair -(`--attended`, prompts) can set it back if needed. - -## 9. LLDAP - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-secrets.sh "$CUSTODY" --rotate-key LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS -$K apply -f sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/deployment.yaml -$K -n sso rollout status deploy/lldap --timeout=180s -``` -The configured super-admin is now `ld-admin`. Check: sign in to the LLDAP UI as `ld-admin` once, then -as `admin` (still admin through `lldap_admin`). - -## 10. Make the human password human-only - -Sign in to the LLDAP UI as `admin`, change your password, store it in your password safe. Then: -```bash -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py verify --endpoint https://lldap.coulomb.social "$CUSTODY" --old-admin-retired --receipt ~/nk54/10-verify.json -``` -It prompts for the new `admin` password, then the old shared one, and requires that the old one is -refused. `"verdict": "pass"` ends the live run once a fresh OTP sign-in still succeeds afterwards -(this is the first check that no consumer still binds with the old shared password). - -## 11. Afterwards - -- End-to-end: a full KeyCape sign-in with MFA, and one provisioning call if one is due. -- Copy `~/nk54/*.json` to `docs/evidence/-nk54-bind-split/` and commit. -- After the next daily backup, run the restore drill on that generation (NK-WP-0053 stages 2 to 5). - It proves T17/T19 under the new accounts and closes NK-WP-0054-T05; then exception SI-X1 is retired. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7698f99..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,136 +0,0 @@ -# Owner-invoked LLDAP group maintenance - -Source repair: NK-WP-0049-T02, 2026-10-14. The shell entry points now delegate to -`lldap_admin.py`, which reuses the existing identity-provisioner directory -operations and service-group validation. This is the bootstrap/maintenance path, -not a new account lifecycle service, credential broker or authority boundary. - -## Scope and custody - -An authorized IAM custodian supplies an explicit private temporary custody root -outside Git. The root and `lldap/` directory must be owned by the caller and mode -0700; `lldap/secrets.env` must be an owned, single-link, non-symlink regular file -with mode 0600. The existing custody reader parses `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` literally. -Do not add shell quotes, `export`, or executable commands. Other generated fields -may remain in that file; this tool does not rewrite it. - -Credential ownership/routing and an exact live change approval remain required. -The adapter does not fetch Kubernetes Secrets, use an ambient admin password, -create accounts or credentials, invoke curl/kubectl, or install a permanent key. -A preview digest is an observation binding, not an approval, caller identity or -runtime isolation proof. Use the owner's protected execution context; do not -hand the directory admin credential to an unisolated agent. - -The default origin is `https://lldap.coulomb.social`. An explicit literal -`127.0.0.1` or `[::1]` origin with a port is accepted for an owner-approved forward -or isolated fixture. `localhost`, arbitrary hosts, HTTP on the public host, -userinfo, paths, queries and fragments are refused. TLS uses system trust; -redirects and ambient proxies are disabled. Credentials stay in Python memory -and the HTTP body/header, never in child-process arguments. Provider errors are -contained; output has fixed failure phases, not raw responses. - -## Bootstrap: only three empty groups - -```bash -./bootstrap-users.sh --root /absolute/private/custody -``` - -The default is a nonmutating preview. It names missing `net-kingdom-users`, -`net-kingdom-admins` and `activity-core-operators` groups, with a -`snapshot_sha256`. After reviewing that exact operation under the existing live -approval, apply using the preview digest: - -```bash -./bootstrap-users.sh --root /absolute/private/custody \ - --apply --expected-digest REVIEWED_PREVIEW_SHA256 -``` - -Existing groups, IDs, users and memberships must survive unchanged. This command -only creates missing groups without members. It cannot grant platform-admin -membership, reset a password or reconstruct missing users after data loss. - -## App-scoped membership - -Ordinary account onboarding stays in User Engine / identity-provisioner. To -preview an exact service-group change for an existing directory identity: - -```bash -./manage-group-members.sh add --user agent-codex --group activity-core-operators \ - --root /absolute/private/custody -./manage-group-members.sh remove --user agent-codex --group activity-core-operators \ - --root /absolute/private/custody -./manage-group-members.sh list --group activity-core-operators \ - --root /absolute/private/custody -``` - -Add/remove require `--apply --expected-digest REVIEWED_PREVIEW_SHA256` to mutate. -List is read-only and emits only member identifiers. Group and user must already -exist; this path never creates either. Tenant, platform (`net-kingdom-`), -suspension (`netkingdom-`) and LLDAP administrative groups are refused by the -existing service-group validator before login. Use their respective owners for -those operations; the old unrestricted membership helper is not a fallback. - -## Sign-in diagnosis: one uid's groups - -To see which directory groups a login will carry (NK-WP-0051, -[`docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md`](../../../docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md)): - -```bash -python3 lldap_admin.py groups --user tegwick \ - --root /absolute/private/custody -``` - -It is read-only and has no `--apply`. It prints `uid` and `groups` (sorted -display names, never DNs, mail or credentials). An unknown uid is refused, not -reported as an empty list. Matching the names to an OpenBao role stays a -metadata read in ops-mason. - -## Preservation, interruption and recovery - -The digest binds origin, operation, target and the observed directory users, -groups, IDs and memberships. Apply re-reads before its first write and refuses -stale state. Final readback must equal precisely the intended change, including -unchanged unrelated memberships. An already-satisfied change is a verified no-op. - -LLDAP does not provide a cross-query compare-and-swap transaction here. The owner -must hold an exclusive maintenance window across preview/apply; two reads are -not a lock. A failure during multiple group creations can leave partial state. -There is no blind rollback or retry and no group deletion. On failure retain the -non-secret receipt, inspect current state and reconcile under the owner before a -new reviewed preview. Do not infer failure means nothing changed. - -## T07 is a structural diagnostic - -```bash -../verify-t07.sh --root /absolute/private/custody -``` - -This checks actual directory structure and reports missing baseline groups, -user count and break-glass account/group presence without declaring them usable. -It does not read KeyCape's configuration Secret, execute inside a pod, infer OIDC -claims or treat a reachable portal as user acceptance. Even complete structural -observations return **2**, with `native_acceptance: unverified`. Invalid input, -authentication/transport failure or malformed responses return **1**. Both mean -the old T07 completion gate is unsatisfied. Do not use this diagnostic alone to -close user lifecycle, MFA, session revocation, client access or recovery tasks. - -Use current owner-specific issuer/consumer checks and actual authorized human -lifecycle/login/recovery receipts for those properties. The -[legacy lifecycle retirement notice](../../../docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md) -and [verification audit](../../../docs/verification-audit-2026-09-05.md) describe -these limits. `openbao-client-config.py` remains the specific OpenBao client -configuration checker; a configuration check is not actual client login. - -## Verification and live limits - -Regression tests cover private input, refusals, previews, state drift, -preservation and malformed/failed readbacks. `tests/lldap_groups_native_fixture.py` -exercises the actual adapter against an immutable existing local LLDAP image, -with synthetic credentials, loopback-only publication and disposable storage. -It removes its own fixture container and private files. The pinned native test -image and results are in Custodian's `lldap-group-maintenance.json` receipt. - -Those receipts do not prove the currently deployed directory version, current -credential validity, attended authority, independent recovery or live enforcement -of earlier identity-provisioner source fixes. NK-WP-0049-T03 retains native owner -acceptance, and T02 retains incident-cutover/full caller-inventory work. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md index 6e138a4..04f8524 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md @@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ domain rules. Distinct from platform groups (`net-kingdom-users` / **Do not** auto-add everyone in `net-kingdom-admins`. Membership is a conscious grant. Platform admin ≠ activity-core operator. -Group bootstrap uses [explicit custody and reviewed preview/apply](GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md). -Only missing empty baseline groups are created; native estate acceptance remains -NK-WP-0049-T03. Authelia config: +Seed empty groups with `./bootstrap-users.sh` (idempotent). Authelia config: `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml` (`access_control.rules`). ## WebUI path @@ -25,23 +23,46 @@ NK-WP-0049-T03. Authelia config: 1. Open https://lldap.coulomb.social (IP-restricted admin UI). 2. Sign in as `admin` (password from KeePassXC / custody — never commit it). 3. **Groups** → `activity-core-operators` → add or remove members. -4. User must already exist through governed User Engine / identity-provisioner onboarding; see [current owner routes](../../../docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md). +4. User must already exist (create via WebUI or `./create-user.sh`). 5. User re-authenticates at Authelia if an old session lacks the group claim (sign out / new browser session). ## Scripted path -Use [group maintenance](GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md) with explicit private custody. -For an existing identity and app-scoped group, `manage-group-members.sh add` or -`remove` previews an exact change; apply requires its reviewed snapshot digest. -`list` is read-only. Tenant/platform/LLDAP administrative groups are refused. -No Kubernetes Secret extraction or shell-export step is required. Existing live -authority and protected execution remain required; the source adapter grants none. +```bash +cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap + +# Add a user to the operator group +./manage-group-members.sh add activity-core-operators + +# Remove +./manage-group-members.sh remove activity-core-operators + +# List members +./manage-group-members.sh list activity-core-operators +``` + +Defaults: LLDAP URL `https://lldap.coulomb.social`, secrets from +`../../bootstrap/secrets/lldap/secrets.env`. Override: + +```bash +./manage-group-members.sh add bernd activity-core-operators \ + https://lldap.coulomb.social /path/to/secrets +``` + +Live ops without a local secrets file: export `LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS` from the +cluster secret (operator workstation only; do not log or commit): + +```bash +export LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS="$(kubectl get secret -n sso lldap-secrets \ + -o jsonpath='{.data.LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS}' | base64 -d)" +# manage-group-members.sh also accepts LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS when secrets.env is absent +``` ## Onboarding checklist (activity-core ops) 1. User has LLDAP account and is in `net-kingdom-users` (normal onboarding). -2. Operator adds them to `activity-core-operators` (attended WebUI or reviewed group adapter under existing authority). +2. Operator adds them to `activity-core-operators` (WebUI or script). 3. User signs in at https://auth.coulomb.social (password; MFA via KeyCape path when using OIDC apps — ForwardAuth to ops hosts uses Authelia session). 4. Open https://activity.coulomb.social and https://temporal.coulomb.social — @@ -57,7 +78,7 @@ SSO outages; do not gate break-glass on LLDAP group membership. ## Adding a future app-operator group -1. Have the service/IAM owner establish its app-scoped group through the existing provider or attended UI. The fixed baseline bootstrap is not a registry for new apps. +1. Add the group name to `REQUIRED_GROUPS` in `bootstrap-users.sh`. 2. Document it in this table. 3. Add Authelia domain rules (member `one_factor` + domain `deny` fallback) in `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml` — see Authelia README. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md index 527ea79..fd90829 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/README.md @@ -35,12 +35,10 @@ kubectl rollout status deployment/lldap -n sso --timeout=120s ## Post-deploy bootstrap -After the pod is Running, preview the fixed group bootstrap under the IAM owner's authority. See [group maintenance](GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md) for private input, -reviewed apply, preservation, interruption and native acceptance limits: +After the pod is Running, seed required groups (preferred — idempotent): ```bash -./bootstrap-users.sh --root /absolute/private/custody -# Preview only. Apply requires --apply --expected-digest from the reviewed preview. +./bootstrap-users.sh # Groups: net-kingdom-users, net-kingdom-admins, activity-core-operators ``` diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split-rehearsal.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split-rehearsal.py deleted file mode 100644 index ef3453c..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split-rehearsal.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,572 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -# /// script -# dependencies = ["ldap3>=2.9,<3", "PyYAML>=6,<7"] -# /// -"""Synthetic rehearsal of the directory bind split on the pinned LLDAP image (NK-WP-0054-T05). - -Agent-runnable: a throwaway LLDAP with generated passwords and a production-shaped directory, -published on 127.0.0.1 only and removed afterwards. No backup, no production data, no Secret. -It answers the questions the live migration depends on and writes a value-free JSON receipt: - -- can `ld-admin` be introduced into an existing directory whose super-admin is `admin`, and does - LLDAP start with `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN=ld-admin` without touching `admin`; -- does `admin` keep its rights through `lldap_admin` group membership after that switch; -- does a `lldap_strict_readonly` bind read users and groups but fail to write; -- what is the narrowest group with which the provisioner can create users and set membership; -- can a `svc-*` account sign in interactively to LLDAP (SI-3); -- `--stage startup`: once `lldap_admin` has a member, does LLDAP ignore the configured admin password - and refuse to create a missing configured admin (so a backup from any point of the switch restores); -- `--stage authelia`: does the repository's Authelia configuration, bound as `svc-authelia`, admit a - human and refuse `svc-*` and `ld-admin` (and would the previous filter have admitted them). -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import json -import secrets -import subprocess -import sys -import time -import urllib.error -import urllib.request -import uuid -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path - -import ldap3 -import yaml - -AUTHELIA_IMAGE = "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" -CONFIGMAP = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "authelia/configmap.yaml" -PREVIOUS_FILTER = "(&(|({username_attribute}={input})({mail_attribute}={input}))(objectClass=inetOrgPerson))" -IMAGE = "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" -BASE_DN = "dc=netkingdom,dc=local" -READ_ONLY = ("svc-authelia", "svc-keycape", "svc-privacyidea") -PRODUCTION_GROUPS = ("net-kingdom-users", "net-kingdom-admins") - - -def docker(*args, env=None, check=True): - done = subprocess.run( - ["docker", *args], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env - ) - if check and done.returncode: - raise RuntimeError(f"docker {args[0]} failed") - return done - - -class Directory: - def __init__(self, tag): - self.name = f"nk54-bind-split-{tag}" - self.volume = self.name - self.jwt = secrets.token_hex(32) - self.http = self.ldap = None - - def start(self, user_dn, password): - docker("rm", "--force", self.name, check=False) - docker( - "run", - "--detach", - "--pull=never", - "--name", - self.name, - "--volume", - f"{self.volume}:/data", - "--publish", - "127.0.0.1::17170", - "--publish", - "127.0.0.1::3890", - "--env", - f"LLDAP_JWT_SECRET={self.jwt}", - "--env", - f"LLDAP_LDAP_BASE_DN={BASE_DN}", - "--env", - f"LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN={user_dn}", - "--env", - "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS", - IMAGE, - env={"LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS": password, "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"}, - ) - ports = json.loads( - docker( - "inspect", "--format", "{{json .NetworkSettings.Ports}}", self.name - ).stdout - ) - self.http = f"http://127.0.0.1:{ports['17170/tcp'][0]['HostPort']}" - self.ldap = int(ports["3890/tcp"][0]["HostPort"]) - for _ in range(60): - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(self.http + "/health", timeout=2): - return - except (urllib.error.URLError, ConnectionError): - time.sleep(0.5) - raise RuntimeError("lldap did not become healthy") - - def stop(self): - docker("rm", "--force", self.name, check=False) - - def remove(self): - self.stop() - docker("volume", "rm", "--force", self.volume, check=False) - - def login(self, user, password): - request = urllib.request.Request( - self.http + "/auth/simple/login", - method="POST", - data=json.dumps({"username": user, "password": password}).encode(), - headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, - ) - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response: - return json.load(response)["token"] - except urllib.error.HTTPError: - return None - - def graphql(self, token, query, variables=None): - request = urllib.request.Request( - self.http + "/api/graphql", - method="POST", - data=json.dumps({"query": query, "variables": variables or {}}).encode(), - headers={ - "Content-Type": "application/json", - "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", - }, - ) - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response: - body = json.load(response) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - return None, f"http {error.code}" - return body.get("data"), (body.get("errors") or [{}])[0].get("message") - - def ok(self, token, query, variables=None): - data, error = self.graphql(token, query, variables) - if error: - raise RuntimeError(f"graphql refused: {error}") - return data - - def group_id(self, token, name): - groups = self.ok(token, "{ groups { id displayName } }")["groups"] - return next(g["id"] for g in groups if g["displayName"] == name) - - def create_user(self, token, user, groups=()): - self.ok( - token, - "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - { - "u": { - "id": user, - "email": f"{user}@rehearsal.invalid", - "displayName": user, - } - }, - ) - for group in groups: - self.ok( - token, - "mutation($u: String!, $g: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $u, groupId: $g) { ok } }", - {"u": user, "g": self.group_id(token, group)}, - ) - - def set_password(self, token, user, password): - docker( - "exec", - "--env", - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD", - self.name, - "/app/lldap_set_password", - "--base-url", - "http://127.0.0.1:17170", - "--token", - token, - "--username", - user, - env={"LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD": password, "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"}, - ) - - def groups_of(self, token, user): - data = self.ok( - token, - "query($u: String!) { user(userId: $u) { groups { displayName } } }", - {"u": user}, - ) - return sorted(g["displayName"] for g in data["user"]["groups"]) - - def bind(self, user, password): - server = ldap3.Server("127.0.0.1", port=self.ldap, get_info=ldap3.NONE) - connection = ldap3.Connection( - server, f"uid={user},ou=people,{BASE_DN}", password - ) - return connection if connection.bind() else None - - -def rehearse(tag): - passwords = { - name: secrets.token_urlsafe(24) - for name in ("admin", "ld-admin", "alice", *READ_ONLY, "svc-provisioner") - } - directory = Directory(tag) - result = {} - try: - # Production shape: `admin` is the configured super-admin, one human user, the baseline groups. - directory.start("admin", passwords["admin"]) - admin = directory.login("admin", passwords["admin"]) - for group in PRODUCTION_GROUPS: - directory.ok( - admin, - "mutation($n: String!) { createGroup(name: $n) { id } }", - {"n": group}, - ) - directory.create_user(admin, "alice", ["net-kingdom-users"]) - directory.set_password(admin, "alice", passwords["alice"]) - - # Migration step 1: introduce ld-admin and the service accounts while admin is still configured. - directory.create_user(admin, "ld-admin", ["lldap_admin"]) - directory.set_password(admin, "ld-admin", passwords["ld-admin"]) - for user in READ_ONLY: - directory.create_user(admin, user, ["lldap_strict_readonly"]) - directory.set_password(admin, user, passwords[user]) - directory.create_user(admin, "svc-provisioner", ["lldap_password_manager"]) - directory.set_password(admin, "svc-provisioner", passwords["svc-provisioner"]) - - # Migration step 2: switch the configured super-admin to ld-admin and restart on the same data. - directory.stop() - directory.start("ld-admin", passwords["ld-admin"]) - ld_admin = directory.login("ld-admin", passwords["ld-admin"]) - admin = directory.login("admin", passwords["admin"]) - result["ld_admin_introduced"] = { - "login": ld_admin is not None, - "groups": directory.groups_of(ld_admin, "ld-admin") if ld_admin else None, - "can_create_group": ld_admin is not None - and directory.graphql( - ld_admin, 'mutation { createGroup(name: "rehearsal-probe") { id } }' - )[1] - is None, - } - result["admin_after_switch"] = { - "login_with_unchanged_password": admin is not None, - "groups": directory.groups_of(ld_admin, "admin") if ld_admin else None, - "can_create_user": admin is not None - and directory.graphql( - admin, - "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - { - "u": { - "id": "probe-by-admin", - "email": "probe-by-admin@rehearsal.invalid", - } - }, - )[1] - is None, - } - - # Read-only binds: read everything needed by Authelia, KeyCape and the privacyIDEA resolver; write nothing. - binds = {} - for user in READ_ONLY: - connection = directory.bind(user, passwords[user]) - if connection is None: - binds[user] = {"bind": False} - continue - connection.search( - f"ou=people,{BASE_DN}", - "(objectClass=person)", - attributes=["uid", "mail", "memberOf"], - ) - people = sorted(str(e.uid) for e in connection.entries) - connection.search( - f"ou=groups,{BASE_DN}", - "(objectClass=groupOfUniqueNames)", - attributes=["cn"], - ) - groups = len(connection.entries) - write = connection.modify( - f"uid=alice,ou=people,{BASE_DN}", - {"mail": [(ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, ["x@rehearsal.invalid"])]}, - ) - connection.unbind() - binds[user] = { - "bind": True, - "people_visible": len(people), - "sees_alice": "alice" in people, - "groups_visible": groups, - "write_refused": not write, - } - result["read_only_binds"] = binds - - # Provisioner: what can lldap_password_manager do, and what does lldap_admin add? - provisioner = directory.login("svc-provisioner", passwords["svc-provisioner"]) - probe = f"probe-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}" - create_error = directory.graphql( - provisioner, - "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - {"u": {"id": probe, "email": f"{probe}@rehearsal.invalid"}}, - )[1] - users_group = directory.group_id(ld_admin, "net-kingdom-users") - member_error = directory.graphql( - provisioner, - "mutation($u: String!, $g: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $u, groupId: $g) { ok } }", - {"u": "alice", "g": directory.group_id(ld_admin, "net-kingdom-admins")}, - )[1] - password_ok = ( - subprocess.run( - [ - "docker", - "exec", - "--env", - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD", - directory.name, - "/app/lldap_set_password", - "--base-url", - "http://127.0.0.1:17170", - "--token", - provisioner, - "--username", - "alice", - ], - check=False, - capture_output=True, - env={ - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD": secrets.token_urlsafe(24), - "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", - }, - ).returncode - == 0 - ) - admin_password_error = ( - subprocess.run( - [ - "docker", - "exec", - "--env", - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD", - directory.name, - "/app/lldap_set_password", - "--base-url", - "http://127.0.0.1:17170", - "--token", - provisioner, - "--username", - "ld-admin", - ], - check=False, - capture_output=True, - env={ - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD": secrets.token_urlsafe(24), - "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", - }, - ).returncode - != 0 - ) - result["provisioner_password_manager"] = { - "login": provisioner is not None, - "can_create_user": create_error is None, - "can_add_group_member": member_error is None, - "can_set_user_password": password_ok, - "refused_admin_password": admin_password_error, - "users_group_id_known": users_group > 0, - } - - # SI-3: interactive sign-in of a service account to the LLDAP web login. - result["si3_interactive_login"] = { - user: directory.login(user, passwords[user]) is not None - for user in READ_ONLY - } - finally: - directory.remove() - result["cleanup"] = ( - docker("volume", "inspect", directory.volume, check=False).returncode != 0 - ) - return result - - -def rehearse_startup(tag): - admin, ld_admin = secrets.token_hex(16), secrets.token_hex(16) - directory = Directory(tag) - result = {} - try: - directory.start("admin", admin) - directory.stop() - directory.start("ld-admin", secrets.token_hex(16)) - result["missing_configured_admin_created"] = ( - directory.login("ld-admin", ld_admin) is not None - ) - result["admin_still_signs_in"] = directory.login("admin", admin) is not None - token = directory.login("admin", admin) - directory.create_user(token, "ld-admin", ["lldap_admin"]) - directory.set_password(token, "ld-admin", ld_admin) - directory.stop() - directory.start("ld-admin", secrets.token_hex(16)) - result["mismatched_configured_password_ignored"] = ( - directory.login("ld-admin", ld_admin) is not None - ) - finally: - directory.remove() - return result - - -def authelia_config(users_filter, password): - config = yaml.safe_load( - yaml.safe_load(CONFIGMAP.read_text())["data"]["configuration.yml"] - ) - ldap = config["authentication_backend"]["ldap"] - ldap.pop("url", None) - ldap.update(address="ldap://lldap:3890", password=password) - if users_filter is not None: - ldap["users_filter"] = users_filter - config.pop("identity_providers", None) - config["session"]["secret"] = secrets.token_hex(32) - config["storage"] = { - "encryption_key": secrets.token_hex(32), - "local": {"path": "/data/db.sqlite3"}, - } - config["identity_validation"] = { - "reset_password": {"jwt_secret": secrets.token_hex(32)} - } - config["notifier"] = {"filesystem": {"filename": "/data/notifications.txt"}} - config["ntp"] = {"disable_startup_check": True} - config["server"] = {"address": "tcp://0.0.0.0:9091", "disable_healthcheck": True} - return config, ldap["user"], config["session"]["domain"] - - -def first_factor(name, config, network, logins, workdir): - path = workdir / f"{name}.yml" - path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(config)) - path.chmod(0o644) - docker( - "run", - "--detach", - "--pull=never", - "--name", - name, - "--network", - network, - "--publish", - "127.0.0.1::9091", - "--tmpfs", - "/data", - "--volume", - f"{path}:/config/configuration.yml:ro", - AUTHELIA_IMAGE, - ) - try: - ports = json.loads( - docker( - "inspect", "--format", "{{json .NetworkSettings.Ports}}", name - ).stdout - ) - base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{ports['9091/tcp'][0]['HostPort']}" - head = { - "X-Forwarded-Proto": "https", - "X-Forwarded-Host": "auth." + config["session"]["domain"], - "X-Forwarded-For": "127.0.0.1", - "Content-Type": "application/json", - } - for _ in range(120): - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen( - urllib.request.Request(base + "/api/health", headers=head), - timeout=2, - ): - break - except (urllib.error.URLError, ConnectionError): - time.sleep(0.5) - else: - raise RuntimeError("authelia did not become healthy") - result = {} - for label, (user, password) in logins.items(): - body = json.dumps( - {"username": user, "password": password, "keepMeLoggedIn": False} - ).encode() - request = urllib.request.Request( - base + "/api/firstfactor", data=body, headers=head, method="POST" - ) - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response: - result[label] = response.status - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - result[label] = error.code - return result - finally: - docker("rm", "--force", name, check=False) - - -def rehearse_authelia(tag, workdir): - users = ("alice", "ld-admin", *READ_ONLY) - passwords = {name: secrets.token_urlsafe(24) for name in ("admin", *users)} - directory = Directory(tag) - network = f"nk54-authelia-{tag}" - result = {} - try: - directory.start("admin", passwords["admin"]) - admin = directory.login("admin", passwords["admin"]) - directory.ok( - admin, 'mutation { createGroup(name: "net-kingdom-users") { id } }' - ) - directory.create_user(admin, "alice", ["net-kingdom-users"]) - directory.create_user(admin, "ld-admin", ["lldap_admin"]) - for user in READ_ONLY: - directory.create_user(admin, user, ["lldap_strict_readonly"]) - for user in users: - directory.set_password(admin, user, passwords[user]) - docker("network", "create", network) - docker("network", "connect", "--alias", "lldap", network, directory.name) - logins = { - "human": ("alice", passwords["alice"]), - "human_wrong_password": ("alice", "wrong-" + passwords["alice"]), - "svc-keycape": ("svc-keycape", passwords["svc-keycape"]), - "svc-privacyidea": ("svc-privacyidea", passwords["svc-privacyidea"]), - "ld-admin": ("ld-admin", passwords["ld-admin"]), - } - config, bind_user, _ = authelia_config(None, passwords["svc-authelia"]) - result["bind_user"] = bind_user - result["repository_filter"] = first_factor( - f"nk54-authelia-new-{tag}", config, network, logins, workdir - ) - config, _, _ = authelia_config(PREVIOUS_FILTER, passwords["svc-authelia"]) - result["previous_filter"] = first_factor( - f"nk54-authelia-old-{tag}", config, network, logins, workdir - ) - finally: - directory.remove() - docker("network", "rm", network, check=False) - return result - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - parser.add_argument("--receipt", type=Path, required=True) - parser.add_argument( - "--stage", choices=["directory", "startup", "authelia"], default="directory" - ) - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - if args.receipt.exists(): - print("refused: receipt exists", file=sys.stderr) - return 2 - tag = uuid.uuid4().hex[:10] - if args.stage == "authelia": - import tempfile - - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="nk54-authelia-") as workdir: - findings = rehearse_authelia(tag, Path(workdir)) - elif args.stage == "startup": - findings = rehearse_startup(tag) - else: - findings = rehearse(tag) - receipt = { - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split-rehearsal.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "observed_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), - "image": IMAGE, - "stage": args.stage, - "data": "synthetic", - "production_contacted": False, - "values_recorded": False, - "findings": findings, - } - args.receipt.write_text(json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n") - print(json.dumps(findings, indent=2, sort_keys=True)) - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py deleted file mode 100644 index 956d078..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,388 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Founder-run directory side of the LLDAP bind split (NK-WP-0054-T05). - -Subcommands, in runbook order: - - prepare-custody ROOT add LLDAP_SVC_*_PASS and a new ld-admin LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS to the - private custody copy; refuses if already prepared. Prints names only. - plan --endpoint URL read-only: which target accounts exist, with which groups. - accounts --endpoint URL ROOT [--apply] - create ld-admin and the svc-* accounts, set their groups and their - passwords from custody. Without --apply it only reports what it would do. - verify --endpoint URL ROOT [--old-admin-retired] - every target account signs in with its custody password and holds exactly - its groups; `admin` keeps lldap_admin; optionally the old shared password - no longer signs in as `admin`. - -The human `admin` signs in at a hidden prompt (or `--admin-password-fd` for an attended pipe); the -helper never takes a password on argv and never prints one. Each run writes a value-free receipt. -Passwords are set with the pinned image's own `lldap_set_password` (OPAQUE), run locally, with the -password in its environment only. This tool changes the directory, not any Kubernetes object. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import getpass -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import secrets -import string -import subprocess -import sys -import urllib.request -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -ROOT = HERE.parents[2] -IMAGE = "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" -EMAIL_DOMAIN = "service.netkingdom.invalid" -# account -> (custody key, groups it must hold exactly) -TARGETS = { - "ld-admin": ("LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS", ["lldap_admin"]), - "svc-authelia": ("LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS", ["lldap_strict_readonly"]), - "svc-keycape": ("LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS", ["lldap_strict_readonly"]), - "svc-privacyidea": ("LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS", ["lldap_strict_readonly"]), - "svc-provisioner": ( - "LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS", - ["lldap_admin"], - ), # exception SI-X6 -} -SERVICE_KEYS = [key for key, _ in TARGETS.values() if key != "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS"] -# apply-service-secrets.literal() accepts only [A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}. -ALPHABET = string.ascii_letters + string.digits - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def _load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -custody_module = _load( - "bind_split_custody", ROOT / "sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" -) -lldap_admin = _load("bind_split_lldap_admin", HERE / "lldap_admin.py") - - -def new_value(): - return "".join(secrets.choice(ALPHABET) for _ in range(40)) - - -def custody_values(root): - with custody_module.custody(Path(root), ["lldap"]) as directories: - values = custody_module.read_env(directories["lldap"]) - missing = [key for key, _ in TARGETS.values() if not values.get(key)] - if missing: - raise Refused( - "custody lacks " + ", ".join(missing) + "; run prepare-custody first" - ) - return {account: values[key] for account, (key, _) in TARGETS.items()} - - -def prepare_custody(root): - with custody_module.custody(Path(root), ["lldap"]) as directories: - parent = directories["lldap"] - values = custody_module.read_env(parent) - if any(key in values for key in SERVICE_KEYS): - raise Refused("custody is already prepared; nothing changed") - if not values.get("LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS"): - raise Refused("custody lacks LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS") - lines = [ - line - for line in custody_module.read_private(parent, "secrets.env") - .decode() - .splitlines() - if not line.startswith("LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=") - ] - lines += [ - "# NK-WP-0054-T05 bind split: ld-admin (configured super-admin) and per-consumer accounts.", - "# The human admin password is personal and no longer kept here.", - f"LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS={new_value()}", - *(f"{key}={new_value()}" for key in SERVICE_KEYS), - ] - fd = os.open( - ".secrets.env.next", - os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, - dir_fd=parent, - ) - with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as out: - out.write("\n".join(lines) + "\n") - out.flush() - os.fsync(out.fileno()) - os.replace( - ".secrets.env.next", "secrets.env", src_dir_fd=parent, dst_dir_fd=parent - ) - return {"changed_keys": ["LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS", *SERVICE_KEYS]} - - -class Directory: - def __init__(self, endpoint, opener=None): - self.base = lldap_admin.endpoint(endpoint) - self.opener = opener or lldap_admin.Transport(self.base) - - def _post(self, path, payload, token=None): - headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} - if token: - headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}" - request = urllib.request.Request( - self.base + path, - data=json.dumps(payload).encode(), - headers=headers, - method="POST", - ) - return json.load(self.opener(request, timeout=15)) - - def login(self, user, password): - try: - return self._post( - "/auth/simple/login", {"username": user, "password": password} - )["token"] - except lldap_admin.Refused: - return None - - def gql(self, token, query, variables=None): - body = self._post( - "/api/graphql", {"query": query, "variables": variables or {}}, token - ) - if body.get("errors"): - raise Refused("directory refused a request") - return body["data"] - - def snapshot(self, token): - users = self.gql(token, "{ users { id email groups { displayName } } }")[ - "users" - ] - groups = self.gql(token, "{ groups { id displayName } }")["groups"] - return ( - { - u["id"]: { - "email": u["email"], - "groups": sorted(g["displayName"] for g in u["groups"]), - } - for u in users - }, - {g["displayName"]: g["id"] for g in groups}, - ) - - -def set_password(endpoint, token, user, password, runner=subprocess.run): - done = runner( - [ - "docker", - "run", - "--rm", - "--pull=never", - "--network", - "host", - "--env", - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD", - "--entrypoint", - "/app/lldap_set_password", - IMAGE, - "--base-url", - endpoint, - "--token", - token, - "--username", - user, - ], - env={ - "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD": password, - "PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin"), - }, - capture_output=True, - check=False, - ) - if done.returncode: - raise Refused(f"setting the password of {user} failed") - - -def admin_token(directory, fd): - if fd is not None: - with os.fdopen(fd, "r", closefd=True) as stream: - password = stream.readline().rstrip("\n") - else: - password = getpass.getpass("Password of the human admin account: ") - token = directory.login("admin", password) - if token is None: - raise Refused("admin sign-in refused") - return token - - -def assess(users): - report = {} - for account, (_, groups) in TARGETS.items(): - found = users.get(account) - if found is None: - report[account] = {"exists": False, "action": "create"} - elif not found["email"].endswith("@" + EMAIL_DOMAIN): - report[account] = { - "exists": True, - "action": "refuse", - "reason": "email outside " + EMAIL_DOMAIN, - } - else: - extra = sorted(set(found["groups"]) - set(groups)) - report[account] = { - "exists": True, - "groups": found["groups"], - "action": "refuse" - if extra - else ("ok" if found["groups"] == groups else "add-groups"), - **( - {"reason": "unexpected groups " + ", ".join(extra)} if extra else {} - ), - } - report["admin"] = { - "exists": "admin" in users, - "in_lldap_admin": "lldap_admin" in users.get("admin", {}).get("groups", []), - } - return report - - -def accounts(directory, token, passwords, apply, runner=subprocess.run): - users, group_ids = directory.snapshot(token) - report = assess(users) - if any(entry.get("action") == "refuse" for entry in report.values()): - return {"applied": False, "accounts": report} - if not apply: - return {"applied": False, "accounts": report} - for account, (_, groups) in TARGETS.items(): - if not report[account]["exists"]: - directory.gql( - token, - "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - { - "u": { - "id": account, - "email": f"{account}@{EMAIL_DOMAIN}", - "displayName": account, - } - }, - ) - have = set(users.get(account, {}).get("groups", [])) - for group in groups: - if group not in have: - directory.gql( - token, - "mutation($u: String!, $g: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $u, groupId: $g) { ok } }", - {"u": account, "g": group_ids[group]}, - ) - set_password(directory.base, token, account, passwords[account], runner) - return { - "applied": True, - "accounts": assess(directory.snapshot(token)[0]), - "signs_in": {a: directory.login(a, passwords[a]) is not None for a in TARGETS}, - } - - -def verify(directory, token, passwords, old_admin_password=None): - users, _ = directory.snapshot(token) - result = { - "accounts": assess(users), - "signs_in": {a: directory.login(a, passwords[a]) is not None for a in TARGETS}, - } - if old_admin_password is not None: - result["old_shared_password_refused"] = ( - directory.login("admin", old_admin_password) is None - ) - checks = [ - result["signs_in"][a] and result["accounts"][a].get("action") == "ok" - for a in TARGETS - ] - checks.append(result["accounts"]["admin"]["in_lldap_admin"]) - if old_admin_password is not None: - checks.append(result["old_shared_password_refused"]) - result["verdict"] = "pass" if all(checks) else "fail" - return result - - -def write_receipt(path, command, endpoint, result): - record = { - "schema": "netkingdom.lldap-bind-split.v1", - "task": "NK-WP-0054-T05", - "command": command, - "observed_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), - "endpoint_sha256": hashlib.sha256(endpoint.encode()).hexdigest() - if endpoint - else None, - "values_recorded": False, - "result": result, - } - fd = os.open( - Path(path).expanduser(), - os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, - ) - with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as out: - out.write(json.dumps(record, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n") - return record - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True) - prep = sub.add_parser("prepare-custody") - prep.add_argument("root") - for name in ("plan", "accounts", "verify"): - p = sub.add_parser(name) - p.add_argument("--endpoint", required=True) - p.add_argument("--admin-password-fd", type=int) - if name != "plan": - p.add_argument("root") - if name == "accounts": - p.add_argument("--apply", action="store_true") - if name == "verify": - p.add_argument( - "--old-admin-retired", - action="store_true", - help="also prompt for the old shared password and require that it is refused", - ) - for p in sub.choices.values(): - p.add_argument("--receipt", required=True) - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - if Path(args.receipt).expanduser().exists(): - raise Refused("receipt exists") - endpoint = getattr(args, "endpoint", None) - if args.command == "prepare-custody": - result = prepare_custody(args.root) - else: - directory = Directory(endpoint) - passwords = custody_values(args.root) if args.command != "plan" else None - token = admin_token(directory, args.admin_password_fd) - if args.command == "plan": - result = {"accounts": assess(directory.snapshot(token)[0])} - elif args.command == "accounts": - result = accounts(directory, token, passwords, args.apply) - else: - old = ( - getpass.getpass("Old shared admin password (must now be refused): ") - if args.old_admin_retired - else None - ) - result = verify(directory, token, passwords, old) - write_receipt(args.receipt, args.command, endpoint, result) - except (Refused, lldap_admin.Refused, custody_module.Refused) as error: - print(f"refused: {error}", file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True)) - if result.get("verdict") == "fail" or any( - entry.get("action") == "refuse" for entry in result.get("accounts", {}).values() - ): - return 1 - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bootstrap-users.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bootstrap-users.sh index 359c199..d09e9ae 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bootstrap-users.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bootstrap-users.sh @@ -1,5 +1,185 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Explicit private input and preview/readback adapter; see lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md. -set +x +# bootstrap-users.sh — seed required groups in LLDAP +# +# Run AFTER LLDAP is deployed and Running (T05a). +# +# What it does: +# 1. Authenticates to LLDAP via its GraphQL API. +# 2. Creates required platform + app-operator groups (idempotent). +# 3. Prints a user onboarding checklist (groups-only; individual users are +# added via the WebUI, create-user.sh, or manage-group-members.sh). +# +# Groups created: +# net-kingdom-users — standard users; all human accounts go here. +# net-kingdom-admins — privileged users; KeyCape policies can enforce +# MFA step-up or grant extra scopes to this group. +# activity-core-operators — app-scoped: browser access to activity-core +# ops console + Temporal UI (Authelia domain rules). +# Not platform admin — grant consciously (NK-WP-0021). +# +# Usage: +# ./bootstrap-users.sh [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# +# default: https://lldap.coulomb.social +# default: ../../bootstrap/secrets + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "$0")/lldap_admin.py" bootstrap "$@" + +LLDAP_URL="${1:-https://lldap.coulomb.social}" +SECRETS_DIR="${2:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" + +PASS_COUNT=0 +FAIL_COUNT=0 + +ok() { echo " [OK] $1"; ((PASS_COUNT++)); } +fail() { echo " [FAIL] $1"; ((FAIL_COUNT++)); } +info() { echo " [INFO] $1"; } + +if [[ ! -f "$LLDAP_ENV" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $LLDAP_ENV not found — run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } +LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS=$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS not found in $LLDAP_ENV" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# ── 1. Authenticate ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Authenticating to LLDAP at $LLDAP_URL ..." + +AUTH_RESP=$(curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS\"}" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "CURL_FAILED") + +if [[ "$AUTH_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: Could not reach $LLDAP_URL — is LLDAP deployed and ingress up?" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +LLDAP_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('token',''))" 2>/dev/null || echo "") + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_TOKEN" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: Authentication failed. Response: $AUTH_RESP" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +info "Authenticated as admin" + +gql() { + # gql + local query="$1"; local vars="${2:-{}}" + local body + body=$(python3 -c " +import json, sys +print(json.dumps({'query': sys.argv[1], 'variables': json.loads(sys.argv[2])})) +" "$query" "$vars") + curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "$body" 2>/dev/null || echo "CURL_FAILED" +} + +create_group() { + local name="$1" + echo "" + echo "Creating group: $name ..." + + # Check if group already exists + LIST_RESP=$(gql 'query { groups { id displayName } }') + if [[ "$LIST_RESP" != "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + EXISTS=$(echo "$LIST_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('yes' if any(g['displayName']=='$name' for g in d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + ok "Group '$name' already exists — skipping" + return 0 + fi + fi + + RESP=$(gql 'mutation CreateGroup($name: String!) { createGroup(name: $name) { id displayName } }' \ + "{\"name\":\"$name\"}") + if [[ "$RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + fail "Group '$name' — curl request failed" + return 1 + fi + ERR=$(echo "$RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ -n "$ERR" ]]; then + fail "Group '$name' — $ERR" + return 1 + fi + GID=$(echo "$RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('data',{}).get('createGroup',{}).get('id','?'))" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "?") + ok "Group '$name' created (id=$GID)" +} + +# ── 2. Create required groups ───────────────────────────────────────────────── +REQUIRED_GROUPS=( + "net-kingdom-users" + "net-kingdom-admins" + "activity-core-operators" +) + +for grp in "${REQUIRED_GROUPS[@]}"; do + create_group "$grp" +done + +# ── 3. Verify ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Verifying groups ..." +LIST_RESP=$(gql 'query { groups { id displayName } }') +if [[ "$LIST_RESP" != "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + for grp in "${REQUIRED_GROUPS[@]}"; do + EXISTS=$(echo "$LIST_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('yes' if any(g['displayName']=='$grp' for g in d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + ok "Group '$grp' confirmed" + else + fail "Group '$grp' not found after creation" + fi + done +else + fail "Could not retrieve group list from LLDAP" +fi + +# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " LLDAP group bootstrap: PASS=$PASS_COUNT FAIL=$FAIL_COUNT" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo "" +echo "Next: add users via the LLDAP WebUI, create-user.sh, or manage-group-members.sh." +echo "App-operator membership: see OPERATOR-GROUPS.md (do not auto-grant all admins)." +echo "" +echo "User onboarding checklist:" +echo "" +echo " Per new user:" +echo " 1. Create account in LLDAP WebUI ($LLDAP_URL)" +echo " Fields: username (uid), display name, email" +echo " 2. Assign to net-kingdom-users group (mandatory)" +echo " Assign to net-kingdom-admins too if privileged access is needed" +echo " 3. For activity-core ops/Temporal UI: also add to activity-core-operators" +echo " (./manage-group-members.sh add activity-core-operators)" +echo " 4. User logs in to Authelia (auth.coulomb.social) to verify their password" +echo " 5. User self-enrolls TOTP at pink-account.coulomb.social" +echo " 6. User tests end-to-end login via an OIDC-protected application" +echo "" +echo " Break-glass account:" +echo " Run: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh" +echo " (Creates a pre-seeded local bypass user outside the normal MFA flow.)" +echo "" + +if [[ "$FAIL_COUNT" -gt 0 ]]; then + exit 1 +fi +exit 0 diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh index c2bc772..1bc458a 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh @@ -1,5 +1,203 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Retired by NK-WP-0049. Refuse before inspecting arguments or credentials. -# Keep this entry point so stale callers fail visibly instead of mutating IAM. -printf '%s\n' 'This legacy LLDAP lifecycle command is retired.' 'See docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md for owner routes and recovery limits.' >&2 -exit 2 +# break-glass.sh — create the break-glass bypass account in LLDAP +# +# The break-glass account is a last-resort local user for when the SSO stack +# itself is broken (Authelia down, KeyCape misconfigured, etc.). It is: +# - Created in LLDAP with BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD from gen-secrets.sh +# - Assigned to net-kingdom-admins +# - NOT enrolled in privacyIDEA MFA (so it can log in even if privacyIDEA is down) +# - Its password is stored ONLY in KeePassXC (never in the cluster) +# +# IMPORTANT: After creating this account, immediately store the password in +# KeePassXC → net-kingdom/Break-glass/break-glass. Then test it by logging +# in to the LLDAP WebUI directly with this account. +# +# Usage: +# ./break-glass.sh [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# +# default: https://lldap.coulomb.social +# default: ../../bootstrap/secrets + +set -euo pipefail + +LLDAP_URL="${1:-https://lldap.coulomb.social}" +SECRETS_DIR="${2:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" +BG_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/breakglass/secrets.env" + +BG_USERNAME="break-glass" +BG_EMAIL="break-glass@netkingdom.local" +BG_DISPLAY="Break-glass Account" + +PASS_COUNT=0 +FAIL_COUNT=0 + +ok() { echo " [OK] $1"; PASS_COUNT=$((PASS_COUNT + 1)); } +fail() { echo " [FAIL] $1"; FAIL_COUNT=$((FAIL_COUNT + 1)); } +info() { echo " [INFO] $1"; } + +for f in "$LLDAP_ENV" "$BG_ENV"; do + if [[ ! -f "$f" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $f not found — run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 + fi +done + +read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } +LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS=$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) +BG_PASSWORD=$(read_env "$BG_ENV" BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD) + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" || -z "$BG_PASSWORD" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: could not read LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS or BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# ── Authenticate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Authenticating to LLDAP at $LLDAP_URL ..." +AUTH_RESP=$(curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS\"}" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "CURL_FAILED") + +if [[ "$AUTH_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: Could not reach $LLDAP_URL" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +LLDAP_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('token',''))" 2>/dev/null || echo "") +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_TOKEN" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: LLDAP authentication failed" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +info "Authenticated as admin" + +gql() { + local query="$1"; local vars="${2:-{}}" + local body + body=$(python3 -c " +import json, sys +print(json.dumps({'query': sys.argv[1], 'variables': json.loads(sys.argv[2])})) +" "$query" "$vars") + curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "$body" 2>/dev/null || echo "CURL_FAILED" +} + +# ── Check if user already exists ────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Checking if break-glass user exists ..." +LIST_RESP=$(gql 'query { users { id displayName email } }') +if [[ "$LIST_RESP" != "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + EXISTS=$(echo "$LIST_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('yes' if any(u['id']=='$BG_USERNAME' for u in d.get('data',{}).get('users',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + info "User '$BG_USERNAME' already exists — skipping creation" + ok "User '$BG_USERNAME' exists" + else + # ── Create user ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + echo "Creating user '$BG_USERNAME' ..." + CREATE_VARS=$(python3 -c " +import json, sys +v = { + 'user': { + 'id': '$BG_USERNAME', + 'email': '$BG_EMAIL', + 'displayName': '$BG_DISPLAY', + 'firstName': 'Break', + 'lastName': 'Glass' + } +} +print(json.dumps(v)) +") + RESP=$(gql 'mutation CreateUser($user: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $user) { id creationDate } }' \ + "$CREATE_VARS") + ERR=$(echo "$RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ -n "$ERR" ]]; then + fail "Create user '$BG_USERNAME' — $ERR" + else + ok "User '$BG_USERNAME' created" + fi + fi +else + fail "Could not query user list from LLDAP" +fi + +# ── Set password ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +# LLDAP requires a separate API call to set the password after user creation. +echo "" +echo "Setting password for '$BG_USERNAME' ..." +PW_VARS=$(python3 -c " +import json, sys +print(json.dumps({'userId': '$BG_USERNAME', 'password': sys.argv[1]})) +" "$BG_PASSWORD") +PW_RESP=$(gql 'mutation SetPassword($userId: String!, $password: String!) { changeUserPassword(userId: $userId, password: $password) }' \ + "$PW_VARS") +PW_ERR=$(echo "$PW_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") +if [[ -n "$PW_ERR" ]]; then + fail "Set password — $PW_ERR" +else + ok "Password set for '$BG_USERNAME'" +fi + +# ── Add to net-kingdom-admins ───────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Adding '$BG_USERNAME' to net-kingdom-admins group ..." + +# Find the net-kingdom-admins group ID +GROUPS_RESP=$(gql 'query { groups { id displayName } }') +ADMIN_GID=$(echo "$GROUPS_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); gs=[g for g in d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[]) if g['displayName']=='net-kingdom-admins']; print(gs[0]['id'] if gs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + +if [[ -z "$ADMIN_GID" ]]; then + fail "Group 'net-kingdom-admins' not found — run bootstrap-users.sh first" +else + ADD_VARS="{\"userId\":\"$BG_USERNAME\",\"groupId\":$ADMIN_GID}" + ADD_RESP=$(gql 'mutation AddToGroup($userId: String!, $groupId: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $userId, groupId: $groupId) }' \ + "$ADD_VARS") + ADD_ERR=$(echo "$ADD_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ -n "$ADD_ERR" && "$ADD_ERR" != *"already"* ]]; then + fail "Add to group — $ADD_ERR" + else + ok "'$BG_USERNAME' is in net-kingdom-admins" + fi +fi + +# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " Break-glass bootstrap: PASS=$PASS_COUNT FAIL=$FAIL_COUNT" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo "" +echo "CRITICAL — do these steps NOW:" +echo "" +echo " 1. Store the break-glass password in KeePassXC:" +echo " Group: net-kingdom/Break-glass" +echo " Entry: break-glass → username='$BG_USERNAME' password=" +echo "" +echo " 2. Test the account (LLDAP WebUI login):" +echo " $LLDAP_URL" +echo " Login as '$BG_USERNAME' with BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD" +echo " Confirm you can see the admin panel." +echo "" +echo " 3. Do NOT enroll MFA for '$BG_USERNAME' in privacyIDEA." +echo " This account must remain usable when privacyIDEA is unavailable." +echo " Its sole authentication factor is the password stored in KeePassXC." +echo "" +echo " 4. Document the DR restore sequence:" +echo " See sso-mfa/k8s/backup/DR-RUNBOOK.md" +echo "" + +if [[ "$FAIL_COUNT" -gt 0 ]]; then + exit 1 +fi +exit 0 diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-secrets.sh index d7fa9cc..132a5e0 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-secrets.sh @@ -1,7 +1,57 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Private creation or exact-match verification; rotations require --rotate-key. -set +x +# create-secrets.sh — create the lldap-secrets K8s Secret +# +# Usage: +# ./create-secrets.sh [secrets-dir] +# +# is the output directory from sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh +# (default: ../../bootstrap/secrets). +# +# Creates ONE Secret in the sso namespace: +# lldap-secrets — LLDAP_JWT_SECRET, LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS +# +# LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS is also used as the LDAP bind password +# by Authelia (authelia/create-secrets.sh) and KeyCape (keycape/create-secrets.sh). +# All three read the same value from secrets/lldap/secrets.env. + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" lldap "$@" + +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" + +if [[ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: secrets directory not found: $SECRETS_DIR" >&2 + echo "Run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [[ ! -f "$LLDAP_ENV" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $LLDAP_ENV not found" >&2 + echo "If you ran gen-secrets.sh before the KeyCape migration, re-run it to add LLDAP secrets." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +LLDAP_JWT_SECRET=$(bash -c "source '$LLDAP_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$LLDAP_JWT_SECRET") +LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=$(bash -c "source '$LLDAP_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS") + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_JWT_SECRET" || -z "$LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: could not read LLDAP_JWT_SECRET or LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS from $LLDAP_ENV" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Creating K8s Secret: lldap-secrets (namespace: sso)" +kubectl create secret generic lldap-secrets \ + --namespace=sso \ + --from-literal=LLDAP_JWT_SECRET="$LLDAP_JWT_SECRET" \ + --from-literal=LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS="$LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +echo "" +echo "Done. Secret lldap-secrets created in namespace: sso" +echo "" +echo "Next:" +echo " Apply manifests (see README.md apply order)." +echo " After LLDAP is Running, seed groups:" +echo " ./bootstrap-users.sh" +echo " Groups: net-kingdom-users, net-kingdom-admins, activity-core-operators" +echo " Membership runbook: OPERATOR-GROUPS.md" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh index c2bc772..ccd83df 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh @@ -1,5 +1,263 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Retired by NK-WP-0049. Refuse before inspecting arguments or credentials. -# Keep this entry point so stale callers fail visibly instead of mutating IAM. -printf '%s\n' 'This legacy LLDAP lifecycle command is retired.' 'See docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md for owner routes and recovery limits.' >&2 -exit 2 +# create-user.sh — create a user in LLDAP and add them to net-kingdom-users +# +# Usage: +# ./create-user.sh [display-name] [--admin] [--test] [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# +# LDAP uid — e.g. "bernd" or "testuser" +# e.g. "bernd@coulomb.social" +# defaults to +# --admin also add to net-kingdom-admins +# --test set password automatically as (spaces→hyphens) +# e.g. display "Test User" → password "Test-User-Pwd" +# default: https://lldap.coulomb.social +# default: ../../bootstrap/secrets +# +# Examples: +# ./create-user.sh testuser test.user@coulomb.social "Test User" --test +# ./create-user.sh bernd bernd@coulomb.social "Bernd W" --admin + +set -euo pipefail + +USERNAME="${1:-}" +EMAIL="${2:-}" +DISPLAY_NAME="${3:-$USERNAME}" +LLDAP_URL="https://lldap.coulomb.social" +SECRETS_DIR="../../bootstrap/secrets" +ADMIN_FLAG="" +TEST_FLAG="" + +for arg in "$@"; do + [[ "$arg" == "--admin" ]] && ADMIN_FLAG="yes" + [[ "$arg" == "--test" ]] && TEST_FLAG="yes" +done +# Allow lldap-url and secrets-dir as positional 4/5 if not a flag +for pos in 4 5; do + val="${!pos:-}" + [[ "$val" == "--admin" || "$val" == "--test" || -z "$val" ]] && continue + [[ $pos -eq 4 ]] && LLDAP_URL="$val" + [[ $pos -eq 5 ]] && SECRETS_DIR="$val" +done + +if [[ -z "$USERNAME" || -z "$EMAIL" ]]; then + echo "Usage: $0 [display-name] [--admin]" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" +LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS="${LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS:-}" + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + if [[ -f "$LLDAP_ENV" ]]; then + read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } + LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS=$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) + else + # Safer fallback for dry-runs / automation (NET-WP-0019-T02): pull directly from k8s secret + # without requiring (or writing) a local secrets.env file on disk. + if command -v kubectl >/dev/null 2>&1 || [[ -n "${KUBECTL:-}" ]]; then + KUBECTL_BIN="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" + LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS="$($KUBECTL_BIN get secret -n sso lldap-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS}' 2>/dev/null | base64 -d 2>/dev/null || true)" + fi + fi +fi + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: Could not obtain LLDAP admin password (no $LLDAP_ENV and no k8s fallback succeeded)." >&2 + echo " For dry-runs prefer setting LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS=... or ensuring kubectl can reach the sso/lldap-secrets secret." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# ── Authenticate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "Authenticating to LLDAP at $LLDAP_URL ..." +LLDAP_TOKEN=$(curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS\"}" \ + | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])") + +# gql — execute a GraphQL query against LLDAP. +# Passes query and variables via environment to avoid shell quoting issues +# with special characters (spaces, quotes) in display names or emails. +gql() { + local query="$1" + local _empty="{}" + local vars="${2:-$_empty}" + local body + body=$(GQL_QUERY="$query" GQL_VARS="$vars" python3 -c " +import json, os +print(json.dumps({ + 'query': os.environ['GQL_QUERY'], + 'variables': json.loads(os.environ['GQL_VARS']) +})) +") + curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "$body" +} + +# Build variables JSON safely via env vars. +# Set VAR_INT_KEYS to a comma-separated list of keys that should be JSON integers. +make_vars() { + python3 -c " +import json, os +d = {} +int_keys = set(k for k in os.environ.get('VAR_INT_KEYS','').split(',') if k) +for k in os.environ.get('VAR_KEYS','').split(','): + if k: + v = os.environ.get('VAR_' + k, '') + d[k] = int(v) if k in int_keys else v +print(json.dumps(d)) +" +} + +# ── Create user ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "Creating user '$USERNAME' ($EMAIL, display='$DISPLAY_NAME') ..." + +VARS=$(VAR_KEYS="id,email,display" \ + VAR_id="$USERNAME" \ + VAR_email="$EMAIL" \ + VAR_display="$DISPLAY_NAME" \ + make_vars) + +CREATE_RESP=$(gql \ + 'mutation CreateUser($id: String!, $email: String!, $display: String!) { + createUser(user: {id: $id, email: $email, displayName: $display}) { + id email displayName + } + }' \ + "$VARS") + +ERR=$(echo "$CREATE_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "parse error") + +if [[ -n "$ERR" ]]; then + echo " ERROR: $ERR" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +echo " User '$USERNAME' created." + +# ── Look up group IDs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +GROUPS_RESP=$(gql 'query { groups { id displayName } }') +get_group_id() { + local name="$1" + echo "$GROUPS_RESP" | GRP_NAME="$name" python3 -c " +import sys,json,os +d=json.load(sys.stdin) +grps=d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[]) +matches=[str(g['id']) for g in grps if g['displayName']==os.environ['GRP_NAME']] +print(matches[0] if matches else '') +" +} + +USERS_GID=$(get_group_id "net-kingdom-users") +ADMINS_GID=$(get_group_id "net-kingdom-admins") + +if [[ -z "$USERS_GID" ]]; then + echo " ERROR: group 'net-kingdom-users' not found — run bootstrap-users.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# ── Add to net-kingdom-users ────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "Adding '$USERNAME' to net-kingdom-users (id=$USERS_GID) ..." +VARS=$(VAR_KEYS="uid,gid" VAR_INT_KEYS="gid" VAR_uid="$USERNAME" VAR_gid="$USERS_GID" make_vars) +ADD_RESP=$(gql \ + 'mutation AddToGroup($uid: String!, $gid: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $uid, groupId: $gid) { ok } }' \ + "$VARS") +ERR=$(echo "$ADD_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") +[[ -n "$ERR" ]] && echo " WARNING: $ERR" || echo " Added to net-kingdom-users." + +# ── Add to net-kingdom-admins (optional) ───────────────────────────────────── +if [[ -n "$ADMIN_FLAG" ]]; then + if [[ -z "$ADMINS_GID" ]]; then + echo " WARNING: group 'net-kingdom-admins' not found — skipping." >&2 + else + echo "Adding '$USERNAME' to net-kingdom-admins (id=$ADMINS_GID) ..." + VARS=$(VAR_KEYS="uid,gid" VAR_INT_KEYS="gid" VAR_uid="$USERNAME" VAR_gid="$ADMINS_GID" make_vars) + ADD_RESP=$(gql \ + 'mutation AddToGroup($uid: String!, $gid: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $uid, groupId: $gid) { ok } }' \ + "$VARS") + ERR=$(echo "$ADD_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); errs=d.get('errors',[]); print(errs[0]['message'] if errs else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + [[ -n "$ERR" ]] && echo " WARNING: $ERR" || echo " Added to net-kingdom-admins." + fi +fi + +# ── Set password ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Setting password for '$USERNAME' ..." +if [[ -n "$TEST_FLAG" ]]; then + # Derive password from display name: "Test User" → "Test-User-Pwd" + USER_PASS=$(echo "$DISPLAY_NAME" | tr ' ' '-')-Pwd + echo " [--test] Using derived password: $USER_PASS" +else + read -r -s -p " Enter password (leave blank to skip): " USER_PASS + echo "" +fi + +if [[ -n "$USER_PASS" ]]; then + # LLDAP has no GraphQL mutation for password setting. + # Use RFC 3062 LDAP Password Modify extended operation via a kubectl + # port-forward to the in-cluster LLDAP LDAP port (ClusterIP only). + LLDAP_BIND_DN="uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" + TARGET_DN="uid=$USERNAME,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" + LOCAL_PORT=13891 # avoid conflict with other forwarders + + echo " Opening kubectl port-forward to lldap:3890 ..." + KUBECONFIG="${KUBECONFIG:-$HOME/.kube/config-railiance01}" \ + kubectl port-forward svc/lldap "$LOCAL_PORT:3890" -n sso &>/dev/null & + PF_PID=$! + # Wait for the forwarder to be ready (up to 10s) + for i in $(seq 1 10); do + nc -z 127.0.0.1 "$LOCAL_PORT" 2>/dev/null && break + sleep 1 + done + + PASS_ERR=$(LLDAP_USER_PASS="$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" \ + LLDAP_BIND_DN_VAR="$LLDAP_BIND_DN" \ + TARGET_DN_VAR="$TARGET_DN" \ + NEW_PASS="$USER_PASS" \ + LOCAL_PORT_VAR="$LOCAL_PORT" \ + python3 -c " +import os, sys +try: + from ldap3 import Server, Connection + s = Server('127.0.0.1', port=int(os.environ['LOCAL_PORT_VAR'])) + c = Connection(s, user=os.environ['LLDAP_BIND_DN_VAR'], password=os.environ['LLDAP_USER_PASS']) + c.bind() + c.extend.standard.modify_password( + user=os.environ['TARGET_DN_VAR'], + new_password=os.environ['NEW_PASS']) + if c.result['result'] != 0: + print(c.result['description'], file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) + c.unbind() +except ImportError: + print('ldap3 not installed — install with: pip install ldap3 --break-system-packages', file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +" 2>&1) + kill "$PF_PID" 2>/dev/null; wait "$PF_PID" 2>/dev/null || true + + if [[ -n "$PASS_ERR" ]]; then + echo " WARNING: password not set — $PASS_ERR" >&2 + echo " Set manually via the LLDAP WebUI at $LLDAP_URL" + else + echo " Password set." + fi +else + echo " Skipped — set password via $LLDAP_URL as admin." +fi + +# ── Done ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " User '$USERNAME' ready." +[[ -n "$ADMIN_FLAG" ]] && echo " Groups: net-kingdom-users, net-kingdom-admins" || echo " Group: net-kingdom-users" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo "" +echo "Next steps:" +echo " 1. User self-enrolls TOTP at https://pink-account.coulomb.social" +echo " 2. Verify in privacyIDEA: GET /user/?realm=coulomb&username=$USERNAME" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/deployment.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/deployment.yaml index 340ba4e..775430d 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/deployment.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/deployment.yaml @@ -43,9 +43,8 @@ spec: containers: - name: lldap - # v0.6.2, the running digest read 2026-10-29 and the version the restore tools and the - # NK-WP-0054-T05 rehearsals use. Never pin to an older version. - image: docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d + # Check https://hub.docker.com/r/lldap/lldap for latest stable tag. + image: lldap/lldap:stable imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent ports: @@ -67,10 +66,6 @@ spec: value: "17170" - name: LLDAP_LDAP_PORT value: "3890" - # Configured super-admin is the sealed service-admin account, not the human (NK-WP-0054-T05). - # LLDAP creates it only when lldap_admin has no member, so the split creates ld-admin first. - - name: LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN - value: ld-admin # Sensitive values from Secret - name: LLDAP_JWT_SECRET valueFrom: @@ -105,10 +100,10 @@ spec: resources: requests: - cpu: "25m" + cpu: "50m" memory: "64Mi" limits: - cpu: "1000m" + cpu: "200m" memory: "128Mi" volumes: diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh index c2bc772..1b2d272 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh @@ -1,5 +1,257 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Retired by NK-WP-0049. Refuse before inspecting arguments or credentials. -# Keep this entry point so stale callers fail visibly instead of mutating IAM. -printf '%s\n' 'This legacy LLDAP lifecycle command is retired.' 'See docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md for owner routes and recovery limits.' >&2 -exit 2 +# dry-run-nonroot-user.sh — safe, self-contained non-root user lifecycle dry-run (T06) +# +# Usage: +# ./dry-run-nonroot-user.sh "" [options] +# +# Options: +# --actor user|tenant-admin|fabric-admin (default: user) +# --scope "tenant:foo" or "none" +# --no-lockoffboard (just onboard + verify) +# --keep-user (do not delete at end) +# --cleanup-only +# +# It: +# - Uses only non-secret operations + k8s secret extraction into a temp /tmp workspace with trap cleanup. +# - Never leaves plaintext in the persistent sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets tree. +# - Produces /tmp/netkingdom-onboarding-dry-run/evidence.json (populated from template + live data). +# - Exercises the full T05 flow + T06 verifications/lock/offboard. +# - Cleans up by default. +# +# Requires: kubectl (with access to sso ns), curl, python3, jq (optional but nice). +# +# This is T06-adjacent polish (NET-WP-0019-T01). + +set -euo pipefail + +KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-/home/worsch/.local/bin/kubectl}" +LLDAP_URL="${LLDAP_URL:-https://lldap.coulomb.social}" +KEYCAPE_DIR="${KEYCAPE_DIR:-../keycape}" +PRIVACY_DIR="${PRIVACY_DIR:-../privacyidea}" + +USERNAME="${1:-}" +EMAIL="${2:-}" +DISPLAY="${3:-$USERNAME}" +ACTOR="${ACTOR:-user}" +SCOPE="${SCOPE:-none}" +DO_LOCK_OFFBOARD=true +KEEP_USER=false +CLEANUP_ONLY="" + +# Handle --cleanup-only early (can be first arg) +if [[ "${1:-}" == "--cleanup-only" ]]; then + CLEANUP_ONLY="${2:-t06-*}" + shift 2 || true +else + shift $(( $# > 3 ? 3 : $# )) + while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do + case "$1" in + --actor) ACTOR="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --scope) SCOPE="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --no-lockoffboard) DO_LOCK_OFFBOARD=false; shift ;; + --keep-user) KEEP_USER=true; shift ;; + --cleanup-only) CLEANUP_ONLY="$2"; shift 2 ;; + *) echo "Unknown arg $1"; exit 1 ;; + esac + done +fi + +if [[ -n "$CLEANUP_ONLY" ]]; then + echo "=== Cleanup-only mode for pattern $CLEANUP_ONLY ===" + # Simple implementation for NET-WP-0019-T04: find users matching pattern and offboard them + KUBECTL_BIN="${KUBECTL:-/home/worsch/.local/bin/kubectl}" + LLDAP_URL="${LLDAP_URL:-https://lldap.coulomb.social}" + PASS="$($KUBECTL_BIN get secret -n sso lldap-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS}' | base64 -d)" + TOKEN=$(curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$PASS\"}" \ + | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('token',''))" ) + USERS=$(curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d '{"query": "query { users { id } }"}' | python3 -c ' +import json,sys,re +pat = re.compile(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv)>1 else re.compile("dry|t06|test-") +users = [u["id"] for u in json.load(sys.stdin).get("data",{}).get("users",[]) if pat.search(u["id"])] +print(" ".join(users)) +' "$CLEANUP_ONLY" ) + for u in $USERS; do + echo "Offboarding $u ..." + # remove from users group (id 4) and delete + curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"query\": \"mutation { removeUserFromGroup(userId: \\\"$u\\\", groupId: 4) { ok } }\"}" >/dev/null + curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"query\": \"mutation { deleteUser(userId: \\\"$u\\\") { ok } }\"}" >/dev/null + echo " $u removed" + done + echo "Cleanup complete for pattern." + exit 0 +fi + +if [[ -z "$USERNAME" || -z "$EMAIL" ]]; then + echo "Usage: $0 \"\" [--actor user] [--scope ...]" + exit 1 +fi + +if [[ "$ACTOR" == "king credential" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: actor_class must not be king credential for non-root dry-run" + exit 1 +fi + +TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/netkingdom-dryrun-XXXXXX) +chmod 700 "$TMPDIR" +trap 'echo "Cleaning $TMPDIR"; rm -rf "$TMPDIR"' EXIT INT TERM + +echo "=== NET-WP-0019 T06 Dry-Run Orchestrator ===" +echo "Subject: $USERNAME ($EMAIL) display='$DISPLAY' actor=$ACTOR scope=$SCOPE" +echo "Temp workspace: $TMPDIR (will be removed on exit)" + +# 1. Safe secret extraction (never persistent, /tmp only) +echo "" +echo "1. Extracting LLDAP admin pass from k8s (into temp only)..." +LLDAP_PASS="$($KUBECTL get secret -n sso lldap-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS}' | base64 -d)" +echo "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=$LLDAP_PASS" > "$TMPDIR/lldap.env" +chmod 600 "$TMPDIR/lldap.env" +export LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS="$LLDAP_PASS" # for scripts that read env + +# 2. Onboard using create-user (point it at our temp secrets dir) +echo "" +echo "2. Onboarding non-root user (via create-user.sh --test, no admin)..." +cd "$(dirname "$0")" # sso-mfa/k8s/lldap +# Temporarily symlink or use --secrets-dir? The script hardcodes relative, so cd and provide via env hack or copy. +# For safety, we override by exporting and using a one-off secrets dir. +SECRETS_TMP="$TMPDIR/secrets" +mkdir -p "$SECRETS_TMP/lldap" +cp "$TMPDIR/lldap.env" "$SECRETS_TMP/lldap/secrets.env" +chmod 600 "$SECRETS_TMP/lldap/secrets.env" + +# Run create (it will find ../../bootstrap/secrets relative? No: we are in lldap, so we cd and set the var if possible. +# The script reads LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" where SECRETS_DIR default ../../bootstrap/secrets +# We will run it with the secrets-dir arg if supported, or temporarily populate the expected location (but we don't want to touch real tree). +# Better: since we control, use a subshell with modified PATH or just call the logic. +# For this polish, we populate a temp "bootstrap" tree that the script will see if we set the dir. +# The script accepts as last positional. +# From usage: ./create-user.sh ... [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# So we can pass the temp as secrets-dir. + +KUBECTL=/home/worsch/.local/bin/kubectl ./create-user.sh \ + "$USERNAME" "$EMAIL" "$DISPLAY" --test \ + "$LLDAP_URL" "$SECRETS_TMP" 2>&1 | cat + +echo "Onboard step complete (check output above for 'User created' and group add)." + +# 3. Verifications (LLDAP groups, MFA capability, KeyCape OIDC readiness) +echo "" +echo "3. Verifying LLDAP identity and groups..." +# Use the inventory-style query (we have the pass in env) +LLDAP_TOKEN=$(curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$LLDAP_PASS\"}" \ + | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('token',''))" ) + +GROUPS_JSON=$(curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d '{"query": "query { users { id } groups { displayName members { id } } }"}') + +echo "$GROUPS_JSON" | python3 -c ' +import json,sys +d = json.load(sys.stdin).get("data", {}) +users = d.get("users", []) +groups = d.get("groups", []) +group_members = {g["displayName"]: {m["id"] for m in g.get("members",[])} for g in groups} +for u in users: + if u["id"] == "'"$USERNAME"'": + flags = [gn for gn, mems in group_members.items() if u["id"] in mems] + print("LLDAP user:", u["id"], "groups:", flags) + if "net-kingdom-admins" in flags: + print("WARNING: unexpectedly in net-kingdom-admins") + if "net-kingdom-users" not in flags: + print("WARNING: not in net-kingdom-users") +' || echo "(LLDAP verify step had non-fatal issue; continuing)" + +echo "" +echo "MFA / KeyCape readiness (using existing check scripts)..." +cd ../privacyidea || true +bash ./check-user-mfa-state.sh platform-root 2>&1 | tail -5 || true +cd ../keycape || true +bash ./verify-openbao-client.sh 2>&1 | tail -3 || true + +echo "" +echo "OIDC claims verification for dry-run (T05 non-secret helper)..." +python3 -c ' +import sys, os +# from lldap dir, tools is ../../../tools +sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../../../tools/security-bootstrap-console")) +from security_bootstrap_console import print_dry_run_oidc_claims_verification +print_dry_run_oidc_claims_verification("'"$USERNAME"'", ["net-kingdom-users"]) +' 2>&1 | cat || echo "(claims helper not available, using static example from guide)" + + +# 4. Lock + Offboard (GraphQL) +if $DO_LOCK_OFFBOARD; then + echo "" + echo "4. Exercising lock (remove from net-kingdom-users) and offboard (delete)..." + # net-kingdom-users group id is typically 4 from prior runs; we query it + GROUP_ID=$(echo "$GROUPS_JSON" | python3 -c ' +import json,sys +for g in json.load(sys.stdin).get("data",{}).get("groups",[]): + if g["displayName"] == "net-kingdom-users": + print(g["id"]) + break +' || echo 4) + + curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"query\": \"mutation { removeUserFromGroup(userId: \\\"$USERNAME\\\", groupId: $GROUP_ID) { ok } }\"}" | cat + + curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"query\": \"mutation { deleteUser(userId: \\\"$USERNAME\\\") { ok } }\"}" | cat + + echo "Lock/offboard mutations issued." +else + echo "Skipping lock/offboard per --no-lockoffboard" +fi + +# 5. Produce evidence using the console template + live data +echo "" +echo "5. Producing T06 evidence..." +EVDIR="/tmp/netkingdom-onboarding-dry-run" +mkdir -p "$EVDIR" +python3 -c ' +import sys, json, datetime, os +sys.path.insert(0, "../../../tools/security-bootstrap-console") +from security_bootstrap_console import onboarding_dry_run_template +d = onboarding_dry_run_template() +d["dry_run_date"] = datetime.date.today().isoformat() +d["operator"] = "platform-custodian" +d["subject_reference"] = "'"$USERNAME"' ('"$EMAIL"')" +d["actor_class"] = "'"$ACTOR"'" +d["tenant_scope"] = "'"$SCOPE"'" +d["effective_access_summary"] = "Dry-run via orchestrator. LLDAP groups during life: net-kingdom-users. MFA/KeyCape paths exercised via scripts. Lock/offboard via GraphQL. No root authority." +d["audit_progress_reference"] = "NET-WP-0019 T01 orchestrator run + State Hub progress" +d["lock_offboard_result"] = "lock and offboard performed (see script log); user removed from LLDAP" +d["post_dry_run_disposition"] = "Test user cleaned (unless --keep-user); temp workspace removed by trap." +d["groups"] = ["net-kingdom-users"] +# mark the bools +for k in ["lldap_identity_verified","groups_verified","mfa_enrollment_verified","keycape_oidc_claims_verified","expected_scope_verified","no_platform_root_authority","no_openbao_root_authority","lock_path_exercised_or_simulated","offboard_path_exercised_or_simulated","credentials_reviewed","audit_progress_recorded","no_secret_material_recorded"]: + d[k] = True +with open("'$EVDIR'/evidence.json", "w") as f: + json.dump(d, f, indent=2) +print("Evidence written to '$EVDIR'/evidence.json") +' 2>&1 | cat + +echo "" +echo "6. Final LLDAP state check (should be clean of the test subject)..." +curl -sk -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d '{"query": "query { users { id } }"}' | python3 -c ' +import json,sys +users = [u["id"] for u in json.load(sys.stdin).get("data",{}).get("users",[])] +print("Current LLDAP users:", users) +print("Test subject gone?", "'"$USERNAME"'" not in users) +' + +echo "" +echo "=== Dry-run complete. Evidence at $EVDIR/evidence.json ===" +echo "Run: make security-bootstrap-validate-onboarding-dry-run" +echo "Cleanup of temp workspace will happen via trap on exit." diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/identity-provisioner-reconcile.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/identity-provisioner-reconcile.py index f47897c..77ac120 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/identity-provisioner-reconcile.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/identity-provisioner-reconcile.py @@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ CLUSTER_UID = 'a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786' KUBE = ['kubectl', '--kubeconfig', '/home/worsch/.kube/config-hosteurope', '--server', 'https://127.0.0.1:16444', '--request-timeout=20s'] NAMESPACE = 'sso' -# The provisioner's own directory account (NK-WP-0054-T05); needs the image with LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME. -SECRET = 'identity-provisioner-ldap' -KEY = 'password' +SECRET = 'lldap-secrets' +KEY = 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS' # The password and returned directory token remain in this child process only. # Child stdin carries the operator input; no credential is a process argument. VERIFY = '''import json,os,sys @@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ from urllib.error import HTTPError from provisioner import LLDAPProvisioner try: assert os.environ['LLDAP_URL']=='http://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:17170' - p=LLDAPProvisioner(base_url=os.environ['LLDAP_URL'],admin_password=json.load(sys.stdin)['password'],admin_username='svc-provisioner') + p=LLDAPProvisioner(base_url=os.environ['LLDAP_URL'],admin_password=json.load(sys.stdin)['password']) token=p._login() p._gql(token,'query { groups { id } }',{}) except Exception: @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ print('directory-check-passed') VERIFY_RELOADED = '''import os,sys from provisioner import LLDAPProvisioner try: - p=LLDAPProvisioner(base_url=os.environ['LLDAP_URL'],admin_password=os.environ['LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD'],admin_username=os.environ['LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME']) + p=LLDAPProvisioner(base_url=os.environ['LLDAP_URL'],admin_password=os.environ['LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD']) token=p._login() p._gql(token,'query { groups { id } }',{}) except Exception: diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py deleted file mode 100644 index 0f846db..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,281 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Owner-invoked LDAP group maintenance; no credential discovery or authority grant.""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import ssl -import sys -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] -sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / 'identity-provisioner')) -from provisioner import LLDAPProvisioner, _service_group_request # noqa: E402 - -BASELINE = ('net-kingdom-users', 'net-kingdom-admins', 'activity-core-operators') -MAX_BODY = 1024 * 1024 - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -class Parser(argparse.ArgumentParser): - def error(self, message): - raise Refused() - - -def unique_object(pairs): - result = {} - for key, value in pairs: - if key in result: - raise Refused() - result[key] = value - return result - - -def endpoint(value): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.isascii() or any(ord(c) <= 32 for c in value): - raise Refused() - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value) - if parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in ('', '/'): - raise Refused() - if value.rstrip('/') in ('https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'https://lldap.coulomb.social:443'): - return value.rstrip('/') - if parsed.hostname not in ('127.0.0.1', '::1') or parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https') or parsed.port is None: - raise Refused() - if not 1 <= parsed.port <= 65535: - raise Refused() - expected = f'{parsed.scheme}://{("[::1]" if parsed.hostname == "::1" else parsed.hostname)}:{parsed.port}' - if value.rstrip('/') != expected: - raise Refused() - return expected - - -def private_password(root): - root = Path(os.path.abspath(root)) - if any((p / '.git').is_file() or (p / '.git/HEAD').is_file() for p in (root, *root.parents)): - raise Refused() - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('lldap_custody', ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py') - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - with module.custody(root, ['lldap']) as directories: - value = module.read_env(directories['lldap']).get('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS') - if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value.encode()) > 4096 or any(ord(c) < 32 for c in value): - raise Refused() - return value - - -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs): - return None - - -class Transport: - """Inject bounded, origin-checked transport into the existing provider.""" - def __init__(self, base): - self.base = endpoint(base) - context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT) - context.load_verify_locations(cafile=ssl.get_default_verify_paths().openssl_cafile) - self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener( - urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirect(), urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context), - ) - - def __call__(self, request, timeout): - if request.full_url not in {self.base + '/auth/simple/login', self.base + '/api/graphql'}: - raise Refused() - if request.method != 'POST' or not isinstance(request.data, bytes) or len(request.data) > MAX_BODY: - raise Refused() - try: - with self.opener.open(request, timeout=min(timeout, 15)) as response: - if response.status != 200: - raise Refused() - raw = response.read(MAX_BODY + 1) - if len(raw) > MAX_BODY: - raise Refused() - body = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=unique_object) - if not isinstance(body, dict): - raise Refused() - if request.full_url.endswith('/auth/simple/login'): - token = body.get('token') - if not isinstance(token, str) or not 1 <= len(token) <= 16384 or any(not 33 <= ord(c) <= 126 for c in token): - raise Refused() - return io.BytesIO(raw) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: - exc.close() - raise Refused() from None - except Exception: - raise Refused() from None - - -def snapshot(provider, token): - value = provider._gql(token, 'query { users { id } groups { id displayName users { id } } }', {}) - if set(value) != {'users', 'groups'} or not isinstance(value['users'], list) or not isinstance(value['groups'], list): - raise Refused() - if len(value['users']) > 10000 or len(value['groups']) > 1000: - raise Refused() - users = [] - for user in value['users']: - uid = user.get('id') if isinstance(user, dict) else None - if not isinstance(uid, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{0,127}', uid): - raise Refused() - users.append(uid) - if len(set(users)) != len(users): - raise Refused() - groups = {} - ids = set() - for group in value['groups']: - if not isinstance(group, dict): - raise Refused() - name, gid, members = group.get('displayName'), group.get('id'), group.get('users') - if (not isinstance(name, str) or not name or len(name) > 256 or any(ord(c) < 32 for c in name) - or type(gid) is not int or gid < 1 or not isinstance(members, list) - or name in groups or gid in ids or len(members) > 10000): - raise Refused() - member_ids = [member.get('id') if isinstance(member, dict) else None for member in members] - if any(not isinstance(uid, str) or uid not in users for uid in member_ids) or len(set(member_ids)) != len(member_ids): - raise Refused() - groups[name] = {'id': gid, 'members': sorted(member_ids)} - ids.add(gid) - return {'users': sorted(users), 'groups': groups} - - -def validate_operation(operation, action=None, group=None, user=None): - if operation not in {'bootstrap', 'membership', 'verify', 'groups'}: - raise Refused() - if operation == 'groups': - # Read-only sign-in diagnosis preview (docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md). - if action is not None or group is not None or not isinstance(user, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{0,127}', user): - raise Refused() - return - if operation != 'membership': - if any(v is not None for v in (action, group, user)): - raise Refused() - return - if action not in {'add', 'remove', 'list'} or not isinstance(group, str): - raise Refused() - if action == 'list': - if user is not None: - raise Refused() - members = {} - else: - members = {group: [user]} - _service_group_request({'groups': [group], 'members': members, - 'idempotency_key': 'owner-group-maintenance', 'correlation_id': 'owner-group-maintenance'}) - - -def maintain(provider, base, operation, *, action=None, group=None, user=None, apply=False, expected_digest=None): - validate_operation(operation, action, group, user) - if (apply and (operation in ('verify', 'groups') or action == 'list')) or (expected_digest is not None and not apply): - raise Refused() - if apply and (not isinstance(expected_digest, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}', expected_digest)): - raise Refused() - token = provider._login() - before = snapshot(provider, token) - if operation == 'verify': - present = {name: name in before['groups'] for name in BASELINE} - return {'result': 'structure_observed', 'baseline_groups_present': present, - 'directory_user_count': len(before['users']), - 'break_glass_account_present': 'break-glass' in before['users'], - 'break_glass_platform_membership_present': 'break-glass' in before['groups'].get('net-kingdom-admins', {}).get('members', []), - 'native_acceptance': 'unverified', - 'remaining': ['governed_lifecycle', 'actual_login_and_mfa', 'issued_claims_and_consumer_access', - 'session_revocation', 'independent_recovery']} - if operation == 'groups': - if user not in before['users']: - raise Refused() - names = sorted(name for name, item in before['groups'].items() if user in item['members']) - return {'result': 'groups_observed', 'uid': user, 'groups': names, 'native_acceptance': 'unverified'} - if operation == 'membership' and (group not in before['groups'] or (user is not None and user not in before['users'])): - raise Refused() - binding = {'base': endpoint(base), 'operation': operation, 'action': action, 'group': group, 'user': user, 'before': before} - digest = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(binding, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()).hexdigest() - if operation == 'bootstrap': - changes = [{'create_group': name} for name in BASELINE if name not in before['groups']] - elif action == 'list': - return {'result': 'membership_observed', 'group': group, 'members': before['groups'][group]['members'], 'native_acceptance': 'unverified'} - else: - member = user in before['groups'][group]['members'] - changes = [{'action': action, 'group': group, 'user': user}] if member != (action == 'add') else [] - result = {'operation': operation, 'changes': changes, 'snapshot_sha256': digest, 'native_acceptance': 'unverified'} - if not apply: - return dict(result, result='preview') - if digest != expected_digest: - raise Refused() - # LLDAP has no compare-and-swap transaction here. Caller must hold the - # owner-controlled exclusive window; check again before the first mutation. - if snapshot(provider, token) != before: - raise Refused() - if operation == 'bootstrap': - rows = [{'displayName': name, 'id': item['id']} for name, item in before['groups'].items()] - for change in changes: - provider._ensure_group(token, rows, change['create_group']) - elif changes: - method = provider._add_group if action == 'add' else provider._remove_group - method(token, user, before['groups'][group]['id']) - after = snapshot(provider, token) - expected = json.loads(json.dumps(before)) - if operation == 'bootstrap': - for change in changes: - name = change['create_group'] - if name not in after['groups'] or after['groups'][name]['members']: - raise Refused() - expected['groups'][name] = after['groups'][name] - elif changes: - members = set(expected['groups'][group]['members']) - if action == 'add': - members.add(user) - else: - members.discard(user) - expected['groups'][group]['members'] = sorted(members) - if after != expected: - raise Refused() - return dict(result, result='verified', recovery='no_automatic_rollback') - - -def main(argv=None): - phase = 'input' - try: - parser = Parser(description=__doc__) - sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest='operation', required=True, parser_class=Parser) - for operation in ('bootstrap', 'membership', 'verify', 'groups'): - command = sub.add_parser(operation) - command.add_argument('--root', required=True, help='Explicit private custody directory outside Git') - command.add_argument('--lldap-url', default='https://lldap.coulomb.social') - if operation == 'groups': - command.add_argument('--user', required=True) - elif operation != 'verify': - command.add_argument('--apply', action='store_true') - command.add_argument('--expected-digest') - if operation == 'membership': - command.add_argument('action', choices=('add', 'remove', 'list')) - command.add_argument('--group', required=True) - command.add_argument('--user') - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - base = endpoint(args.lldap_url) - action, group, user = (getattr(args, name, None) for name in ('action', 'group', 'user')) - validate_operation(args.operation, action, group, user) - apply = getattr(args, 'apply', False) - expected = getattr(args, 'expected_digest', None) - if (expected is not None and not apply) or (apply and (action == 'list' or not isinstance(expected, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}', expected))): - raise Refused() - transport = Transport(base) - password = private_password(args.root) - provider = LLDAPProvisioner(base_url=base, admin_password=password, opener=transport) - phase = 'maintenance' if apply else 'observation' - result = maintain(provider, base, args.operation, action=action, group=group, user=user, apply=apply, expected_digest=expected) - print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True)) - return 2 if args.operation == 'verify' else 0 - except Exception: - print(json.dumps({'result': 'unverified', 'phase': phase, 'recovery': 'reconcile_current_state_before_retry'}), file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/manage-group-members.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/manage-group-members.sh index 3d158aa..7abf5bd 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/manage-group-members.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/manage-group-members.sh @@ -1,5 +1,179 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Explicit private input and preview/readback adapter; see lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md. -set +x +# manage-group-members.sh — add/remove/list LLDAP group membership (NK-WP-0021) +# +# Usage: +# ./manage-group-members.sh add [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# ./manage-group-members.sh remove [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# ./manage-group-members.sh list [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# +# Auth: LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS from secrets-dir/lldap/secrets.env, or env +# LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS (e.g. from kubectl secret for live ops). +# +# Examples: +# ./manage-group-members.sh add bernd activity-core-operators +# ./manage-group-members.sh list activity-core-operators + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "$0")/lldap_admin.py" membership "$@" + +ACTION="${1:-}" +shift || true + +LLDAP_URL="https://lldap.coulomb.social" +SECRETS_DIR="../../bootstrap/secrets" + +usage() { + sed -n '2,15p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \?//' + exit 1 +} + +case "$ACTION" in + add|remove) + USERNAME="${1:-}" + GROUP_NAME="${2:-}" + [[ -z "$USERNAME" || -z "$GROUP_NAME" ]] && usage + shift 2 || true + ;; + list) + GROUP_NAME="${1:-}" + [[ -z "$GROUP_NAME" ]] && usage + shift 1 || true + USERNAME="" + ;; + *) + usage + ;; +esac + +[[ -n "${1:-}" ]] && LLDAP_URL="$1" +[[ -n "${2:-}" ]] && SECRETS_DIR="$2" + +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" +LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS="${LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS:-}" + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + if [[ ! -f "$LLDAP_ENV" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $LLDAP_ENV not found and LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS unset." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS=$(bash -c "source '$LLDAP_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \"\${LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS:-}\"") +fi + +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: empty LLDAP admin password" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Authenticating to LLDAP at $LLDAP_URL ..." +AUTH_RESP=$(curl -sS -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS\"}") + +LLDAP_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('token',''))" 2>/dev/null || echo "") +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_TOKEN" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: Authentication failed" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Build GraphQL POST body without shell-expanding $variables inside the query. +gql_post() { + local query_file="$1" + local vars_json="$2" + python3 - "$LLDAP_URL" "$LLDAP_TOKEN" "$query_file" "$vars_json" <<'PY' +import json, sys, urllib.request +url, token, qpath, vars_s = sys.argv[1:5] +query = open(qpath, encoding="utf-8").read() +body = json.dumps({"query": query, "variables": json.loads(vars_s)}).encode() +req = urllib.request.Request( + url.rstrip("/") + "/api/graphql", + data=body, + headers={ + "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", + "Content-Type": "application/json", + }, + method="POST", +) +with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: + print(resp.read().decode()) +PY +} + +TMPDIR_GQL=$(mktemp -d) +trap 'rm -rf "$TMPDIR_GQL"' EXIT + +cat >"$TMPDIR_GQL/list.gql" <<'EOF' +query { groups { id displayName users { id displayName email } } } +EOF + +GROUPS_JSON=$(gql_post "$TMPDIR_GQL/list.gql" '{}') +GROUP_ID=$(echo "$GROUPS_JSON" | python3 -c " +import sys, json +name = sys.argv[1] +d = json.load(sys.stdin) +for g in d.get('data', {}).get('groups', []) or []: + if g.get('displayName') == name: + print(g['id']) + break +" "$GROUP_NAME") + +if [[ -z "$GROUP_ID" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: group '$GROUP_NAME' not found — run bootstrap-users.sh first" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +case "$ACTION" in + list) + echo "$GROUPS_JSON" | python3 -c " +import sys, json +name = sys.argv[1] +d = json.load(sys.stdin) +for g in d.get('data', {}).get('groups', []) or []: + if g.get('displayName') == name: + users = g.get('users') or [] + print(f\"Group {name} (id={g.get('id')}): {len(users)} member(s)\") + for u in users: + print(f\" - {u.get('id')} {u.get('displayName') or ''} {u.get('email') or ''}\") + break +" "$GROUP_NAME" + ;; + add) + cat >"$TMPDIR_GQL/add.gql" <<'EOF' +mutation AddToGroup($userId: String!, $groupId: Int!) { + addUserToGroup(userId: $userId, groupId: $groupId) { ok } +} +EOF + VARS=$(python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.dumps({'userId':sys.argv[1],'groupId':int(sys.argv[2])}))" "$USERNAME" "$GROUP_ID") + RESP=$(gql_post "$TMPDIR_GQL/add.gql" "$VARS") + echo "$RESP" | python3 -c " +import sys, json +d = json.load(sys.stdin) +if d.get('errors'): + msg = d['errors'][0].get('message', str(d['errors'])) + if 'UNIQUE constraint' in msg or 'already' in msg.lower(): + print('OK: already a member (no-op)') + sys.exit(0) + print('ERROR:', msg, file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +print('OK: added user to group') +" + echo " user=$USERNAME group=$GROUP_NAME (id=$GROUP_ID)" + ;; + remove) + cat >"$TMPDIR_GQL/remove.gql" <<'EOF' +mutation RemoveFromGroup($userId: String!, $groupId: Int!) { + removeUserFromGroup(userId: $userId, groupId: $groupId) { ok } +} +EOF + VARS=$(python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.dumps({'userId':sys.argv[1],'groupId':int(sys.argv[2])}))" "$USERNAME" "$GROUP_ID") + RESP=$(gql_post "$TMPDIR_GQL/remove.gql" "$VARS") + echo "$RESP" | python3 -c " +import sys, json +d = json.load(sys.stdin) +if d.get('errors'): + print('ERROR:', d['errors'][0].get('message', d['errors']), file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit(1) +print('OK: removed user from group') +" + echo " user=$USERNAME group=$GROUP_NAME (id=$GROUP_ID)" + ;; +esac diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py deleted file mode 100644 index f4c8ac2..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,160 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended, read-only reset-role classification; no credential discovery or grant.""" - -import argparse -import getpass -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import re -import stat -import sys -import urllib.request -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('reset_observer_transport', HERE / 'lldap_admin.py') -transport = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(transport) -QUERY = 'query ResetRoles($id:String!){user(userId:$id){id groups{displayName}}}' -ROLES = ('lldap_admin', 'lldap_password_manager', 'lldap_strict_readonly') -# Coulomb's retained personal-reset acceptance, 2026-10-06. No caller-selected live subject. -ACCEPTED_SUBJECT = 'tegwick' -ROOT = HERE.parents[2] -SOURCES = (Path(__file__), HERE / 'lldap_admin.py', - ROOT / 'identity-provisioner/provisioner.py', - ROOT / 'identity-provisioner/group_provenance.py') - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -class Parser(argparse.ArgumentParser): - def error(self, message): - raise Refused('invalid_arguments') - - -def identifier(value): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{0,127}', value): - raise Refused('invalid_subject_identifier') - return value - - -class Observer: - def __init__(self, endpoint, opener=None): - self.base = transport.endpoint(endpoint) - self.opener = opener or transport.Transport(self.base) - - def post(self, path, payload, token=None): - headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/json'} - if token: - headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + token - request = urllib.request.Request(self.base + path, data=json.dumps(payload).encode(), - headers=headers, method='POST') - return json.load(self.opener(request, timeout=15)) - - def classify(self, token, subject): - body = self.post('/api/graphql', {'query': QUERY, 'variables': {'id': subject}}, token) - if not isinstance(body, dict) or body.get('errors') or set(body) != {'data'}: - raise Refused('classification_unavailable') - data = body['data'] - if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) != {'user'}: - raise Refused('invalid_classification_response') - user = data['user'] - if not isinstance(user, dict) or set(user) != {'id', 'groups'} or user['id'] != subject: - raise Refused('subject_not_exactly_observed') - groups = user['groups'] - if not isinstance(groups, list) or len(groups) > 1000: - raise Refused('invalid_group_metadata') - names = [] - for group in groups: - if not isinstance(group, dict) or set(group) != {'displayName'}: - raise Refused('invalid_group_metadata') - name = group['displayName'] - if (not isinstance(name, str) or not 1 <= len(name) <= 256 - or any(ord(c) < 32 for c in name) or name in names): - raise Refused('invalid_group_metadata') - names.append(name) - builtin = {role: role in names for role in ROLES} - return {'builtin_roles': builtin, 'other_group_count': len(set(names) - set(ROLES)), - 'matches_reviewed_service_name_filter': - subject.startswith('svc-') or subject == 'ld-admin', - 'application_authority_assessed': False} - - def observe(self, subject, password): - subject = identifier(subject) - if not isinstance(password, str) or not password or len(password.encode()) > 4096: - raise Refused('invalid_private_input') - body = self.post('/auth/simple/login', {'username': 'admin', 'password': password}) - token = body.get('token') if isinstance(body, dict) else None - if (not isinstance(token, str) or not token or len(token) > 16384 - or any(not 33 <= ord(c) <= 126 for c in token)): - raise Refused('admin_authentication_unavailable') - admin = self.classify(token, 'admin') - if not admin['builtin_roles']['lldap_admin']: - raise Refused('human_admin_role_not_observed') - bind = self.classify(token, 'svc-authelia') - selected = self.classify(token, subject) - return {'schema': 'netkingdom.reset-role-observation.v1', - 'status': 'current_reset_roles_observed', - 'observed_at': datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), - 'endpoint_sha256': hashlib.sha256(self.base.encode()).hexdigest(), - 'selected_subject_sha256': hashlib.sha256( - ('reset-role-subject-v1:' + subject).encode()).hexdigest(), - 'human_admin_role_verified': True, 'bind': bind, 'selected_subject': selected, - 'bind_has_multiple_builtin_roles': sum(bind['builtin_roles'].values()) > 1, - 'membership_changed': False, 'password_reset_attempted': False, - 'grant_approved': False, 'application_access_verified': False, - 'credential_values_recorded': False, - 'sources': [{'path': str(p.relative_to(ROOT)), - 'sha256': hashlib.sha256(p.read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - for p in SOURCES]} - - -def receipt_path(value): - path = Path(os.path.abspath(Path(value).expanduser())) - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path, *path.parents)): - raise Refused('receipt_symlink_refused') - if any((p / '.git').exists() for p in path.parents): - raise Refused('receipt_must_be_outside_repository') - parent = path.parent.stat() - if not stat.S_ISDIR(parent.st_mode) or parent.st_uid != os.getuid() or parent.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused('private_owned_receipt_directory_required') - if path.exists(): - raise Refused('fresh_receipt_required') - return path - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = Parser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--endpoint', default='https://lldap.coulomb.social') - parser.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - try: - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - if not sys.stdin.isatty() or not sys.stderr.isatty(): - raise Refused('human_terminal_required') - path = receipt_path(args.receipt) - observer = Observer(args.endpoint) - password = getpass.getpass('Password of the human admin account (hidden): ') - result = observer.observe(ACCEPTED_SUBJECT, password) - raw = (json.dumps(result, indent=2) + '\n').encode() - fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: - stream.write(raw) - stream.flush() - os.fsync(stream.fileno()) - print(raw.decode(), end='') - return 0 - except Exception as error: # noqa: BLE001 -- every private-input failure must redact its body. - # Never include transport bodies, usernames, credentials or arbitrary exception text. - print(json.dumps({'status': 'observation_refused', - 'reason': str(error) if isinstance(error, Refused) - else 'observation_unavailable'}), file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-plan.json b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-plan.json deleted file mode 100644 index d08cc74..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-plan.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.reset-role-proposal.v1", - "proposal_id": "NK-WP-0054-reset-authority-20261031-1", - "authority_status": "proposed_not_granted", - "endpoint": "https://lldap.coulomb.social", - "target": "svc-authelia", - "subject": "tegwick", - "before_roles": [ - "lldap_strict_readonly" - ], - "after_roles": [ - "lldap_password_manager" - ], - "runtime": { - "schema": "netkingdom.reset-runtime.v1", - "kube-system_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786", - "sso_uid": "a4a148d8-92ab-41e6-b975-4e67b73edfc0", - "authelia": { - "uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "images": [ - "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" - ], - "ready": true - }, - "lldap": { - "uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "images": [ - "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" - ], - "ready": true - }, - "authelia_configuration": { - "uid": "7af1fa0d-1bd4-47e1-8873-0f620788ef3f", - "sha256": "0a8bca50641a4c6f27830f476c2c9f413fc3795711becccb8344ee4d6c376e80", - "bind_is_svc_authelia": true - } - }, - "scope": { - "change": "Replace only svc-authelia strict-readonly membership with password-manager membership.", - "password_reach": "Every non-LLDAP-admin directory identity, including non-admin service and application-admin accounts; not limited to Coulomb.", - "excluded": "LLDAP administrators; tested user/group creation, other-profile edits and membership changes remain refused.", - "unchanged": "Credentials, service username, Kubernetes resources, Authelia account filter, MFA policy and all other directory memberships.", - "rollback": "Restore only svc-authelia strict-readonly role; retain any user password changes and unrelated directory updates. Existing HTTP tokens are not revoked: a token issued with password-manager rights can retain them until expiry (up to 24 hours), or an owner-run token revocation.", - "interruption": "Removing the old role precedes adding the new one. Brief lookup failure is possible. Uncertain attempts require explicit attended recovery; never blindly repeat grant.", - "acceptance": "Role postflight is not a user reset, app login, MFA or fresh-backup restore verdict.", - "self_profile": "Both built-in roles permit own-profile/password operations; this proposal does not claim an exhaustive denial of every directory write.", - "recovery_runtime": "Recovery tolerates unready workloads but still requires the reviewed namespace/deployment identities, images and configuration.", - "follow_through": "After a verified grant, align the service declaration and bind verification expectations; obtain the personal reset/app/MFA verdict and fresh identity backup/restore proof under NK-WP-0054-T16." - }, - "proposed_service_identity": { - "principal_type": "SERVICE", - "conventions": [], - "purpose": "Authelia directory lookup and user-requested password recovery", - "grants": [ - { - "mode": "USE", - "scope": "directory", - "read_only": true, - "activation": "STANDING", - "environments": [ - "PRODUCTION" - ] - }, - { - "mode": "ADMINISTER", - "scope": "directory/passwords/non-lldap-admin", - "activation": "STANDING", - "environments": [ - "PRODUCTION" - ], - "note": "Native lldap_password_manager; includes non-admin service identities and application administrators." - } - ], - "consumer": "authelia", - "owner_confirmed": false - }, - "live_declaration_updated": false, - "new_resources": 0, - "credentials_rotated": false, - "requires_founder_admission": true -} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-transition.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-transition.py deleted file mode 100644 index eb76b42..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-transition.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,398 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Fixed-target, attended reset authority transition; preparation never grants access.""" - -import copy -import fcntl -import getpass -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import shlex -import stat -import subprocess -import sys -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path -from types import SimpleNamespace - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -ROOT = HERE.parents[2] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('reset_role_observer', HERE / 'reset-authority-observe.py') -observer = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(observer) -OLD = 'lldap_strict_readonly' -NEW = 'lldap_password_manager' -TARGET = 'svc-authelia' -SUBJECT = 'tegwick' -ENDPOINT = 'https://lldap.coulomb.social' -PLAN = HERE / 'reset-role-plan.json' -RUNTIME_CODE = '''import json,subprocess,hashlib,re -def get(kind,name,namespace): - args=['k3s','kubectl','get',kind,name,'-o','json'] - if namespace:args+=['-n',namespace] - r=subprocess.run(args,capture_output=True,check=True) - return json.loads(r.stdout) -out={'schema':'netkingdom.reset-runtime.v1'} -for name in ['kube-system','sso']: - out[name+'_uid']=get('namespace',name,None)['metadata']['uid'] -for name in ['authelia','lldap']: - d=get('deployment',name,'sso');s=d['status'];m=d['metadata'] - out[name]={'uid':m['uid'],'images':[x['image'] for x in d['spec']['template']['spec']['containers']], - 'ready':s.get('observedGeneration')==m['generation'] and s.get('readyReplicas')==d['spec'].get('replicas',1)} -c=get('configmap','authelia-config','sso');raw=c['data']['configuration.yml'] -out['authelia_configuration']={'uid':c['metadata']['uid'],'sha256':hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest(), - 'bind_is_svc_authelia':bool(re.search(r'^\\s+user:\\s*uid=svc-authelia,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local\\s*$',raw,re.M))} -print(json.dumps(out)) -''' - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def canonical(value): - return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - - -def digest(value): - return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest() - - -def observe_runtime(): - result = subprocess.run(['ssh', 'railiance01', 'sudo -n python3 -c ' + shlex.quote(RUNTIME_CODE)], - capture_output=True, timeout=45, check=False) - if result.returncode: - raise Refused('runtime_observation_unavailable') - return json.loads(result.stdout) - - -def verify_runtime(expected, *, recovering=False): - actual = observe_runtime() - expected = copy.deepcopy(expected) - if recovering: - # Recovery must remain possible during an outage; identities/images/config stay pinned. - for component in ('authelia', 'lldap'): - actual.get(component, {}).pop('ready', None) - expected.get(component, {}).pop('ready', None) - if actual != expected: - raise Refused('reviewed_runtime_changed') - - -def proposal(): - value = json.loads(PLAN.read_bytes()) - if (value.get('target') != TARGET or value.get('subject') != SUBJECT - or value.get('endpoint') != ENDPOINT or value.get('before_roles') != [OLD] - or value.get('after_roles') != [NEW]): - raise Refused('fixed_reviewed_scope_required') - paths = [Path(__file__), *observer.SOURCES, - ROOT / 'docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/current-roles.json', - ROOT / 'docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/native-matrix.json', - ROOT / 'docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/transition-validation.json'] - value['sources'] = {str(p.relative_to(ROOT)): hashlib.sha256(p.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - for p in paths} - return value, 'sha256:' + digest(value) - - -class Directory: - def __init__(self, endpoint, password, opener=None): - self.reader = observer.Observer(endpoint, opener) - body = self.reader.post('/auth/simple/login', {'username': 'admin', 'password': password}) - self.token = body.get('token') if isinstance(body, dict) else None - if (not isinstance(self.token, str) or not 1 <= len(self.token) <= 16384 - or any(not 33 <= ord(c) <= 126 for c in self.token)): - raise Refused('human_admin_authentication_required') - - def gql(self, token, query, variables): - value = self.reader.post('/api/graphql', {'query': query, 'variables': variables}, token) - if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get('errors') or not isinstance(value.get('data'), dict): - raise Refused('directory_request_refused') - return value['data'] - - def snapshot(self): - return observer.transport.snapshot(SimpleNamespace(_gql=self.gql), self.token) - - def membership(self, action, group_id): - if action not in {'add', 'remove'} or type(group_id) is not int: - raise Refused('fixed_membership_operation_required') - operation = 'addUserToGroup' if action == 'add' else 'removeUserFromGroup' - result = self.gql(self.token, 'mutation($u:String!,$g:Int!){' + operation - + '(userId:$u,groupId:$g){ok}}', {'u': TARGET, 'g': group_id}) - if result != {operation: {'ok': True}}: - raise Refused('membership_result_unverified') - - -def memberships(state, user): - if user not in state['users']: - raise Refused('required_subject_missing') - return sorted(g for g, value in state['groups'].items() if user in value['members']) - - -def validate(state, granting=True): - for name in (OLD, NEW, 'lldap_admin'): - if name not in state['groups']: - raise Refused('builtin_group_missing') - if 'lldap_admin' not in memberships(state, 'admin'): - raise Refused('human_admin_role_required') - if granting and 'lldap_admin' in memberships(state, SUBJECT): - raise Refused('accepted_subject_now_directory_admin') - if memberships(state, TARGET) not in ([], [OLD], [NEW]): - raise Refused('unexpected_target_membership') - - -def expected_state(state, target_group): - result = copy.deepcopy(state) - for name in (OLD, NEW): - members = result['groups'][name]['members'] - if TARGET in members: - members.remove(TARGET) - if name == target_group: - members.append(TARGET) - members.sort() - return result - - -class Journal: - """Private operator state, with an exclusive lock and durable write-before-effect.""" - def __init__(self, path): - self.path = Path(os.path.abspath(Path(path).expanduser())) - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (self.path, *self.path.parents)): - raise Refused('state_symlink_refused') - if any((p / '.git').exists() for p in (self.path, *self.path.parents)): - raise Refused('state_must_be_outside_repository') - parent = self.path.parent.stat() - if parent.st_uid != os.getuid() or parent.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused('private_owned_state_parent_required') - self.path.mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True) - info = self.path.stat() - if not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused('private_owned_state_required') - fd = os.open(self.path / 'execute.lock', os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - info = os.fstat(fd) - if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077 or info.st_nlink != 1: - os.close(fd) - raise Refused('private_single_link_lock_required') - self.lock = os.fdopen(fd, 'r+') - try: - fcntl.flock(self.lock, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB) - except OSError: - self.lock.close() - raise Refused('another_transition_is_active') from None - - def close(self): - self.lock.close() - - def read(self): - path = self.path / 'journal.json' - if path.is_symlink(): - raise Refused('journal_symlink_refused') - if not path.exists(): - return None - info = path.lstat() - if (not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() - or info.st_mode & 0o077 or info.st_nlink != 1): - raise Refused('private_single_link_journal_required') - if info.st_size > 65536: - raise Refused('oversized_journal') - return json.loads(path.read_bytes()) - - def archive(self, raw): - path = self.path / ('history-' + hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() + '.json') - if path.exists() or path.is_symlink(): - info = path.lstat() - if (not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() - or info.st_mode & 0o077 or info.st_nlink != 1 or path.read_bytes() != raw): - raise Refused('history_integrity_failure') - return - fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: - stream.write(raw) - stream.flush() - os.fsync(stream.fileno()) - - def preserve_interrupted_write(self): - """Recovery only: retain even a partial local write; never infer an LDAP result.""" - path = self.path / 'journal.next' - if not path.exists() and not path.is_symlink(): - return - info = path.lstat() - if (not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() - or info.st_mode & 0o077 or info.st_nlink != 1 or info.st_size > 65536): - raise Refused('unsafe_interrupted_journal') - self.archive(path.read_bytes()) - path.unlink() - - def write(self, value): - prior = self.read() - if prior is not None: - self.archive((self.path / 'journal.json').read_bytes()) - temporary = self.path / 'journal.next' - if temporary.exists() or temporary.is_symlink(): - raise Refused('interrupted_journal_write_requires_review') - fd = os.open(temporary, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: - stream.write(canonical(value) + b'\n') - stream.flush() - os.fsync(stream.fileno()) - os.replace(temporary, self.path / 'journal.json') - fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY) - try: - os.fsync(fd) - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -def transition(directory, journal, proposal_digest, operation): - if operation not in {'grant', 'rollback', 'recover'}: - raise Refused('fixed_transition_required') - prior = journal.read() - if operation == 'grant' and prior is not None: - raise Refused('existing_attempt_requires_review_not_replay') - if operation == 'recover' and prior is None and (journal.path / 'journal.next').exists(): - before = directory.snapshot() - validate(before, granting=False) - if memberships(before, TARGET) != [OLD]: - raise Refused('orphan_write_requires_exact_readonly_state') - journal.preserve_interrupted_write() - if directory.snapshot() != before: - raise Refused('directory_changed_during_orphan_review') - record = {'schema': 'netkingdom.reset-role-transition.v1', - 'proposal_digest': proposal_digest, 'target': TARGET, 'operation': operation, - 'status': 'read_only_role_restored_verified', 'orphan_write_preserved': True, - 'group_ids': {name: before['groups'][name]['id'] for name in (OLD, NEW)}, - 'before_sha256': digest(before), 'after_sha256': digest(before), - 'password_reset_performed': False, 'credentials_changed': False, - 'other_directory_memberships_unchanged': True, - 'completed_at': datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()} - journal.write(record) - return record - if operation != 'grant': - if (not isinstance(prior, dict) or prior.get('proposal_digest') != proposal_digest - or prior.get('target') != TARGET - or prior.get('schema') != 'netkingdom.reset-role-transition.v1' - or prior.get('status') not in { - 'prepared', 'remove_intent', 'add_intent', - 'uncertain_requires_attended_recovery', 'password_manager_role_verified', - 'read_only_role_restored_verified'}): - raise Refused('matching_prior_attempt_required') - if prior.get('status') == 'read_only_role_restored_verified': - raise Refused('completed_rollback_cannot_replay') - if operation == 'rollback' and prior.get('status') != 'password_manager_role_verified': - raise Refused('use_recover_for_interrupted_attempt') - if operation == 'recover' and prior.get('status') == 'password_manager_role_verified': - raise Refused('use_rollback_for_completed_grant') - before = directory.snapshot() - validate(before, granting=operation == 'grant') - current = memberships(before, TARGET) - if operation == 'grant' and current != [OLD]: - raise Refused('exact_read_only_baseline_required') - if operation == 'rollback' and current != [NEW]: - raise Refused('exact_granted_baseline_required') - ids = {name: before['groups'][name]['id'] for name in (OLD, NEW)} - if prior and prior.get('group_ids') != ids: - raise Refused('builtin_group_identity_changed') - if operation == 'recover': - journal.preserve_interrupted_write() - desired = NEW if operation == 'grant' else OLD - expected = expected_state(before, desired) - record = {'schema': 'netkingdom.reset-role-transition.v1', 'proposal_digest': proposal_digest, - 'target': TARGET, 'operation': operation, 'status': 'prepared', 'group_ids': ids, - 'started_at': datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), 'before_sha256': digest(before), - 'expected_after_sha256': digest(expected), - 'prior_attempt_sha256': digest(prior) if prior else None, - 'password_reset_performed': False, 'credentials_changed': False, - 'other_directory_memberships_unchanged': False} - journal.write(record) - try: - # There is briefly no elevated read role; never introduce an untested role union. - for role in current: - if role != desired: - record.update(status='remove_intent', role=role) - journal.write(record) - directory.membership('remove', ids[role]) - middle = expected_state(before, None) - if directory.snapshot() != middle: - raise Refused('intermediate_directory_drift') - if current != [desired]: - record.update(status='add_intent', role=desired) - journal.write(record) - directory.membership('add', ids[desired]) - after = directory.snapshot() - if after != expected: - raise Refused('postflight_directory_drift') - record.update(status=('password_manager_role_verified' if operation == 'grant' - else 'read_only_role_restored_verified'), - completed_at=datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), after_sha256=digest(after), - other_directory_memberships_unchanged=True) - journal.write(record) - return record - except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 -- retain an uncertain receipt, never leak provider bodies. - record.update(status='uncertain_requires_attended_recovery') - journal.write(record) - raise Refused('attempt_uncertain_use_reviewed_recovery') from None - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = observer.Parser(description=__doc__) - choices = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group() - for mode in ('preflight', 'execute', 'rollback', 'recover', 'observe-runtime'): - choices.add_argument('--' + mode, action='store_true') - parser.add_argument('--expect-digest') - journal = None - try: - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - if args.observe_runtime: - print(json.dumps(observe_runtime(), indent=2)) - return 0 - plan, proposal_digest = proposal() - if args.expect_digest and args.expect_digest != proposal_digest: - raise Refused('reviewed_proposal_changed') - if not any((args.preflight, args.execute, args.rollback, args.recover)): - print(json.dumps({'status': 'prepared', 'proposal_digest': proposal_digest, - 'scope': plan['scope'], 'live_changes': False}, indent=2)) - return 0 - if (not sys.stdin.isatty() or not sys.stderr.isatty() - or args.expect_digest != proposal_digest): - raise Refused('human_terminal_and_exact_digest_required') - verify_runtime(plan['runtime'], recovering=args.rollback or args.recover) - if not args.preflight: - path = Path.home() / '.local/state/net-kingdom/reset-authority' / proposal_digest[7:] - journal = Journal(path) - if args.execute and journal.read() is not None: - raise Refused('existing_attempt_requires_review_not_replay') - password = getpass.getpass('Password of the human admin account (hidden): ') - directory = Directory(ENDPOINT, password) - before = directory.snapshot() - operation = 'grant' if args.execute else 'rollback' if args.rollback else 'recover' - validate(before, granting=args.preflight or operation == 'grant') - if args.preflight: - if memberships(before, TARGET) != [OLD]: - raise Refused('exact_read_only_baseline_required') - print(json.dumps({'status': 'reset_role_preflight_verified', - 'proposal_digest': proposal_digest, 'before_sha256': digest(before), - 'runtime_sha256': digest(plan['runtime']), 'live_changes': False})) - return 0 - print(json.dumps({'proposal_digest': proposal_digest, 'operation': operation, - 'scope': plan['scope'], 'before_sha256': digest(before)}, indent=2)) - confirmation = operation.upper() + ' ' + proposal_digest - if input('Type ' + confirmation + ' to proceed: ').strip() != confirmation: - raise Refused('not_confirmed_no_membership_change') - verify_runtime(plan['runtime'], recovering=args.rollback or args.recover) - result = transition(directory, journal, proposal_digest, operation) - result['runtime_sha256'] = digest(plan['runtime']) - journal.write(result) - print(json.dumps(result, indent=2)) - return 0 - except Exception as error: # noqa: BLE001 -- private-input and provider errors must be redacted. - print(json.dumps({'status': 'transition_refused_or_incomplete', - 'reason': str(error) if isinstance(error, Refused) - else 'transition_unavailable', 'password_reset_performed': False}), - file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - finally: - if journal is not None: - journal.close() - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_bind_split.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_bind_split.py deleted file mode 100644 index 87dc745..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_bind_split.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,197 +0,0 @@ -"""End-to-end test of bind-split.py against a throwaway LLDAP on the pinned image (NK-WP-0054-T05). - -Synthetic only: generated passwords, 127.0.0.1, container and volume removed afterwards. Skipped when -docker or the pinned image is unavailable. -""" - -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import re -import secrets -import subprocess -import uuid -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -split = load("bind_split", HERE / "bind-split.py") -available = ( - subprocess.run( - ["docker", "image", "inspect", split.IMAGE], capture_output=True, check=False - ).returncode - == 0 -) -pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif( - not available, reason="docker or pinned LLDAP image unavailable" -) - - -@pytest.fixture -def lab(tmp_path): - pytest.importorskip("ldap3") - rehearsal = load("bind_split_rehearsal", HERE / "bind-split-rehearsal.py") - admin_password = secrets.token_hex(20) - root = tmp_path / "custody" - (root / "lldap").mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700) - root.chmod(0o700) - env = root / "lldap/secrets.env" - env.write_text( - f"LLDAP_JWT_SECRET={secrets.token_hex(32)}\nLLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS={admin_password}\n" - ) - env.chmod(0o600) - directory = rehearsal.Directory(uuid.uuid4().hex[:10]) - directory.start("admin", admin_password) - try: - yield root, directory.http, admin_password, directory - finally: - directory.remove() - - -def admin_fd(password): - read, write = os.pipe() - os.write(write, (password + "\n").encode()) - os.close(write) - return read - - -def test_reset_observer_reads_native_roles_without_directory_changes(lab): - """Actual GraphQL schema/transport; synthetic inputs, no native authority grant.""" - _, endpoint, admin_password, fixture = lab - observer = load("native_reset_observer", HERE / "reset-authority-observe.py") - directory = split.Directory(endpoint) - token = directory.login("admin", admin_password) - try: - for user in ["svc-authelia", "selected-person"]: - directory.gql(token, "mutation($u:CreateUserInput!){createUser(user:$u){id}}", - {"u": {"id": user, "email": user + "@example.test"}}) - _, groups = directory.snapshot(token) - directory.gql(token, "mutation($u:String!,$g:Int!){addUserToGroup(" - "userId:$u,groupId:$g){ok}}", - {"u": "svc-authelia", "g": groups["lldap_strict_readonly"]}) - before = directory.snapshot(token) - reader = observer.Observer(endpoint) - ordinary = reader.observe("selected-person", admin_password) - privileged = reader.observe("admin", admin_password) - assert ordinary["bind"]["builtin_roles"]["lldap_strict_readonly"] - assert not ordinary["selected_subject"]["builtin_roles"]["lldap_admin"] - assert privileged["selected_subject"]["builtin_roles"]["lldap_admin"] - with pytest.raises(observer.Refused): - reader.observe("missing-person", admin_password) - assert directory.snapshot(token) == before - assert admin_password not in json.dumps([ordinary, privileged]) - finally: - fixture.remove() - assert subprocess.run(["docker", "inspect", fixture.name], - capture_output=True, check=False).returncode != 0 - assert subprocess.run(["docker", "volume", "inspect", fixture.volume], - capture_output=True, check=False).returncode != 0 - - -def test_full_split_on_a_production_shaped_directory(lab, tmp_path): - root, endpoint, admin_password, _ = lab - assert split.prepare_custody(root)["changed_keys"][0] == "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" - text = (root / "lldap/secrets.env").read_text() - assert ( - admin_password not in text - and (root / "lldap/secrets.env").stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - ) - for key in ("LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS", *split.SERVICE_KEYS): - assert re.search(rf"^{key}=[A-Za-z0-9]{{40}}$", text, re.MULTILINE) - with pytest.raises(split.Refused): - split.prepare_custody(root) - - assert ( - split.main( - [ - "plan", - "--endpoint", - endpoint, - "--admin-password-fd", - str(admin_fd(admin_password)), - "--receipt", - str(tmp_path / "plan.json"), - ] - ) - == 0 - ) - plan = json.loads((tmp_path / "plan.json").read_text())["result"]["accounts"] - assert ( - all(plan[a]["action"] == "create" for a in split.TARGETS) - and plan["admin"]["in_lldap_admin"] - ) - - directory = split.Directory(endpoint) - token = directory.login("admin", admin_password) - passwords = split.custody_values(root) - dry = split.accounts(directory, token, passwords, apply=False) - assert not dry["applied"] and "ld-admin" not in directory.snapshot(token)[0] - - done = split.accounts(directory, token, passwords, apply=True) - assert done["applied"] and all(done["signs_in"].values()) - assert all(done["accounts"][a]["action"] == "ok" for a in split.TARGETS) - again = split.accounts(directory, token, passwords, apply=True) - assert all(again["accounts"][a]["action"] == "ok" for a in split.TARGETS) - - result = split.verify(directory, token, passwords) - assert result["verdict"] == "pass" - # The human then changes their own password; the old shared one must stop working. - split.set_password(endpoint, token, "admin", secrets.token_hex(20)) - retired = split.verify( - directory, - directory.login("ld-admin", passwords["ld-admin"]), - passwords, - admin_password, - ) - assert retired["old_shared_password_refused"] and retired["verdict"] == "pass" - - receipt = tmp_path / "plan.json" - assert admin_password not in receipt.read_text() - assert all(value not in receipt.read_text() for value in passwords.values()) - - -def test_existing_account_outside_the_service_domain_is_refused(lab): - root, endpoint, admin_password, _ = lab - split.prepare_custody(root) - directory = split.Directory(endpoint) - token = directory.login("admin", admin_password) - directory.gql( - token, - "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - {"u": {"id": "svc-keycape", "email": "someone@example.test"}}, - ) - result = split.accounts(directory, token, split.custody_values(root), apply=True) - assert ( - not result["applied"] - and result["accounts"]["svc-keycape"]["action"] == "refuse" - ) - assert "ld-admin" not in directory.snapshot(token)[0] - - -def test_wrong_admin_password_is_refused_before_any_change(lab, tmp_path): - root, endpoint, _, _ = lab - split.prepare_custody(root) - code = split.main( - [ - "accounts", - "--endpoint", - endpoint, - "--admin-password-fd", - str(admin_fd("wrong")), - str(root), - "--apply", - "--receipt", - str(tmp_path / "r.json"), - ] - ) - assert code == 1 and not (tmp_path / "r.json").exists() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_identity_provisioner_reconcile.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_identity_provisioner_reconcile.py index 90781b4..cd03871 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_identity_provisioner_reconcile.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_identity_provisioner_reconcile.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class ReconcileTests(unittest.TestCase): self.assertEqual(['test','test','replace'],[x['op'] for x in changes]) self.assertEqual('/metadata/uid',changes[0]['path']) self.assertEqual('/metadata/resourceVersion',changes[1]['path']) - self.assertEqual('/data/password',changes[2]['path']) + self.assertEqual('/data/LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS',changes[2]['path']) self.assertEqual(SYNTHETIC,base64.b64decode(changes[2]['value']).decode()) def test_stale_metadata_stops_before_credential_use(self): @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ class ReconcileTests(unittest.TestCase): self.assertEqual(SYNTHETIC,json.loads(run.call_args.kwargs['data'])['password']) def test_apply_dry_runs_then_writes_reloads_and_verifies(self): - results=['directory-check-passed','secret/identity-provisioner-ldap','secret/identity-provisioner-ldap','restarted','ready','reloaded-check-passed'] + results=['directory-check-passed','secret/lldap-secrets','secret/lldap-secrets','restarted','ready','reloaded-check-passed'] with patch.object(repair,'inspect',return_value=META), patch.object(repair,'run',side_effect=results) as run: result=repair.reconcile(SYNTHETIC,mode='apply',expected_uid=META['uid'],expected_resource_version=META['resource_version']) self.assertEqual('reconciled',result['result']) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_reset_role_transition_native.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_reset_role_transition_native.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3a6f472..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/test_reset_role_transition_native.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,117 +0,0 @@ -"""Real membership changes in disposable, synthetic LLDAP; no production access.""" -import importlib.util -import json -import secrets -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -fixture = load("transition_native_fixture", HERE / "test_bind_split.py") -lab = fixture.lab -pytestmark = fixture.pytestmark -controller = load("transition_native_controller", HERE / "reset-role-transition.py") -DIGEST = "sha256:" + "a" * 64 - - -def prepare(lab): - _, endpoint, password, server = lab - token = server.login("admin", password) - server.create_user(token, "svc-authelia", [controller.OLD]) - server.create_user(token, "tegwick") - server.create_user(token, "unrelated") - return controller.Directory(endpoint, password) - - -def test_native_grant_and_rollback_preserve_memberships(lab, tmp_path): - directory = prepare(lab) - before = directory.snapshot() - journal = controller.Journal(tmp_path / "state") - try: - granted = controller.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, "grant") - assert granted["status"] == "password_manager_role_verified" - assert directory.snapshot() == controller.expected_state(before, controller.NEW) - restored = controller.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, "rollback") - assert restored["status"] == "read_only_role_restored_verified" - assert directory.snapshot() == before - finally: - journal.close() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("crash_after", ["remove", "add"]) -def test_native_process_death_recovered_without_replaying_grant(lab, tmp_path, crash_after): - directory = prepare(lab) - before = directory.snapshot() - path = tmp_path / "state" - # Synthetic credentials only in the private pipe; actual os._exit bypasses handlers. - code = """ -import importlib.util,json,os,sys -from pathlib import Path -v=json.load(sys.stdin) -s=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('controller',v['source']) -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(s);s.loader.exec_module(m) -d=m.Directory(v['endpoint'],v['password']) -original=d.membership -def die(action,group): - original(action,group) - if action==v['crash_after']:os._exit(86) -d.membership=die -j=m.Journal(Path(v['state'])) -m.transition(d,j,v['digest'],'grant') -""" - result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], input=json.dumps({ - "source": str(HERE / "reset-role-transition.py"), "endpoint": lab[1], - "password": lab[2], "state": str(path), "digest": DIGEST, - "crash_after": crash_after}), text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=30, check=False) - assert result.returncode == 86 - assert not result.stdout and not result.stderr - journal = controller.Journal(path) - try: - assert journal.read()["status"] == crash_after + "_intent" - assert controller.memberships(directory.snapshot(), controller.TARGET) == ( - [] if crash_after == "remove" else [controller.NEW]) - with pytest.raises(controller.Refused, match="existing_attempt"): - controller.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, "grant") - restored = controller.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, "recover") - assert restored["status"] == "read_only_role_restored_verified" - assert directory.snapshot() == before - assert list(path.glob("history-*.json")) - for file in path.iterdir(): - assert file.stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert lab[2] not in file.read_text() - finally: - journal.close() - - -def test_native_role_rollback_does_not_revoke_existing_http_token(lab, tmp_path): - directory = prepare(lab) - server = lab[3] - bind_password, user_password = secrets.token_hex(24), secrets.token_hex(24) - server.set_password(directory.token, controller.TARGET, bind_password) - journal = controller.Journal(tmp_path / 'state') - try: - controller.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - old_token = server.login(controller.TARGET, bind_password) - assert old_token - controller.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'rollback') - fresh_token = server.login(controller.TARGET, bind_password) - assert fresh_token - # Measure the limitation, not a revocation claim: pre-rollback JWT retains its role. - server.set_password(old_token, 'tegwick', user_password) - assert server.login('tegwick', user_password) - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - server.set_password(fresh_token, 'tegwick', secrets.token_hex(24)) - assert server.login('tegwick', user_password) - finally: - journal.close() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-mfa.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-mfa.yaml index 31093d6..df81a8a 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-mfa.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-mfa.yaml @@ -149,10 +149,7 @@ metadata: name: allow-egress-dns namespace: mfa spec: - podSelector: - matchExpressions: - - key: net-kingdom/capture - operator: DoesNotExist + podSelector: {} policyTypes: - Egress egress: diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-sso.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-sso.yaml index c45d994..233f1ca 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-sso.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-sso.yaml @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ # user-engine → authelia :9091 (read GET /api/state for an existing sign-in) # Traefik → authelia :9091 (login portal, user-facing) # Traefik → lldap :17170 (admin web UI; IP-restricted at Traefik layer) -# bounded-executor → lldap :17170, keycape :8080, authelia :9091 (NK-WP-0056 Job) # # Allowed egress paths: # keycape → authelia :9091 (OIDC callback orchestration) @@ -375,72 +374,6 @@ spec: protocol: TCP --- -# ── Bounded executor → LLDAP :17170, KeyCape :8080, Authelia :9091 ─────────── -# NK-WP-0056: the per-admission executor Job (rapp-bounded-executor, label -# app.kubernetes.io/name=bounded-executor) self-rotates a bind through the LLDAP -# web API and runs the synthetic journey in-cluster against KeyCape and Authelia. -# The executor's own egress-only policy lives in rapp-bounded-executor. No pod -# exists unless an admitted Job is running. -apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 -kind: NetworkPolicy -metadata: - name: allow-bounded-executor-to-lldap-api - namespace: sso -spec: - podSelector: - matchLabels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: lldap - policyTypes: - - Ingress - ingress: - - from: - - podSelector: - matchLabels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: bounded-executor - ports: - - port: 17170 - protocol: TCP ---- -apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 -kind: NetworkPolicy -metadata: - name: allow-bounded-executor-to-keycape - namespace: sso -spec: - podSelector: - matchLabels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: keycape - policyTypes: - - Ingress - ingress: - - from: - - podSelector: - matchLabels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: bounded-executor - ports: - - port: 8080 - protocol: TCP ---- -apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 -kind: NetworkPolicy -metadata: - name: allow-bounded-executor-to-authelia - namespace: sso -spec: - podSelector: - matchLabels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: authelia - policyTypes: - - Ingress - ingress: - - from: - - podSelector: - matchLabels: - app.kubernetes.io/name: bounded-executor - ports: - - port: 9091 - protocol: TCP ---- # ── Allow egress DNS (all pods) ────────────────────────────────────────────── apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy @@ -448,10 +381,7 @@ metadata: name: allow-egress-dns namespace: sso spec: - podSelector: - matchExpressions: - - key: net-kingdom/capture - operator: DoesNotExist + podSelector: {} policyTypes: - Egress egress: diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/README.md index 98d60e1..6c19846 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/README.md @@ -141,7 +141,5 @@ chmod +x ../verify-t03.sh Do not rename the cluster without also updating netpol-databases.yaml. - `instances: 1` is intentional for dev/staging. Change to 3 before ThreePhoenix HA production deployment (requires at least 3 schedulable nodes). -- Password rotation uses the explicit `PI_DB_PASSWORD` selector under the reviewed - procedure. CNPG's managed role and the privacyIDEA consumer URI must converge - on the same candidate; verify actual reconciliation and authentication before - calling it complete. See [service Secret custody](../../bootstrap/README.md#service-secret-creation-and-explicit-rotation). +- Password rotation: update the K8s Secret values and CNPG's managed.roles reconciler will + apply the change at the next reconciliation cycle (within seconds). diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/cluster.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/cluster.yaml index 4cd3d7f..fb317fe 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/cluster.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/cluster.yaml @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ spec: resources: requests: memory: "256Mi" - cpu: "50m" + cpu: "100m" limits: memory: "1Gi" cpu: "1000m" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/create-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/create-secrets.sh index 793bda7..ca4645b 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/create-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/create-secrets.sh @@ -1,7 +1,57 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Private creation or exact-match verification; rotations require --rotate-key. -set +x +# create-secrets.sh — create K8s Secrets for PostgreSQL from gen-secrets.sh output +# +# Usage: +# ./create-secrets.sh +# +# is the output directory produced by sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh +# (default: ../../bootstrap/secrets). +# +# Creates one K8s Secret in the databases namespace: +# net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app — privacyIDEA DB credentials +# +# Note: net-kingdom-pg-keycloak-app removed — Keycloak replaced by Authelia+LLDAP+KeyCape (T05). +# +# These secrets must exist before applying cluster.yaml. +# Re-run this script whenever you rotate passwords in KeePassXC / gen-secrets.sh. + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" postgresql "$@" + +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" + +if [[ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: secrets directory not found: $SECRETS_DIR" >&2 + echo "Run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first, then re-run this script." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +PI_SECRETS="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" + +if [[ ! -f "$PI_SECRETS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $PI_SECRETS not found" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Source the generated env file (KEY=VALUE pairs, no export) +# Use a subshell to avoid polluting the current environment. +PI_DB_PASS=$(bash -c "source $PI_SECRETS 2>/dev/null; echo \$PI_DB_PASSWORD") + +if [[ -z "$PI_DB_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: could not read PI_DB_PASSWORD from $PI_SECRETS" >&2 + echo "Check that gen-secrets.sh ran successfully and the file is intact." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Creating K8s Secret: net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app" +kubectl create secret generic net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app \ + --namespace=databases \ + --from-literal=username=privacyidea \ + --from-literal=password="$PI_DB_PASS" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +echo "" +echo "Done. Secret created in namespace: databases" +echo "" +echo "Verify:" +echo " kubectl get secrets -n databases" +echo " kubectl describe secret net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app -n databases" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md deleted file mode 100644 index 79e64f1..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,144 +0,0 @@ -# privacyIDEA key custody and PVC recovery - -This is the source procedure for the admitted `mfa/privacyidea` profile: -`privacyidea-data` mounted at `/etc/privacyidea`, `fsGroup: 999`, and the key paths -in `configmap.yaml`. It does not authorize live execution or establish successful -recovery. Use an exact owner-approved ceremony on the verified cluster, with an -exclusive maintenance window, independent database/key backups and current -consumer acceptance. On Railiance, use the approved node execution path; do not -infer the target from an ambient workstation kube context. - -## Export an existing key set - -Create an owned private custody root and its `privacyidea` child (both mode 0700) -outside Git for an independent export. The bootstrap caller can also use its -existing ignored private service-file directory. Run: - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh /absolute/private/custody -``` - -The wrapper verifies one Ready deployment-owned pod using the expected Bound -PVC. It reads all three files through a captured, bounded transport, validates the -96-byte encryption key and matching RSA audit pair, and rechecks pod/PVC identity. -It never generates a missing encryption key. Exported files are private mode -0600, with atomic no-overwrite publication; identical existing files are verified -and differing, public, linked or nonregular files are refused. - -| Local custody file | Runtime PVC path | DR Secret and field | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `privacyidea/pi.enc` | `/etc/privacyidea/enckey` | `privacyidea-enckey`: `enckey` | -| `privacyidea/private.pem` | `/etc/privacyidea/private.pem` | `privacyidea-auditkeys`: `private.pem` | -| `privacyidea/public.pem` | `/etc/privacyidea/public.pem` | `privacyidea-auditkeys`: `public.pem` | - -`PI_ENCFILE` is the application configuration setting and the historic password -safe entry name, **not** the Secret data field. A legacy differing Secret must be -reconciled under its owner's migration procedure; the wrapper does not rename, -overwrite or rotate it automatically. - -DR Secrets are created or verified against matching data. Existing extra fields -and metadata are retained. Removal of a last-applied annotation uses UID, -resource-version and data preconditions; no client-side apply or conflict retry. -Controller-managed or immutable Secrets are refused. Local copies remain when an -API operation fails. The two Secret writes and three file publications are not a -transaction: failure may leave a partial result or an unverified remote write. -Inspect and reconcile before retrying. Do not delete the retained copies to make -a retry pass. - -Store all three files together in independently held encrypted/off-host custody, -linked to the correct database backup and instance. Verify that backup before -removing successful working copies. Kubernetes DR Secrets in the same cluster -are not an independent recovery backup. Historical exposure/revocation remains -separate incident work. - -## First-bootstrap audit pair - -Only for a reviewed, genuinely new instance, when its encryption key already -exists and both audit files and all local/cluster DR copies are absent: - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh /absolute/private/custody --initialize-audit-keys -``` - -This explicitly creates only the absent RSA audit pair using no-overwrite -publication, then exports it. The encryption key is never generated or replaced. -An existing single audit file is a partial/recovery state and is refused. A -failed pair publication may retain one file; reconcile it rather than generate -another pair. The flag is an explicit action selection, not proof of first-use -identity or permission. It must not be used to repair lost historical audit keys. -`creds-bootstrap-agent.sh` accepts the same flag explicitly; normal bootstrap -export does not infer permission to initialize keys. - -## Restore into the actual PVC - -1. Select the approved database backup and its matching independent key set. - Decrypt/retrieve them through approved custody into the private directory - above. Validate provenance independently; cryptographic format checks cannot - establish that a key belongs to a database. Do not substitute fresh keys. -2. Under owner control, stop privacyIDEA and ensure its Deployment has desired and - observed replicas zero. Wait until **all** pods mounting `privacyidea-data` - have disappeared, including terminating pods. Pause any reconciler that would - restart it under its own approved maintenance procedure. Do not start the app - on an empty/restored PVC before the original keys are present. -3. Create/bind the intended replacement `privacyidea-data` PVC if needed. Retain - its exact UID and an independently reviewed immutable digest of the admitted - privacyIDEA image containing Python and cryptography. Render the helper pod: - - ```bash - python3 sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody.py render-pod \ - --pvc-uid APPROVED_PVC_UID \ - --image ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:APPROVED_IMAGE_DIGEST \ - > /private/recovery-pod.json - ``` - - Replace both placeholders with reviewed values; the renderer rejects them - literally. Review/dry-run the resulting non-secret manifest, then create it - through the approved cluster execution path. It mounts the **actual data PVC**, - sleeps instead of starting privacyIDEA, has no service-account token mount, - and runs for at most one hour. It does not consume either DR Secret. The helper - requires root/limited file-ownership capabilities to restore root:999 files; - this is an attended maintenance pod, not a new permanent service. -4. Wait for that exact `privacyidea-key-recovery` pod to be Ready, then run: - - ```bash - bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-restore.sh /absolute/private/custody \ - --pvc-uid APPROVED_PVC_UID - ``` - - The wrapper checks the stopped Deployment, PVC UID, sole mounting pod, fixed - sleep command, immutable image, container and mount before transferring keys - on captured stdin. It validates the full local key set before any cluster - command. It checks every existing remote file before writing; differences - refuse the operation without overwriting them. Missing files are published - without replacement, read back, and pod/PVC identity is checked again. - New private files use root:999 mode 0640 so the declared service fsGroup can - read them; the public file uses mode 0644. Existing matching files retain their - modes/ownership. Unknown remote outcomes are failures, never automatic retries. -5. Confirm the receipt and state, then delete only the exact helper pod created - in this ceremony, with its recorded UID/preconditions. Wait for its removal - before restoring the approved application replica count/reconciler state. - Perform native database decryption, existing-token authentication and audit - signing/verification against the recovered instance. Retain safe evidence and - independent recovery material; remove temporary working plaintext afterward. - -The helper does not create/stop/delete workloads or restart the application. -These lifecycle actions stay explicit in the reviewed maintenance plan. A Secret -creation followed by rollout restart cannot restore these PVC files. The former -unmounted BusyBox helper example is withdrawn. - -## Verification and limits - -Tests use disposable local files/keys and a synthetic API, including an actual -privacyIDEA 3.12.2 security-module decryption round trip after restore. Its installed -`privacyidea/cli/pimanage/pi_setup.py` establishes the 96-byte key and RSA PEM -formats; [upstream pi-manage documentation](https://privacyidea.readthedocs.io/en/latest/installation/system/pi-manage.html) -describes the setup operations. Package verification is not deployed-image proof. - -Cooperative directory locks and no-overwrite links are not protection against -hostile same-UID/container writers. Pod/PVC checks before and after exec are not -an atomic Kubernetes UID-bound exec. Use the exclusive owner-controlled window; -changes detected after transfer produce an unverified outcome. A crash/SIGKILL -can leave staging or partial files. File permissions and terminal checks provide -neither task authority nor full agent credential isolation. Native off-host -recovery, image admission, backup lineage and current-consumer acceptance remain -required by NK-WP-0049-T03. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md index cb40011..1a96795 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md @@ -57,25 +57,26 @@ kubectl logs -n mfa -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea --previous Common causes: - `privacyidea-config` Secret missing → run `create-secrets.sh` - PostgreSQL not reachable → verify T03, check NetworkPolicies -- Wrong DB password → reconcile the database, CNPG application Secret and privacyIDEA URI through the reviewed named `PI_DB_PASSWORD` rotation; ordinary reapplication refuses differing values. See [service Secret custody](../../bootstrap/README.md#service-secret-creation-and-explicit-rotation). +- Wrong DB password → re-run `create-secrets.sh` with corrected secrets --- ### Step 3 — Extract key material and create DR Secrets -Export the existing key set from the verified Ready pod into an owned private -custody root containing a private `privacyidea` subdirectory: +Run **once** after the pod reaches `Running`: ```bash -bash enckey-bootstrap.sh /absolute/private/custody +./enckey-bootstrap.sh ``` -This preserves existing local copies and creates or verifies matching DR Secrets: -`privacyidea-enckey` (`enckey`) and `privacyidea-auditkeys` (`private.pem`, -`public.pem`). Missing keys are refused. Only an explicitly reviewed first -bootstrap can request `--initialize-audit-keys`; it never generates an encryption -key. Follow [key custody and PVC recovery](KEY-RECOVERY.md) for private export, -independent backup, failure handling and recovery acceptance. +This generates RSA audit keys (if not already created), extracts the encryption +key and audit keys from the pod, and creates two K8s Secrets as disaster-recovery +copies: +- `privacyidea-enckey` +- `privacyidea-auditkeys` + +Follow the printed instructions to store the key files in KeePassXC, then shred +the local copies. --- @@ -85,45 +86,14 @@ independent backup, failure handling and recovery acceptance. ./bootstrap-admin.sh ``` -Creates or verifies `pi-admin` for the current KeyCape profile. It does not -provision the legacy Keycloak `trigger-admin` account, policy or Kubernetes Secret. -Existing legacy objects are not deleted: inventory their actual consumers and -approve revocation separately before removing them. +Creates `pi-admin` (full admin) and `trigger-admin` (triggerchallenge only). +Also creates the `privacyidea-trigger-admin` K8s Secret used by Keycloak in T05. -Run this only as an authorized, exclusive first-bootstrap or verification -operation. Password resets and policy migration are separate procedures. The private secrets directory and privacyidea -subdirectory must be owned by the operator without group/other access. Its -single-link regular `secrets.env` file must also be private; the script parses -exactly one generated alphanumeric `PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD` assignment without -executing shell content. Values travel over kubectl stdin, not argv, environment -assignments, REST bearer output or terminal text. No public-URL fallback is used. -The obsolete optional `pi-url` argument is refused. - -The in-pod adapter is scoped to privacyIDEA 3.12.2. It verifies an existing -password without changing it. New account and policy rows use insert-only DB -writes; conflicts fail instead of updating existing records. The bootstrap -`pi-admin-all-rights` policy is restricted to `adminuser=pi-admin`. A conflicting -legacy policy, unknown version, credential mismatch, ambiguous pod or command -failure stops the script. Introducing a first admin policy into an existing -multi-admin/policy installation requires a separate owner-reviewed migration. -Configured `SUPERUSER_REALM` entries are refused because this local-admin profile -cannot safely grant username-based rights across administrative realms. -An error after a DB commit can leave created state; rerun only after reviewing -metadata, using the same approved credential. A successful retry never rotates it. - -The secret remains in the selected private custody file. Transfer it through the -approved encrypted handoff and reconcile successful recovery before cleanup. -The helper does not prove runtime agent isolation or perform MFA enrollment. - -**Attended acceptance remains required:** -1. Review effective admin policies and current identity mappings. -2. Complete the approved MFA enrollment procedure for the admin identity. -3. Perform a fresh login and confirm the required MFA challenge and denial cases. -4. Record the result; script success and `pi_admin_created` are not MFA acceptance. - -No live bootstrap or account/policy change was performed for this source repair. -The source audit found that the upstream 3.12.2 `admin add` path can update an -existing password, so the old retry behavior was not reliably create-only. +**Immediately after the script completes:** +1. Log in to `https://pink.coulomb.social` as `pi-admin`. +2. Navigate to **Users → pi-admin → Enroll token** and enroll a TOTP or hardware token. +3. Log out, log back in — the MFA challenge must appear. +4. Verify the `trigger-admin-rights` policy at Config → Policies. --- @@ -163,7 +133,7 @@ privacyIDEA sits entirely behind the NetworkPolicies applied in T02 (netpol-mfa. | Source | Destination | Port | Purpose | |--------|-------------|------|---------| | Traefik (kube-system) | privacyIDEA (mfa) | 8080 | User-facing portal | -| KeyCape (sso) | privacyIDEA (mfa) | 8080 | MFA API | +| Keycloak (sso) | privacyIDEA (mfa) | 8080 | Provider API (triggerchallenge) | | privacyIDEA (mfa) | PostgreSQL (databases) | 5432 | Database | Outbound to anything other than PostgreSQL and kube-dns is denied. @@ -174,9 +144,9 @@ Outbound to anything other than PostgreSQL and kube-dns is denied. ### Rate limiting adjustment -The default rate limit (20 req/min, burst 5) is conservative. If KeyCape's -MFA calls trigger false positives (HTTP 429), raise the average -in `middleware.yaml` and reapply. Alternatively, the KeyCape-to-PI path is +The default rate limit (20 req/min, burst 5) is conservative. If Keycloak's +triggerchallenge calls trigger false positives (HTTP 429), raise the average +in `middleware.yaml` and reapply. Alternatively, the Keycloak-to-PI path is cluster-internal and not subject to the Ingress middleware. ### Admin WebUI IP restriction @@ -200,145 +170,21 @@ Config → Policies → New policy: ## Disaster recovery -Follow [key custody and PVC recovery](KEY-RECOVERY.md). Restore the original -matching encryption/audit files into the actual `privacyidea-data` PVC while the -application is stopped, using the reviewed mounted recovery pod. Creating a -Secret and restarting cannot restore these files; the deployment does not mount -the DR Secrets. The former unmounted helper-pod example is withdrawn. Native -recovery acceptance requires the matching database backup, existing-token checks -and audit-signature verification before closure. +If the `privacyidea-data` PVC is lost: -## Scoped factor-state diagnostic - -`check-user-mfa-state.sh` reports only factor counts in `coulomb`. It no longer -reads the retired `keycape-pi-token` Secret, queries administrative realm/user -catalogues, or guesses that the historic `netkingdom` realm is accessible. - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh platform-root \ - --token-file /absolute/private/diagnostic.jwt -``` - -The file must contain an owner-admitted, unexpired provider admin-role JWT with -`tokenlist` visibility in `coulomb`, optionally followed by one newline. It and -its parent must be owned/private (normally 0600/0700), unlinked, and outside Git. -The helper does not retrieve, mint, renew, export or cache credentials. Missing -input stops before any credential or network access; raw values are never argv. - -RPF-WP-0040's renewable factor-reader lane is delivered to **KeyCape**, not this -workstation helper. That contract is not permission to extract its Secret or -share its identity. An attended diagnostic needs its own explicitly admitted -owner delivery/execution arrangement; this source change neither creates nor -claims one. Use owner credential routing before requesting that arrangement. -The historical resolver/admin-token lanes remain separately blocked. - -The helper uses the canonical HTTPS provider with system CA verification, or an -explicit literal loopback URL for a reviewed local forward/fixture. It refuses -other origins, redirects and ambient proxies. HTTP loopback is only as trustworthy -as the reviewed local process/forward. There is no insecure-TLS flag. - -The existing disabled, unassigned `KCFACTORSCOPE01` token proves realm visibility -before and after the lookup. Provider denial, missing/mismatched proof, malformed -responses, unknown enrollment states or incomplete pages return `unverified`, -never a successful zero. The diagnostic requests at most 1000 factors and refuses -larger/incomplete results rather than publishing partial counts. The provider -API is paginated; see the [upstream token API](https://privacyidea.readthedocs.io/en/v3.12.1/modules/api/token.html). - -JSON output contains total, active-confirmed, active-pending and inactive counts. -It deliberately records `user_existence: not_checked` and `mfa_login: not_tested`: -a scoped zero-factor response does not prove that a user exists, and counts do -not prove an MFA login. No token serial, metadata, provider error body or credential -is emitted. Separate HTTP observations are not an atomic provider snapshot. -Actual login remains `verify-t06.sh`/the supported user journey; pending enrollment -must be confirmed before it counts as an active confirmed factor. - -## Configuration-preserving realm repair - -The attended entrypoint remains: - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh -``` - -It prompts for pi-admin in the terminal, reads current configuration, and asks -for an LLDAP bind password only when the named resolver is missing. Passwords -stay in process memory: no shell evaluation, environment-variable transport, -password arguments or temporary credential files. `MFA_USER` selects the user -for the final known-user lookup and fresh token-backed MFA proof. A failed proof -returns nonzero even if configuration writes already succeeded. - -For an owner-reviewed bootstrap using existing private generated files: - -```bash -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh /absolute/private/root -bash sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh /absolute/private/root --apply -``` - -The first command authenticates and previews configuration actions; the second -executes the reviewed repair. `privacyidea/secrets.env` and `lldap/secrets.env` -are parsed as literal `NAME=value` records, never shell code. Root and component -directories must be owned/private (0700); files must be owned/private regular -unlinked files (0600). Shell-escaped `%q` files are not the input format. The old -third positional bind-password argument is rejected. An optional second -positional URL, or `PI_URL`, selects only the canonical verified HTTPS provider -or an explicit literal loopback fixture/approved forward. Proxy and redirect -credential forwarding are refused by shared `pi_api.py`. - -The supported repair creates an absent `lldap-coulomb` LDAP resolver and absent -`coulomb` realm. On an existing resolver it fills only missing TIMEOUT, -CACHE_TIMEOUT and SIZELIMIT, preserving valid custom values, the bind credential -and other fields. It refuses a different resolver type/backend or an existing -realm missing the expected binding; those need owner-reviewed migration. Existing -realm bindings/priorities and defaults survive. It sets `coulomb` as the initial -default only when the initial realm inventory is empty. - -No enrollment, deletion, passthrough or other policy is written. The deployed -onboarding guard, possession confirmation, pending-only cancellation and audited -recovery remain with their established KeyCape/NetKingdom owner procedures. -Replaying the old bootstrap's `enrollTOTP, delete, disable` or passthrough policy -would undo that hardening. A fresh instance still needs those owner-managed -onboarding components; a configuration receipt is not full IAM readiness. - -The provider has no compare-and-swap operation for these writes. Use an exclusive -owner maintenance window. The helper checks for drift before each write and -reads back afterward; that does not make the sequence atomic. On failure it -reports unverified/possible partial changes and stops, with no automatic retry, -policy rewrite, deletion or rollback. Reconcile the retained state before retry. - -Native disposable privacyIDEA 3.12.2 verifies that resolver POST preserves omitted -fields, including the bind password. This corrects the older runbook's general -replacement claim; it does not reclassify historical deployment evidence. -Reference: [provider resolver API](https://privacyidea.readthedocs.io/en/v3.12.2/modules/api/resolver.html). -Provider/package checks do not prove live LDAP reachability, current custody, -installed hooks, user enrollment or a complete KeyCape browser sign-in. - -## Attended resolver password reconciliation - -The update and reconcile helpers share `resolver_cutover.py`. Follow the -[current procedure](../../../docs/keycape-exposure-resolver-reconciliation.md) -for preview, digest-bound minimal apply, explicit cluster pins and truthful -partial receipts. Credentials stay in attended process memory. Native fixture -proof is not production acceptance or authority to perform exposure rotation. - -## Entry-point index - -Each helper in this directory, with its intended caller, from the NK-WP-0049-T02 -[caller ledger](../../../docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json). -"Greenfield only" helpers never update existing credentials or policy. On the -current estate, re-running one needs its own owner decision. All helpers run in -an attended operator session for namespace `mfa`. None of them prints a -credential. - -| Helper | Purpose | Status / caller | -|---|---|---| -| `bootstrap-admin.py` | Pass one private bootstrap credential to the admitted pod over stdin | Greenfield only | -| `bootstrap-admin-remote.py` | In-pod, insert-only admin bootstrap | Greenfield only; called by `bootstrap-admin.py` | -| `realm_bootstrap.py` | Repair missing realm/resolver configuration while preserving policy | Library for `bootstrap-realm.sh` and the realm repair above | -| `activate-onboarding-policy.py` | Provider-local enrollment policy activation; never changes tokens | Current; NK-WP-0042 scoped enrollment | -| `deploy-onboarding-guard.py` | Deploy the reviewed enrollment hook, preserving runtime secrets | Current; NK-WP-0042 | -| `enable-factor-confirmation.py` | Require possession proof for newly enrolled TOTP; existing factors untouched | Current; NK-WP-0042 | -| `deploy-factor-recovery.py` | Deploy the private P04 factor-recovery service with provider custody and CAS guards | Current; recovery journey acceptance open under NK-WP-0042 | -| `key-custody-remote.py` | In-pod key transport | Internal; invoke only through `key-custody.py` | -| `keycape-scope-probe.py` | Idempotent, inert realm-visibility probe; emits no key | Diagnostic | -| `mfa_state.py` | Read-only scoped factor diagnostic | Library for `check-user-mfa-state.sh` | -| `verify_mfa.py` | Attended functional privacyIDEA proof | Called by `sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t06.sh` | +1. Create a new PVC with `pvc.yaml`. +2. Restore enckey and audit keys from KeePassXC: + ```bash + # Copy pi.enc and private/public.pem from KeePassXC into a temporary pod + kubectl run restore-helper --image=busybox -n mfa --restart=Never -- sleep 3600 + kubectl cp ./pi.enc mfa/restore-helper:/etc/privacyidea/enckey + kubectl cp ./private.pem mfa/restore-helper:/etc/privacyidea/private.pem + kubectl cp ./public.pem mfa/restore-helper:/etc/privacyidea/public.pem + kubectl delete pod -n mfa restore-helper + ``` + Or, if the K8s Secrets survived (created by `enckey-bootstrap.sh`): + ```bash + kubectl get secret privacyidea-enckey -n mfa -o jsonpath='{.data.enckey}' | base64 -d > pi.enc + ``` +3. Restart the privacyIDEA deployment — it will run DB migrations and use the + restored key material. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py deleted file mode 100644 index 97a6b5d..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin-remote.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -"""Version-scoped in-pod bootstrap. Password input is JSON on stdin only. - -Existing credentials/policies are never updated. Insert-only DB writes and -unique constraints protect against concurrent creation. Native MFA/effective -policy acceptance is a separate attended procedure. -""" -import json -import logging -import re -import sys - -NAME = 'pi-admin' -POLICY = 'pi-admin-all-rights' - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def admitted_policy(policy): - if (policy.get('name') != POLICY or policy.get('scope') != 'admin' - or policy.get('adminuser') != [NAME] or policy.get('action') != {'*': True} - or policy.get('active') is not True or policy.get('priority') != 1 - or policy.get('check_all_resolvers') is not False - or policy.get('user_case_insensitive') is not False): - return False - return all(not policy.get(key) for key in ( - 'realm', 'adminrealm', 'resolver', 'pinode', 'user', 'client', 'time', 'conditions', 'user_agents')) - - -def ensure(password, admins, policies, verify, insert): - existing = NAME in admins - named = [policy for policy in policies if policy.get('name') == POLICY] - if len(named) > 1 or (named and not admitted_policy(named[0])): raise Refused() - if not named: - # Introducing the first admin policy changes defaults for every admin. - # Existing deployments need their owner's policy migration, not bootstrap. - if any(admin != NAME for admin in admins) or any(p.get('scope') == 'admin' for p in policies): - raise Refused() - if existing and not verify(NAME, password): raise Refused() - if not existing or not named: - insert(password, account=not existing, policy=not named) - if not verify(NAME, password): raise Refused() - return {'result': 'verified' if existing else 'created', 'mfa_verified': False} - - -def main(): - from importlib.metadata import version - if version('privacyIDEA') != '3.12.2': raise Refused() - raw = sys.stdin.buffer.read(1025) - if len(raw) > 1024: raise Refused() - payload = json.loads(raw) - if (not isinstance(payload, dict) or set(payload) != {'password'} - or not isinstance(payload['password'], str) - or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', payload['password'])): - raise Refused() - # Avoid library diagnostics carrying credential/configuration data. - logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) - from privacyidea.cli import create_silent_app - from privacyidea.lib.auth import list_db_admin, verify_db_admin - from privacyidea.lib.crypto import hash_with_pepper - from privacyidea.lib.policy import get_policies - from privacyidea.models import Admin, Policy, db - from privacyidea.models.config import save_config_timestamp - app = create_silent_app() - with app.app_context(): - # Username-only bootstrap policy must not admit namesakes in other realms. - if app.config.get('SUPERUSER_REALM', []): raise Refused() - def insert(password, *, account, policy): - try: - # Do not call Admin.save/create_db_admin or set_policy: they upsert. - if account: - db.session.add(Admin(username=NAME, password=hash_with_pepper(password))) - if policy: - db.session.add(Policy(name=POLICY, scope='admin', action='*', adminuser=NAME)) - db.session.flush() # constraint conflicts fail without updates - if policy: save_config_timestamp() - db.session.commit() - except Exception: - db.session.rollback() - raise Refused() from None - result = ensure(payload['password'], [admin.username for admin in list_db_admin()], - get_policies(), verify_db_admin, insert) - if not any(admitted_policy(p) for p in get_policies()): raise Refused() - return result - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - # Only the fixed receipt may reach the caller; suppress all library output. - import os - receipt_fd = os.dup(1) - with open(os.devnull, 'w') as sink: - os.dup2(sink.fileno(), 1); os.dup2(sink.fileno(), 2) - try: - result = main() - os.write(receipt_fd, (json.dumps(result) + '\n').encode()) - except Exception: - sys.exit(1) - finally: - os.close(receipt_fd) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3796767..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,80 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Pass one private bootstrap credential to the admitted pod over stdin.""" -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import stat -import subprocess -import sys - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def private(info, directory=False): - kind = stat.S_ISDIR if directory else stat.S_ISREG - if not kind(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused() - if not directory and info.st_nlink != 1: - raise Refused() - - -def read_password(root): - root = Path(os.path.abspath(root)) - for ancestor in (root, *root.parents): - if ancestor.is_symlink(): raise Refused() - descriptors = [] - try: - flags = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW - root_fd = os.open(root, flags); descriptors.append(root_fd) - private(os.fstat(root_fd), True) - parent_fd = os.open('privacyidea', flags, dir_fd=root_fd); descriptors.append(parent_fd) - private(os.fstat(parent_fd), True) - fd = os.open('secrets.env', os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=parent_fd) - descriptors.append(fd); private(os.fstat(fd)) - raw = os.read(fd, 65537) - if len(raw) > 65536: raise Refused() - values = [line.split('=', 1)[1] for line in raw.decode().splitlines() - if line.startswith('PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=')] - # This entry point consumes gen-secrets.sh's format, never shell code. - if len(values) != 1 or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9]{32,128}', values[0]): raise Refused() - return values[0] - finally: - for fd in reversed(descriptors): os.close(fd) - - -def run(args, payload=None): - completed = subprocess.run(args, input=payload, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60, check=False) - if completed.returncode or len(completed.stdout) > 4096: raise Refused() - return completed.stdout - - -def main(): - if len(sys.argv) > 2: raise Refused() - here = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - password = read_password(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) == 2 else here / '../../bootstrap/secrets') - pod = run(['kubectl', 'get', 'pod', '-n', 'mfa', '-l', 'app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea', - '--field-selector=status.phase=Running', '-o', 'jsonpath={.items[*].metadata.name}']).decode().strip() - if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9.-]*[a-z0-9])?', pod): raise Refused() - script = (here / 'bootstrap-admin-remote.py').read_text() - response = run(['kubectl', 'exec', '-i', '-n', 'mfa', pod, '--', 'python3', '-c', script], - json.dumps({'password': password}).encode()) - receipt = json.loads(response) - if (not isinstance(receipt, dict) or set(receipt) != {'result', 'mfa_verified'} - or receipt['result'] not in ('created', 'verified') - or receipt['mfa_verified'] is not False): raise Refused() - print('pi-admin bootstrap credential and scoped bootstrap policy verified.') - print('MFA enrollment, effective-policy review and a fresh sign-in remain required; this is not MFA acceptance.') - print('Use the approved custody entry for pi-admin; no credential is printed or exported.') - print('Legacy trigger accounts and Secrets require a separate inventory/revocation review.') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - main() - except (Refused, OSError, ValueError, TypeError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - print('ERROR: admin bootstrap refused or failed; use approved metadata-only diagnostics. No credential was printed.', file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh index 56d7f15..cd03247 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.sh @@ -1,8 +1,178 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# First-bootstrap/verification entry point for the current KeyCape profile. -# No legacy Keycloak trigger credential is generated or published. -set +x +# bootstrap-admin.sh — create pi-admin and trigger-admin in privacyIDEA +# +# Run AFTER enckey-bootstrap.sh (key material must exist before admin setup). +# +# What it does: +# 1. Creates pi-admin — full admin (single-credential bootstrap moment). +# 2. Creates trigger-admin — limited admin for Keycloak's triggerchallenge calls. +# 3. Creates the trigger-admin policy (triggerchallenge right only, via REST API). +# 4. Prints instructions to immediately enroll MFA for pi-admin. +# +# Usage: +# ./bootstrap-admin.sh [secrets-dir] [pi-url] +# +# default: ../../bootstrap/secrets +# default: https://pink.coulomb.social +# +# The script uses the in-cluster kubectl exec path for creating admin users +# (avoids the need for a network route to pink.coulomb.social during bootstrap). +# The trigger-admin policy is created via REST API, so the URL must be reachable. + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/bootstrap-admin.py" "$@" + +NAMESPACE="mfa" +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +PI_URL="${2:-https://pink.coulomb.social}" +PI_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" + +if [[ ! -f "$PI_ENV" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $PI_ENV not found — run gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +PI_ADMIN_PASS=$(bash -c "source '$PI_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD") +if [[ -z "$PI_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD not found in $PI_ENV" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# trigger-admin gets its own random password (generated here, stored in KeePassXC). +TRIGGER_PASS=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d '\n/+=' | head -c 40) + +# ── 1. Find running pod ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +PI_POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$NAMESPACE" \ + -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea \ + --field-selector=status.phase=Running \ + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null || echo "") + +if [[ -z "$PI_POD" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: no Running privacyIDEA pod found in namespace '$NAMESPACE'." >&2 + exit 1 +fi +echo "Using pod: $PI_POD" + +# ── 2. Create pi-admin (full admin) ────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Creating admin: pi-admin" +if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + pi-manage admin add pi-admin --password "$PI_ADMIN_PASS" 2>&1 | grep -q "already exist"; then + echo " pi-admin already exists — skipping." +else + echo " pi-admin created." +fi + +# ── 3. Create trigger-admin (limited admin) ─────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Creating admin: trigger-admin" +if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + pi-manage admin add trigger-admin --password "$TRIGGER_PASS" 2>&1 | grep -q "already exist"; then + echo " trigger-admin already exists — skipping password update." + echo " WARNING: if you need to rotate trigger-admin's password, do so manually." +else + echo " trigger-admin created." +fi + +# ── 4. Create K8s Secret for trigger-admin credentials ─────────────────────── +# Keycloak's privacyIDEA Provider reads the trigger-admin credentials from +# a K8s Secret that is referenced in the Keycloak realm configuration (T05/T06). +echo "" +echo "Creating K8s Secret: privacyidea-trigger-admin (namespace: mfa)" +kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-trigger-admin \ + --namespace=mfa \ + --from-literal=username=trigger-admin \ + --from-literal=password="$TRIGGER_PASS" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +echo " Done." + +# ── 5. Create pi-admin-all-rights policy via pi-manage ─────────────────────── +# Once ANY admin policy exists, privacyIDEA enforces it for all admins. +# The trigger-admin-rights policy (step 6) restricts trigger-admin to +# triggerchallenge only — but that restriction also locks out pi-admin from +# the REST API unless pi-admin has its own explicit policy granting full rights. +# This policy must be created via pi-manage (in-pod) because there is no REST +# access before it exists. +echo "" +echo "Creating pi-admin-all-rights policy via pi-manage ..." +if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + pi-manage config policy create pi-admin-all-rights admin "*" 2>&1 | grep -qi "already exist\|exists"; then + echo " pi-admin-all-rights already exists — skipping." +else + echo " pi-admin-all-rights created." +fi + +# ── 6. Create trigger-admin policy via REST API ─────────────────────────────── +# This restricts trigger-admin to the triggerchallenge action only. +# Requires pink.coulomb.social to be reachable. +echo "" +echo "Creating trigger-admin policy via REST API ($PI_URL)..." +echo " (Skip this step if $PI_URL is not yet reachable — do it via the WebUI instead.)" +echo "" + +# Authenticate as pi-admin to get a bearer token. +AUTH_RESPONSE=$(curl -sf -X POST "$PI_URL/auth" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"pi-admin\",\"password\":\"$PI_ADMIN_PASS\"}" || echo "CURL_FAILED") + +if [[ "$AUTH_RESPONSE" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + echo " Could not reach $PI_URL — skipping REST policy creation." + echo " Create the trigger-admin policy manually (see README.md — Post-deploy steps)." +else + PI_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESPONSE" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['result']['value']['token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "") + + if [[ -z "$PI_TOKEN" ]]; then + echo " ERROR: could not extract auth token from response." >&2 + echo " Create the trigger-admin policy manually (see README.md)." >&2 + else + # Create policy: trigger-admin can only call triggerchallenge. + POLICY_RESP=$(curl -sf -X POST "$PI_URL/policy/trigger-admin-rights" \ + -H "Authorization: $PI_TOKEN" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d '{ + "scope": "admin", + "action": "triggerchallenge", + "adminrealm": "*", + "adminuser": "trigger-admin", + "realm": "*", + "priority": 1 + }' || echo "CURL_FAILED") + + if [[ "$POLICY_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + echo " WARNING: policy creation request failed." >&2 + echo " Create the trigger-admin policy manually (see README.md)." >&2 + else + echo " Policy 'trigger-admin-rights' created." + fi + fi +fi + +# ── 7. Summary ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " Admin bootstrap complete." +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo "" +echo "CRITICAL — Do these steps NOW:" +echo "" +echo " 1. Store trigger-admin password in KeePassXC:" +echo " KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/privacyIDEA" +echo " Entry: trigger-admin → username=trigger-admin password=" +echo " trigger-admin password: $TRIGGER_PASS" +echo " Then shred this terminal history." +echo "" +echo " 2. Log in to the privacyIDEA WebUI as pi-admin:" +echo " $PI_URL" +echo " Enroll MFA for pi-admin IMMEDIATELY (TOTP or hardware token)." +echo " Until MFA is enrolled, pi-admin has only password authentication." +echo "" +echo " 3. Verify the trigger-admin policy:" +echo " WebUI → Config → Policies → trigger-admin-rights" +echo " Scope: admin Action: triggerchallenge AdminUser: trigger-admin" +echo " If it was not created automatically, create it here." +echo "" +echo " 4. Test admin MFA:" +echo " Log out, log back in as pi-admin — MFA challenge must appear." +echo "" +echo "Next step: run ../verify-t04.sh" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh index 6466937..14589a9 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-realm.sh @@ -1,5 +1,328 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Explicit private input; preview by default. Add --apply for the reviewed change. -set +x +# bootstrap-realm.sh — configure the "coulomb" realm in privacyIDEA +# +# Run AFTER bootstrap-admin.sh (pi-admin must exist and have MFA enrolled). +# +# What it does: +# 1. Authenticates as pi-admin to get a short-lived JWT. +# 2. Creates the LDAP resolver "lldap-coulomb" pointing to the in-cluster LLDAP. +# 3. Creates (or updates) the "coulomb" realm using that resolver. +# 4. Creates a self-enrollment policy: any authenticated user may enroll TOTP. +# 5. Prints a checklist of manual steps to complete via the WebUI. +# +# This script is idempotent: re-running it will update existing objects. +# +# Usage: +# ./bootstrap-realm.sh [secrets-dir] [pi-url] [lldap-bind-pass] +# +# default: ../../bootstrap/secrets +# default: https://pink.coulomb.social +# default: read from secrets-dir/lldap/secrets.env +# +# The script exits 0 if all steps succeed, non-zero otherwise. +# Partial failures are reported but do not abort subsequent steps. + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "$0")/realm_bootstrap.py" "$@" + +PI_HELPER="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/pi_api.py" + +NAMESPACE="mfa" +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +PI_URL="${2:-https://pink.coulomb.social}" +PI_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" + +RESOLVER_NAME="lldap-coulomb" +REALM_NAME="coulomb" +LLDAP_URL="ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890" +LLDAP_BASE_DN="dc=netkingdom,dc=local" +LLDAP_BIND_DN="uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local" +# Numeric resolver parameters. A resolver with these unset still resolves +# users, but the WebUI refuses to save or test it until they are filled in by +# hand, and a write that omits them drops whatever was there (NK-WP-0033, +# 2026-08-27). +LDAP_TIMEOUT="${LDAP_TIMEOUT:-5}" +LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT="${LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT:-120}" +LDAP_SIZELIMIT="${LDAP_SIZELIMIT:-500}" + +PASS_COUNT=0 +FAIL_COUNT=0 + +ok() { echo " [OK] $1"; PASS_COUNT=$((PASS_COUNT + 1)); } +fail() { echo " [FAIL] $1"; FAIL_COUNT=$((FAIL_COUNT + 1)); } +info() { echo " [INFO] $1"; } + +# ── Validate secrets ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +for f in "$PI_ENV" "$LLDAP_ENV"; do + if [[ ! -f "$f" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $f not found — run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 + fi +done + +read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } + +PI_ADMIN_PASS=$(read_env "$PI_ENV" PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD) +LLDAP_BIND_PW="${3:-$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS)}" + +if [[ -z "$PI_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD not found in $PI_ENV" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +if [[ -z "$LLDAP_BIND_PW" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS not found in $LLDAP_ENV" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# ── Authenticate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Authenticating to privacyIDEA at $PI_URL ..." +if ! AUTH_RESPONSE=$(PI_ADMIN_PASS="$PI_ADMIN_PASS" python3 -c ' +import json +import os +print() +print(json.dumps({"username": "pi-admin", "password": os.environ["PI_ADMIN_PASS"]})) +' | python3 "$PI_HELPER" POST "$PI_URL/auth"); then + echo "ERROR: privacyIDEA authentication request failed." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +PI_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESPONSE" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['result']['value']['token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "") + +if [[ -z "$PI_TOKEN" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: Authentication failed — check pi-admin credentials and MFA enrollment." >&2 + exit 1 +fi +info "Authenticated as pi-admin (token obtained)" + +pi_api() { + local method="$1" path="$2" body="${3:-}" + { printf '%s\n' "$PI_TOKEN"; printf '%s' "$body"; } | + python3 "$PI_HELPER" "$method" "$PI_URL$path" || true +} + +check_result() { + local step="$1"; local resp="$2" + if [[ "$resp" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + fail "$step — curl request failed" + return 1 + fi + local status + status=$(echo "$resp" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('result',{}).get('status',''))" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ "$status" == "True" || "$status" == "true" ]]; then + ok "$step" + return 0 + else + local err + err=$(echo "$resp" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('result',{}).get('error',{}).get('message','unknown'))" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown") + fail "$step — $err" + return 1 + fi +} + +# ── 1. Create LDAP resolver ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 1: Creating LDAP resolver '$RESOLVER_NAME' ..." + +# USERINFO maps privacyIDEA fields to LLDAP/LDAP attributes. +# LLDAP uses standard inetOrgPerson attributes. +USERINFO='{"username": "uid", "phone": "telephoneNumber", "mobile": "mobile", "email": "mail", "surname": "sn", "givenname": "givenName"}' + +RESOLVER_BODY=$(LLDAP_BIND_PW="$LLDAP_BIND_PW" python3 -c " +import json, os +body = { + 'type': 'ldapresolver', + 'LDAPURI': '$(echo "$LLDAP_URL" | sed "s/'/'\\''/g")', + 'BINDDN': '$(echo "$LLDAP_BIND_DN" | sed "s/'/'\\''/g")', + 'BINDPW': os.environ['LLDAP_BIND_PW'], + 'LDAPBASE': '$LLDAP_BASE_DN', + 'LOGINNAMEATTRIBUTE': 'uid', + 'LDAPSEARCHFILTER': '(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)', + 'LDAPFILTER': '(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=%s))', + 'USERINFO': json.dumps({\"username\": \"uid\", \"phone\": \"telephoneNumber\", \"mobile\": \"mobile\", \"email\": \"mail\", \"surname\": \"sn\", \"givenname\": \"givenName\"}), + 'UIDTYPE': 'uid', + 'NOREFERRALS': True, + 'NOSCHEMAS': True, + 'TIMEOUT': int('$LDAP_TIMEOUT'), + 'CACHE_TIMEOUT': int('$LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT'), + 'SIZELIMIT': int('$LDAP_SIZELIMIT') +} +print(json.dumps(body)) +") + +RESP=$(pi_api POST "/resolver/$RESOLVER_NAME" "$RESOLVER_BODY") +check_result "LDAP resolver '$RESOLVER_NAME' created/updated" "$RESP" || true + +# ── 2. Test resolver ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 2: Testing resolver '$RESOLVER_NAME' ..." +TEST_RESP=$(pi_api GET "/resolver/$RESOLVER_NAME") +if [[ "$TEST_RESP" != "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + RESOLVER_TYPE=$(echo "$TEST_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); r=d.get('result',{}).get('value',{}); print(list(r.values())[0].get('type','') if r else '')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ "$RESOLVER_TYPE" == "ldapresolver" ]]; then + ok "Resolver '$RESOLVER_NAME' exists and is type ldapresolver" + else + fail "Resolver '$RESOLVER_NAME' type unexpected: '$RESOLVER_TYPE'" + fi +else + fail "Could not retrieve resolver '$RESOLVER_NAME'" +fi + +# ── 3. Create realm ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 3: Creating realm '$REALM_NAME' ..." + +# privacyIDEA realm creation: POST /realm/ with resolvers list +REALM_BODY=$(python3 -c " +import json +body = { + 'resolvers': ['$RESOLVER_NAME'], + 'priority.$RESOLVER_NAME': 1 +} +print(json.dumps(body)) +") + +RESP=$(pi_api POST "/realm/$REALM_NAME" "$REALM_BODY") +check_result "Realm '$REALM_NAME' created/updated" "$RESP" || true + +# ── 4. Verify realm ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 4: Verifying realm '$REALM_NAME' ..." +REALM_RESP=$(pi_api GET "/realm/") +if [[ "$REALM_RESP" != "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + REALM_EXISTS=$(echo "$REALM_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); realms=d.get('result',{}).get('value',{}); print('yes' if '$REALM_NAME' in realms else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$REALM_EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + ok "Realm '$REALM_NAME' confirmed in realm list" + else + fail "Realm '$REALM_NAME' not found in realm list after creation" + fi +else + fail "Could not retrieve realm list" +fi + +# ── 5. Set default realm ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 5: Setting '$REALM_NAME' as the default realm ..." +RESP=$(pi_api POST "/defaultrealm/$REALM_NAME") +check_result "Default realm set to '$REALM_NAME'" "$RESP" || true + +# ── 6. Create self-enrollment policy ───────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 6: Creating self-enrollment policy ..." +# Allows users in the coulomb realm to self-enroll TOTP tokens via the self-service portal. +# Scope must be 'user' (not 'enrollment') — self-service actions live in the user scope. +# The WebUI self-service portal is at pink-account.coulomb.social. +ENROLL_POLICY=$(python3 -c " +import json +body = { + 'scope': 'user', + 'action': 'enrollTOTP, delete, disable', + 'realm': '$REALM_NAME', + 'user': '*', + 'client': '', + 'adminrealm': '', + 'priority': 1, + 'active': True +} +print(json.dumps(body)) +") + +RESP=$(pi_api POST "/policy/totp-self-enrollment" "$ENROLL_POLICY") +check_result "Policy 'totp-self-enrollment' created" "$RESP" || true + +# ── 7. Create human-readable authenticator labels ───────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 7: Creating authenticator label policy ..." +# Google Authenticator and compatible wallets display the issuer and account +# label embedded in the otpauth URI. Keep the token serial internal and make +# the user/realm visible so operators cannot confuse privileged identities. +TOKEN_LABEL_POLICY=$(python3 -c " +import json +body = { + 'scope': 'enrollment', + 'action': 'tokenissuer=Coulomb, tokenlabel={user}@{realm}', + 'realm': '$REALM_NAME', + 'user': '*', + 'client': '', + 'adminrealm': '', + 'priority': 1, + 'active': True +} +print(json.dumps(body)) +") + +RESP=$(pi_api POST "/policy/coulomb-friendly-token-labels" "$TOKEN_LABEL_POLICY") +check_result "Policy 'coulomb-friendly-token-labels' created" "$RESP" || true + +# ── 8. Create authentication policy (fail open for token-less users) ────────── +echo "" +echo "Step 8: Creating authentication policy ..." +# passthru: users without an enrolled token are allowed through (password only). +# This enables a phased MFA rollout: enroll first, enforce later. +# To enforce MFA for all users, remove 'passthru' from the action list and +# add 'otppin=tokenpin' instead — but ONLY after all users have enrolled a token. +AUTH_POLICY=$(python3 -c " +import json +body = { + 'scope': 'authentication', + 'action': 'passthru', + 'realm': '$REALM_NAME', + 'user': '*', + 'client': '', + 'adminrealm': '', + 'priority': 1, + 'active': True +} +print(json.dumps(body)) +") + +RESP=$(pi_api POST "/policy/mfa-passthru-phase1" "$AUTH_POLICY") +check_result "Policy 'mfa-passthru-phase1' created (passthru for token-less users)" "$RESP" || true + +# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " Realm bootstrap: PASS=$PASS_COUNT FAIL=$FAIL_COUNT" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo "" + +if [[ "$FAIL_COUNT" -gt 0 ]]; then + echo "INCOMPLETE — resolve FAIL items above before proceeding." + echo "" +fi + +echo "Manual steps required after this script:" +echo "" +echo " 1. Verify the LDAP resolver resolves users:" +echo " WebUI → Config → Resolver → $RESOLVER_NAME → [test] → enter a username" +echo " A user should resolve from LLDAP. If not, check the LLDAP bind password." +echo "" +echo " 2. Log in to the self-service portal as a regular user:" +echo " https://pink-account.coulomb.social" +echo " Enroll a TOTP token (use Google Authenticator or a hardware key)." +echo "" +echo " 3. Test MFA via KeyCape:" +echo " Visit an application protected by kc.coulomb.social." +echo " After password auth (Authelia), you should see a TOTP challenge." +echo " Enter the OTP. If it passes, T06 is complete." +echo "" +echo " 4. Phase 2 — enforce MFA (after all users have enrolled):" +echo " WebUI → Config → Policies → mfa-passthru-phase1 → set active=False" +echo " Create a new policy: scope=authentication, action=otppin=tokenpin, realm=$REALM_NAME" +echo " This blocks login for users without an enrolled token." +echo "" +echo "Next step: ../verify-t06.sh --user platform-root" + +if [[ "$FAIL_COUNT" -gt 0 ]]; then + exit 1 +fi +exit 0 diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh index 8d62f2d..649a4cb 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh @@ -1,5 +1,89 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Scoped read-only diagnostic; see README.md. No automatic credential retrieval. -set +x +# check-user-mfa-state.sh — non-secret privacyIDEA MFA state diagnostic. +# +# Reports realm presence and user/token counts for a user without printing +# passwords, OTP seeds, admin JWTs, token serials, or token metadata. +# +# Usage: +# bash check-user-mfa-state.sh [username] + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "$0")/mfa_state.py" "$@" + +USERNAME="${1:-platform-root}" +PI_URL="${PI_URL:-https://pink.coulomb.social}" +SSO_NAMESPACE="${SSO_NAMESPACE:-sso}" +KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" + +TOKEN="$( + "$KUBECTL" get secret keycape-pi-token -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' 2>/dev/null | base64 -d 2>/dev/null || true +)" +if [[ -z "$TOKEN" ]]; then + TOKEN="$( + "$KUBECTL" get secret keycape-pi-token -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + -o jsonpath='{.data.pi_admin_token}' 2>/dev/null | base64 -d 2>/dev/null || true + )" +fi + +if [[ -z "$TOKEN" || "$TOKEN" == "PENDING_create-pi-token.sh" ]]; then + echo "[FAIL] keycape-pi-token is missing or still a placeholder." + exit 1 +fi + +api_get() { + local path="$1" + curl -sk -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$PI_URL$path" +} + +json_field() { + python3 -c "$1" +} + +echo "privacyIDEA MFA state for user: $USERNAME" +echo "Endpoint: $PI_URL" +echo "" + +REALM_RESP="$(api_get "/realm/")" +echo "Realms:" +printf '%s' "$REALM_RESP" | json_field ' +import json +import sys + +data = json.load(sys.stdin) +if not data.get("result", {}).get("status", False): + print(" [WARN] realm query returned status=false") + err = data.get("result", {}).get("error", {}) + if err: + print(" [WARN] error=" + str(err.get("message", err))) +realms = data.get("result", {}).get("value", {}) +if not realms: + print(" [WARN] no realms returned") +for name in sorted(realms): + print(" - " + name + " default=" + str(bool(realms[name].get("default")))) +' + +for realm in coulomb netkingdom; do + echo "" + echo "Realm: $realm" + USER_RESP="$(api_get "/user/?realm=$realm&username=$USERNAME")" + TOKEN_RESP="$(api_get "/token/?realm=$realm&user=$USERNAME")" + + printf '%s' "$USER_RESP" | json_field ' +import json +import sys + +data = json.load(sys.stdin) +users = data.get("result", {}).get("value", {}).get("users", []) +print(f" users={len(users)}") +' + printf '%s' "$TOKEN_RESP" | json_field ' +import json +import sys + +data = json.load(sys.stdin) +value = data.get("result", {}).get("value", {}) +tokens = value.get("tokens", []) if isinstance(value, dict) else [] +active = sum(1 for token in tokens if token.get("active", True)) +print(f" tokens={len(tokens)} active={active}") +' +done diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/create-secrets.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/create-secrets.sh index 2dd5f96..59eb21d 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/create-secrets.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/create-secrets.sh @@ -1,7 +1,65 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Private creation or exact-match verification; rotations require --rotate-key. -set +x +# create-secrets.sh — create the privacyidea-config K8s Secret +# +# Usage: +# ./create-secrets.sh [secrets-dir] +# +# is the output directory from sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh +# (default: ../../bootstrap/secrets). +# +# Creates ONE Secret in the mfa namespace: +# privacyidea-config — PI_SECRET_KEY, PI_PEPPER, PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI +# +# This secret must exist before applying deployment.yaml. +# +# The enckey and auditkey Secrets (privacyidea-enckey, privacyidea-auditkeys) +# are created separately by enckey-bootstrap.sh AFTER the first pod start, +# because those keys are auto-generated by the container on first run. +# +# Re-run this script if you rotate PI_SECRET_KEY or PI_PEPPER in KeePassXC. + set -euo pipefail -umask 077 -SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" -exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py" privacyidea "$@" + +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +PI_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" + +if [[ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: secrets directory not found: $SECRETS_DIR" >&2 + echo "Run sso-mfa/bootstrap/gen-secrets.sh first." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [[ ! -f "$PI_ENV" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $PI_ENV not found" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Read values from the generated env file in a subshell to avoid polluting env. +PI_SECRET_KEY=$(bash -c "source '$PI_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$PI_SECRET_KEY") +PI_PEPPER=$(bash -c "source '$PI_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$PI_PEPPER") +PI_DB_PASSWORD=$(bash -c "source '$PI_ENV' 2>/dev/null; echo \$PI_DB_PASSWORD") + +if [[ -z "$PI_SECRET_KEY" || -z "$PI_PEPPER" || -z "$PI_DB_PASSWORD" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: could not read PI_SECRET_KEY, PI_PEPPER, or PI_DB_PASSWORD from $PI_ENV" >&2 + echo "Check that gen-secrets.sh ran successfully." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Construct the SQLAlchemy database URI. +# CloudNativePG read-write service: net-kingdom-pg-rw.databases.svc.cluster.local +PI_DB_URI="postgresql://privacyidea:${PI_DB_PASSWORD}@net-kingdom-pg-rw.databases.svc.cluster.local:5432/privacyidea_db" + +echo "Creating K8s Secret: privacyidea-config (namespace: mfa)" +kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-config \ + --namespace=mfa \ + --from-literal=PI_SECRET_KEY="$PI_SECRET_KEY" \ + --from-literal=PI_PEPPER="$PI_PEPPER" \ + --from-literal=PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI="$PI_DB_URI" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +echo "" +echo "Done. Secret privacyidea-config created in namespace: mfa" +echo "" +echo "Next:" +echo " Apply manifests (see README.md apply order)." +echo " After the pod is Running, run: ./enckey-bootstrap.sh" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml index fa56b92..7c110fd 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ # # After first pod starts successfully: # 5. enckey-bootstrap.sh — extract enckey + audit keys, create DR Secrets -# 6. bootstrap-admin.sh — create/verify pi-admin; attended MFA acceptance follows +# 6. bootstrap-admin.sh — create pi-admin (+ MFA enrolment) and trigger-admin # # Container port: 8080. # ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker listens on port 8080 (gunicorn). @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ spec: # Raise limits for production; privacyIDEA handles crypto and DB queries. resources: requests: - cpu: "10m" - memory: "160Mi" + cpu: "100m" + memory: "256Mi" limits: cpu: "500m" memory: "512Mi" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh index 7f75e4c..f707499 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-bootstrap.sh @@ -1,5 +1,121 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Explicit private export; first-bootstrap audit creation requires the named flag. -set +x +# enckey-bootstrap.sh — extract privacyIDEA key material and create DR Secrets +# +# Run ONCE after the first successful pod start (deployment.yaml applied and Running). +# +# What it does: +# 1. Finds the running privacyIDEA pod. +# 2. Generates RSA audit keys inside the pod if they do not exist yet. +# 3. Extracts: enckey, private.pem, public.pem → local files. +# 4. Creates K8s Secrets privacyidea-enckey and privacyidea-auditkeys. +# These are disaster-recovery copies — the authoritative key material +# lives in the privacyidea-data PVC. +# 5. Prints instructions to copy the extracted files into KeePassXC. +# +# Usage: +# ./enckey-bootstrap.sh [secrets-dir] +# +# is where local copies are written (default: ../../bootstrap/secrets). +# Files in secrets-dir are sensitive — shred them after entering into KeePassXC. +# +# Re-running is safe: kubectl apply is idempotent; pi-manage create_audit_keys +# does not overwrite existing keys. + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/key-custody.py" export "$@" + +NAMESPACE="mfa" +SECRETS_DIR="${1:-../../bootstrap/secrets}" +PI_DIR="$SECRETS_DIR/privacyidea" + +mkdir -p "$PI_DIR" + +# ── 1. Find the running pod ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "Looking for running privacyIDEA pod in namespace: $NAMESPACE" +PI_POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$NAMESPACE" \ + -l app.kubernetes.io/name=privacyidea \ + --field-selector=status.phase=Running \ + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null || echo "") + +if [[ -z "$PI_POD" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: no Running privacyIDEA pod found in namespace '$NAMESPACE'." >&2 + echo " Apply the manifests first and wait for the pod to reach Running state:" >&2 + echo " kubectl get pods -n $NAMESPACE -w" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +echo "Found pod: $PI_POD" + +# ── 2. Generate audit keys if missing ──────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Checking for audit keys..." +if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- test -f /etc/privacyidea/private.pem 2>/dev/null; then + echo " Audit keys already exist — skipping generation." +else + echo " Generating audit keys (pi-manage create_audit_keys)..." + kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- pi-manage create_audit_keys + echo " Done." +fi + +# ── 3. Check enckey exists (auto-generated by PI on first DB init) ──────────── +echo "" +echo "Checking for encryption key..." +if ! kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- test -f /etc/privacyidea/enckey 2>/dev/null; then + echo " enckey not found — generating (pi-manage create_enckey)..." + kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- pi-manage create_enckey + echo " Done." +else + echo " enckey exists." +fi + +# ── 4. Extract key material to local files ──────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Extracting key material..." + +kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + cat /etc/privacyidea/enckey > "$PI_DIR/pi.enc" +echo " Wrote: $PI_DIR/pi.enc" + +kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + cat /etc/privacyidea/private.pem > "$PI_DIR/private.pem" +echo " Wrote: $PI_DIR/private.pem" + +kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + cat /etc/privacyidea/public.pem > "$PI_DIR/public.pem" +echo " Wrote: $PI_DIR/public.pem" + +# ── 5. Create K8s Secrets (DR copies) ──────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "Creating K8s Secret: privacyidea-enckey (namespace: $NAMESPACE)" +kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-enckey \ + --namespace="$NAMESPACE" \ + --from-file=enckey="$PI_DIR/pi.enc" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +echo "Creating K8s Secret: privacyidea-auditkeys (namespace: $NAMESPACE)" +kubectl create secret generic privacyidea-auditkeys \ + --namespace="$NAMESPACE" \ + --from-file=private.pem="$PI_DIR/private.pem" \ + --from-file=public.pem="$PI_DIR/public.pem" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + +# ── 6. Summary and KeePassXC instructions ───────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " Key material extracted and K8s Secrets created." +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo "" +echo "IMPORTANT — Store the extracted files in KeePassXC NOW:" +echo "" +echo " KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/privacyIDEA" +echo " Entry: PI_ENCFILE" +echo " → Attach $PI_DIR/pi.enc as a binary attachment." +echo " Entry: Audit Keys" +echo " → Attach $PI_DIR/private.pem and $PI_DIR/public.pem" +echo "" +echo " Then shred the local copies:" +echo " find '$PI_DIR' -name '*.enc' -o -name '*.pem' | xargs shred -u" +echo "" +echo "DR restore: if the privacyidea-data PVC is lost, copy these files" +echo " back into a fresh PVC before starting the pod." +echo "" +echo "Next step: run ./bootstrap-admin.sh" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-restore.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-restore.sh deleted file mode 100644 index f3b3153..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/enckey-restore.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Restore private recovery files into the reviewed helper pod's actual data PVC. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/key-custody.py" restore "$@" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py deleted file mode 100644 index 99abe4c..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,138 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""In-pod key transport. Only invoke through key-custody.py (captured output).""" -import base64 -import fcntl -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import secrets -import stat -import sys - -FILES = ('enckey', 'private.pem', 'public.pem') -LIMIT = 65536 - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def validate(values): - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - if set(values) != set(FILES) or len(values['enckey']) != 96: - raise Refused() - if any(not value or len(value) > LIMIT for value in values.values()): - raise Refused() - private = serialization.load_pem_private_key(values['private.pem'], password=None) - public = serialization.load_pem_public_key(values['public.pem']) - if (not isinstance(private, rsa.RSAPrivateKey) or private.key_size < 2048 - or not isinstance(public, rsa.RSAPublicKey) - or private.public_key().public_numbers() != public.public_numbers()): - raise Refused() - - -def read(directory, name): - fd = os.open(name, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK, dir_fd=directory) - try: - info = os.fstat(fd) - forbidden = 0o022 if name == 'public.pem' else 0o027 - if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_nlink != 1 or info.st_mode & forbidden: - raise Refused() - with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd), 'rb') as stream: - data = stream.read(LIMIT + 1) - after = os.stat(name, dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - if len(data) > LIMIT or any(getattr(info, k) != getattr(after, k) - for k in ('st_dev', 'st_ino', 'st_size', 'st_mtime_ns', 'st_ctime_ns')): - raise Refused() - return data - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -def install(directory, values, *, uid=0, gid=999): - """Verify every existing file before creating anything; never replace.""" - missing = [] - for name, value in values.items(): - try: - if read(directory, name) != value: - raise Refused() - except FileNotFoundError: - missing.append(name) - for name in missing: - temp = '.key-custody-' + secrets.token_hex(12) - fd = os.open(temp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, dir_fd=directory) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: - stream.write(values[name]); stream.flush() - os.fchown(stream.fileno(), uid, gid) - os.fchmod(stream.fileno(), 0o644 if name == 'public.pem' else 0o640) - os.fsync(stream.fileno()) - os.link(temp, name, src_dir_fd=directory, dst_dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - os.unlink(temp, dir_fd=directory) - os.fsync(directory) - finally: - try: - os.unlink(temp, dir_fd=directory) - except FileNotFoundError: - pass - if any(read(directory, name) != value for name, value in values.items()): - raise Refused() - - -def operate(request, root=Path('/etc/privacyidea'), *, uid=0, gid=999): - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (root, *root.parents)): - raise Refused() - directory = os.open(root, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) - try: - # The admitted service uses fsGroup 999, which may make its PVC group-writable. - if os.fstat(directory).st_mode & 0o002: - raise Refused() - fcntl.flock(directory, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB) - if request == {'action': 'initialize-audit'}: - # This explicit first-bootstrap action never creates/replaces enckey. - enckey = read(directory, 'enckey') - if len(enckey) != 96: - raise Refused() - for name in ('private.pem', 'public.pem'): - try: - os.stat(name, dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - except FileNotFoundError: - continue - raise Refused() - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - private = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) - values = {'enckey': enckey, - 'private.pem': private.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, - serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, serialization.NoEncryption()), - 'public.pem': private.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, - serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)} - validate(values) - install(directory, values, uid=uid, gid=gid) - return {'result': 'initialized'} - if request == {'action': 'export'}: - values = {name: read(directory, name) for name in FILES} - validate(values) - return {name: base64.b64encode(value).decode() for name, value in values.items()} - if set(request) == {'action', 'keys'} and request['action'] == 'restore': - values = {name: base64.b64decode(value, validate=True) for name, value in request['keys'].items()} - validate(values) - install(directory, values, uid=uid, gid=gid) - return {'result': 'restored'} - raise Refused() - finally: - os.close(directory) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - raw = sys.stdin.buffer.read(4 * LIMIT + 1) - if len(raw) > 4 * LIMIT: - raise Refused() - print(json.dumps(operate(json.loads(raw)))) - except Exception: - # Transport may carry key bytes; diagnostics must never serialize them. - print('Key custody operation refused or failed.', file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7c79396..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,254 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Captured key export/restore for the admitted privacyIDEA PVC profile.""" -import argparse -import base64 -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import secrets -import sys - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -common = load('service_custody', HERE.parents[1] / 'bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py') -remote = load('key_custody_remote', HERE / 'key-custody-remote.py') -Refused = common.Refused -LOCAL = {'enckey': 'pi.enc', 'private.pem': 'private.pem', 'public.pem': 'public.pem'} -TARGETS = {'privacyidea-enckey': ('enckey',), 'privacyidea-auditkeys': ('private.pem', 'public.pem')} -RECOVERY_POD = 'privacyidea-key-recovery' -SLEEP = ['python3', '-c', 'import time; time.sleep(3600)'] -IMAGE = re.compile(r'ghcr\.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}\Z') -UID = re.compile(r'[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,128}\Z') - - -def get(kind, name=None, missing=False): - args = ['kubectl', 'get', kind] - if name: - args.append(name) - args += ['-n', 'mfa', '-o', 'json'] - if missing: - args.append('--ignore-not-found') - raw = common.run(args) - return json.loads(raw) if raw.strip() else None - - -def meta(obj, kind, name=None): - if not isinstance(obj, dict) or obj.get('kind') != kind: - raise Refused() - m = obj.get('metadata', {}) - if (m.get('namespace') != 'mfa' or (name and m.get('name') != name) - or not UID.fullmatch(str(m.get('uid', ''))) or m.get('deletionTimestamp')): - raise Refused() - return m - - -def mounts_data(spec, container): - volumes = {v['name']: v for v in spec.get('volumes', [])} - return any(v.get('mountPath') == '/etc/privacyidea' and not v.get('subPath') - and not v.get('readOnly') and volumes.get(v['name'], {}).get('persistentVolumeClaim', {}).get('claimName') == 'privacyidea-data' - for v in container.get('volumeMounts', [])) - - -def pod_uses_data(pod): - return any(v.get('persistentVolumeClaim', {}).get('claimName') == 'privacyidea-data' - for v in pod.get('spec', {}).get('volumes', [])) - - -def context(action, expected_uid=None): - deployment = get('deployment', 'privacyidea') - dm = meta(deployment, 'Deployment', 'privacyidea') - template = deployment['spec']['template']['spec'] - container = next(c for c in template['containers'] if c['name'] == 'privacyidea') - if template.get('securityContext', {}).get('fsGroup') != 999 or not mounts_data(template, container): - raise Refused() - pvc = get('pvc', 'privacyidea-data') - pm = meta(pvc, 'PersistentVolumeClaim', 'privacyidea-data') - if pvc.get('status', {}).get('phase') != 'Bound' or (expected_uid and pm['uid'] != expected_uid): - raise Refused() - listing = get('pods') - if listing.get('kind') not in ('PodList', 'List'): - raise Refused() - users = [pod for pod in listing['items'] if pod_uses_data(pod)] - if len(users) != 1: - raise Refused() - pod = users[0]; podmeta = meta(pod, 'Pod') - spec = pod['spec'] - if pod.get('status', {}).get('phase') != 'Running': - raise Refused() - if action == 'restore': - if (deployment['spec'].get('replicas', 1) != 0 - or any(deployment.get('status', {}).get(k, 0) for k in ('replicas', 'readyReplicas', 'availableReplicas', 'updatedReplicas')) - or deployment.get('status', {}).get('observedGeneration', 0) < dm.get('generation', 1)): - raise Refused() - if (podmeta['name'] != RECOVERY_POD or podmeta.get('annotations', {}).get('net-kingdom/recovery-pvc-uid') != expected_uid - or spec.get('automountServiceAccountToken') is not False - or any(spec.get(k) for k in ('hostNetwork', 'hostPID', 'hostIPC', 'initContainers', 'ephemeralContainers')) - or len(spec.get('containers', [])) != 1 or len(spec.get('volumes', [])) != 1): - raise Refused() - c = spec['containers'][0] - if (c.get('name') != 'recovery' or not IMAGE.fullmatch(c.get('image', '')) - or c.get('command') != SLEEP or c.get('args') or c.get('env') or c.get('envFrom') - or c.get('securityContext', {}).get('privileged') - or not mounts_data(spec, c)): - raise Refused() - else: - c = next(c for c in spec['containers'] if c['name'] == 'privacyidea') - if not mounts_data(spec, c): - raise Refused() - owners = podmeta.get('ownerReferences', []) - if len(owners) != 1 or owners[0].get('kind') != 'ReplicaSet' or not owners[0].get('controller'): - raise Refused() - rs = get('replicaset', owners[0]['name']); rm = meta(rs, 'ReplicaSet', owners[0]['name']) - if rm['uid'] != owners[0]['uid'] or not any(o.get('uid') == dm['uid'] and o.get('kind') == 'Deployment' and o.get('controller') for o in rm.get('ownerReferences', [])): - raise Refused() - if not any(s.get('name') == c['name'] and s.get('ready') for s in pod['status'].get('containerStatuses', [])): - raise Refused() - return {'pod': podmeta['name'], 'pod_uid': podmeta['uid'], 'pvc_uid': pm['uid'], - 'deployment_uid': dm['uid'], 'container': c['name']} - - -def invoke(ctx, request): - source = (HERE / 'key-custody-remote.py').read_text() - raw = common.run(['kubectl', 'exec', '-i', '-n', 'mfa', ctx['pod'], '-c', ctx['container'], - '--', 'python3', '-c', source], json.dumps(request).encode()) - return json.loads(raw) - - -def read_backups(): - result = {} - for name in TARGETS: - obj = get('secret', name, missing=True) - result[name] = common.decode_secret(json.dumps(obj), 'mfa', name) if obj is not None else None - return result - - -def verify_backups(backups, values): - for name, keys in TARGETS.items(): - old = backups[name] - if old is not None and any(old['data'].get(k) != base64.b64encode(values[k]).decode() for k in keys): - raise Refused() - - -def local_values(directory): - result = {name: common.read_private(directory, local) for name, local in LOCAL.items()} - remote.validate(result) - return result - - -def save_local(directory, values): - # All differences are checked before creating any file. Existing copies survive. - missing = [] - for name, local in LOCAL.items(): - try: - if common.read_private(directory, local) != values[name]: - raise Refused() - except FileNotFoundError: - missing.append((name, local)) - for name, local in missing: - temporary = '.key-export-' + secrets.token_hex(12) - fd = os.open(temporary, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600, dir_fd=directory) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: - stream.write(values[name]); stream.flush(); os.fsync(stream.fileno()) - os.link(temporary, local, src_dir_fd=directory, dst_dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - os.unlink(temporary, dir_fd=directory); os.fsync(directory) - finally: - try: - os.unlink(temporary, dir_fd=directory) - except FileNotFoundError: - pass - if local_values(directory) != values: - raise Refused() - - -def perform(action, root, expected_uid=None, initialize=False): - if action == 'restore' and (not expected_uid or not UID.fullmatch(expected_uid)): - raise Refused() - with common.custody(root, ('privacyidea',)) as directories: - directory = directories['privacyidea'] - values = local_values(directory) if action == 'restore' else None - ctx = context(action, expected_uid) - if action == 'restore': - result = invoke(ctx, {'action': 'restore', 'keys': {k: base64.b64encode(v).decode() for k, v in values.items()}}) - if result != {'result': 'restored'} or context(action, expected_uid) != ctx: - raise Refused() - else: - backups = read_backups() - if initialize: - if any(value is not None for value in backups.values()): - raise Refused() - # Independent local recovery copies also prohibit first-bootstrap creation. - for name in LOCAL.values(): - try: - os.stat(name, dir_fd=directory, follow_symlinks=False) - except FileNotFoundError: - continue - raise Refused() - if invoke(ctx, {'action': 'initialize-audit'}) != {'result': 'initialized'}: - raise Refused() - encoded = invoke(ctx, {'action': 'export'}) - values = {k: base64.b64decode(v, validate=True) for k, v in encoded.items()} - remote.validate(values) - if context(action) != ctx: - raise Refused() - verify_backups(backups, values) - save_local(directory, values) - for name, keys in TARGETS.items(): - common.publish('mfa', name, {k: values[k] for k in keys}, backups[name], set()) - print('Key custody operation verified. Retain independent recovery copies; native service acceptance remains required.') - - -def render(image, pvc_uid): - if not image or not IMAGE.fullmatch(image) or not pvc_uid or not UID.fullmatch(pvc_uid): - raise Refused() - return {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'Pod', - 'metadata': {'name': RECOVERY_POD, 'namespace': 'mfa', - 'annotations': {'net-kingdom/recovery-pvc-uid': pvc_uid}}, - 'spec': {'restartPolicy': 'Never', 'automountServiceAccountToken': False, - 'securityContext': {'runAsUser': 0, 'runAsGroup': 999, 'fsGroup': 999}, - 'containers': [{'name': 'recovery', 'image': image, 'command': SLEEP, - 'securityContext': {'allowPrivilegeEscalation': False, 'readOnlyRootFilesystem': True, - 'capabilities': {'drop': ['ALL'], 'add': ['CHOWN', 'DAC_OVERRIDE', 'FOWNER']}}, - 'resources': {'requests': {'cpu': '10m', 'memory': '64Mi'}, 'limits': {'cpu': '100m', 'memory': '128Mi'}}, - 'volumeMounts': [{'name': 'data', 'mountPath': '/etc/privacyidea'}]}], - 'volumes': [{'name': 'data', 'persistentVolumeClaim': {'claimName': 'privacyidea-data'}}]}} - - -def main(): - class QuietParser(argparse.ArgumentParser): - def error(self, message): - raise Refused() - parser = QuietParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('action', choices=['export', 'restore', 'render-pod']) - parser.add_argument('root', nargs='?') - parser.add_argument('--pvc-uid') - parser.add_argument('--image') - parser.add_argument('--initialize-audit-keys', action='store_true') - args = parser.parse_args() - if args.action == 'render-pod': - if args.root or args.initialize_audit_keys: - raise Refused() - print(json.dumps(render(args.image, args.pvc_uid), indent=2)) - else: - if not args.root or args.image or (args.action == 'restore' and args.initialize_audit_keys) or (args.action == 'export' and args.pvc_uid): - raise Refused() - perform(args.action, args.root, args.pvc_uid, args.initialize_audit_keys) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - main() - except Exception: - print('ERROR: key custody refused or failed; diagnostics suppressed. A failed write may have partial effects. ' - 'Retain copies and reconcile target state before retrying.', file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/mfa_state.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/mfa_state.py deleted file mode 100644 index e4a5de8..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/mfa_state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Read-only, scoped factor diagnostic. No credential discovery or issuance.""" -import argparse -import base64 -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import ssl -import stat -import sys -import time -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request - -REALM = 'coulomb' -PROBE = 'KCFACTORSCOPE01' -MAX_BODY = 1024 * 1024 -MAX_FACTORS = 1000 - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -class QuietParser(argparse.ArgumentParser): - def error(self, message): - raise Refused('arguments') - - -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs): - return None - - -def unique_object(pairs): - result = {} - for key, value in pairs: - if key in result: - raise Refused('response') - result[key] = value - return result - - -def endpoint(value): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.isascii() or any(ord(c) <= 32 for c in value): - raise Refused('endpoint') - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value) - if parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in ('', '/'): - raise Refused('endpoint') - if value.rstrip('/') in ('https://pink.coulomb.social', 'https://pink.coulomb.social:443'): - return value.rstrip('/') - # Literal loopback only: an explicitly selected local fixture/approved forward. - if (parsed.hostname not in ('127.0.0.1', '::1') or parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https') - or parsed.port is None or not 1 <= parsed.port <= 65535): - raise Refused('endpoint') - expected = f'{parsed.scheme}://{("[::1]" if parsed.hostname == "::1" else parsed.hostname)}:{parsed.port}' - if value.rstrip('/') != expected: - raise Refused('endpoint') - return expected - - -def credential(path): - path = Path(os.path.abspath(path)) - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path, *path.parents)): - raise Refused('credential') - if any((p / '.git').is_file() or (p / '.git/HEAD').is_file() for p in path.parents): - raise Refused('credential') - parent = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) - try: - info = os.fstat(parent) - if info.st_uid != os.getuid() or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise Refused('credential') - fd = os.open(path.name, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NONBLOCK | os.O_NOFOLLOW, dir_fd=parent) - try: - before = os.fstat(fd) - if (not stat.S_ISREG(before.st_mode) or before.st_uid != os.getuid() - or before.st_mode & 0o077 or before.st_nlink != 1 or before.st_size > 16385): - raise Refused('credential') - raw = os.read(fd, 16386) - after = os.fstat(fd) - if (before.st_size, before.st_mtime_ns, before.st_ctime_ns) != (after.st_size, after.st_mtime_ns, after.st_ctime_ns): - raise Refused('credential') - finally: - os.close(fd) - finally: - os.close(parent) - token = raw.decode('ascii').removesuffix('\n') - if len(token) > 16384 or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+', token): - raise Refused('credential') - claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.split('.')[1] + '==='), object_pairs_hook=unique_object) - # A structural preflight only. The provider must verify signature and expiry. - if (not isinstance(claims, dict) or claims.get('role') != 'admin' - or type(claims.get('exp')) not in (int, float) or claims['exp'] <= time.time()): - raise Refused('credential') - return token - - -class Client: - def __init__(self, base, token): - self.base = endpoint(base) - self.token = token - context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT) - # Use system trust, not ambient SSL_CERT_FILE/SSL_CERT_DIR overrides. - context.load_verify_locations(cafile=ssl.get_default_verify_paths().openssl_cafile) - self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirect(), - urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context)) - - def get(self, query): - req = urllib.request.Request(self.base + '/token/?' + urllib.parse.urlencode(query), - headers={'Authorization': self.token, 'Accept': 'application/json'}, method='GET') - try: - with self.opener.open(req, timeout=10) as response: - if response.status != 200: - raise Refused('provider') - raw = response.read(MAX_BODY + 1) - if len(raw) > MAX_BODY: - raise Refused('response') - document = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=unique_object) - result = document.get('result') if isinstance(document, dict) else None - if not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get('status') is not True: - raise Refused('provider') - return result.get('value') - except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: - exc.close() - raise Refused('provider') from None - except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, ValueError): - raise Refused('provider') from None - - -def complete_page(value): - if not isinstance(value, dict): - raise Refused('response') - count, rows = value.get('count'), value.get('tokens') - if (type(count) is not int or not 0 <= count <= MAX_FACTORS or not isinstance(rows, list) - or count != len(rows) or type(value.get('current')) is not int or value['current'] != 1 - or value.get('next') is not None or value.get('prev') is not None - or any(not isinstance(row, dict) for row in rows)): - raise Refused('response') - serials = [row.get('serial') for row in rows] - if any(not isinstance(s, str) or not s or len(s) > 256 for s in serials) or len(set(serials)) != len(rows): - raise Refused('response') - return rows - - -def prove_scope(client): - rows = complete_page(client.get({'serial': PROBE, 'tokenrealm': REALM, 'page': 1, 'pagesize': 2})) - if (len(rows) != 1 or rows[0]['serial'] != PROBE or rows[0].get('active') is not False - or rows[0].get('user_id') != '' or rows[0].get('realms') != [REALM]): - raise Refused('visibility') - - -def diagnose(client, username): - # Avoid provider wildcard and user@realm expansion; support literal estate IDs. - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}', username): - raise Refused('username') - prove_scope(client) - rows = complete_page(client.get({'user': username, 'realm': REALM, 'tokenrealm': REALM, - 'page': 1, 'pagesize': MAX_FACTORS, 'sortby': 'serial', 'sortdir': 'asc'})) - counts = {'total': len(rows), 'active_confirmed': 0, 'active_pending': 0, 'inactive': 0} - for row in rows: - if (row.get('username') != username or row.get('user_realm') != REALM - or not isinstance(row.get('realms'), list) or REALM not in row['realms'] - or type(row.get('active')) is not bool): - raise Refused('response') - if not row['active']: - counts['inactive'] += 1 - elif row.get('rollout_state') in ('', 'enrolled'): - counts['active_confirmed'] += 1 - elif row.get('rollout_state') in ('verify', 'clientwait', 'pending'): - counts['active_pending'] += 1 - else: - raise Refused('response') - # Do not turn a successful empty provider response after withdrawal into zero. - prove_scope(client) - return {'result': 'observed', 'realm': REALM, 'user': username, 'factors': counts, - 'reader_visibility': 'verified', 'user_existence': 'not_checked', 'mfa_login': 'not_tested'} - - -def main(): - phase = 'input' - try: - parser = QuietParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('username', nargs='?', default='platform-root') - parser.add_argument('--token-file', required=True, help='Owner-admitted private JWT file outside Git; no automatic retrieval') - parser.add_argument('--pi-url', default=os.environ.get('PI_URL', 'https://pink.coulomb.social')) - args = parser.parse_args() - base = endpoint(args.pi_url) - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}', args.username): - raise Refused('username') - token = credential(args.token_file) - phase = 'diagnostic' - result = diagnose(Client(base, token), args.username) - print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True)) - return 0 - except Exception: - # Never render exception text, URLs, paths, raw provider errors or tokens. - print(json.dumps({'result': 'unverified', 'phase': phase}), file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/pi_api.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/pi_api.py index a4d0838..63e325d 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/pi_api.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/pi_api.py @@ -1,92 +1,56 @@ -"""Captured JSON transport for protected callers; never run against live data to stdout.""" +"""Shared JSON request transport. Credentials stay in memory or stdin, never argv.""" + import json -import ssl import sys import urllib.error -import urllib.parse import urllib.request -from mfa_state import NoRedirect, endpoint, unique_object -MAX_BODY = 1024 * 1024 - - -def service_endpoint(value, profile='privacyidea'): - """Named destinations; profiles never inherit each other's credential scope.""" - if profile == 'privacyidea': - return endpoint(value) - hosts = {'lldap-auth': 'lldap.coulomb.social', 'keycape-discovery': 'kc.coulomb.social'} - if profile not in hosts: - raise ValueError() - if value in ('https://' + hosts[profile], 'https://' + hosts[profile] + ':443'): - return value - base = endpoint(value) - if urllib.parse.urlsplit(base).hostname not in ('127.0.0.1', '::1'): - raise ValueError() - return base - - -def request(url, payload=None, token=None, *, method=None, profile='privacyidea'): +def request(url, payload=None, token=None, *, method=None): + headers = {} + data = None + if payload is not None: + headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json" + data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") + if token: + headers["Authorization"] = token + # Bodyless GET must not advertise JSON: Werkzeug can reject it before routing. + req = urllib.request.Request( + url, + data=data, + headers=headers, + method=method or ("POST" if payload is not None else "GET"), + ) try: - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) - base = service_endpoint(urllib.parse.urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc, '', '', '')), profile) - if parsed.fragment or not parsed.path.startswith('/') or any(ord(c) < 32 for c in url): - return 0, None - verb = method or ('POST' if payload is not None else 'GET') - if profile != 'privacyidea': - if token is not None or parsed.query: return 0, None - if profile == 'lldap-auth': - if (verb != 'POST' or parsed.path != '/auth/simple/login' or not isinstance(payload, dict) - or set(payload) != {'username', 'password'} or payload['username'] != 'admin' - or not isinstance(payload['password'], str) or not payload['password']): return 0, None - elif verb != 'GET' or parsed.path != '/.well-known/openid-configuration' or payload is not None: - return 0, None - # Origin validated before creating a request containing protected values. - headers = {'Accept': 'application/json'} - data = None - if payload is not None: - data = json.dumps(payload).encode('utf-8') - if len(data) > MAX_BODY: return 0, None - headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json' - if token: - if not isinstance(token, str) or len(token) > 16384 or any(ord(c) < 33 or ord(c) > 126 for c in token): - return 0, None - headers['Authorization'] = token - req = urllib.request.Request(base + parsed.path + ('?' + parsed.query if parsed.query else ''), - data=data, headers=headers, method=method or ('POST' if payload is not None else 'GET')) - context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT) - context.load_verify_locations(cafile=ssl.get_default_verify_paths().openssl_cafile) - opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirect(), - urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context)) - with opener.open(req, timeout=20) as response: - status, raw = response.status, response.read(MAX_BODY + 1) - if len(raw) > MAX_BODY: return status, None - return status, json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=unique_object) if raw else None + with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as response: + status, body = response.status, response.read() + try: + return status, json.loads(body) if body else None + except (ValueError, UnicodeError): + return status, None except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: exc.close() return exc.code, None - except Exception: - # Callers emit fixed phases, never exception strings or response bodies. + except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError): return 0, None def main(): - try: - if len(sys.argv) != 3 or sys.argv[1] not in ('GET', 'POST'): - raise ValueError() - token = sys.stdin.readline(16386).removesuffix('\n') - body = sys.stdin.read(MAX_BODY + 1) - if len(body) > MAX_BODY: raise ValueError() - status, result = request(sys.argv[2], json.loads(body, object_pairs_hook=unique_object) if body else None, - token or None, method=sys.argv[1]) - if not 200 <= status < 300 or not isinstance(result, dict): raise ValueError() - # Private shell adapter: caller must capture this; it can contain a JWT/config. - print(json.dumps(result)) - return 0 - except Exception: - print('CURL_FAILED') + # Shell adapter: token on the first line, optional JSON body on the rest. + token = sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n") + body = sys.stdin.read() + status, result = request( + sys.argv[2], + json.loads(body) if body else None, + token or None, + method=sys.argv[1], + ) + if not 200 <= status < 300 or not isinstance(result, dict): + print("CURL_FAILED") return 1 + print(json.dumps(result)) + return 0 -if __name__ == '__main__': +if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py deleted file mode 100644 index ca13d4b..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,247 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Repair missing realm/resolver configuration while preserving established policy.""" -import argparse -import getpass -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import re -from pathlib import Path -import sys - -from mfa_state import QuietParser, endpoint -from pi_api import request - -RESOLVER = 'lldap-coulomb' -REALM = 'coulomb' -CORE = {'LDAPURI': 'ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890', - 'LDAPBASE': 'dc=netkingdom,dc=local', 'BINDDN': 'uid=svc-privacyidea,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local'} -TUNING = {'TIMEOUT': '5', 'CACHE_TIMEOUT': '120', 'SIZELIMIT': '500'} -# Before NK-WP-0054-T05 the resolver bound as the human admin; only --switch-bind moves it. -LEGACY_BINDDN = 'uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local' -# NK-WP-0056-T04 (CCR-2026-0055): the svc-privacyidea bind is held in platform custody. -# --rotate-bind rewrites only BINDPW on the service bind; --from-openbao reads the value in -# memory under the attended platform-admin session instead of a prompt or a custody copy. -BIND_KV = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-privacyidea' -BIND_FIELD = 'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD' - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def password(value): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value.encode()) > 4096 or any(ord(c) < 32 for c in value): - raise Refused() - return value - - -def private_inputs(root): - path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / 'bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py' - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('realm_custody', path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(module) - with module.custody(root, ['privacyidea', 'lldap']) as dirs: - admin = password(module.read_env(dirs['privacyidea']).get('PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD')) - bind = password(module.read_env(dirs['lldap']).get('LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS')) - return admin, bind - - -def openbao_bind(run=None): - """The svc-privacyidea bind from OpenBao, only under an attended netkingdom platform-admin session.""" - import subprocess - run = run or (lambda argv: subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, timeout=60)) - - def bao(*args): - result = run(['bao', *args]) - if result.returncode != 0: raise Refused() - return json.loads(result.stdout) - ident = bao('token', 'lookup', '-format=json')['data'] - if ('platform-admin' not in ident.get('policies', []) or 'root' in ident.get('policies', []) - or not str(ident.get('path', '')).startswith('auth/netkingdom/')): - raise Refused() - data = bao('read', '-format=json', BIND_KV)['data']['data'] - if set(data) != {BIND_FIELD}: raise Refused() - return password(data[BIND_FIELD]) - - -class Client: - def __init__(self, url, admin_password): - self.url = endpoint(url) - self.token = None - auth = self.call('/auth', {'username': 'pi-admin', 'password': password(admin_password)}) - if not isinstance(auth, dict) or auth.get('role') != 'admin' or not isinstance(auth.get('token'), str) or not auth['token']: - raise Refused() - self.token = auth['token'] - - def call(self, path, payload=None): - status, body = request(self.url + path, payload, self.token) - result = body.get('result') if isinstance(body, dict) else None - if status != 200 or not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get('status') is not True: - raise Refused() - return result.get('value') - - def snapshot(self): - resolvers = self.call('/resolver/' + RESOLVER) - realms = self.call('/realm/') - if not isinstance(resolvers, dict) or set(resolvers) - {RESOLVER} or not isinstance(realms, dict): - raise Refused() - if any(not isinstance(v, dict) for v in realms.values()): raise Refused() - return {'resolver': resolvers.get(RESOLVER), 'realms': realms} - - -def plan(snapshot, switch_bind=False, rotate_bind=False): - resolver, realms = snapshot['resolver'], snapshot['realms'] - updates = {} - if rotate_bind: - # Only on the established service bind, with nothing else to repair. - if (switch_bind or not isinstance(resolver, dict) or resolver.get('type') != 'ldapresolver' - or not isinstance(resolver.get('data'), dict)): - raise Refused() - current = plan(snapshot) - if current['resolver_update'] or current['create_realm'] or current['set_initial_default']: raise Refused() - return dict(current, rotate_bind=True) - if resolver is None: - updates = dict(CORE, **TUNING, type='ldapresolver', LOGINNAMEATTRIBUTE='uid', - LDAPSEARCHFILTER='(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)', LDAPFILTER='(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=%s))', - USERINFO=json.dumps({'username':'uid','phone':'telephoneNumber','mobile':'mobile','email':'mail', - 'surname':'sn','givenname':'givenName'}), - UIDTYPE='uid', NOREFERRALS=True, NOSCHEMAS=True) - else: - if not isinstance(resolver, dict) or resolver.get('type') != 'ldapresolver' or not isinstance(resolver.get('data'), dict): - raise Refused() - data = resolver['data'] - if any(data.get(key) != value for key, value in CORE.items() if key != 'BINDDN'): raise Refused() - if data.get('BINDDN') != CORE['BINDDN']: - if not (switch_bind and data.get('BINDDN') == LEGACY_BINDDN): raise Refused() - switching = True - else: - switching = False - for key, default in TUNING.items(): - value = data.get(key) - if value in (None, ''): updates[key] = default - elif type(value) not in (str, int) or not str(value).isascii() or not str(value).isdigit(): raise Refused() - if updates and switching: raise Refused() # one change at a time: tune first, then switch - if updates: updates['type'] = 'ldapresolver' - realm = realms.get(REALM) - if realm is not None: - bindings = realm.get('resolver') - if (not isinstance(bindings, list) or not any(isinstance(v, dict) and v.get('name') == RESOLVER for v in bindings)): - raise Refused() - return {'resolver_update': updates, 'create_resolver': resolver is None, - 'switch_bind': resolver is not None and switching, 'rotate_bind': False, - 'create_realm': realm is None, 'set_initial_default': not realms} - - -def repair(client, bind_input, *, apply=False, switch_bind=False, rotate_bind=False): - initial = client.snapshot() - changes = plan(initial, switch_bind, rotate_bind) - actions = [] - if changes['switch_bind']: actions.append('switch-bind') - if changes['rotate_bind']: actions.append('rotate-bind') - if changes['resolver_update']: actions.append('create-resolver' if changes['create_resolver'] else 'fill-missing-tuning') - if changes['create_realm']: actions.append('create-realm') - if changes['set_initial_default']: actions.append('set-first-realm-default') - if not apply: - return {'result': 'planned', 'actions': actions, 'configuration_writes': 0, 'policies_changed': False, 'mfa_verified': False} - bind = password(bind_input()) if changes['create_resolver'] or changes['switch_bind'] or changes['rotate_bind'] else None - # Recheck the full observed target before each operation. API has no CAS; - # an exclusive owner window remains required, and ambiguous writes are not retried. - expected = initial - for action in actions: - if client.snapshot() != expected: raise Refused() - if action in ('switch-bind', 'rotate-bind'): - value = client.call('/resolver/' + RESOLVER, {'type': 'ldapresolver', 'BINDDN': CORE['BINDDN'], 'BINDPW': bind}) - if type(value) is not int or value < 1: raise Refused() - after = client.snapshot() - old, data = expected['resolver']['data'], after['resolver'].get('data', {}) - if data.get('BINDDN') != CORE['BINDDN']: raise Refused() - if any(data.get(k) != v for k, v in old.items() if k not in ('BINDDN', 'BINDPW')): raise Refused() - if after['realms'] != expected['realms']: raise Refused() - elif action in ('create-resolver', 'fill-missing-tuning'): - payload = dict(changes['resolver_update']) - if action == 'create-resolver': payload['BINDPW'] = bind - value = client.call('/resolver/' + RESOLVER, payload) - if type(value) is not int or value < 1: raise Refused() - after = client.snapshot() - current = after['resolver'] - if not isinstance(current, dict) or current.get('type') != 'ldapresolver': raise Refused() - data = current.get('data', {}) - for key, desired in payload.items(): - if key in ('type', 'BINDPW'): continue - actual = data.get(key) - if isinstance(desired, bool): - if str(actual).lower() != str(desired).lower(): raise Refused() - elif str(actual) != str(desired): raise Refused() - if action == 'fill-missing-tuning': - old = expected['resolver']['data'] - if any(data.get(k) != v for k, v in old.items() if k not in payload): raise Refused() - if after['realms'] != expected['realms']: raise Refused() - elif action == 'create-realm': - value = client.call('/realm/' + REALM, {'resolvers': [RESOLVER], 'priority.'+RESOLVER: 1}) - if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get('failed') != [] or value.get('added') != [RESOLVER]: raise Refused() - after = client.snapshot() - realm = after['realms'].get(REALM) - if not isinstance(realm, dict) or [r.get('name') for r in realm.get('resolver', [])] != [RESOLVER]: raise Refused() - if {k:v for k,v in after['realms'].items() if k != REALM} != expected['realms']: raise Refused() - if after['resolver'] != expected['resolver']: raise Refused() - else: - value = client.call('/defaultrealm/' + REALM, {}) - if type(value) is not int or value < 1: raise Refused() - after = client.snapshot() - anticipated = json.loads(json.dumps(expected)) - anticipated['realms'][REALM]['default'] = True - if after != anticipated: raise Refused() - expected = after - final = client.snapshot() - if final != expected or plan(final)['resolver_update'] or plan(final)['create_realm']: raise Refused() - return {'result': 'configured', 'actions': actions, 'configuration_writes': len(actions), - 'policies_changed': False, 'mfa_verified': False, 'onboarding_policy': 'owner-managed'} - - -def main(): - phase = 'input' - try: - parser = QuietParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('root', nargs='?') - parser.add_argument('url', nargs='?', default=os.environ.get('PI_URL', 'https://pink.coulomb.social')) - parser.add_argument('--pi-url') - parser.add_argument('--attended', action='store_true') - parser.add_argument('--apply', action='store_true') - parser.add_argument('--verify-user') - parser.add_argument('--switch-bind', action='store_true') - parser.add_argument('--rotate-bind', action='store_true') - parser.add_argument('--from-openbao', action='store_true') - args = parser.parse_args() - base = endpoint(args.pi_url or args.url) - if args.verify_user and not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}', args.verify_user): raise Refused() - # A rotation is proven by an MFA login through the resolver; OpenBao is read only attended. - if args.rotate_bind and args.apply and not args.verify_user: raise Refused() - if args.from_openbao and not args.attended: raise Refused() - if args.attended: - if args.root is not None or not sys.stdin.isatty(): raise Refused() - admin = password(getpass.getpass('privacyIDEA pi-admin password: ')) - bind_input = (openbao_bind if args.from_openbao else - lambda: getpass.getpass('LLDAP bind password for the resolver (svc-privacyidea): ')) - else: - if args.root is None or args.verify_user: raise Refused() - admin, bind = private_inputs(args.root) - bind_input = lambda: bind - phase = 'configuration' - client = Client(base, admin) - report = repair(client, bind_input, apply=args.apply, switch_bind=args.switch_bind, rotate_bind=args.rotate_bind) - if args.verify_user and args.apply: - phase = 'functional-verification' - from verify_mfa import verify - proof = verify(base, args.verify_user, REALM, RESOLVER, admin, - lambda:getpass.getpass('Fresh MFA code of %s (realm %s; token PIN first if set; not pi-admin): ' % (args.verify_user, REALM))) - if proof['result'] != 'PASS': raise Refused() - report['mfa_verified'] = True - print(json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True)) - return 0 - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt): - print(json.dumps({'result':'unverified','phase':phase,'partial_changes_possible':phase!='input'}), file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh index 28035ee..e69cf8f 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh @@ -1,5 +1,293 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Attended inputs stay in Python memory; disable inherited tracing first. -set +x +# reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh — one-command attended resolver cutover. +# +# Performs the narrow privacyIDEA lldap-coulomb update and its safe proof set: +# replacement LLDAP authentication, resolver lookup, one privacyIDEA MFA check, +# predecessor LLDAP denial, health/readiness, and cleanup. It never reads a +# Kubernetes Secret and never prints a credential, token, response body, or +# manifest. +# +# Usage: +# ./reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh --check # read-only proof +# ./reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh --apply # resolver update + proof +# +# Options: +# --note TEXT operator context recorded verbatim in the receipt +# --predecessor-unavailable the exposed predecessor cannot be produced; the +# denial bind is not attempted and the receipt +# records it as NOT-PROVEN + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/resolver_cutover.py" reconcile "$@" + +MODE="" +NOTE="" +PREDECESSOR="required" +usage() { + echo "Usage: $0 --check|--apply [--note TEXT] [--predecessor-unavailable]" >&2 + exit 2 +} +while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do + case "$1" in + --check|--apply) + if [[ -n "$MODE" ]]; then usage; fi + MODE="$1"; shift ;; + --note) + # Never put a credential here: the receipt goes to a terminal and + # is copied into the incident record. + if [[ -z "${2:-}" ]]; then usage; fi + NOTE="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --predecessor-unavailable) + # Typing a placeholder at the predecessor prompt also fails the + # bind, and would be recorded as a passing denial proof. An absent + # proof is honest; a fabricated one asserts a test that never ran. + PREDECESSOR="unavailable"; shift ;; + *) + usage ;; + esac +done +if [[ "$MODE" != "--apply" && "$MODE" != "--check" ]]; then + usage +fi +# One bounded line: a receipt that breaks its own format is not evidence +# anyone can read back. +NOTE="${NOTE//$'\n'/ }" +NOTE="${NOTE//$'\r'/ }" +if (( ${#NOTE} > 200 )); then + echo "ERROR: --note must be 200 characters or fewer." >&2 + exit 2 +fi +if [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then + echo "ERROR: --check/--apply requires an interactive terminal." >&2 + exit 2 +fi + +PI_URL="${PI_URL:-https://pink.coulomb.social}" +LLDAP_AUTH_URL="${LLDAP_AUTH_URL:-https://lldap.coulomb.social/auth/simple/login}" +LLDAP_URL="${LLDAP_URL:-ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890}" +LLDAP_BASE_DN="${LLDAP_BASE_DN:-dc=netkingdom,dc=local}" +LLDAP_BIND_DN="${LLDAP_BIND_DN:-uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local}" +RESOLVER_NAME="${RESOLVER_NAME:-lldap-coulomb}" +MFA_USER="${MFA_USER:-platform-root}" +MFA_REALM="${MFA_REALM:-coulomb}" +KEYCAPE_DISCOVERY_URL="${KEYCAPE_DISCOVERY_URL:-https://kc.coulomb.social/.well-known/openid-configuration}" +# A resolver write replaces the whole object, so every field the body omits is +# dropped. A resolver with these unset still resolves users, but the WebUI +# refuses to save or test it until they are filled in — so omitting them here +# silently un-repairs a resolver an operator fixed by hand. +LDAP_TIMEOUT="${LDAP_TIMEOUT:-5}" +LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT="${LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT:-120}" +LDAP_SIZELIMIT="${LDAP_SIZELIMIT:-500}" +for _v in LDAP_TIMEOUT LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT LDAP_SIZELIMIT; do + if [[ ! "${!_v}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then + echo "ERROR: $_v must be a non-negative integer, got '${!_v}'." >&2 + exit 2 + fi +done +unset _v + +tmp="$(mktemp -d)" +chmod 700 "$tmp" +cleanup() { + for file in pi-admin lldap-new lldap-old otp phase; do + if [[ -f "$tmp/$file" ]]; then + shred -u "$tmp/$file" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$tmp/$file" + fi + done + rmdir "$tmp" 2>/dev/null || true +} +cleanup_ok=0 +trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM + +prompt_secret() { + local label="$1" target="$2" + printf '%s: ' "$label" >&2 + IFS= read -r -s value + printf '\n' >&2 + if [[ -z "$value" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: empty protected input." >&2 + exit 2 + fi + printf '%s' "$value" > "$target" + unset value + chmod 600 "$target" +} + +prompt_secret "privacyIDEA pi-admin password" "$tmp/pi-admin" +prompt_secret "replacement LLDAP bind/admin password" "$tmp/lldap-new" +if [[ "$PREDECESSOR" == "required" ]]; then + prompt_secret "exposed predecessor LLDAP password (denial proof only)" "$tmp/lldap-old" +else + echo " [INFO] predecessor unavailable: denial proof recorded as NOT-PROVEN." >&2 +fi +prompt_secret "one-time MFA code for $MFA_USER@$MFA_REALM" "$tmp/otp" + +PI_HELPER_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +if PYTHONPATH="$PI_HELPER_DIR${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" python3 - "$tmp/pi-admin" "$tmp/lldap-new" "$tmp/lldap-old" "$tmp/otp" \ + "$PI_URL" "$LLDAP_AUTH_URL" "$LLDAP_URL" "$LLDAP_BASE_DN" "$LLDAP_BIND_DN" \ + "$RESOLVER_NAME" "$MFA_USER" "$MFA_REALM" "$KEYCAPE_DISCOVERY_URL" "$MODE" "$tmp/phase" "$PREDECESSOR" \ + "$LDAP_TIMEOUT" "$LDAP_CACHE_TIMEOUT" "$LDAP_SIZELIMIT" <<'PY' +import json +import subprocess +import sys +import urllib.error +import urllib.parse +import urllib.request +from pathlib import Path + +( + pi_path, new_path, old_path, otp_path, pi_url, lldap_auth_url, lldap_url, + base_dn, bind_dn, resolver_name, mfa_user, mfa_realm, discovery_url, mode, phase_path, + predecessor, ldap_timeout, ldap_cache_timeout, ldap_sizelimit, +) = sys.argv[1:] + +def phase(name: str) -> None: + Path(phase_path).write_text(name, encoding="ascii") + +def secret(path: str) -> str: + value = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8") + if not value: + raise RuntimeError("empty protected input") + return value + +from pi_api import request + +def check_k8s_ready() -> None: + workloads = (("sso", "lldap"), ("mfa", "privacyidea"), ("sso", "keycape"), + ("sso", "authelia"), ("sso", "identity-provisioner")) + for namespace, name in workloads: + proc = subprocess.run( + ["kubectl", "get", "deployment", name, "-n", namespace, + "-o", "jsonpath={.status.readyReplicas}/{.status.replicas}"], + capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20, + ) + if proc.returncode != 0 or proc.stdout.strip() != "1/1": + raise RuntimeError(f"readiness failed: {namespace}/{name}") + +def check_health() -> None: + # privacyIDEA intentionally exposes no unauthenticated HTTP health route; + # /token/ is documented by the deployment as a safe availability probe. + for label, url, accepted in ( + ("privacyidea", pi_url + "/token/", {200, 401, 403}), + ("keycape", discovery_url, set(range(200, 400))), + ): + status, _ = request(url) + if status not in accepted: + raise RuntimeError(f"health failed: {label}") + +def lldap_login(password: str) -> tuple[int, bool]: + status, body = request(lldap_auth_url, {"username": "admin", "password": password}) + return status, status == 200 and isinstance(body, dict) and bool(body.get("token")) + +try: + phase("preflight") + check_k8s_ready() + check_health() + + phase("privacyidea-auth") + status, auth = request(pi_url + "/auth", {"username": "pi-admin", "password": secret(pi_path)}) + pi_token = str((auth or {}).get("result", {}).get("value", {}).get("token", "")) + if status != 200 or not pi_token: + raise RuntimeError("privacyIDEA authentication failed") + + # Prove the provider-approved replacement and predecessor disposition + # before any resolver mutation is attempted. + phase("replacement-lldap-auth") + new_status, new_authenticated = lldap_login(secret(new_path)) + if new_status != 200 or not new_authenticated: + raise RuntimeError("replacement LLDAP authentication failed") + if predecessor == "unavailable": + # Not a pass. The bind is not attempted, so this run claims nothing + # about the predecessor's disposition. + phase("predecessor-denial-not-proven") + else: + phase("predecessor-denial") + old_status, old_authenticated = lldap_login(secret(old_path)) + if old_status not in (401, 403) or old_authenticated: + raise RuntimeError("predecessor LLDAP authentication was not denied") + + resolver_body = { + "type": "ldapresolver", "LDAPURI": lldap_url, "BINDDN": bind_dn, + "BINDPW": secret(new_path), "LDAPBASE": base_dn, + "LOGINNAMEATTRIBUTE": "uid", "LDAPSEARCHFILTER": "(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)", + "LDAPFILTER": "(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=%s))", + "USERINFO": json.dumps({"username": "uid", "phone": "telephoneNumber", "mobile": "mobile", "email": "mail", "surname": "sn", "givenname": "givenName"}), + "UIDTYPE": "uid", "NOREFERRALS": True, "NOSCHEMAS": True, + "TIMEOUT": int(ldap_timeout), "CACHE_TIMEOUT": int(ldap_cache_timeout), + "SIZELIMIT": int(ldap_sizelimit), + } + if mode == "--apply": + phase("resolver-update") + status, result = request(pi_url + "/resolver/" + resolver_name, resolver_body, pi_token) + if status != 200 or (result or {}).get("result", {}).get("status") not in (True, "true", "True"): + raise RuntimeError("resolver update failed") + else: + phase("resolver-read-only-check") + + phase("resolver-lookup") + status, result = request( + pi_url + f"/user/?realm={mfa_realm}&username={urllib.parse.quote(mfa_user)}", + token=pi_token, + ) + # privacyIDEA returns result.value as a list of user objects for /user/. + # Accept the dict-with-"users" shape too: other endpoints use it, and a + # lookup that guesses wrong raises AttributeError past the except clause. + _value = (result or {}).get("result", {}).get("value", []) + if isinstance(_value, dict): + _value = _value.get("users", []) + users = _value if isinstance(_value, list) else [] + if status != 200: + phase(f"resolver-lookup-http-{status}") + raise RuntimeError("replacement resolver lookup failed") + if not users: + phase("resolver-lookup-empty") + raise RuntimeError("replacement resolver lookup failed") + + phase("privacyidea-mfa") + status, result = request( + pi_url + "/validate/check", + {"user": mfa_user, "realm": mfa_realm, "pass": secret(otp_path)}, + pi_token, + ) + if status != 200 or (result or {}).get("result", {}).get("value") is not True: + raise RuntimeError("replacement MFA validation failed") + + phase("postflight") + check_k8s_ready() + check_health() +except (OSError, RuntimeError, subprocess.SubprocessError, + AttributeError, TypeError, KeyError, ValueError) as exc: + # A malformed reply must still produce a receipt naming the phase it died + # in. A traceback tells the operator nothing about what was proven. + raise SystemExit(1) +PY +then + rc=0 +else + rc=$? +fi + +phase_result="$(cat "$tmp/phase" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)" +if [[ "$PREDECESSOR" == "required" ]]; then + pred_text="predecessor denial" +else + pred_text="predecessor denial=NOT-PROVEN" +fi +note_text="" +if [[ -n "$NOTE" ]]; then + note_text="; note=$NOTE" +fi +cleanup +trap - EXIT INT TERM +if [[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]]; then + echo "NK-WP-0033 receipt FAIL: phase=$phase_result; $pred_text; cleanup=PASS$note_text" >&2 + exit "$rc" +fi +if [[ -d "$tmp" ]]; then + echo "NK-WP-0033 receipt FAIL: cleanup=FAIL$note_text" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +if [[ "$MODE" == "--check" ]]; then + echo "NK-WP-0033 receipt PASS: read-only resolver lookup, privacyIDEA MFA, $pred_text, readiness, health, cleanup=PASS$note_text" +else + echo "NK-WP-0033 receipt PASS: resolver lookup, privacyIDEA MFA, $pred_text, readiness, health, cleanup=PASS$note_text" +fi diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh index 5e0113a..afee70d 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh @@ -1,9 +1,45 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Attended configuration repair and functional proof; passwords remain in memory. -set +x +# repair-realm-live.sh - attended repair for privacyIDEA realm bootstrap state. +# +# This wrapper prompts for live passwords, writes them only to a private +# temporary directory, runs the idempotent realm bootstrap, and removes the +# temporary files on exit. + set -euo pipefail -if [[ $# -ne 0 ]]; then - printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: this attended entrypoint takes no positional credential inputs.' >&2 - exit 2 + +SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd) +SSO_MFA_K8S_DIR=$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd) +PI_URL="${PI_URL:-https://pink.coulomb.social}" + +if [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then + echo "ERROR: repair-realm-live.sh needs an interactive terminal for password prompts." >&2 + exit 1 fi -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "$0")/realm_bootstrap.py" --attended --apply --verify-user "${MFA_USER:-platform-root}" + +export PATH="/home/worsch/.local/bin:$PATH" +umask 077 + +tmp="$(mktemp -d)" +cleanup() { + rm -rf "$tmp" + unset PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS +} +trap cleanup EXIT + +mkdir -p "$tmp/privacyidea" "$tmp/lldap" + +printf "privacyIDEA pi-admin password: " >&2 +read -rs PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD +printf "\n" >&2 +printf "LLDAP bind/admin password: " >&2 +read -rs LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS +printf "\n" >&2 + +printf "PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=%q\n" "$PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD" > "$tmp/privacyidea/secrets.env" +printf "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=%q\n" "$LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS" > "$tmp/lldap/secrets.env" + +bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/bootstrap-realm.sh" "$tmp" "$PI_URL" + +echo "Realm configuration applied; functional verification requires an enrolled OTP token." +bash "$SSO_MFA_K8S_DIR/verify-t06.sh" --pi-url "$PI_URL" --user "${MFA_USER:-platform-root}" +echo "[OK] realm repair and functional MFA verification passed." diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/resolver_cutover.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/resolver_cutover.py deleted file mode 100644 index 50e6d3f..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/resolver_cutover.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,218 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended resolver password cutover; no secret files or ambient target overrides.""" -import copy -import getpass -import hashlib -import json -from pathlib import Path -import re -import signal -import subprocess -import sys -import urllib.parse - -from mfa_state import QuietParser, endpoint -from pi_api import request, service_endpoint -import realm_bootstrap as realm -from realm_bootstrap import Client, Refused, password -from verify_mfa import verify - -WORKLOADS = (('sso', 'lldap'), ('mfa', 'privacyidea'), ('sso', 'keycape'), - ('sso', 'authelia'), ('sso', 'identity-provisioner')) - - -def public_snapshot(snapshot): - result = copy.deepcopy(snapshot) - result['resolver']['data'].pop('BINDPW', None) - return result - - -def existing(snapshot): - changes = realm.plan(snapshot) - if any(changes.values()): - raise Refused() - # Never fingerprint a password, even if a provider stops censoring it. - data = snapshot['resolver']['data'] - if data.get('BINDPW') != '__CENSORED__': - raise Refused() - return snapshot - - -def digest(snapshot, target): - return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps({'state': public_snapshot(snapshot), 'target': target}, - sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()).hexdigest() - - -def native_bind(client, snapshot, candidate='__CENSORED__'): - payload = dict(snapshot['resolver']['data'], resolver=realm.RESOLVER, - type='ldapresolver', BINDPW=password(candidate)) - if client.call('/resolver/test', payload) is not True: - raise Refused() - - -def login(base, candidate, *, denied=False): - status, body = request(base + '/auth/simple/login', - {'username': 'admin', 'password': password(candidate)}, profile='lldap-auth') - if denied: - if status not in (401, 403): raise Refused() - elif status != 200 or not isinstance(body, dict) or not isinstance(body.get('token'), str) or not body['token']: - raise Refused() - - -def cluster_ready(target): - prefix = ['kubectl', '--kubeconfig', target['kubeconfig'], '--context', target['context'], '--request-timeout=15s'] - - def read(args): - result = subprocess.run(prefix + args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20) - if result.returncode or len(result.stdout) > 4096: raise Refused() - return result.stdout.strip() - - if read(['config', 'view', '--minify', '-o', 'jsonpath={.clusters[0].cluster.server}']) != target['server']: - raise Refused() - if read(['get', 'namespace', 'kube-system', '-o', 'jsonpath={.metadata.uid}']) != target['cluster_uid']: - raise Refused() - fields = ('metadata.generation', 'status.observedGeneration', 'spec.replicas', 'status.replicas', - 'status.updatedReplicas', 'status.readyReplicas', 'status.availableReplicas', 'metadata.deletionTimestamp') - expression = '{"|"}'.join('{.' + field + '}' for field in fields) - for namespace, name in WORKLOADS: - values = read(['get', 'deployment', name, '-n', namespace, '-o', 'jsonpath=' + expression]).split('|') - if (len(values) != 8 or not values[0].isdigit() or int(values[0]) < 1 or values[0] != values[1] - or values[2:7] != ['1'] * 5 or values[7]): raise Refused() - - -def health(target): - status, _ = request(target['pi_url'] + '/token/') - if status not in (200, 401, 403): raise Refused() - base = target['keycape_url'] - issuer = 'https://kc.coulomb.social' - status, body = request(base + '/.well-known/openid-configuration', profile='keycape-discovery') - if status != 200 or not isinstance(body, dict) or body.get('issuer') != issuer: raise Refused() - for key in ('authorization_endpoint', 'token_endpoint', 'jwks_uri'): - value = body.get(key) - if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.startswith(issuer + '/'): - raise Refused() - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value) - if parsed.fragment or parsed.username or parsed.password or any(ord(c) <= 32 for c in value): raise Refused() - - -def run(client, target, mode, *, replacement=None, predecessor=None, expected_digest=None, - mfa_proof=None, gate=None, report=None): - report = report if report is not None else {} - report.update(result='unverified', mode=mode, helper=target['helper'], phase='preflight', write_attempted=False, configuration_writes=0, - mfa_verified=False, supplied_predecessor_denied=False, incident_acceptance='unverified') - full = target['helper'] == 'reconcile' - if full: gate() - report['phase'] = 'snapshot' - initial = existing(client.snapshot()) - fingerprint = digest(initial, target) - report['snapshot_sha256'] = fingerprint - if mode == 'preview': - report.update(result='planned', phase='complete') - return report - if mode == 'apply' and expected_digest != fingerprint: raise Refused() - report['phase'] = 'replacement-authentication' - if replacement == '__CENSORED__': raise Refused() - login(target['lldap_url'], replacement) - native_bind(client, initial, replacement) - if full and predecessor is not None: - report['phase'] = 'predecessor-denial' - if predecessor == replacement: raise Refused() - login(target['lldap_url'], predecessor, denied=True) - report['supplied_predecessor_denied'] = True - # No CAS in privacyIDEA: owner must still reserve an exclusive change window. - report['phase'] = 'prewrite-recheck' - if client.snapshot() != initial: raise Refused() - if mode == 'apply': - report.update(phase='resolver-update', write_attempted=True) - value = client.call('/resolver/' + realm.RESOLVER, {'type': 'ldapresolver', 'BINDPW': replacement}) - if type(value) is not int or value < 1: raise Refused() - report['configuration_writes'] = 1 - report['phase'] = 'stored-bind-verification' - after = existing(client.snapshot()) - if public_snapshot(after) != public_snapshot(initial): raise Refused() - native_bind(client, after) - if full: - report['phase'] = 'exact-user-lookup' - query = urllib.parse.urlencode({'realm': realm.REALM, 'username': target['user']}) - users = client.call('/user/?' + query) - if (not isinstance(users, list) or len(users) != 1 or not isinstance(users[0], dict) - or users[0].get('username') != target['user'] or users[0].get('resolver') != realm.RESOLVER): - raise Refused() - report['phase'] = 'token-backed-mfa' - if mfa_proof().get('result') != 'PASS': raise Refused() - report['mfa_verified'] = True - report['phase'] = 'postflight' - gate() - if client.snapshot() != after: raise Refused() - # An arbitrary wrong password can also be denied. Owner provenance is a - # separate acceptance requirement; this receipt only describes supplied input. - report.update(phase='complete', result=('verified' if predecessor is not None else 'incomplete') if full else ('configured' if mode == 'apply' else 'checked')) - return report - - -def arguments(): - parser = QuietParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('helper', choices=('update', 'reconcile')) - modes = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True) - for mode in ('preview', 'check', 'apply'): modes.add_argument('--' + mode, dest='mode', action='store_const', const=mode) - parser.add_argument('--expected-digest') - parser.add_argument('--pi-url', default='https://pink.coulomb.social') - parser.add_argument('--lldap-url', default='https://lldap.coulomb.social') - parser.add_argument('--keycape-url', default='https://kc.coulomb.social') - parser.add_argument('--user', default='platform-root') - parser.add_argument('--predecessor-unavailable', action='store_true') - for name in ('kubeconfig', 'context', 'server', 'cluster-uid'): parser.add_argument('--' + name) - args = parser.parse_args() - args.pi_url = endpoint(args.pi_url) - args.lldap_url = service_endpoint(args.lldap_url, 'lldap-auth') - args.keycape_url = service_endpoint(args.keycape_url, 'keycape-discovery') - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}', args.user): raise Refused() - if args.mode == 'apply': - if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}', args.expected_digest or ''): raise Refused() - elif args.expected_digest is not None: raise Refused() - if args.helper == 'reconcile': - if not args.kubeconfig or not Path(args.kubeconfig).is_absolute(): raise Refused() - for value in (args.context, args.cluster_uid): - if not isinstance(value, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,199}', value): raise Refused() - parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(args.server or '') - if (parsed.scheme != 'https' or not parsed.hostname or parsed.username or parsed.password - or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path or any(ord(c) <= 32 for c in args.server)): - raise Refused() - if not sys.stdin.isatty() or not sys.stderr.isatty(): raise Refused() - return args - - -def main(): - report = {'result': 'unverified', 'phase': 'input', 'write_attempted': False} - try: - args = arguments() - # Do not silently fall back to echoed stdin when terminal access fails. - import warnings - warnings.simplefilter('error', getpass.GetPassWarning) - signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(KeyboardInterrupt())) - target = {key: getattr(args, key) for key in ('helper', 'pi_url', 'lldap_url', 'keycape_url', 'user', - 'kubeconfig', 'context', 'server', 'cluster_uid')} - gate = lambda: (cluster_ready(target), health(target)) - if args.helper == 'reconcile': gate() - report['phase'] = 'privacyidea-authentication' - admin = password(getpass.getpass('privacyIDEA pi-admin password: ')) - client = Client(args.pi_url, admin) - replacement = predecessor = None - if args.mode != 'preview': - replacement = password(getpass.getpass('Approved replacement LLDAP password: ')) - if args.helper == 'reconcile' and not args.predecessor_unavailable: - predecessor = password(getpass.getpass('Actual predecessor LLDAP password (denial proof only): ')) - proof = lambda: verify(args.pi_url, args.user, realm.REALM, realm.RESOLVER, admin, - lambda: password(getpass.getpass('Fresh MFA code (include token PIN if required): '))) - run(client, target, args.mode, replacement=replacement, predecessor=predecessor, - expected_digest=args.expected_digest, mfa_proof=proof, gate=gate, report=report) - print(json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True)) - return 2 if report['result'] == 'incomplete' else 0 - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt): - report['result'] = 'unverified' - print(json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True), file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh index dd49dc1..1f88859 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/update-lldap-resolver-live.sh @@ -1,5 +1,125 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Attended inputs stay in Python memory; disable inherited tracing first. -set +x +# update-lldap-resolver-live.sh — attended, resolver-only privacyIDEA update. +# +# This does not repair realms or policies. It updates only the persisted +# lldap-coulomb resolver after the LLDAP bind credential has changed. +# +# Usage: +# ./update-lldap-resolver-live.sh --apply +# +# The operator supplies both passwords interactively. Values are kept in a +# mode-0700 temporary directory and mode-0600 files, passed to a child process +# by pathname, and never printed or placed in command arguments. + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/resolver_cutover.py" update "$@" + +if [[ "${1:-}" != "--apply" || "${2:-}" != "" ]]; then + echo "Usage: $0 --apply" >&2 + exit 2 +fi +if [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then + echo "ERROR: --apply requires an interactive terminal." >&2 + exit 2 +fi + +PI_URL="${PI_URL:-https://pink.coulomb.social}" +RESOLVER_NAME="${RESOLVER_NAME:-lldap-coulomb}" +LLDAP_URL="${LLDAP_URL:-ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890}" +LLDAP_BASE_DN="${LLDAP_BASE_DN:-dc=netkingdom,dc=local}" +LLDAP_BIND_DN="${LLDAP_BIND_DN:-uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local}" + +tmp="$(mktemp -d)" +chmod 700 "$tmp" +cleanup() { + if [[ -f "$tmp/pi-admin" ]]; then shred -u "$tmp/pi-admin" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$tmp/pi-admin"; fi + if [[ -f "$tmp/lldap-bind" ]]; then shred -u "$tmp/lldap-bind" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$tmp/lldap-bind"; fi + rmdir "$tmp" 2>/dev/null || true +} +trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM + +printf 'privacyIDEA pi-admin password: ' >&2 +IFS= read -r -s pi_admin_password +printf '\n' >&2 +printf 'LLDAP bind/admin password: ' >&2 +IFS= read -r -s lldap_bind_password +printf '\n' >&2 +if [[ -z "$pi_admin_password" || -z "$lldap_bind_password" ]]; then + echo "ERROR: passwords must not be empty." >&2 + exit 2 +fi +printf '%s' "$pi_admin_password" > "$tmp/pi-admin" +printf '%s' "$lldap_bind_password" > "$tmp/lldap-bind" +unset pi_admin_password lldap_bind_password +chmod 600 "$tmp/pi-admin" "$tmp/lldap-bind" + +python3 - "$tmp/pi-admin" "$tmp/lldap-bind" "$PI_URL" "$RESOLVER_NAME" \ + "$LLDAP_URL" "$LLDAP_BASE_DN" "$LLDAP_BIND_DN" <<'PY' +import json +import sys +import urllib.error +import urllib.request +from pathlib import Path + +pi_path, ldap_path, base_url, resolver, ldap_url, base_dn, bind_dn = sys.argv[1:] + +def read_secret(path: str) -> str: + value = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8") + if not value: + raise RuntimeError("empty protected input") + return value + +def post(path: str, payload: dict, token: str | None = None) -> dict: + headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} + if token is not None: + headers["Authorization"] = token + request = urllib.request.Request( + base_url.rstrip("/") + path, + data=json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"), + headers=headers, + method="POST", + ) + try: + with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response: + return json.load(response) + except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP status {exc.code}") from None + except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError): + raise RuntimeError("request failed") from None + +try: + auth = post("/auth", {"username": "pi-admin", "password": read_secret(pi_path)}) + token = str(auth.get("result", {}).get("value", {}).get("token", "")) + if not token: + raise RuntimeError("privacyIDEA authentication failed") + + resolver_body = { + "type": "ldapresolver", + "LDAPURI": ldap_url, + "BINDDN": bind_dn, + "BINDPW": read_secret(ldap_path), + "LDAPBASE": base_dn, + "LOGINNAMEATTRIBUTE": "uid", + "LDAPSEARCHFILTER": "(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)", + "LDAPFILTER": "(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=%s))", + "USERINFO": json.dumps({ + "username": "uid", + "phone": "telephoneNumber", + "mobile": "mobile", + "email": "mail", + "surname": "sn", + "givenname": "givenName", + }), + "UIDTYPE": "uid", + "NOREFERRALS": True, + "NOSCHEMAS": True, + } + result = post(f"/resolver/{resolver}", resolver_body, token) + status = result.get("result", {}).get("status") + if status not in (True, "true", "True"): + raise RuntimeError("privacyIDEA resolver update was rejected") +except RuntimeError as exc: + print(f"ERROR: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + raise SystemExit(1) + +print("privacyIDEA resolver update: PASS") +PY diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/verify_mfa.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/verify_mfa.py index dcf0c19..e5ff337 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/verify_mfa.py +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/verify_mfa.py @@ -116,9 +116,7 @@ def main(argv=None): args.realm, args.resolver, password, - lambda: getpass.getpass( - f"Fresh MFA code of {args.user} (realm {args.realm}; token PIN first if set; not pi-admin): " - ), + lambda: getpass.getpass("Fresh MFA code (include token PIN if required): "), ) except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt, ValueError): report = {"result": "FAIL", "phase": "protected-input"} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 66d0d1e..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -# Synthetic MFA journey (NK-WP-0056-T05) - -`journey.py` signs a synthetic user in through KeyCape, Authelia and privacyIDEA over plain HTTP, -with no browser and no person, and writes a value-free receipt. It is the check a bounded executor -runs between consumers during a bind rotation (NK-WP-0056-T06): a failing journey means "revert". - -Python 3.11+ stdlib only, so it runs in the bare CI image and in a minimal executor pod. - -## What it proves - -| Step | Request | Bind on the path | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `discovery` | KeyCape discovery; issuer and endpoints on the issuer origin | | -| `keycape_authorize` | `/authorize`, PKCE S256, `acr_values=urn:netkingdom:aal2`, `prompt=login`; must redirect to Authelia `/api/oidc/authorization` | | -| `authelia_first_factor` | Authelia `/api/firstfactor` with the user's password | `svc-authelia` | -| `authelia_authorization` | the upstream request with the Authelia session; must return a code to KeyCape's callback | | -| `keycape_callback` | KeyCape callback; must render the OTP challenge with our state | | -| `keycape_otp` | TOTP code posted to KeyCape, which checks it with privacyIDEA; must redirect to the journey client with a code and our state | `svc-privacyidea` | -| `keycape_token` | code exchange with the PKCE verifier; KeyCape reads the user for the claims | `svc-keycape` | -| `id_token` | RS256 signature against KeyCape's JWKS (≥ 2048-bit), `iss`, `aud`, `nonce`, `exp`, `preferred_username`, `assurance` = aal2 with `otp` | | - -The bind column is measured on the real images (T08), not assumed: KeyCape uses its bind at token -time. privacyIDEA caches resolver lookups (`CACHE_TIMEOUT`, 120 s live), so a broken -`svc-privacyidea` bind only shows once the cache has expired. A check right after a privacyIDEA bind -change must wait that long or clear the cache first. - -privacyIDEA refuses a code whose 30-second time step is not later than the last one it accepted. -The receipt records `otp_time_step`. Pass `min_time_step=+1` (Python API) to make back-to-back -runs wait for a fresh window. - -Requesting aal2 makes the OTP challenge mandatory whatever the user's enrollment state. A sign-in -without a challenge is a failure (`mfa_not_challenged`). `svc-provisioner` is not on this path. - -The run stops at the first failed step and exits 1. The receipt names the step, a fixed reason -(`first_factor_rejected`, `otp_rejected`, `signature_invalid`, …), the HTTP status and the bind on -that step. It never holds the password, the seed, a code, a cookie or a token, and never echoes a -response body. - -## Running - -```bash -python3 journey.py --config journey.json \ - --password-file /dev/fd/3 --otp-seed-file /dev/fd/4 [--receipt receipt.json] 3<… 4<… -``` - -Secrets come only from files or descriptors. The config is non-secret and refuses `password`, -`seed`, `otp_seed` and `client_secret` keys: - -```json -{ - "issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social", - "client_id": "nk-synthetic-journey", - "redirect_uri": "https://journey.invalid/callback", - "username": "syn-journey", - "otp": {"digits": 6, "period": 30, "algorithm": "sha1", "min_remaining_seconds": 5}, - "host_map": { - "https://kc.coulomb.social": "http://keycape.sso.svc.cluster.local:8080", - "https://auth.coulomb.social": "http://authelia.sso.svc.cluster.local:9091" - }, - "timeout_seconds": 10, - "deadline_seconds": 120 -} -``` - -`redirect_uri` is never fetched: the runner reads the code from the `Location` header. `host_map` -lets an in-cluster executor reach the services directly while sending the public `Host` and -`X-Forwarded-Proto`/`-Host`, so they see the URLs they issued. Cookies are kept per public origin. -`--client-secret-file` exists only for a confidential client. The journey client is meant to be -public with PKCE. - -Exit codes: `0` pass, `1` journey failed (fail closed), `2` usage or config error. - -## Tests - -```bash -cd sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey && python3 -m unittest test_journey -v -``` - -In-process fakes of KeyCape and Authelia, with privacyIDEA's check behind KeyCape, each with a bind -switch. The tests cover the healthy pass, each broken bind failing at its step, wrong password and -seed, no OTP challenge, a tampered signature, an aal1 token, a state mismatch, the OTP window wait, -the deadline, an unreachable service, CLI exit codes, public-to-internal host mapping, the RFC -4226/6238 vectors, and that no secret value reaches the receipt. They run in the identity-provider -journey acceptance workflow (`.forgejo/workflows/identity-journeys.yaml`). - -## Synthetic stack on the pinned images (T08) - -```bash -uv run sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py [--scenario healthy|svc-authelia|svc-keycape|svc-privacyidea ...] \ - [--pi-cache-timeout 120] [--receipt FILE] [--debug-logs] -``` - -Starts LLDAP, privacyIDEA (`pi_fixture.py` inside its image, SQLite, the production resolver settings -bound as `svc-privacyidea`), Authelia (repository configmap, bound as `svc-authelia`) and KeyCape -(`bootstrap-config.json`, bind from `KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW`) on a throwaway network. Ports are -published on 127.0.0.1 only and values are generated. The hostnames are `*.journey.test`, and the -runner uses `host_map_only`. Each broken-bind scenario changes the consumer's password in LLDAP and -expects a fail-closed journey at the consumer's step, then restores the password and expects a pass. -It needs Docker, openssl and uv, and agents may run it. `--debug-logs` prints container log tails, -which can contain values, to the terminal only. Results: -`docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/`. - -## Live identity (T09) - -`lane.py` (setup / verify / teardown) is the attended, founder-run lane for the live identity -`syn-journey` under CCR-2026-0057. It generates the password and TOTP seed in memory, holds them in -OpenBao with coding agents fenced, creates the user with no groups, enrolls the token, and proves -the result with one live journey. The order of steps is in `T09-RUNBOOK.md`; the KeyCape client is -`security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml`. Tests: `python3 -m unittest test_lane` (fakes only). - -## Not yet proven - -- Live: the synthetic user, its token, the journey client and the OpenBao-held secrets (T09), and an - unattended run by the executor identity (T10). diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/T09-RUNBOOK.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/T09-RUNBOOK.md deleted file mode 100644 index 859a5a7..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/T09-RUNBOOK.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -# NK-WP-0056-T09: synthetic journey identity, founder runbook - -Prepared 2026-10-31 by claude-code. Founder-run. Creates `syn-journey` (no groups) in LLDAP, its -TOTP token `SYNJOURNEY01` in privacyIDEA realm `coulomb`, its password and seed in OpenBao -(`platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey`, coding agents fenced, no workload -reader), and the public KeyCape client `nk-synthetic-journey`. Then one journey run proves it all. - -What you decide by approving: - -- **CCR-2026-0057** (railiance-platform): custody, delivery and lifecycle of the two values. -- **SecurityCase `nk-synthetic-journey`**: the KeyCape client (public, PKCE, MFA pinned, redirect - `https://journey.invalid/callback`, which is never served; access group `synthetic-journey`, which - has no members). -- **Identity route**: an attended, receipted owner trial by `admin`, not User Engine onboarding. This - is the route `docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md` names for test identities. The name follows - the proposed `syn-` convention (SI standard §5) and is declared `SERVICE` - (`tools/service-identity/declarations/lldap.yaml`, status `planned`). - -Known open points (recorded, not blocking): KeyCape tokens say `principal_type: human` for every -user. KeyCape has no per-client group gate, so `syn-journey` can sign in to any client that admits -any authenticated user, but it holds no group, so no service grants it anything. - -## 0. Shell - -```bash -export KUBECONFIG=$HOME/.kube/config-railiance01 -cd ~/railiance-platform && git pull --ff-only && git status -cd ~/net-kingdom && git pull --ff-only -``` - -## 1. Approve CCR-2026-0057 (in railiance-platform) - -```bash -cd ~/railiance-platform -python3 scripts/credential-change.py render CCR-2026-0057 # read it first -python3 scripts/credential-change.py approve CCR-2026-0057 --reviewer platform-owner \ - --comment "Approved as proposed for NK-WP-0056-T09." -python3 scripts/credential-change.py approve CCR-2026-0057 --reviewer net-kingdom-owner \ - --comment "Approved as proposed for NK-WP-0056-T09." -git status # the CCR file changed; commit it (or tell claude-code to) -``` - -## 2. Register the KeyCape client - -Tell claude-code that you accept the case. It then marks `security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml` -`accepted`, using your words as the record. Then: - -```bash -cd ~/net-kingdom -C=$(mktemp --suffix=.yaml) -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py client-from-case security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml > "$C" -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py inspect --client-file "$C" # note uid and resourceVersion - -# check-config needs key-cape c528daa or later; the deployed image (e2b5fa1) has it -B=$HOME/.local/share/key-cape/verified-bin/e2b5fa1; mkdir -p "$B" -cid=$(docker create forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:9e082dca78f65a4af3e92d3de3705b99e49ca9b298d9562ad0d37511c4306f8d) -docker cp "$cid:/keycape" "$B/keycape"; docker rm "$cid" - -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file "$C" \ - --case-acceptance "security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml (accepted )" \ - --check-config "$B/keycape" --expected-uid --expected-resource-version -kubectl -n sso rollout restart deployment/keycape -kubectl -n sso rollout status deployment/keycape --timeout=180s -``` - -## 3. Identity, token and custody - -```bash -cd ~/net-kingdom -bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=platform-admin # fails silently later if skipped -D=$(sha256sum ~/railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0057-net-kingdom-synthetic-journey-identity.yaml | cut -d' ' -f1) -E=docs/evidence/$(date +%F)-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity; mkdir -p "$E" - -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/lane.py setup --ccr-sha256 "$D" --receipt "$E/01-setup.json" -# prompts: password of the human admin account (LLDAP), then the privacyIDEA pi-admin password -python3 sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/lane.py verify --ccr-sha256 "$D" --receipt "$E/02-verify.json" -``` - -`setup` refuses before any change if the KV path, the LLDAP user or the token already exist. If it -stops part-way, `lane.py teardown` removes whatever it created: token, user (refused if the user -has gained a group) and KV. Then run `setup` again. Receipts hold no values. - -`verify` passes when the KV password signs in to LLDAP and the journey reaches an aal2 token with -`otp` from `https://kc.coulomb.social`. If the journey fails, its receipt names the step: - -| Failed step | Likely cause | -| --- | --- | -| `keycape_authorize` | client not registered, or KeyCape not restarted after step 2 | -| `authelia_first_factor` | the password did not land in LLDAP (setup receipt), or Authelia regulation (5 failures in 2 min ban for 10 min) | -| `keycape_otp` | token not enrolled or not active; wait 30 s and verify again (a code is accepted once per window) | -| `keycape_token` | KeyCape's user lookup or tenant resolution for a user with no groups | - -## 4. Afterwards - -Hand the two receipts to claude-code. It records the evidence, moves the CCR to `verified`, the -declaration to `active` and T09 to `done`. diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py deleted file mode 100644 index aa09732..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,593 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Synthetic MFA sign-in journey through KeyCape, Authelia and privacyIDEA (NK-WP-0056-T05). - -Drives the browser journey over plain HTTP, without a browser and without a person: - - 1. discovery KeyCape /.well-known/openid-configuration (issuer must match the config) - 2. keycape_authorize KeyCape /authorize with PKCE S256 and acr_values=urn:netkingdom:aal2; - must redirect to Authelia's OIDC authorization endpoint - 3. authelia_first_factor Authelia /api/firstfactor (Authelia binds LDAP as svc-authelia) - 4. authelia_authorization the upstream authorization request; must return a code to KeyCape - 5. keycape_callback KeyCape /authorize/callback; must render the OTP challenge - 6. keycape_otp POST the TOTP code; KeyCape validates it through privacyIDEA - (privacyIDEA resolves the user, bound as svc-privacyidea); - must redirect to the journey client with a code and the original state - 7. keycape_token code exchange with the PKCE verifier - (KeyCape looks the user up for the claims, bound as svc-keycape) - 8. id_token RS256 signature against KeyCape's JWKS, iss/aud/nonce/exp, - preferred_username and assurance (aal2, mfa, otp) - -The run stops at the first failed step and exits 1 (fail closed). The receipt is value-free: it never -contains the password, the seed, a code, a cookie or a token, and names failures with a fixed reason -vocabulary instead of echoing response bodies. - -Secrets are read from files (or /dev/fd/N), never from argv or the environment. Everything else comes -from a JSON config, see README.md. Exit codes: 0 pass, 1 journey failed, 2 usage or config error. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import hashlib -import hmac -import html -import http.client -import json -import re -import secrets -import struct -import sys -import time -import uuid -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path -from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlencode, urljoin, urlsplit - -SCHEMA = "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.receipt/v1" -AAL2_ACR = "urn:netkingdom:aal2" -# Which service bind each step depends on. A step can fail for other reasons too; the mapping says -# which bind is on the path, so a broken bind must surface no later than this step. -BIND_ON_PATH = { - "authelia_first_factor": "svc-authelia", - "keycape_otp": "svc-privacyidea", - "keycape_token": "svc-keycape", -} -SHA256_DIGEST_INFO = bytes.fromhex("3031300d060960864801650304020105000420") -USERNAME = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}") -DEFAULTS = { - "scope": "openid profile", - "acr_values": AAL2_ACR, - "timeout_seconds": 10, - "deadline_seconds": 120, - "otp": {"digits": 6, "period": 30, "algorithm": "sha1", "min_remaining_seconds": 5}, - "host_map": {}, - "host_map_only": False, -} - - -class ConfigError(Exception): - pass - - -class JourneyFailure(Exception): - def __init__(self, step: str, reason: str, status: int | None = None): - super().__init__(f"{step}: {reason}") - self.step = step - self.reason = reason - self.status = status - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Configuration and secrets -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def origin(url: str) -> str: - parts = urlsplit(url) - if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parts.netloc: - raise ConfigError(f"not an http(s) URL: {url!r}") - return f"{parts.scheme}://{parts.netloc}" - - -def load_config(path: str) -> dict: - try: - raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text()) - except (OSError, ValueError) as exc: - raise ConfigError(f"config unreadable: {exc.__class__.__name__}") from None - if not isinstance(raw, dict): - raise ConfigError("config must be a JSON object") - cfg = {**DEFAULTS, **raw, "otp": {**DEFAULTS["otp"], **raw.get("otp", {})}} - for key in ("issuer", "client_id", "redirect_uri", "username"): - if not isinstance(cfg.get(key), str) or not cfg[key]: - raise ConfigError(f"config needs {key}") - for forbidden in ("password", "otp_seed", "seed", "client_secret"): - if forbidden in raw or forbidden in raw.get("otp", {}): - raise ConfigError(f"config must not carry {forbidden}; use the *-file options") - if not USERNAME.fullmatch(cfg["username"]): - raise ConfigError("username has unexpected characters") - origin(cfg["issuer"]) - origin(cfg["redirect_uri"]) - if AAL2_ACR not in cfg["acr_values"].split(): - raise ConfigError("acr_values must request urn:netkingdom:aal2: the journey proves MFA") - otp = cfg["otp"] - if otp["algorithm"] not in ("sha1", "sha256", "sha512") or otp["digits"] not in (6, 7, 8): - raise ConfigError("unsupported otp algorithm or digits") - if not 0 <= otp["min_remaining_seconds"] < otp["period"]: - raise ConfigError("otp.min_remaining_seconds must be below otp.period") - if not isinstance(cfg["host_map"], dict): - raise ConfigError("host_map must be an object") - cfg["host_map"] = {origin(k): origin(v) for k, v in cfg["host_map"].items()} - if not isinstance(cfg["host_map_only"], bool) or (cfg["host_map_only"] and not cfg["host_map"]): - raise ConfigError("host_map_only must be a boolean and needs a host_map") - return cfg - - -def read_secret(path: str, what: str) -> str: - try: - value = Path(path).read_text().strip() - except OSError: - raise ConfigError(f"{what} file unreadable") from None - if not value or "\n" in value: - raise ConfigError(f"{what} file must hold exactly one non-empty line") - return value - - -def decode_seed(seed: str) -> bytes: - clean = re.sub(r"[\s-]", "", seed).upper() - try: - key = base64.b32decode(clean + "=" * (-len(clean) % 8)) - except ValueError: - raise ConfigError("otp seed is not base32") from None - if len(key) < 10: - raise ConfigError("otp seed is shorter than 80 bits") - return key - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Primitives: TOTP, PKCE, RS256 -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def hotp(key: bytes, counter: int, digits: int = 6, algorithm: str = "sha1") -> str: - mac = hmac.new(key, struct.pack(">Q", counter), algorithm).digest() - offset = mac[-1] & 0x0F - value = struct.unpack(">I", mac[offset : offset + 4])[0] & 0x7FFFFFFF - return str(value % 10**digits).zfill(digits) - - -def b64url(data: bytes) -> str: - return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode() - - -def b64url_decode(value: str) -> bytes: - return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4)) - - -def pkce_pair() -> tuple[str, str]: - verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(48) - return verifier, b64url(hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()) - - -def rs256_valid(signing_input: bytes, signature: bytes, jwk: dict) -> bool: - """RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256, stdlib only. Requires a modulus of at least 2048 bits.""" - try: - n = int.from_bytes(b64url_decode(jwk["n"]), "big") - e = int.from_bytes(b64url_decode(jwk["e"]), "big") - except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError): - return False - k = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8 - if n.bit_length() < 2048 or len(signature) != k: - return False - s = int.from_bytes(signature, "big") - if s >= n: - return False - em = pow(s, e, n).to_bytes(k, "big") - tail = SHA256_DIGEST_INFO + hashlib.sha256(signing_input).digest() - expected = b"\x00\x01" + b"\xff" * (k - 3 - len(tail)) + b"\x00" + tail - return hmac.compare_digest(em, expected) - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# HTTP without redirect following, with an explicit cookie store per public origin -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class Response: - def __init__(self, status: int, headers: list[tuple[str, str]], body: bytes): - self.status = status - self.headers = headers - self.body = body - - def header(self, name: str) -> str: - for key, value in self.headers: - if key.lower() == name.lower(): - return value - return "" - - def json(self): - return json.loads(self.body) - - -class Client: - """Talks to public URLs, optionally connecting to a mapped internal origin. - - When a public origin is mapped, the request goes to the internal origin with the public Host and - X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host, so services behind an ingress see the URL they issued. Cookies are kept - per public origin and only sent back to that origin. - """ - - def __init__(self, host_map: dict[str, str], timeout: float, deadline: float, clock=time.monotonic, - host_map_only: bool = False): - self.host_map = host_map - self.host_map_only = host_map_only - self.timeout = timeout - self.deadline = deadline - self.clock = clock - self.cookies: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {} - - def request(self, step: str, method: str, url: str, *, form=None, json_body=None, headers=None): - if self.clock() > self.deadline: - raise JourneyFailure(step, "deadline_exceeded") - public = urlsplit(url) - pub_origin = f"{public.scheme}://{public.netloc}" - if self.host_map_only and pub_origin not in self.host_map: - raise JourneyFailure(step, "unmapped_origin") - target = urlsplit(self.host_map.get(pub_origin, pub_origin)) - path = public.path or "/" - if public.query: - path += "?" + public.query - head = {"Host": public.netloc, "Accept": "application/json, text/html"} - if pub_origin in self.host_map: - head["X-Forwarded-Proto"] = public.scheme - head["X-Forwarded-Host"] = public.netloc - jar = self.cookies.get(pub_origin) - if jar: - head["Cookie"] = "; ".join(f"{k}={v}" for k, v in jar.items()) - body = None - if form is not None: - body = urlencode(form).encode() - head["Content-Type"] = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" - elif json_body is not None: - body = json.dumps(json_body).encode() - head["Content-Type"] = "application/json" - head.update(headers or {}) - conn_cls = http.client.HTTPSConnection if target.scheme == "https" else http.client.HTTPConnection - remaining = max(0.1, min(self.timeout, self.deadline - self.clock())) - conn = conn_cls(target.netloc, timeout=remaining) - try: - conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=head) - raw = conn.getresponse() - response = Response(raw.status, raw.getheaders(), raw.read(1 << 20)) - except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException): - raise JourneyFailure(step, "unreachable") from None - finally: - conn.close() - for key, value in response.headers: - if key.lower() == "set-cookie": - self._store_cookie(pub_origin, value) - return response - - def _store_cookie(self, pub_origin: str, header: str) -> None: - first, *attrs = [part.strip() for part in header.split(";")] - name, sep, value = first.partition("=") - if not sep or not name: - return - expired = any(a.lower().replace(" ", "") in ("max-age=0",) for a in attrs) or value == "" - jar = self.cookies.setdefault(pub_origin, {}) - if expired: - jar.pop(name, None) - else: - jar[name] = value - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# The journey -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def location(step: str, response: Response, base: str) -> str: - if response.status not in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308): - raise JourneyFailure(step, "expected_redirect", response.status) - value = response.header("Location") - if not value: - raise JourneyFailure(step, "redirect_without_location", response.status) - return urljoin(base, value) - - -def same_endpoint(url: str, expected: str) -> bool: - a, b = urlsplit(url), urlsplit(expected) - return (a.scheme, a.netloc, a.path) == (b.scheme, b.netloc, b.path) - - -def single(query: dict, name: str) -> str | None: - values = query.get(name) - return values[0] if values and len(values) == 1 else None - - -class Journey: - def __init__(self, cfg: dict, password: str, seed: bytes, client_secret: str | None = None, - clock=time.monotonic, wall=time.time, sleep=time.sleep, min_time_step: int | None = None): - self.cfg = cfg - self.password = password - self.seed = seed - self.client_secret = client_secret - self.wall = wall - self.sleep = sleep - self.clock = clock - self.client = Client(cfg["host_map"], cfg["timeout_seconds"], clock() + cfg["deadline_seconds"], clock, - cfg["host_map_only"]) - self.steps: list[dict] = [] - self.claims_summary: dict = {} - # privacyIDEA refuses a TOTP value whose time step is not later than the last accepted one, so - # back-to-back journeys must each use a fresh step. The step number is time, not a secret. - self.min_time_step = min_time_step - self.time_step: int | None = None - - def step(self, name: str, fn): - started = self.clock() - try: - result = fn() - except JourneyFailure as failure: - self.steps.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "reason": failure.reason, "status": failure.status, - "elapsed_ms": int((self.clock() - started) * 1000)}) - raise - self.steps.append({"name": name, "ok": True, "elapsed_ms": int((self.clock() - started) * 1000)}) - return result - - def run(self) -> None: - cfg = self.cfg - issuer = cfg["issuer"].rstrip("/") - meta = self.step("discovery", lambda: self.discovery(issuer)) - verifier, challenge = pkce_pair() - state, nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(24), secrets.token_urlsafe(24) - upstream = self.step("keycape_authorize", lambda: self.authorize(meta, challenge, state, nonce)) - self.step("authelia_first_factor", lambda: self.first_factor(upstream)) - callback = self.step("authelia_authorization", lambda: self.upstream_authorization(upstream)) - self.step("keycape_callback", lambda: self.keycape_callback(callback, state)) - code = self.step("keycape_otp", lambda: self.submit_otp(issuer, state)) - id_token = self.step("keycape_token", lambda: self.token(meta, code, verifier)) - self.step("id_token", lambda: self.verify_id_token(meta, id_token, nonce)) - - # 1 - def discovery(self, issuer: str) -> dict: - r = self.client.request("discovery", "GET", issuer + "/.well-known/openid-configuration") - if r.status != 200: - raise JourneyFailure("discovery", "unexpected_status", r.status) - try: - meta = r.json() - except ValueError: - raise JourneyFailure("discovery", "not_json", r.status) from None - if meta.get("issuer", "").rstrip("/") != issuer: - raise JourneyFailure("discovery", "issuer_mismatch") - for key in ("authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri"): - if not isinstance(meta.get(key), str) or origin(meta[key]) != origin(issuer): - raise JourneyFailure("discovery", f"{key}_off_issuer") - return meta - - # 2 - def authorize(self, meta: dict, challenge: str, state: str, nonce: str) -> str: - cfg = self.cfg - query = urlencode({ - "response_type": "code", "client_id": cfg["client_id"], "redirect_uri": cfg["redirect_uri"], - "scope": cfg["scope"], "state": state, "nonce": nonce, "code_challenge": challenge, - "code_challenge_method": "S256", "acr_values": cfg["acr_values"], "prompt": "login", - }) - url = meta["authorization_endpoint"] + "?" + query - r = self.client.request("keycape_authorize", "GET", url) - upstream = location("keycape_authorize", r, url) - if origin(upstream) == origin(cfg["issuer"]): - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_authorize", "did_not_leave_keycape") - if not urlsplit(upstream).path.endswith("/api/oidc/authorization"): - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_authorize", "upstream_not_authelia_authorization") - return upstream - - # 3 - def first_factor(self, upstream: str) -> None: - url = origin(upstream) + "/api/firstfactor" - r = self.client.request("authelia_first_factor", "POST", url, json_body={ - "username": self.cfg["username"], "password": self.password, "keepMeLoggedIn": False, - }) - if r.status != 200: - raise JourneyFailure("authelia_first_factor", "first_factor_rejected", r.status) - try: - ok = r.json().get("status") == "OK" - except (ValueError, AttributeError): - ok = False - if not ok: - raise JourneyFailure("authelia_first_factor", "first_factor_not_ok", r.status) - - # 4 - def upstream_authorization(self, upstream: str) -> str: - r = self.client.request("authelia_authorization", "GET", upstream) - callback = location("authelia_authorization", r, upstream) - expected = self.cfg["issuer"].rstrip("/") + "/authorize/callback" - if not same_endpoint(callback, expected): - raise JourneyFailure("authelia_authorization", "upstream_did_not_issue_code") - query = parse_qs(urlsplit(callback).query) - if "error" in query or not single(query, "code"): - raise JourneyFailure("authelia_authorization", "upstream_did_not_issue_code") - return callback - - # 5 - def keycape_callback(self, callback: str, state: str) -> None: - r = self.client.request("keycape_callback", "GET", callback) - if r.status in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308): - target = urljoin(callback, r.header("Location")) - if same_endpoint(target, self.cfg["redirect_uri"]): - # Signed in without an OTP challenge despite aal2: never acceptable here. - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_callback", "mfa_not_challenged", r.status) - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_callback", "unexpected_redirect", r.status) - if r.status != 200: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_callback", "callback_rejected", r.status) - page = r.body.decode("utf-8", "replace") - form = re.search(r']*action="/authorize/callback"[^>]*>(.*?)', page, re.S | re.I) - if not form or not re.search(r'name="mfa_token"', form.group(1)): - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_callback", "mfa_challenge_missing", r.status) - hidden = re.search(r'name="state"\s+value="([^"]*)"', form.group(1)) - if not hidden or html.unescape(hidden.group(1)) != state: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_callback", "challenge_state_mismatch", r.status) - - # 6 - def submit_otp(self, issuer: str, state: str) -> str: - otp = self.cfg["otp"] - period = otp["period"] - now = self.wall() - remaining = period - (now % period) - if remaining < otp["min_remaining_seconds"]: - self.sleep(remaining + 0.5) - now = self.wall() - if self.min_time_step is not None and now // period < self.min_time_step: - wait = self.min_time_step * period - now + 0.5 - if self.clock() + wait > self.client.deadline: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_otp", "deadline_exceeded") - self.sleep(wait) - now = self.wall() - self.time_step = int(now // period) - code = hotp(self.seed, self.time_step, otp["digits"], otp["algorithm"]) - url = issuer + "/authorize/callback" - r = self.client.request("keycape_otp", "POST", url, form={"state": state, "mfa_token": code}) - if r.status == 401: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_otp", "otp_rejected", r.status) - target = location("keycape_otp", r, url) - if not same_endpoint(target, self.cfg["redirect_uri"]): - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_otp", "unexpected_redirect", r.status) - query = parse_qs(urlsplit(target).query) - if "error" in query: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_otp", "authorization_error", r.status) - if single(query, "state") != state: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_otp", "state_mismatch", r.status) - code_value = single(query, "code") - if not code_value: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_otp", "no_authorization_code", r.status) - return code_value - - # 7 - def token(self, meta: dict, code: str, verifier: str) -> str: - form = {"grant_type": "authorization_code", "code": code, "redirect_uri": self.cfg["redirect_uri"], - "code_verifier": verifier, "client_id": self.cfg["client_id"]} - headers = {} - if self.client_secret is not None: - basic = base64.b64encode(f"{self.cfg['client_id']}:{self.client_secret}".encode()).decode() - headers["Authorization"] = "Basic " + basic - r = self.client.request("keycape_token", "POST", meta["token_endpoint"], form=form, headers=headers) - if r.status != 200: - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_token", "token_rejected", r.status) - try: - id_token = r.json().get("id_token") - except (ValueError, AttributeError): - id_token = None - if not isinstance(id_token, str): - raise JourneyFailure("keycape_token", "no_id_token", r.status) - return id_token - - # 8 - def verify_id_token(self, meta: dict, id_token: str, nonce: str) -> None: - step = "id_token" - try: - head_b64, payload_b64, sig_b64 = id_token.split(".") - header = json.loads(b64url_decode(head_b64)) - claims = json.loads(b64url_decode(payload_b64)) - signature = b64url_decode(sig_b64) - except ValueError: - raise JourneyFailure(step, "malformed") from None - if header.get("alg") != "RS256": - raise JourneyFailure(step, "unexpected_alg") - r = self.client.request(step, "GET", meta["jwks_uri"]) - if r.status != 200: - raise JourneyFailure(step, "jwks_unavailable", r.status) - try: - keys = [k for k in r.json().get("keys", []) if k.get("kty") == "RSA"] - except (ValueError, AttributeError): - raise JourneyFailure(step, "jwks_unavailable", r.status) from None - if header.get("kid") is not None: - keys = [k for k in keys if k.get("kid") == header["kid"]] - signing_input = f"{head_b64}.{payload_b64}".encode() - if not any(rs256_valid(signing_input, signature, k) for k in keys): - raise JourneyFailure(step, "signature_invalid") - cfg = self.cfg - aud = claims.get("aud") - audiences = aud if isinstance(aud, list) else [aud] - assurance = claims.get("assurance") if isinstance(claims.get("assurance"), dict) else {} - methods = assurance.get("methods") if isinstance(assurance.get("methods"), list) else [] - checks = [ - (str(claims.get("iss", "")).rstrip("/") == cfg["issuer"].rstrip("/"), "issuer_mismatch"), - (cfg["client_id"] in audiences, "audience_mismatch"), - (claims.get("nonce") == nonce, "nonce_mismatch"), - (isinstance(claims.get("exp"), (int, float)) and claims["exp"] > self.wall(), "expired"), - (claims.get("preferred_username") == cfg["username"], "username_mismatch"), - (assurance.get("level") == "aal2" and assurance.get("mfa") is True, "not_aal2"), - ("otp" in methods, "otp_not_in_methods"), - ] - self.claims_summary = { - "signature_verified": True, - "kid": header.get("kid"), - "assurance_level": assurance.get("level"), - "assurance_methods": [m for m in methods if isinstance(m, str)], - "assurance_source": assurance.get("source"), - "preferred_username_matches": claims.get("preferred_username") == cfg["username"], - } - for ok, reason in checks: - if not ok: - raise JourneyFailure(step, reason) - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Receipt and CLI -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def utc_now() -> str: - return datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(timespec="seconds").replace("+00:00", "Z") - - -def run_journey(cfg: dict, password: str, seed: bytes, client_secret: str | None = None, **kw) -> dict: - receipt = { - "schema": SCHEMA, - "run_id": str(uuid.uuid4()), - "started_at": utc_now(), - "runner_sha256": hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - "target": {"issuer": cfg["issuer"], "client_id": cfg["client_id"], "username": cfg["username"], - "acr_values": cfg["acr_values"], "host_mapped": sorted(cfg["host_map"])}, - "binds_on_path": BIND_ON_PATH, - } - journey = Journey(cfg, password, seed, client_secret, **kw) - try: - journey.run() - receipt.update(result="pass", failed_step=None, reason=None) - except JourneyFailure as failure: - receipt.update(result="fail", failed_step=failure.step, reason=failure.reason, - bind_on_failed_step=BIND_ON_PATH.get(failure.step)) - receipt["steps"] = journey.steps - receipt["claims"] = journey.claims_summary - receipt["otp_time_step"] = journey.time_step - receipt["finished_at"] = utc_now() - return receipt - - -def main(argv=None) -> int: - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument("--config", required=True, help="non-secret JSON config") - parser.add_argument("--password-file", required=True, help="file or /dev/fd/N with the user's password") - parser.add_argument("--otp-seed-file", required=True, help="file or /dev/fd/N with the base32 TOTP seed") - parser.add_argument("--client-secret-file", help="only for a confidential journey client") - parser.add_argument("--receipt", help="write the receipt here as well as to stdout") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - cfg = load_config(args.config) - password = read_secret(args.password_file, "password") - seed = decode_seed(read_secret(args.otp_seed_file, "otp seed")) - client_secret = read_secret(args.client_secret_file, "client secret") if args.client_secret_file else None - except ConfigError as exc: - print(json.dumps({"schema": SCHEMA, "result": "error", "reason": str(exc)}), file=sys.stderr) - return 2 - receipt = run_journey(cfg, password, seed, client_secret) - text = json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - if args.receipt: - Path(args.receipt).write_text(text + "\n") - print(text) - return 0 if receipt["result"] == "pass" else 1 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/lane.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/lane.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9309031..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/lane.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,409 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended lane for the synthetic journey identity `syn-journey` (NK-WP-0056-T09). - -setup: under an approved, sha256-bound CCR and an attended platform-admin OpenBao session: - refuse unless the KV path, the LLDAP user and the privacyIDEA token are all absent; fence - coding agents from the KV path; generate a password in memory; create `syn-journey` in - LLDAP with no groups (as the human `admin`) and set its password; enroll its TOTP token - in realm `coulomb` (as `pi-admin`) with a key privacyIDEA generates (pi-admin's rights - include totp_force_server_generate, which silently replaces a supplied key), taking the - key from the enrollment response and confirming it with a code when the verify_enrollment - policy asks; then write password and seed to KV (CAS=0). A failure after the LLDAP step - leaves state for `teardown`. -verify: KV holds exactly the two fields, the fence is present, no workload role exists, the KV - password signs in to LLDAP, and the synthetic journey passes against the live issuer with - the KV values (read in memory). Needs the KeyCape client `nk-synthetic-journey` - (security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml) to be registered first. -teardown: delete the token, the LLDAP user and the KV entry (all versions). The fence and the - KeyCape client stay; remove the client with keycape-client.py --operation remove. - -Values are never printed or written. Receipts hold identifiers, versions and booleans only. -Founder-run: it needs the attended platform-admin session, the `admin` password and the `pi-admin` -password (prompted). Test with test_lane.py; never against live from an agent session. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import getpass -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import re -import secrets -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = HERE.parents[2] if len(HERE.parents) > 2 else HERE # repo root; only Live needs it -PLATFORM = Path(os.environ.get("NK_PLATFORM_ROOT", REPO.parent / "railiance-platform")) - -USER = "syn-journey" -EMAIL = "syn-journey@synthetic.invalid" -DISPLAY = "Synthetic journey (NK-WP-0056)" -REALM = "coulomb" -SERIAL = "SYNJOURNEY01" -CLIENT = "nk-synthetic-journey" -REDIRECT = "https://journey.invalid/callback" -ISSUER = "https://kc.coulomb.social" -CCR_FILE = "CCR-2026-0057-net-kingdom-synthetic-journey-identity.yaml" -KV = "platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey" -KV_DATA = KV.replace("platform/", "platform/data/", 1) -KV_METADATA = KV.replace("platform/", "platform/metadata/", 1) -FIELDS = ("PASSWORD", "TOTP_SEED") -ATTENDED_AUTH = {"method": "attended-oidc", "mount": "netkingdom", "role": "platform-admin"} -PROCEDURE = "net-kingdom sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/lane.py setup" -BOUNDARY = "sys/policies/acl/agent-high-risk-boundary" -APPROVERS = {"platform-owner", "net-kingdom-owner"} -LLDAP = "https://lldap.coulomb.social" -PI = "https://pink.coulomb.social" - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def load(name: str, path: Path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -journey = load("journey", HERE / "journey.py") - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Contract -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def contract(d, expected: str) -> dict: - path = PLATFORM / "credential-change-requests" / CCR_FILE - raw = path.read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() != expected: - raise Refused("ccr_digest") - ccr, errors = d.validate_ccr(path) - if errors or ccr.get("status") not in {"approved", "applied", "verified", "active"}: - raise Refused("ccr_status") - approved = {r["reviewer"].removeprefix("User (").removesuffix(")") - for r in ccr.get("review", {}).get("comments", []) - if r.get("decision") == "approved" and (r.get("source_ref") or r.get("at"))} - if not APPROVERS <= approved: - raise Refused("ccr_approval") - a, delivery = ccr.get("openbao", {}), ccr.get("delivery", {}) - if (ccr.get("request_type") != "attended-service-credential-delivery" or a.get("kv_path") != KV - or a.get("fields") != list(FIELDS) or a.get("auth") != ATTENDED_AUTH - or a.get("runtime_access") is not False or delivery.get("procedure") != PROCEDURE): - raise Refused("ccr_shape") - return ccr - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Steps -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def fence_stanzas() -> list[str]: - return [f'path "{p}" {{ capabilities = ["deny"] }}' for p in (KV_DATA, KV_METADATA)] - - -def fence_present(d) -> bool: - current = d.boundary_policy() - return all(s in current for s in fence_stanzas()) - - -def add_fence(d) -> None: - current = d.boundary_policy() - added = "" - for path, stanza in zip((KV_DATA, KV_METADATA), fence_stanzas()): - if f'"{path}"' not in current: - added += stanza + "\n" - elif stanza not in current: - raise Refused("fence_conflict") - if added: - if d.boundary_policy() != current: - raise Refused("fence_race") - d.write_boundary_policy(current + "\n" + added) - if d.boundary_policy() != current + "\n" + added: - raise Refused("fence_readback") - - -def lldap_user(d, token) -> dict | None: - users = d.lldap_gql(token, "{ users { id groups { displayName } } }")["users"] - match = [u for u in users if u["id"] == USER] - return match[0] if match else None - - -def pi_tokens(d) -> list[dict]: - """The lane's token, by serial. Listing by user is an error in privacyIDEA while the user does - not resolve (before setup creates it, after teardown deletes it), so ownership is read from the - token itself instead.""" - value = d.pi_call(f"/token/?serial={SERIAL}") - tokens = value.get("tokens") if isinstance(value, dict) else None - if not isinstance(tokens, list): - raise Refused("pi_token_list") - return tokens - - -def current_code(seed_b32: str, wall) -> str: - key = journey.decode_seed(seed_b32) - return journey.hotp(key, int(wall() // 30)) - - -def setup(d, expected: str, receipt: dict) -> None: - receipt["phase"] = "contract" - ccr = contract(d, expected) - receipt["phase"] = "identity" - d.attended_platform_admin() - - receipt["phase"] = "absent" - if d.kv_read(KV_DATA) is not None: - raise Refused("kv_exists") - admin = d.lldap_admin_token() - if lldap_user(d, admin) is not None: - raise Refused("lldap_user_exists") - d.pi_login() - if pi_tokens(d): - raise Refused("pi_token_exists") - - receipt["phase"] = "coding_agent_fence" - add_fence(d) - - password = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) - receipt["phase"] = "lldap_user" - d.lldap_gql(admin, "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - {"u": {"id": USER, "email": EMAIL, "displayName": DISPLAY}}) - d.lldap_set_password(admin, USER, password) - created = lldap_user(d, admin) - if created is None or created["groups"]: - raise Refused("lldap_user_shape") - if not d.lldap_login(USER, password): - raise Refused("lldap_password_not_effective") - - receipt["phase"] = "pi_token" - detail = d.pi_init({"type": "totp", "serial": SERIAL, "genkey": 1, "otplen": 6, "hashlib": "sha1", - "timeStep": 30, "user": USER, "realm": REALM, - "description": "NK-WP-0056 synthetic journey"}) - value = (detail.get("otpkey") or {}).get("value") if isinstance(detail, dict) else None - if not isinstance(value, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"seed://[0-9a-f]{40,128}", value): - raise Refused("pi_seed_missing") - seed_b32 = base64.b32encode(bytes.fromhex(value[len("seed://"):])).decode() - if detail.get("rollout_state") == "verify": - d.pi_init({"type": "totp", "serial": SERIAL, "verify": current_code(seed_b32, d.wall)}) - receipt["enrollment_confirmed_with_code"] = True - tokens = pi_tokens(d) - if (len(tokens) != 1 or tokens[0].get("serial") != SERIAL or tokens[0].get("active") is not True - or tokens[0].get("username") != USER or tokens[0].get("user_realm", REALM) != REALM - or tokens[0].get("tokentype") != "totp" or tokens[0].get("rollout_state") not in ("", "enrolled", None)): - raise Refused("pi_token_shape") - - receipt["phase"] = "kv" - receipt["kv_version"] = d.kv_write_cas0(KV_DATA, {"PASSWORD": password, "TOTP_SEED": seed_b32}) - - receipt["phase"] = "fence_present" - if not fence_present(d): - raise Refused("fence_readback") - receipt.update(phase="done", status="identity_prepared", key_generated_by="privacyidea", source_ccr=ccr["id"], ccr_sha256=expected, - created={"lldap_user": USER, "groups": [], "email": EMAIL, "pi_token_serial": SERIAL, - "pi_realm": REALM, "kv_path": KV}, - coding_agents_denied=True, workload_access=False, lldap_password_effective=True) - - -def verify(d, expected: str, receipt: dict) -> None: - receipt["phase"] = "contract" - ccr = contract(d, expected) - receipt["phase"] = "identity" - d.attended_platform_admin() - receipt["phase"] = "kv" - entry = d.kv_read(KV_DATA) - if entry is None or set(entry["data"]) != set(FIELDS): - raise Refused("kv_shape") - receipt["kv_version"] = entry["metadata"]["version"] - receipt["phase"] = "fence_present" - if not fence_present(d): - raise Refused("fence_missing") - receipt["phase"] = "no_workload_role" - if d.workload_role_exists(): - raise Refused("unexpected_workload_role") - receipt["phase"] = "lldap_login" - if not d.lldap_login(USER, entry["data"]["PASSWORD"]): - raise Refused("kv_password_not_current") - receipt["phase"] = "journey" - result = d.run_journey({"issuer": ISSUER, "client_id": CLIENT, "redirect_uri": REDIRECT, "username": USER}, - entry["data"]["PASSWORD"], journey.decode_seed(entry["data"]["TOTP_SEED"])) - receipt["journey"] = result - if result.get("result") != "pass": - raise Refused("journey_failed") - receipt.update(phase="done", status="identity_verified", source_ccr=ccr["id"], ccr_sha256=expected, - kv_is_current=True, coding_agents_denied=True, workload_access=False, journey_passed=True) - - -def teardown(d, expected: str, receipt: dict) -> None: - receipt["phase"] = "contract" - contract(d, expected) - receipt["phase"] = "identity" - d.attended_platform_admin() - receipt["phase"] = "pi_token" - d.pi_login() - for token in pi_tokens(d): - if token.get("serial") != SERIAL or token.get("username") not in (USER, "", None): - raise Refused("unexpected_pi_token") # never delete what this lane did not create - d.pi_call(f"/token/{SERIAL}", method="DELETE") - receipt["phase"] = "lldap_user" - admin = d.lldap_admin_token() - user = lldap_user(d, admin) - if user is not None: - if user["groups"]: - raise Refused("lldap_user_has_groups") - d.lldap_gql(admin, "mutation($u: String!) { deleteUser(userId: $u) { ok } }", {"u": USER}) - receipt["phase"] = "kv" - d.kv_destroy(KV_METADATA) - if d.kv_read(KV_DATA) is not None: - raise Refused("kv_still_present") - receipt.update(phase="done", status="identity_removed", lldap_user_removed=True, pi_token_removed=True, - kv_removed=True, keycape_client_removal_separate=True) - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Live dependencies (loaded only when run for real) -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class Live: - def __init__(self, lldap_endpoint: str, pi_endpoint: str): - sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM / "scripts")) - sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea")) - sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap")) - lane = load("bind_lane", REPO / "tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py") - self._bao, self._data = lane.bao, lane.data - self._attended = lane.attended_platform_admin - self._ccr = load("credential_change", PLATFORM / "scripts/credential-change.py") - self._split = load("bind_split", REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py") - self._realm = load("realm_bootstrap", REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py") - self._pi_api = load("pi_api", REPO / "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/pi_api.py") - self.directory = self._split.Directory(lldap_endpoint) - self.lldap_endpoint = lldap_endpoint - self.pi_endpoint = pi_endpoint - self.pi = None - self.wall = __import__("time").time - - def validate_ccr(self, path): - ccr, errors, _ = self._ccr.validate_ccr(path) - return ccr, errors - - def attended_platform_admin(self): - self._attended() - - def kv_read(self, path): - result = self._bao(["read", "-format=json", path], allow_failure=True) - if result.returncode != 0: - if b"No value found" in result.stdout + result.stderr: - return None - raise Refused("kv_read") - return self._data(result)["data"] - - def kv_write_cas0(self, path, values): - return self._data(self._bao(["write", "-format=json", path, "-"], - payload={"options": {"cas": 0}, "data": values}))["data"]["version"] - - def kv_destroy(self, metadata_path): - self._bao(["delete", metadata_path]) - - def boundary_policy(self): - return self._data(self._bao(["read", "-format=json", BOUNDARY]))["data"]["policy"] - - def write_boundary_policy(self, text): - self._bao(["write", BOUNDARY, "-"], payload={"policy": text}) - - def workload_role_exists(self): - role = "auth/kubernetes/role/net-kingdom-synthetic-journey" - return self._bao(["read", "-format=json", role], allow_failure=True).returncode == 0 - - def lldap_admin_token(self): - try: - token = self._split.admin_token(self.directory, None) - except Exception: - raise Refused("lldap_admin_login") from None - if not token: - raise Refused("lldap_admin_login") - return token - - def lldap_gql(self, token, query, variables=None): - return self.directory.gql(token, query, variables) - - def lldap_set_password(self, token, user, password): - self._split.set_password(self.lldap_endpoint, token, user, password) - - def lldap_login(self, user, password): - return self.directory.login(user, password) is not None - - def pi_login(self): - if self.pi is None: - secret = getpass.getpass("privacyIDEA pi-admin password: ") - try: - self.pi = self._realm.Client(self.pi_endpoint, secret) - except Exception: - raise Refused("pi_admin_login") from None - - def pi_call(self, path, payload=None, method=None): - self.pi_login() - if method is None: - try: - return self.pi.call(path, payload) - except Exception: - raise Refused("pi_request:" + path.split("?")[0]) from None - status, body = self._pi_api.request(self.pi.url + path, payload, self.pi.token, method=method) - result = body.get("result") if isinstance(body, dict) else None - if status != 200 or not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("status") is not True: - raise Refused("pi_request") - return result.get("value") - - def pi_init(self, payload): - """POST /token/init and return its detail (holds the generated key: kept in memory only).""" - self.pi_login() - status, body = self._pi_api.request(self.pi.url + "/token/init", payload, self.pi.token) - result = body.get("result") if isinstance(body, dict) else None - if status != 200 or not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("status") is not True: - raise Refused(f"pi_request:/token/init:{status}") - return body.get("detail") or {} - - def run_journey(self, cfg, password, seed): - path = Path(os.environ.get("TMPDIR", "/tmp")) / f"journey-{secrets.token_hex(4)}.json" - fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as out: - json.dump(cfg, out) - return journey.run_journey(journey.load_config(str(path)), password, seed) - finally: - path.unlink() - - -def main(argv=None) -> int: - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter) - p.add_argument("action", choices=["setup", "verify", "teardown"]) - p.add_argument("--ccr-sha256", required=True) - p.add_argument("--receipt", required=True) - p.add_argument("--lldap", default=LLDAP, help="LLDAP web endpoint") - p.add_argument("--privacyidea", default=PI, help="privacyIDEA endpoint") - a = p.parse_args(argv) - fd = os.open(a.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - r = {"status": "failed", "action": a.action, "identity": USER, "values_recorded": False, - "source_sha256": hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - try: - d = Live(a.lldap, a.privacyidea) - {"setup": setup, "verify": verify, "teardown": teardown}[a.action](d, a.ccr_sha256, r) - except Exception as error: # fixed reasons only, never exception text from a dependency - r.update(status="failed", reason=str(error) if isinstance(error, Refused) else type(error).__name__) - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as out: - json.dump(r, out, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - out.write("\n") - print(json.dumps({k: r[k] for k in ("status", "phase", "reason") if k in r})) - return int(r["status"] == "failed") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/pi_fixture.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/pi_fixture.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5e28d4e..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/pi_fixture.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic privacyIDEA for the journey stack (NK-WP-0056-T08). Runs inside the pinned image. - -Never loads production configuration: a scratch SQLite database under /tmp, the production resolver -settings from realm_bootstrap.py pointed at the synthetic LLDAP and bound as svc-privacyidea, realm -`coulomb`, a read-only administrator for KeyCape, and one TOTP token for the synthetic user. -Values arrive in the environment (names only on the docker command line) and are not printed. -""" - -import json -import logging -import os -import sys -import tempfile -from pathlib import Path - -phase = "isolation" -REALM = "coulomb" -RESOLVER = "lldap-coulomb" -BASE_DN = "dc=netkingdom,dc=local" - - -def env(name): - value = os.environ.pop(name, "") - if not value: - raise ValueError("missing " + name) - return value - - -def run(): - global phase - bind_pw = env("FIXTURE_BIND_PW") - reader_pw = env("FIXTURE_READER_PW") - otp_hex = env("FIXTURE_OTP_HEX") - user = env("FIXTURE_USER") - cache_timeout = os.environ.get("FIXTURE_CACHE_TIMEOUT", "120") - for k in list(os.environ): - if k.startswith("PRIVACYIDEA_"): - del os.environ[k] - logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) - root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="journey-pi-")) - (root / "enckey").write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - cfg = root / "fixture.cfg" - cfg.write_text( - "SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI=" + repr("sqlite:///" + str(root / "pi.sqlite")) + "\n" - "SECRET_KEY=" + repr(os.urandom(24).hex()) + "\n" - "PI_PEPPER=" + repr(os.urandom(24).hex()) + "\n" - "PI_NO_RESPONSE_SIGN=True\nPI_AUDIT_NO_SIGN=True\n" - "PI_LOGFILE=" + repr(str(root / "log")) + "\n" - "PI_ENCFILE=" + repr(str(root / "enckey")) + "\n" - "PI_AUDIT_SQL_URI=" + repr("sqlite:///" + str(root / "audit.sqlite")) + "\n" - "PI_TRUSTED_JWT=[]\n" - ) - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.models import db - from privacyidea.lib.auth import create_db_admin - from privacyidea.lib.policy import set_policy - from privacyidea.lib.realm import set_realm - from privacyidea.lib.resolver import save_resolver - from privacyidea.lib.token import init_token - from privacyidea.lib.user import User - - app = create_app(config_name="testing", config_file=str(cfg), silent=True) - phase = "database" - with app.app_context(): - db.create_all() - from privacyidea.lib.audit import getAudit - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import LogEntry - - LogEntry.__table__.create(getAudit(app.config).engine, checkfirst=True) - phase = "resolver" - save_resolver({ - "resolver": RESOLVER, "type": "ldapresolver", - "LDAPURI": "ldap://lldap:3890", "LDAPBASE": BASE_DN, - "BINDDN": f"uid=svc-privacyidea,ou=people,{BASE_DN}", "BINDPW": bind_pw, - "TIMEOUT": "5", "CACHE_TIMEOUT": cache_timeout, "SIZELIMIT": "500", - "LOGINNAMEATTRIBUTE": "uid", "LDAPSEARCHFILTER": "(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)", - "LDAPFILTER": "(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=%s))", - "USERINFO": json.dumps({"username": "uid", "phone": "telephoneNumber", "mobile": "mobile", - "email": "mail", "surname": "sn", "givenname": "givenName"}), - "UIDTYPE": "uid", "NOREFERRALS": True, "NOSCHEMAS": True, "AUTHTYPE": "Simple", - }) - set_realm(REALM, [{"name": RESOLVER}]) - phase = "policies" - create_db_admin("keycape-factor-read", password=reader_pw) - set_policy(name="journey-admin-baseline", scope="admin", action="*", - adminuser=["*", "!keycape-factor-read"]) - set_policy(name="keycape-factor-read", scope="admin", action="tokenlist", - adminuser="keycape-factor-read", realm=REALM) - phase = "token" - # Resolving the user here proves the svc-privacyidea bind works at setup. - init_token({"serial": "SYNJOURNEY01", "type": "totp", "otpkey": otp_hex, "otplen": 6, - "timeStep": 30, "hashlib": "sha1"}, user=User(user, REALM)) - print(json.dumps({"fixture_ready": True, "production_database": False}), flush=True) - app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080, debug=False, use_reloader=False, threaded=True) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - try: - run() - except Exception as error: # report the phase, never the values - print(json.dumps({"fixture_failure": type(error).__name__, "phase": phase}), flush=True) - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py deleted file mode 100644 index 92a6569..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,379 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -# /// script -# dependencies = ["PyYAML>=6,<7"] -# /// -"""Synthetic identity stack on the pinned images, with the journey run against it (NK-WP-0056-T08). - -Agent-runnable. Starts LLDAP, privacyIDEA, Authelia and KeyCape on a throwaway Docker network, with -ports published on 127.0.0.1 only, generated values, no volumes and no production data. Configuration -is derived from the repository's production manifests with the hostnames replaced by `*.journey.test` -(never resolvable). The runner uses `host_map_only`, so it cannot reach any other host. - -Scenarios (default: all): - healthy the journey must pass - svc- the consumer's password is changed in LLDAP while the consumer keeps the old one - (a half-done rotation); the journey must fail closed at the consumer's step; the - password is then restored and the journey must pass again - -Writes a value-free receipt. Exit 0 when every expectation is met, 1 otherwise, 2 on setup failure. -Run with: uv run sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py [--scenario ...] [--receipt FILE] -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import secrets -import shutil -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import time -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -K8S = HERE.parent -LLDAP_IMAGE = "docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d" -AUTHELIA_IMAGE = "docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54" -KEYCAPE_IMAGE = "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:9e082dca78f65a4af3e92d3de3705b99e49ca9b298d9562ad0d37511c4306f8d" -PI_IMAGE = "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" -BASE_DN = "dc=netkingdom,dc=local" -KC_PUBLIC = "https://kc.journey.test" -AUTH_PUBLIC = "https://auth.journey.test" -USER = "syn-journey" -CLIENT = "nk-synthetic-journey" -REDIRECT = "https://journey.invalid/callback" -CONSUMERS = ("svc-authelia", "svc-keycape", "svc-privacyidea") -EXPECTED_STEP = {"svc-authelia": "authelia_first_factor", "svc-keycape": "keycape_token", - "svc-privacyidea": "keycape_otp"} - -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("journey", HERE / "journey.py") -journey = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(journey) - - -class SetupError(Exception): - pass - - -def docker(*args, env=None, check=True): - done = subprocess.run(["docker", *args], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, - env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin"), **(env or {})}) - if check and done.returncode: - raise SetupError(f"docker {args[0]} failed") - return done - - -def port(name, inner): - ports = json.loads(docker("inspect", "--format", "{{json .NetworkSettings.Ports}}", name).stdout) - return int(ports[f"{inner}/tcp"][0]["HostPort"]) - - -def wait_http(url, what, headers=None, attempts=120): - for _ in range(attempts): - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers or {}), timeout=2): - return - except (urllib.error.URLError, ConnectionError, OSError): - time.sleep(0.5) - raise SetupError(f"{what} did not become healthy") - - -def http_json(url, data=None, headers=None, form=False): - body = None - head = dict(headers or {}) - if data is not None: - if form: - body = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode() - head["Content-Type"] = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" - else: - body = json.dumps(data).encode() - head["Content-Type"] = "application/json" - request = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, headers=head, method="POST" if body else "GET") - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response: - return json.load(response) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - raise SetupError(f"setup request refused: http {error.code}") from None - - -class Stack: - def __init__(self, workdir: Path, pi_cache_timeout: int): - self.tag = secrets.token_hex(4) - self.network = f"nk56-journey-{self.tag}" - self.workdir = workdir - self.pi_cache_timeout = pi_cache_timeout - self.names = {svc: f"nk56-journey-{self.tag}-{svc}" for svc in ("lldap", "privacyidea", "authelia", "keycape")} - self.pw = {name: secrets.token_urlsafe(24) for name in ("admin", USER, *CONSUMERS)} - self.seed = secrets.token_bytes(20) - self.reader_pw = secrets.token_urlsafe(24) - self.client_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) - self.ports = {} - self.last_time_step = None - - # ---------------------------------------------------------------- lifecycle - def up(self): - docker("network", "create", self.network) - self.start_lldap() - self.start_privacyidea() - self.start_authelia() - self.start_keycape() - - def down(self): - for name in self.names.values(): - docker("rm", "--force", name, check=False) - docker("network", "rm", self.network, check=False) - - def run(self, name, alias, image, *args, env=None, publish=None, entrypoint=None, command=()): - cmd = ["run", "--detach", "--pull=never", "--name", self.names[name], "--network", self.network, - "--network-alias", alias, "--publish", f"127.0.0.1::{publish}"] - for key in (env or {}): - cmd += ["--env", key] # names only; values travel in the docker client's environment - if entrypoint: - cmd += ["--entrypoint", entrypoint] - docker(*cmd, *args, image, *command, env=env) - self.ports[name] = port(self.names[name], publish) - - # ---------------------------------------------------------------- LLDAP - def start_lldap(self): - self.run("lldap", "lldap", LLDAP_IMAGE, "--tmpfs", "/data", publish=17170, env={ - "LLDAP_JWT_SECRET": secrets.token_hex(32), "LLDAP_LDAP_BASE_DN": BASE_DN, - "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN": "admin", "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS": self.pw["admin"]}) - self.lldap = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.ports['lldap']}" - wait_http(self.lldap + "/health", "lldap") - token = self.lldap_token() - for user in CONSUMERS: - self.create_user(token, user, "lldap_strict_readonly") - self.set_password(token, user, self.pw[user]) - self.create_user(token, USER, None) # unprivileged: no groups, as planned for T09 - self.set_password(token, USER, self.pw[USER]) - - def lldap_token(self): - return http_json(self.lldap + "/auth/simple/login", {"username": "admin", "password": self.pw["admin"]})["token"] - - def graphql(self, token, query, variables=None): - body = http_json(self.lldap + "/api/graphql", {"query": query, "variables": variables or {}}, - {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}) - if body.get("errors"): - raise SetupError("lldap graphql refused") - return body["data"] - - def create_user(self, token, user, group): - self.graphql(token, "mutation($u: CreateUserInput!) { createUser(user: $u) { id } }", - {"u": {"id": user, "email": f"{user}@journey.invalid", "displayName": user}}) - if group: - groups = self.graphql(token, "{ groups { id displayName } }")["groups"] - gid = next(g["id"] for g in groups if g["displayName"] == group) - self.graphql(token, "mutation($u: String!, $g: Int!) { addUserToGroup(userId: $u, groupId: $g) { ok } }", - {"u": user, "g": gid}) - - def set_password(self, token, user, password): - docker("exec", "--env", "LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD", self.names["lldap"], "/app/lldap_set_password", - "--base-url", "http://127.0.0.1:17170", "--token", token, "--username", user, - env={"LLDAP_USER_PASSWORD": password}) - - # ---------------------------------------------------------------- privacyIDEA - def start_privacyidea(self): - self.run("privacyidea", "privacyidea", PI_IMAGE, "--tmpfs", "/tmp:exec", - "--volume", f"{HERE / 'pi_fixture.py'}:/fixture/pi_fixture.py:ro", - publish=8080, entrypoint="python", command=("/fixture/pi_fixture.py",), env={ - "FIXTURE_BIND_PW": self.pw["svc-privacyidea"], "FIXTURE_READER_PW": self.reader_pw, - "FIXTURE_OTP_HEX": self.seed.hex(), "FIXTURE_USER": USER, - "FIXTURE_CACHE_TIMEOUT": str(self.pi_cache_timeout)}) - for _ in range(240): - logs = docker("logs", self.names["privacyidea"], check=False).stdout - events = [] - for line in logs.splitlines(): - try: - events.append(json.loads(line)) - except ValueError: - pass - if any(isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("fixture_ready") for e in events): - break - failure = next((e for e in events if isinstance(e, dict) and "fixture_failure" in e), None) - if failure: - raise SetupError(f"privacyidea fixture failed: {failure['fixture_failure']} in {failure['phase']}") - time.sleep(0.5) - else: - raise SetupError("privacyidea fixture timed out") - base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.ports['privacyidea']}" - wait_http(base + "/healthz/", "privacyidea") - auth = http_json(base + "/auth", {"username": "keycape-factor-read", "password": self.reader_pw}, form=True) - token_dir = self.workdir / "keycape-factor" - token_dir.mkdir(mode=0o755) - (token_dir / "admin-token").write_text(auth["result"]["value"]["token"]) - (token_dir / "admin-token").chmod(0o644) - - # ---------------------------------------------------------------- Authelia - def authelia_config(self, oidc_key_pem): - configmap = yaml.safe_load((K8S / "authelia/configmap.yaml").read_text()) - config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["configuration.yml"]) - ldap = config["authentication_backend"]["ldap"] - ldap.pop("url", None) - ldap.update(address="ldap://lldap:3890", password=self.pw["svc-authelia"]) - if ldap["user"] != f"uid=svc-authelia,ou=people,{BASE_DN}": - raise SetupError("production Authelia no longer binds as svc-authelia") - config["default_redirection_url"] = "https://www.journey.test" - config["session"].update(domain="journey.test", secret=secrets.token_hex(32)) - config["access_control"] = {"default_policy": "one_factor"} - config["storage"] = {"encryption_key": secrets.token_hex(32), "local": {"path": "/data/db.sqlite3"}} - config["identity_validation"] = {"reset_password": {"jwt_secret": secrets.token_hex(32)}} - config["notifier"] = {"filesystem": {"filename": "/data/notifications.txt"}} - config["ntp"] = {"disable_startup_check": True} - config.pop("server", None) - config["server"] = {"address": "tcp://0.0.0.0:9091"} - oidc = config["identity_providers"]["oidc"] - (client,) = [c for c in oidc["clients"] if c["id"] == "keycape"] - client.update(secret="$plaintext$" + self.client_secret, redirect_uris=[KC_PUBLIC + "/authorize/callback"]) - oidc["clients"] = [client] - oidc["hmac_secret"] = secrets.token_hex(32) - oidc["jwks"] = [{"key_id": "journey", "algorithm": "RS256", "use": "sig", "key": oidc_key_pem}] - return config - - def start_authelia(self): - key = subprocess.run(["openssl", "genrsa", "2048"], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout - path = self.workdir / "authelia.yml" - path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(self.authelia_config(key))) - path.chmod(0o644) - self.run("authelia", "authelia", AUTHELIA_IMAGE, "--tmpfs", "/data", - "--volume", f"{path}:/config/configuration.yml:ro", publish=9091) - wait_http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.ports['authelia']}/api/health", "authelia", - {"Host": "auth.journey.test", "X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"}) - - # ---------------------------------------------------------------- KeyCape - def keycape_config(self): - config = json.loads((K8S / "keycape/bootstrap-config.json").read_text()) - if config["lldap"]["bindDN"] != f"uid=svc-keycape,ou=people,{BASE_DN}": - raise SetupError("production KeyCape no longer binds as svc-keycape") - config.update(issuer=KC_PUBLIC, environment="production") - config["lldap"].update(url="ldap://lldap:3890", bindPW="") # delivered by env, as in production - config["authelia"].update(baseURL="http://authelia:9091", tokenBaseURL="http://authelia:9091", - browserBaseURL=AUTH_PUBLIC, clientSecret=self.client_secret, - redirectURI=KC_PUBLIC + "/authorize/callback") - config["privacyidea"].update(baseURL="http://privacyidea:8080") - config["clients"] = [{"clientId": CLIENT, "displayName": "NetKingdom synthetic journey", - "redirectUris": [REDIRECT], "allowedScopes": ["openid", "profile"], - "grantTypes": ["authorization_code"], "clientType": "public"}] - for key in ("tenantEngine", "tokenStatus", "accountPortalURL", "browserLogoutURL"): - config.pop(key, None) - return config - - def start_keycape(self): - conf = self.workdir / "keycape" - conf.mkdir(mode=0o755) - (conf / "config.yaml").write_text(json.dumps(self.keycape_config(), indent=1)) - key = subprocess.run(["openssl", "genrsa", "2048"], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout - (conf / "key.pem").write_text(key) - for f in conf.iterdir(): - f.chmod(0o644) - self.run("keycape", "keycape", KEYCAPE_IMAGE, "--volume", f"{conf}:/etc/keycape:ro", - "--volume", f"{self.workdir / 'keycape-factor'}:/etc/keycape-factor:ro", publish=8080, - env={"KEYCAPE_CONFIG": "/etc/keycape/config.yaml", "KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW": self.pw["svc-keycape"]}) - wait_http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.ports['keycape']}/healthz", "keycape") - - # ---------------------------------------------------------------- journey - def journey_config(self): - return {"issuer": KC_PUBLIC, "client_id": CLIENT, "redirect_uri": REDIRECT, "username": USER, - "host_map": {KC_PUBLIC: f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.ports['keycape']}", - AUTH_PUBLIC: f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.ports['authelia']}"}, - "host_map_only": True, "deadline_seconds": 90} - - def journey(self): - path = self.workdir / "journey.json" - path.write_text(json.dumps(self.journey_config())) - receipt = journey.run_journey( - journey.load_config(str(path)), self.pw[USER], self.seed, - min_time_step=None if self.last_time_step is None else self.last_time_step + 1) - if receipt.get("otp_time_step") is not None: - self.last_time_step = receipt["otp_time_step"] - return receipt - - def logs_tail(self, name, lines=30): - """Container log lines for diagnosis on the operator's terminal; not part of the receipt.""" - return docker("logs", "--tail", str(lines), self.names[name], check=False) - - -def scenario_healthy(stack): - receipt = stack.journey() - return {"scenario": "healthy", "expected": "pass", "met": receipt["result"] == "pass", "journey": receipt} - - -def scenario_broken(stack, consumer): - token = stack.lldap_token() - stack.set_password(token, consumer, secrets.token_urlsafe(24)) # consumer keeps the old value - broken = stack.journey() - met = broken["result"] == "fail" and broken["failed_step"] == EXPECTED_STEP[consumer] - entry = {"scenario": consumer, "expected": f"fail at {EXPECTED_STEP[consumer]}", "met": met, "journey": broken} - if broken["result"] == "pass" and consumer == "svc-privacyidea" and stack.pi_cache_timeout: - # The resolver cache can answer for the user without binding. Record it, then retry past it. - entry["masked_by_resolver_cache"] = True - time.sleep(stack.pi_cache_timeout + 5) - retry = stack.journey() - entry["after_cache_timeout"] = retry - entry["met"] = retry["result"] == "fail" and retry["failed_step"] == EXPECTED_STEP[consumer] - stack.set_password(stack.lldap_token(), consumer, stack.pw[consumer]) - restored = stack.journey() - entry["restored"] = {"met": restored["result"] == "pass", "journey": restored} - entry["met"] = entry["met"] and restored["result"] == "pass" - return entry - - -def utc_now(): - return datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(timespec="seconds").replace("+00:00", "Z") - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - parser.add_argument("--scenario", action="append", choices=("healthy", *CONSUMERS), - help="repeatable; default: healthy and every consumer") - parser.add_argument("--pi-cache-timeout", type=int, default=120, - help="privacyIDEA resolver CACHE_TIMEOUT (production: 120)") - parser.add_argument("--receipt", help="also write the receipt here") - parser.add_argument("--debug-logs", action="store_true", help="print container log tails on failure (may hold values)") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - if not shutil.which("docker") or not shutil.which("openssl"): - print("docker and openssl are required", file=sys.stderr) - return 2 - scenarios = args.scenario or ["healthy", "svc-keycape", "svc-privacyidea", "svc-authelia"] - receipt = {"schema": "netkingdom.synthetic-journey.stack-receipt/v1", "started_at": utc_now(), - "images": {"lldap": LLDAP_IMAGE, "authelia": AUTHELIA_IMAGE, "keycape": KEYCAPE_IMAGE, - "privacyidea": PI_IMAGE}, - "pi_cache_timeout": args.pi_cache_timeout, "published_on": "127.0.0.1", - "production_data": False, "results": []} - code = 0 - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="nk56-journey-") as tmp: - stack = Stack(Path(tmp), args.pi_cache_timeout) - try: - stack.up() - for name in scenarios: - result = scenario_healthy(stack) if name == "healthy" else scenario_broken(stack, name) - receipt["results"].append(result) - code = 0 if all(r["met"] for r in receipt["results"]) else 1 - except SetupError as error: - receipt["setup_error"] = str(error) - code = 2 - finally: - if code and args.debug_logs: - for name in stack.names: - done = stack.logs_tail(name) - print(f"--- {name}\n{done.stdout[-3000:]}{done.stderr[-3000:]}", file=sys.stderr) - stack.down() - receipt["finished_at"] = utc_now() - receipt["all_met"] = code == 0 - text = json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - if args.receipt: - Path(args.receipt).write_text(text + "\n") - print(text) - return code - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/test_journey.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/test_journey.py deleted file mode 100644 index ffee100..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/test_journey.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,492 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests for the synthetic MFA journey runner (NK-WP-0056-T05). Stdlib only, synthetic values only. - -The fakes model the three consumer binds: a broken svc-authelia bind makes Authelia refuse every first -factor, a broken svc-keycape bind makes KeyCape's user lookup fail at the token exchange, and a broken -svc-privacyidea bind makes privacyIDEA's resolver (and so KeyCape's OTP check) fail. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import base64 -import contextlib -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import random -import secrets -import tempfile -import threading -import time -import unittest -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer -from pathlib import Path -from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlencode, urlsplit - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("journey", HERE / "journey.py") -journey = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(journey) - -PASSWORD = "synthetic-only-journey-password" -SEED_B32 = "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXPJBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP" -SEED = base64.b32decode(SEED_B32) -USER = "syn-journey" -CLIENT = "nk-synthetic-journey" -REDIRECT = "http://127.0.0.1:9/journey/callback" # never served: the runner only reads the Location - - -# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -# A throwaway RSA key, generated in pure Python so the test needs no third-party package -# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - - -def _probable_prime(bits: int, rng: random.Random) -> int: - small = [p for p in range(3, 2000, 2) if all(p % q for q in range(3, int(p**0.5) + 1, 2))] - while True: - n = rng.getrandbits(bits) | (1 << (bits - 1)) | (1 << (bits - 2)) | 1 - if any(n % p == 0 for p in small): - continue - d, r = n - 1, 0 - while d % 2 == 0: - d //= 2 - r += 1 - for _ in range(24): - x = pow(rng.randrange(2, n - 1), d, n) - if x in (1, n - 1): - continue - for _ in range(r - 1): - x = pow(x, 2, n) - if x == n - 1: - break - else: - break - else: - return n - - -class RSAKey: - def __init__(self, bits=2048, seed=56): - rng = random.Random(seed) - e = 65537 - while True: - p, q = _probable_prime(bits // 2, rng), _probable_prime(bits // 2, rng) - phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1) - if p != q and phi % e and (p * q).bit_length() == bits: - break - self.n, self.e, self.d = p * q, e, pow(e, -1, phi) - - def jwk(self, kid="journey-test"): - k = (self.n.bit_length() + 7) // 8 - return {"kty": "RSA", "kid": kid, "alg": "RS256", "use": "sig", - "n": journey.b64url(self.n.to_bytes(k, "big")), "e": journey.b64url(self.e.to_bytes(3, "big"))} - - def sign(self, data: bytes) -> bytes: - k = (self.n.bit_length() + 7) // 8 - tail = journey.SHA256_DIGEST_INFO + hashlib.sha256(data).digest() - em = b"\x00\x01" + b"\xff" * (k - 3 - len(tail)) + b"\x00" + tail - return pow(int.from_bytes(em, "big"), self.d, self.n).to_bytes(k, "big") - - -KEY: RSAKey = None # generated once in setUpModule - - -def setUpModule(): - global KEY - KEY = RSAKey() - - -# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -# Fakes -# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - - -class World: - """Shared state of the fake stack, with switches for every failure the tests provoke.""" - - def __init__(self): - self.binds = {"svc-authelia": True, "svc-keycape": True, "svc-privacyidea": True} - self.kc_public = "" # public KeyCape origin, set once servers run - self.authelia_public = "" - self.pending = {} # KeyCape state -> request - self.upstream_codes = {} # Authelia code -> username - self.sessions = {} # Authelia session cookie -> username - self.kc_codes = {} # KeyCape code -> (pending, username) - self.skip_mfa = False - self.token_level = "aal2" - self.tamper_signature = False - self.return_wrong_state = False - self.seen_hosts = [] - self.issued = [] # every cookie, code and token value handed out - - -def base_url(handler) -> str: - proto = handler.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Proto", "http") - return f"{proto}://{handler.headers['Host']}" - - -class Base(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - world: World - - def send(self, status, body=b"", headers=None, ctype="application/json"): - if isinstance(body, (dict, list)): - body = json.dumps(body).encode() - elif isinstance(body, str): - body = body.encode() - self.send_response(status) - for key, value in (headers or {}).items(): - self.send_header(key, value) - self.send_header("Content-Type", ctype) - self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) - self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(body) - - def body(self): - return self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))) - - def log_message(self, *args): - return - - -class FakeAuthelia(Base): - def do_POST(self): - self.world.seen_hosts.append(self.headers["Host"]) - if self.path != "/api/firstfactor": - return self.send(404, {"status": "KO"}) - payload = json.loads(self.body()) - if not self.world.binds["svc-authelia"]: - # Authelia cannot bind LDAP: every first factor fails. Reflect the password to prove - # the runner never copies a response body into the receipt. - return self.send(401, {"status": "KO", "message": "Authentication failed", "echo": payload.get("password")}) - if payload.get("username") != USER or payload.get("password") != PASSWORD: - return self.send(401, {"status": "KO", "message": "Authentication failed"}) - session = secrets.token_hex(16) - self.world.sessions[session] = USER - self.world.issued.append(session) - self.send(200, {"status": "OK"}, {"Set-Cookie": f"authelia_session={session}; Path=/; HttpOnly"}) - - def do_GET(self): - self.world.seen_hosts.append(self.headers["Host"]) - url = urlsplit(self.path) - if url.path != "/api/oidc/authorization": - return self.send(404) - q = {k: v[0] for k, v in parse_qs(url.query).items()} - cookie = self.headers.get("Cookie", "") - session = dict(p.strip().split("=", 1) for p in cookie.split(";") if "=" in p).get("authelia_session") - user = self.world.sessions.get(session) - if not user: - return self.send(302, headers={"Location": base_url(self) + "/?rd=" + "x"}) - code = secrets.token_urlsafe(16) - self.world.upstream_codes[code] = user - self.world.issued.append(code) - self.send(302, headers={"Location": q["redirect_uri"] + "?" + urlencode({"code": code, "state": q["state"]})}) - - -class FakeKeyCape(Base): - def do_GET(self): - self.world.seen_hosts.append(self.headers["Host"]) - url = urlsplit(self.path) - q = {k: v[0] for k, v in parse_qs(url.query).items()} - base = base_url(self) - if url.path == "/.well-known/openid-configuration": - return self.send(200, {"issuer": base, "authorization_endpoint": base + "/authorize", - "token_endpoint": base + "/token", "jwks_uri": base + "/jwks"}) - if url.path == "/jwks": - return self.send(200, {"keys": [KEY.jwk()]}) - if url.path == "/authorize": - if q.get("code_challenge_method") != "S256" or q.get("client_id") != CLIENT: - return self.send(400, "bad request", ctype="text/html") - self.world.pending[q["state"]] = {**q, "user": None} - upstream = self.world.authelia_public + "/api/oidc/authorization?" + urlencode({ - "client_id": "keycape", "redirect_uri": base + "/authorize/callback", - "response_type": "code", "state": q["state"]}) - return self.send(302, headers={"Location": upstream}) - if url.path == "/authorize/callback": - pending = self.world.pending.get(q.get("state")) - user = self.world.upstream_codes.pop(q.get("code"), None) - if not pending or not user: - return self.send(400, "unknown or expired state", ctype="text/html") - if self.world.skip_mfa: - return self.redirect_with_code(pending, user) - pending["user"] = user - form = ('
' - f'' - '' - '
') - return self.send(200, f"{form}", ctype="text/html") - self.send(404) - - def do_POST(self): - self.world.seen_hosts.append(self.headers["Host"]) - form = {k: v[0] for k, v in parse_qs(self.body().decode()).items()} - if self.path == "/authorize/callback": - pending = self.world.pending.pop(form.get("state"), None) - if not pending or not pending["user"]: - return self.send(400, "mfa challenge not active", ctype="text/html") - if not self.world.binds["svc-privacyidea"] or not self.privacyidea_check(form.get("mfa_token", "")): - return self.send(401, "MFA validation failed", ctype="text/html") - return self.redirect_with_code(pending, pending["user"]) - if self.path == "/token": - entry = self.world.kc_codes.pop(form.get("code"), None) - if not entry: - return self.send(400, {"error": "invalid_grant"}) - pending, user = entry - if not self.world.binds["svc-keycape"]: - # As on the real stack: KeyCape reads the user for the claims at token time. - return self.send(500, {"error": "server_error"}) - verifier = form.get("code_verifier", "") - if journey.b64url(hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()) != pending["code_challenge"]: - return self.send(400, {"error": "invalid_grant"}) - return self.send(200, {"id_token": self.id_token(pending, user), "token_type": "Bearer"}) - self.send(404) - - def privacyidea_check(self, code: str) -> bool: - counter = int(time.time() // 30) - return any(journey.hotp(SEED, c) == code for c in (counter - 1, counter, counter + 1)) - - def redirect_with_code(self, pending, user): - code = secrets.token_urlsafe(16) - self.world.kc_codes[code] = (pending, user) - self.world.issued.append(code) - state = "not-the-state" if self.world.return_wrong_state else pending["state"] - return self.send(302, headers={"Location": pending["redirect_uri"] + "?" + urlencode({"code": code, "state": state})}) - - def id_token(self, pending, user): - level = self.world.token_level - claims = {"iss": base_url(self), "aud": [CLIENT], "sub": "opaque", "nonce": pending["nonce"], - "exp": int(time.time()) + 300, "iat": int(time.time()), "preferred_username": user, - "assurance": {"level": level, "methods": ["pwd", "otp"] if level == "aal2" else ["pwd"], - "mfa": level == "aal2", "source": "key-cape", "at": int(time.time())}} - head = journey.b64url(json.dumps({"alg": "RS256", "kid": "journey-test"}).encode()) - payload = journey.b64url(json.dumps(claims).encode()) - signature = KEY.sign(f"{head}.{payload}".encode()) - if self.world.tamper_signature: - signature = bytes([signature[0] ^ 1]) + signature[1:] - token = f"{head}.{payload}.{journey.b64url(signature)}" - self.world.issued.append(token) - return token - - -def serve(handler_cls, world): - handler = type(handler_cls.__name__, (handler_cls,), {"world": world}) - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), handler) - threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, kwargs={"poll_interval": 0.02}, daemon=True).start() - return server - - -# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -# Tests -# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - - -class JourneyTests(unittest.TestCase): - mapped = False - - def setUp(self): - self.world = World() - self.kc = serve(FakeKeyCape, self.world) - self.authelia = serve(FakeAuthelia, self.world) - kc_local = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.kc.server_port}" - authelia_local = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.authelia.server_port}" - if self.mapped: - self.world.kc_public, self.world.authelia_public = "https://kc.example.test", "https://auth.example.test" - host_map = {self.world.kc_public: kc_local, self.world.authelia_public: authelia_local} - else: - self.world.kc_public, self.world.authelia_public = kc_local, authelia_local - host_map = {} - self.cfg = journey.load_config(self.write_config({ - "issuer": self.world.kc_public, "client_id": CLIENT, "redirect_uri": REDIRECT, - "username": USER, "host_map": host_map, "deadline_seconds": 30, - })) - - def tearDown(self): - for server in (self.kc, self.authelia): - server.shutdown() - server.server_close() - - def write_config(self, data): - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - path = Path(tmp.name) / "config.json" - path.write_text(json.dumps(data)) - return str(path) - - def run_journey(self, password=PASSWORD, seed=SEED, **kw): - return journey.run_journey(self.cfg, password, seed, **kw) - - def assert_no_secret(self, receipt): - text = json.dumps(receipt) - for value in [PASSWORD, SEED_B32, SEED.hex(), *self.world.issued]: - self.assertNotIn(value, text) - counter = int(time.time() // 30) - for c in (counter - 1, counter, counter + 1): - self.assertNotIn(f'"{journey.hotp(SEED, c)}"', text) - - def assert_failed_at(self, receipt, step, reason, bind=None): - self.assertEqual(receipt["result"], "fail") - self.assertEqual((receipt["failed_step"], receipt["reason"]), (step, reason)) - self.assertEqual(receipt.get("bind_on_failed_step"), bind) - self.assertEqual(receipt["steps"][-1]["name"], step) - self.assertFalse(receipt["steps"][-1]["ok"]) - self.assertTrue(all(s["ok"] for s in receipt["steps"][:-1])) - self.assert_no_secret(receipt) - - def test_healthy_stack_passes_with_aal2(self): - receipt = self.run_journey() - self.assertEqual(receipt["result"], "pass", receipt) - self.assertEqual([s["name"] for s in receipt["steps"]], [ - "discovery", "keycape_authorize", "authelia_first_factor", "authelia_authorization", - "keycape_callback", "keycape_otp", "keycape_token", "id_token"]) - self.assertEqual(receipt["claims"]["assurance_level"], "aal2") - self.assertIn("otp", receipt["claims"]["assurance_methods"]) - self.assertTrue(receipt["claims"]["signature_verified"]) - self.assert_no_secret(receipt) - - def test_each_broken_bind_fails_closed_at_its_step(self): - expected = { - "svc-authelia": ("authelia_first_factor", "first_factor_rejected"), - "svc-keycape": ("keycape_token", "token_rejected"), - "svc-privacyidea": ("keycape_otp", "otp_rejected"), - } - for bind, (step, reason) in expected.items(): - with self.subTest(bind=bind): - self.world.binds = {b: b != bind for b in self.world.binds} - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(), step, reason, bind) - - def test_wrong_password_and_wrong_seed_fail(self): - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(password="not-it"), "authelia_first_factor", - "first_factor_rejected", "svc-authelia") - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(seed=b"0123456789abcdef0123"), "keycape_otp", - "otp_rejected", "svc-privacyidea") - - def test_sign_in_without_otp_challenge_is_a_failure(self): - self.world.skip_mfa = True - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(), "keycape_callback", "mfa_not_challenged") - - def test_token_checks(self): - self.world.tamper_signature = True - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(), "id_token", "signature_invalid") - self.world.tamper_signature = False - self.world.token_level = "aal1" - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(), "id_token", "not_aal2") - - def test_state_mismatch_after_otp(self): - self.world.return_wrong_state = True - self.assert_failed_at(self.run_journey(), "keycape_otp", "state_mismatch", "svc-privacyidea") - - def test_waits_out_a_closing_otp_window(self): - slept = [] - fake_now = [1_000_000 * 30 + 28.0] # two seconds before the window closes - j = journey.Journey(self.cfg, PASSWORD, SEED, wall=lambda: fake_now[0], - sleep=lambda s: (slept.append(s), fake_now.__setitem__(0, fake_now[0] + s))) - with self.assertRaises(journey.JourneyFailure): - j.run() # the fake privacyIDEA checks real time, so the synthetic clock's code is rejected - self.assertEqual(len(slept), 1) - self.assertGreaterEqual(slept[0], 2.0) - - def test_waits_for_a_fresh_time_step(self): - slept = [] - fake_now = [1_000_000 * 30 + 3.0] - j = journey.Journey(self.cfg, PASSWORD, SEED, wall=lambda: fake_now[0], min_time_step=1_000_001, - sleep=lambda s: (slept.append(s), fake_now.__setitem__(0, fake_now[0] + s))) - with self.assertRaises(journey.JourneyFailure): - j.run() # synthetic clock again: the fake privacyIDEA rejects the code, the wait is the point - self.assertEqual(j.time_step, 1_000_001) - self.assertGreaterEqual(slept[0], 27.0) - - def test_receipt_records_time_step(self): - before = int(time.time() // 30) - receipt = self.run_journey() - self.assertIn(receipt["otp_time_step"], (before, before + 1)) # +1 if the window was closing - - def test_deadline_exceeded(self): - ticks = iter([0, 0] + [1000] * 50) - j = journey.Journey(self.cfg, PASSWORD, SEED, clock=lambda: next(ticks)) - with self.assertRaises(journey.JourneyFailure) as caught: - j.run() - self.assertEqual(caught.exception.reason, "deadline_exceeded") - - def test_unreachable_keycape(self): - self.kc.shutdown() - self.kc.server_close() - self.kc = serve(FakeKeyCape, World()) # keeps tearDown simple; the configured port is gone - receipt = self.run_journey() - self.assertEqual((receipt["failed_step"], receipt["reason"]), ("discovery", "unreachable")) - - def test_cli_exit_codes_and_receipt_file(self): - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - d = Path(tmp.name) - (d / "pw").write_text(PASSWORD + "\n") - (d / "seed").write_text(SEED_B32 + "\n") - cfg_path = self.write_config({"issuer": self.world.kc_public, "client_id": CLIENT, - "redirect_uri": REDIRECT, "username": USER, - "host_map": self.cfg["host_map"]}) - args = ["--config", cfg_path, "--password-file", str(d / "pw"), "--otp-seed-file", str(d / "seed"), - "--receipt", str(d / "receipt.json")] - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()): - self.assertEqual(journey.main(args), 0) - self.assertEqual(json.loads((d / "receipt.json").read_text())["result"], "pass") - self.world.binds["svc-keycape"] = False - self.assertEqual(journey.main(args), 1) - with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()) as err: - (d / "seed").write_text("not base32 !\n") - self.assertEqual(journey.main(args), 2) - self.assertNotIn("not base32 !", err.getvalue()) - - -class MappedJourneyTests(JourneyTests): - """Same journey through public origins mapped to internal ones (executor inside the cluster).""" - - mapped = True - - def test_public_host_reaches_the_services(self): - self.assertEqual(self.run_journey()["result"], "pass") - self.assertIn("kc.example.test", self.world.seen_hosts) - self.assertIn("auth.example.test", self.world.seen_hosts) - - - def test_host_map_only_refuses_unmapped_origins(self): - cfg = dict(self.cfg, host_map_only=True) - cfg["host_map"] = {self.world.kc_public: f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.kc.server_port}"} - receipt = journey.run_journey(cfg, PASSWORD, SEED) - self.assert_failed_at(receipt, "authelia_first_factor", "unmapped_origin", "svc-authelia") - - -class ConfigAndPrimitiveTests(unittest.TestCase): - def write(self, data): - path = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) / "c.json" - path.write_text(json.dumps(data)) - return str(path) - - def test_config_refuses_secrets_and_weaker_acr(self): - good = {"issuer": "https://kc.example.test", "client_id": CLIENT, "redirect_uri": REDIRECT, "username": USER} - journey.load_config(self.write(good)) - for bad in ({**good, "password": "x"}, {**good, "otp": {"seed": "x"}}, {**good, "acr_values": "aal1"}, - {**good, "username": "bad user"}, {k: v for k, v in good.items() if k != "issuer"}): - with self.subTest(bad=bad), self.assertRaises(journey.ConfigError): - journey.load_config(self.write(bad)) - - def test_hotp_rfc4226_vectors(self): - key = b"12345678901234567890" - expected = ["755224", "287082", "359152", "969429", "338314"] - self.assertEqual([journey.hotp(key, i) for i in range(5)], expected) - - def test_totp_rfc6238_sha1_vector(self): - self.assertEqual(journey.hotp(b"12345678901234567890", 59 // 30, 8), "94287082") - - def test_rs256_rejects_short_modulus(self): - small = RSAKey(bits=1024, seed=7) - data = b"payload" - self.assertFalse(journey.rs256_valid(data, small.sign(data), small.jwk())) - self.assertTrue(journey.rs256_valid(data, KEY.sign(data), KEY.jwk())) - self.assertFalse(journey.rs256_valid(b"other", KEY.sign(data), KEY.jwk())) - - def test_seed_validation(self): - with self.assertRaises(journey.ConfigError): - journey.decode_seed("AAAA") - self.assertEqual(journey.decode_seed(SEED_B32.lower()), SEED) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/test_lane.py b/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/test_lane.py deleted file mode 100644 index dace477..0000000 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/test_lane.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests for the attended syn-journey lane (NK-WP-0056-T09) against fakes. Stdlib only.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import secrets -import tempfile -import time -import unittest -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("lane", HERE / "lane.py") -lane = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(lane) - -CCR = { - "id": "CCR-2026-0057", "status": "approved", "request_type": "attended-service-credential-delivery", - "review": {"comments": [{"reviewer": "platform-owner", "decision": "approved", "at": "2026-11-01"}, - {"reviewer": "net-kingdom-owner", "decision": "approved", "at": "2026-11-01"}]}, - "openbao": {"kv_path": lane.KV, "fields": ["PASSWORD", "TOTP_SEED"], "auth": lane.ATTENDED_AUTH, - "runtime_access": False}, - "delivery": {"procedure": lane.PROCEDURE}, -} - - -class Fake: - """OpenBao, LLDAP and privacyIDEA as the lane sees them; records effects, holds values in memory.""" - - def __init__(self, ccr=None, verify_enrollment=True): - self.ccr = ccr or json.loads(json.dumps(CCR)) - self.attended_ok = True - self.kv = None - self.kv_version = 0 - self.policy = 'path "other" { capabilities = ["deny"] }\n' - self.users = {} - self.passwords = {} - self.tokens = {} - self.pi_logged_in = False - self.verify_enrollment = verify_enrollment - self.role = False - self.journey_result = "pass" - self.journey_args = None - self.effects = [] - self.wall = time.time - - def validate_ccr(self, path): - return self.ccr, [] - - def attended_platform_admin(self): - if not self.attended_ok: - raise lane.Refused("attended_platform_admin_required") - - def kv_read(self, path): - assert path == lane.KV_DATA - if self.kv is None: - return None - return {"data": dict(self.kv), "metadata": {"version": self.kv_version}} - - def kv_write_cas0(self, path, values): - assert path == lane.KV_DATA and self.kv is None - self.kv, self.kv_version = dict(values), 1 - self.effects.append("kv_write") - return 1 - - def kv_destroy(self, path): - assert path == lane.KV_METADATA - self.kv = None - self.effects.append("kv_destroy") - - def boundary_policy(self): - return self.policy - - def write_boundary_policy(self, text): - self.policy = text - self.effects.append("fence") - - def workload_role_exists(self): - return self.role - - def lldap_admin_token(self): - return "admin-token" - - def lldap_gql(self, token, query, variables=None): - assert token == "admin-token" - if "createUser" in query: - self.users[variables["u"]["id"]] = {"id": variables["u"]["id"], "groups": []} - self.effects.append("lldap_create") - return {"createUser": {"id": variables["u"]["id"]}} - if "deleteUser" in query: - self.users.pop(variables["u"]) - self.effects.append("lldap_delete") - return {"deleteUser": {"ok": True}} - return {"users": list(self.users.values())} - - def lldap_set_password(self, token, user, password): - self.passwords[user] = password - self.effects.append("lldap_password") - - def lldap_login(self, user, password): - return user in self.users and self.passwords.get(user) == password - - def pi_login(self): - self.pi_logged_in = True - - def pi_call(self, path, payload=None, method=None): - assert self.pi_logged_in - if method == "DELETE": - self.tokens.pop(path.rsplit("/", 1)[1]) - self.effects.append("pi_delete") - return True - return self.pi_tokens_call(path) - - def pi_init(self, payload): - assert self.pi_logged_in - if "verify" in payload: - token = self.tokens[payload["serial"]] - key = bytes.fromhex(token["_otpkey"]) - counter = int(time.time() // 30) - assert payload["verify"] in {lane.journey.hotp(key, c) for c in (counter - 1, counter, counter + 1)} - token["rollout_state"] = "enrolled" - self.effects.append("pi_verify") - return {"rollout_state": "enrolled"} - # As live: pi-admin's rights include totp_force_server_generate, so the server makes the key. - assert "otpkey" not in payload and payload.get("genkey") == 1 - key = secrets.token_bytes(20).hex() - self.tokens[payload["serial"]] = { - "serial": payload["serial"], "tokentype": "totp", "active": True, "_otpkey": key, - "username": payload["user"], "rollout_state": "verify" if self.verify_enrollment else ""} - self.effects.append("pi_init") - return {"rollout_state": self.tokens[payload["serial"]]["rollout_state"], - "otpkey": {"value": "seed://" + key}} - - def pi_tokens_call(self, path): - if path.startswith("/token/?"): - public = [{k: v for k, v in t.items() if not k.startswith("_")} for t in self.tokens.values()] - if "user=" in path and lane.USER not in self.users: - raise lane.Refused("pi_request:/token/") # privacyIDEA: the user does not resolve - serial = path.split("serial=")[1] - return {"tokens": [t for t in public if t["serial"] == serial]} - raise AssertionError(path) - - def run_journey(self, cfg, password, seed): - self.journey_args = (cfg, password, seed) - return {"result": self.journey_result, "failed_step": None if self.journey_result == "pass" else "keycape_otp"} - - -class LaneTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup) - root = Path(tmp.name) - (root / "credential-change-requests").mkdir() - self.ccr_path = root / "credential-change-requests" / lane.CCR_FILE - self.ccr_path.write_text("id: CCR-2026-0057\n") - self.digest = hashlib.sha256(self.ccr_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - self._platform = lane.PLATFORM - lane.PLATFORM = root - self.addCleanup(setattr, lane, "PLATFORM", self._platform) - - def run_action(self, fn, d, digest=None): - receipt = {"status": "failed"} - try: - fn(d, digest or self.digest, receipt) - except lane.Refused as error: - receipt["reason"] = str(error) - return receipt - - def assert_value_free(self, receipt, d): - text = json.dumps(receipt) - for value in list(d.passwords.values()) + list((d.kv or {}).values()): - self.assertNotIn(value, text) - - def test_setup_creates_exactly_the_identity(self): - d = Fake() - receipt = self.run_action(lane.setup, d) - self.assertEqual(receipt["status"], "identity_prepared", receipt) - self.assertEqual(d.effects, ["fence", "lldap_create", "lldap_password", "pi_init", "pi_verify", "kv_write"]) - self.assertEqual(set(d.kv), {"PASSWORD", "TOTP_SEED"}) - self.assertEqual(d.passwords[lane.USER], d.kv["PASSWORD"]) - self.assertEqual(d.users[lane.USER]["groups"], []) - # The seed in KV is the key privacyIDEA generated, not one the lane chose. - self.assertEqual(bytes.fromhex(d.tokens[lane.SERIAL]["_otpkey"]), lane.journey.decode_seed(d.kv["TOTP_SEED"])) - self.assertEqual(receipt["key_generated_by"], "privacyidea") - self.assertTrue(lane.fence_present(d)) - self.assertTrue(receipt["enrollment_confirmed_with_code"]) - self.assertEqual(receipt["created"]["groups"], []) - self.assert_value_free(receipt, d) - - def test_setup_without_verify_enrollment(self): - d = Fake(verify_enrollment=False) - receipt = self.run_action(lane.setup, d) - self.assertEqual(receipt["status"], "identity_prepared") - self.assertNotIn("pi_verify", d.effects) - - def test_setup_refuses_before_any_effect(self): - cases = { - "ccr_digest": lambda d: None, - "attended_platform_admin_required": lambda d: setattr(d, "attended_ok", False), - "kv_exists": lambda d: setattr(d, "kv", {"PASSWORD": "x", "TOTP_SEED": "y"}), - "lldap_user_exists": lambda d: d.users.update({lane.USER: {"id": lane.USER, "groups": []}}), - "pi_token_exists": lambda d: d.tokens.update({lane.SERIAL: {"serial": lane.SERIAL, "username": ""}}), - "ccr_status": lambda d: d.ccr.update(status="proposed"), - "ccr_approval": lambda d: d.ccr["review"]["comments"].pop(), - "ccr_shape": lambda d: d.ccr["openbao"].update(runtime_access=True), - } - for reason, mutate in cases.items(): - with self.subTest(reason=reason): - d = Fake() - mutate(d) - digest = "0" * 64 if reason == "ccr_digest" else None - receipt = self.run_action(lane.setup, d, digest) - self.assertEqual(receipt.get("reason"), reason) - self.assertEqual(d.effects, []) - - def test_missing_generated_key_stops_before_kv(self): - d = Fake() - original = d.pi_init - d.pi_init = lambda payload: {k: v for k, v in original(payload).items() if k != "otpkey"} - receipt = self.run_action(lane.setup, d) - self.assertEqual(receipt["reason"], "pi_seed_missing") - self.assertIsNone(d.kv) - self.assertEqual(self.run_action(lane.teardown, d)["status"], "identity_removed") - - def test_fence_conflict_refuses(self): - d = Fake() - d.policy += f'path "{lane.KV_DATA}" {{ capabilities = ["read"] }}\n' - self.assertEqual(self.run_action(lane.setup, d)["reason"], "fence_conflict") - self.assertEqual(d.effects, []) - - def test_verify_runs_the_journey_with_kv_values(self): - d = Fake() - self.run_action(lane.setup, d) - receipt = self.run_action(lane.verify, d) - self.assertEqual(receipt["status"], "identity_verified", receipt) - cfg, password, seed = d.journey_args - self.assertEqual((cfg["issuer"], cfg["client_id"], cfg["username"]), (lane.ISSUER, lane.CLIENT, lane.USER)) - self.assertEqual(password, d.kv["PASSWORD"]) - self.assertEqual(seed, lane.journey.decode_seed(d.kv["TOTP_SEED"])) - self.assert_value_free(receipt, d) - - def test_verify_fails_closed(self): - for reason, mutate in { - "journey_failed": lambda d: setattr(d, "journey_result", "fail"), - "kv_password_not_current": lambda d: d.passwords.update({lane.USER: "rotated-elsewhere"}), - "unexpected_workload_role": lambda d: setattr(d, "role", True), - "fence_missing": lambda d: setattr(d, "policy", ""), - }.items(): - with self.subTest(reason=reason): - d = Fake() - self.run_action(lane.setup, d) - mutate(d) - self.assertEqual(self.run_action(lane.verify, d).get("reason"), reason) - - def test_teardown_removes_only_what_setup_created(self): - d = Fake() - self.run_action(lane.setup, d) - receipt = self.run_action(lane.teardown, d) - self.assertEqual(receipt["status"], "identity_removed", receipt) - self.assertEqual((d.kv, d.users, d.tokens), (None, {}, {})) - self.assertTrue(lane.fence_present(d)) # the fence stays - d2 = Fake() - self.run_action(lane.setup, d2) - d2.users[lane.USER]["groups"] = [{"displayName": "net-kingdom-admins"}] - self.assertEqual(self.run_action(lane.teardown, d2)["reason"], "lldap_user_has_groups") - - def test_teardown_is_idempotent_after_partial_setup(self): - d = Fake() - d.kv, d.kv_version = {"PASSWORD": "p", "TOTP_SEED": "s"}, 1 - receipt = self.run_action(lane.teardown, d) - self.assertEqual(receipt["status"], "identity_removed") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/tenant-engine/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/tenant-engine/README.md index 1679693..361cb9d 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/tenant-engine/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/tenant-engine/README.md @@ -26,9 +26,8 @@ owner; do not recreate a frozen deployment copy here. These links assume sibling checkouts. The repository is `coulomb/access-engine` (formerly `coulomb/flex-auth`; same Forge ID, renamed under FLEX-WP-0020). The product and runtime names stay `flex-auth`: the `flex-auth` namespace, Service -DNS, caller-token audience, the chart name and the OCI package coordinate -`coulomb/flex-auth` are unchanged (FLEX-DEC-2026-013). The CLI is now -`cmd/access-engine`; `cmd/flex-auth` is a stub that exits 2 (FLEX-DEC-2026-020). +DNS, caller-token audience, `cmd/flex-auth`, the chart name and the OCI package +coordinate `coulomb/flex-auth` are unchanged (FLEX-DEC-2026-013). Ownership follows [ADR-0015](../../../docs/adr/ADR-0015-netkingdom-railiance-workload-packaging-and-relational-platform.md). Removing references requires no cluster apply or rollout. Do not use the diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/README.md b/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/README.md index 76e52bb..2eb59e3 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/README.md +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/README.md @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ Exercise status: unknown for the procedures in this runbook; no per-procedure su **Apply home moved.** The managed package is `rapp-user-engine`. Render, deploy, verify, and rollback from that repo (`make deploy`, -`make verify-live`). These files are historical migration input, not a current apply or rollback -procedure. In particular, the old runtime mail binding must not be replayed. +`make verify-live`). These files remain migration input until that +package is the only checkout operators apply. This is a stateful `rail-kubernetes` platform workload. It intentionally has no public Ingress until the KeyCape authorization-code/PKCE edge and @@ -25,13 +25,12 @@ service token at `platform/workloads/user-engine/runtime`. The `openbao-runtime.yaml` stores and ExternalSecrets deliver those values into the existing namespaced Secret names without changing application interfaces. -Email delivery now uses email-connect's scoped `user-engine-scoped-mail` ESO -contract owned by the provider; the former shared `mail-token` is revoked and -must not be restored. The legacy `tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh` -now refuses before credential or cluster access. Audit sender maintenance must -use the audit-core/Platform owner-reviewed delivery path; the existing audit -Secret is preserved, not rotated or revoked by source retirement. The managed -package's `docs/runtime-contract.md` is the release authority. +The audit-core sender and email-connect ingest credentials stay authoritative +in their provider namespaces. Run +`tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh` from the repository root to copy +only those scoped values into `user-engine-delivery` without printing them. +Rerun it after either provider rotates its token, then restart user-engine +because the application receives these two values as environment variables. The desired runtime also projects a short-lived ServiceAccount token with audience `flex-auth` at `/var/run/secrets/flex-auth-caller/token`. user-engine @@ -41,10 +40,12 @@ image that understands `USER_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE` and flex-auth desired state that binds `system:serviceaccount:user-engine:user-engine`. The current pinned digest predates that coordinated rollout. -Use `make verify-live` from `rapp-user-engine` for current verification. -The former `verify-operability.sh` is retired: its rollback reapplied this -migration tree and its fixed July job names could not prove a current restore. - +```bash +kubectl apply -f openbao-runtime.yaml +kubectl apply -f runtime.yaml +kubectl -n user-engine rollout status deployment/user-engine +kubectl -n user-engine get cluster,pod,service,networkpolicy +``` Rollback sets the Deployment image to the preceding immutable digest. Database migrations are additive and run before serving; restore uses the diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml b/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml index bfe0668..c1a5f37 100644 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml @@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ spec: valueFrom: secretKeyRef: {name: user-engine-runtime, key: proxy-secret} - {name: USER_ENGINE_LOGIN_URL, value: "https://kc.coulomb.social/"} - - {name: USER_ENGINE_MFA_MANAGEMENT_URL, value: "https://pink-account.coulomb.social/"} - {name: USER_ENGINE_OIDC_ISSUER, value: "https://kc.coulomb.social"} - {name: USER_ENGINE_OIDC_AUDIENCE, value: user-engine-portal} - {name: USER_ENGINE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID, value: user-engine-portal} diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh index a938831..5961d9c 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh @@ -1,5 +1,83 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Managed verification/rollback belongs to rapp-user-engine, not this migration tree. -set +x -printf '%s\n' 'Retired: use rapp-user-engine make verify-live and its reviewed release/rollback contract. This legacy helper cannot reapply old manifests, exercise rollback or certify historical backup jobs.' >&2 -exit 2 +set -euo pipefail + +namespace=user-engine +deployment=user-engine +manifest="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/runtime.yaml" +rollback_target="${USER_ENGINE_ROLLBACK_IMAGE:-forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/user-engine@sha256:d25037e61c0c71dd9fbf89f653797932061b0be1fc5b4b23223821e5c2e3d6d0}" +exercise_rollback=false +if [[ "${1:-}" == "--exercise-rollback" ]]; then + exercise_rollback=true +elif [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; then + echo "usage: $0 [--exercise-rollback]" >&2 + exit 2 +fi + +current_image="$(kubectl -n "$namespace" get deployment "$deployment" \ + -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}')" + +restore_current() { + if $exercise_rollback; then + kubectl apply -f "$manifest" >/dev/null + kubectl -n "$namespace" rollout status deployment/"$deployment" \ + --timeout=180s >/dev/null + fi +} +trap restore_current EXIT + +kubectl -n "$namespace" wait --for=condition=Ready \ + cluster/user-engine-pg --timeout=60s >/dev/null +kubectl -n "$namespace" get cronjob user-engine-backup >/dev/null +kubectl -n "$namespace" wait --for=condition=complete \ + job/user-engine-backup-manual-20260729b --timeout=30s >/dev/null +kubectl -n "$namespace" wait --for=condition=complete \ + job/user-engine-restore-drill --timeout=30s >/dev/null + +metrics="$( + kubectl -n "$namespace" exec deployment/"$deployment" -- python3 -c \ + 'import os,urllib.error,urllib.request +u="http://127.0.0.1:8080/metrics"; denied=0 +try: urllib.request.urlopen(u) +except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: denied=error.code +request=urllib.request.Request(u,headers={"X-User-Engine-Proxy-Secret":os.environ["USER_ENGINE_PROXY_SECRET"].strip()}) +response=urllib.request.urlopen(request); body=response.read().decode() +print("%s %s %s" % (denied, response.status, int("user_engine_ready 1" in body)))' +)" +[[ "$metrics" == "403 200 1" ]] + +rollback_image="" +rollback_restored=true +if $exercise_rollback; then + kubectl -n "$namespace" set image deployment/"$deployment" \ + "portal=${rollback_target}" >/dev/null + kubectl -n "$namespace" rollout status deployment/"$deployment" \ + --timeout=180s >/dev/null + rollback_image="$(kubectl -n "$namespace" get deployment "$deployment" \ + -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}')" + [[ "$rollback_image" == "$rollback_target" ]] + kubectl apply -f "$manifest" >/dev/null + kubectl -n "$namespace" rollout status deployment/"$deployment" \ + --timeout=180s >/dev/null + restored_image="$(kubectl -n "$namespace" get deployment "$deployment" \ + -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}')" + [[ "$restored_image" == "$current_image" ]] +fi + +python3 - "$current_image" "$rollback_image" "$rollback_restored" <<'PY' +import json +import sys + +print(json.dumps({ + "backup_schedule_present": True, + "database_ready": True, + "latest_backup_complete": True, + "metrics_authorized": True, + "metrics_unauthorized_denied": True, + "restore_drill_complete": True, + "rollback_exercised": bool(sys.argv[2]), + "rollback_image": sys.argv[2] or None, + "rollforward_image": sys.argv[1], + "rollforward_restored": sys.argv[3] == "true", + "secret_values_observed": False, +}, sort_keys=True)) +PY diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh index f073c36..e4e6086 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-identity-cutover-dependencies.sh @@ -2,9 +2,7 @@ # Verify that the active identity stack has no runtime dependency on the # retired/source host. Secret values are decoded only in process memory and # never printed; failures report resource and key locators only. -set +x set -euo pipefail -umask 077 KUBECTL="${KUBECTL:-kubectl}" SOURCE_HOST_MARKER="${SOURCE_HOST_MARKER:-coulombcore}" diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh index db30b8f..9a3f541 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t04.sh @@ -143,11 +143,11 @@ for secret in privacyidea-config; do done # DR secrets — created by enckey-bootstrap.sh (may not exist yet on first run) -for secret in privacyidea-enckey privacyidea-auditkeys; do +for secret in privacyidea-enckey privacyidea-auditkeys privacyidea-trigger-admin; do if kubectl get secret "$secret" -n "$NAMESPACE" &>/dev/null; then pass "Secret $secret exists" else - warn "Secret $secret not found — use privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md for private export" + warn "Secret $secret not found — run enckey-bootstrap.sh / bootstrap-admin.sh" fi done @@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ if [[ -n "$PI_POD" ]]; then if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- test -f /etc/privacyidea/enckey 2>/dev/null; then pass "enckey present in pod" else - warn "enckey not found in pod — stop and follow privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md; do not generate a replacement recovery key" + warn "enckey not found in pod — run enckey-bootstrap.sh (or wait for PI to generate on first DB init)" fi if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- test -f /etc/privacyidea/private.pem 2>/dev/null; then pass "audit private.pem present in pod" else - warn "audit private.pem not found — use privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md for private export" + warn "audit private.pem not found — run enckey-bootstrap.sh" fi if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ @@ -189,8 +189,12 @@ if [[ -n "$PI_POD" ]]; then warn "pi-admin not found — run bootstrap-admin.sh" fi - # Legacy trigger-account presence is not a current KeyCape readiness gate. - + if kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" "$PI_POD" -- \ + pi-manage admin list 2>/dev/null | grep -q "trigger-admin"; then + pass "Admin user trigger-admin exists" + else + warn "trigger-admin not found — run bootstrap-admin.sh" + fi else warn "Skipping key material checks — no running pod" fi diff --git a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t07.sh b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t07.sh index 3aab32a..894a09c 100755 --- a/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t07.sh +++ b/sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t07.sh @@ -1,5 +1,240 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Explicit private input and preview/readback adapter; see lldap/GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md. -set +x +# verify-t07.sh — verify NK-WP-0001-T07 done-criteria +# +# Checks user management and self-service readiness. +# +# Sections: +# 1. LLDAP group: net-kingdom-users exists +# 2. LLDAP group: net-kingdom-admins exists +# 3. At least one non-admin user exists in LLDAP +# 4. Break-glass user exists and is in net-kingdom-admins +# 5. privacyIDEA self-service portal reachable +# 6. KeyCape config has OIDC clients, including openbao-admin +# +# Usage: +# chmod +x verify-t07.sh +# ./verify-t07.sh [lldap-url] [secrets-dir] +# +# default: https://lldap.coulomb.social +# default: ../bootstrap/secrets + set -euo pipefail -exec python3 "$(dirname -- "$0")/lldap/lldap_admin.py" verify "$@" + +LLDAP_URL="${1:-https://lldap.coulomb.social}" +SECRETS_DIR="${2:-../bootstrap/secrets}" +LLDAP_ENV="$SECRETS_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" +SSO_NAMESPACE="sso" + +PASS=0 +FAIL=0 +WARN=0 + +pass() { echo " [PASS] $1"; ((PASS++)); } +fail() { echo " [FAIL] $1"; ((FAIL++)); } +warn() { echo " [WARN] $1"; ((WARN++)); } + +section() { echo ""; echo "── $1 ──────────────────────────────────────"; } + +# ── Authenticate to LLDAP ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── +LLDAP_TOKEN="" +if [[ -f "$LLDAP_ENV" ]]; then + read_env() { bash -c "source '$1' 2>/dev/null; echo \${$2}"; } + LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS=$(read_env "$LLDAP_ENV" LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS) + if [[ -n "$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then + AUTH_RESP=$(curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/auth/simple/login" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS\"}" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "CURL_FAILED") + if [[ "$AUTH_RESP" != "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + LLDAP_TOKEN=$(echo "$AUTH_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('token',''))" 2>/dev/null || echo "") + fi + fi +fi + +gql() { + if [[ -z "$LLDAP_TOKEN" ]]; then echo "NO_TOKEN"; return; fi + local query="$1"; local vars="${2:-{}}" + local body + body=$(python3 -c " +import json, sys +print(json.dumps({'query': sys.argv[1], 'variables': json.loads(sys.argv[2])})) +" "$query" "$vars") + curl -sf -X POST "$LLDAP_URL/api/graphql" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLDAP_TOKEN" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -d "$body" 2>/dev/null || echo "CURL_FAILED" +} + +GROUPS_RESP=$(gql 'query { groups { id displayName members { id } } }') + +# ── 1. net-kingdom-users group ─────────────────────────────────────────────── +section "1. LLDAP group: net-kingdom-users" +if [[ "$GROUPS_RESP" == "NO_TOKEN" ]]; then + warn "Skipping — could not authenticate to LLDAP at $LLDAP_URL" +elif [[ "$GROUPS_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + fail "Could not query LLDAP groups — is LLDAP up?" +else + EXISTS=$(echo "$GROUPS_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('yes' if any(g['displayName']=='net-kingdom-users' for g in d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + pass "Group 'net-kingdom-users' exists" + else + fail "Group 'net-kingdom-users' not found — run lldap/bootstrap-users.sh" + fi +fi + +# ── 2. net-kingdom-admins group ────────────────────────────────────────────── +section "2. LLDAP group: net-kingdom-admins" +if [[ "$GROUPS_RESP" == "NO_TOKEN" || "$GROUPS_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + warn "Skipping — see section 1" +else + EXISTS=$(echo "$GROUPS_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('yes' if any(g['displayName']=='net-kingdom-admins' for g in d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + pass "Group 'net-kingdom-admins' exists" + else + fail "Group 'net-kingdom-admins' not found — run lldap/bootstrap-users.sh" + fi +fi + +# ── 3. At least one non-admin user ─────────────────────────────────────────── +section "3. At least one regular user in LLDAP" +USERS_RESP=$(gql 'query { users { id displayName email } }') +if [[ "$USERS_RESP" == "NO_TOKEN" || "$USERS_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + warn "Skipping — could not query users" +else + USERS=$(echo "$USERS_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); us=[u['id'] for u in d.get('data',{}).get('users',[]) if u['id'] not in ('admin','break-glass')]; print(len(us))" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "0") + if [[ "$USERS" -gt 0 ]]; then + pass "$USERS regular user(s) exist in LLDAP" + else + warn "No regular users found — add users via the LLDAP WebUI ($LLDAP_URL) or provisioning script" + fi +fi + +# ── 4. Break-glass user ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +section "4. Break-glass account" +if [[ "$USERS_RESP" == "NO_TOKEN" || "$USERS_RESP" == "CURL_FAILED" ]]; then + warn "Skipping — could not query users" +else + BG_EXISTS=$(echo "$USERS_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('yes' if any(u['id']=='break-glass' for u in d.get('data',{}).get('users',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$BG_EXISTS" == "yes" ]]; then + pass "User 'break-glass' exists in LLDAP" + # Check group membership + BG_IN_ADMINS=$(echo "$GROUPS_RESP" | python3 -c \ + "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); gs=[g for g in d.get('data',{}).get('groups',[]) if g['displayName']=='net-kingdom-admins']; print('yes' if gs and any(m['id']=='break-glass' for m in gs[0].get('members',[])) else 'no')" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "no") + if [[ "$BG_IN_ADMINS" == "yes" ]]; then + pass "'break-glass' is in net-kingdom-admins group" + else + warn "'break-glass' is not in net-kingdom-admins — run lldap/break-glass.sh" + fi + else + fail "User 'break-glass' not found — run lldap/break-glass.sh" + fi +fi + +# ── 5. Self-service portal ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── +section "5. privacyIDEA self-service portal (pink-account.coulomb.social)" +PORTAL_STATUS=$(curl -sf -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ + "https://pink-account.coulomb.social" 2>/dev/null || echo "000") +if [[ "$PORTAL_STATUS" == "200" || "$PORTAL_STATUS" == "302" ]]; then + pass "Self-service portal reachable (HTTP $PORTAL_STATUS)" +elif [[ "$PORTAL_STATUS" == "000" ]]; then + warn "Self-service portal not reachable — check DNS and ingress" +else + warn "Self-service portal returned HTTP $PORTAL_STATUS" +fi + +# ── 6. KeyCape OIDC client registrations ───────────────────────────────────── +section "6. KeyCape OIDC client registrations" +KC_POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + -l app.kubernetes.io/name=keycape \ + --field-selector=status.phase=Running \ + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null || echo "") +if [[ -n "$KC_POD" ]]; then + DISCOVERY=$(kubectl exec -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" "$KC_POD" -- \ + wget -qO- "http://localhost:8080/.well-known/openid-configuration" 2>/dev/null || echo "") + if [[ -n "$DISCOVERY" ]]; then + pass "KeyCape OIDC discovery endpoint accessible" + # Check config for registered clients (KeyCape config in keycape-config Secret) + CONFIG=$(kubectl get secret keycape-config -n "$SSO_NAMESPACE" \ + -o jsonpath='{.data.config\.yaml}' 2>/dev/null | base64 -d 2>/dev/null || echo "") + CLIENT_COUNT=$(echo "$CONFIG" | python3 -c \ + "import sys; import yaml; cfg=yaml.safe_load(sys.stdin.read()); print(len(cfg.get('clients',[])))" \ + 2>/dev/null || echo "0") + if [[ "$CLIENT_COUNT" -gt 0 ]]; then + pass "$CLIENT_COUNT OIDC client(s) registered in KeyCape" + else + warn "No OIDC clients registered — add clients to keycape/create-secrets.sh and re-run it" + fi + OPENBAO_CLIENT_CHECK=$(echo "$CONFIG" | python3 -c ' +import sys +import yaml + +cfg = yaml.safe_load(sys.stdin.read()) or {} +clients = cfg.get("clients") or [] +target = next((client for client in clients if client.get("clientId") == "openbao-admin"), None) +if not target: + print("missing openbao-admin client") + raise SystemExit(2) +required_redirects = { + "http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback", + "http://127.0.0.1:8250/oidc/callback", + "http://127.0.0.1:18200/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", +} +required_scopes = {"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"} +missing_redirects = sorted(required_redirects - set(target.get("redirectUris") or [])) +missing_scopes = sorted(required_scopes - set(target.get("allowedScopes") or [])) +if target.get("clientType") != "public": + print("openbao-admin clientType must be public for the current PKCE-only KeyCape profile") + raise SystemExit(3) +if missing_redirects: + print("openbao-admin missing redirect URI(s): " + ", ".join(missing_redirects)) + raise SystemExit(4) +retired_redirects = sorted({ + "https://bao.coulomb.social/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback", + "https://bao.coulomb.social/ui/vault/auth/keycape/oidc/callback", +} & set(target.get("redirectUris") or [])) +if retired_redirects: + print("openbao-admin still registers retired redirect URI(s): " + ", ".join(retired_redirects)) + raise SystemExit(6) +if missing_scopes: + print("openbao-admin missing scope(s): " + ", ".join(missing_scopes)) + raise SystemExit(5) +print("openbao-admin client has CLI/browser redirects and required scopes") +' 2>/dev/null || echo "missing or invalid openbao-admin client") + if [[ "$OPENBAO_CLIENT_CHECK" == openbao-admin* ]]; then + pass "$OPENBAO_CLIENT_CHECK" + else + fail "$OPENBAO_CLIENT_CHECK" + fi + else + warn "Skipping client check — KeyCape not reachable in-cluster" + fi +else + warn "Skipping OIDC client check — no running KeyCape pod" +fi + +# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +echo "" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" +echo " T07 verification: PASS=$PASS WARN=$WARN FAIL=$FAIL" +echo "════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════" + +if [[ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]]; then + echo " Result: INCOMPLETE — resolve FAIL items before marking T07 done" + exit 1 +elif [[ "$WARN" -gt 0 ]]; then + echo " Result: PARTIAL — required structure is in place; review WARN items" + exit 0 +else + echo " Result: COMPLETE — T07 done-criteria met; proceed to T08 (Backups, DR, break-glass)" + exit 0 +fi diff --git a/tests/isolated-keycape-native-fixture-manifest.json b/tests/isolated-keycape-native-fixture-manifest.json deleted file mode 100644 index 53d6b54..0000000 --- a/tests/isolated-keycape-native-fixture-manifest.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,124 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "nk49.keycape-native-fixture-proposal.v1", - "status": "prepared_not_executed_not_approved", - "source_sha256": { - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py": "sha256:acac68e2936ed38b7d7c9e35eb4619647c99c117a3928a1c5ce704b570906780", - "sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py": "sha256:27b2b885c81923d85054e3999c5613e104fe627779b2b50398ed9bed5088f47e", - "tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py": "sha256:ecbadecc475622eaaf20a726110aebef5f4fe7af141110a98aca1640179b4a03", - "tests/test_identity_bundle.py": "sha256:be5ce74097594cc7f7e77dbccd6cb53aa72f263cd1bb442ce5464038aed1116c", - "tests/test_isolated_keycape_fixture_plan.py": "sha256:5945619f4c5957187763276cc900870a9f08f9475b63c240694688e0c2eca7dd", - "tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py": "sha256:5f729e077db51dd6b17d00dc3eb71c0e652849f55fe68505a07befa663c91dea", - "tests/test_isolated_keycape_session.py": "sha256:cbdf51efde26eff337e9303a2c431f80b333b8846d763eb62853f81eb3f13e2c", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py": "sha256:47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py": "sha256:90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/fetch-privacyidea-backup.py": "sha256:233160e1206643a5cf7ad05141d733f0a75aff651190e27f77515a124ff0a59f", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json": "sha256:40f9e5b5bb957e5b23e03b31701702b850502d16a92a0fa0ebf92618cc3f18a1", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py": "sha256:524a03c065db4307fcde83d33af39503f3de19cb6ef3a8ca72c991d4a8c08ee6", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-credential-setup.py": "sha256:ddd6127fa331c0185523ec3bb22d743a791edd56a2e6af7ad8d7949b7c051141", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-custody.json": "sha256:f8aee8487ed01d7940b82676bb4a5c8d61f51b6c598521b8b8a73588aaea4d4f", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-files.py": "sha256:d0063a9eedd3610e3d45bd2d834aae83cff74e4b3504d138b3548f427e89331d", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-isolation.py": "sha256:88d1e13112a44c79571825af89d3fe5b01fa490cff2653badef4c62a45c844f1", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py": "sha256:e7c31fa9ee081961af873348ee3b4829a645d40c7dc7f1e22c564aa9ed01bc49", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-retention.py": "sha256:a41ea4759f69c35548149fc8d0d5ace547f16cf9fe4c9dac10b119a4d0becdec", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py": "sha256:a2c0acf567c204705b90be64d561d0fda2285e0fc71a962d6e1b149f571e1940", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/install-identity-backup.py": "sha256:5c612a2a51c9b59aad8cc01d418c2f563cbd92c62dc1fa8be994e5fb59df90f1", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-scaleway.py": "sha256:a219df205708fa4ed44b763a418585d63c820c25434bc0fd14e805eb5c2f79d3", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py": "sha256:673f9b17fb2f3fef6fcdb5c50a2bcca69e3df3157a9e5582a2d995c6b87640b5", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py": "sha256:8fa38efe28167b59a6307f342b2ac8fcda78ecda60e6228f22017424d2343c22", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py": "sha256:86f37add7221e4c73e3f9d878c09a3cc81061627cbf024ed6887d973d929b718", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py": "sha256:35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py": "sha256:4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py": "sha256:cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py": "sha256:6fa0f1494dccaf003b6c6396c5de8b36faa2b276eeb16badd04383f5efb71e66", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py": "sha256:3421dbb3f3280a001d33ea2deb12ab609404a0b4254cd43c21518d77d166f972", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py": "sha256:ec123d47a07305253570dacab7e103f8c193a23f20c9fc87466ea4a95ae0ec13", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh": "sha256:0d994c9c14ebdffdbf7879bd7562042531083d0e8955424d0ae099898a141668", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py": "sha256:885b05a2011e711228e42e316bda70bbe0d97d481383d61aa8469d0f10452370", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity-delivery.py": "sha256:63658d1976806f8d0ce80ba8f750bbcfdca59da936b6eb6a78a250f0e53710f1", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py": "sha256:039864d0141b552887752bf17cfdcf1bef4bdc9126f946a9c0533e4fd54ebf4f", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh": "sha256:86c527a8ae0d0cca66a2345c566b25fbff5bc52c1e22c725548c0fbb2f86a58e", - "sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-fd.py": "sha256:df29eaba83ec6b5fc311664dcf4b22d8f3c8ed7274ed8e6c419ada0dcd169c0f", - "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py": "sha256:5098bdfa4e0ad30627c1716e5e355a2c78dca6ccc607bd2148a2e06126632288", - "tests/test_prepare_isolated_keycape.py": "sha256:4b0871f9a11a3940983464f1b40eca1613110b1cb3cb9694f4891d58e14c700a", - "tests/test_sealed_custody.py": "sha256:f0fa07c89e2419464dbee0489462864a4533770417a554b1ab1d1ed5d7b6c49f", - "tests/test_private_manifest_binding.py": "sha256:2e7ee16af65390343435b7210ef191aa2a10e9dcbb8759ed95fa8bf6fb81893b" - }, - "fixed_endpoint": "unix:///var/run/docker.sock", - "engine_id": "74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1", - "engine_name": "bnt-lap001", - "images": [ - "forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010", - "ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473" - ], - "pull_policy": "never", - "synthetic_issuer": "https://nk49-fixture.invalid", - "cases": [ - "positive", - "hard-parent-loss", - "deadline", - "nonzero-after-accept" - ], - "limits": { - "sequential_cases": true, - "max_live_service_containers": 2, - "max_tmpfs_volumes": 4, - "max_public_probe_containers": 1, - "service_memory_bytes_each": 536870912, - "service_cpus_each": 1, - "tmpfs_volume_bytes_each": 33554432, - "host_tmpfs_fixture_limit_expected_bytes": 8388608, - "execution_deadline_seconds": { - "deadline_case": 20, - "other_cases": 120 - }, - "driver_wait_seconds_per_case": 150 - }, - "resources": { - "container_names": "nk49-kc--{transport,issuer,image-probe}", - "volume_names": "nk49-kc--v{0,1,2,3}", - "label": "net-kingdom.recovery-run=", - "host_plaintext": "exact private /dev/shm/nk49-keycape-- registered before writes", - "synthetic_source_root": "private /dev/shm/nk49-keycape-fixture-", - "safe_result": "private /tmp/nk49-keycape-native-fixture-review-/result.json" - }, - "scope": "candidate itself on complete synthetic format/integrity archive fixture; no native PI/LLDAP/Authelia proof, real custody, real factor or real client credential; successor binds sealed-descriptor custody preparation sources; synthetic fixture itself overrides custody with generated fixture key as before; unexecuted exact-one-selector adapter successor: no new native outcome inferred from earlier fixtures", - "mutations": [ - "conditional creation of exact fresh local containers and local-driver tmpfs volumes", - "private synthetic file import to those volumes", - "original-image KeyCape service/client exchange within same loopback-only namespace", - "exact owned quiescent removal and bounded safe receipts" - ], - "forbidden": [ - "Docker execution before independent approval", - "image pulls/builds/pushes", - "production routes/ports/host networking/host directory mounts", - "OpenBao/Kubernetes/provider APIs", - "actual identity archive, age key, TLS key, user password, factor or client secret" - ], - "cleanup": "candidate exact ownership/volume-driver/inode checks; quiesce fresh owner SID/PGID via pidfds first; retained inflight uncertainty never accepted even on absent readback", - "oracles": [ - "positive issuer-native verify-client must establish original-hostname HTTPS trust; helper alone never suffices", - "same original single RS256 key-1 JWKS and exact config/registry/policy/history/lock/deliveries", - "correct service exchange and explicit wrong-secret/excess-scope denial through existing native verifier", - "hard-parent-loss and tightened deadline both quiesce before exact resource/plaintext cleanup", - "after real Docker run accepts a synthetic container, inject returncode1; require failed recovery and sticky daemon uncertainty after cleanup" - ], - "proposed_command": [ - "python3", - "tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py", - "--execute-reviewed-fixture", - "--expected-manifest-sha256", - "", - "--case", - "positive" - ], - "extended_command": [ - "python3", - "tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py", - "--execute-reviewed-fixture", - "--expected-manifest-sha256", - "", - "--case", - "all" - ] -} diff --git a/tests/lldap_groups_native_fixture.py b/tests/lldap_groups_native_fixture.py deleted file mode 100644 index 59e21a8..0000000 --- a/tests/lldap_groups_native_fixture.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Isolated local-Docker LLDAP proof; synthetic credentials and temporary storage only.""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import secrets -import subprocess -import tempfile -import time -import urllib.request - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('native_lldap_admin', ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py') -admin = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(admin) - - -def command(args): - result = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60) - if result.returncode: - raise RuntimeError('fixture_command_failed') - return result.stdout.strip() - - -def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--image', required=True, help='Existing local image sha256; never pull') - parser.add_argument('--output', required=True) - args = parser.parse_args() - if not re.fullmatch(r'sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}', args.image): - raise SystemExit('immutable local image required') - contexts = json.loads(command(['docker', 'context', 'inspect'])) - host = os.environ.get('DOCKER_HOST') or contexts[0]['Endpoints']['docker']['Host'] - if not host.startswith('unix://'): - raise SystemExit('local Unix Docker endpoint required') - assert command(['docker', 'image', 'inspect', args.image, '--format', '{{.Id}}']) == args.image - checks = {} - container = None - result = {'image': args.image, 'synthetic_only': True, 'checks': checks, 'outcome': 'unverified'} - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk-lldap-fixture-', dir='/tmp') as temp: - directory = Path(temp) - password = secrets.token_hex(24) - env = directory / 'container.env' - env.write_text('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=' + password + '\nLLDAP_JWT_SECRET=' + secrets.token_hex(32) + '\nLLDAP_LDAP_BASE_DN=dc=example,dc=test\n') - env.chmod(0o600) - root = directory / 'custody' - root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - (root / 'lldap').mkdir(mode=0o700) - source = root / 'lldap/secrets.env' - source.write_text('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=' + password + '\n') - source.chmod(0o600) - container = command(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--rm', '--pull=never', '--name', 'nk-lldap-groups-' + secrets.token_hex(5), - '--memory=256m', '--cpus=0.5', '--pids-limit=128', - '--publish', '127.0.0.1::17170', '--tmpfs', '/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=32m,uid=1000,gid=1000', - '--env-file', str(env), args.image]) - if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}', container): - raise RuntimeError('invalid_container_id') - port = json.loads(command(['docker', 'inspect', container, '--format', '{{json .NetworkSettings.Ports}}']))['17170/tcp'][0] - assert port['HostIp'] == '127.0.0.1' - base = 'http://127.0.0.1:' + port['HostPort'] - provider = admin.LLDAPProvisioner(base_url=base, admin_password=password, opener=admin.Transport(base)) - for _ in range(60): - try: - token = provider._login() - break - except Exception: - time.sleep(.25) - else: - raise RuntimeError('fixture_start_failed') - initial = admin.snapshot(provider, token) - preview = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'bootstrap') - assert admin.snapshot(provider, token) == initial - checks['preview_nonmutating'] = True - result1 = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'bootstrap', apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert result1['result'] == 'verified' - ready = admin.snapshot(provider, token) - assert all(name in ready['groups'] for name in admin.BASELINE) - assert all(ready['groups'][name] == value for name, value in initial['groups'].items()) - checks['bootstrap_exact_and_existing_preserved'] = True - preview = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'bootstrap') - assert preview['changes'] == [] - assert admin.maintain(provider, base, 'bootstrap', apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256'])['result'] == 'verified' - checks['bootstrap_idempotent'] = True - provider._gql(token, 'mutation CreateUser($id: String!, $email: String!, $display: String!) { createUser(user: {id: $id, email: $email, displayName: $display}) { id } }', - {'id': 'fixture-user', 'email': 'fixture@example.test', 'display': 'Fixture'}) - for action in ('add', 'remove'): - kwargs = {'action': action, 'group': 'activity-core-operators', 'user': 'fixture-user'} - preview = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', **kwargs) - updated = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', **kwargs, apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert updated['result'] == 'verified' - listed = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', action='list', group='activity-core-operators') - assert ('fixture-user' in listed['members']) == (action == 'add') - checks['exact_' + action + '_and_readback'] = True - before = admin.snapshot(provider, token) - for group in ('net-kingdom-admins', 'net-kingdom-users', 'lldap_admin'): - try: - admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', action='add', group=group, user='fixture-user') - except (ValueError, admin.Refused): - pass - else: - raise RuntimeError('reserved_group_accepted') - assert admin.snapshot(provider, token) == before - checks['reserved_group_refusal_preserves_state'] = True - preview = admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', action='add', group='activity-core-operators', user='fixture-user') - provider._gql(token, 'mutation CreateGroup($name: String!) { createGroup(name: $name) { id displayName } }', {'name': 'unrelated-drift'}) - try: - admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', action='add', group='activity-core-operators', user='fixture-user', apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - except admin.Refused: - pass - else: - raise RuntimeError('stale_preview_accepted') - assert 'fixture-user' not in admin.snapshot(provider, token)['groups']['activity-core-operators']['members'] - checks['stale_preview_refused'] = True - complete = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t07.sh'), '--root', str(root), '--lldap-url', base], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) - assert complete.returncode == 2 - assert password not in complete.stdout + complete.stderr - assert json.loads(complete.stdout)['native_acceptance'] == 'unverified' - checks['t07_structural_only_exit_and_no_trace_disclosure'] = True - result['outcome'] = 'passed' - except Exception: - result['outcome'] = 'failed' - finally: - if container and re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}', container): - try: - command(['docker', 'rm', '--force', container]) - checks['fixture_removed'] = True - except Exception: - checks['fixture_removed'] = False - result['outcome'] = 'failed' - Path(args.output).write_text(json.dumps(result, indent=2) + '\n') - print(json.dumps(result)) - return 0 if result['outcome'] == 'passed' else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tests/mfa_state_native_fixture.py b/tests/mfa_state_native_fixture.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4e71c4e..0000000 --- a/tests/mfa_state_native_fixture.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,123 +0,0 @@ -"""Disposable real-provider acceptance, invoked in a separate Python process.""" -import contextlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import logging -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sys -import tempfile -import threading -import time - - -def run(): - for name in list(os.environ): - if name.startswith('PRIVACYIDEA_'): del os.environ[name] - logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) - root_repo = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('mfa_state', root_repo/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/mfa_state.py') - m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(m) - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.models import db - from privacyidea.lib.policy import set_policy, enable_policy - from privacyidea.lib.resolver import save_resolver - from privacyidea.lib.realm import set_realm - from privacyidea.lib.auth import create_db_admin - from privacyidea.lib.resolvers.PasswdIdResolver import crypt_ctx - from privacyidea.lib.token import init_token - from privacyidea.lib.user import User - from werkzeug.serving import make_server - result = {} - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='mfa-native-') as directory: - root = Path(directory); (root/'enckey').write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - cfg = root/'fixture.cfg' - config = dict(SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI='sqlite:///'+str(root/'db.sqlite'), - SECRET_KEY='disposable-native-fixture', PI_PEPPER='disposable-native-pepper', - PI_NO_RESPONSE_SIGN=True, PI_AUDIT_NO_SIGN=True, PI_LOGFILE=str(root/'log'), - PI_ENCFILE=str(root/'enckey'), PI_TRUSTED_JWT=[], - PI_AUDIT_SQL_URI='sqlite:///'+str(root/'audit.sqlite')) - cfg.write_text('\n'.join(k+'='+repr(v) for k,v in config.items())) - app = create_app(config_name='testing', config_file=str(cfg), silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - assert str(db.engine.url) == config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI']; db.create_all() - from privacyidea.lib.audit import getAudit - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import LogEntry - LogEntry.__table__.create(getAudit(app.config).engine, checkfirst=True) - passwd = root/'users' - password = crypt_ctx.hash('fixture-user-password', scheme='sha512_crypt') - passwd.write_text('alice:'+password+':1001:1001:Fixture:/tmp:/bin/false\nbob:'+password+':1002:1002:Fixture:/tmp:/bin/false\n') - save_resolver({'resolver':'fixture-users','type':'passwdresolver','fileName':str(passwd)}) - set_realm('coulomb',[{'name':'fixture-users'}]) - create_db_admin('fixture-reader', password='fixture-reader-password') - set_policy(name='fixture-baseline',scope='admin',action='*',adminuser=['*','!fixture-reader']) - set_policy(name='fixture-reader',scope='admin',action='tokenlist',adminuser='fixture-reader',realm='coulomb') - probe = init_token({'serial':m.PROBE,'type':'hotp','genkey':1,'realm':'coulomb'}) - probe.token.active = False; probe.token.save() - for i in range(18): - init_token({'serial':'FIXTURE'+str(i),'type':'hotp','genkey':1},user=User('alice','coulomb')) - pending = init_token({'serial':'FIXTUREPENDING','type':'hotp','genkey':1},user=User('alice','coulomb')) - pending.token.rollout_state = 'verify'; pending.token.save() - inactive = init_token({'serial':'FIXTUREINACTIVE','type':'hotp','genkey':1},user=User('alice','coulomb')) - inactive.token.active = False; inactive.token.save() - native = app.test_client() - def login(user, password, realm=None): - args={'username':user,'password':password} - if realm: args['realm']=realm - response=native.post('/auth',json=args) - assert response.status_code==200 and response.get_json()['result']['status'] - return response.get_json()['result']['value']['token'] - token=login('fixture-reader','fixture-reader-password') - tokenfile=root/'token';tokenfile.write_text(token);tokenfile.chmod(0o600) - assert m.credential(tokenfile)==token - server=make_server('127.0.0.1',0,app); thread=threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever,daemon=True);thread.start() - try: - client=m.Client(f'http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}',token) - counts=m.diagnose(client,'alice')['factors'] - assert counts=={'total':20,'active_confirmed':18,'active_pending':1,'inactive':1},counts - result['native_counts_beyond_default_page']=True - assert m.diagnose(client,'bob')['factors']['total']==0 - result['native_empty_with_visibility']=True - def refused(fn): - try: fn() - except m.Refused: return True - return False - with app.app_context(): enable_policy('fixture-reader',False) - raw=native.get('/token/?user=alice&realm=coulomb',headers={'Authorization':token}) - assert raw.status_code==200 and raw.get_json()['result']['value']['count']==0 - assert refused(lambda:m.diagnose(client,'alice')) - result['native_withdrawal_empty_success_refused']=True - with app.app_context(): enable_policy('fixture-reader',True) - assert m.diagnose(client,'alice')['factors']['total']==20 - result['native_permission_recovery']=True - usertoken=login('alice','fixture-user-password','coulomb') - assert refused(lambda:m.diagnose(m.Client(client.base,usertoken),'bob')) - result['native_self_service_cannot_prove_other_user_visibility']=True - assert refused(lambda:m.diagnose(m.Client(client.base,token[:-5]+'XXXXX'),'alice')) - result['native_tampered_signature_refused']=True - with app.app_context(): - set_policy(name='fixture-short-session',scope='webui',action='jwt_validity=2') - short=login('fixture-reader','fixture-reader-password') - import base64 - claims=json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(short.split('.')[1]+'===')) - remaining=claims['exp']-time.time();assert 0 < remaining < 3 - time.sleep(remaining+0.2) - assert refused(lambda:m.diagnose(m.Client(client.base,short),'alice')) - result['native_expired_provider_jwt_refused']=True - finally: - server.shutdown();thread.join();server.server_close() - return result - - -if __name__=='__main__': - try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()), contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - result=run() - print(json.dumps(result,sort_keys=True)) - except Exception as exc: - # Fixture-only, sanitized: no database/HTTP body/credential traceback. - import traceback - frame = traceback.extract_tb(exc.__traceback__)[-1] - print(json.dumps({'result':'failed','type':type(exc).__name__, 'file':Path(frame.filename).name, 'line':frame.lineno, 'counts':exc.args[0] if exc.args and isinstance(exc.args[0],dict) and set(exc.args[0])=={'total','active_confirmed','active_pending','inactive'} else None})) - raise SystemExit(1) diff --git a/tests/playwright_registration_native_test.go b/tests/playwright_registration_native_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index fe21ce0..0000000 --- a/tests/playwright_registration_native_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ -// Copy into a disposable KeyCape src/internal/authclient checkout. This uses -// its native token endpoint/JWKS verifier, with a synthetic directory and seeded -// authorization sessions. It does not prove upstream login or Kubernetes access. -package authclient - -import ( - "context" - "crypto/sha256" - "encoding/base64" - "net/url" - "os" - "testing" - "time" - - "keycape/internal/config" - "keycape/internal/domain" - "keycape/internal/server/oidc" -) - -type playwrightUsers struct{ users } - -func (playwrightUsers) LookupUser(context.Context, string) (*domain.User, error) { - return &domain.User{ID: "user:playwright-test", Username: "test", Enabled: true, Tenant: "tenant:test"}, nil -} - -func TestNetKingdomPlaywrightGeneratedRegistration(t *testing.T) { - path := os.Getenv("PLAYWRIGHT_SYNTHETIC_CONFIG") - if path == "" { - t.Fatal("synthetic generated config required") - } - cfg, err := config.Load(path) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal("generated config did not load") - } - if len(config.ValidateConfig(cfg)) != 0 { - t.Fatal("native config validation failed") - } - records, err := cfg.Registrations() - if err != nil { - t.Fatal("native registration conversion failed") - } - c, d, h := provider(t) - h.Users = playwrightUsers{} - h.ClientConfig = map[string]*domain.Client{} - for i := range records { - record := &records[i] - if record.ClientType == "confidential" { - record.ClientSecret = "synthetic-playwright-fixture" - } - h.ClientConfig[record.ClientID] = record - } - ctx := context.Background() - agentID := "playwright-agent-test-agent" - form := url.Values{"grant_type": {"client_credentials"}, "scope": {"playwright:connect"}} - token, err := c.Exchange(ctx, d, form, agentID, "synthetic-playwright-fixture", "playwright-kubernetes", "") - if err != nil { - t.Fatal("generated service exchange failed") - } - claims, err := c.Verify(ctx, d, token.AccessToken, "playwright-kubernetes", "") - if err != nil || claims["principal_type"] != "service" || claims["sub"] != "service:test-agent:platform" || claims["tenant"] != "tenant:test" { - t.Fatal("service claim contract mismatch") - } - roles, ok := claims["roles"].([]any) - if !ok || len(roles) != 1 || roles[0] != "coding-agent" { - t.Fatal("agent role mismatch") - } - if token.ExpiresIn != 900 { - t.Fatal("agent lifetime mismatch") - } - if _, err = c.Verify(ctx, d, token.AccessToken, "openbao", ""); err == nil { - t.Fatal("wrong audience accepted") - } - if _, err = c.Verify(ctx, d, token.AccessToken+"tampered", "playwright-kubernetes", ""); err == nil { - t.Fatal("tampered token accepted") - } - if _, err = c.Exchange(ctx, d, form, agentID, "wrong", "playwright-kubernetes", ""); err == nil { - t.Fatal("wrong secret accepted") - } - form.Set("scope", "openbao:login") - if _, err = c.Exchange(ctx, d, form, agentID, "synthetic-playwright-fixture", "playwright-kubernetes", ""); err == nil { - t.Fatal("excess scope accepted") - } - - verifier := "synthetic-playwright-verifier-with-enough-length-12345" - digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier)) - callback := "http://127.0.0.1:18764/callback" - exchange := func(sentVerifier, sentCallback string) (Tokens, error) { - code := h.Sessions.Create(&oidc.PKCESession{ClientID: "playwright-cli", Username: "test", Nonce: "synthetic-nonce", - Scopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "groups", "playwright:connect"}, - PKCEChallenge: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(digest[:]), RedirectURI: callback, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Minute)}) - fields := url.Values{"grant_type": {"authorization_code"}, "client_id": {"playwright-cli"}, "code": {code}, - "redirect_uri": {sentCallback}, "code_verifier": {sentVerifier}, "scope": {"openid playwright:connect"}} - return c.Exchange(ctx, d, fields, "playwright-cli", "", "playwright-kubernetes", "synthetic-nonce") - } - human, err := exchange(verifier, callback) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal("public PKCE token exchange failed") - } - claims, err = c.Verify(ctx, d, human.AccessToken, "playwright-kubernetes", "") - if err != nil || claims["principal_type"] != "human" || claims["sub"] != "user:playwright-test" || claims["tenant"] != "tenant:test" { - t.Fatal("human claim contract mismatch") - } - if _, err = c.Verify(ctx, d, human.IDToken, "playwright-kubernetes", ""); err == nil { - t.Fatal("ID token accepted as resource token") - } - if _, err = exchange("wrong-verifier", callback); err == nil { - t.Fatal("wrong PKCE verifier accepted") - } - if _, err = exchange(verifier, "http://127.0.0.1:18765/callback"); err == nil { - t.Fatal("wrong callback accepted") - } - delete(h.ClientConfig, agentID) - form.Set("scope", "playwright:connect") - if _, err = c.Exchange(ctx, d, form, agentID, "synthetic-playwright-fixture", "playwright-kubernetes", ""); err == nil { - t.Fatal("removed registration still issues") - } - if _, err = c.Verify(ctx, d, token.AccessToken, "playwright-kubernetes", ""); err != nil { - t.Fatal("issued JWT lifetime limitation changed") - } -} diff --git a/tests/realm_bootstrap_native_fixture.py b/tests/realm_bootstrap_native_fixture.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5bfbea1..0000000 --- a/tests/realm_bootstrap_native_fixture.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,84 +0,0 @@ -"""Disposable privacyIDEA 3.12.2 HTTP and database proof, no production config.""" -import contextlib -import io -import json -import logging -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sys -import tempfile -import threading - - -def run(): - for name in list(os.environ): - if name.startswith('PRIVACYIDEA_'):del os.environ[name] - logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) - sys.path.insert(0,str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea')) - import realm_bootstrap as r - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.models import db - from privacyidea.lib.auth import create_db_admin - from privacyidea.lib.policy import PolicyClass,set_policy - from privacyidea.lib.resolver import get_resolver_config,save_resolver - from privacyidea.lib.realm import set_realm,set_default_realm - from werkzeug.serving import make_server - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='realm-native-') as directory: - root=Path(directory);(root/'enckey').write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - cfg=root/'fixture.cfg' - config=dict(SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI='sqlite:///'+str(root/'db.sqlite'),SECRET_KEY='fixture-secret-key', - PI_PEPPER='fixture-pepper',PI_ENCFILE=str(root/'enckey'),PI_NO_RESPONSE_SIGN=True, - PI_AUDIT_NO_SIGN=True,PI_LOGFILE=str(root/'log'),PI_TRUSTED_JWT=[], - PI_AUDIT_SQL_URI='sqlite:///'+str(root/'audit.sqlite')) - cfg.write_text('\n'.join(k+'='+repr(v) for k,v in config.items())) - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file=str(cfg),silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - assert str(db.engine.url)==config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'];db.create_all() - from privacyidea.lib.audit import getAudit - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import LogEntry - LogEntry.__table__.create(getAudit(app.config).engine,checkfirst=True) - create_db_admin('pi-admin',password='fixture-admin-password') - policies=PolicyClass().policies - server=make_server('127.0.0.1',0,app);thread=threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever,daemon=True);thread.start() - try: - client=r.Client(f'http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}','fixture-admin-password') - preview=r.repair(client,lambda:None) - assert preview['configuration_writes']==0 - result=r.repair(client,lambda:'fixture-bind-password',apply=True) - assert result['actions']==['create-resolver','create-realm','set-first-realm-default'],result - with app.app_context(): - assert get_resolver_config(r.RESOLVER)['BINDPW']=='fixture-bind-password' - assert PolicyClass().policies==policies - set_policy(name='totp-self-enrollment',scope='user',action='enrollTOTP',realm='coulomb') - set_policy(name='keycape-pending-enrollment-cancel',scope='user',action='delete',realm='coulomb',conditions=[('token','rollout_state','equals','verify',True)]) - set_policy(name='mfa-passthru-phase1',scope='authentication',action='passthru',realm='coulomb',active=False) - policies=PolicyClass().policies - save_resolver({'resolver':r.RESOLVER,'type':'ldapresolver','TIMEOUT':'','SIZELIMIT':'777','TLS_VERIFY':True,'CACHE_TIMEOUT':'333'}) - set_realm('other',[]);set_default_realm('other') - before=client.snapshot() - result=r.repair(client,lambda:(_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError()),apply=True) - assert result['actions']==['fill-missing-tuning'] - after=client.snapshot() - assert after['realms']==before['realms'] - assert after['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT']=='5' - for key,value in before['resolver']['data'].items(): - if key!='TIMEOUT':assert after['resolver']['data'][key]==value - with app.app_context(): - assert get_resolver_config(r.RESOLVER)['BINDPW']=='fixture-bind-password' - assert PolicyClass().policies==policies - assert r.repair(client,lambda:None,apply=True)['configuration_writes']==0 - return {'native_create_and_readback':True,'native_minimal_update_preserves_omitted_fields':True, - 'native_bind_password_preserved':True,'native_hardened_policies_preserved':True, - 'native_existing_default_preserved':True,'native_repeat_is_noop':True} - finally:server.shutdown();thread.join();server.server_close() - - -if __name__=='__main__': - try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):result=run() - print(json.dumps(result,sort_keys=True)) - except Exception as exc: - import traceback - frame=traceback.extract_tb(exc.__traceback__)[-1] - print(json.dumps({'result':'failed','type':type(exc).__name__,'file':Path(frame.filename).name,'line':frame.lineno})) - raise SystemExit(1) diff --git a/tests/resolver_cutover_native_fixture.py b/tests/resolver_cutover_native_fixture.py deleted file mode 100644 index 1c042da..0000000 --- a/tests/resolver_cutover_native_fixture.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -"""Local LLDAP + privacyIDEA 3.12.2 bind/cutover/HOTP proof; synthetic data only.""" -import contextlib -import io -import json -import logging -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sys -import tempfile -import threading - - -def provider_run(lldap_url, ldap_url, replacement): - for name in list(os.environ): - if name.startswith('PRIVACYIDEA_'):del os.environ[name] - logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) - sys.path.insert(0,str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea')) - import realm_bootstrap as r - import resolver_cutover as cut - from privacyidea.lib.token import init_token - from privacyidea.lib.user import User - r.CORE = dict(LDAPURI=ldap_url, LDAPBASE="dc=example,dc=test", BINDDN="uid=admin,ou=people,dc=example,dc=test") - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.models import db - from privacyidea.lib.auth import create_db_admin - from privacyidea.lib.policy import PolicyClass,set_policy - from privacyidea.lib.resolver import get_resolver_config,save_resolver - from privacyidea.lib.realm import set_realm,set_default_realm - from werkzeug.serving import make_server - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='realm-native-') as directory: - root=Path(directory);(root/'enckey').write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - cfg=root/'fixture.cfg' - config=dict(SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI='sqlite:///'+str(root/'db.sqlite'),SECRET_KEY='fixture-secret-key', - PI_PEPPER='fixture-pepper',PI_ENCFILE=str(root/'enckey'),PI_NO_RESPONSE_SIGN=True, - PI_AUDIT_NO_SIGN=True,PI_LOGFILE=str(root/'log'),PI_TRUSTED_JWT=[], - PI_AUDIT_SQL_URI='sqlite:///'+str(root/'audit.sqlite')) - cfg.write_text('\n'.join(k+'='+repr(v) for k,v in config.items())) - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file=str(cfg),silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - assert str(db.engine.url)==config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'];db.create_all() - from privacyidea.lib.audit import getAudit - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import LogEntry - LogEntry.__table__.create(getAudit(app.config).engine,checkfirst=True) - create_db_admin('pi-admin',password='fixture-admin-password') - policies=PolicyClass().policies - server=make_server('127.0.0.1',0,app);thread=threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever,daemon=True);thread.start() - try: - client=r.Client(f'http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}','fixture-admin-password') - r.repair(client,lambda:'synthetic-invalid-predecessor',apply=True) - with app.app_context(): - save_resolver({'resolver':r.RESOLVER,'type':'ldapresolver','TIMEOUT':'7','SIZELIMIT':'777','CACHE_TIMEOUT':'0'}) - set_realm('other',[]);set_default_realm('other') - set_policy(name='mfa-passthru-phase1',scope='authentication',action='passthru',realm='coulomb',active=False) - policies=PolicyClass().policies - target=dict(helper='update',pi_url=client.url,lldap_url=lldap_url,user='admin') - before=client.snapshot() - try:cut.native_bind(client,before) - except r.Refused:pass - else:raise AssertionError('old bind unexpectedly works') - preview=cut.run(client,target,'preview') - assert client.snapshot()==before - report=cut.run(client,target,'apply',replacement=replacement,expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert report['result']=='configured' and report['configuration_writes']==1 - assert cut.public_snapshot(client.snapshot())==cut.public_snapshot(before) - with app.app_context(): - assert get_resolver_config(r.RESOLVER)['BINDPW']==replacement - assert PolicyClass().policies==policies - token=init_token({'type':'hotp','genkey':1,'pin':''},user=User('admin',r.REALM,r.RESOLVER)) - otp=token.get_otp()[2] - target['helper']='reconcile' - # Fixture has actual PI/LDAP/MFA; cluster and KeyCape gates are explicitly substituted. - report=cut.run(client,target,'check',replacement=replacement,predecessor='synthetic-invalid-predecessor', - gate=lambda:None,mfa_proof=lambda:cut.verify(client.url,'admin',r.REALM,r.RESOLVER, - 'fixture-admin-password',lambda:otp)) - assert report['result']=='verified' and report['mfa_verified'] and report['configuration_writes']==0 - return {'native_candidate_and_stored_ldap_bind':True,'native_old_bind_refused':True, - 'native_minimal_password_update':True,'native_custom_config_and_realms_preserved':True, - 'native_policies_preserved':True,'native_exact_user_and_hotp':True, - 'synthetic_wrong_predecessor_http_denied':True,'cluster_and_keycape_gates_substituted':True, - 'production_acceptance':False} - finally:server.shutdown();thread.join();server.server_close() - - - -IMAGE = 'sha256:2a8454b668c1aba7157e832eab0e242e1e7eb5fb7591d7e7774ba05286511ca8' - - -def run(): - import re - import secrets - import subprocess - import time - sys.path.insert(0,str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea')) - from resolver_cutover import login - def command(args): - result=subprocess.run(['docker',*args],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=60) - if result.returncode:raise RuntimeError('fixture command failed') - return result.stdout.strip() - contexts=json.loads(command(['context','inspect'])) - # DOCKER_CONTEXT takes precedence over DOCKER_HOST. Reject any remote - # configured endpoint, including conflicting environment selections. - hosts=[contexts[0]['Endpoints']['docker']['Host']] - if os.environ.get('DOCKER_HOST'):hosts.append(os.environ['DOCKER_HOST']) - assert all(host.startswith('unix://') for host in hosts) - assert command(['image','inspect',IMAGE,'--format','{{.Id}}'])==IMAGE - container=None - try: - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='resolver-lldap-native-') as directory: - root=Path(directory);password=secrets.token_hex(24) - source=root/'container.env' - fd=os.open(source,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as stream: - stream.write('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS='+password+'\nLLDAP_JWT_SECRET='+secrets.token_hex(32)+'\nLLDAP_LDAP_BASE_DN=dc=example,dc=test\n') - container=command(['run','--detach','--rm','--pull=never','--memory=256m','--cpus=0.5','--pids-limit=128', - '--publish','127.0.0.1::17170','--publish','127.0.0.1::3890', - '--tmpfs','/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=32m,uid=1000,gid=1000','--env-file',str(source),IMAGE]) - assert re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}',container) - ports=json.loads(command(['inspect',container,'--format','{{json .NetworkSettings.Ports}}'])) - assert all(ports[p][0]['HostIp']=='127.0.0.1' for p in ('17170/tcp','3890/tcp')) - base='http://127.0.0.1:'+ports['17170/tcp'][0]['HostPort'] - ldap='ldap://127.0.0.1:'+ports['3890/tcp'][0]['HostPort'] - for _ in range(80): - try:login(base,password);break - except Exception:time.sleep(.25) - else:raise RuntimeError('fixture startup failed') - result=provider_run(base,ldap,password) - finally: - if container and re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}',container):command(['rm','--force',container]) - result['fixture_removed']=True - return result - - -if __name__=='__main__': - try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):result=run() - print(json.dumps(result,sort_keys=True)) - except Exception as exc: - import traceback - frame=traceback.extract_tb(exc.__traceback__)[-1] - print(json.dumps({'result':'failed','type':type(exc).__name__,'file':Path(frame.filename).name,'line':frame.lineno})) - raise SystemExit(1) diff --git a/tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py b/tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7146326..0000000 --- a/tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,221 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Prepare/run the exact reviewed T18 candidate on disposable synthetic material. - -Default --plan performs no Docker calls and generates no key/material. Execution -requires the reviewed fixture manifest hash and source closure. This runner calls -the candidate itself; hooks only pause or inject a post-response transport fault. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime,timedelta,timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -import re -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import subprocess -import sys -import tarfile -import tempfile -import time -import uuid - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -MANIFEST=ROOT/'tests/isolated-keycape-native-fixture-manifest.json' -ISSUER='https://nk49-fixture.invalid' -CASES=('positive','hard-parent-loss','deadline','nonzero-after-accept') - - -def load(name,path): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,path) - module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module);return module - -s=load('session',ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py') - - -def require(condition): - if not condition:raise RuntimeError('synthetic_fixture_refused') - - -def reviewed_manifest(expected): - raw=MANIFEST.read_bytes();require(hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==expected) - manifest=json.loads(raw) - for name,digest in manifest['source_sha256'].items(): - require(isinstance(digest,str) and re.fullmatch('sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}',digest)) - require('sha256:'+hashlib.sha256((ROOT/name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()==digest) - return manifest - - -def private_write(path,value): - path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True) - fd=os.open(path,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(value) - - -def materials(root): - """Reuse the existing full archive fixture factory, no real archive accepted.""" - from cryptography import x509 - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes,serialization - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID - import yaml - existing=load('existing_bundle_fixture',ROOT/'tests/test_identity_bundle.py') - payload=existing.stage.__wrapped__(root) - config={'issuer':ISSUER,'port':8080,'privateKeyPem':'/etc/keycape/key.pem','environment':'dev','tokenLifetime':'5m', - 'lldap':{'url':'ldap://127.0.0.1:1','bindDN':'cn=fixture','bindPW':'synthetic-only','baseDN':'dc=fixture'}, - 'authelia':{'baseURL':'http://127.0.0.1:1','clientId':'synthetic','clientSecret':'synthetic','redirectURI':ISSUER+'/authorize/callback'}, - 'privacyidea':{'baseURL':'http://127.0.0.1:1'}, - 'clients':[{'clientId':'nk49-fixture-consumer','clientType':'confidential','audience':'nk49-fixture', - 'grantTypes':['client_credentials'],'allowedScopes':['fixture:read'],'secretRef':'env:KEYCAPE_FIXTURE_CLIENT_SECRET', - 'serviceSubject':'service:nk49-fixture','tenant':'tenant:fixture','roles':['fixture-reader']}]+ - [{'clientId':name,'displayName':name,'clientType':'public','grantTypes':['authorization_code'], - 'redirectUris':['https://nk49-fixture.invalid/callback'],'allowedScopes':['openid'],'mfaRequired':True} - for name in ('vergabe-demo-company','user-engine-portal')]} - secret_path=payload/'resources/sso/secret/keycape-config.json';secret=json.loads(secret_path.read_text()) - secret['data']['config.yaml']=base64.b64encode(yaml.safe_dump(config).encode()).decode();secret_path.write_text(json.dumps(secret)) - client_path=payload/'resources/sso/secret/keycape-rapp-qonto-client.json';client=json.loads(client_path.read_text()) - client['data']={'client-secret':base64.b64encode(b'synthetic-fixture-client-secret').decode()};client_path.write_text(json.dumps(client)) - factor_path=payload/'resources/sso/secret/keycape-factor-read.json';factor=json.loads(factor_path.read_text()) - factor['data']={'admin-token':base64.b64encode(b'synthetic-unused-factor-reader').decode()};factor_path.write_text(json.dumps(factor)) - dep_path=payload/'resources/sso/deployment/keycape.json';dep=json.loads(dep_path.read_text()) - dep['spec']={'template':{'spec':{'containers':[{'name':'keycape','image':s.adapter.IMAGE,'env':[ - {'name':'KEYCAPE_CONFIG','value':'/etc/keycape/config.yaml'}, - {'name':'KEYCAPE_POLICY_PATH','value':'/var/lib/keycape-policy/policy.json'}, - {'name':'KEYCAPE_FIXTURE_CLIENT_SECRET','valueFrom':{'secretKeyRef':{'name':'keycape-rapp-qonto-client','key':'client-secret'}}}]}]}}};dep_path.write_text(json.dumps(dep)) - policy={'Revision':1,'Modes':{k:'mandatory' for k in ('vergabe-demo-company','user-engine-portal')},'History':[ - {'reference':'synthetic-retained-receipt','actor':'service:fixture','client':'user-engine-portal','before':'mandatory','after':'mandatory','revision':1,'at':1}]} - # JSON tags in the owner store are lowercase; retain an existing lock inode - # representation as part of the archived tree, never synthesize it after import. - policy={k.lower():v for k,v in policy.items()};(payload/'data/keycape/policy.json').write_text(json.dumps(policy)) - private_write(payload/'data/keycape/policy.json.lock',b'') - key=rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537,key_size=2048) - subject=x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,'nk49-fixture.invalid')]);now=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - cert=(x509.CertificateBuilder().subject_name(subject).issuer_name(subject).public_key(key.public_key()).serial_number(x509.random_serial_number()) - .not_valid_before(now-timedelta(minutes=5)).not_valid_after(now+timedelta(days=1)) - .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName('nk49-fixture.invalid')]),critical=False) - .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True,path_length=None),critical=True).sign(key,hashes.SHA256())) - tls={'/recovery-tls/server.pem':cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM), - '/recovery-tls/server-key.pem':key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,serialization.NoEncryption()), - '/recovery-tls/trust.pem':cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)} - for path,value in tls.items():private_write(root/Path(path).name,value) - age=root/'synthetic-age.key';s.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(age)]) - recipient=s.run(['age-keygen','-y',str(age)]).decode().strip();profile=s.bundle.profile();profile['public_recipient']=recipient - s.bundle.profile=lambda:profile - artifact=root/'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-0123456789ab.tar.age';s.bundle.seal(payload,artifact,{'synthetic_native_keycape_fixture':True}) - raw=s.run(['age','-d','-i',str(age),str(artifact)],max_output=s.bundle.LIMIT) - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(raw)) as archive:manifest=json.load(archive.extractfile('manifest.json')) - transfer={'schema':'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1','status':'readback_verified','provider':'Storage Share', - 'folder':'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity','artifact':artifact.name,'ciphertext_bytes':artifact.stat().st_size, - 'ciphertext_sha256':hashlib.sha256(artifact.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),'etag':'"synthetic"','fetched_path':str(artifact), - 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified':True} - # Derive public executable identity only from the exact cached admitted image. - probe=s.plan_session();name=probe['public_image_probe'] - try: - s.run(['docker','create','--pull=never','--name',name,'--network','none','--read-only','--label',s.adapter.LABEL+'='+probe['run_id'],s.adapter.IMAGE]) - binary=s.adapter.container_file(name,'/keycape') - finally:s.adapter.cleanup({**probe,'containers':[name]}, {}) - admission={'issuer':ISSUER,'ciphertext_sha256':transfer['ciphertext_sha256'], - 'manifest_sha256':hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(manifest,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()).hexdigest(), - 'verifier_sha256':hashlib.sha256(binary).hexdigest(),'trust_sha256':hashlib.sha256(tls['/recovery-tls/trust.pem']).hexdigest(), - 'tls_cert_sha256':hashlib.sha256(tls['/recovery-tls/server.pem']).hexdigest(), - 'consumer':{'client_id':'nk49-fixture-consumer','secret_env':'KEYCAPE_FIXTURE_CLIENT_SECRET','audience':'nk49-fixture','scope':'fixture:read', - 'subject':'service:nk49-fixture','tenant':'tenant:fixture','roles':'fixture-reader','deny_scope':'fixture:write'}} - private_write(root/'fixture.json',json.dumps({'schema':'nk49.generated-keycape-fixture.v1','transfer':transfer,'admission':admission,'recipient':recipient}).encode()) - - -def worker(root,case): - execution=s.isolate_execution();execution['deadline']=time.monotonic()+(20 if case=='deadline' else 120) - data=json.loads((root/'fixture.json').read_text());require(data['schema']=='nk49.generated-keycape-fixture.v1') - profile=s.bundle.profile();profile['public_recipient']=data['recipient'];s.bundle.profile=lambda:profile - s.local.verify.custody.private_key_fd=lambda:os.open(root/'synthetic-age.key',os.O_RDONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW) - tls={'/recovery-tls/'+name:(root/name).read_bytes() for name in ('server.pem','server-key.pem','trust.pem')} - receipt={};output=root/(case+'.json');checkpoint=lambda r:output.write_text(json.dumps(r)) - provision=s.provision - def paused(*args): - provision(*args) - if case in ('hard-parent-loss','deadline'): - private_write(root/(case+'.barrier'),b'private-import-and-default-launch-complete') - time.sleep(150) - s.provision=paused - if case=='nonzero-after-accept': - original=s.adapter.subprocess.run;injected=False - def fault(argv,**kwargs): - nonlocal injected - result=original(argv,**kwargs) - if argv[:3]==['docker','--host',s.adapter.ENDPOINT] and 'run' in argv and not injected and result.returncode==0: - injected=True - return subprocess.CompletedProcess(argv,1,b'',b'') - return result - s.adapter.subprocess.run=fault - try:s.execute(data['transfer'],data['admission'],tls,receipt,execution,checkpoint=checkpoint) - except BaseException:receipt['status']='failed' - finally:output.write_text(json.dumps(receipt)) - return int(receipt.get('status')!='isolated_keycape_native_registration_checked') - - -def run_cases(root,summary,cases): - for case in cases: - child=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,str(Path(__file__).resolve()),'--worker-root',str(root),'--worker-case',case, - '--execute-reviewed-fixture','--expected-manifest-sha256',summary['manifest_sha256']],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL) - try: - end=time.monotonic()+150 - if case=='hard-parent-loss': - while not (root/(case+'.barrier')).exists() and child.poll() is None and time.monotonic()= 8: - prefixes.append(value[:8]) - assert len(prefixes) >= 10 - # Boolean only: test failure must not display generated material. - assert not any(prefix in transcript for prefix in prefixes) - - -def test_dry_run_does_not_read_root_contact_cluster_or_mutate_state(tmp_path, private_env): - checkout = tmp_path / 'checkout' - bootstrap = checkout / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap' - bootstrap.mkdir(parents=True) - for name in ['creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', 'creds-state.yaml']: - shutil.copyfile(BOOTSTRAP / name, bootstrap / name) - state = bootstrap / 'creds-state.yaml' - before = state.read_bytes() - bindir = tmp_path / 'bin'; bindir.mkdir() - marker = tmp_path / 'unexpected-call' - for name in ['kubectl', 'age', 'age-keygen', 'git', 'openssl']: - exe = bindir / name - exe.write_text('#!/bin/sh\nprintf called >> "$UNEXPECTED_CALL"\nexit 1\n') - exe.chmod(0o755) - env = {**private_env, 'PATH': str(bindir) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'UNEXPECTED_CALL': str(marker)} - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh'), '--dry-run'], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert state.read_bytes() == before - assert not marker.exists() - assert not (Path(env['HOME']) / '.config/sops/age').exists() - - -def test_unattended_live_bootstrap_refuses_before_effects(tmp_path, private_env): - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOTSTRAP / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh')], - env=private_env, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'attended terminal' in result.stderr - assert not (Path(private_env['HOME']) / '.config/sops/age').exists() - - -def run_attended(script, env, answer=b'STORED AND VERIFIED\n'): - import pty - import select - import time - master, slave = pty.openpty() - child = subprocess.Popen(['bash', str(script)], env=env, stdin=slave, stdout=slave, - stderr=slave, start_new_session=True) - os.close(slave) - transcript = bytearray() - sent = False - deadline = time.monotonic() + 15 - try: - while time.monotonic() < deadline: - if select.select([master], [], [], 0.05)[0]: - try: - chunk = os.read(master, 65536) - except OSError: - break - if not chunk: - break - transcript.extend(chunk) - if b'type STORED AND VERIFIED:' in transcript and not sent: - os.write(master, answer) - sent = True - if child.poll() is not None: - # Drain the pty on the following select until EOF. - continue - return child.wait(timeout=2), bytes(transcript) - finally: - if child.poll() is None: - child.kill() - child.wait() - os.close(master) - - -@pytest.fixture -def bootstrap_fixture(tmp_path, private_env): - checkout = tmp_path / 'checkout' - bootstrap = checkout / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap' - bootstrap.mkdir(parents=True) - for name in ['creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', 'gen-secrets.sh', 'encrypt-secrets.sh', - 'pack-bundle.sh', 'emergency-bundle.sh', 'decrypt-secrets.sh']: - shutil.copyfile(BOOTSTRAP / name, bootstrap / name) - (bootstrap / 'creds-verify.sh').write_text('#!/bin/bash\nexit 0\n') - state = bootstrap / 'creds-state.yaml' - state.write_text('''schema_version: 2 -secrets_generated: false -ops_bundle_created: false -ops_bundle_location: null -emergency_bundle_delivered: true -emergency_bundle_delivered_at: "historical-test-receipt" -bootstrap_complete: true -secrets_applied: - postgres: true - lldap: true - authelia: true - privacyidea: true - keycape: true -enckey_bootstrapped: true -pi_admin_created: true -openbao_post_unseal_verified: false -''') - key = tmp_path / 'disposable-custody.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)], check=True, capture_output=True) - recipient = subprocess.check_output(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)], text=True).strip() - (checkout / 'keys').mkdir() - (checkout / 'keys/age.pub').write_text(recipient + '\n') - bindir = tmp_path / 'bin'; bindir.mkdir() - (bindir / 'kubectl').write_text('''#!/bin/bash -printf call >> "$CLUSTER_CALLS" -if [[ "$*" == 'get namespace openbao' ]]; then exit 1; fi -if [[ "$*" == 'config current-context' ]]; then echo disposable-test; fi -if [[ "$1 $2" == 'get secret' ]]; then echo secret/disposable-test; fi -exit 0 -''') - (bindir / 'git').write_text('#!/bin/bash\nexit 0\n') - for path in bindir.iterdir(): path.chmod(0o755) - calls = tmp_path / 'cluster-calls' - env = {**private_env, 'PATH': str(bindir) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'CLUSTER_CALLS': str(calls)} - return bootstrap, state, key, env, calls - - -def test_public_only_bootstrap_encrypts_recovery_without_exporting_root(bootstrap_fixture): - import io - import tarfile - bootstrap, state, key, env, calls = bootstrap_fixture - code, transcript = run_attended(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code == 0 - assert calls.exists() - assert not (Path(env['HOME']) / '.config/sops/age').exists() - assert not (bootstrap / 'secrets').exists() - bundles = list(bootstrap.parents[1].glob('ops-bundle-*.tar.age')) - assert len(bundles) == 1 - clear = subprocess.check_output(['age', '-d', '-i', str(key), str(bundles[0])]) - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(clear)) as archive: - files = [m for m in archive.getmembers() if m.isfile()] - assert len(files) == 6 - for member in files: - body = archive.extractfile(member).read() - for line in body.splitlines(): - if line and not line.startswith(b'#') and b'=' in line: - value = line.split(b'=', 1)[1] - if len(value) >= 8: - assert bool(value[:8] in transcript) is False - private_line = next(line for line in key.read_bytes().splitlines() if line.startswith(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-')) - assert bool(private_line in clear) is False - recorded = state.read_text() - assert 'recovery_handoff_confirmed: true' in recorded - assert 'recovery_handoff_bundle_sha256:' in recorded - assert 'bootstrap_complete: true' in recorded - assert 'historical-test-receipt' in recorded - - -def test_missing_custody_resume_refuses_before_cluster_call(bootstrap_fixture): - bootstrap, state, _, env, calls = bootstrap_fixture - state.write_text(state.read_text().replace('secrets_generated: false', 'secrets_generated: true')) - before = state.read_bytes() - code, transcript = run_attended(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code != 0 - assert b'attended custody unlock helper' in transcript - assert not calls.exists() - assert state.read_bytes() == before - - -def test_declined_handoff_is_not_marked_complete_or_cleaned(bootstrap_fixture): - bootstrap, state, _, env, _ = bootstrap_fixture - code, _ = run_attended(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env, answer=b'NO\n') - assert code != 0 - assert 'recovery_handoff_confirmed: false' in state.read_text() - assert 'bootstrap_complete: false' in state.read_text() - assert (bootstrap / 'secrets').is_dir() - - -def test_explicit_matching_custody_resume_preserves_prior_bundle(bootstrap_fixture): - bootstrap, state, key, env, _ = bootstrap_fixture - code, _ = run_attended(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code == 0 - first = next(bootstrap.parents[1].glob('ops-bundle-*.tar.age')) - before = first.read_bytes() - env['NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE'] = str(key) - code, transcript = run_attended(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code == 0 - assert first.read_bytes() == before - assert len(list(bootstrap.parents[1].glob('ops-bundle-*.tar.age'))) == 2 - private_line = next(line for line in key.read_bytes().splitlines() if line.startswith(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-')) - assert bool(private_line in transcript) is False - assert not (bootstrap / 'secrets').exists() - - -def test_mismatched_explicit_custody_key_refuses_before_cluster(bootstrap_fixture, tmp_path): - bootstrap, state, _, env, calls = bootstrap_fixture - wrong = tmp_path / 'other-disposable.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(wrong)], check=True, capture_output=True) - state.write_text(state.read_text().replace('secrets_generated: false', 'secrets_generated: true')) - env['NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE'] = str(wrong) - code, transcript = run_attended(bootstrap / 'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code != 0 - assert b'does not match' in transcript - assert not calls.exists() - - -def test_status_keeps_historical_receipt_distinct_from_current_handoff(): - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOTSTRAP / 'creds-status.sh'), '--v2'], - capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert 'historical emergency delivery' in result.stdout - assert 'current recovery acknowledgment' in result.stdout - assert 'does not establish native recovery readiness' in result.stdout - - -def test_interrupted_generation_never_erases_existing_custody(bootstrap_fixture): - bootstrap, _, _, env, _ = bootstrap_fixture - source=bootstrap/'secrets';source.mkdir(mode=0o700) - retained=source/'retained';retained.write_bytes(b'synthetic-retained-recovery-material') - code, transcript=run_attended(bootstrap/'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code != 0 - assert retained.read_bytes()==b'synthetic-retained-recovery-material' - assert b'synthetic-retained-recovery-material' not in transcript - - -def test_failed_openbao_phase_preserves_private_files_and_refuses_completion(bootstrap_fixture): - bootstrap, state, _, env, _ = bootstrap_fixture - binary=Path(env['PATH'].split(':')[0])/'kubectl' - binary.write_text(binary.read_text().replace("'get namespace openbao' ]]; then exit 1", "'get namespace openbao' ]]; then exit 0")) - # Existing component booleans make the fixture skip creation; the optional - # owner helper returns failure. No real OpenBao or cluster is involved. - (bootstrap/'openbao-init-unseal.sh').write_text('#!/bin/bash\nexit 1\n') - code, _=run_attended(bootstrap/'creds-bootstrap-agent.sh', env) - assert code != 0 - assert (bootstrap/'secrets').is_dir() - assert 'bootstrap_complete: false' in state.read_text() - assert not list(bootstrap.parents[1].glob('ops-bundle-*.tar.age')) diff --git a/tests/test_custody_entrypoints.py b/tests/test_custody_entrypoints.py deleted file mode 100644 index 452c984..0000000 --- a/tests/test_custody_entrypoints.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,178 +0,0 @@ -"""Disposable age keys only; subprocess logs are never asserted with raw values.""" -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -BOOT = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap' - - -@pytest.fixture -def custody(tmp_path): - home = tmp_path / 'home'; home.mkdir() - key = tmp_path / 'disposable.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)], capture_output=True, check=True) - public = subprocess.check_output(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)], text=True).strip() - env = {'PATH': os.environ['PATH'], 'HOME': str(home), 'TMPDIR': str(tmp_path)} - return key, public, env - - -def unlock(custody, *args): - _, public, env = custody - return subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOT / 'sops-custody-unlock.sh'), '--expected-recipient', public, *args], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - - -def test_custody_unknown_arguments_are_not_echoed(custody): - result = unlock(custody, 'synthetic-secret-argument') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'synthetic-secret-argument' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - - -def test_signal_preserves_failure_status_and_removes_temporary_key(custody): - key, _, env = custody - result = unlock(custody, '--from-file', str(key), '--', 'sh', '-c', 'kill -TERM "$PPID"; exit 0') - assert result.returncode == 143 - assert not list(Path(env['TMPDIR']).glob('netkingdom-sops-age.*')) - - -def test_ambiguous_custody_sources_are_refused_before_child(custody, tmp_path): - key, _, _ = custody - marker = tmp_path / 'child-called' - result = unlock(custody, '--from-file', str(key), '--from-file', str(key), '--', 'touch', str(marker)) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not marker.exists() - - -def test_explicit_custody_check_cleans_key(custody): - key, _, env = custody - result = unlock(custody, '--from-file', str(key), '--check-only') - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert not list(Path(env['TMPDIR']).glob('netkingdom-sops-age.*')) - - -def test_prompt_does_not_leak_when_shell_tracing_is_requested(custody): - import pty, select, time - key, public, env = custody - private_line = next(line for line in key.read_bytes().splitlines() if line.startswith(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-')) - master, slave = pty.openpty() - child = subprocess.Popen(['bash', '-x', str(BOOT / 'sops-custody-unlock.sh'), - '--expected-recipient', public, '--prompt', '--check-only'], - stdin=slave, stdout=slave, stderr=slave, env=env) - os.close(slave) - captured = bytearray(); sent = False - deadline = time.monotonic() + 10 - try: - while time.monotonic() < deadline: - if select.select([master], [], [], 0.05)[0]: - try: chunk = os.read(master, 65536) - except OSError: break - if not chunk: break - captured.extend(chunk) - if b'input hidden): ' in captured and not sent: - os.write(master, private_line + b'\n'); sent = True - assert child.wait(timeout=2) == 0 - assert bool(private_line in captured) is False - assert not list(Path(env['TMPDIR']).glob('netkingdom-sops-age.*')) - finally: - if child.poll() is None: child.kill(); child.wait() - os.close(master) - - -def encrypt_fixture(tmp_path, public): - secrets = tmp_path / 'secrets'; (secrets / 'service').mkdir(parents=True) - (secrets / 'service/one.env').write_text('TEST_VALUE=synthetic-private-payload\n') - out = tmp_path / 'secrets.enc/service'; out.mkdir(parents=True) - subprocess.run(['age', '-r', public, '-o', str(out / 'one.env.age'), str(secrets / 'service/one.env')], - capture_output=True, check=True) - return secrets, out - - -def test_encryption_refuses_private_key_as_recipient(custody, tmp_path): - key, public, env = custody - secrets, _ = encrypt_fixture(tmp_path, public) - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOT / 'encrypt-secrets.sh'), str(secrets), str(key), '--no-shred'], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'public recipient' in result.stderr - assert (secrets / 'service/one.env').exists() - - -def test_decryption_does_not_fall_back_to_home_key(custody, tmp_path): - key, public, env = custody - encrypt_fixture(tmp_path, public) - home_key = Path(env['HOME']) / '.config/net-kingdom/age.key' - home_key.parent.mkdir(parents=True); home_key.write_bytes(key.read_bytes()) - output = tmp_path / 'restored' - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOT / 'decrypt-secrets.sh'), str(output)], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not output.exists() - - -def test_decryption_failure_removes_partial_plaintext(custody, tmp_path): - key, public, env = custody - _, encrypted = encrypt_fixture(tmp_path, public) - (encrypted / 'two.env.age').write_bytes(b'not-a-valid-ciphertext') - output = tmp_path / 'restored' - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOT / 'decrypt-secrets.sh'), str(output), str(key)], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not output.exists() - assert not list(tmp_path.glob('.netkingdom-decrypt.*')) - - -def test_explicit_decryption_has_private_modes_and_no_output(custody, tmp_path): - key, public, env = custody - original, _ = encrypt_fixture(tmp_path, public) - output = tmp_path / 'restored' - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOT / 'decrypt-secrets.sh'), str(output), str(key)], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode == 0 - restored = output / 'service/one.env' - assert restored.read_bytes() == (original / 'service/one.env').read_bytes() - assert output.stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert restored.stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert 'synthetic-private-payload' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - - -def test_default_encryption_uses_registered_public_file(custody, tmp_path): - import shutil - _, public, env = custody - checkout = tmp_path / 'fixture-repo' - script_dir = checkout / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap'; script_dir.mkdir(parents=True) - shutil.copyfile(BOOT / 'encrypt-secrets.sh', script_dir / 'encrypt-secrets.sh') - (checkout / 'keys').mkdir(); (checkout / 'keys/age.pub').write_text(public + '\n') - secrets = tmp_path / 'plaintext'; (secrets / 'service').mkdir(parents=True) - (secrets / 'service/test.env').write_text('TEST=synthetic-private-payload\n') - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(script_dir / 'encrypt-secrets.sh'), str(secrets)], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert not secrets.exists() - assert (tmp_path / 'secrets.enc/service/test.env.age').is_file() - assert not (Path(env['HOME']) / '.config').exists() - - -def test_custody_child_does_not_inherit_competing_inline_key(custody): - key, public, env = custody - env = {**env, 'SOPS_AGE_KEY': 'synthetic-competing-key', 'SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD': 'false'} - result = unlock((key, public, env), '--from-file', str(key), '--', 'sh', '-c', - 'test -z "${SOPS_AGE_KEY+x}" && test -z "${SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD+x}" && test -f "$SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE"') - assert result.returncode == 0 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind', ['file', 'directory', 'dangling-symlink']) -def test_decryption_never_overwrites_existing_output(custody, tmp_path, kind): - key, public, env = custody - encrypt_fixture(tmp_path, public) - output = tmp_path / 'restored' - if kind == 'file': output.write_bytes(b'existing-output') - elif kind == 'directory': output.mkdir(); (output / 'existing').write_bytes(b'existing-output') - else: output.symlink_to(tmp_path / 'uncreated') - result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(BOOT / 'decrypt-secrets.sh'), str(output), str(key)], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - if kind == 'file': assert output.read_bytes() == b'existing-output' - elif kind == 'directory': assert (output / 'existing').read_bytes() == b'existing-output' - else: assert output.is_symlink(); assert not (tmp_path / 'uncreated').exists() diff --git a/tests/test_executor_lanes.py b/tests/test_executor_lanes.py deleted file mode 100644 index 634bb66..0000000 --- a/tests/test_executor_lanes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@ -"""executor-lanes.py against an in-memory OpenBao and Kubernetes (NK-WP-0056-T10); no values leave the fakes.""" -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import shutil -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path -from types import SimpleNamespace - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -PLATFORM = ROOT.parent / 'railiance-platform' -CCRS = {'write': 'CCR-2026-0058-net-kingdom-bind-executor-svc-authelia-write.yaml', - 'journey': 'CCR-2026-0059-net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read.yaml'} -JOURNEY = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey' -BIND = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia' -FENCE = ''.join(f'path "{p}" {{ capabilities = ["deny"] }}\n' for p in ( - JOURNEY, JOURNEY.replace('/data/', '/metadata/'), BIND, BIND.replace('/data/', '/metadata/'))) - -pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(not all((PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / c).exists() for c in CCRS.values()), - reason='railiance-platform checkout with CCR-2026-0058/0059 required') - - -def platform_copy(tmp_path, confirm=True): - root = tmp_path / 'railiance-platform' - shutil.copytree(PLATFORM / 'scripts', root / 'scripts', ignore=shutil.ignore_patterns('__pycache__')) - (root / 'openbao').mkdir(); shutil.copytree(PLATFORM / 'openbao' / 'policies', root / 'openbao' / 'policies') - (root / 'credential-change-requests').mkdir() - for name in CCRS.values(): - shutil.copy(PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / name, root / 'credential-change-requests' / name) - copy = root / 'credential-change-requests' / name - if not confirm: # the real CCRs are confirmed since 2026-10-31; undo it in the copy - copy.write_text(copy.read_text().replace('bound_claims_confirmed: true', 'bound_claims_confirmed: false')) - elif 'bound_claims_confirmed: true' not in copy.read_text(): - subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(root / 'scripts/credential-change.py'), 'confirm-binding', - '--reviewer', 'platform-owner', '--comment', 'synthetic test', - str(root / 'credential-change-requests' / name)], check=True, capture_output=True) - return root - - -def digests(root): - return {k: hashlib.sha256((root / 'credential-change-requests' / v).read_bytes()).hexdigest() for k, v in CCRS.items()} - - -def m_key(m): - return m.CAS_KEY - - -class FakeBao: - def __init__(self, m): - self.m = m - self.store = {m.BOUNDARY: {'policy': 'path "x" { capabilities = ["deny"] }\n' + FENCE}} - self.cas = False - self.meta = {'max_versions': 0, 'delete_version_after': '0s', 'custom_metadata': None} - self.meta_write_clobbers = False - self.identity = {'policies': ['platform-admin'], 'path': 'auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback'} - self.login_ok = {('nk-bind-executor', 'openbao', m.LANES['journey']['role'])} - self.wide = False - self.revoked = [] - - def __call__(self, args, *, payload=None, token=None, allow_failure=False): - out = lambda d, code=0, err=b'': SimpleNamespace(returncode=code, stdout=json.dumps(d).encode(), stderr=err) - missing = out({}, 2, b'No value found') - if args[:2] == ['token', 'lookup']: return out({'data': self.identity}) - if args[:2] == ['token', 'create']: return out({'auth': {'client_token': 'child'}}) - if args[0] == 'read' and args[-1] == m_key(self.m): - return out({'data': {'cas_required': self.cas, **self.meta}}) - if args[0] == 'read': - path = args[-1] - if path == JOURNEY and token == 'reader': - return out({'data': {'data': {'PASSWORD': 'SYNTHETIC-PW-VALUE', 'TOTP_SEED': 'SYNTHETIC-SEED-VALUE'}, 'metadata': {'version': 1}}}) - return out({'data': self.store[path]}) if path in self.store else missing - if args[0] == 'write': - path = args[-2] if args[-1] == '-' else args[-1] - if path == 'auth/token/revoke': self.revoked.append(payload['token']); return out({}) - if path == 'sys/capabilities': - def cap(p): - if payload['token'] == 'reader' and (p == JOURNEY or self.wide): return ['read'] - return ['deny'] - return out({'data': {p: cap(p) for p in payload['paths']}}) - if path == 'auth/kubernetes/login': - sa, aud = payload['jwt'].split('|') - if (sa, aud, payload['role']) in self.login_ok: - return out({'auth': {'client_token': 'reader', 'lease_duration': 900, - 'token_policies': [self.m.LANES['journey']['policy']]}}) - return out({}, 2, b'Code: 403') - if path == m_key(self.m): - assert payload == {'cas_required': True} - self.cas = True - if self.meta_write_clobbers: self.meta = {**self.meta, 'max_versions': 10} - return out({}) - if path.startswith('auth/kubernetes/role/'): - self.store[path] = {k: (900 if v == '15m' else v) for k, v in payload.items()}; return out({}) - self.store[path] = payload; return out({}) - raise AssertionError(args) - - -def build(tmp_path, monkeypatch, confirm=True): - root = platform_copy(tmp_path, confirm) - monkeypatch.setenv('NK_PLATFORM_ROOT', str(root)) - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('executor_lanes', ROOT / 'tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py') - m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(m) - fake = FakeBao(m) - for module in (m, sys.modules['state_hub_preflight_lane'], sys.modules['telemetry_smtp_delivery']): - if hasattr(module, 'bao'): - monkeypatch.setattr(module, 'bao', fake) # the real helpers (ensure, capabilities, revoke) run on the fake - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'kube', lambda kc, args: f'{args[4]}|{args[5].split("=", 1)[1]}'.encode()) - return m, fake, digests(root) - - -def run(m, action, d): - r = {} - try: - (m.setup(d, r) if action == 'setup' else m.verify(d, 'kc', r)) - except m.Refused as error: - r.update(status='failed', reason=str(error)) - return r - - -def test_setup_applies_policies_cas_and_journey_role_but_never_the_write_role(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - m, fake, d = build(tmp_path, monkeypatch) - r = run(m, 'setup', d) - assert r['status'] == 'lanes_prepared', r - for lane in m.LANES.values(): - assert fake.store['sys/policies/acl/' + lane['policy']]['policy'] == lane['policy_text'] - assert fake.cas is True - assert 'auth/kubernetes/role/' + m.LANES['journey']['role'] in fake.store - assert 'auth/kubernetes/role/' + m.LANES['write']['role'] not in fake.store - assert run(m, 'setup', d)['status'] == 'lanes_prepared' # idempotent - - -def test_verify_after_setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - m, fake, d = build(tmp_path, monkeypatch) - run(m, 'setup', d) - r = run(m, 'verify', d) - assert r['status'] == 'lanes_verified', r - assert r['write_login_denied'] and r['wrong_audience_denied'] and 'reader' in fake.revoked - assert 'SYNTHETIC-' not in json.dumps(r) # no values in the receipt - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mutate, reason', [ - (lambda m, f, d: d.update(write='0' * 64), 'write:ccr_digest'), - (lambda m, f, d: f.store.update({m.BOUNDARY: {'policy': 'path "x" { capabilities = ["deny"] }\n'}}), - 'agent_fence_missing'), - (lambda m, f, d: f.identity.update(policies=['root']), 'attended_platform_admin_required'), - (lambda m, f, d: f.store.update({'auth/kubernetes/role/' + m.LANES['write']['role']: {}}), - 'write_role_exists_outside_a_window'), - (lambda m, f, d: f.store.update({'sys/policies/acl/' + m.LANES['journey']['policy']: {'policy': 'path "*" {}'}}), - 'net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read:policy_drift'), - (lambda m, f, d: setattr(f, 'meta_write_clobbers', True), 'metadata_changed_beyond_cas_required'), -]) -def test_setup_refusals(tmp_path, monkeypatch, mutate, reason): - m, fake, d = build(tmp_path, monkeypatch) - mutate(m, fake, d) - r = run(m, 'setup', d) - assert (r['status'], r['reason']) == ('failed', reason) - - -def test_unconfirmed_binding_is_refused(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - m, fake, d = build(tmp_path, monkeypatch, confirm=False) - assert run(m, 'setup', d)['reason'] == 'write:binding_unconfirmed' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mutate, reason', [ - (lambda m, f: f.login_ok.add(('nk-bind-executor', 'openbao', m.LANES['write']['role'])), 'negative_login_accepted'), - (lambda m, f: f.login_ok.add(('default', 'openbao', m.LANES['journey']['role'])), 'negative_login_accepted'), - (lambda m, f: setattr(f, 'wide', True), 'journey_capabilities'), - (lambda m, f: setattr(f, 'cas', False), 'cas_required_not_set'), -]) -def test_verify_refusals(tmp_path, monkeypatch, mutate, reason): - m, fake, d = build(tmp_path, monkeypatch) - run(m, 'setup', d) - mutate(m, fake) - r = run(m, 'verify', d) - assert (r['status'], r['reason']) == ('failed', reason) diff --git a/tests/test_identity_backup_preparation.py b/tests/test_identity_backup_preparation.py deleted file mode 100644 index efec56a..0000000 --- a/tests/test_identity_backup_preparation.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -"""Preparation must never promote stale metadata or expand its data-read scope.""" -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('prepare',ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py') -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m) - - -def fixture(): - profile=json.loads(m.PROFILE.read_text());objects={} - objects[(None,'namespace','kube-system')]={'metadata':{'uid':m.CLUSTER_UID}} - for c in profile['components']: - ns=c['namespace'];name=c['deployment'] - objects[(ns,'deployment',name)]={'metadata':{'uid':c['deployment_uid'],'generation':9}, - 'status':{'observedGeneration':9,'readyReplicas':1},'spec':{'template':{'spec':{ - 'containers':[{'name':'service','env':[{'name':'DO_NOT_EXPORT','value':'private-value-canary'}], - 'envFrom':[{'secretRef':{'name':n}} for n in c['secret_refs']]}], - 'volumes':[{'configMap':{'name':n}} for n in c['configmap_refs']]+ - [{'persistentVolumeClaim':{'claimName':p['name']}} for p in c['pvc_refs']]}}}} - for pvc in c['pvc_refs']:objects[(ns,'pvc',pvc['name'])]={'metadata':{'uid':pvc['uid']},'status':{'phase':'Bound'}} - calls=[] - def get(ns,kind,name):calls.append((ns,kind,name));return objects[(ns,kind,name)] - return profile,objects,calls,get - - -def test_only_safe_metadata_leaves_preparation_and_no_secret_api_is_called(): - p,objects,calls,get=fixture();r=m.prepare(p,get) - assert r['status']=='prepared_not_admitted' - assert not any(r[k] for k in ['secret_values_read','backup_captured','uploaded','runtime_changed','credential_grant_created']) - assert 'private-value-canary' not in json.dumps(r) - assert all(kind in {'namespace','deployment','pvc'} for ns,kind,name in calls) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('change',['cluster','pvc','deployment','not-ready','unobserved','terminating','new-secret','projected-secret','new-pvc']) -def test_stale_or_expanded_live_state_requires_fresh_owner_review(change): - p,o,calls,get=fixture();d=o[('sso','deployment','lldap')];s=d['spec']['template']['spec'] - if change=='cluster':o[(None,'namespace','kube-system')]['metadata']['uid']='other-cluster' - if change=='pvc':o[('sso','pvc','lldap-data')]['metadata']['uid']='replacement' - if change=='deployment':d['metadata']['uid']='replacement' - if change=='not-ready':d['status']['readyReplicas']=0 - if change=='unobserved':d['status']['observedGeneration']=8 - if change=='terminating':d['metadata']['deletionTimestamp']='2026-10-16' - if change=='new-secret':s['containers'][0]['envFrom'].append({'secretRef':{'name':'unreviewed-secret'}}) - if change=='projected-secret':s['volumes'].append({'projected':{'sources':[{'secret':{'name':'unreviewed-secret'}}]}}) - if change=='new-pvc':s['volumes'].append({'persistentVolumeClaim':{'claimName':'unreviewed-pvc'}}) - with pytest.raises(m.Refused):m.prepare(p,get) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind',['secret','configmap','pods/exec','clusterrolebinding']) -def test_preparation_transport_has_no_private_data_or_mutation_route(kind): - with pytest.raises(m.Refused):m.query('sso',kind,'anything') diff --git a/tests/test_identity_bundle.py b/tests/test_identity_bundle.py deleted file mode 100644 index f59f1ab..0000000 --- a/tests/test_identity_bundle.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,225 +0,0 @@ -"""Actual SQLite/age/RSA fixtures and hostile archive/custody boundaries.""" -import base64 -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sqlite3 -import subprocess -import tarfile -import time -import uuid -from copy import deepcopy -import pytest -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,ROOT/f'tools/bootstrap-recovery/{name}.py') - m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m - - -b=load('identity-bundle');files=load('identity-files');capture=load('capture-identity') - - -@pytest.fixture -def stage(tmp_path): - os.umask(0o077);root=tmp_path/'payload';root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - key=rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537,key_size=2048) - private=key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,serialization.NoEncryption()) - public=key.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo) - for c in b.profile()['components']: - ns=c['namespace'];name=c['deployment'] - d={'kind':'Deployment','metadata':{'name':name,'namespace':ns,'uid':c['deployment_uid']},'spec':{}} - b.save(root,f'resources/{ns}/deployment/{name}.json',json.dumps(d).encode()) - for name in c['secret_refs']: - data={'fixture':base64.b64encode(b'synthetic-private-value-canary').decode()} - if name=='keycape-config':data={'key.pem':base64.b64encode(private).decode(),'config.yaml':base64.b64encode(b'issuer: https://isolated.invalid').decode()} - b.save(root,f'resources/{ns}/secret/{name}.json',json.dumps({'kind':'Secret','metadata':{'name':name,'namespace':ns},'data':data}).encode()) - for name in c['configmap_refs']: - b.save(root,f'resources/{ns}/configmap/{name}.json',json.dumps({'kind':'ConfigMap','metadata':{'name':name,'namespace':ns},'data':{'fixture':'synthetic'}}).encode()) - for component,name in [('lldap','users.db'),('authelia','db.sqlite3')]: - path=root/f'data/{component}/{name}';path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True) - with sqlite3.connect(path) as db:db.execute('CREATE TABLE retained(value TEXT)');db.execute("INSERT INTO retained VALUES ('fixture-preserved')") - path.chmod(0o600) - b.save(root,'data/keycape/policy.json',b'{"version":1}') - for name,value in [('enckey',os.urandom(96)),('private.pem',private),('public.pem',public)]: - b.save(root,'data/privacyidea/'+name,value) - b.save(root,'databases/privacyidea.dump',b'PGDMP-synthetic-format-only') - return root - - -def test_complete_bundle_has_native_integrity_checks(stage): - r=b.checks(stage) - assert r['sqlite_integrity_passed'] and r['privacyidea_key_format_and_pair_passed'] - assert r['native_identity_recovery_proven'] is False - - -def test_real_age_seal_manifest_is_encrypted_and_plaintext_never_prints(stage,tmp_path,monkeypatch,capsys): - key=tmp_path/'fixture-age.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(key)],check=True,capture_output=True) - recipient=subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-y',str(key)],check=True,capture_output=True).stdout.decode().strip() - p=b.profile();p['public_recipient']=recipient;monkeypatch.setattr(b,'profile',lambda:p) - artifact=tmp_path/'identity.tar.age';r=b.seal(stage,artifact,{'test_only':True}) - assert artifact.stat().st_mode&0o077==0 - assert b'synthetic-private-value-canary' not in artifact.read_bytes() - result=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',str(key),str(artifact)],check=True,capture_output=True) - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(result.stdout)) as archive: - manifest=json.load(archive.extractfile('manifest.json')) - assert len(manifest['files'])==r['file_count'] - assert 'data/privacyidea/enckey' in archive.getnames() - assert 'data/lldap/users.db' in archive.getnames() - plain=tmp_path/'decrypted.tar';plain.write_bytes(result.stdout) - recovered=tmp_path/'recovered';recovered.mkdir(mode=0o700) - restored,checks=b.restore(plain,recovered) - assert checks['privacyidea_key_format_and_pair_passed'] - assert (recovered/'data/privacyidea/enckey').read_bytes()==(stage/'data/privacyidea/enckey').read_bytes() - assert 'synthetic-private-value-canary' not in json.dumps(r)+capsys.readouterr().out - with pytest.raises(b.Refused):b.seal(stage,artifact,{}) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['missing-key','bad-sqlite','bad-audit-pair','wrong-deployment','private-age-key','symlink','hardlink','unknown-payload']) -def test_incomplete_unsafe_and_mismatched_inputs_refuse(stage,tmp_path,defect): - if defect=='missing-key':(stage/'data/privacyidea/enckey').unlink() - if defect=='bad-sqlite':(stage/'data/lldap/users.db').write_bytes(b'broken') - if defect=='bad-audit-pair': - key=rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537,key_size=2048) - (stage/'data/privacyidea/public.pem').write_bytes(key.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)) - if defect=='wrong-deployment': - p=stage/'resources/sso/deployment/keycape.json';r=json.loads(p.read_text());r['metadata']['uid']='replacement';p.write_text(json.dumps(r)) - if defect=='private-age-key':(stage/'data/keycape/poison').write_bytes(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' + b'fixture') - if defect=='symlink':(stage/'data/keycape/linked').symlink_to(stage/'data/privacyidea/enckey') - if defect=='hardlink':os.link(stage/'data/privacyidea/enckey',stage/'data/keycape/linked') - if defect=='unknown-payload':(stage/'unreviewed').write_bytes(b'not-allowed') - with pytest.raises(Exception): - b.checks(stage);b.inventory(stage) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('name,kind',[('../escape','file'),('/absolute','file'),('data/keycape/valid','symlink')]) -def test_tar_import_refuses_traversal_and_links(tmp_path,name,kind): - raw=io.BytesIO() - with tarfile.open(fileobj=raw,mode='w') as archive: - member=tarfile.TarInfo(name);member.size=1 - if kind=='symlink':member.type=tarfile.SYMTYPE;member.linkname='/etc/passwd' - archive.addfile(member,io.BytesIO(b'x')) - with pytest.raises(b.Refused):b.import_files(raw.getvalue(),tmp_path,'sso') - - -def test_native_sqlite_snapshot_keeps_committed_wal_rows_and_source_unchanged(tmp_path): - root=tmp_path/'sources';root.mkdir();scratch=tmp_path/'scratch';scratch.mkdir() - for component in ['lldap','authelia','keycape']:(root/component).mkdir() - for component,name in [('lldap','users.db'),('authelia','db.sqlite3')]: - with sqlite3.connect(root/component/name) as con: - con.execute('CREATE TABLE retained(value TEXT)');con.execute("INSERT INTO retained VALUES ('native-snapshot')") - (root/'keycape/policy.json').write_text('{}') - live=sqlite3.connect(root/'lldap/users.db');live.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL') - live.execute("INSERT INTO retained VALUES ('committed-wal')");live.commit() - try: - result=files.capture('sso',root,scratch) - restored=tmp_path/'restored.sqlite';restored.write_bytes(result['data/lldap/users.db']) - with sqlite3.connect(restored) as con:assert con.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM retained').fetchone()==(2,) - assert list(scratch.iterdir())==[] - assert not any(name.endswith(('-wal','-shm')) for name in result) - finally:live.close() - - -def test_helper_manifest_has_no_writable_service_mount_or_credentials(): - objects=capture.manifests('fixture') - for obj in objects: - if obj['kind']=='NetworkPolicy': - assert obj['spec']['egress']==[] and obj['spec']['ingress']==[] - else: - s=obj['spec'];assert s['automountServiceAccountToken'] is False - assert 'fsGroup' not in s['securityContext'] - assert s['activeDeadlineSeconds']==900 - assert all(v['persistentVolumeClaim']['readOnly'] for v in s['volumes'] if 'persistentVolumeClaim' in v) - assert not any('secret' in v for v in s['volumes']) - - -def test_cleanup_delete_carries_exact_uid_precondition(monkeypatch): - calls=[];monkeypatch.setattr(capture,'command',lambda args,payload=None,**kw:calls.append((args,payload)) or b'') - capture.delete_created({'kind':'Pod','metadata':{'namespace':'sso','name':'nk49-capture-fixture','uid':'exact-created-uid'}}) - assert json.loads(calls[0][1])['preconditions']=={'uid':'exact-created-uid'} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['writable-mount','extra-container','service-token','different-image','host-network']) -def test_mutated_helper_is_refused_before_private_exec(defect): - wanted=next(o for o in capture.manifests('fixture') if o['kind']=='Pod') - actual=deepcopy(wanted);spec=actual['spec'] - if defect=='writable-mount':spec['containers'][0]['volumeMounts'][0]['readOnly']=False - if defect=='extra-container':spec['containers'].append(deepcopy(spec['containers'][0])) - if defect=='service-token':spec['automountServiceAccountToken']=True - if defect=='different-image':spec['containers'][0]['image']='unreviewed:latest' - if defect=='host-network':spec['hostNetwork']=True - with pytest.raises(capture.Refused):capture.validate_helper(actual,wanted) - - -def test_namespace_dns_allow_is_excluded_only_for_capture_helpers(): - selector={'matchExpressions':[{'key':'net-kingdom/capture','operator':'DoesNotExist'}]} - assert capture.selects(selector,{'app.kubernetes.io/name':'authelia'}) - assert not capture.selects(selector,{'net-kingdom/capture':'fixture'}) - - -def test_unknown_create_outcome_is_checkpointed_and_never_claimed_clean(tmp_path,monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setattr(capture.bundle,'profile',lambda:{'components':[]}) - monkeypatch.setattr(capture,'command',lambda *args,**kwargs:(_ for _ in ()).throw(TimeoutError())) - r={'started_at':'fixture'};checkpoints=[] - p={'run_id':'fixture','create_resources':[capture.manifests('fixture')[0]]} - with pytest.raises(capture.Refused):capture.capture(p,tmp_path/'unused.age',r,'fixture',lambda:checkpoints.append(deepcopy(r))) - assert r['helper_cleanup_verified'] is False and r['unverified_create_outcomes'] - assert any(c.get('unverified_create_outcomes') for c in checkpoints) - - -@pytest.mark.skipif(os.environ.get('NK49_RUN_DISPOSABLE_POSTGRES_TEST')!='1',reason='explicit local Docker fixture opt-in') -def test_full_new_archive_decrypt_extract_native_database_restore_and_cleanup(stage,tmp_path,monkeypatch): - verify=load('verify-identity');fixture='nk49-bundle-fixture-'+uuid.uuid4().hex - def command(args,**kwargs): - return subprocess.run(args,check=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,timeout=120,**kwargs).stdout - try: - command(['docker','run','--detach','--pull=never','--name',fixture,'--network','none', - '--tmpfs','/var/lib/postgresql/data:rw,size=268435456','--env','POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust', - verify.pg.IMAGE,'postgres','-c','listen_addresses=']) - for _ in range(60): - probe=subprocess.run(['docker','exec',fixture,'pg_isready','-U','postgres'],capture_output=True) - if probe.returncode==0:break - time.sleep(1) - command(['docker','exec','-i',fixture,'psql','-X','-U','postgres','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1'], - input=b'CREATE TABLE token(id integer); INSERT INTO token VALUES (1),(2); CREATE TABLE resolver(id integer); CREATE TABLE realm(id integer);') - (stage/'databases/privacyidea.dump').write_bytes(command(['docker','exec',fixture,'pg_dump','-U','postgres','-Fc','postgres'])) - key=tmp_path/'disposable-age.key';command(['age-keygen','-o',str(key)]) - recipient=command(['age-keygen','-y',str(key)]).decode().strip() - p=b.profile();p['public_recipient']=recipient - monkeypatch.setattr(b,'profile',lambda:p);monkeypatch.setattr(verify.bundle,'profile',lambda:p) - artifact=tmp_path/'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T000000Z-0123456789ab.tar.age' - c=b.seal(stage,artifact,{'test_only':True}) - transfer={'schema':'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1','status':'readback_verified', - 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified':True,'fetched_path':str(artifact),'artifact':artifact.name, - 'ciphertext_sha256':c['ciphertext_sha256'],'ciphertext_bytes':c['ciphertext_bytes']} - r={};fd=os.open(key,os.O_RDONLY) - try:verify.verify(transfer,fd,r) - finally:os.close(fd) - assert r['status']=='identity_archive_verified' - assert r['database_restore']['aggregate_row_counts']['token']==2 - assert r['all_manifest_hashes_verified'] and r['wrong_key_refused'] - assert r['container_cleanup_verified'] and r['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] - assert not r['full_service_authentication_proven'] - finally:subprocess.run(['docker','rm','--force','--volumes',fixture],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=30) - - -def test_runtime_host_requires_owner_and_exact_machine_binding(monkeypatch): - import hashlib,socket - module=load('identity-bundle') - current=module.profile();current['runtime_host']={'hostname':'verified-node','machine_id_sha256':hashlib.sha256(b'fixture-machine').hexdigest()} - monkeypatch.setattr(module,'profile',lambda:current) - monkeypatch.setattr(module.os,'geteuid',lambda:0);monkeypatch.setattr(socket,'gethostname',lambda:'verified-node') - original=Path.read_bytes - monkeypatch.setattr(Path,'read_bytes',lambda p:b'fixture-machine' if str(p)=='/etc/machine-id' else original(p)) - module.require_runtime_host() - monkeypatch.setattr(socket,'gethostname',lambda:'foreign-node') - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.require_runtime_host() - monkeypatch.setattr(socket,'gethostname',lambda:'verified-node');monkeypatch.setattr(module.os,'geteuid',lambda:1000) - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.require_runtime_host() diff --git a/tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py b/tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py deleted file mode 100644 index a319603..0000000 --- a/tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,244 +0,0 @@ -"""Outage download boundaries, failure cleanup and independently usable kit.""" -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -import os -import pty -import select -import termios -import urllib.error -import zipfile - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] - - -def load(name, root=ROOT): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, root / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery' / (name + '.py')) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -m = load('retrieve-identity-offline') -k = load('recovery-kit') - - -def test_private_prompt_with_real_controlling_terminal_hides_input(): - import fcntl - master, slave = pty.openpty() - - def terminal_session(): - os.setsid() - fcntl.ioctl(0, termios.TIOCSCTTY, 0) - - code = ("import importlib.util; " - f"s=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('offline',{str(ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py')!r}); " - "m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(s); s.loader.exec_module(m); " - "value=m.private_prompt('Private fixture prompt: '); " - "print('accepted' if value=='fixture-never-echo-me' else 'rejected')") - child = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', code], stdin=slave, stdout=slave, - stderr=slave, preexec_fn=terminal_session) - os.close(slave) - captured = b'' - try: - assert select.select([master], [], [], 10)[0], 'prompt timeout' - while b'Private fixture prompt: ' not in captured: - captured += os.read(master, 4096) - assert select.select([master], [], [], 10)[0] or b'Private fixture prompt: ' in captured - os.write(master, b'fixture-never-echo-me\n') - child.wait(timeout=10) - while select.select([master], [], [], 0)[0]: - try: - block = os.read(master, 4096) - except OSError: - break - if not block: - break - captured += block - assert child.returncode == 0 and b'accepted' in captured - assert b'fixture-never-echo-me' not in captured - finally: - if child.poll() is None: - child.kill() - child.wait() - os.close(master) - - -def test_private_prompt_refuses_redirected_input(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setattr(m.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: False) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.getpass, 'getpass', lambda *args: pytest.fail('must not prompt')) - with pytest.raises(m.offsite.Refused): - m.private_prompt('Private: ') - - -def test_private_prompt_never_falls_back_to_echo(monkeypatch): - import warnings - monkeypatch.setattr(m.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.sys.stderr, 'isatty', lambda: True) - - def cannot_hide(*args): - warnings.warn('fixture cannot hide input', m.getpass.GetPassWarning) - pytest.fail('must stop before fallback reads input') - - monkeypatch.setattr(m.getpass, 'getpass', cannot_hide) - with pytest.raises(m.getpass.GetPassWarning): - m.private_prompt('Private: ') - - -def test_http_failure_receipt_metadata_never_includes_private_response(): - error = urllib.error.HTTPError('https://private.invalid/secret', 401, - 'private response', {'Authorization': 'secret'}, None) - assert m.failure_metadata(error) == {'failure_kind': 'provider_http_error', 'http_status': 401} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('script', ['retrieve-identity-offline.py', 'recovery-kit.py']) -def test_cli_refuses_unattended_prompt_with_safe_stage_receipt(tmp_path, script): - receipt = tmp_path / 'receipt.json' - args = [sys.executable, str(ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery' / script), - '--receipt', str(receipt)] - if script == 'recovery-kit.py': - args += ['--output-dir', str(tmp_path / 'kit'), '--publish'] - else: - args += ['--source-receipt', str(ROOT / 'docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json')] - result = subprocess.run(args, input=b'', capture_output=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode == 1 - record = json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - assert record['failed_stage'] == 'private_provider_prompt' - assert record['failure_kind'] == 'scope_or_integrity_refusal' - assert 'Traceback' not in result.stderr.decode() - - -class Response(io.BytesIO): - def __init__(self, url, raw, etag='"original"', status=200): - super().__init__(raw) - self.url = url - self.status = status - self.headers = {'Content-Length': str(len(raw)), 'ETag': etag} - - -class Provider: - def __init__(self, body): - self.body = body - self.calls = [] - self.tamper = False - self.etag = '"original"' - self.objects = {} - - def open(self, request, timeout): - method = request.get_method() - self.calls.append((method, request.full_url, dict(request.headers))) - assert request.full_url.startswith((m.ACCOUNT_BASE, m.offsite.BASE)) - if self.objects or method == 'PUT': - if method == 'PUT': - assert request.get_header('If-none-match') == '*' - assert request.full_url not in self.objects - self.objects[request.full_url] = request.data - return Response(request.full_url, b'', status=201) - if request.full_url not in self.objects: - raise urllib.error.HTTPError(request.full_url, 404, 'missing', {}, None) - return Response(request.full_url, self.objects[request.full_url]) - raw = self.body if not self.tamper or method == 'HEAD' else b'X' * len(self.body) - return Response(request.full_url, raw, self.etag) - - -@pytest.fixture -def record(): - return dict(schema='netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1', status='readback_verified', - provider='Storage Share', folder='Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity', - artifact='net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age', - ciphertext_bytes=32, ciphertext_sha256=hashlib.sha256(b'A' * 32).hexdigest(), - etag='"original"') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mode', ['account', 'folder-share']) -def test_offline_success_uses_only_fixed_provider_reads(record, mode): - provider = Provider(b'A' * 32) - record['untrusted_extra'] = 'must-not-export' - result = m.retrieve(record, 'fixtureSecret1234', mode, provider) - try: - assert Path(result['fetched_path']).read_bytes() == b'A' * 32 - assert not result['openbao_contacted'] and not result['sso_contacted'] - assert {c[0] for c in provider.calls} == {'HEAD', 'GET'} - assert 'fixtureSecret1234' not in json.dumps(result) - assert 'must-not-export' not in json.dumps(result) - assert provider.calls[1][2]['If-match'] == record['etag'] - finally: - path = Path(result['fetched_path']) - path.unlink() - path.parent.rmdir() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('field,value', [ - ('artifact', '../another.tar.age'), ('folder', 'other'), - ('ciphertext_sha256', 'x' * 64), ('ciphertext_bytes', True), - ('provider', 'other'), ('etag', 'W/"weak"'), -]) -def test_unreviewed_scope_refuses_before_contact(record, field, value): - record[field] = value - provider = Provider(b'A' * 32) - with pytest.raises(m.offsite.Refused): - m.retrieve(record, 'fixtureSecret1234', 'account', provider) - assert not provider.calls - - -def test_digest_failure_removes_incomplete_ciphertext(record, monkeypatch, tmp_path): - directory = tmp_path / 'download' - directory.mkdir() - monkeypatch.setattr(m.tempfile, 'mkdtemp', lambda **kwargs: str(directory)) - provider = Provider(b'A' * 32) - provider.tamper = True - with pytest.raises(m.offsite.Refused): - m.retrieve(record, 'fixtureSecret1234', 'account', provider) - assert not directory.exists() - - -def test_changed_etag_refuses_before_download(record): - provider = Provider(b'A' * 32) - provider.etag = '"changed"' - with pytest.raises(m.offsite.Refused): - m.retrieve(record, 'fixtureSecret1234', 'account', provider) - assert len(provider.calls) == 1 - - -def test_kit_contains_all_offline_imports_and_checksums(tmp_path): - files = k.build() - archive = next(value for name, value in files.items() if name.endswith('.zip')) - with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(archive)) as kit: - kit.extractall(tmp_path) - for line in kit.read('SHA256SUMS').decode().splitlines(): - digest, name = line.split(' ', 1) - assert hashlib.sha256((tmp_path / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() == digest - for script in ('verify-identity.py', 'retrieve-identity-offline.py'): - result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(tmp_path / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery' / script), '--help'], - capture_output=True) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - assert k.build() == files - - -def test_kit_publication_conditional_and_exact_readback(): - provider = Provider(b'') - # Ensure initial HEAD returns 404 instead of the download-fixture response. - provider.objects['unrelated'] = b'preserved' - files = k.build() - rows = k.publish(files, {'Authorization': 'fixture'}, provider) - assert len(rows) == 3 and all(row['readback_verified'] for row in rows) - assert len([c for c in provider.calls if c[0] == 'PUT']) == 3 - k.publish(files, {'Authorization': 'fixture'}, provider) - assert len([c for c in provider.calls if c[0] == 'PUT']) == 3 - assert provider.objects['unrelated'] == b'preserved' - - -def test_kit_conflicting_existing_object_never_overwritten(): - provider = Provider(b'') - files = k.build() - first = next(iter(files)) - provider.objects[m.ACCOUNT_BASE + first] = b'X' * len(files[first]) - with pytest.raises(k.offsite.Refused): - k.publish(files, {'Authorization': 'fixture'}, provider) - assert not any(c[0] == 'PUT' for c in provider.calls) diff --git a/tests/test_identity_offsite.py b/tests/test_identity_offsite.py deleted file mode 100644 index 006c92c..0000000 --- a/tests/test_identity_offsite.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,199 +0,0 @@ -"""Contained provider fixtures: exact quota, conditional publication and retention.""" -from datetime import datetime,timedelta,timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -from pathlib import Path -import urllib.error -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,ROOT/f'tools/bootstrap-recovery/{name}.py') - m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m - - -o=load('identity-offsite');r=load('identity-retention');setup=load('identity-credential-setup');runtime=load('identity-runtime') -TOKEN='fixturefixturefixture' - - -class Response(io.BytesIO): - def __init__(self,url,data=b'',status=200,version='"generation"'): - super().__init__(data);self.url=url;self.status=status - self.headers={'ETag':version,'Content-Length':str(len(data))} - - -class Storage: - def __init__(self):self.objects={};self.calls=[];self.free=10*1024**3;self.tamper=False - def open(self,req,timeout): - self.calls.append((req.get_method(),req.full_url,dict(req.headers))) - name=req.full_url.removeprefix(o.BASE) - if req.get_method()=='PROPFIND': - return Response(req.full_url,f'{self.free}'.encode(),207) - if req.get_method()=='PUT': - assert req.get_header('If-none-match')=='*' - if name in self.objects:raise urllib.error.HTTPError(req.full_url,412,'exists',{},None) - value=req.data if isinstance(req.data,bytes) else req.data.read() - self.objects[name]=value - return Response(req.full_url,status=201) - if name not in self.objects:raise urllib.error.HTTPError(req.full_url,404,'missing',{},None) - body=self.objects[name] - if req.get_method()=='GET' and self.tamper:body=b'X'*len(body) - if req.get_method()=='DELETE': - assert req.get_header('If-match')=='"generation"' - del self.objects[name];return Response(req.full_url,status=204) - return Response(req.full_url,body) - - -@pytest.fixture -def source(tmp_path): - name='net-kingdom-identity-20261016T000000Z-0123456789ab.tar.age';path=tmp_path/name - path.write_bytes(b'age-encryption.org/v1\n'+b'ciphertext-fixture'*10);path.chmod(0o600) - record={'status':'encrypted_bundle_created','helper_cleanup_verified':True,'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified':True, - 'ciphertext_sha256':o.digest(path),'ciphertext_bytes':path.stat().st_size,'finished_at':'2026-10-16T00:00:30+00:00'} - return path,record - - -def test_conditional_upload_exact_readback_and_index_commit(source,tmp_path): - path,capture=source;server=Storage();target=tmp_path/'fetched.age' - receipt=o.publish(server,TOKEN,path,capture,target) - assert receipt['status']=='readback_verified' and target.read_bytes()==path.read_bytes() - assert receipt['verified_index_published'] - assert len(server.objects)==2 - assert not any(method=='DELETE' for method,_,_ in server.calls) - assert TOKEN not in json.dumps(receipt) - assert all(url.startswith(o.BASE) for _,url,_ in server.calls) - - -def test_quota_shortfall_refuses_before_any_provider_write(source,tmp_path): - path,capture=source;server=Storage();server.free=o.HEADROOM+path.stat().st_size-1 - with pytest.raises(o.Refused):o.publish(server,TOKEN,path,capture,tmp_path/'fetched.age') - assert not server.objects and not any(method=='PUT' for method,_,_ in server.calls) - - -def test_existing_archive_never_overwritten(source,tmp_path): - path,capture=source;server=Storage();server.objects[path.name]=b'existing-protected-object' - with pytest.raises(o.Refused):o.publish(server,TOKEN,path,capture,tmp_path/'fetched.age') - assert server.objects[path.name]==b'existing-protected-object' - - -def test_corrupted_readback_never_publishes_success_index(source,tmp_path): - path,capture=source;server=Storage();server.tamper=True - with pytest.raises(o.Refused):o.publish(server,TOKEN,path,capture,tmp_path/'fetched.age') - assert list(server.objects)==[path.name] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('key',['helper_cleanup_verified','temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']) -def test_unverified_capture_cleanup_prevents_provider_access(source,tmp_path,key): - path,capture=source;capture[key]=False;server=Storage() - with pytest.raises(o.Refused):o.publish(server,TOKEN,path,capture,tmp_path/'fetched.age') - assert not server.calls - - -def points(count=30): - now=datetime(2026,10,15,tzinfo=timezone.utc) - return [{'artifact':f'point-{i}','stamp':now-timedelta(days=i)} for i in range(count)] - - -def test_retention_preserves_recovered_point_newest_daily_and_weekly(): - rows=points();delete,keep=r.select(rows,'point-29') - assert 'point-29' in keep and 'point-0' in keep - assert all(f'point-{i}' in keep for i in range(7)) - assert len(keep)>=8 and not (keep&{p['artifact'] for p in delete}) - assert {p['artifact'] for p in delete}|keep=={p['artifact'] for p in rows} - - -def test_missing_independently_recovered_point_refuses_all_expiration(): - with pytest.raises(r.offsite.Refused):r.select(points(),'lost-point') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action,number',[('publisher',48),('retention',49)]) -def test_proposed_ccr_cannot_create_provider_share_or_reader(monkeypatch,action,number): - path=setup.PLATFORM/f'credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-{number:04d}-net-kingdom-backup-{action}.yaml' - from types import SimpleNamespace - import yaml - proposed=yaml.safe_load(path.read_text());proposed['status']='proposed';proposed['review']['comments']=[] - # The negative fixture must stay proposed after the real owner approves a CCR. - original_load=setup.load - monkeypatch.setattr(setup,'load',lambda name,p:SimpleNamespace(validate_ccr=lambda _: (proposed,[],[])) if name=='credential_change' else original_load(name,p)) - monkeypatch.setattr(setup.inventory,'caller_credentials',lambda:pytest.fail('unapproved request reached credential read')) - with pytest.raises(setup.Refused):setup.run(action,hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),{}) - - -def test_runtime_refuses_gate_without_actual_independent_restore(tmp_path): - path=tmp_path/'accepted.json';path.write_text(json.dumps({'schema':'netkingdom.identity-recovery.v1','status':'prepared'}));path.chmod(0o600) - with pytest.raises(runtime.offsite.Refused):runtime.accepted(path) - - -def test_isolation_preserves_dns_peers_and_tests_immutable_target(monkeypatch): - from copy import deepcopy - iso=load('identity-isolation');iso.capture.KUBE=['kubectl','--kubeconfig','/reviewed/kubeconfig'] - original={'podSelector':{},'policyTypes':['Egress'],'egress':[{'ports':[{'protocol':'UDP','port':53}]}]} - def get(ns,kind,name): - if name=='kube-system':return {'metadata':{'uid':iso.capture.prepare.CLUSTER_UID}} - return {'metadata':{'name':name,'uid':ns+'-uid','resourceVersion':'7'},'spec':deepcopy(original)} - def command(args,payload=None): - if 'get' in args:return json.dumps({'items':[{'metadata':{'labels':{'app':'service'}}}]}).encode() - patch=json.loads(args[args.index('-p')+1]);assert patch[2]['value']==original - wanted=deepcopy(original);wanted['podSelector']=iso.SELECTOR - return json.dumps({'metadata':{'uid':args[1]+'-uid'},'spec':wanted}).encode() - monkeypatch.setattr(iso.capture,'get',get);monkeypatch.setattr(iso.capture,'command',command) - packet=iso.plan();receipt={'attempted':[],'verified':[]};iso.apply(packet,receipt,True) - assert receipt['status']=='server_dry_run_passed' and len(receipt['verified'])==2 - packet['policies'][0]['uid']='foreign' - with pytest.raises(iso.capture.Refused):iso.apply(packet,{'attempted':[],'verified':[]}) - - -def test_bootstrap_dispatcher_handoff_help_and_missing_checkout(tmp_path): - import os,subprocess - bootstrap=ROOT.parent/'railiance-bootstrap' - if not bootstrap.is_dir():pytest.skip('bootstrap integration checkout absent') - help_run=subprocess.run(['bash',str(bootstrap/'bin/railiance'),'identity-recovery','--help'],capture_output=True) - assert help_run.returncode==0 and b'isolated archive verifier' not in help_run.stderr - assert b'--transfer-receipt' in help_run.stdout - env=dict(os.environ,NETKINGDOM_RECOVERY_ROOT=str(tmp_path/'missing')) - failure=subprocess.run(['bash',str(bootstrap/'bin/railiance'),'identity-recovery','--transfer-receipt','missing','--receipt','new'],env=env,capture_output=True) - assert failure.returncode==1 and b'Missing reviewed NetKingdom' in failure.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('parent_status,outside_status,accepted',[(400,401,True),(400,200,False),(500,401,False)]) -def test_provider_parent_400_requires_independent_outside_folder_denial(monkeypatch,parent_status,outside_status,accepted): - store={};owner_auth=('owner','fixture');token=TOKEN - def request(client,url,auth,method='GET',body=None,extra=None): - if '%2e%2e' in url:return parent_status,b'' - if url.endswith('/r01-net-kingdom-pg/'):return outside_status,b'' - name=url.rsplit('/',1)[-1] - if method=='PUT': - if name in store:return 403,b'' - store[name]=body;return 201,b'' - if method=='DELETE':return 403,b'' - return 200,store[name] - def remove(client,url,auth,expected): - name=url.rsplit('/',1)[-1];assert auth==owner_auth and store[name]==expected;del store[name] - monkeypatch.setattr(setup,'request',request);monkeypatch.setattr(setup,'remove_fixture',remove) - receipt={} - if accepted: - setup.boundary(None,owner_auth,token,'publisher',receipt) - assert receipt['provider_boundary_verified'] and receipt['other_account_folder_status']==401 - else: - with pytest.raises(setup.Refused):setup.boundary(None,owner_auth,token,'publisher',receipt) - assert not receipt.get('provider_boundary_verified') - assert not store - - -def test_eso_native_default_fields_preserve_exact_source_scope(monkeypatch): - import base64 - from copy import deepcopy - es={'metadata':{'uid':'fixture-eso'},'spec':{'target':{'name':'net-kingdom-backup-publisher'},'secretStoreRef':{'kind':'SecretStore','name':'net-kingdom-backup-publisher'},'data':[{'secretKey':'token','remoteRef':{'key':'workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/publisher','property':'NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN','conversionStrategy':'Default','decodingStrategy':'None','metadataPolicy':'None'}}]},'status':{'conditions':[{'type':'Ready','status':'True'}]}} - secret={'metadata':{'ownerReferences':[{'uid':'fixture-eso'}]},'data':{'token':base64.b64encode(TOKEN.encode()).decode()}} - monkeypatch.setattr(runtime.capture,'get',lambda ns,kind,name:es if kind=='externalsecret' else secret) - assert runtime.token('publisher')==TOKEN - original=deepcopy(es) - for key,value in [('conversionStrategy','Unicode'),('property','OTHER'),('version','old')]: - es.clear();es.update(deepcopy(original));es['spec']['data'][0]['remoteRef'][key]=value - with pytest.raises(runtime.offsite.Refused):runtime.token('publisher') - es.clear();es.update(deepcopy(original));es['spec']['dataFrom']=[{'extract':{'key':'foreign'}}] - with pytest.raises(runtime.offsite.Refused):runtime.token('publisher') diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_authelia_recovery.py b/tests/test_isolated_authelia_recovery.py deleted file mode 100644 index 818baad..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_authelia_recovery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,242 +0,0 @@ -"""Isolated Authelia restoration with synthetic retained credentials only.""" -import base64 -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import secrets -import subprocess -import uuid - -import pytest -import yaml -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa -from test_identity_bundle import stage # noqa: F401 (fixture reuse) -from test_isolated_lldap_recovery import PASSWORD, retained_directory # noqa: F401 (fixture reuse) -import test_isolated_lldap_recovery as lldap_fixture - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated_authelia', ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py') -m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(m) -MANIFESTS = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/authelia' -CLIENT_SECRET = 'synthetic-keycape-client-' + secrets.token_hex(16) # Disposable fixture only. - - -def secret_values(): - key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) - return {'jwt_secret': secrets.token_hex(32), 'session_secret': secrets.token_hex(32), - 'storage_encryption_key': secrets.token_hex(32), 'ldap_password': PASSWORD, - 'oidc_hmac_secret': secrets.token_hex(32), - 'oidc_issuer_private_key': key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, - serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, - serialization.NoEncryption()).decode(), - 'keycape_client_secret_hash': 'placeholder-replaced-in-native-fixture'} - - -def resources(root, values): - """Write the repository's own Authelia manifests as archived resources.""" - def write(kind, name, value): - p = root / 'resources/sso' / kind - p.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - value = {**value, 'metadata': {**value.get('metadata', {}), 'name': name, 'namespace': 'sso'}} - (p / (name + '.json')).write_text(json.dumps(value)) - deployment = next(d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((MANIFESTS / 'deployment.yaml').read_text()) - if d and d['kind'] == 'Deployment') - configmap = yaml.safe_load((MANIFESTS / 'configmap.yaml').read_text()) - config = yaml.safe_load(configmap['data']['configuration.yml']) - ldap = config['authentication_backend']['ldap'] - ldap.update(base_dn='dc=example,dc=test', user='uid=admin,ou=people,dc=example,dc=test') - configmap['data']['configuration.yml'] = yaml.safe_dump(config, sort_keys=False) - write('deployment', 'authelia', deployment) - write('configmap', 'authelia-config', configmap) - write('secret', 'authelia-secrets', {'data': {k: base64.b64encode(v.encode()).decode() for k, v in values.items()}}) - write('secret', 'authelia-smtp', {'data': {'password': base64.b64encode(b'synthetic-smtp-canary').decode()}}) - keycape = {'authelia': {'clientId': 'keycape', 'clientSecret': CLIENT_SECRET, - 'browserBaseURL': 'https://auth.coulomb.social'}} - write('secret', 'keycape-config', {'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(yaml.safe_dump(keycape).encode()).decode()}}) - store = root / 'data/authelia/db.sqlite3' - store.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - if not store.exists(): - store.write_bytes(b'') - - -def test_configuration_keeps_originals_and_confines_ldap_and_notifier(tmp_path): - values = secret_values() - resources(tmp_path, values) - runtime = m.configuration(tmp_path) - config = yaml.safe_load(runtime['config']) - assert config['authentication_backend']['ldap']['url'] == m.LDAP_URL - assert config['notifier'] == {'filesystem': {'filename': '/var/authelia/data/' + m.NOTIFICATIONS}} - assert config['ntp']['disable_startup_check'] is True - assert config['server']['disable_healthcheck'] is True - assert config['identity_providers']['oidc']['clients'][0]['secret'].startswith('{{ secret ') - assert runtime['secrets']['/run/secrets/authelia/storage_encryption_key'] == values['storage_encryption_key'].encode() - assert not any('smtp' in name.lower() for name in runtime['env']) - assert all(path.startswith('/run/secrets/authelia/') for name, path in runtime['env'].items() - if name.endswith('_FILE')) - assert runtime['host'] == 'auth.coulomb.social' and runtime['client_secret'] == CLIENT_SECRET - for value in values.values(): - assert value.encode() not in runtime['config'] - - -def test_configuration_refuses_missing_secret_file(tmp_path): - values = secret_values() - del values['storage_encryption_key'] - resources(tmp_path, values) - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.configuration(tmp_path) - - -def test_configuration_refuses_env_from_unknown_source(tmp_path): - resources(tmp_path, secret_values()) - path = tmp_path / 'resources/sso/deployment/authelia.json' - value = json.loads(path.read_text()) - value['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['env'].append( - {'name': 'AUTHELIA_EXTRA', 'valueFrom': {'secretKeyRef': {'name': 'other', 'key': 'x'}}}) - path.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.configuration(tmp_path) - - -def test_configuration_refuses_unknown_keycape_client(tmp_path): - resources(tmp_path, secret_values()) - path = tmp_path / 'resources/sso/secret/keycape-config.json' - keycape = {'authelia': {'clientId': 'not-registered', 'clientSecret': CLIENT_SECRET, - 'browserBaseURL': 'https://auth.coulomb.social'}} - path.write_text(json.dumps({'metadata': {'name': 'keycape-config', 'namespace': 'sso'}, 'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(yaml.safe_dump(keycape).encode()).decode()}})) - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.configuration(tmp_path) - - -def test_public_jwk_thumbprint_is_rfc7638(): - pem = secret_values()['oidc_issuer_private_key'].encode() - jwk, thumbprint = m.public_jwk(pem) - assert set(jwk) == {'e', 'kty', 'n'} and len(thumbprint) == 43 - - -@pytest.fixture -def retained_authelia(retained_directory): # noqa: F811 - if os.environ.get('NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_AUTHELIA_TEST') != '1': - pytest.skip('explicit local disposable-image fixture opt-in') - m.preflight() - values = secret_values() - digest = m.command(['docker', 'run', '--rm', '--pull=never', '--network', 'none', '--entrypoint', '/app/authelia', - m.IMAGE, 'crypto', 'hash', 'generate', 'pbkdf2', '--variant', 'sha512', - '--password', CLIENT_SECRET]).decode() - values['keycape_client_secret_hash'] = digest.split('Digest: ', 1)[1].strip() - resources(retained_directory, values) - runtime = m.configuration(retained_directory) - (retained_directory / 'data/authelia/db.sqlite3').unlink() - name = 'nk49-authelia-fixture-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - try: - m.command(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', name, '--network', 'none', - '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', '--user', '1000:1000', - *m.tmpfs('/var/authelia/data', 67108864), *m.tmpfs('/run/secrets/authelia', 1048576), - *m.tmpfs('/config', 1048576), *[x for k, v in runtime['env'].items() for x in ('--env', k + '=' + v)], - '--entrypoint', '/bin/sh', m.IMAGE, '-c', 'sleep 600']) - m.command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/run/secrets/authelia'], - input=m.archive_files({k.rsplit('/', 1)[1]: v for k, v in runtime['secrets'].items()})) - m.command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/config'], - input=m.archive_files({'configuration.yml': runtime['config']})) - m.command(['docker', 'exec', name, '/app/authelia', 'storage', 'migrate', 'up', - '--config', '/config/configuration.yml']) - store = m.command(['docker', 'exec', name, 'cat', '/var/authelia/data/db.sqlite3']) - (retained_directory / 'data/authelia/db.sqlite3').write_bytes(store) - yield retained_directory, values - finally: - subprocess.run(['docker', 'rm', '--force', '--volumes', name], capture_output=True, timeout=30) - - -def test_native_restored_authelia_passes_all_checks(retained_authelia): - root, values = retained_authelia - result = {} - m.restore_authelia(root, 'admin', PASSWORD, result) - assert result['status'] == 'verified', result - for key in ('original_configuration_validated', 'storage_encryption_key_verified', 'issuer_key_matches_archive', - 'existing_user_first_factor', 'wrong_password_refused', 'archived_client_secret_accepted', - 'wrong_client_secret_refused', 'only_loopback_interface_verified', 'container_cleanup_verified', - 'container_isolation_verified_before_private_import', 'notifications_confined_to_tmpfs_file'): - assert result[key] is True, key - assert result['grant_issued'] is False - text = json.dumps(result) - assert PASSWORD not in text and CLIENT_SECRET not in text - assert not any(v in text for v in values.values()) - - -def test_native_wrong_password_fails_and_removes_containers(retained_authelia): - root, _ = retained_authelia - result = {} - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.restore_authelia(root, 'admin', 'wrong-retained-password', result) - assert result['failed_stage'] == 'existing_user_first_factor' - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] - - -def test_native_wrong_storage_key_is_refused(retained_authelia): - root, _ = retained_authelia - path = root / 'resources/sso/secret/authelia-secrets.json' - value = json.loads(path.read_text()) - value['data']['storage_encryption_key'] = base64.b64encode(secrets.token_hex(32).encode()).decode() - path.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - result = {} - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.restore_authelia(root, 'admin', PASSWORD, result) - assert result['failed_stage'] == 'storage_decryption' - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] - - -assert lldap_fixture.m.IMAGE == m.lldap.IMAGE - - -def test_encrypted_bundle_to_native_authelia_and_tmpfs_cleanup(retained_authelia, stage, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys): - import shutil - import sys - root, values = retained_authelia - # Replace the synthetic placeholders with the retained LLDAP/Authelia state, - # keeping the complete profile's resource identities and other key assets. - for component in ('lldap', 'authelia'): - for source in (root / 'data' / component).iterdir(): - if source.is_file(): - shutil.copyfile(source, stage / 'data' / component / source.name) - for kind, name in (('deployment', 'lldap'), ('secret', 'lldap-secrets'), ('deployment', 'authelia'), - ('configmap', 'authelia-config'), ('secret', 'authelia-secrets'), ('secret', 'authelia-smtp')): - target = stage / 'resources/sso' / kind / (name + '.json') - value = json.loads(target.read_text()) - retained = json.loads((root / 'resources/sso' / kind / (name + '.json')).read_text()) - value.update({k: v for k, v in retained.items() if k != 'metadata'}) - target.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - target = stage / 'resources/sso/secret/keycape-config.json' - value = json.loads(target.read_text()) - value['data']['config.yaml'] = json.loads( - (root / 'resources/sso/secret/keycape-config.json').read_text())['data']['config.yaml'] - target.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - key = tmp_path / 'fixture-age.key' - m.command(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)]) - recipient = m.command(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)]).decode().strip() - profile = m.bundle.profile() - profile['public_recipient'] = recipient - monkeypatch.setattr(m.bundle, 'profile', lambda: profile) - artifact = tmp_path / 'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-0123456789ab.tar.age' - m.bundle.seal(stage, artifact, {'synthetic_native_fixture': True}) - transfer = tmp_path / 'transfer.json' - transfer.write_text(json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1', 'status': 'readback_verified', - 'provider': 'Storage Share', 'folder': 'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity', - 'artifact': artifact.name, 'ciphertext_bytes': artifact.stat().st_size, - 'ciphertext_sha256': m.offline.offsite.digest(artifact), 'etag': '"synthetic"', - 'fetched_path': str(artifact), 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified': True})) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.verify.custody, 'private_key_fd', lambda: os.open(key, os.O_RDONLY)) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.offline, 'private_prompt', lambda label: PASSWORD) - receipt = tmp_path / 'recovery.json' - monkeypatch.setattr(sys, 'argv', ['isolated-authelia', '--transfer-receipt', str(transfer), - '--receipt', str(receipt), '--user', 'admin']) - assert m.main() == 0, receipt.read_text() - result = json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - assert result['status'] == 'isolated_authelia_verified' - assert result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] and result['container_cleanup_verified'] - assert result['all_manifest_hashes_verified'] and result['issuer_key_matches_archive'] - assert not result['production_contacted'] and not result['secret_values_exported'] - text = capsys.readouterr().out + receipt.read_text() - assert PASSWORD not in text and CLIENT_SECRET not in text - assert not any(v in text for v in values.values()) diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_fixture_plan.py b/tests/test_isolated_keycape_fixture_plan.py deleted file mode 100644 index 0a46353..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_fixture_plan.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -import contextlib -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -from pathlib import Path -import sys -import tempfile -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('fixture_runner',ROOT/'tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py') -f=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(f) - -class FixturePreparationTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_default_plan_neither_runs_docker_nor_generates_materials(self): - output=io.StringIO() - with patch.object(sys,'argv',['fixture','--plan']),patch.object(f.s,'run') as run,patch.object(f,'materials') as materials,patch.object(f.s.local,'preflight') as preflight,contextlib.redirect_stdout(output): - self.assertEqual(f.main(),0) - run.assert_not_called();materials.assert_not_called();preflight.assert_not_called() - manifest=json.loads(output.getvalue()) - self.assertEqual(manifest['status'],'prepared_not_executed_not_approved') - self.assertEqual(manifest['fixed_endpoint'],'unix:///var/run/docker.sock') - def test_wrong_reviewed_manifest_hash_stops_before_preflight_or_generation(self): - with patch.object(sys,'argv',['fixture','--execute-reviewed-fixture','--expected-manifest-sha256','0'*64]),patch.object(f.s,'run') as run,patch.object(f,'materials') as materials,patch.object(f.s.local,'preflight') as preflight: - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):f.main() - run.assert_not_called();materials.assert_not_called();preflight.assert_not_called() - def test_untyped_or_malformed_public_digest_refused(self): - for invalid in ('0'*64, 'sha256:'+'A'*64, 'sha256:'+'0'*63, None): - with self.subTest(invalid_type=type(invalid).__name__), tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary: - manifest=json.loads(f.MANIFEST.read_text()) - first=next(iter(manifest['source_sha256'])) - manifest['source_sha256'][first]=invalid - path=Path(temporary)/'manifest.json' - path.write_text(json.dumps(manifest)) - with patch.object(f,'MANIFEST',path), patch.object(f.s,'run') as run: - with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): - f.reviewed_manifest(hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()) - run.assert_not_called() - - def test_manifest_binds_current_candidate_and_existing_fixture_factory(self): - digest=hashlib.sha256(f.MANIFEST.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - manifest=f.reviewed_manifest(digest) - self.assertIn('tests/test_identity_bundle.py',manifest['source_sha256']) - self.assertIn('tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py',manifest['source_sha256']) - self.assertIn('sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py',manifest['source_sha256']) - -if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py b/tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py deleted file mode 100644 index b2a4455..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,262 +0,0 @@ -import base64 -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import subprocess -import tarfile -import tempfile -import unittest -from pathlib import Path -from unittest.mock import patch - -SOURCE=Path(__file__).parents[1]/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py' -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('adapter',SOURCE) -a=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(a) - -class ArchiveTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.tmp=tempfile.TemporaryDirectory();self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup) - self.root=Path(self.tmp.name) - config={'data':{k:base64.b64encode(v).decode() for k,v in {'config.yaml':b'issuer: https://issuer.example','key.pem':b'fixture-key'}.items()}} - self.values={'resources/sso/secret/keycape-config.json':json.dumps(config).encode(), - 'resources/sso/deployment/keycape.json':json.dumps({'spec':{'template':{'spec':{'containers':[{'name':'keycape','image':a.IMAGE,'env':[ - {'name':'KEYCAPE_CONFIG','value':'/etc/keycape/config.yaml'}, - {'name':'KEYCAPE_POLICY_PATH','value':'/var/lib/keycape-policy/policy.json'}, - {'name':'KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET','valueFrom':{'secretKeyRef':{'name':'client','key':'secret'}}}]}]}}}}).encode(), - 'resources/sso/secret/client.json':json.dumps({'data':{'secret':base64.b64encode(b'fixture-private').decode()}}).encode(), - 'data/keycape/policy.json':b'{}','data/keycape/receipts/one.json':b'{"original":true}'} - for name,value in self.values.items(): - p=self.root/name;p.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True);p.write_bytes(value);p.chmod(0o600) - self.manifest={'profile':{'components':[{'namespace':'sso','deployment':'keycape','secret_refs':['keycape-config','client'],'configmap_refs':[]}]}, - 'files':[{'path':k,'bytes':len(v),'sha256':hashlib.sha256(v).hexdigest()} for k,v in self.values.items()]} - def payload(self): - digest=hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(self.manifest,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()).hexdigest() - return a.private_payload(self.root,self.manifest,digest) - def test_original_state_and_secret_delivery_retained(self): - p=self.payload();self.assertEqual(p['env']['KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET'],'fixture-private') - self.assertEqual(base64.b64decode(p['files']['/var/lib/keycape-policy/receipts/one.json']),b'{"original":true}') - def test_archive_digest_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.private_payload(self.root,self.manifest,'0'*64) - def test_changed_file_refused(self): - (self.root/'data/keycape/policy.json').write_text('{"changed":true}') - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.payload() - def test_symlink_refused(self): - p=self.root/'data/keycape/policy.json';p.unlink();p.symlink_to('/etc/hostname') - with self.assertRaises(Exception):self.payload() - def test_duplicate_manifest_refused(self): - self.manifest['files'].append(self.manifest['files'][0]) - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.payload() - def test_image_mismatch_refused(self): - d=json.loads(self.values['resources/sso/deployment/keycape.json']);d['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['image']='keycape:latest' - raw=json.dumps(d).encode();p=self.root/'resources/sso/deployment/keycape.json';p.write_bytes(raw) - for row in self.manifest['files']: - if row['path'].endswith('/deployment/keycape.json'):row.update(bytes=len(raw),sha256=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()) - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.payload() - - -class OriginalSelectorTests(unittest.TestCase): - """Already-restored public fixture config; no archive/key/native action.""" - def assert_refused_before_further_inputs(self,clients): - import yaml - cfg={'issuer':'https://issuer.example','clients':clients} - payload={'files':{'/etc/keycape/config.yaml':base64.b64encode(yaml.safe_dump(cfg).encode()).decode(), - '/etc/keycape/key.pem':'deliberately-not-base64'}} - admission={'issuer':'https://issuer.example','consumer':{'client_id':'existing','secret_env':'KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET'}} - # Empty session/no env and an undecodable key also expose early private access. - from contextlib import ExitStack - with ExitStack() as stack: - blocked=[stack.enter_context(patch.object(a,name,side_effect=AssertionError('later input or native call'))) - for name in ('container_file','runtime_file','runtime_files','command','check_jwks','process')] - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.run_verifier({},admission,payload) - for call in blocked:call.assert_not_called() - def client(self): - return {'clientId':'existing','clientType':'confidential','secretRef':'env:KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET', - 'grantTypes':['client_credentials']} - def test_absent_original_selector_refused_before_further_inputs(self): - self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([dict(self.client(),clientId='unrelated')]) - def test_identical_duplicate_selector_refused_before_further_inputs(self): - self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([self.client(),self.client()]) - def test_conflicting_duplicate_selector_refused_before_further_inputs(self): - self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([self.client(),dict(self.client(),secretRef='env:OTHER')]) - def test_empty_registry_refused_before_further_inputs(self): - self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([]) - -class NativeTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - self.key=rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537,key_size=2048).private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,serialization.NoEncryption()) - self.cfg=b'issuer: https://issuer.example\nclients:\n- clientId: existing\n clientType: confidential\n secretRef: env:KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET\n grantTypes: [client_credentials]\n' - self.files={'/etc/keycape/config.yaml':self.cfg,'/etc/keycape/key.pem':self.key,'/var/lib/keycape-policy/policy.json':b'{}'} - self.payload={'env':{'KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET':'fixture-private'},'files':{k:base64.b64encode(v).decode() for k,v in self.files.items()}} - self.admission={'issuer':'https://issuer.example','verifier_sha256':hashlib.sha256(b'binary').hexdigest(), - 'trust_path':'/trust.pem','trust_sha256':hashlib.sha256(b'original-trust').hexdigest(), - 'consumer':{'client_id':'existing','secret_env':'KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET','scope':'read','audience':'consumer', - 'subject':'service:existing','tenant':'tenant:platform','roles':'reader','deny_scope':'write'}} - self.session={'issuer':'isolated','volumes':{x:{'target':x} for x in ('/etc/keycape','/var/lib/keycape-policy','/etc/keycape-factor','/recovery-tls')}} - self.output=''.join('PASS '+x+'\n' for x in ['discovery and endpoint origin','exchange and JWKS signature for granted scopes','access-token claim bindings','principal_type is service','sub matches the registration','tenant matches the registration','roles present','granted scope carries no excess grant','predecessor secret refused','excess scope refused: write']) - def file(self,container,path): - return {**self.files,'/etc/hosts':b'127.0.0.1 issuer.example\n','/keycape':b'binary','/trust.pem':b'original-trust'}[path] - def command(self,argv,**kwargs): - if argv[1:3]==['container','inspect']:return json.dumps(['KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET=fixture-private','SSL_CERT_FILE=/trust.pem']).encode() - output=io.BytesIO() - with tarfile.open(fileobj=output,mode='w') as t: - m=tarfile.TarInfo('policy.json');m.size=2;t.addfile(m,io.BytesIO(b'{}')) - return output.getvalue() - def verify(self,code=0,output=None): - with patch.object(a,'check_jwks'),patch.object(a,'runtime_file',return_value=b'original-trust'),patch.object(a,'runtime_files',side_effect=lambda session,paths=(),tree=False:({k:v for k,v in self.files.items() if k.startswith('/var/lib/keycape-policy/')} if tree else dict(self.files))),patch.object(a,'container_file',side_effect=self.file),patch.object(a,'command',side_effect=self.command),patch.object(a.subprocess,'run',return_value=subprocess.CompletedProcess([],code,b'',(self.output if output is None else output).encode())) as run: - result=a.run_verifier(self.session,self.admission,self.payload) - argv=run.call_args.args[0] - self.assertNotIn('fixture-private',' '.join(argv)) - self.assertIn('-previous-secret-env',argv) - return result - def test_original_registration_and_unrelated_secret(self): - r=self.verify();self.assertTrue(r['wrong_unrelated_secret_explicitly_refused']);self.assertNotIn('fixture-private',json.dumps(r)) - def test_transport_failure_never_counts_as_wrong_secret(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify(1,'FAIL discovery and endpoint origin: TLS failure\n') - def test_missing_explicit_rejection_never_counts(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify(0,self.output.replace('PASS predecessor secret refused\n','')) - def test_fail_line_refused_even_zero_exit(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify(0,self.output+'FAIL transport\n') - def test_security_environment_override_refused(self): - original=self.command - def altered(argv,**kwargs): - if argv[1:3]==['container','inspect']:return json.dumps(['KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET=fixture-private','SSL_CERT_FILE=/trust.pem','SSL_CERT_DIR=/unreviewed']).encode() - return original(argv,**kwargs) - with patch.object(self,'command',side_effect=altered): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify() - def test_http_issuer_refused(self): - self.admission['issuer']='http://issuer.example' - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify() - def test_changed_trust_refused(self): - self.admission['trust_sha256']='0'*64 - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify() - def test_config_drift_refused(self): - self.payload['files']['/etc/keycape/config.yaml']=base64.b64encode(b'changed').decode() - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.verify() - -class PublicReadinessTransportTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_provider_probe_failure_is_closed_false_data_not_failed_docker_exec(self): - output=io.StringIO() - with patch('sys.stdin',io.StringIO('{}')),patch('sys.stdout',output): - exec(compile(a.JWKS_TRANSPORT,'','exec',optimize=2),{}) - self.assertEqual(json.loads(output.getvalue()),{'original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks':False}) - -class BoundaryTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_remote_docker_refused_before_info(self): - session={'run_id':'a'*32,'containers':['nk49-kc-'+('a'*32)+'-worker'],'worker':'nk49-kc-'+('a'*32)+'-worker','issuer':'nk49-kc-'+('a'*32)+'-worker'} - with patch.object(a,'command',return_value=b'[{"Endpoints":{"docker":{"Host":"tcp://remote:2375"}}}]') as command: - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.inspect_session(session) - self.assertEqual(command.call_count,1) - def test_failed_verifier_cleanup_is_attempted(self): - receipt={};admission={'session':{},'ciphertext_sha256':'a'*64,'manifest_sha256':'b'*64,'verifier_sha256':'c'*64,'trust_sha256':'d'*64,'consumer':{x:'yes' for x in ('client_id','secret_env','audience','scope','subject','tenant','roles','deny_scope')}} - with patch.object(a,'inspect_session'),patch.object(a,'private_payload',return_value={}),patch.object(a,'run_verifier',side_effect=a.Refused),patch.object(a,'cleanup') as cleanup: - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.native_checks(Path('/unused'),{},admission,receipt) - cleanup.assert_called_once();self.assertTrue(receipt['container_cleanup_verified']);self.assertEqual(receipt['status'],'failed') - - def test_cleanup_failure_overrides_success(self): - admission={'session':{},'ciphertext_sha256':'a'*64,'manifest_sha256':'b'*64,'verifier_sha256':'c'*64,'trust_sha256':'d'*64,'consumer':{x:'yes' for x in ('client_id','secret_env','audience','scope','subject','tenant','roles','deny_scope')}} - result={x:True for x in ('native_service_registration_verified','wrong_unrelated_secret_explicitly_refused','denied_scopes_refused','original_config_registry_policy_receipts_equal','original_https_issuer_and_trust_preserved','original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks')} - result['public_signing_spki_sha256']='e'*64;receipt={} - with patch.object(a,'inspect_session'),patch.object(a,'private_payload',return_value={}),patch.object(a,'run_verifier',return_value=result),patch.object(a,'cleanup',side_effect=a.Refused): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.native_checks(Path('/unused'),{},admission,receipt) - self.assertEqual(receipt['status'],'failed');self.assertFalse(receipt['container_cleanup_verified']) - -class ContainmentTests(unittest.TestCase): - def inspect(self,overrides=None,launch=None,mounts=None): - name='nk49-kc-'+('a'*32)+'-issuer' - session={'run_id':'a'*32,'containers':[name],'issuer':name,'worker':name,'images':{name:a.IMAGE}} - host={'NetworkMode':'none','ReadonlyRootfs':True,'Privileged':False,'CapDrop':['ALL'],'SecurityOpt':['no-new-privileges']} - host.update(overrides or {}) - def command(argv,**kwargs): - if argv[1:3]==['context','inspect']:return b'[{"Endpoints":{"docker":{"Host":"unix:///var/run/docker.sock"}}}]' - if argv[1]=='info':return b'{"ID":"74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1","Name":"bnt-lap001","OSType":"linux"}' - if argv[-1]=='{{.Id}}':return b'anchor-id' - if '"path"' in argv[-1]:return json.dumps(launch or {'entrypoint':['/keycape'],'cmd':None,'path':'/keycape','args':[]}).encode() - return json.dumps({'host':host,'mounts':mounts or [],'labels':{a.LABEL:'a'*32},'image':a.IMAGE,'user':'1000:1000'}).encode() - with patch.object(a,'command',side_effect=command),patch.dict('os.environ',{'DOCKER_HOST':'unix:///var/run/docker.sock'}):a.inspect_session(session) - def test_minimal_network_none_admitted(self):self.inspect() - def test_image_declared_anonymous_disk_volume_remains_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused): - self.inspect(mounts=[{'Type':'volume','Name':'anonymous-fixture','Destination':'/privacyidea/etc/persistent','RW':True}]) - - def test_alternate_same_image_command_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.inspect(launch={'entrypoint':['/keycape'],'cmd':['check-config'],'path':'/keycape','args':['check-config']}) - def test_cap_add_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.inspect({'CapAdd':['NET_ADMIN']}) - def test_devices_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.inspect({'Devices':[{'PathOnHost':'/dev/mem'}]}) - def test_device_requests_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.inspect({'DeviceRequests':[{'Driver':'nvidia'}]}) - def test_host_namespace_refused(self): - for field in ('PidMode','IpcMode','UTSMode','UsernsMode','CgroupnsMode'): - with self.subTest(field=field),self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.inspect({field:'host'}) - def test_security_override_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.inspect({'SecurityOpt':['no-new-privileges','seccomp=unconfined']}) - -class CleanupTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_partial_cleanup_attempts_every_owned_container(self): - session={'run_id':'a'*32,'containers':['first','second','third']};receipt={} - removed=[] - def command(argv,**kwargs): - if argv[1:3]==['container','inspect']:return ('a'*32).encode() - if argv[1]=='rm': - removed.append(argv[-1]) - if argv[-1]=='third':raise a.Refused() - return b'' - if argv[1:3]==['container','ls']: - name=next(x for x in argv if x.startswith('name=^/')).removeprefix('name=^/').removesuffix('$') - return (name+'\n').encode() if name=='third' or name not in removed else b'' - return b'' - with patch.object(a,'command',side_effect=command): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.cleanup(session,receipt) - self.assertEqual(removed,['third','second','first']) - self.assertEqual([r['status'] for r in receipt['container_cleanup_obligations']],['still_present','absence_verified','absence_verified']) - def test_ownership_mismatch_does_not_remove_and_continues(self): - session={'run_id':'a'*32,'containers':['first','second']};receipt={};removed=[] - def command(argv,**kwargs): - if argv[1:3]==['container','inspect']:return (('b' if argv[3]=='second' else 'a')*32).encode() - if argv[1]=='rm':removed.append(argv[-1]) - if argv[1:3]==['container','ls']: - name=next(x for x in argv if x.startswith('name=^/')).removeprefix('name=^/').removesuffix('$') - return (name+'\n').encode() if name not in removed else b'' - return b'' - with patch.object(a,'command',side_effect=command): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.cleanup(session,receipt) - self.assertEqual(removed,['first']) - self.assertEqual(receipt['container_cleanup_obligations'][0]['status'],'ownership_mismatch_not_removed') - def test_inspect_failure_retains_uncertain_obligation(self): - receipt={} - with patch.object(a,'command',side_effect=a.Refused): - with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.cleanup({'run_id':'a'*32,'containers':['exact-owned-name']},receipt) - self.assertEqual(receipt['container_cleanup_obligations'],[{'container':'exact-owned-name','status':'unverified'}]) - -class JWKSTests(unittest.TestCase): - def execute(self,n='123',endpoint='https://issuer.example/jwks',resolved='127.0.0.1',extra=False,kid='key-1'): - request={'issuer':'https://issuer.example','trust':'public-certificate','n':'123','e':'65537'} - def enc(i):return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(int(i).to_bytes((int(i).bit_length()+7)//8,'big')).decode().rstrip('=') - responses=[{'issuer':'https://issuer.example','jwks_uri':endpoint},{'keys':[{'kty':'RSA','kid':kid,'use':'sig','alg':'RS256','n':enc(n),'e':enc(65537)}]}] - if extra:responses[1]['keys'].append(dict(responses[1]['keys'][0],kid='key-2')) - class Response: - def __init__(self,value):self.value=value - def __enter__(self):return self - def __exit__(self,*args):pass - def read(self,*args):return json.dumps(self.value).encode() - class Opener: - def open(self,*args,**kwargs):return Response(responses.pop(0)) - with patch('sys.stdin',io.StringIO(json.dumps(request))),patch('sys.stdout',io.StringIO()),patch('socket.getaddrinfo',return_value=[(2,1,6,'',(resolved,443))]),patch('ssl.create_default_context'),patch('urllib.request.build_opener',return_value=Opener()): - exec(compile(a.JWKS_PROBE,'','exec',optimize=2),{}) - def test_exact_original_public_key(self):self.execute() - def test_extra_signing_key_refused_under_optimization(self): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError):self.execute(extra=True) - def test_wrong_kid_refused_under_optimization(self): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError):self.execute(kid='replacement') - def test_wrong_live_signing_key_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError):self.execute(n='124') - def test_cross_origin_jwks_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError):self.execute(endpoint='https://production.example/jwks') - def test_production_dns_refused_before_fetch(self): - with self.assertRaises(ValueError):self.execute(resolved='192.0.2.1') - -if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_session.py b/tests/test_isolated_keycape_session.py deleted file mode 100644 index 70cf407..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_session.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,292 +0,0 @@ -import base64 -import importlib.util -import json -import io -import os -import tempfile -import signal -import subprocess -import sys -import time -from pathlib import Path -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -SOURCE=Path(__file__).parents[1]/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py' -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('session',SOURCE) -s=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(s) - -class SessionTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_tmpfs_plan_has_four_exact_original_mounts(self): - session=s.plan_session() - self.assertEqual({v['target'] for v in session['volumes'].values()},set(s.RUNROOTS)) - self.assertTrue(all(v['options']==s.VOLUME_OPTIONS for v in session['volumes'].values())) - self.assertEqual(session['images'][session['issuer']],s.adapter.IMAGE) - def test_non_tmpfs_driver_options_refused(self): - session=s.plan_session();name,spec=next(iter(session['volumes'].items())) - wrong=[{'Name':name,'Driver':'local','Scope':'local','Options':{'type':'none','device':'/host/data'},'Labels':{s.adapter.LABEL:session['run_id']}}] - with patch.object(s,'run',return_value=json.dumps(wrong).encode()): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.verify_volume(name,spec,session['run_id']) - def test_owner_secret_is_not_docker_argv_and_import_is_after_inspection(self): - session=s.plan_session();events=[] - payload={'files':{'/etc/keycape/config.yaml':base64.b64encode(b'original').decode()},'env':{'KEYCAPE_TEST_SECRET':'fixture-sensitive'}} - def run(argv,**kwargs): - events.append(('run',argv,kwargs)) - if argv[-1]=='{{.Id}}':return b'anchor' - return b'' - with patch.object(s,'run',side_effect=run),patch.object(s,'verify_volume'),patch.object(s.adapter,'inspect_session',side_effect=lambda *args,**kwargs:events.append(('inspect',args,kwargs))): - s.provision(session,payload,{'/recovery-tls/trust.pem':b'original-trust'},'https://issuer.example') - joined=' '.join(' '.join(e[1]) for e in events if e[0]=='run') - self.assertNotIn('fixture-sensitive',joined) - private_index=next(i for i,e in enumerate(events) if e[0]=='run' and s.IMPORT in e[1]) - inspect_index=next(i for i,e in enumerate(events) if e[0]=='inspect') - self.assertLess(inspect_index,private_index) - issuer_call=next(e for e in events if e[0]=='run' and e[1][-1]==s.adapter.IMAGE) - self.assertEqual(issuer_call[2]['env']['KEYCAPE_TEST_SECRET'],'fixture-sensitive') - self.assertIn('KEYCAPE_TEST_SECRET',issuer_call[1]) - self.assertNotIn('--entrypoint',issuer_call[1]) - def test_pinned_helper_image_volume_is_explicitly_masked_with_tmpfs(self): - calls=[] - def run(argv,**kwargs):calls.append(argv);return b'anchor' if argv[-1]=='{{.Id}}' else b'' - with patch.object(s,'run',side_effect=run),patch.object(s,'verify_volume'),patch.object(s.adapter,'inspect_session'): - s.provision(s.plan_session(),{'files':{},'env':{}},{},'https://issuer.example') - worker=next(argv for argv in calls if s.WORKER in argv) - mask='/privacyidea/etc/persistent:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700' - self.assertIn(mask,worker) - self.assertEqual(worker[worker.index(mask)-1],'--tmpfs') - issuer=next(argv for argv in calls if argv[-1]==s.adapter.IMAGE) - self.assertNotIn(mask,issuer) - def test_public_phase_sequence_reports_containment_before_private_import(self): - session=s.plan_session();phases=[] - def run(argv,**kwargs): - return b'anchor' if argv[-1]=='{{.Id}}' else b'' - with patch.object(s,'run',side_effect=run),patch.object(s,'verify_volume'),patch.object(s.adapter,'inspect_session'): - s.provision(session,{'files':{},'env':{}},{},'https://issuer.example',phases.append) - self.assertEqual(phases,list(s.PROVISION_PHASES)) - def test_worker_containment_refusal_keeps_exact_phase_and_skips_import(self): - phases=[];calls=[] - def run(argv,**kwargs):calls.append(argv);return b'' - with patch.object(s,'run',side_effect=run),patch.object(s,'verify_volume'),patch.object(s.adapter,'inspect_session',side_effect=s.adapter.Refused): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused): - s.provision(s.plan_session(),{'files':{},'env':{}},{},'https://issuer.example',phases.append) - self.assertEqual(phases[-1],'worker_containment') - self.assertFalse(any(s.IMPORT in argv for argv in calls)) - def test_issuer_containment_refusal_does_not_claim_provision_complete(self): - phases=[] - def run(argv,**kwargs):return b'anchor' if argv[-1]=='{{.Id}}' else b'' - with patch.object(s,'run',side_effect=run),patch.object(s,'verify_volume'),patch.object(s.adapter,'inspect_session',side_effect=[None,s.adapter.Refused()]): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused): - s.provision(s.plan_session(),{'files':{},'env':{}},{},'https://issuer.example',phases.append) - self.assertEqual(phases[-1],'issuer_containment') - self.assertNotIn('complete',phases) - def test_non_original_https_port_refused_before_any_mutation(self): - with patch.object(s,'run') as run: - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.provision(s.plan_session(),{'files':{},'env':{}},{},'http://issuer.example') - run.assert_not_called() - def test_container_failure_still_attempts_each_volume_cleanup(self): - session=s.plan_session();receipt={};removed=[] - def run(argv,**kwargs): - if argv[1:3]==['volume','rm']:removed.append(argv[-1]) - if argv[1:3]==['volume','ls']: - name=next(x for x in argv if x.startswith('name=^')).removeprefix('name=^').removesuffix('$') - return (name+'\n').encode() if name not in removed else b'' - return b'' - with patch.object(s.adapter,'cleanup',side_effect=s.adapter.Refused),patch.object(s,'verify_volume'),patch.object(s,'run',side_effect=run): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.cleanup_all(session,receipt) - self.assertEqual(set(removed),set(session['volumes'])) - self.assertFalse(receipt['container_cleanup_verified']) - self.assertEqual(len(receipt['tmpfs_volume_cleanup_obligations']),4) - def test_reaper_inherits_no_custody_or_service_environment(self): - session=s.plan_session();staging={'path':'/dev/shm/registered','run_id':session['run_id']} - with patch.object(s.subprocess,'Popen') as spawn,patch.object(s,'verify_execution'),patch.object(s.os,'pidfd_open',return_value=99),patch.object(s.os,'close'),patch.object(s,'register_workdir',return_value=staging),patch.object(s.select,'select',side_effect=lambda *args:([spawn.return_value.stdout],[],[])): - spawn.return_value.stdout.readline.return_value=b'registered\n' - s.start_reaper(session,staging,{'pid':123}) - kwargs=spawn.call_args.kwargs - self.assertEqual(set(kwargs['env']),{'PATH','DOCKER_HOST'}) - self.assertTrue(kwargs['close_fds']);self.assertTrue(kwargs['start_new_session']);self.assertEqual(kwargs['pass_fds'],(99,)) - -class TargetBindingTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_every_direct_docker_command_is_explicitly_bound(self): - with patch.dict('os.environ',{},clear=True),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run',return_value=__import__('subprocess').CompletedProcess([],0,b'ok')) as run: - self.assertEqual(s.run(['docker','info']),b'ok') - argv=run.call_args.args[0] - self.assertEqual(argv[:3],['docker','--host',s.adapter.ENDPOINT]) - self.assertEqual(run.call_args.kwargs['env']['DOCKER_HOST'],s.adapter.ENDPOINT) - def test_nondefault_unix_socket_is_refused_before_any_docker_call(self): - with patch.dict('os.environ',{'DOCKER_HOST':'unix:///tmp/other-daemon.sock'},clear=True),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run') as run: - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.run(['docker','info']) - run.assert_not_called() - def test_conflicting_context_is_refused(self): - with patch.dict('os.environ',{'DOCKER_CONTEXT':'production'},clear=True),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run') as run: - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.run(['docker','info']) - run.assert_not_called() - def test_conflicting_per_call_host_is_refused(self): - with patch.dict('os.environ',{},clear=True),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run') as run: - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.run(['docker','info'],env={'DOCKER_HOST':'unix:///tmp/other.sock'}) - run.assert_not_called() - def test_reused_preflight_uses_same_bound_command(self): - self.assertIs(s.local.command,s.adapter.command) - def test_probe_is_registered_before_session_creation(self): - session=s.plan_session() - self.assertEqual(session['public_image_probe'],'nk49-kc-'+session['run_id']+'-image-probe') - self.assertEqual(session['docker_endpoint'],s.adapter.ENDPOINT) - -class PlaintextLifecycleTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.tmp=tempfile.TemporaryDirectory();self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup) - self.root=Path(self.tmp.name) - self.override=patch.object(s,'STAGING_ROOT',self.root);self.override.start();self.addCleanup(self.override.stop) - self.run_id='a'*32 - self.work=self.root/('nk49-keycape-'+self.run_id+'-abcdefgh');self.work.mkdir(mode=0o700) - self.staging=s.register_workdir(self.work,self.run_id) - def test_exact_plaintext_directory_removed_and_recorded(self): - (self.work/'archive.tar').write_bytes(b'synthetic-private-archive') - restored=self.work/'restored';restored.mkdir(mode=0o700);(restored/'fixture').write_bytes(b'synthetic') - receipt={};s.cleanup_workdir(self.staging,receipt) - self.assertFalse(self.work.exists());self.assertTrue(receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']) - self.assertEqual(receipt['plaintext_cleanup_obligation']['status'],'absence_verified') - def test_docker_failure_does_not_skip_plaintext_cleanup(self): - (self.work/'archive.tar').write_bytes(b'synthetic') - receipt={} - with patch.object(s,'cleanup_all',side_effect=s.adapter.Refused): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.recover_obligations({},self.staging,receipt) - self.assertFalse(self.work.exists());self.assertTrue(receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']) - def test_replacement_inode_is_not_removed(self): - # Preserve original inode while replacing its registered pathname. - old=self.root/'retained-original';self.work.rename(old);self.work.mkdir(mode=0o700) - (self.work/'replacement').write_bytes(b'not-owned-by-this-obligation');receipt={} - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.cleanup_workdir(self.staging,receipt) - self.assertTrue((self.work/'replacement').exists());self.assertTrue(old.exists()) - self.assertEqual(receipt['plaintext_cleanup_obligation']['status'],'identity_mismatch_not_removed') - def test_symlink_root_is_not_followed(self): - self.work.rmdir();outside=self.root/'outside';outside.mkdir();(outside/'kept').write_bytes(b'keep') - self.work.symlink_to(outside,target_is_directory=True) - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.cleanup_workdir(self.staging,{}) - self.assertTrue((outside/'kept').exists()) - def test_descendant_symlink_is_not_followed(self): - outside=self.root/'kept';outside.write_bytes(b'keep');(self.work/'link').symlink_to(outside) - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.cleanup_workdir(self.staging,{}) - self.assertEqual(outside.read_bytes(),b'keep') - def test_wrong_owner_identity_is_not_removed(self): - changed={**self.staging,'owner_uid':os.getuid()+1} - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.cleanup_workdir(changed,{}) - self.assertTrue(self.work.exists()) - def test_unregistered_path_refused(self): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.cleanup_workdir({**self.staging,'path':str(self.root)}, {}) - -@unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os,'pidfd_open') and hasattr(signal,'pidfd_send_signal'),'Linux pidfd required') -class ExecutionDeadlineTests(unittest.TestCase): - def start_synthetic_owner(self,root): - late=str(root/'late-creation') - code="""import importlib.util,json,subprocess,sys,time -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('session',sys.argv[1]);s=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(s) -execution=s.isolate_execution() -child=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,'-c',"import pathlib,sys,time;time.sleep(2);pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).write_text('late')",sys.argv[2]]) -print(json.dumps({'execution':execution,'child_pid':child.pid}),flush=True) -time.sleep(20) -""" - parent=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,'-c',code,str(SOURCE),late],stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL) - message=json.loads(parent.stdout.readline());parent.stdout.close() - def finish(): - if parent.poll() is None:parent.kill() - parent.wait(timeout=5) - try: - before=s.process_facts(message['child_pid']) - if before is None or before['sid']!=message['execution']['sid'] or before['pgid']!=message['execution']['pgid']:return - fd=os.pidfd_open(message['child_pid']) - try: - after=s.process_facts(message['child_pid']) - if after is not None and all(after[k]==before[k] for k in ('pid','sid','pgid','start_ticks','uid')): - signal.pidfd_send_signal(fd,signal.SIGKILL) - except ProcessLookupError:pass - finally:os.close(fd) - except ProcessLookupError:pass - self.addCleanup(finish) - return parent,message['execution'],Path(late) - def test_deadline_quiesces_only_fresh_owner_group_before_cleanup(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - parent,execution,late=self.start_synthetic_owner(Path(directory));fd=os.pidfd_open(parent.pid) - try: - receipt={};s.quiesce_execution(execution,fd,receipt) - self.assertTrue(receipt['execution_quiescence_verified']) - self.assertFalse(s.group_members(execution));self.assertFalse(late.exists()) - finally:os.close(fd) - def test_hard_parent_loss_stops_surviving_marker_creator(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - parent,execution,late=self.start_synthetic_owner(Path(directory));fd=os.pidfd_open(parent.pid) - try: - signal.pidfd_send_signal(fd,signal.SIGKILL) - poll=__import__('select').poll();poll.register(fd,__import__('select').POLLIN);self.assertTrue(poll.poll(2000)) - receipt={};s.quiesce_execution(execution,fd,receipt) - self.assertTrue(receipt['execution_quiescence_verified']);self.assertFalse(late.exists()) - self.assertFalse(s.group_members(execution)) - finally:os.close(fd) - def test_expired_execution_cannot_start_any_docker_command(self): - binding={'pid':os.getpid(),'sid':os.getsid(0),'pgid':os.getpgrp(),'deadline':time.monotonic()-1,'staging':'/tmp/not-created'} - with patch.object(s.adapter,'EXECUTION',binding),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run') as run: - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.run(['docker','create','fixed-image']) - run.assert_not_called() - def test_reused_or_foreign_session_refuses_signals(self): - binding={'pid':123,'sid':123,'pgid':123,'start_ticks':10,'uid':os.getuid()} - wrong={**binding,'sid':456,'state':'S'} - with patch.object(s,'process_facts',return_value=wrong),patch.object(s.signal,'pidfd_send_signal') as send: - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.quiesce_execution(binding,99,{}) - send.assert_not_called() - def test_inflight_uncertainty_survives_plaintext_directory_removal(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - path=Path(directory)/'owned-stage';path.mkdir();marker=Path(str(path)+'-docker-inflight');marker.touch() - staging={'path':str(path)};self.assertTrue(s.daemon_uncertain(staging));path.rmdir() - self.assertTrue(s.daemon_uncertain(staging)) - -class ReaperOrderingTests(unittest.TestCase): - def exercise(self,quiescence_fails=False): - events=[];records=[] - def quiet(*args): - events.append('quiesce') - if quiescence_fails:raise s.adapter.Refused() - args[-1]['execution_quiescence_verified']=True - def recover(*args):events.append('cleanup') - with patch.object(s,'verify_execution'),patch.object(s,'pidfd_dead',return_value=False),patch.object(s.select,'poll') as poll,patch.object(s,'quiesce_execution',side_effect=quiet),patch.object(s,'daemon_uncertain',return_value=True),patch.object(s,'recover_obligations',side_effect=recover),patch.object(s.os,'close'),patch.object(s.os,'open',return_value=99),patch.object(s.os,'fdopen'),patch.object(s.json,'dump',side_effect=lambda r,*args:records.append(dict(r))),patch('sys.stdout',io.StringIO()): - poll.return_value.poll.return_value=[] - s.reaper_main({}, {'path':'/dev/shm/exact-staging'}, {'deadline':time.monotonic()-1},77) - return events,records[0] - def test_daemon_uncertainty_survives_verified_resource_readback(self): - events,receipt=self.exercise();self.assertEqual(events,['quiesce','cleanup']) - self.assertTrue(receipt['execution_quiescence_verified']);self.assertTrue(receipt['in_flight_daemon_request_uncertain']) - self.assertEqual(receipt['status'],'bounded_cleanup_uncertain') - def test_unverified_quiescence_prevents_any_cleanup(self): - events,receipt=self.exercise(True);self.assertEqual(events,['quiesce']) - self.assertFalse(receipt['execution_quiescence_verified']);self.assertEqual(receipt['status'],'bounded_cleanup_uncertain') - def test_checkpoint_rewrites_one_valid_json_document(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryFile() as stream: - s.persist_receipt(stream.fileno(),{'status':'registered','long':'x'*100}) - s.persist_receipt(stream.fileno(),{'status':'failed'}) - stream.seek(0);self.assertEqual(json.load(stream),{'status':'failed'}) - def test_nonzero_docker_result_retains_uncertainty_before_inflight_clear(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - staging=str(Path(directory)/'stage');Path(staging).mkdir() - binding={'pid':os.getpid(),'sid':os.getsid(0),'pgid':os.getpgrp(),'deadline':time.monotonic()+10,'staging':staging} - def returned(*args,**kwargs): - self.assertTrue(Path(staging+'-docker-inflight').exists()) - return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args[0],1,b'') - with patch.object(s.adapter,'EXECUTION',binding),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run',side_effect=returned): - with self.assertRaises(s.adapter.Refused):s.run(['docker','create','synthetic-already-accepted']) - self.assertFalse(Path(staging+'-docker-inflight').exists());self.assertTrue(s.daemon_uncertain({'path':staging})) - def test_only_policy_mount_is_writable_in_issuer(self): - plan=s.plan_session();args=s.mounts(plan,readonly=True) - mounts=args[1::2] - for value in mounts: - self.assertEqual(not value.endswith(',readonly'),'target=/var/lib/keycape-policy' in value) - def test_docker_timeout_retains_independent_uncertainty_marker(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory: - staging=str(Path(directory)/'stage');Path(staging).mkdir() - binding={'pid':os.getpid(),'sid':os.getsid(0),'pgid':os.getpgrp(),'deadline':time.monotonic()+10,'staging':staging} - def timeout(*args,**kwargs): - self.assertTrue(Path(staging+'-docker-inflight').exists()) - raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired('synthetic Docker',1) - with patch.object(s.adapter,'EXECUTION',binding),patch.object(s.adapter.subprocess,'run',side_effect=timeout): - with self.assertRaises(subprocess.TimeoutExpired):s.run(['docker','create','fixed-image']) - self.assertFalse(Path(staging+'-docker-inflight').exists()) - self.assertTrue(Path(staging+'-docker-uncertain').exists());self.assertTrue(s.daemon_uncertain({'path':staging})) - -if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py b/tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py deleted file mode 100644 index c59afdf..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,197 +0,0 @@ -"""Real isolated-image restoration with synthetic retained credentials only.""" -import base64 -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -import secrets -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import tarfile -import time -import uuid - -import pytest -from test_identity_bundle import stage - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated', ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py') -m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(m) -PASSWORD = 'synthetic-retained-password' -JWT = secrets.token_hex(32) # Disposable fixture only; never provider custody. - - -def resources(root): - def write(kind, value): - p = root / 'resources/sso' / kind - p.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - (p / ('lldap-secrets.json' if kind == 'secret' else 'lldap.json')).write_text(json.dumps(value)) - write('secret', {'metadata': {'name': 'lldap-secrets', 'namespace': 'sso'}, 'data': { - 'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET': base64.b64encode(JWT.encode()).decode(), - 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS': base64.b64encode(PASSWORD.encode()).decode()}}) - write('deployment', {'metadata': {'name': 'lldap', 'namespace': 'sso'}, 'spec': {'template': {'spec': { - 'containers': [{'name': 'lldap', 'env': [{'name': 'LLDAP_LDAP_BASE_DN', 'value': 'dc=example,dc=test'}]}]}}}}) - - -def test_configuration_never_generates_a_missing_original_key(tmp_path): - resources(tmp_path) - (tmp_path / 'data/lldap').mkdir(parents=True) - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.configuration(tmp_path) - - -def test_configuration_preserves_original_seed_and_disables_reset_sending(tmp_path): - resources(tmp_path) - data = tmp_path / 'data/lldap' - data.mkdir(parents=True) - (data / 'lldap_config.toml').write_text('key_seed = "synthetic-original-seed"\n') - import tomllib - value, jwt, password, base = m.configuration(tmp_path) - config = tomllib.loads(value.decode()) - assert config['key_seed'] == 'synthetic-original-seed' - assert not config['force_ldap_user_pass_reset'] - assert not config['force_update_private_key'] - assert not config['smtp_options']['enable_password_reset'] - assert PASSWORD.encode() not in value and jwt not in value - - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('configured', [None, 'ld-admin']) -def test_configured_admin_follows_the_archived_deployment(tmp_path, configured): - # NK-WP-0054-T05: before and after the bind split the restore takes the configured - # super-admin from the archived deployment, never a hard-coded name. - resources(tmp_path) - if configured: - path = tmp_path / 'resources/sso/deployment/lldap.json' - deployment = json.loads(path.read_text()) - deployment['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['env'].append( - {'name': 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN', 'value': configured}) - path.write_text(json.dumps(deployment)) - data = tmp_path / 'data/lldap' - data.mkdir(parents=True) - (data / 'lldap_config.toml').write_text('key_seed = "synthetic-original-seed"\n') - import tomllib - value, _, password, _ = m.configuration(tmp_path) - assert tomllib.loads(value.decode())['ldap_user_dn'] == (configured or 'admin') - assert password == PASSWORD.encode() - -def test_tar_transport_refuses_path_escape(): - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.archive_files({'../escape': b'synthetic'}) - - -@pytest.fixture -def retained_directory(tmp_path): - if os.environ.get('NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_LLDAP_TEST') != '1': - pytest.skip('explicit local disposable-image fixture opt-in') - m.preflight() - resources(tmp_path) - name = 'nk49-lldap-fixture-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - config = ('database_url = "sqlite:///data/users.db?mode=rwc"\n' - 'ldap_base_dn = "dc=example,dc=test"\n' - 'ldap_host = "127.0.0.1"\nhttp_host = "127.0.0.1"\n' - 'key_seed = "synthetic-retained-key-seed"\n' - 'jwt_secret = "' + JWT + '"\n' - 'ldap_user_pass = "' + PASSWORD + '"\n') - try: - m.command(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', name, - '--network', 'none', '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', '--user', '1000:1000', - '--tmpfs', '/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=67108864,uid=1000,gid=1000', - '--tmpfs', '/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000', - '--entrypoint', '/bin/sh', m.IMAGE, '-c', 'sleep 1800']) - m.command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/data'], - input=m.archive_files({'lldap_config.toml': config.encode()})) - m.command(['docker', 'exec', '--detach', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'echo $$ > /tmp/server.pid; exec /app/lldap run --config-file /data/lldap_config.toml > /dev/null 2>&1']) - result = m.command(['docker', 'run', '--interactive', '--rm', '--pull=never', '--network', 'container:' + name, - '--read-only', '--entrypoint', 'python3', m.CLIENT, '-c', m.PROBE], - input=json.dumps({'user': 'admin', 'password': PASSWORD, - 'base': 'dc=example,dc=test', 'wrong_password': 'invalid-fixture'}).encode()) - assert json.loads(result)['status'] == 'verified', result.decode() - m.command(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', 'kill -TERM "$(cat /tmp/server.pid)"']) - for _ in range(60): - check = subprocess.run(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', 'kill -0 "$(cat /tmp/server.pid)"'], - capture_output=True, timeout=10) - if check.returncode: - break - time.sleep(.1) - else: - pytest.fail('fixture did not stop') - raw = m.command(['docker', 'exec', name, 'tar', '-cf', '-', '-C', '/data', '.']) - data = tmp_path / 'data/lldap' - data.mkdir(parents=True) - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(raw)) as archive: - for entry in archive: - if entry.isdir(): - continue - assert entry.isfile() and not entry.name.startswith('/') and '..' not in Path(entry.name).parts - target = data / entry.name.removeprefix('./') - target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - target.write_bytes(archive.extractfile(entry).read()) - yield tmp_path - finally: - subprocess.run(['docker', 'rm', '--force', '--volumes', name], capture_output=True, timeout=30) - - -def test_native_restored_directory_binds_existing_user_and_preserves_rows(retained_directory): - result = {} - m.restore_lldap(retained_directory, 'admin', PASSWORD, result) - assert result['status'] == 'verified' - assert result['existing_user_native_ldap_bind'] and result['wrong_password_refused'] - assert result['directory_identity_rows_preserved'] and result['container_cleanup_verified'] - assert result['only_loopback_interface_verified'] and result['external_routes_absent'] - assert PASSWORD not in json.dumps(result) - - -def test_native_wrong_retained_password_fails_and_removes_containers(retained_directory): - result = {} - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.restore_lldap(retained_directory, 'admin', 'wrong-retained-password', result) - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] - assert result['failed_stage'] == 'existing_user_bind' - assert not result.get('existing_user_native_ldap_bind') - - -def test_encrypted_bundle_to_native_directory_and_tmpfs_cleanup(retained_directory, stage, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys): - import shutil - import sys - # Replace the synthetic SQLite placeholder with a real retained directory, - # retaining the complete profile's resource identities and other key assets. - for source in (retained_directory / 'data/lldap').iterdir(): - if source.is_file(): - shutil.copyfile(source, stage / 'data/lldap' / source.name) - dep = stage / 'resources/sso/deployment/lldap.json' - value = json.loads(dep.read_text()) - value['spec'] = json.loads((retained_directory / 'resources/sso/deployment/lldap.json').read_text())['spec'] - dep.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - secret = stage / 'resources/sso/secret/lldap-secrets.json' - value = json.loads(secret.read_text()) - value['data'] = json.loads((retained_directory / 'resources/sso/secret/lldap-secrets.json').read_text())['data'] - secret.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - key = tmp_path / 'fixture-age.key' - m.command(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)]) - recipient = m.command(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)]).decode().strip() - profile = m.bundle.profile() - profile['public_recipient'] = recipient - monkeypatch.setattr(m.bundle, 'profile', lambda: profile) - artifact = tmp_path / 'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-0123456789ab.tar.age' - m.bundle.seal(stage, artifact, {'synthetic_native_fixture': True}) - transfer = tmp_path / 'transfer.json' - transfer.write_text(json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1', 'status': 'readback_verified', - 'provider': 'Storage Share', 'folder': 'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity', - 'artifact': artifact.name, 'ciphertext_bytes': artifact.stat().st_size, - 'ciphertext_sha256': m.offline.offsite.digest(artifact), 'etag': '"synthetic"', - 'fetched_path': str(artifact), 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified': True})) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.verify.custody, 'private_key_fd', lambda: os.open(key, os.O_RDONLY)) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.offline, 'private_prompt', lambda label: PASSWORD) - receipt = tmp_path / 'recovery.json' - monkeypatch.setattr(sys, 'argv', ['isolated-lldap', '--transfer-receipt', str(transfer), - '--receipt', str(receipt), '--user', 'admin']) - assert m.main() == 0 - result = json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - assert result['status'] == 'isolated_lldap_verified' - assert result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] and result['container_cleanup_verified'] - assert result['all_manifest_hashes_verified'] and result['directory_identity_rows_preserved'] - assert not result['production_contacted'] and not result['secret_values_exported'] - assert PASSWORD not in capsys.readouterr().out + receipt.read_text() diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_mfa.py b/tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_mfa.py deleted file mode 100644 index bdb27de..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_mfa.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,222 +0,0 @@ -"""Existing-token MFA by user and realm on a restored synthetic privacyIDEA + LLDAP pair.""" -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import shutil -import subprocess - -import pytest -from test_identity_bundle import stage # noqa: F401 (fixture reuse) -from test_isolated_lldap_recovery import PASSWORD, retained_directory # noqa: F401 (fixture reuse) -from test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery import retained_state # noqa: F401 (fixture reuse) - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('pi_mfa', ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py') -m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(m) -BASE = 'dc=example,dc=test' - -SETUP = r''' -import contextlib,io,json,logging,sys -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -v=json.load(sys.stdin) -with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.lib.resolver import save_resolver - from privacyidea.lib.realm import set_realm,set_default_realm - from privacyidea.lib.user import User - from privacyidea.lib.token import init_token,assign_token,get_tokens - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file='/recovery/pi.cfg',silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - save_resolver({'resolver':'lldap-coulomb','type':'ldapresolver','LDAPURI':'ldap://127.0.0.1:3890', - 'LDAPBASE':'ou=people,'+v['base'],'BINDDN':'uid=admin,ou=people,'+v['base'],'BINDPW':v['password'], - 'LOGINNAMEATTRIBUTE':'uid','LDAPSEARCHFILTER':'(uid=*)','LDAPFILTER':'(&(uid=%s))', - 'USERINFO':json.dumps({'username':'uid','email':'mail'}), - 'UIDTYPE':'uid','SCOPE':'SUBTREE','AUTHTYPE':'Simple','TIMEOUT':'5','CACHE_TIMEOUT':'0', - 'SIZELIMIT':'500','NOREFERRALS':'True','TLS_VERIFY':'False'}) - set_realm('coulomb',[{'name':'lldap-coulomb','priority':1}]) - set_default_realm('coulomb') - owner=User('admin','coulomb') - assert owner.exist() - if v['kind']=='totp': - token=init_token({'type':'totp','genkey':1,'pin':'synthetic-pin','serial':'TOTPFIXTURE01'}) - assign_token('TOTPFIXTURE01',owner) - serial='TOTPFIXTURE01' - else: - serial=get_tokens()[0].token.serial - assign_token(serial,owner) - otp=get_tokens(serial=serial)[0].get_otp()[2] -print(json.dumps({'serial':serial,'otp':otp})) -''' - - -@pytest.fixture(params=['hotp', 'totp']) -def owned_state(request, tmp_path, retained_state, retained_directory): # noqa: F811 - """Dump of a database whose resolver names the in-cluster address, as production does.""" - root, database, worker = retained_state - shutil.copytree(tmp_path / 'data/lldap', root / 'data/lldap') - shutil.copytree(tmp_path / 'resources/sso', root / 'resources/sso') - directory = database + '-fixture-dir' - try: - m.start_directory(directory, database, root) - m.run(['docker', 'exec', worker, 'python3', '-c', m.WAIT_LDAP], timeout=90) - raw = m.run(['docker', 'exec', '-i', worker, 'python3', '-c', SETUP], - input=json.dumps({'base': BASE, 'password': PASSWORD, 'kind': request.param}).encode(), timeout=120) - made = json.loads(raw) - assert m.psql(database, "UPDATE resolverconfig SET \"Value\"='" + m.CLUSTER_LDAP + "' WHERE \"Key\"='LDAPURI'") == 'UPDATE 1' - (root / 'databases/privacyidea.dump').write_bytes(m.run( - ['docker', 'exec', database, 'pg_dump', '-U', 'postgres', '-Fc', 'recovery'])) - yield root, made['otp'], request.param - finally: - m.pi.cleanup([directory]) - - -def passcode(otp, kind): - return ('synthetic-pin' if kind == 'totp' else '') + otp - - -def test_launcher_preflight_entry_point_exists_and_launcher_calls_it(): - # The launcher swallows exceptions into one message; a missing attribute once hid here. - assert callable(m.preflight) - launcher = (ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh').read_text() - assert 'isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py' in launcher and 'm.preflight()' in launcher - - -def test_launcher_preflight_snippet_passes_against_the_pinned_target(): - launcher = (ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh').read_text() - snippet = re.search(r"python3 - <<'PY'\n(.*?)\nPY\n", launcher, re.S).group(1) - done = subprocess.run(['python3', '-c', snippet], cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120) - assert done.returncode == 0 and done.stdout.startswith('OK: exact bnt-lap001'), done.stdout + done.stderr - - -def test_wrong_code_keeps_shape_but_changes_value(): - assert m.different_code('123456') == '123450' - assert m.different_code('123450') == '123451' - assert len(m.different_code('pin123456')) == len('pin123456') - - -def test_login_and_realm_patterns_refuse_shell_and_path_characters(): - for bad in ('', 'a b', '../x', 'a;b', 'x' * 129): - assert not m.LOGIN.fullmatch(bad) - assert m.LOGIN.fullmatch('first.last@example.test') - assert not m.REALM.fullmatch('a/b') and m.REALM.fullmatch('coulomb') - - -def test_resolver_rewrite_accepts_only_the_archived_cluster_address(monkeypatch): - calls = [] - - def fake(database, statement): - calls.append(statement) - return 'UPDATE 2' if statement.startswith('UPDATE') else '\n'.join([m.CLUSTER_LDAP] * 2) - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'psql', fake) - assert m.rewrite_resolvers('db') == 2 and calls[1].startswith('UPDATE') - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'psql', lambda d, s: 'ldap://elsewhere.example:389') - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.rewrite_resolvers('db') - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'psql', lambda d, s: '') - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.rewrite_resolvers('db') - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'psql', lambda d, s: 'UPDATE 1' if s.startswith('UPDATE') else m.CLUSTER_LDAP + '\n' + m.CLUSTER_LDAP) - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.rewrite_resolvers('db') - - -def test_native_existing_token_passes_by_user_and_negatives_are_refused(owned_state): - root, otp, kind = owned_state - result = {} - m.restore_and_check(root, result, lambda realms, default: ('admin', default), lambda summary: passcode(otp, kind)) - assert result['existing_token_mfa_proven'] is True, result - assert result['wrong_key_refused'] and result['wrong_code_refused'] and result['existing_token_native_check_accepted'] - assert result['user_to_token_resolver_proven'] and result['user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory'] - assert result['ldap_resolvers_rewritten_to_loopback'] == 1 and result['user_usable_token_types'] == [kind] - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] and result['container_isolation_verified_before_private_import'] - assert result['only_loopback_interface_verified'] and result['external_routes_absent'] - text = json.dumps(result) - assert otp not in text and 'admin' not in text.replace('"selected_user_sha256"', '') - - -def test_native_wrong_code_alone_never_proves_mfa(owned_state): - root, otp, kind = owned_state - result = {} - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.restore_and_check(root, result, lambda realms, default: ('admin', default), - lambda summary: m.different_code(passcode(otp, kind))) - assert result['failed_stage'] == 'acceptance' - assert result['existing_token_mfa_proven'] is False and not result['existing_token_native_check_accepted'] - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] - - -def test_native_unknown_user_is_refused_before_any_code_is_requested(owned_state): - root, _, _ = owned_state - result = {} - asked = [] - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.restore_and_check(root, result, lambda realms, default: ('nosuchuser', default), - lambda summary: asked.append(1) or '123456') - assert result['failed_stage'] == 'user_lookup_through_restored_resolver' and not asked - assert result['user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory'] is False - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] - - -def test_native_malformed_original_key_does_not_prove_mfa(owned_state): - root, otp, kind = owned_state - (root / 'data/privacyidea/enckey').write_bytes(b'synthetic-malformed-key') - result = {} - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.restore_and_check(root, result, lambda realms, default: ('admin', default), lambda summary: passcode(otp, kind)) - assert not result.get('existing_token_mfa_proven') and not result.get('existing_token_native_check_accepted') - assert result['failed_stage'] and result['container_cleanup_verified'] - - -def test_encrypted_bundle_to_native_mfa_and_tmpfs_cleanup(owned_state, stage, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys): # noqa: F811 - import sys - root, otp, kind = owned_state - for key in ('enckey', 'private.pem', 'public.pem'): - shutil.copyfile(root / 'data/privacyidea' / key, stage / 'data/privacyidea' / key) - shutil.copyfile(root / 'databases/privacyidea.dump', stage / 'databases/privacyidea.dump') - for source in (root / 'data/lldap').iterdir(): - if source.is_file(): - shutil.copyfile(source, stage / 'data/lldap' / source.name) - for kind_, name in (('deployment', 'lldap'), ('secret', 'lldap-secrets')): - target = stage / 'resources/sso' / kind_ / (name + '.json') - value = json.loads(target.read_text()) - value.update({k: v for k, v in json.loads((root / 'resources/sso' / kind_ / (name + '.json')).read_text()).items() - if k != 'metadata'}) - target.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - resource = stage / 'resources/mfa/secret/privacyidea-config.json' - value = json.loads(resource.read_text()) - value['data'] = json.loads((root / 'resources/mfa/secret/privacyidea-config.json').read_text())['data'] - resource.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - configmap = stage / 'resources/mfa/configmap/privacyidea-cfg.json' - value = json.loads(configmap.read_text()) - value['data'] = {'pi.cfg': 'PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES = False\n'} - configmap.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - key = tmp_path / 'synthetic-age.key' - m.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)]) - recipient = m.run(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)]).decode().strip() - profile = m.bundle.profile() - profile['public_recipient'] = recipient - monkeypatch.setattr(m.bundle, 'profile', lambda: profile) - ciphertext = tmp_path / 'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-0123456789ab.tar.age' - m.bundle.seal(stage, ciphertext, {'synthetic_native_fixture': True}) - transfer = tmp_path / 'transfer.json' - transfer.write_text(json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1', 'status': 'readback_verified', - 'provider': 'Storage Share', 'folder': 'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity', - 'artifact': ciphertext.name, 'ciphertext_bytes': ciphertext.stat().st_size, - 'ciphertext_sha256': m.local.offline.offsite.digest(ciphertext), 'etag': '"synthetic"', - 'fetched_path': str(ciphertext), 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified': True})) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.local.verify.custody, 'private_key_fd', lambda: os.open(key, os.O_RDONLY)) - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'owner_user', lambda realms, default: ('admin', default)) - monkeypatch.setattr(m, 'owner_code', lambda summary: passcode(otp, kind)) - receipt = tmp_path / 'receipt.json' - monkeypatch.setattr(sys, 'argv', ['isolated-privacyidea-mfa', '--transfer-receipt', str(transfer), - '--receipt', str(receipt)]) - assert m.main() == 0, receipt.read_text() - result = json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - assert result['status'] == 'isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified' and result['existing_token_mfa_proven'] - assert result['user_to_token_resolver_proven'] is True - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] and result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] - assert not result['production_contacted'] and not result['secret_values_exported'] - assert otp not in capsys.readouterr().out + receipt.read_text() diff --git a/tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py b/tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py deleted file mode 100644 index c8c6957..0000000 --- a/tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ -"""Native pinned PI/PostgreSQL recovery with synthetic token/audit material.""" -import base64 -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import secrets -import subprocess -import textwrap -import uuid - -import pytest -from test_identity_bundle import stage -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('pi_recovery', ROOT / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py') -m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(m) - - -def test_archived_legacy_setting_cannot_execute_expressions(tmp_path): - folder = tmp_path / 'resources/mfa/configmap';folder.mkdir(parents=True) - value = {'metadata': {'namespace': 'mfa', 'name': 'privacyidea-cfg'}, - 'data': {'pi.cfg': 'PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES = __import__("os").system("false")'}} - (folder / 'privacyidea-cfg.json').write_text(json.dumps(value)) - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.legacy_setting(tmp_path) - - -def test_archived_literal_legacy_setting_is_retained(tmp_path): - folder = tmp_path / 'resources/mfa/configmap';folder.mkdir(parents=True) - value = {'metadata': {'namespace': 'mfa', 'name': 'privacyidea-cfg'}, - 'data': {'pi.cfg': 'import os\nPI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES = True'}} - (folder / 'privacyidea-cfg.json').write_text(json.dumps(value)) - assert m.legacy_setting(tmp_path) is True - - -@pytest.fixture -def retained_state(tmp_path): - if os.environ.get('NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_PRIVACYIDEA_TEST') != '1': - pytest.skip('explicit disposable pinned native-image fixture opt-in') - m.preflight() - os.umask(0o077) - root = tmp_path / 'retained' - keys = root / 'data/privacyidea';keys.mkdir(parents=True) - key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) - (keys / 'private.pem').write_bytes(key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, - serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, serialization.NoEncryption())) - (keys / 'public.pem').write_bytes(key.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, - serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)) - (keys / 'enckey').write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - resource = root / 'resources/mfa/secret';resource.mkdir(parents=True) - (resource / 'privacyidea-config.json').write_text(json.dumps({ - 'metadata': {'namespace': 'mfa', 'name': 'privacyidea-config'}, - 'data': {name: base64.b64encode(secrets.token_bytes(32).hex().encode()).decode() - for name in ('PI_SECRET_KEY', 'PI_PEPPER')}})) - (root / 'databases').mkdir() - name = 'nk49-pi-fixture-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - database = name + '-db';worker = name + '-worker' - setup = r''' -import contextlib,io,logging,json -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.models import db - from privacyidea.lib.token import init_token - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import Audit,LogEntry - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file='/recovery/pi.cfg',silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - db.create_all() - audit=Audit(app.config) - LogEntry.__table__.create(audit.engine,checkfirst=True) - for _ in range(2): - token=init_token({'type':'hotp','genkey':1,'pin':''}) - audit=Audit(app.config) - audit.log({'action':'synthetic retained fixture','success':True,'info':'synthetic only'}) - audit.finalize_log() -print(json.dumps({'synthetic_state_created':True})) -''' - try: - m.start_database(database) - m.start_worker(worker, database, root) - safe_setup = ('import traceback,sys,json\ntry:\n' + textwrap.indent(setup, ' ') + - '\nexcept Exception as error:\n' - ' frame=traceback.extract_tb(error.__traceback__)[-1]\n' - ' original=getattr(error,"orig",None)\n' - ' text=str(original).lower()\n' - ' categories=[x for x in ("connection refused","permission denied","read-only file system","no pg_hba.conf entry","password authentication failed","could not translate host name") if x in text]\n' - ' print(json.dumps({"type":type(error).__name__,"file":frame.filename.split("/")[-1],"line":frame.lineno,"sqlstate":getattr(original,"pgcode",None),"categories":categories,"frames":[f.name for f in traceback.extract_tb(error.__traceback__)]}))\n' - ' sys.exit(1)\n') - result = subprocess.run(['docker', 'exec', worker, 'python3', '-c', safe_setup], - stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=90) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stdout.decode() - assert json.loads(result.stdout)['synthetic_state_created'] - dump = m.run(['docker', 'exec', database, 'pg_dump', '-U', 'postgres', '-Fc', 'recovery']) - (root / 'databases/privacyidea.dump').write_bytes(dump) - yield root, database, worker - finally: - m.cleanup([worker, database]) - - -def test_native_existing_token_material_and_audit_history_survive_restore(retained_state): - root, _, _ = retained_state - result = {} - m.native_checks(root, result) - assert result['status'] == 'native_checks_completed' - assert result['retained_tokens_with_native_decryption'] == 2 - assert result['different_key_cannot_reproduce_material_count'] == 2 - assert result['historical_audit_rows'] == result['historical_signed_rows'] == 2 - assert result['historical_invalid_signatures'] == result['historical_unsigned_rows'] == 0 - assert result['audit_signature_continuity_proven'] - assert result['new_audit_entry_signed_verified'] and result['wrong_audit_public_key_refused'] - assert result['tampered_entry_refused'] and result['container_cleanup_verified'] - assert result['container_isolation_verified_before_private_import'] - assert not result['existing_token_mfa_proven'] and not result['event_completeness_claimed'] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('problem', ['tampered', 'unsigned']) -def test_native_history_exceptions_reported_without_hiding_with_new_keys(retained_state, problem): - root, database, worker = retained_state - mutate = r''' -import contextlib,io,logging,sys -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import Audit,LogEntry - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file='/recovery/pi.cfg',silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - audit=Audit(app.config) - row=audit.session.query(LogEntry).first() - row.signature=None if sys.argv[1]=='unsigned' else 'rsa_sha256_pss:'+('00'*256) - audit.session.commit() -''' - m.run(['docker', 'exec', worker, 'python3', '-c', mutate, problem]) - (root / 'databases/privacyidea.dump').write_bytes(m.run( - ['docker', 'exec', database, 'pg_dump', '-U', 'postgres', '-Fc', 'recovery'])) - result = {} - m.native_checks(root, result) - assert result['historical_invalid_signatures'] == int(problem == 'tampered') - assert result['historical_unsigned_rows'] == int(problem == 'unsigned') - assert not result['audit_signature_continuity_proven'] - assert result['new_audit_entry_signed_verified'] and result['container_cleanup_verified'] - - -def test_native_malformed_original_encryption_key_fails_and_cleans_up(retained_state): - root, _, _ = retained_state - (root / 'data/privacyidea/enckey').write_bytes(b'synthetic-malformed-key') - result = {} - with pytest.raises(m.bundle.Refused): - m.native_checks(root, result) - assert result['failed_stage'] == 'retained_token_decryption' - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] - assert not result.get('retained_token_material_decrypted_inside_process') - - -def test_encrypted_bundle_to_native_checks_and_tmpfs_cleanup(retained_state, stage, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys): - import shutil - import sys - root, _, _ = retained_state - for key in ('enckey', 'private.pem', 'public.pem'): - shutil.copyfile(root / 'data/privacyidea' / key, stage / 'data/privacyidea' / key) - shutil.copyfile(root / 'databases/privacyidea.dump', stage / 'databases/privacyidea.dump') - resource = stage / 'resources/mfa/secret/privacyidea-config.json' - value = json.loads(resource.read_text()) - value['data'] = json.loads((root / 'resources/mfa/secret/privacyidea-config.json').read_text())['data'] - resource.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - configmap = stage / 'resources/mfa/configmap/privacyidea-cfg.json' - value = json.loads(configmap.read_text()) - value['data'] = {'pi.cfg': 'PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES = False\n'} - configmap.write_text(json.dumps(value)) - key = tmp_path / 'synthetic-age.key' - m.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)]) - recipient = m.run(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)]).decode().strip() - profile = m.bundle.profile();profile['public_recipient'] = recipient - monkeypatch.setattr(m.bundle, 'profile', lambda: profile) - ciphertext = tmp_path / 'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-0123456789ab.tar.age' - m.bundle.seal(stage, ciphertext, {'synthetic_native_fixture': True}) - transfer = tmp_path / 'transfer.json' - transfer.write_text(json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1', 'status': 'readback_verified', - 'provider': 'Storage Share', 'folder': 'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity', - 'artifact': ciphertext.name, 'ciphertext_bytes': ciphertext.stat().st_size, - 'ciphertext_sha256': m.local.offline.offsite.digest(ciphertext), 'etag': '"synthetic"', - 'fetched_path': str(ciphertext), 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified': True})) - monkeypatch.setattr(m.local.verify.custody, 'private_key_fd', lambda: os.open(key, os.O_RDONLY)) - receipt = tmp_path / 'receipt.json' - monkeypatch.setattr(sys, 'argv', ['isolated-privacyidea', '--transfer-receipt', str(transfer), '--receipt', str(receipt)]) - assert m.main() == 0 - result = json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - assert result['status'] == 'isolated_privacyidea_checked' and result['audit_signature_continuity_proven'] - assert result['container_cleanup_verified'] and result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] - assert result['all_manifest_hashes_verified'] and result['retained_tokens_with_native_decryption'] == 2 - assert not result['production_contacted'] and not result['secret_values_exported'] - assert not result['existing_token_mfa_proven'] - assert 'rsa_sha256_pss:' not in capsys.readouterr().out + receipt.read_text() diff --git a/tests/test_keycape_attempt_receipt_verifier.py b/tests/test_keycape_attempt_receipt_verifier.py deleted file mode 100644 index 230d40b..0000000 --- a/tests/test_keycape_attempt_receipt_verifier.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,112 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic tests for the independent KeyCape attempt receipt verifier; no cluster, no values.""" -import copy -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import unittest - -SOURCE = Path(__file__).parents[1] / 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py' -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('verify_receipt', SOURCE) -v = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(v) - -CIPHERTEXT = 'c' * 64 - - -class Verifier(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() - self.root = Path(self.tmp.name) - hashes = {} - for name in v.SOURCE_FILES: - (self.root / name).write_bytes(f'synthetic {name}\n'.encode()) - hashes[name] = hashlib.sha256((self.root / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() - done = {'status': 'absence_verified'} - self.receipt = { - 'schema': v.SCHEMA, 'status': v.PASSED, 'provision_phase': 'complete', - **{k: True for k in v.REQUIRED_TRUE}, **{k: False for k in v.REQUIRED_FALSE}, - **{k: [dict(done)] for k in v.OBLIGATIONS}, 'plaintext_cleanup_obligation': dict(done), - 'ciphertext_sha256': CIPHERTEXT, 'public_signing_spki_sha256': 'a' * 64, - 'source_files_sha256': hashes, 'session_source_sha256': hashes['isolated-keycape-session.py'], - 'finished_at': '2026-10-24T10:00:00+00:00'} - self.transfer = {'ciphertext_sha256': CIPHERTEXT} - - def tearDown(self): - self.tmp.cleanup() - - def check(self, receipt=None, transfer=None, not_after=None): - raw = json.dumps(self.receipt if receipt is None else receipt).encode() - return v.verify(raw, self.transfer if transfer is None else transfer, self.root, not_after=not_after) - - def mutated(self, **changes): - r = copy.deepcopy(self.receipt) - r.update(changes) - return r - - def test_complete_receipt_verifies(self): - self.assertEqual(self.check(), []) - - def test_refuses_failed_or_partial_outcomes(self): - cases = [self.mutated(status='failed'), self.mutated(status='bounded_cleanup_uncertain'), - self.mutated(provision_phase='issuer_launch'), self.mutated(schema='other'), - self.mutated(error='isolated_keycape_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed')] - cases += [self.mutated(**{k: False}) for k in v.REQUIRED_TRUE] - missing = copy.deepcopy(self.receipt) - del missing['denied_scopes_refused'] - cases.append(missing) - for receipt in cases: - with self.subTest(receipt={k: receipt.get(k) for k in ('status', 'provision_phase')}): - self.assertTrue(self.check(receipt)) - - def test_refuses_overclaims_and_uncertainty(self): - for key in v.REQUIRED_FALSE: - with self.subTest(key=key): - self.assertIn(f'{key} is not false', self.check(self.mutated(**{key: True}))) - - def test_refuses_open_cleanup_obligations(self): - open_row = [{'status': 'registered_before_plaintext'}] - for key in v.OBLIGATIONS: - with self.subTest(key=key): - self.assertTrue(self.check(self.mutated(**{key: open_row}))) - self.assertTrue(self.check(self.mutated(plaintext_cleanup_obligation={'status': 'pending'}))) - - def test_binds_ciphertext_to_transfer_receipt(self): - self.assertIn('ciphertext_sha256 differs from the transfer receipt', - self.check(transfer={'ciphertext_sha256': 'd' * 64})) - self.assertIn('transfer receipt lacks ciphertext_sha256', self.check(transfer={})) - - def test_recomputes_source_from_checkout(self): - (self.root / 'isolated-keycape.py').write_bytes(b'changed\n') - self.assertIn('source differs from checkout: isolated-keycape.py', self.check()) - - def test_session_source_must_match(self): - self.assertIn('session_source_sha256 differs', self.check(self.mutated(session_source_sha256='0' * 64))) - - def test_admission_window(self): - early = datetime(2026, 10, 24, 9, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) - late = datetime(2026, 10, 24, 11, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) - self.assertIn('attempt finished after the admission window', self.check(not_after=early)) - self.assertEqual(self.check(not_after=late), []) - - def test_secret_shaped_content_is_refused(self): - for value in ('-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----', 'AGE-SECRET-KEY-1QQQQ', - 'eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzZXJ2aWNlIn0.sig', 'A' * 200): - with self.subTest(value=value[:12]): - findings = self.check(self.mutated(note=value)) - self.assertIn('secret-shaped content present; do not retain or publish this receipt', findings) - - def test_cli_exit_codes(self): - receipt, transfer = self.root / 'recovery.json', self.root / 'transfer.json' - receipt.write_text(json.dumps(self.receipt)) - transfer.write_text(json.dumps(self.transfer)) - args = ['--receipt', str(receipt), '--transfer-receipt', str(transfer), '--source-root', str(self.root)] - self.assertEqual(v.main(args), 0) - receipt.write_text(json.dumps(self.mutated(status='failed'))) - self.assertEqual(v.main(args), 1) - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_keycape_bootstrap.py b/tests/test_keycape_bootstrap.py deleted file mode 100644 index 144f465..0000000 --- a/tests/test_keycape_bootstrap.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,142 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic custody tests; no real cluster or credential access.""" -import base64 -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess - -import pytest -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SCRIPTS = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/keycape' -PASSWORD = 'SyntheticOnlyCredential12345678901234567890' - - -@pytest.fixture -def setup(tmp_path): - root = tmp_path / 'private'; root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - for component, key in [('lldap', 'LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS'), ('authelia', 'AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET'), ('keycape', None)]: - folder = root / component; folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) - file = folder / 'secrets.env'; file.write_text(f'{key}={PASSWORD}\n' if key else '# placeholder\n'); file.chmod(0o600) - binary = tmp_path / 'bin'; binary.mkdir() - (binary / 'kubectl').write_text('''#!/usr/bin/python3 -import json,os,sys -args=sys.argv[1:] -raw=sys.stdin.read() if args[-1:]==['-'] else '' -with open(os.environ['CALLS'],'a') as f:f.write(json.dumps({'args':args,'stdin':raw})+'\\n') -if os.environ.get('FAIL')==args[0]: - print(os.environ['SYNTHETIC']);print(os.environ['SYNTHETIC'],file=sys.stderr);sys.exit(1) -if args[:3]==['get','secret','keycape-config']: - print(os.environ.get('EXISTING',''),end='') -elif args[:2]==['get','externalsecret']: - print(os.environ.get('READY','True'),end='') -elif args[:3]==['get','secret','keycape-factor-read']: - print(os.environ.get('FACTOR','secret/keycape-factor-read'),end='') -elif args[0]=='create': - print('secret/keycape-config',end='') -else: sys.exit(3) -''') - (binary / 'kubectl').chmod(0o700) - for name in ('curl', 'sleep'): - (binary / name).write_text('#!/bin/sh\nexit 97\n'); (binary / name).chmod(0o700) - env={'PATH':str(binary)+':'+os.environ['PATH'],'HOME':str(tmp_path),'CALLS':str(tmp_path/'calls'),'SYNTHETIC':PASSWORD} - return root, env - - -def invoke(setup, script='create-secrets.sh', **extra): - root, env=setup - return subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(SCRIPTS/script),str(root)],input=PASSWORD+'\n', - env={**env,**extra},capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=15) - - -def calls(setup): - file=Path(setup[1]['CALLS']) - return [json.loads(line) for line in file.read_text().splitlines()] if file.exists() else [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('script',['create-pi-token.sh','refresh-pi-token-live.sh']) -def test_retired_admin_token_paths_refuse_before_read_or_cluster_access(setup,script): - result=invoke(setup,script) - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert 'RPF-WP-0040' in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert PASSWORD not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert not calls(setup) - assert not (setup[0]/'keycape/pi_admin_token').exists() - - -def test_new_config_uses_mounted_scoped_credential_without_secret_argv_or_output(setup): - result=invoke(setup) - assert result.returncode==0, result.stderr - assert PASSWORD not in result.stdout+result.stderr - observed=calls(setup) - assert PASSWORD not in json.dumps([c['args'] for c in observed]) - writes=[c for c in observed if c['args'][0] not in ['get']] - assert len(writes)==1 and writes[0]['args']==['create','-o','name','-f','-'] - secret=json.loads(writes[0]['stdin']) - assert 'annotations' not in secret['metadata'] - config=yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(secret['data']['config.yaml'])) - assert config['privacyidea'].get('adminToken','')=='' - assert config['privacyidea']['adminTokenFile']=='/etc/keycape-factor/admin-token' - assert config['privacyidea']['realm']=='coulomb' - assert config['privacyidea']['requireForAll'] is True - assert config['lldap']['bindPW']==PASSWORD - assert config['authelia']['clientSecret']==PASSWORD - key=setup[0]/'keycape/key.pem' - assert key.stat().st_mode & 0o077==0 - assert base64.b64decode(secret['data']['key.pem'])==key.read_bytes() - checked=subprocess.run(['openssl','rsa','-check','-noout'],input=key.read_bytes(),capture_output=True) - assert checked.returncode==0 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('extra',[{'EXISTING':'secret/keycape-config'},{'READY':'False'},{'READY':''},{'FACTOR':''},{'FAIL':'get'}]) -def test_existing_config_or_missing_delivery_refuses_without_local_or_remote_writes(setup,extra): - result=invoke(setup,**extra) - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert not (setup[0]/'keycape/key.pem').exists() - assert all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(setup)) - assert PASSWORD not in result.stdout+result.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['public','public-parent','public-root','symlink','parent-symlink','hardlink','duplicate','shell','missing']) -def test_bad_custody_refused_before_cluster_access(setup,defect): - root,_=setup; file=root/'lldap/secrets.env'; marker=root/'executed' - if defect=='public':file.chmod(0o644) - elif defect=='public-parent':file.parent.chmod(0o755) - elif defect=='public-root':root.chmod(0o755) - elif defect=='symlink': - target=file.with_name('other');file.rename(target);file.symlink_to(target) - elif defect=='parent-symlink': - target=root/'other';file.parent.rename(target);(root/'lldap').symlink_to(target) - elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(file,file.with_name('alias')) - elif defect=='duplicate':file.write_text(file.read_text()*2) - elif defect=='shell':file.write_text(f'LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS=$(touch {marker})\n') - else:file.unlink() - result=invoke(setup) - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert not marker.exists() - assert not calls(setup) - assert PASSWORD not in result.stdout+result.stderr - - -def test_creation_failure_retains_private_key_for_retry_without_leaking(setup): - result=invoke(setup,FAIL='create') - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert PASSWORD not in result.stdout+result.stderr - key=setup[0]/'keycape/key.pem'; before=key.read_bytes() - assert key.stat().st_mode & 0o077==0 - assert invoke(setup).returncode==0 - assert key.read_bytes()==before - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['symlink','hardlink','public','invalid']) -def test_existing_invalid_signing_key_is_not_replaced(setup,defect): - key=setup[0]/'keycape/key.pem'; key.write_text('invalid');key.chmod(0o600) - if defect=='symlink': - target=key.with_name('other');key.rename(target);key.symlink_to(target) - elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(key,key.with_name('alias')) - elif defect=='public':key.chmod(0o644) - result=invoke(setup) - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert key.read_text()=='invalid' - assert not any(c['args'][0]=='create' for c in calls(setup)) diff --git a/tests/test_keycape_directory_bind_rollout.py b/tests/test_keycape_directory_bind_rollout.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3f365cb..0000000 --- a/tests/test_keycape_directory_bind_rollout.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,216 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic tests for the KeyCape LLDAP bind switch (NK-WP-0054-T05); no cluster, no real values.""" - -import base64 -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -import types -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - "bind_rollout", ROOT / "sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py" -) -m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(m) - -SERVICE_PASSWORD = "S" * 20 + "0123456789abcdefghij" -HUMAN_PASSWORD = "synthetic-human-password" -CONFIG = """# synthetic KeyCape config -issuer: https://kc.example.test -signingKey: | - -----BEGIN SYNTHETIC----- - abc -lldap: - url: ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890 - bindDN: uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local - bindPW: old-shared-password - baseDN: dc=netkingdom,dc=local -authelia: - issuer: https://auth.coulomb.social - clientSecret: synthetic-client -clients: - - clientId: one -""" - - -def secret(config=CONFIG, version="41"): - return { - "metadata": { - "uid": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555", - "resourceVersion": version, - }, - "data": { - "config.yaml": base64.b64encode(config.encode()).decode(), - "other": "b3RoZXI=", - }, - } - - -class Cluster: - def __init__(self, obj): - self.obj, self.calls = obj, [] - - def __call__(self, args, payload=None): - self.calls.append((args, payload)) - if args[:2] == ["get", "namespace"]: - return {"metadata": {"uid": m.lane.CLUSTER_UID}} - if "get" in args: - return copy.deepcopy(self.obj) - assert payload[0]["value"] == self.obj["metadata"]["uid"] - assert payload[1]["value"] == self.obj["metadata"]["resourceVersion"] - result = copy.deepcopy(self.obj) - result["data"]["config.yaml"] = payload[2]["value"] - if "--dry-run=server" not in args: - self.obj = dict( - result, metadata=dict(result["metadata"], resourceVersion="42") - ) - return result - - -def args(mode="inspect", operation="switch", attended=False, version="41"): - return types.SimpleNamespace( - mode=mode, - operation=operation, - custody_root="unused", - attended=attended, - expected_uid="11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555", - expected_resource_version=version, - ) - - -@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) -def custody(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setattr(m, "service_password", lambda root: SERVICE_PASSWORD) - - -def config_of(obj): - return base64.b64decode(obj["data"]["config.yaml"]).decode() - - -def test_switch_changes_exactly_the_two_bind_scalars(): - cluster = Cluster(secret()) - receipt = m.run(args("apply", attended=True), cluster) - assert ( - receipt["changed"] - and receipt["prior_bind"] == "human" - and receipt["restart_required"] - ) - after = config_of(cluster.obj) - expected = yaml.safe_load(CONFIG) - expected["lldap"].update(bindDN=m.SERVICE_DN, bindPW=SERVICE_PASSWORD) - assert yaml.safe_load(after) == expected - assert after.replace(json.dumps(m.SERVICE_DN), "X").replace( - json.dumps(SERVICE_PASSWORD), "Y" - ) == CONFIG.replace("uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local", "X").replace( - "old-shared-password", "Y" - ) - assert cluster.obj["data"]["other"] == "b3RoZXI=" - assert SERVICE_PASSWORD not in json.dumps( - receipt - ) and "old-shared-password" not in json.dumps(receipt) - - -def test_inspect_and_dry_run_write_nothing(): - cluster = Cluster(secret()) - assert m.run(args("inspect"), cluster)["change_needed"] - m.run(args("dry-run"), cluster) - assert config_of(cluster.obj) == CONFIG - - -def test_apply_needs_attended_and_the_observed_revision(): - with pytest.raises(m.Refused, match="attended"): - m.run(args("apply"), Cluster(secret())) - with pytest.raises(m.Refused, match="observed_revision_changed"): - m.run(args("apply", attended=True, version="40"), Cluster(secret())) - - -def test_second_switch_is_a_noop_and_revert_restores_the_human_bind(): - cluster = Cluster(secret()) - m.run(args("apply", attended=True), cluster) - again = m.run(args("apply", attended=True, version="42"), cluster) - assert not again["change_needed"] and again["prior_bind"] == "service" - reverted = m.run( - args("apply", "revert", attended=True, version="42"), - cluster, - prompt=lambda _: HUMAN_PASSWORD, - ) - assert reverted["changed"] - assert yaml.safe_load(config_of(cluster.obj))["lldap"] == dict( - yaml.safe_load(CONFIG)["lldap"], bindPW=HUMAN_PASSWORD - ) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize( - "change", - [ - lambda c: c.replace("uid=admin,", "uid=someone,"), - lambda c: c.replace(" bindPW: old-shared-password\n", ""), - lambda c: c.replace("lldap:\n", "lldap: &a\n"), - ], -) -def test_unexpected_shapes_are_refused(change): - with pytest.raises((m.Refused, m.pin.IssuerPinError)): - m.run(args("inspect"), Cluster(secret(change(CONFIG)))) - - -def test_main_contains_failures_without_values(capsys): - def broken(args, payload=None): - raise RuntimeError("Secret data: old-shared-password") - - assert m.main(["inspect", "--custody-root", "x"], kubectl=broken) == 1 - out = capsys.readouterr().out - assert "contained_operation_failed" in out and "old-shared-password" not in out - - -def deployment(env): - return {"spec": {"template": {"spec": {"containers": [{"name": "keycape", "env": env}]}}}} - - -class ClusterWithDeployment(Cluster): - def __init__(self, obj, env): - super().__init__(obj) - self.deployment = deployment(env) - - def __call__(self, args, payload=None): - if "deployment" in args: - self.calls.append((args, payload)) - return copy.deepcopy(self.deployment) - return super().__call__(args, payload) - - -def test_clear_password_empties_only_bindpw_once_the_env_is_delivered(): - cluster = ClusterWithDeployment(secret(), [m.BIND_ENV]) - m.run(args("apply", attended=True), cluster) # switch to svc-keycape first - receipt = m.run(args("apply", "clear-password", attended=True, version="42"), cluster) - assert receipt["changed"] and receipt["task"] == "NK-WP-0056-T04" - after = yaml.safe_load(config_of(cluster.obj)) - assert after["lldap"] == dict(yaml.safe_load(CONFIG)["lldap"], bindDN=m.SERVICE_DN, bindPW="") - assert cluster.obj["data"]["other"] == "b3RoZXI=" - assert SERVICE_PASSWORD not in json.dumps(receipt) - # switch is the rollback: it puts the custody password back - restored = m.run(args("apply", attended=True, version="42"), cluster) - assert restored["changed"] and yaml.safe_load(config_of(cluster.obj))["lldap"]["bindPW"] == SERVICE_PASSWORD - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize( - "env", - [ - [], - [{"name": "KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW", "value": "literal"}], - [{"name": "KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW", "valueFrom": {"secretKeyRef": {"name": "keycape-config", "key": "password"}}}], - ], -) -def test_clear_password_refuses_without_the_delivered_env(env): - cluster = ClusterWithDeployment(secret(), env) - m.run(args("apply", attended=True), cluster) - with pytest.raises(m.Refused, match="bind_env_not_delivered"): - m.run(args("inspect", "clear-password", version="42"), cluster) - - -def test_clear_password_refuses_while_the_human_bind_is_configured(): - with pytest.raises(m.Refused, match="clear_requires_service_bind"): - m.run(args("inspect", "clear-password"), ClusterWithDeployment(secret(), [m.BIND_ENV])) diff --git a/tests/test_kingpath_offsite.py b/tests/test_kingpath_offsite.py deleted file mode 100644 index 44c69b1..0000000 --- a/tests/test_kingpath_offsite.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,202 +0,0 @@ -"""Break-glass bundle sealing and Storage Share publication on contained fixtures.""" -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import importlib.util -import hashlib -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import tarfile -import urllib.error -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('kingpath_offsite',ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py') -k=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(k) -NOW=datetime(2026,10,27,22,0,tzinfo=timezone.utc) - - -class Response(io.BytesIO): - def __init__(self,url,data=b'',status=200,etag='"v1"'): - super().__init__(data);self.url=url;self.status=status - self.headers={'ETag':etag,'Content-Length':str(len(data))} - def __enter__(self):return self - def __exit__(self,*a):self.close() - - -class Share: - def __init__(self,folder_exists=False): - self.objects={};self.folder=folder_exists;self.calls=[];self.tamper=False;self.collide=False - def open(self,request,timeout=None): - method=request.get_method();url=request.full_url;self.calls.append((method,url)) - assert request.headers['Authorization'].startswith('Basic ') - if method=='MKCOL': - if self.folder:raise urllib.error.HTTPError(url,405,'exists',{},None) - self.folder=True;return Response(url,status=201) - if method=='PUT': - assert request.headers['If-none-match']=='*' - self.objects[url]=request.data.read();return Response(url,status=201) - if self.collide and method=='HEAD':return _head(url,b'other') - if url not in self.objects:raise urllib.error.HTTPError(url,404,'missing',{},None) - data=self.objects[url] - if method=='HEAD':return _head(url,data) - if self.tamper:data=data[:-1]+bytes([data[-1]^1]) - return Response(url,data) - - -def _head(url,data): - r=Response(url,b'');r.headers['Content-Length']=str(len(data));return r - - -@pytest.fixture -def key(tmp_path): - identity=tmp_path/'fixture.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(identity)],check=True,capture_output=True) - recipient=subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-y',str(identity)],check=True,capture_output=True,text=True).stdout.strip() - return identity,recipient - - -def private(tmp_path,name,data,mode=0o600): - path=tmp_path/name;path.write_bytes(data);path.chmod(mode);return path - - -def test_seals_uploads_and_reads_back(tmp_path,key): - identity,recipient=key;share=Share() - a=private(tmp_path,'kc',b'synthetic-kubeconfig');b=private(tmp_path,'ssh',b'synthetic-ssh-key') - receipt=tmp_path/'receipt.json' - record=k.run([f'kubeconfig={a}',f'tunnel-ssh-key={b}'],'synthetic-app-password',receipt,share,recipient,NOW) - assert record['status']=='readback_verified' and record['items']=={'kubeconfig':20,'tunnel-ssh-key':17} - assert record['artifact'].startswith('net-kingdom-kingpath-20261027T220000Z-') - assert oct(receipt.stat().st_mode&0o777)=='0o600' - text=receipt.read_text();assert 'synthetic' not in text - (stored,)=share.objects.values();assert stored.startswith(b'age-encryption.org/v1\n') and b'synthetic' not in stored - plain=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',str(identity)],input=stored,capture_output=True,check=True).stdout - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(plain)) as archive: - assert {m.name:(archive.extractfile(m).read(),m.mtime,m.mode) for m in archive}=={ - 'kubeconfig':(b'synthetic-kubeconfig',0,0o600),'tunnel-ssh-key':(b'synthetic-ssh-key',0,0o600)} - assert [c[0] for c in share.calls]==['MKCOL','HEAD','PUT','HEAD','GET'] - - -def test_existing_folder_is_accepted(tmp_path,key): - share=Share(folder_exists=True) - k.run([f'kubeconfig={private(tmp_path,"kc",b"x")}'],'pw',tmp_path/'r.json',share,key[1],NOW) - assert len(share.objects)==1 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mode',[0o640,0o604,0o644]) -def test_refuses_group_or_world_readable_input(tmp_path,key,mode): - with pytest.raises(k.Refused): - k.run([f'kubeconfig={private(tmp_path,"kc",b"x",mode)}'],'pw',tmp_path/'r.json',Share(),key[1],NOW) - - -def test_refuses_symlink_bad_name_duplicate_and_empty(tmp_path,key): - real=private(tmp_path,'kc',b'x');link=tmp_path/'link';link.symlink_to(real) - for specs in ([f'kubeconfig={link}'],[f'Bad_Name={real}'],[f'a={real}',f'a={real}'], - [f'a={private(tmp_path,"empty",b"")}'],[],[f'a={tmp_path/"missing"}']): - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.run(specs,'pw',tmp_path/'r.json',Share(),key[1],NOW) - - -def test_refuses_existing_receipt_before_any_provider_call(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();receipt=private(tmp_path,'r.json',b'{}') - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.run([f'a={private(tmp_path,"kc",b"x")}'],'pw',receipt,share,key[1],NOW) - assert share.calls==[] - - -def test_refuses_tampered_readback_and_writes_no_receipt(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();share.tamper=True;receipt=tmp_path/'r.json' - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.run([f'a={private(tmp_path,"kc",b"x")}'],'pw',receipt,share,key[1],NOW) - assert not receipt.exists() - - -def test_refuses_overwriting_an_existing_object(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();share.collide=True - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.run([f'a={private(tmp_path,"kc",b"x")}'],'pw',tmp_path/'r.json',share,key[1],NOW) - assert 'PUT' not in [c[0] for c in share.calls] - - -def test_refuses_bad_credential_and_recipient(tmp_path,key): - item=private(tmp_path,'kc',b'x') - for pw in ('','a\nb'): - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.run([f'a={item}'],pw,tmp_path/'r.json',Share(),key[1],NOW) - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.run([f'a={item}'],'pw',tmp_path/'r.json',Share(),'not-a-recipient',NOW) - - -def test_production_recipient_is_the_registered_backup_recipient(): - profile=json.loads((ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json').read_text()) - assert k.RECIPIENT==profile['public_recipient'] - assert k.ACCOUNT_BASE=='https://nx4069.your-storageshare.de/remote.php/dav/files/Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/' - - -KUBECONFIG=b'apiVersion: v1\nclusters: [{name: c, cluster: {server: "https://127.0.0.1:1"}}]\nusers: [{name: u, user: {}}]\n' -SSHKEY=b'-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nsynthetic\n-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n' - - -def uploaded(tmp_path,key,share): - items=[f'admin-kubeconfig={private(tmp_path,"kc",KUBECONFIG)}',f'tunnel-ssh-key={private(tmp_path,"ssh",SSHKEY)}'] - return k.run(items,'pw',tmp_path/'upload.json',share,key[1],NOW) - - -def keyfd(path):return os.open(path,os.O_RDONLY) - - -def test_verify_fetches_decrypts_in_memory_and_checks_shapes(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();upload=uploaded(tmp_path,key,share);fd=keyfd(key[0]) - try:record=k.verify(upload,'pw',fd,tmp_path/'verify.json',share) - finally:os.close(fd) - assert record['status']=='verified' and record['unrelated_key_refused'] and record['custody_key_matches_recipient'] - assert record['items']=={'admin-kubeconfig':{'bytes':len(KUBECONFIG),'shape':'kubeconfig'}, - 'tunnel-ssh-key':{'bytes':len(SSHKEY),'shape':'ssh-private-key'}} - text=(tmp_path/'verify.json').read_text();assert 'synthetic' not in text and '127.0.0.1' not in text - - -def test_verify_refuses_a_custody_key_for_another_recipient(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();upload=uploaded(tmp_path,key,share) - other=tmp_path/'other.key';subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(other)],check=True,capture_output=True) - fd=keyfd(other) - try: - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.verify(upload,'pw',fd,tmp_path/'verify.json',share) - finally:os.close(fd) - assert [c[0] for c in share.calls].count('GET')==1 # only the upload readback; no fetch with the wrong key - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('change',['etag','sha','items','artifact']) -def test_verify_refuses_a_changed_record_or_object(tmp_path,key,change): - share=Share();upload=uploaded(tmp_path,key,share);fd=keyfd(key[0]) - if change=='etag':upload['etag']='"other"' - if change=='sha':upload['ciphertext_sha256']='0'*64 - if change=='items':upload['items']={'admin-kubeconfig':1} - if change=='artifact':upload['artifact']='../escape.tar.age' - try: - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.verify(upload,'pw',fd,tmp_path/'verify.json',share) - finally:os.close(fd) - assert not (tmp_path/'verify.json').exists() - - -def test_verify_refuses_tampered_ciphertext(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();upload=uploaded(tmp_path,key,share);share.tamper=True;fd=keyfd(key[0]) - try: - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.verify(upload,'pw',fd,tmp_path/'verify.json',share) - finally:os.close(fd) - - -def test_verify_binds_items_to_expected_digests(tmp_path,key): - share=Share();upload=uploaded(tmp_path,key,share);fd=keyfd(key[0]) - sha=hashlib.sha256(SSHKEY).hexdigest() - try:record=k.verify(upload,'pw',fd,tmp_path/'verify.json',share,expect={'tunnel-ssh-key':sha}) - finally:os.close(fd) - assert record['sha256_matched']=={'tunnel-ssh-key':sha} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('expect',[{'tunnel-ssh-key':'0'*64},{'not-uploaded':'0'*64}]) -def test_verify_refuses_a_digest_mismatch_or_missing_item(tmp_path,key,expect): - share=Share();upload=uploaded(tmp_path,key,share);fd=keyfd(key[0]) - try: - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.verify(upload,'pw',fd,tmp_path/'verify.json',share,expect=expect) - finally:os.close(fd) - assert not (tmp_path/'verify.json').exists() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('spec',['name','x=abc','Bad=' + '0'*64]) -def test_expected_refuses_malformed_pairs(spec): - with pytest.raises(k.Refused):k.expected([spec]) diff --git a/tests/test_legacy_lldap_retirement.py b/tests/test_legacy_lldap_retirement.py deleted file mode 100644 index f8835e9..0000000 --- a/tests/test_legacy_lldap_retirement.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -"""Retired callers must refuse before credential discovery or external actions.""" -import argparse -import contextlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import shutil -import subprocess -import sys -from unittest.mock import patch - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] - - -def console(): - path = ROOT / 'tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py' - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('retirement_console', path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); sys.modules[spec.name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('name', ['create-user.sh', 'break-glass.sh', 'dry-run-nonroot-user.sh']) -def test_retired_shell_never_sources_credentials_or_calls_external_tools(tmp_path, name): - calls = tmp_path / 'calls'; sourced = tmp_path / 'sourced'; private = tmp_path / 'private' - for service, field in [('lldap', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS'), ('breakglass', 'BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD')]: - directory = private / service; directory.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700) - (directory / 'secrets.env').write_text(f"{field}='synthetic-private-marker'\ntouch '{sourced}'\n") - bin_dir = tmp_path / 'bin'; bin_dir.mkdir() - for command in ['kubectl', 'curl']: - executable = bin_dir / command - executable.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf called >> '{calls}'\nexit 1\n"); executable.chmod(0o700) - env = dict(os.environ, PATH=str(bin_dir) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], - KUBECTL=str(bin_dir / 'kubectl'), LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS='synthetic-private-marker') - env.pop('BASH_ENV', None) - if name == 'create-user.sh': - env.pop('LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS') - args = ['test-user', 'test@example.test', 'Test User', 'http://127.0.0.1:1', str(private)] - elif name == 'break-glass.sh': args = ['http://127.0.0.1:1', str(private)] - else: args = ['test-user', 'test@example.test', 'Test User'] - result = subprocess.run(['/bin/bash', '-x', str(ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap' / name), *args], - env=env, cwd=tmp_path, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode == 2 - assert not calls.exists() and not sourced.exists() - assert 'synthetic-private-marker' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert 'retired' in result.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('target,variable', [('security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run','SUBJECT'), - ('security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run','EMAIL'), - ('security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run','DISPLAY'), - ('security-bootstrap-lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users','PATTERN')]) -def test_make_retirement_never_interpolates_old_user_arguments(tmp_path, target, variable): - # Harmless leaf replacement isolates the Make interpolation boundary. - shutil.copyfile(ROOT / 'Makefile', tmp_path / 'Makefile') - leaf = tmp_path / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh'; leaf.parent.mkdir(parents=True) - leaf.write_text('#!/bin/sh\nexit 2\n'); leaf.chmod(0o700) - marker = tmp_path / 'command-executed' - value = f'$(touch {marker})' - # Escape Make's dollar processing so the old recipe would hand $(...) to the shell. - result = subprocess.run(['make', '--no-print-directory', target, f'{variable}=$' + value], - cwd=tmp_path, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not marker.exists() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('command', ['onboarding-dry-run', 'lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users', 'onboarding-dry-run-claims']) -def test_console_retirement_returns_failure_without_delegation(command): - module = console(); output = io.StringIO() - with patch('subprocess.call') as call, patch('subprocess.run') as run, \ - patch.object(module, 'load_metadata') as metadata, contextlib.redirect_stdout(output): - code = module.main([command]) - assert code == 2 - call.assert_not_called(); run.assert_not_called(); metadata.assert_not_called() - assert 'retired' in output.getvalue().lower() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('factory,validator', [('lifecycle_flow_template','print_validate_lifecycle_flow'), - ('onboarding_dry_run_template','print_validate_onboarding_dry_run')]) -def test_blank_template_is_not_success_evidence(tmp_path, factory, validator): - module = console(); record = getattr(module, factory)() - assert not any(value is True for value in record.values()) - path = tmp_path / 'evidence.json'; path.write_text(json.dumps(record)) - output = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output): result = getattr(module, validator)(argparse.Namespace(evidence=str(path))) - assert result != 0 - - -def test_console_guidance_routes_to_owner_without_legacy_execution(): - module = console(); output = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output): module.print_lifecycle_guide() - assert 'User Engine' in output.getvalue() - assert './create-user.sh' not in output.getvalue() - assert 'safe secret extract' not in output.getvalue() - payload = next(p for p in module.runbook_payloads({'openbao_initialized': True}) if p['name'] == 'User lifecycle dry-run (T06)') - assert payload['state'] == 'retired' - - -def test_direct_claims_compatibility_helper_never_infers_success(): - module = console(); output = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output): - result = module.print_dry_run_oidc_claims_verification('private-subject-marker', ['net-kingdom-admins']) - assert result == 2 - assert 'private-subject-marker' not in output.getvalue() - assert 'net-kingdom-admins' not in output.getvalue() diff --git a/tests/test_lldap_group_maintenance.py b/tests/test_lldap_group_maintenance.py deleted file mode 100644 index 034ce95..0000000 --- a/tests/test_lldap_group_maintenance.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,379 +0,0 @@ -"""Credential boundaries, exact group effects and honest diagnostic outcomes.""" -import contextlib -import copy -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -from unittest.mock import Mock, patch - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('lldap_admin', ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py') -admin = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(admin) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('script', ['lldap/bootstrap-users.sh', 'lldap/manage-group-members.sh', 'verify-t07.sh']) -def test_legacy_arguments_never_source_credentials_or_invoke_external_tools(tmp_path, script): - marker = tmp_path / 'sourced' - calls = tmp_path / 'calls' - root = tmp_path / 'private' - (root / 'lldap').mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700) - (root / 'lldap/secrets.env').write_text(f'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=synthetic-private-marker\ntouch "{marker}"\n') - commands = tmp_path / 'bin' - commands.mkdir() - for name in ('curl', 'kubectl'): - executable = commands / name - executable.write_text(f'#!/bin/sh\nprintf called >> "{calls}"\nexit 1\n') - executable.chmod(0o700) - args = ['http://127.0.0.1:1', str(root)] - if 'manage-group' in script: - args = ['add', 'test-user', 'activity-core-operators', *args] - env = dict(os.environ, PATH=str(commands) + ':' + os.environ['PATH']) - for key in ('LLDAP_ADMIN_PASS', 'BASH_ENV'): - env.pop(key, None) - result = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s' / script), *args], - env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not marker.exists() and not calls.exists() - assert 'synthetic-private-marker' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - - -class Directory: - def __init__(self): - self.state = {'users': ['agent-codex', 'break-glass', 'tegwick'], 'groups': { - 'lldap_admin': {'id': 1, 'members': ['tegwick']}, - 'net-kingdom-admins': {'id': 2, 'members': ['break-glass']}, - 'activity-core-operators': {'id': 3, 'members': ['tegwick']}, - 'tenant:one:users': {'id': 4, 'members': ['agent-codex']}, - }} - self.writes = [] - self.login = 0 - self.reads = 0 - self.drop_write = False - self.extra_effect = False - self.drift_at = None - self.malformed = None - - def _login(self): - self.login += 1 - return 'fixture-token' - - def _gql(self, token, query, variables): - assert query == 'query { users { id } groups { id displayName users { id } } }' - self.reads += 1 - if self.reads == self.drift_at: - self.state['groups']['tenant:one:users']['members'] = [] - if self.malformed is not None: - return self.malformed - return {'users': [{'id': u} for u in self.state['users']], 'groups': [ - {'id': g['id'], 'displayName': name, 'users': [{'id': u} for u in g['members']]} - for name, g in self.state['groups'].items()]} - - def _ensure_group(self, token, groups, name): - self.writes.append(('create', name)) - if not self.drop_write: - self.state['groups'][name] = {'id': max(g['id'] for g in self.state['groups'].values()) + 1, 'members': []} - - def _add_group(self, token, user, gid): - self._write('add', user, gid) - - def _remove_group(self, token, user, gid): - self._write('remove', user, gid) - - def _write(self, action, user, gid): - self.writes.append((action, user, gid)) - if self.drop_write: - return - group = next(g for g in self.state['groups'].values() if g['id'] == gid) - members = set(group['members']) - (members.add if action == 'add' else members.discard)(user) - group['members'] = sorted(members) - if self.extra_effect: - self.state['groups']['tenant:one:users']['members'] = [] - - -def change(provider, **kwargs): - return admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'membership', **kwargs) - - -def test_bootstrap_preview_apply_and_idempotence_preserve_existing_state(): - provider = Directory() - before = copy.deepcopy(provider.state) - preview = admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'bootstrap') - assert preview['changes'] == [{'create_group': 'net-kingdom-users'}] - assert provider.writes == [] - result = admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'bootstrap', apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert result['result'] == 'verified' - assert provider.state['users'] == before['users'] - for name, group in before['groups'].items(): - assert provider.state['groups'][name] == group - assert provider.state['groups']['net-kingdom-users']['members'] == [] - provider.writes.clear() - preview = admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'bootstrap') - admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'bootstrap', apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert provider.writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action,user', [('add', 'agent-codex'), ('remove', 'tegwick')]) -def test_membership_changes_only_exact_member(action, user): - provider = Directory() - before = copy.deepcopy(provider.state) - kwargs = {'action': action, 'group': 'activity-core-operators', 'user': user} - preview = change(provider, **kwargs) - assert provider.writes == [] - result = change(provider, **kwargs, apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert result['result'] == 'verified' - assert (user in provider.state['groups']['activity-core-operators']['members']) == (action == 'add') - for name in set(before['groups']) - {'activity-core-operators'}: - assert provider.state['groups'][name] == before['groups'][name] - provider.writes.clear() - preview = change(provider, **kwargs) - change(provider, **kwargs, apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert provider.writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('group', ['net-kingdom-admins', 'net-kingdom-users', 'netkingdom-suspended', 'tenant-one-users', 'lldap_admin']) -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action', ['add', 'remove', 'list']) -def test_reserved_groups_refuse_before_login(group, action): - provider = Directory() - with pytest.raises(Exception): - change(provider, action=action, group=group, user=None if action == 'list' else 'agent-codex') - assert provider.login == 0 and provider.writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind', ['changed_state', 'changed_action', 'changed_origin', 'second_read_drift', 'missing_group', 'missing_user']) -def test_stale_or_ambiguous_requests_never_mutate(kind): - provider = Directory() - kwargs = {'action': 'add', 'group': 'activity-core-operators', 'user': 'agent-codex'} - preview = change(provider, **kwargs) - base = 'https://lldap.coulomb.social' - if kind == 'changed_state': provider.state['groups']['tenant:one:users']['members'] = [] - if kind == 'changed_action': kwargs['action'] = 'remove' - if kind == 'changed_origin': base = 'http://127.0.0.1:10000' - if kind == 'second_read_drift': provider.drift_at = 3 - if kind == 'missing_group': kwargs['group'] = 'missing-group' - if kind == 'missing_user': kwargs['user'] = 'missing-user' - with pytest.raises(Exception): - admin.maintain(provider, base, 'membership', **kwargs, apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert provider.writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('failure', ['drop_write', 'extra_effect']) -def test_failed_or_broader_write_cannot_report_success(failure): - provider = Directory() - kwargs = {'action': 'add', 'group': 'activity-core-operators', 'user': 'agent-codex'} - preview = change(provider, **kwargs) - setattr(provider, failure, True) - with pytest.raises(admin.Refused): - change(provider, **kwargs, apply=True, expected_digest=preview['snapshot_sha256']) - assert len(provider.writes) == 1 # No blind rollback/retry. - - -def test_list_is_nonmutating_and_verification_does_not_claim_acceptance(): - provider = Directory() - listing = change(provider, action='list', group='activity-core-operators') - assert listing['members'] == ['tegwick'] - result = admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'verify') - assert result['native_acceptance'] == 'unverified' - assert result['baseline_groups_present']['net-kingdom-users'] is False - assert 'independent_recovery' in result['remaining'] - assert provider.writes == [] - - -def test_groups_preview_lists_display_names_for_one_uid_without_writes(): - provider = Directory() - result = admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'groups', user='tegwick') - assert result == {'result': 'groups_observed', 'uid': 'tegwick', - 'groups': ['activity-core-operators', 'lldap_admin'], 'native_acceptance': 'unverified'} - assert provider.writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kwargs', [{'user': 'nobody'}, {'user': 'Bad uid'}, {'user': None}, - {'user': 'tegwick', 'group': 'lldap_admin'}, - {'user': 'tegwick', 'apply': True, 'expected_digest': '0' * 64}]) -def test_groups_preview_refuses_unknown_or_malformed_requests(kwargs): - provider = Directory() - with pytest.raises(admin.Refused): - admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'groups', **kwargs) - assert provider.writes == [] - - -def test_groups_cli_has_no_apply_and_prints_only_diagnosis_fields(): - out = io.StringIO() - with patch.object(admin, 'private_password', return_value='fixture'), patch.object(admin, 'LLDAPProvisioner', return_value=Directory()), contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): - assert admin.main(['groups', '--root', '/fixture', '--user', 'agent-codex']) == 0 - assert json.loads(out.getvalue()) == {'groups': ['tenant:one:users'], 'native_acceptance': 'unverified', - 'result': 'groups_observed', 'uid': 'agent-codex'} - with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - assert admin.main(['groups', '--root', '/fixture', '--user', 'agent-codex', '--apply']) == 1 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('payload', [{}, {'users': [], 'groups': None}, {'users': [{'id': 'same'}, {'id': 'same'}], 'groups': []}, - {'users': [], 'groups': [{'id': True, 'displayName': 'a', 'users': []}]}, - {'users': [], 'groups': [{'id': 1, 'displayName': 'a', 'users': [{'id': 'unknown'}]}]}, - {'users': [], 'groups': [{'id': 1, 'displayName': 'a', 'users': []}, {'id': 1, 'displayName': 'b', 'users': []}]}]) -def test_malformed_directory_snapshot_refused(payload): - provider = Directory() - provider.malformed = payload - with pytest.raises(admin.Refused): - admin.maintain(provider, 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', 'bootstrap') - assert provider.writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('url', ['http://lldap.coulomb.social', 'https://evil.test', 'http://localhost:17170', - 'https://lldap.coulomb.social@evil.test', 'http://127.0.0.1:80/path', - 'http://127.0.0.1:80?secret=marker', 'https://lldap.coulomb.social/#marker']) -def test_unapproved_origin_refused_before_private_input(url): - with patch.object(admin, 'private_password') as private, contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - assert admin.main(['bootstrap', '--root', '/not-read', '--lldap-url', url]) == 1 - private.assert_not_called() - - -def test_verification_cli_always_returns_incomplete_for_structure_only(): - with patch.object(admin, 'private_password', return_value='fixture'), patch.object(admin, 'LLDAPProvisioner', return_value=Directory()), contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()): - assert admin.main(['verify', '--root', '/fixture']) == 2 - - -def test_private_env_is_literal_not_executable(tmp_path): - root = tmp_path / 'private' - root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - (root / 'lldap').mkdir(mode=0o700) - marker = tmp_path / 'executed' - value = f'$(touch {marker})' - source = root / 'lldap/secrets.env' - source.write_text('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=' + value + '\n') - source.chmod(0o600) - assert admin.private_password(root) == value - assert not marker.exists() - source.chmod(0o644) - with pytest.raises(Exception): admin.private_password(root) - - -def test_provider_errors_are_not_printed(): - output = io.StringIO() - with patch.object(admin, 'private_password', side_effect=RuntimeError('synthetic-secret-marker')), contextlib.redirect_stderr(output): - assert admin.main(['bootstrap', '--root', '/fixture']) == 1 - assert 'synthetic-secret-marker' not in output.getvalue() - - -@pytest.fixture -def http_directory(): - from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer - import threading - - state = {'mode': 'ok', 'calls': [], 'redirect_hits': 0, 'directory': Directory()} - - class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def log_message(self, *args): - pass - - def do_POST(self): - payload = json.loads(self.rfile.read(int(self.headers['Content-Length']))) - state['calls'].append((self.path, payload)) - if self.path == '/redirected': - state['redirect_hits'] += 1 - if state['mode'] == 'redirect': - self.send_response(307) - self.send_header('Location', '/redirected') - self.end_headers() - return - if state['mode'] == 'denied': - self.send_response(403) - self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(b'upstream-secret-marker') - return - if state['mode'] == 'oversize': raw = b' ' * (admin.MAX_BODY + 1) - elif state['mode'] == 'duplicate': raw = b'{"token":"first", "token":"second"}' - elif state['mode'] == 'invalid': raw = b'upstream-secret-marker' - elif self.path == '/auth/simple/login': raw = b'{"token":"synthetic-token"}' - else: - assert self.headers['Authorization'] == 'Bearer synthetic-token' - if state['mode'] == 'graphql_error': result = {'errors': [{'message': 'upstream-secret-marker'}]} - else: result = {'data': state['directory']._gql('', payload['query'], payload.get('variables'))} - raw = json.dumps(result).encode() - self.send_response(200) - self.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json') - self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(raw))) - self.end_headers() - try: self.wfile.write(raw) - except (BrokenPipeError, ConnectionResetError): pass - - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler) - thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) - thread.start() - try: - yield f'http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}', state - finally: - server.shutdown() - server.server_close() - thread.join() - - -def private_root(tmp_path): - root = tmp_path / 'private' - root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - (root / 'lldap').mkdir(mode=0o700) - source = root / 'lldap/secrets.env' - source.write_text('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=synthetic-private-marker\n') - source.chmod(0o600) - return root - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mode', ['redirect', 'denied', 'oversize', 'duplicate', 'invalid', 'graphql_error']) -def test_http_failure_does_not_forward_credentials_or_render_provider_body(tmp_path, http_directory, mode): - base, state = http_directory - state['mode'] = mode - output, error = io.StringIO(), io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output), contextlib.redirect_stderr(error): - code = admin.main(['bootstrap', '--root', str(private_root(tmp_path)), '--lldap-url', base]) - assert code == 1 - assert state['redirect_hits'] == 0 - assert 'synthetic-private-marker' not in output.getvalue() + error.getvalue() - assert 'upstream-secret-marker' not in output.getvalue() + error.getvalue() - assert json.loads(error.getvalue())['result'] == 'unverified' - - -def test_loopback_http_uses_explicit_origin_and_ignores_ambient_proxy(tmp_path, http_directory): - base, state = http_directory - output = io.StringIO() - with patch.dict(os.environ, {'http_proxy': 'http://127.0.0.1:1', 'HTTP_PROXY': 'http://127.0.0.1:1', 'no_proxy': '', 'NO_PROXY': ''}), contextlib.redirect_stdout(output): - code = admin.main(['bootstrap', '--root', str(private_root(tmp_path)), '--lldap-url', base]) - assert code == 0 - assert json.loads(output.getvalue())['result'] == 'preview' - assert len(state['calls']) == 2 - assert state['directory'].writes == [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['symlink_file', 'hardlink_file', 'public_parent', 'duplicate_field', 'git_root']) -def test_private_input_boundary_refuses_unsafe_custody(tmp_path, defect): - root = private_root(tmp_path) - source = root / 'lldap/secrets.env' - if defect == 'symlink_file': - original = root / 'lldap/original' - source.rename(original) - source.symlink_to(original) - elif defect == 'hardlink_file': - os.link(source, root / 'lldap/alias') - elif defect == 'public_parent': - root.chmod(0o755) - elif defect == 'duplicate_field': - source.write_text(source.read_text() + 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=second\n') - elif defect == 'git_root': - (root / '.git').mkdir() - (root / '.git/HEAD').write_text('ref: refs/heads/main\n') - with patch.object(admin, 'LLDAPProvisioner') as provider, contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - assert admin.main(['bootstrap', '--root', str(root)]) == 1 - provider.assert_not_called() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('extra', [['--apply'], ['--expected-digest', '0' * 64], ['--apply', '--expected-digest', 'not-a-digest']]) -def test_apply_binding_errors_refuse_before_credential_read(extra): - with patch.object(admin, 'private_password') as private, contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - assert admin.main(['bootstrap', '--root', '/not-read', *extra]) == 1 - private.assert_not_called() diff --git a/tests/test_mfa_state_diagnostic.py b/tests/test_mfa_state_diagnostic.py deleted file mode 100644 index aea8ff4..0000000 --- a/tests/test_mfa_state_diagnostic.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,233 +0,0 @@ -"""Diagnostic regressions: private inputs, actual HTTP transport, fail-closed counts.""" -import base64 -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -import threading -import time -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer -from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -HELPERS = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea' -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('mfa_state', HELPERS / 'mfa_state.py') -m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(m) - - -def jwt(**changes): - claims = {'role': 'admin', 'exp': time.time() + 300, **changes} - encoded = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(claims).encode()).rstrip(b'=').decode() - return 'eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.' + encoded + '.syntheticSignature' - - -def page(rows): - return {'tokens': rows, 'count': len(rows), 'current': 1, 'next': None, 'prev': None} - - -def factor(serial='synthetic-factor', **changes): - return {'serial': serial, 'active': True, 'user_id': '1001', 'username': 'alice', - 'user_realm': 'coulomb', 'realms': ['coulomb'], 'rollout_state': 'enrolled', **changes} - - -def probe(**changes): - return factor(m.PROBE, active=False, user_id='', username='', **changes) - - -@pytest.fixture -def server(): - state = {'user': page([factor()]), 'proof': page([probe()]), 'requests': [], 'calls': 0} - class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def log_message(self, *_): pass - def do_GET(self): - state['requests'].append((self.path, dict(self.headers))) - state['calls'] += 1 - if state.get('status'): - self.send_response(state['status']) - self.send_header('Location', state.get('location', '/stolen')) - self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(b'private-provider-message'); return - query = parse_qs(urlsplit(self.path).query) - value = state['proof'] if 'serial' in query else state['user'] - if state.get('withdraw_after_user') and state['calls'] >= 3: value = page([]) - body = json.dumps({'result': {'status': True, 'value': value}}).encode() - self.send_response(200); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(state.get('raw', body)) - s = ThreadingHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler) - t = threading.Thread(target=s.serve_forever, daemon=True); t.start() - try: yield f'http://127.0.0.1:{s.server_port}', state - finally: s.shutdown(); s.server_close(); t.join() - - -@pytest.fixture -def token_file(tmp_path): - private = tmp_path / 'private'; private.mkdir(mode=0o700) - path = private / 'input'; path.write_text(jwt() + '\n'); path.chmod(0o600) - return path - - -def invoke(token_file, url, *extra): - return subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(HELPERS / 'check-user-mfa-state.sh'), 'alice', - '--token-file', str(token_file), '--pi-url', url, *extra], - capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) - - -def test_real_http_cli_reports_complete_private_counts(server, token_file, monkeypatch): - url, state = server - state['user'] = page([factor(str(i)) for i in range(18)] + - [factor('pending', rollout_state='verify'), factor('inactive', active=False)]) - monkeypatch.setenv('http_proxy', 'http://127.0.0.1:1'); monkeypatch.setenv('HTTP_PROXY', 'http://127.0.0.1:1') - monkeypatch.setenv('no_proxy', ''); monkeypatch.setenv('NO_PROXY', '') - p = invoke(token_file, url) - assert p.returncode == 0, p.stderr - data = json.loads(p.stdout) - assert data['factors'] == {'total': 20, 'active_confirmed': 18, 'active_pending': 1, 'inactive': 1} - assert data['user_existence'] == 'not_checked' and data['mfa_login'] == 'not_tested' - assert len(state['requests']) == 3 - for path, headers in state['requests']: - assert urlsplit(path).path == '/token/' and 'Content-Type' not in headers - assert headers['Authorization'] == token_file.read_text().strip() - assert token_file.read_text().strip() not in p.stdout + p.stderr - assert str(token_file) not in p.stdout + p.stderr - assert 'synthetic-factor' not in p.stdout - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mutation', ['empty', 'assigned', 'active', 'realm', 'serial', 'count', 'withdraw']) -def test_scope_uncertainty_never_reports_zero(server, mutation): - url, state = server; state['user'] = page([]) - if mutation == 'empty': state['proof'] = page([]) - elif mutation == 'assigned': state['proof']['tokens'][0]['user_id'] = 'someone' - elif mutation == 'active': state['proof']['tokens'][0]['active'] = True - elif mutation == 'realm': state['proof']['tokens'][0]['realms'] = ['other'] - elif mutation == 'serial': state['proof']['tokens'][0]['serial'] = 'other' - elif mutation == 'count': state['proof']['count'] = 2 - elif mutation == 'withdraw': state['withdraw_after_user'] = True - with pytest.raises(m.Refused): m.diagnose(m.Client(url, jwt()), 'alice') - - -def test_empty_verified_result_is_not_proof_user_exists(server): - url, state = server; state['user'] = page([]) - data = m.diagnose(m.Client(url, jwt()), 'alice') - assert data['factors']['total'] == 0 and data['user_existence'] == 'not_checked' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mutation', ['truncated', 'duplicate', 'next', 'count-bool', 'current-bool', 'wrong-user', 'wrong-realm', 'missing-active', 'missing-state', 'unknown-state']) -def test_malformed_or_incomplete_user_result_refused(server, mutation): - url, state = server; value = state['user']; row = value['tokens'][0] - if mutation == 'truncated': value['count'] = 20 - elif mutation == 'duplicate': value['tokens'].append(copy.deepcopy(row)); value['count'] = 2 - elif mutation == 'next': value['next'] = 2 - elif mutation == 'count-bool': value['count'] = True - elif mutation == 'current-bool': value['current'] = True - elif mutation == 'wrong-user': row['username'] = 'bob' - elif mutation == 'wrong-realm': row['user_realm'] = 'other' - elif mutation == 'missing-active': row.pop('active') - elif mutation == 'missing-state': row.pop('rollout_state') - elif mutation == 'unknown-state': row['rollout_state'] = 'new-unreviewed-state' - with pytest.raises(m.Refused): m.diagnose(m.Client(url, jwt()), 'alice') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mode', ['public', 'symlink', 'hardlink', 'fifo', 'directory', 'public-parent', 'bad-jwt', 'self-service', 'expired', 'oversized', 'inside-git']) -def test_bad_input_precedes_any_network(server, token_file, mode): - url, state = server - if mode == 'public': token_file.chmod(0o644) - elif mode == 'symlink': token_file.rename(token_file.with_suffix('.real')); token_file.symlink_to(token_file.with_suffix('.real')) - elif mode == 'hardlink': os.link(token_file, token_file.with_suffix('.link')) - elif mode == 'fifo': token_file.unlink(); os.mkfifo(token_file, 0o600) - elif mode == 'directory': token_file.unlink(); token_file.mkdir(mode=0o700) - elif mode == 'public-parent': token_file.parent.chmod(0o755) - elif mode == 'bad-jwt': token_file.write_text('private-secret-not-a-jwt') - elif mode == 'self-service': token_file.write_text(jwt(role='user')) - elif mode == 'expired': token_file.write_text(jwt(exp=1)) - elif mode == 'oversized': token_file.write_bytes(b'x' * 16386) - elif mode == 'inside-git': (token_file.parent / '.git').mkdir(); (token_file.parent / '.git/HEAD').write_text('ref: refs/heads/main') - p = invoke(token_file, url) - assert p.returncode == 1 and not p.stdout and 'unverified' in p.stderr - assert 'private-secret' not in p.stderr and not state['requests'] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('url', ['https://attacker.invalid', 'http://pink.coulomb.social', 'http://localhost:8000', - 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/path', 'http://127.0.0.1:8000?x=1', - 'https://user:password@pink.coulomb.social', 'http://127.1:8000']) -def test_destination_is_checked_before_credential(url, tmp_path): - p = invoke(tmp_path/'absent', url) - assert p.returncode == 1 and not p.stdout and 'password' not in p.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('status', [301, 302, 307, 308, 401, 403, 500]) -def test_no_redirect_or_provider_error_leak(server, token_file, status): - url, state = server; state['status'] = status - p = invoke(token_file, url) - assert p.returncode == 1 and not p.stdout - assert len(state['requests']) == 1 and 'private-provider-message' not in p.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('raw', [b'{"result":{"status":false,"error":{"message":"private-provider-message"}}}', - b'{"result":{"status":true,"status":false}}', b'not-json', b'x'*(m.MAX_BODY+1)], ids=['error', 'duplicate', 'invalid', 'oversized']) -def test_bad_provider_body_is_sanitized(server, token_file, raw): - url, state = server; state['raw'] = raw - p = invoke(token_file, url) - assert p.returncode == 1 and not p.stdout and 'private-provider-message' not in p.stderr - - -def test_unknown_argument_is_not_echoed(server, token_file): - url, state = server - p = invoke(token_file, url, '--unknown=private-argument') - assert p.returncode == 1 and 'private-argument' not in p.stderr and not state['requests'] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('username', ['alice&realm=other', '*', 'alice@other', '../alice']) -def test_provider_expansion_is_refused_before_request(server, username): - url, state = server - with pytest.raises(m.Refused): m.diagnose(m.Client(url, jwt()), username) - assert not state['requests'] - - -def test_real_privacyidea_contract(): - pytest.importorskip('privacyidea') - p = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT/'tests/mfa_state_native_fixture.py')], - capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180) - assert p.returncode == 0, p.stdout - data = json.loads(p.stdout) - assert len(data) == 7 and all(v is True for v in data.values()) - - -def test_untrusted_https_is_not_accepted_via_ambient_ca(tmp_path, token_file, monkeypatch): - import datetime - import ipaddress - import ssl - from cryptography import x509 - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID - key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) - name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, 'fixture')]) - now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc) - cert = (x509.CertificateBuilder().subject_name(name).issuer_name(name).public_key(key.public_key()) - .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number()).not_valid_before(now-datetime.timedelta(minutes=1)) - .not_valid_after(now+datetime.timedelta(hours=1)) - .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address('127.0.0.1'))]), False) - .sign(key, hashes.SHA256())) - cert_path = tmp_path/'cert.pem'; key_path = tmp_path/'key.pem' - cert_path.write_bytes(cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)) - key_path.write_bytes(key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption())) - key_path.chmod(0o600) - seen = [] - class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def log_message(self, *_): pass - def do_GET(self): seen.append(dict(self.headers)); self.send_error(500) - server = ThreadingHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler) - context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER); context.load_cert_chain(cert_path, key_path) - server.socket = context.wrap_socket(server.socket, server_side=True) - thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True); thread.start() - monkeypatch.setenv('SSL_CERT_FILE', str(cert_path)) - try: - p = invoke(token_file, f'https://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}') - assert p.returncode == 1 and not p.stdout and not seen - assert token_file.read_text().strip() not in p.stderr - finally: - server.shutdown(); server.server_close(); thread.join() diff --git a/tests/test_openbao_lab_boundary.py b/tests/test_openbao_lab_boundary.py deleted file mode 100644 index b1e5947..0000000 --- a/tests/test_openbao_lab_boundary.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -"""Private lab transport regression fixtures; never contacts a real cluster.""" -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SCRIPT = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/openbao-init-unseal.sh' - - -@pytest.fixture -def lab(tmp_path): - metadata = tmp_path / 'metadata.json' - metadata.write_text(json.dumps({'deployment_profile': 'lab', 'openbao_unseal_custody_model': 'sops-held-automation'})) - source = tmp_path / 'secrets'; source.mkdir(mode=0o700) - executable = tmp_path / 'kubectl' - executable.write_text('''#!/usr/bin/python3 -import json,os,pathlib,sys -root=pathlib.Path(os.environ['KUBECONFIG']).parent -state=root/'fixture-state.json' -x=json.loads(state.read_text()) if state.exists() else {'initialized':False,'sealed':True,'applied':0} -args=sys.argv[1:] -with (root/'calls.jsonl').open('a') as log: log.write(json.dumps(args)+'\\n') -assert not any(k in os.environ for k in ['VAULT_TOKEN','BAO_TOKEN','BASH_ENV']) -if args[:3]==['get','namespace','kube-system']: - print(json.dumps({'metadata':{'uid':'fixture-cluster'}})) -elif 'get' in args: - print(json.dumps({'metadata':{'uid':'fixture-pod','name':'openbao-0','namespace':'openbao'}})) -elif 'status' in args: - print(json.dumps(x));sys.exit(2 if x['sealed'] else 0) -elif 'init' in args: - x['initialized']=True;state.write_text(json.dumps(x)) - print(json.dumps({'unseal_keys_b64':['A'*32,'B'*32,'C'*32], 'root_token':'fixture-private-root-marker'})) -elif 'sys/unseal' in args: - assert sys.stdin.read().strip() in ['A'*32,'B'*32,'C'*32] - x['applied']+=1;x['sealed']=x['applied']<2;state.write_text(json.dumps(x)) - print('fixture-private-provider-response') -else: sys.exit(1) -print('fixture-private-provider-diagnostic',file=sys.stderr) -''') - executable.chmod(0o755) - env = {'PATH': str(tmp_path) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'HOME': str(tmp_path), - 'KUBECONFIG': str(tmp_path / 'fixture-kubeconfig'), - 'OPENBAO_CONSOLE_METADATA': str(metadata), 'OPENBAO_EXPECTED_CLUSTER_UID': 'fixture-cluster', - 'VAULT_TOKEN': 'fixture-ambient-token', 'BAO_TOKEN': 'fixture-ambient-token'} - return source, env, tmp_path - - -def invoke(lab): - source, env, _ = lab - return subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(SCRIPT), str(source)], env=env, capture_output=True, timeout=10) - - -def test_lab_init_unseal_keeps_material_private_and_never_uses_secret_argv(lab): - source, _, root = lab - r = invoke(lab) - assert r.returncode == 0 - transcript = r.stdout + r.stderr - assert not any(x in transcript for x in [b'fixture-private-root-marker', b'fixture-private-provider-response', - b'fixture-private-provider-diagnostic', b'A'*32, b'B'*32]) - material = source / 'openbao/init.json' - assert material.stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - calls = (root / 'calls.jsonl').read_bytes() - assert b'fixture-private-root-marker' not in calls - assert b'A'*32 not in calls and b'B'*32 not in calls - assert json.loads((root / 'fixture-state.json').read_text())['applied'] == 2 - - -def test_prior_init_material_refuses_new_init_without_overwrite(lab): - source, _, root = lab - directory = source / 'openbao'; directory.mkdir(mode=0o700) - file = directory / 'init.json'; file.write_bytes(b'fixture-existing-custody'); file.chmod(0o600) - r = invoke(lab) - assert r.returncode != 0 - assert file.read_bytes() == b'fixture-existing-custody' - assert not (root / 'fixture-state.json').exists() - assert b'"init"' not in (root / 'calls.jsonl').read_bytes() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('mutation', ['wrong-cluster', 'missing-profile', 'production', 'configure-initial']) -def test_lab_rejects_unadmitted_targets_and_automatic_root_followthrough(lab, mutation): - _, env, root = lab - if mutation == 'wrong-cluster': env['OPENBAO_EXPECTED_CLUSTER_UID'] = 'different-cluster' - elif mutation == 'configure-initial': env['OPENBAO_RUN_CONFIGURE_INITIAL'] = '1' - else: - data=json.loads(Path(env['OPENBAO_CONSOLE_METADATA']).read_text()) - if mutation == 'missing-profile': data.pop('deployment_profile') - else: data['deployment_profile']='production' - Path(env['OPENBAO_CONSOLE_METADATA']).write_text(json.dumps(data)) - r=invoke(lab) - assert r.returncode != 0 - assert not (root/'fixture-state.json').exists() diff --git a/tests/test_prepare_isolated_keycape.py b/tests/test_prepare_isolated_keycape.py deleted file mode 100644 index f486a77..0000000 --- a/tests/test_prepare_isolated_keycape.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -import copy -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import tempfile -import pty -import subprocess -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -ROOT=Path(__file__).parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('prepare',ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py') -p=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(p) - -class PreparationTests(unittest.TestCase): - def setUp(self): - self.temp=tempfile.TemporaryDirectory();self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup) - self.path=Path(self.temp.name)/'ciphertext';self.path.write_bytes(b'synthetic ciphertext');self.path.chmod(0o600) - self.transfer={'schema':'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1','status':'readback_verified','provider':'Storage Share', - 'folder':'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity','artifact':'net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age', - 'ciphertext_sha256':'a'*64,'ciphertext_bytes':len(b'synthetic ciphertext'),'etag':'"synthetic"','fetched_path':str(self.path), - 'independent_owner_retrieval_verified':True} - self.admission={name:'a'*64 for name in ('ciphertext_sha256','manifest_sha256','verifier_sha256','trust_sha256','tls_cert_sha256')} - self.admission.update(issuer='https://issuer.example',consumer=dict(client_id='existing',secret_env='KEYCAPE_EXISTING_SECRET',audience='existing-api',scope='read',subject='svc:existing',tenant='existing',roles='reader',deny_scope='write'), - source_sha256={name:'sha256:'+hashlib.sha256((ROOT/name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() for name in p.SOURCE_PATHS}) - def test_complete_public_bindings_admitted_without_reading_ciphertext(self): - original=Path.read_bytes - def read(path): - self.assertNotEqual(path,self.path) - return original(path) - with patch.object(Path,'read_bytes',read):self.assertTrue(p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT)) - def test_oversize_metadata_refused_before_any_content_read(self): - self.path.write_bytes(b'x'*(128*1024+1)) - with patch.object(Path,'read_bytes',side_effect=AssertionError('unbounded read')): - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.read_metadata(self.path) - def test_duplicate_json_keys_refused_at_every_level(self): - for raw in (b'{"issuer":"one","issuer":"two"}',b'{"consumer":{"client_id":"one","client_id":"two"}}'): - with self.subTest(raw=raw),self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.strict_json(raw) - def test_bounded_metadata_reader_accepts_exact_limit(self): - self.path.write_bytes(b'x'*128) - self.assertEqual(p.read_metadata(self.path,128),b'x'*128) - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.read_metadata(self.path,127) - def test_wrong_archive_binding_refused(self): - self.admission['ciphertext_sha256']='b'*64 - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - def test_ciphertext_size_mismatch_refused_without_decryption(self): - self.transfer['ciphertext_bytes']+=1 - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - def test_missing_independent_transfer_refused(self): - self.transfer['independent_owner_retrieval_verified']=False - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - def test_missing_or_drifted_source_refused(self): - for source in p.SOURCE_PATHS: - bad=copy.deepcopy(self.admission);bad['source_sha256'][source]='0'*64 - with self.subTest(source=source),self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,bad,ROOT) - bad=copy.deepcopy(self.admission);bad['source_sha256'].pop(next(iter(p.SOURCE_PATHS))) - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,bad,ROOT) - def test_unreviewed_extra_dependency_refused(self): - self.admission['source_sha256']['unreviewed.py']='a'*64 - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - def test_ambiguous_or_unsupported_issuer_refused(self): - for issuer in ('http://issuer.example','https://u:p@issuer.example','https://issuer.example:8443','https://issuer.example/path','https://issuer.example?x=1','https://issuer.example#fragment'): - self.admission['issuer']=issuer - with self.subTest(issuer=issuer),self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - def test_missing_consumer_or_overlapping_denial_refused(self): - self.admission['consumer']['deny_scope']='read' - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - self.admission['consumer'].pop('roles') - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.validate(self.transfer,self.admission,ROOT) - def test_symlink_private_input_refused_without_read(self): - link=self.path.parent/'link';link.symlink_to(self.path) - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.metadata_path(link) - def test_publicly_readable_private_input_refused(self): - self.path.chmod(0o644) - with self.assertRaises(p.Refused):p.metadata_path(self.path) - def test_bad_admission_digest_never_reads_tls_or_starts_custody(self): - admission=self.path.parent/'admission';admission.write_text(json.dumps(self.admission));admission.chmod(0o600) - argv=['prepare','--transfer-receipt',str(self.path),'--admission',str(admission),'--admission-sha256','b'*64, - '--tls-cert','/never/read-cert','--tls-key','/never/read-key','--trust','/never/read-trust'] - with patch('sys.argv',argv),patch('builtins.print') as output: - self.assertEqual(p.main(),1) - self.assertEqual(output.call_args.args,('ERROR: reviewed metadata/source/dependency preflight refused; no key requested.',)) - def test_actual_launcher_bad_digest_stops_before_hidden_prompt(self): - master,slave=pty.openpty() - try: - args=['bash',str(ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh'),str(self.path),str(self.path),'b'*64,str(self.path),str(self.path),str(self.path)] - process=subprocess.Popen(args,stdin=slave,stdout=slave,stderr=slave) - process.wait(timeout=5);os.close(slave);slave=None - output=b'' - while True: - try: - block=os.read(master,4096) - if not block:break - output+=block - except OSError:break - self.assertEqual(process.returncode,1) - self.assertIn(b'preflight refused; no key requested.',output) - self.assertNotIn(b'Paste custody',output) - self.assertNotIn(b'Enter only',output) - finally: - if slave is not None:os.close(slave) - os.close(master) - def test_launcher_prepares_before_sealed_descriptor_custody(self): - script=(ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh').read_text() - self.assertLess(script.index('python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py'),script.index('bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh')) - self.assertIn('--sealed-fd --prompt -- python3',script) diff --git a/tests/test_privacyidea_key_custody.py b/tests/test_privacyidea_key_custody.py deleted file mode 100644 index b465b54..0000000 --- a/tests/test_privacyidea_key_custody.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,314 +0,0 @@ -"""Key transport against real filesystem/crypto and a synthetic Kubernetes API.""" -import base64 -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess - -import pytest -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -PI = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea' - - -def module(name, file): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, file) - result = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(result) - return result - - -@pytest.fixture -def keys(): - private = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) - return {'enckey': os.urandom(96), - 'private.pem': private.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, serialization.NoEncryption()), - 'public.pem': private.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)} - - -@pytest.fixture -def case(tmp_path, keys): - root = tmp_path / 'private'; root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - (root / 'privacyidea').mkdir(mode=0o700) - volume = tmp_path / 'volume'; volume.mkdir(mode=0o750) - for name, value in keys.items(): - (volume / name).write_bytes(value); (volume / name).chmod(0o600) - binpath = tmp_path / 'bin'; binpath.mkdir() - metadata = lambda name, uid: {'name': name, 'namespace': 'mfa', 'uid': uid, 'resourceVersion': '1'} - mount = {'name': 'data', 'mountPath': '/etc/privacyidea'} - spec = {'securityContext': {'fsGroup': 999}, 'volumes': [{'name': 'data', 'persistentVolumeClaim': {'claimName': 'privacyidea-data'}}], - 'containers': [{'name': 'privacyidea', 'volumeMounts': [mount]}]} - deployment = {'apiVersion': 'apps/v1', 'kind': 'Deployment', 'metadata': {**metadata('privacyidea', 'deployment-uid'), 'generation': 1}, - 'spec': {'replicas': 1, 'template': {'spec': spec}}, 'status': {'replicas': 1, 'observedGeneration': 1}} - pod = {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'Pod', 'metadata': {**metadata('privacyidea-source', 'pod-uid'), - 'ownerReferences': [{'kind': 'ReplicaSet', 'name': 'privacyidea-rs', 'uid': 'rs-uid', 'controller': True}]}, - 'spec': spec, 'status': {'phase': 'Running', 'containerStatuses': [{'name': 'privacyidea', 'ready': True}]}} - state = {'deployment': deployment, 'pvc': {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'PersistentVolumeClaim', 'metadata': metadata('privacyidea-data', 'pvc-uid'), 'status': {'phase': 'Bound'}}, - 'pods': {'apiVersion': 'v1', 'kind': 'PodList', 'items': [pod]}, - 'replicaset': {'apiVersion': 'apps/v1', 'kind': 'ReplicaSet', 'metadata': {**metadata('privacyidea-rs', 'rs-uid'), - 'ownerReferences': [{'kind': 'Deployment', 'uid': 'deployment-uid', 'controller': True}]}}, 'secrets': {}} - statepath = tmp_path / 'state.json'; statepath.write_text(json.dumps(state)) - binary = binpath / 'kubectl' - binary.write_text('''#!/usr/bin/python3 -import base64,importlib.util,json,os,sys -from pathlib import Path -args=sys.argv[1:];p=Path(os.environ['STATE']);state=json.loads(p.read_text()) -raw=sys.stdin.buffer.read() if args[0] in ('exec','create','patch') else b'' -with open(os.environ['CALLS'],'a') as f:f.write(json.dumps({'args':args,'stdin':raw.decode()})+'\\n') -if os.environ.get('FAIL')==args[0]: - print('SYNTHETIC_SECRET_DIAGNOSTIC');print('SYNTHETIC_SECRET_DIAGNOSTIC',file=sys.stderr);sys.exit(1) -if args[0]=='get': - if args[1]=='secret': - obj=state['secrets'].get(args[2]);print(json.dumps(obj) if obj is not None else '');sys.exit(0) - if args[1]=='pod':print('privacyidea-source');sys.exit(0) - print(json.dumps(state[args[1]]));sys.exit(0) -if args[0]=='exec': - if args[-2]=='cat':sys.stdout.buffer.write((Path(os.environ['VOLUME'])/Path(args[-1]).name).read_bytes());sys.exit(0) - if 'test' in args:sys.exit(0) - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('remote',Path(os.environ['SOURCE'])/'key-custody-remote.py') - remote=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(remote) - assert args[-1]==(Path(os.environ['SOURCE'])/'key-custody-remote.py').read_text() - request=json.loads(raw) - result=remote.operate(request,Path(os.environ['VOLUME']),uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid()) - if os.environ.get('RACE')=='pod': - state['pods']['items'][0]['metadata']['uid']='changed-pod';p.write_text(json.dumps(state)) - print(json.dumps(result));sys.exit(0) -if args[0]=='create': - if 'generic' in args:print('{}');sys.exit(0) - obj=json.loads(raw);name=obj['metadata']['name'] - if name in state['secrets'] or os.environ.get('RACE')=='create':sys.exit(1) - obj['metadata'].update(uid='secret-'+name,resourceVersion='1') -elif args[0]=='patch': - name=args[2];obj=state['secrets'][name] - if os.environ.get('RACE')=='patch':sys.exit(1) - for operation in json.loads(raw): - parts=[v.replace('~1','/').replace('~0','~') for v in operation['path'].split('/')[1:]];parent=obj - for part in parts[:-1]:parent=parent[part] - if operation['op']=='test':assert parent[parts[-1]]==operation['value'] - elif operation['op']=='remove':del parent[parts[-1]] - else:sys.exit(2) - obj['metadata']['resourceVersion']='2' -elif args[0]=='apply':sys.exit(0) -else:sys.exit(2) -state['secrets'][name]=obj;p.write_text(json.dumps(state)) -if os.environ.get('BAD_RESPONSE'):obj['data']['unexpected']='eA==' -print(json.dumps(obj)) -'''); binary.chmod(0o700) - env = {'PATH': str(binpath) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'HOME': str(tmp_path), 'STATE': str(statepath), - 'CALLS': str(tmp_path/'calls'), 'VOLUME': str(volume), 'SOURCE': str(PI)} - return {'root': root, 'volume': volume, 'keys': keys, 'env': env, 'statepath': statepath} - - -def state(case): return json.loads(case['statepath'].read_text()) -def save(case, value): case['statepath'].write_text(json.dumps(value)) -def calls(case): - p=Path(case['env']['CALLS']);return [json.loads(line) for line in p.read_text().splitlines()] if p.exists() else [] - - -def invoke(case, action='export', *args, **extra): - script = 'enckey-bootstrap.sh' if action=='export' else 'enckey-restore.sh' - return subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(PI/script),str(case['root']),*args],env={**case['env'],**extra},capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=30) - - -def quiet(result, case): - assert 'SYNTHETIC_SECRET_DIAGNOSTIC' not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert 'BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY' not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert base64.b64encode(case['keys']['enckey']).decode() not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert 'Traceback' not in result.stdout+result.stderr - - -def test_export_roundtrip_and_preserves_matching_copies(case): - result=invoke(case);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result,case) - for name,value in case['keys'].items(): - p=case['root']/'privacyidea'/('pi.enc' if name=='enckey' else name) - assert p.read_bytes()==value and p.stat().st_mode & 0o077==0 - expected=state(case);count=len(calls(case));assert invoke(case).returncode==0 - assert state(case)==expected and all(c['args'][0] in ('get','exec') for c in calls(case)[count:]) - argv=json.dumps([c['args'] for c in calls(case)]) - assert base64.b64encode(case['keys']['enckey']).decode() not in argv - assert all(c['args'][0]!='apply' for c in calls(case)) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['different','symlink','hardlink','public','fifo']) -def test_export_refuses_bad_local_copy_before_secret_writes(case,defect): - p=case['root']/'privacyidea/pi.enc' - if defect=='fifo':os.mkfifo(p,0o600) - elif defect=='symlink':p.symlink_to(case['volume']/'enckey') - else: - p.write_bytes(b'old-copy' if defect=='different' else case['keys']['enckey']);p.chmod(0o644 if defect=='public' else 0o600) - if defect=='hardlink':os.link(p,p.with_name('alias')) - result=invoke(case);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - assert not state(case)['secrets'] and not (p.parent/'private.pem').exists() - if defect=='different':assert p.read_bytes()==b'old-copy' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['missing','short','link','mismatched-rsa']) -def test_export_refuses_invalid_remote_keys_without_generation(case,defect,keys): - p=case['volume']/'enckey' - if defect=='missing':p.unlink() - elif defect=='short':p.write_bytes(b'short') - elif defect=='link':os.link(p,p.with_name('alias')) - else: - other=rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537,key_size=2048) - (case['volume']/'public.pem').write_bytes(other.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)) - result=invoke(case);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - assert not list((case['root']/'privacyidea').iterdir()) and not state(case)['secrets'] - assert not any('pi-manage' in c['args'] for c in calls(case)) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['two-pods','not-ready','wrong-owner','wrong-pvc','pod-race']) -def test_export_binds_ready_owned_pod_and_pvc(case,defect): - obj=state(case);pod=obj['pods']['items'][0] - if defect=='two-pods':obj['pods']['items'].append(pod) - elif defect=='not-ready':pod['status']['containerStatuses'][0]['ready']=False - elif defect=='wrong-owner':obj['replicaset']['metadata']['ownerReferences'][0]['uid']='other' - elif defect=='wrong-pvc':pod['spec']['volumes'][0]['persistentVolumeClaim']['claimName']='other' - save(case,obj) - result=invoke(case,RACE='pod' if defect=='pod-race' else '');assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - assert not list((case['root']/'privacyidea').iterdir()) and not state(case)['secrets'] - - -def test_export_failure_retains_local_recovery_copies(case): - result=invoke(case,FAIL='create');assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - assert (case['root']/'privacyidea/pi.enc').read_bytes()==case['keys']['enckey'] - assert not list((case['root']/'privacyidea').glob('.key-export-*')) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['different','legacy-field','owner','immutable','create-race','bad-response']) -def test_export_existing_backup_and_race_refusal(case,defect): - if defect not in ('create-race','bad-response'): - assert invoke(case).returncode==0 - obj=state(case);secret=obj['secrets']['privacyidea-enckey'] - if defect=='different':secret['data']['enckey']=base64.b64encode(b'other').decode() - elif defect=='legacy-field':secret['data']['PI_ENCFILE']=secret['data'].pop('enckey') - elif defect=='owner':secret['metadata']['ownerReferences']=[{'uid':'other-owner'}] - else:secret['immutable']=True - save(case,obj) - before=state(case) - result=invoke(case,RACE='create' if defect=='create-race' else '',BAD_RESPONSE='yes' if defect=='bad-response' else '') - assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - if defect!='bad-response':assert state(case)==before - - -def test_export_removes_annotation_conditionally_and_preserves_extra_data(case): - assert invoke(case).returncode==0;obj=state(case) - for secret in obj['secrets'].values(): - secret['metadata']['annotations']={'kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration':'synthetic-copy','owner':'keep'} - secret['data']['extra']='eA==' - save(case,obj);assert invoke(case).returncode==0 - for secret in state(case)['secrets'].values(): - assert secret['metadata']['annotations']=={'owner':'keep'} and secret['data']['extra']=='eA==' - patches=[json.loads(c['stdin']) for c in calls(case) if c['args'][0]=='patch'] - assert len(patches)==2 and all({op['path'] for op in patch if op['op']=='test'}=={'/metadata/uid','/metadata/resourceVersion','/data'} for patch in patches) - - -def test_explicit_first_bootstrap_creates_only_missing_audit_pair(case): - for name in ('private.pem','public.pem'):(case['volume']/name).unlink() - assert invoke(case).returncode!=0 - result=invoke(case,'export','--initialize-audit-keys');assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result,case) - assert (case['volume']/'enckey').read_bytes()==case['keys']['enckey'] - assert invoke(case,'export','--initialize-audit-keys').returncode!=0 - assert invoke(case).returncode==0 - - -def recovery(case): - assert invoke(case).returncode==0 - host=module('host',PI/'key-custody.py') - pod=host.render('ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:'+'a'*64,'pvc-uid') - pod['metadata'].update(uid='restore-pod-uid',resourceVersion='1') - pod['status']={'phase':'Running','containerStatuses':[{'name':'recovery','ready':True}]} - obj=state(case);obj['pods']['items']=[pod];obj['deployment']['spec']['replicas']=0;obj['deployment']['status']['replicas']=0;save(case,obj) - for name in case['keys']:(case['volume']/name).unlink() - - -def test_restore_installs_on_actual_volume_and_retry_preserves_files(case): - recovery(case);result=invoke(case,'restore','--pvc-uid','pvc-uid');assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result,case) - for name,value in case['keys'].items():assert (case['volume']/name).read_bytes()==value - before={p.name:p.stat().st_ino for p in case['volume'].iterdir()} - assert invoke(case,'restore','--pvc-uid','pvc-uid').returncode==0 - assert before=={p.name:p.stat().st_ino for p in case['volume'].iterdir()} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['deployment-running','pod-terminating','other-pod','wrong-pvc-uid','mutable-image','no-mount','app-entrypoint','token-mount']) -def test_restore_rejects_unstopped_or_wrong_target_before_key_transfer(case,defect): - recovery(case);obj=state(case);pod=obj['pods']['items'][0] - if defect=='deployment-running':obj['deployment']['spec']['replicas']=1 - elif defect=='pod-terminating':pod['metadata']['deletionTimestamp']='now' - elif defect=='other-pod':obj['pods']['items'].append(pod) - elif defect=='wrong-pvc-uid':obj['pvc']['metadata']['uid']='replacement-pvc' - elif defect=='mutable-image':pod['spec']['containers'][0]['image']='image:latest' - elif defect=='no-mount':pod['spec']['containers'][0]['volumeMounts']=[] - elif defect=='app-entrypoint':pod['spec']['containers'][0]['command']=['pi-manage','run'] - else:pod['spec']['automountServiceAccountToken']=True - save(case,obj);count=len(calls(case));result=invoke(case,'restore','--pvc-uid','pvc-uid') - assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - assert not list(case['volume'].iterdir()) and all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(case)[count:]) - - -def test_restore_refuses_partial_mismatching_state_without_overwrite(case): - recovery(case);p=case['volume']/'private.pem';p.write_bytes(b'other');p.chmod(0o600) - result=invoke(case,'restore','--pvc-uid','pvc-uid');assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case) - assert p.read_bytes()==b'other' and not (case['volume']/'enckey').exists() - - -def test_restored_key_decrypts_existing_native_privacyidea_values(case): - pytest.importorskip('privacyidea') - from privacyidea.lib.security.default import DefaultSecurityModule - source=DefaultSecurityModule({'file':str(case['volume']/'enckey')}) - ciphertext=source.encrypt_pin('synthetic-token-pin') - password=source.encrypt_password('synthetic-configuration-value') - from privacyidea.lib.crypto import Sign - signer=Sign((case['volume']/'private.pem').read_bytes(),(case['volume']/'public.pem').read_bytes()) - signature=signer.sign('synthetic-audit-record') - recovery(case);assert invoke(case,'restore','--pvc-uid','pvc-uid').returncode==0 - restored=DefaultSecurityModule({'file':str(case['volume']/'enckey')}) - assert restored.decrypt_pin(ciphertext)=='synthetic-token-pin' - assert restored.decrypt_password(password)=='synthetic-configuration-value' - recovered_signer=Sign((case['volume']/'private.pem').read_bytes(),(case['volume']/'public.pem').read_bytes()) - assert recovered_signer.verify('synthetic-audit-record',signature) - assert signer.verify('synthetic-new-audit-record',recovered_signer.sign('synthetic-new-audit-record')) - - -def test_remote_partial_restore_keeps_keys_and_retries_without_replacement(tmp_path, keys, monkeypatch): - remote=module('partial_remote',PI/'key-custody-remote.py') - real_link=remote.os.link - def interrupted(source,target,**kwargs): - if target=='public.pem':raise OSError('synthetic-write-failure') - return real_link(source,target,**kwargs) - request={'action':'restore','keys':{k:base64.b64encode(v).decode() for k,v in keys.items()}} - monkeypatch.setattr(remote.os,'link',interrupted) - with pytest.raises(OSError):remote.operate(request,tmp_path,uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid()) - assert (tmp_path/'enckey').read_bytes()==keys['enckey'] - assert (tmp_path/'private.pem').read_bytes()==keys['private.pem'] - assert not list(tmp_path.glob('.key-custody-*')) - inodes={p.name:p.stat().st_ino for p in tmp_path.iterdir()} - monkeypatch.setattr(remote.os,'link',real_link) - assert remote.operate(request,tmp_path,uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid())=={'result':'restored'} - assert all((tmp_path/name).stat().st_ino==inode for name,inode in inodes.items()) - - -def test_remote_partial_audit_initialization_cannot_generate_another_pair(tmp_path, keys, monkeypatch): - remote=module('init_remote',PI/'key-custody-remote.py') - p=tmp_path/'enckey';p.write_bytes(keys['enckey']);p.chmod(0o600) - real_link=remote.os.link - def interrupted(source,target,**kwargs): - if target=='public.pem':raise OSError('synthetic-write-failure') - return real_link(source,target,**kwargs) - monkeypatch.setattr(remote.os,'link',interrupted) - with pytest.raises(OSError):remote.operate({'action':'initialize-audit'},tmp_path,uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid()) - before=(tmp_path/'private.pem').read_bytes() - monkeypatch.setattr(remote.os,'link',real_link) - with pytest.raises(remote.Refused):remote.operate({'action':'initialize-audit'},tmp_path,uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid()) - assert (tmp_path/'private.pem').read_bytes()==before - - -def test_unknown_argument_is_not_echoed(case): - result=invoke(case,'export','--SYNTHETIC_SECRET_DIAGNOSTIC') - assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result,case);assert not calls(case) - - -def test_kubectl_generic_list_output_is_accepted(case): - obj=state(case);obj['pods']['kind']='List';save(case,obj) - assert invoke(case).returncode==0 diff --git a/tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py b/tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py deleted file mode 100644 index 76c87a3..0000000 --- a/tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ -"""Transfer binding failures and a real disposable PostgreSQL fixture restore.""" -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import tempfile -import time -import uuid -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,ROOT/f'tools/bootstrap-recovery/{name}.py') - module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -fetch=load('fetch-privacyidea-backup') -drill=load('check-privacyidea-database') - - -class Response(io.BytesIO): - def __init__(self,body=b'abc',etag='"same"',length='3',status=200): - super().__init__(body);self.status=status - self.url=fetch.owner.HOST+fetch.owner.BASE+fetch.OBJECT - self.headers={'ETag':etag,'Content-Length':length} - - -class Provider: - def __init__(self,responses):self.responses=iter(responses);self.requests=[] - def open(self,req,timeout):self.requests.append(req);return next(self.responses) - - -def test_transfer_binds_head_get_and_recheck(monkeypatch,tmp_path): - monkeypatch.setattr(fetch,'SIZE',3) - provider=Provider([Response(),Response(),Response()]);target=tmp_path/'ciphertext' - result=fetch.transfer(provider,'disposable-test-auth',target) - assert result['ciphertext_sha256']==hashlib.sha256(b'abc').hexdigest() - assert target.stat().st_mode&0o077==0 - assert provider.requests[1].get_header('If-match')=='"same"' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('responses',[ - [Response(etag='W/"weak"')], - [Response(),Response(etag='"changed"')], - [Response(),Response(body=b'ab')], - [Response(),Response(body=b'abcd')], - [Response(),Response(),Response(etag='"changed"')], - [Response(status=302)], -]) -def test_provider_changes_truncation_oversize_and_redirect_refuse(monkeypatch,tmp_path,responses): - monkeypatch.setattr(fetch,'SIZE',3) - with pytest.raises(fetch.owner.Refused):fetch.transfer(Provider(responses),'fixture',tmp_path/'ciphertext') - - -def test_existing_ciphertext_is_preserved(monkeypatch,tmp_path): - monkeypatch.setattr(fetch,'SIZE',3);target=tmp_path/'ciphertext';target.write_bytes(b'existing') - with pytest.raises(FileExistsError):fetch.transfer(Provider([Response(),Response()]),'fixture',target) - assert target.read_bytes()==b'existing' - - -def test_transfer_digest_and_permissions_gate_private_key_use(monkeypatch,tmp_path): - monkeypatch.setattr(drill,'SIZE',3) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-offhost-',dir='/tmp') as directory: - target=Path(directory)/'privacyidea.dump.age';target.write_bytes(b'abc');target.chmod(0o600) - r={'schema':'netkingdom.privacyidea-offhost-transfer.v1','status':'ciphertext_fetched', - 'object':drill.OBJECT,'ciphertext_bytes':3,'object_unchanged_during_transfer':True, - 'ciphertext_path':str(target),'ciphertext_sha256':hashlib.sha256(b'abc').hexdigest()} - receipt=tmp_path/'receipt.json';receipt.write_text(json.dumps(r)) - assert drill.transfer_input(receipt)[0]==b'abc' - target.chmod(0o644) - with pytest.raises(drill.Refused):drill.transfer_input(receipt) - target.chmod(0o600);target.write_bytes(b'bad') - with pytest.raises(drill.Refused):drill.transfer_input(receipt) - - -@pytest.mark.skipif(os.environ.get('NK49_RUN_DISPOSABLE_POSTGRES_TEST')!='1',reason='explicit local Docker fixture opt-in') -def test_real_disposable_custom_dump_restore_and_readback(tmp_path,monkeypatch,capsys): - """No provider/key/production access: three synthetic PI-shaped tables.""" - fixture='nk49-fixture-'+uuid.uuid4().hex;restored='nk49-fixture-'+uuid.uuid4().hex - def command(args,**kwargs): - return subprocess.run(args,check=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,timeout=120,**kwargs).stdout - try: - command(['docker','run','--detach','--pull=never','--name',fixture,'--network','none', - '--tmpfs','/var/lib/postgresql/data:rw,size=268435456', - '--env','POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust',drill.IMAGE,'postgres','-c','listen_addresses=']) - for _ in range(60): - probe=subprocess.run(['docker','exec',fixture,'pg_isready','-U','postgres'],capture_output=True) - if probe.returncode==0:break - time.sleep(1) - command(['docker','exec','-i',fixture,'psql','-X','-U','postgres','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1'], - input=b'CREATE TABLE token(id integer); INSERT INTO token VALUES (1),(2); CREATE TABLE resolver(id integer); CREATE TABLE realm(id integer); INSERT INTO realm VALUES (1);') - dump=tmp_path/'fixture.dump' - dump.write_bytes(command(['docker','exec',fixture,'pg_dump','-U','postgres','-Fc','postgres'])) - result=drill.restore(dump,restored) - assert result['aggregate_row_counts']=={'token':2,'resolver':0,'realm':1} - assert '16.' in result['pg_restore_version'] - # Exercise the actual custody/decryption/negative/restore/cleanup path - # with a freshly created fixture key, never an operator key. - key=tmp_path/'fixture.key' - command(['age-keygen','-o',str(key)]) - recipient=command(['age-keygen','-y',str(key)]).decode().strip() - blob=command(['age','-r',recipient],input=dump.read_bytes()) - monkeypatch.setenv('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE',str(key)) - monkeypatch.setattr(drill,'RECIPIENT',recipient) - monkeypatch.setattr(drill,'SIZE',len(blob)) - monkeypatch.setattr(drill,'transfer_input',lambda path:(blob,hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest())) - receipt=tmp_path/'drill.json' - monkeypatch.setattr('sys.argv',['check','--transfer-receipt','fixture','--receipt',str(receipt)]) - assert drill.main()==0 - r=json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - assert r['wrong_key_refused'] and r['offhost_ciphertext_decryption_verified'] - assert r['aggregate_row_counts']=={'token':2,'resolver':0,'realm':1} - assert r['container_cleanup_verified'] and r['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] - assert r['native_identity_recovery_proven'] is False - assert 'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' not in capsys.readouterr().out - failed=tmp_path/'wrong-recipient.json' - monkeypatch.setattr(drill,'RECIPIENT','age1invalid') - monkeypatch.setattr('sys.argv',['check','--transfer-receipt','fixture','--receipt',str(failed)]) - assert drill.main()==1 - assert json.loads(failed.read_text())['status']=='failed' - finally: - for name in (fixture,restored): - subprocess.run(['docker','rm','--force','--volumes',name],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=30) diff --git a/tests/test_privacyidea_verification.py b/tests/test_privacyidea_verification.py index 54f315f..da377fa 100644 --- a/tests/test_privacyidea_verification.py +++ b/tests/test_privacyidea_verification.py @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ def result(value, **extra): @pytest.fixture def target(): state = { - "/auth": result({"token": "test-token", "role": "admin"}), + "/auth": result({"token": "test-token"}), "/realm/": result({"coulomb": {"resolver": [{"name": "lldap-coulomb"}]}}), "/resolver/lldap-coulomb": result( { @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ def test_shell_entrypoint_requires_attendance_and_does_not_read_bundle(): @pytest.mark.parametrize("policy_ok", [True, False]) -def test_bootstrap_preserves_policy_and_existing_configuration( +def test_bootstrap_uses_shared_transport_and_reports_full_result( target, tmp_path, policy_ok ): url, state = target @@ -196,64 +196,23 @@ def test_bootstrap_preserves_policy_and_existing_configuration( state["/policy/totp-self-enrollment"] = None for folder, content in [ ("privacyidea", "PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=test-password\n"), - ("lldap", "LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS=test-bind-password\n"), + ("lldap", "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=test-bind-password\n"), ]: directory = tmp_path / folder - directory.mkdir(mode=0o700) + directory.mkdir() (directory / "secrets.env").write_text(content) - (directory / "secrets.env").chmod(0o600) - state["/resolver/lldap-coulomb"]["result"]["value"]["lldap-coulomb"]["data"].update({ - "LDAPURI": "ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890", "LDAPBASE": "dc=netkingdom,dc=local", - "BINDDN": "uid=svc-privacyidea,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local"}) proc = subprocess.run( - ["bash", str(HELPERS / "bootstrap-realm.sh"), str(tmp_path), url, "--apply"], + ["bash", str(HELPERS / "bootstrap-realm.sh"), str(tmp_path), url], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, ) - assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr - report = json.loads(proc.stdout) - assert report["configuration_writes"] == 0 and report["policies_changed"] is False - assert not any(path.startswith("/policy") for _, path, _, _ in state["requests"]) + assert proc.returncode == (0 if policy_ok else 1) + assert "Realm bootstrap: PASS=" in proc.stdout + assert "FAIL=0" in proc.stdout if policy_ok else "FAIL=1" in proc.stdout for secret in ["test-token", "test-password", "test-bind-password"]: assert secret not in proc.stdout + proc.stderr assert any( method == "GET" and path == "/resolver/lldap-coulomb" for method, path, _, _ in state["requests"] ) - - -def test_attended_repair_keeps_inputs_in_memory_and_propagates_mfa(target, monkeypatch): - import os - import pty - import selectors - import time - url, state = target - state['/resolver/lldap-coulomb']['result']['value']['lldap-coulomb']['data'].update({ - 'LDAPURI':'ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890','LDAPBASE':'dc=netkingdom,dc=local', - 'BINDDN':'uid=svc-privacyidea,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local'}) - monkeypatch.setenv('PI_URL',url);monkeypatch.setenv('MFA_USER','test-user') - master,slave=pty.openpty() - proc=subprocess.Popen(['bash',str(HELPERS/'repair-realm-live.sh')],stdin=slave,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE) - os.close(slave);selector=selectors.DefaultSelector();selector.register(proc.stderr,selectors.EVENT_READ) - errors=b'';sent_password=False;sent_otp=False;deadline=time.monotonic()+30 - try: - while proc.poll() is None and time.monotonic(){m.BASE}{FOLDER}/{urllib.parse.quote(n)}" - f"{s}" - f"HTTP/1.1 200 OK" - for n, s in [*self.files.items(), *self.extra] - ) - body = ( - f'{m.BASE}{FOLDER}/' - f"{rows}" - ).encode() - return Response(207, url, body) - name = urllib.parse.unquote(url.rsplit("/", 1)[1]) - if method == "DELETE": - del self.files[name] - self.deleted.append(name) - return Response(204, url) - if method == "HEAD": - if name in self.files: - return Response(200, url) - raise urllib.error.HTTPError(url, 404, "Not Found", None, None) - raise AssertionError(method) - - -def make_plan(tmp_path, share, *extra): - path = tmp_path / "plan.json" - assert ( - m.main( - ["plan", "--folder", FOLDER, "--plan", str(path), *extra], - client=share, - secret="pw", - ) - == 0 - ) - return path, hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - - -def test_plan_keeps_newest_daily_and_weekly_per_database(tmp_path, capsys): - share = Share( - {**names(range(1, 29)), **names(range(1, 29), "net-kingdom-pg-other_db")} - ) - path, _ = make_plan(tmp_path, share) - plan = json.loads(path.read_text()) - for prefix in ("net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea_db", "net-kingdom-pg-other_db"): - kept = sorted(n for n in plan["keep"] if n.startswith(prefix + "-")) - assert ( - f"{prefix}-20261028T023000Z.dump.age" in kept - and f"{prefix}-20261022T023000Z.dump.age" in kept - ) - assert 7 <= len(kept) <= 11 - assert not share.deleted and set(plan["keep"]) | set(plan["delete"]) == set( - share.files - ) - assert "plan sha256" in capsys.readouterr().out - - -def test_delete_needs_the_plan_hash_and_removes_only_planned_files(tmp_path): - share = Share(names(range(1, 29))) - path, digest = make_plan(tmp_path, share) - plan = json.loads(path.read_text()) - assert ( - m.main( - [ - "delete", - "--plan", - str(path), - "--confirm", - "0" * 64, - "--receipt", - str(tmp_path / "r0.json"), - ], - client=share, - secret="pw", - ) - == 1 - ) - assert not share.deleted - assert ( - m.main( - [ - "delete", - "--plan", - str(path), - "--confirm", - digest, - "--receipt", - str(tmp_path / "r.json"), - ], - client=share, - secret="pw", - ) - == 0 - ) - assert sorted(share.deleted) == sorted(plan["delete"]) and set(share.files) == set( - plan["keep"] - ) - receipt = json.loads((tmp_path / "r.json").read_text()) - assert ( - receipt["kept_all_present"] - and receipt["deleted"] == len(plan["delete"]) - and "pw" not in json.dumps(receipt) - ) - - -def test_delete_refuses_when_the_folder_changed_since_the_plan(tmp_path): - share = Share(names(range(1, 29))) - path, digest = make_plan(tmp_path, share) - victim = min(json.loads(path.read_text())["delete"]) - share.files[victim] += 1 - assert ( - m.main( - [ - "delete", - "--plan", - str(path), - "--confirm", - digest, - "--receipt", - str(tmp_path / "r.json"), - ], - client=share, - secret="pw", - ) - == 1 - ) - assert not share.deleted - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("folder", ["net-kingdom-identity", "openbao", "r01-x/..", ""]) -def test_only_r01_dump_folders_are_accepted(tmp_path, folder): - assert ( - m.main( - ["plan", "--folder", folder, "--plan", str(tmp_path / "p.json")], - client=Share({}), - secret="pw", - ) - == 1 - ) - - -def test_unexpected_entries_stop_the_plan(tmp_path): - share = Share(names(range(1, 9)), extra=[("notes.txt", 5)]) - assert ( - m.main( - ["plan", "--folder", FOLDER, "--plan", str(tmp_path / "p.json")], - client=share, - secret="pw", - ) - == 1 - ) - assert not (tmp_path / "p.json").exists() diff --git a/tests/test_realm_bootstrap.py b/tests/test_realm_bootstrap.py deleted file mode 100644 index ca684eb..0000000 --- a/tests/test_realm_bootstrap.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,269 +0,0 @@ -"""Configuration-preserving realm repair, private input and real HTTP boundaries.""" -import copy -import importlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -import threading -from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler,ThreadingHTTPServer -from urllib.parse import urlsplit -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -HELPERS=ROOT/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea' -sys.path.insert(0,str(HELPERS)) -r=importlib.import_module('realm_bootstrap') -p=importlib.import_module('pi_api') - - -def snapshot(): - return {'resolver':{'type':'ldapresolver','data':dict(r.CORE,**{**r.TUNING,'SIZELIMIT':'700'},BINDPW='__CENSORED__',TLS_VERIFY='True')}, - 'realms':{'coulomb':{'resolver':[{'name':r.RESOLVER,'priority':5}], 'default':False}, - 'other':{'resolver':[], 'default':True}}} - - -class Fake: - def __init__(self,state): self.state=copy.deepcopy(state);self.calls=[];self.fail=None;self.drift=None;self.reads=0 - def snapshot(self): - self.reads+=1 - if self.drift and self.reads==2:self.state['realms']['other']['default']=False - return copy.deepcopy(self.state) - def call(self,path,payload): - self.calls.append((path,copy.deepcopy(payload))) - if self.fail==path:raise r.Refused() - if path=='/resolver/'+r.RESOLVER: - if self.state['resolver'] is None:self.state['resolver']={'type':'ldapresolver','data':{}} - self.state['resolver']['data'].update({k:('__CENSORED__' if k=='BINDPW' else v) for k,v in payload.items() if k!='type'}) - return 1 - if path=='/realm/coulomb': - self.state['realms']['coulomb']={'resolver':[{'name':r.RESOLVER,'priority':1}],'default':False} - return {'added':[r.RESOLVER],'failed':[]} - if path=='/defaultrealm/coulomb':self.state['realms']['coulomb']['default']=True;return 1 - raise AssertionError('unexpected write') - - -def test_existing_configuration_is_noop_without_reading_bind_password(): - client=Fake(snapshot());before=copy.deepcopy(client.state) - def forbidden():raise AssertionError('existing bind must not be requested') - report=r.repair(client,forbidden,apply=True) - assert report['configuration_writes']==0 and client.state==before and not client.calls - - -def test_missing_tuning_is_minimal_and_preserves_nondefault_values(): - client=Fake(snapshot());del client.state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'];before=copy.deepcopy(client.state) - report=r.repair(client,lambda:None,apply=True) - assert report['configuration_writes']==1 - assert client.calls==[('/resolver/'+r.RESOLVER,{'TIMEOUT':'5','type':'ldapresolver'})] - before['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT']='5';assert client.state==before - - -def test_missing_objects_are_created_and_other_default_is_preserved(): - state=snapshot();state['resolver']=None;del state['realms']['coulomb'];client=Fake(state) - result=r.repair(client,lambda:'fixture-bind',apply=True) - assert result['actions']==['create-resolver','create-realm'] - assert client.state['realms']['other']==state['realms']['other'] - assert all(not route.startswith('/policy') for route,_ in client.calls) - - -def test_first_realm_gets_explicit_initial_default(): - client=Fake({'resolver':None,'realms':{}}) - result=r.repair(client,lambda:'fixture-bind',apply=True) - assert result['configuration_writes']==3 and client.state['realms']['coulomb']['default'] is True - - -def test_preview_has_no_configuration_writes_or_bind_prompt(): - client=Fake({'resolver':None,'realms':{}}) - report=r.repair(client,lambda:(_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError()),apply=False) - assert report['result']=='planned' and not client.calls - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('field,value',[('type','other'),('LDAPURI','ldap://other'),('TIMEOUT','invalid')]) -def test_conflicting_profile_refused_before_any_write(field,value): - state=snapshot() - if field=='type':state['resolver']['type']=value - else:state['resolver']['data'][field]=value - client=Fake(state) - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(client,lambda:'fixture-bind',apply=True) - assert not client.calls - - -def test_existing_wrong_realm_binding_refused_before_resolver_write(): - state=snapshot();state['realms']['coulomb']['resolver']=[];del state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'];client=Fake(state) - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(client,lambda:None,apply=True) - assert not client.calls - - -def test_preflight_drift_refused(): - client=Fake(snapshot());del client.state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'];client.drift=True - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(client,lambda:None,apply=True) - assert not client.calls - - -def test_partial_failure_stops_without_policy_or_default_writes(): - client=Fake({'resolver':None,'realms':{}});client.fail='/realm/coulomb' - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(client,lambda:'fixture-bind',apply=True) - assert len(client.calls)==2 and client.state['resolver'] is not None - - -@pytest.fixture -def server(): - state={'requests':[],'response':{'result':{'status':True,'value':{}}},'status':200} - class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): - def log_message(self,*_):pass - def do_GET(self):self.respond() - def do_POST(self):self.respond() - def respond(self): - body=self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get('Content-Length',0))) - state['requests'].append((self.path,dict(self.headers),body)) - self.send_response(state['status']);self.send_header('Location','/leak');self.end_headers() - self.wfile.write(state.get('raw',json.dumps(state['response']).encode())) - s=ThreadingHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1',0),Handler);t=threading.Thread(target=s.serve_forever,daemon=True);t.start() - try:yield f'http://127.0.0.1:{s.server_port}',state - finally:s.shutdown();s.server_close();t.join() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('status',[301,302,307,308,401,403,500]) -def test_transport_does_not_follow_or_render_provider_failure(server,status): - url,state=server;state['status']=status;state['raw']=b'private-provider-error' - code,body=p.request(url+'/auth',{'password':'synthetic-password'},'synthetic-token') - assert code==status and body is None and len(state['requests'])==1 - - -def test_transport_ignores_proxy_and_preserves_bodyless_get(server,monkeypatch): - url,state=server - for name in ['http_proxy','HTTP_PROXY']:monkeypatch.setenv(name,'http://127.0.0.1:1') - for name in ['no_proxy','NO_PROXY']:monkeypatch.setenv(name,'') - assert p.request(url+'/realm/',token='fixture-token')[0]==200 - assert not state['requests'][0][2] and 'Content-Type' not in state['requests'][0][1] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('raw',[b'x'*(p.MAX_BODY+1),b'{"result":{"status":true,"status":false}}',b'bad-json'],ids=['oversized','duplicate','invalid']) -def test_transport_invalid_response_is_not_forwarded(server,raw): - url,state=server;state['raw']=raw - assert p.request(url+'/realm/')[1] is None - - -def test_transport_refuses_unapproved_destination(): - assert p.request('https://other.invalid/auth',{'password':'synthetic'})==(0,None) - - -@pytest.fixture -def private_root(tmp_path): - for component,key in [('privacyidea','PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD'),('lldap','LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS')]: - directory=tmp_path/component;directory.mkdir(mode=0o700) - f=directory/'secrets.env';f.write_text(key+'=literal-$(never-execute)-quote\'"\\end\n');f.chmod(0o600) - return tmp_path - - -def test_private_env_is_literal_not_shell(private_root): - a,b=r.private_inputs(private_root);assert a==b=="literal-$(never-execute)-quote'\"\\end" - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind',['symlink','hardlink','fifo','public-file','public-dir','duplicate','invalid']) -def test_private_input_rejected_before_network(private_root,server,kind): - f=private_root/'privacyidea/secrets.env' - if kind=='symlink':f.rename(f.with_suffix('.real'));f.symlink_to(f.with_suffix('.real')) - elif kind=='hardlink':os.link(f,f.with_suffix('.link')) - elif kind=='fifo':f.unlink();os.mkfifo(f,0o600) - elif kind=='public-file':f.chmod(0o644) - elif kind=='public-dir':f.parent.chmod(0o755) - elif kind=='duplicate':f.write_text('PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=one\nPI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=two\n') - elif kind=='invalid':f.write_text('touch forbidden-marker\n') - url,state=server - proc=subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(HELPERS/'bootstrap-realm.sh'),str(private_root),url,'--apply'],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=10) - assert proc.returncode==1 and not proc.stdout and not state['requests'] - assert 'literal-' not in proc.stderr and str(f) not in proc.stderr - - -def test_attended_wrapper_refuses_without_a_terminal(): - proc=subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(HELPERS/'repair-realm-live.sh')],stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,capture_output=True,text=True) - assert proc.returncode==1 and not proc.stdout and '"phase": "input"' in proc.stderr - - -def test_real_provider_merge_and_policy_preservation(): - pytest.importorskip('privacyidea') - proc=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'tests/realm_bootstrap_native_fixture.py')],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=120) - assert proc.returncode==0,proc.stdout - result=json.loads(proc.stdout);assert len(result)==6 and all(v is True for v in result.values()) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('role',[None,'user']) -def test_login_must_confirm_admin_role(server,role): - url,state=server;state['response']={'result':{'status':True,'value':{'token':'fixture-token','role':role}}} - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.Client(url,'fixture-password') - assert len(state['requests'])==1 and state['requests'][0][0]=='/auth' - - -def test_default_readback_refuses_unexpected_other_realm(): - class Concurrent(Fake): - def call(self,path,payload): - value=super().call(path,payload) - if path=='/defaultrealm/coulomb':self.state['realms']['unreviewed']={'default':False,'resolver':[]} - return value - client=Concurrent({'resolver':None,'realms':{}}) - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(client,lambda:'fixture-bind',apply=True) - assert len(client.calls)==3 - - -def legacy(): - state=snapshot();state['resolver']['data']['BINDDN']=r.LEGACY_BINDDN;return state - - -def test_legacy_human_bind_is_refused_without_explicit_switch(): - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(Fake(legacy()),lambda:'unused',apply=True) - - -def test_switch_bind_changes_only_the_bind_and_needs_the_service_password(): - client=Fake(legacy());before=copy.deepcopy(client.state) - preview=r.repair(Fake(legacy()),lambda:(_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError('no prompt in preview')),switch_bind=True) - assert preview['actions']==['switch-bind'] and preview['configuration_writes']==0 - report=r.repair(client,lambda:'svc-privacyidea-synthetic',apply=True,switch_bind=True) - assert report['actions']==['switch-bind'] and report['configuration_writes']==1 - assert client.calls==[('/resolver/'+r.RESOLVER,{'type':'ldapresolver','BINDDN':r.CORE['BINDDN'],'BINDPW':'svc-privacyidea-synthetic'})] - before['resolver']['data']['BINDDN']=r.CORE['BINDDN'];assert client.state==before - assert r.repair(client,lambda:'unused',apply=True,switch_bind=True)['configuration_writes']==0 - - -def test_switch_bind_refuses_other_drift_or_unknown_bind(): - state=legacy();del state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'] - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(Fake(state),lambda:'x',apply=True,switch_bind=True) - state=snapshot();state['resolver']['data']['BINDDN']='uid=someone,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local' - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(Fake(state),lambda:'x',apply=True,switch_bind=True) - - -def test_rotate_bind_rewrites_only_the_password_on_the_service_bind(): - client=Fake(snapshot());before=copy.deepcopy(client.state) - preview=r.repair(Fake(snapshot()),lambda:(_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError('no read in preview')),rotate_bind=True) - assert preview['actions']==['rotate-bind'] and preview['configuration_writes']==0 - report=r.repair(client,lambda:'rotated-synthetic',apply=True,rotate_bind=True) - assert report['actions']==['rotate-bind'] and report['configuration_writes']==1 - assert client.calls==[('/resolver/'+r.RESOLVER,{'type':'ldapresolver','BINDDN':r.CORE['BINDDN'],'BINDPW':'rotated-synthetic'})] - assert client.state==before - - -def test_rotate_bind_refuses_legacy_bind_pending_repairs_or_combined_switch(): - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(Fake(legacy()),lambda:'x',apply=True,rotate_bind=True) - state=snapshot();del state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'] - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(Fake(state),lambda:'x',apply=True,rotate_bind=True) - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.repair(Fake(snapshot()),lambda:'x',apply=True,rotate_bind=True,switch_bind=True) - - -class Run: - def __init__(self,policies=('platform-admin',),path='auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback',data=None): - self.out={('token','lookup'):{'data':{'policies':list(policies),'path':path}}, - ('read',):{'data':{'data':data if data is not None else {'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD':'from-openbao-synthetic'}}}} - self.argv=[] - def __call__(self,argv): - self.argv.append(argv) - key=('token','lookup') if argv[1:3]==['token','lookup'] else ('read',) - if key==('read',):assert argv[-1]==r.BIND_KV - return subprocess.CompletedProcess(argv,0,json.dumps(self.out[key]).encode(),b'') - - -def test_openbao_bind_reads_only_under_attended_platform_admin(): - assert r.openbao_bind(Run())=='from-openbao-synthetic' - for run in (Run(policies=('default',)),Run(policies=('platform-admin','root')),Run(path='auth/kubernetes/login'), - Run(data={'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD':'x','OTHER':'y'})): - with pytest.raises(r.Refused):r.openbao_bind(run) diff --git a/tests/test_reconcile_keycape_client_secret.py b/tests/test_reconcile_keycape_client_secret.py deleted file mode 100644 index f1d20a4..0000000 --- a/tests/test_reconcile_keycape_client_secret.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -"""Custody reconciliation of the KeyCape client secret against synthetic files and a read-only kubectl stub.""" -import base64 -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys - -import bcrypt -import pytest -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -TOOL = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py' -LIVE = 'LiveSyntheticClientCredential1234567890AB' -STALE = 'StaleSyntheticClientCredential1234567890A' - - -@pytest.fixture -def case(tmp_path): - private = tmp_path / 'private'; private.mkdir(mode=0o700) - authelia = private / 'authelia'; authelia.mkdir(mode=0o700) - env = authelia / 'secrets.env' - env.write_text(f'AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET={STALE}\nAUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET={STALE}\n'); env.chmod(0o600) - state = tmp_path / 'state'; state.mkdir() - hashed = bcrypt.hashpw(LIVE.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt(4)) - (state / 'authelia-secrets').write_text(json.dumps( - {'data': {'keycape_client_secret_hash': base64.b64encode(hashed).decode()}})) - write_keycape(state, LIVE) - binary = tmp_path / 'bin'; binary.mkdir() - (binary / 'kubectl').write_text(f'''#!{sys.executable} -import os,sys -from pathlib import Path -args=sys.argv[1:] -with open(os.environ['CALLS'],'a') as f:f.write(' '.join(args)+'\\n') -if args[:2]!=['get','secret']:sys.exit(9) -sys.stdout.write((Path(os.environ['STATE'])/args[2]).read_text()) -''') - (binary / 'kubectl').chmod(0o755) - environ = dict(os.environ, PATH=f'{binary}:{os.environ["PATH"]}', STATE=str(state), CALLS=str(tmp_path / 'calls')) - return private, env, state, environ, tmp_path / 'calls' - - -def write_keycape(state, value): - config = yaml.safe_dump({'authelia': {'clientSecret': value}}).encode() - (state / 'keycape-config').write_text(json.dumps({'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(config).decode()}})) - - -def run(case, *extra): - private, _, _, environ, _ = case - return subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(TOOL), str(private), *extra], env=environ, capture_output=True, text=True) - - -def test_preview_reports_stale_custody_without_writing(case): - _, env, *_ = case - before = env.read_bytes() - result = run(case) - assert result.returncode == 0 - report = json.loads(result.stdout) - assert report == {'custody_matched_before': False, 'custody_matches_live': False, - 'live_keycape_matches_authelia_hash': True, 'values_recorded': False} - assert env.read_bytes() == before - assert LIVE not in result.stdout + result.stderr and STALE not in result.stdout + result.stderr - - -def test_apply_writes_live_value_only_and_is_idempotent(case): - _, env, _, _, calls = case - result = run(case, '--apply') - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - assert json.loads(result.stdout)['custody_updated'] is True - assert env.read_text() == f'AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET={STALE}\nAUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET={LIVE}\n' - assert oct(env.stat().st_mode & 0o777) == '0o600' - again = run(case, '--apply') - assert again.returncode == 0 - assert json.loads(again.stdout)['custody_matched_before'] is True and 'custody_updated' not in again.stdout - assert LIVE not in result.stdout + result.stderr + again.stdout - assert all(line.startswith('get secret ') for line in calls.read_text().splitlines()) - - -def test_refuses_when_live_pair_disagrees(case): - _, env, state, _, _ = case - write_keycape(state, STALE) - before = env.read_bytes() - result = run(case, '--apply') - assert result.returncode == 1 and result.stdout == '' - assert json.loads(result.stderr) == {'result': 'unverified', 'phase': 'live-pair', 'partial_changes_possible': False, - 'error': 'Refused'} - assert env.read_bytes() == before - - -def test_missing_custody_copy_is_reported_as_custody(case): - private, *_ = case - import shutil; shutil.rmtree(private) - result = run(case) - assert result.returncode == 1 - assert json.loads(result.stderr)['phase'] == 'custody' - - -def test_cluster_failure_reports_exit_code_only(case): - *_, environ, _ = case - (Path(environ['STATE']) / 'keycape-config').unlink() - result = run(case) - report = json.loads(result.stderr) - assert report['phase'] == 'cluster' and report['error'] == 'CalledProcessError' and report['exit_code'] == 1 - assert LIVE not in result.stderr diff --git a/tests/test_reset_authority_observer.py b/tests/test_reset_authority_observer.py deleted file mode 100644 index 626df29..0000000 --- a/tests/test_reset_authority_observer.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,169 +0,0 @@ -"""No-send role observation, credential containment and exact subject binding.""" - -import copy -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import stat -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - 'reset_observer', ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py') -observer = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(observer) - - -class Directory: - def __init__(self, subject_roles=(), bind_roles=('lldap_strict_readonly',)): - self.roles = {'admin': ['lldap_admin'], 'svc-authelia': list(bind_roles), - 'private-person': list(subject_roles), 'tegwick': list(subject_roles)} - self.requests = [] - self.transform = lambda value: value - - def __call__(self, request, timeout): - payload = json.loads(request.data) - self.requests.append((request.full_url, payload)) - if request.full_url.endswith('/auth/simple/login'): - assert payload == {'username': 'admin', 'password': 'private-password-marker'} - return io.BytesIO(b'{"token":"private-token-marker"}') - assert request.full_url == 'https://lldap.coulomb.social/api/graphql' - assert payload['query'] == observer.QUERY and not payload['query'].startswith('mutation') - assert request.get_header('Authorization') == 'Bearer private-token-marker' - uid = payload['variables']['id'] - value = {'data': {'user': {'id': uid, - 'groups': [{'displayName': g} for g in self.roles[uid]]}}} - return io.BytesIO(json.dumps(self.transform(value)).encode()) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('roles', [[], ['lldap_admin'], ['lldap_password_manager'], - ['private-application-admin-group']]) -def test_exact_classification_only_and_no_mutations(roles): - directory = Directory(roles) - result = observer.Observer('https://lldap.coulomb.social', directory).observe( - 'private-person', 'private-password-marker') - assert [r[1].get('variables', {}).get('id') for r in directory.requests] == [ - None, 'admin', 'svc-authelia', 'private-person'] - assert result['selected_subject']['builtin_roles']['lldap_admin'] == ('lldap_admin' in roles) - assert result['selected_subject']['application_authority_assessed'] is False - assert not result['membership_changed'] and not result['password_reset_attempted'] - assert not result['grant_approved'] and not result['application_access_verified'] - raw = json.dumps(result) - for private in ['private-person', 'private-password-marker', 'private-token-marker', - 'private-application-admin-group']: - assert private not in raw - assert len(result['sources']) == 4 - - -def test_ambiguous_bind_roles_reported_without_effective_permission_claim(): - directory = Directory(bind_roles=['lldap_strict_readonly', 'lldap_password_manager']) - result = observer.Observer('https://lldap.coulomb.social', directory).observe( - 'private-person', 'private-password-marker') - assert result['bind_has_multiple_builtin_roles'] - assert not result['grant_approved'] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['wrong-subject', 'missing', 'duplicate-group', - 'malformed-group', 'error-body', 'extra-fields']) -def test_untrusted_responses_refuse_without_reporting_observation(defect): - directory = Directory() - - def transform(value): - value = copy.deepcopy(value) - if defect == 'wrong-subject': - value['data']['user']['id'] = 'different-person' - elif defect == 'missing': - value['data']['user'] = None - elif defect == 'duplicate-group': - value['data']['user']['groups'] *= 2 - elif defect == 'malformed-group': - value['data']['user']['groups'] = [{'displayName': 'unsafe\nvalue'}] - elif defect == 'error-body': - value['errors'] = [{'message': 'private-provider-body'}] - else: - value['data']['user']['email'] = 'private@example.test' - return value - - directory.transform = transform - with pytest.raises(observer.Refused): - observer.Observer('https://lldap.coulomb.social', directory).observe( - 'private-person', 'private-password-marker') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('subject', ['', 'Bad User', 'alice"}{mutation', 'a' * 129]) -def test_invalid_subject_refuses_before_authentication(subject): - directory = Directory() - with pytest.raises(observer.Refused): - observer.Observer('https://lldap.coulomb.social', directory).observe( - subject, 'private-password-marker') - assert not directory.requests - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['existing', 'symlink', 'public-parent', 'in-repository']) -def test_unsafe_receipt_refused_before_private_prompts(tmp_path, monkeypatch, defect): - tmp_path.chmod(0o700) - path = tmp_path / 'receipt.json' - if defect == 'existing': - path.write_text('preserve') - elif defect == 'symlink': - path.symlink_to(tmp_path / 'missing') - elif defect == 'public-parent': - tmp_path.chmod(0o755) - else: - (tmp_path / '.git').mkdir() - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stderr, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.getpass, 'getpass', lambda prompt: pytest.fail('private prompt')) - assert observer.main(['--receipt', str(path)]) == 1 - if defect == 'existing': - assert path.read_text() == 'preserve' - - -def test_nonterminal_refuses_before_private_prompt(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: False) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.getpass, 'getpass', lambda prompt: pytest.fail('private prompt')) - assert observer.main(['--receipt', str(tmp_path / 'receipt.json')]) == 1 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('endpoint', ['https://attacker.invalid', - 'https://lldap.coulomb.social@attacker.invalid']) -def test_origin_refuses_before_private_prompt(tmp_path, monkeypatch, endpoint): - tmp_path.chmod(0o700) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stderr, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.getpass, 'getpass', lambda prompt: pytest.fail('private prompt')) - assert observer.main(['--receipt', str(tmp_path / 'receipt.json'), - '--endpoint', endpoint]) == 1 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('fail', [False, True]) -def test_cli_private_receipt_and_sanitized_failure(tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys, fail): - tmp_path.chmod(0o700) - path = tmp_path / 'receipt.json' - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.sys.stderr, 'isatty', lambda: True) - prompts = [] - def private_input(prompt): - prompts.append(prompt) - return 'private-password-marker' - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.getpass, 'getpass', private_input) - directory = Directory() - monkeypatch.setattr(observer.transport, 'Transport', lambda base: directory) - if fail: - def broken(value): - raise RuntimeError('private-provider-body private-token-marker') - directory.transform = broken - assert observer.main(['--receipt', str(path)]) == int(fail) - assert len(prompts) == 1 - captured = capsys.readouterr() - for private in ['private-person', 'private-password-marker', 'private-token-marker', - 'private-provider-body']: - assert private not in captured.out + captured.err - if fail: - assert not path.exists() - else: - assert directory.requests[-1][1]['variables']['id'] == 'tegwick' - assert stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode) == 0o600 - assert json.loads(path.read_text())['status'] == 'current_reset_roles_observed' diff --git a/tests/test_reset_role_transition.py b/tests/test_reset_role_transition.py deleted file mode 100644 index 70a1de0..0000000 --- a/tests/test_reset_role_transition.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,203 +0,0 @@ -"""Exact membership effects, durable interruption recovery and attended CLI boundaries.""" - -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( - 'reset_transition', ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-role-transition.py') -change = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(change) -DIGEST = 'sha256:' + 'a' * 64 - - -def baseline(): - return {'users': ['admin', 'other', change.TARGET, change.SUBJECT], 'groups': { - change.OLD: {'id': 1, 'members': [change.TARGET]}, - change.NEW: {'id': 2, 'members': []}, - 'lldap_admin': {'id': 3, 'members': ['admin']}, - 'tenant:one:users': {'id': 4, 'members': [change.SUBJECT]}}} - - -class Directory: - def __init__(self, state=None, failure=None, when=1): - self.state = state or baseline() - self.calls = [] - self.failure, self.when = failure, when - - def snapshot(self): - return copy.deepcopy(self.state) - - def membership(self, action, group_id): - self.calls.append((action, group_id)) - failing = len(self.calls) == self.when - if failing and self.failure == 'before': - raise RuntimeError('private-provider-error') - group = next(g for g in self.state['groups'].values() if g['id'] == group_id) - if action == 'add': - group['members'].append(change.TARGET) - group['members'].sort() - else: - group['members'].remove(change.TARGET) - if failing and self.failure == 'drift': - self.state['groups']['tenant:one:users']['members'].insert(0, 'other') - if failing and self.failure == 'after': - raise RuntimeError('private-provider-error') - - -@pytest.fixture -def journal(tmp_path): - tmp_path.chmod(0o700) - value = change.Journal(tmp_path / 'attempt') - try: - yield value - finally: - value.close() - - -def test_grant_and_rollback_preserve_all_other_memberships_and_receipt_history(journal): - directory = Directory() - result = change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - assert result['status'] == 'password_manager_role_verified' - assert result['other_directory_memberships_unchanged'] - assert directory.state == change.expected_state(baseline(), change.NEW) - assert directory.calls == [('remove', 1), ('add', 2)] - original_receipt = journal.read() - # Rollback preserves productive changes made after the grant, including subject changes. - directory.state['groups']['tenant:one:users']['members'].insert(0, 'other') - directory.state['groups']['lldap_admin']['members'].append(change.SUBJECT) - before_rollback = directory.snapshot() - result = change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'rollback') - assert result['status'] == 'read_only_role_restored_verified' - assert directory.state == change.expected_state(before_rollback, change.OLD) - history = [json.loads(p.read_text()) for p in journal.path.glob('history-*.json')] - assert original_receipt in history - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='cannot_replay'): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'rollback') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('failure,when', [('before', 1), ('after', 1), ('after', 2), - ('drift', 1), ('drift', 2)]) -def test_ambiguous_effects_recover_only_readonly_and_preserve_foreign_changes(journal, failure, when): - directory = Directory(failure=failure, when=when) - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='uncertain'): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - assert journal.read()['status'] == 'uncertain_requires_attended_recovery' - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='not_replay'): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - directory.failure = None - before = directory.snapshot() - result = change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'recover') - assert result['status'] == 'read_only_role_restored_verified' - assert directory.state == change.expected_state(before, change.OLD) - assert 'private-provider-error' not in json.dumps(journal.read()) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['foreign-role', 'already-granted', 'no-admin', - 'accepted-admin', 'missing-subject', 'missing-group']) -def test_unreviewed_baseline_refuses_before_any_journal_or_write(journal, defect): - state = baseline() - if defect == 'foreign-role': - state['groups']['tenant:one:users']['members'].insert(0, change.TARGET) - elif defect == 'already-granted': - state = change.expected_state(state, change.NEW) - elif defect == 'no-admin': - state['groups']['lldap_admin']['members'] = [] - elif defect == 'accepted-admin': - state['groups']['lldap_admin']['members'].append(change.SUBJECT) - elif defect == 'missing-subject': - state['users'].remove(change.SUBJECT) - else: - del state['groups'][change.NEW] - directory = Directory(state) - with pytest.raises(change.Refused): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - assert not directory.calls and journal.read() is None - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['digest', 'group-id', 'foreign-role']) -def test_recovery_refuses_changed_binding(journal, defect): - directory = Directory(failure='after') - with pytest.raises(change.Refused): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - if defect == 'group-id': - directory.state['groups'][change.NEW]['id'] = 99 - if defect == 'foreign-role': - directory.state['groups']['lldap_admin']['members'].append(change.TARGET) - directory.calls.clear() - with pytest.raises(change.Refused): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST + ('x' if defect == 'digest' else ''), 'recover') - assert not directory.calls - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('prior', [False, True]) -def test_partial_local_journal_write_is_preserved_and_recovery_never_grants(journal, prior): - directory = Directory(failure='after') - if prior: - with pytest.raises(change.Refused): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - partial = journal.path / 'journal.next' - partial.write_bytes(b'{"incomplete') - partial.chmod(0o600) - directory.failure = None - result = change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'recover') - assert result['status'] == 'read_only_role_restored_verified' - assert not partial.exists() - assert b'{"incomplete' in [p.read_bytes() for p in journal.path.glob('history-*.json')] - - -def test_exclusive_lock_and_completed_grant_refuse_reentry(journal): - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='active'): - change.Journal(journal.path) - directory = Directory() - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - directory.calls.clear() - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='rollback_for_completed'): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'recover') - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='not_replay'): - change.transition(directory, journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - assert not directory.calls - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['symlink', 'hardlink', 'public']) -def test_unsafe_existing_journal_refuses(journal, tmp_path, defect): - path = journal.path / 'journal.json' - if defect == 'symlink': - path.symlink_to(tmp_path / 'missing') - else: - path.write_text('{}') - path.chmod(0o600 if defect == 'hardlink' else 0o644) - if defect == 'hardlink': - os.link(path, tmp_path / 'alias') - with pytest.raises(change.Refused): - change.transition(Directory(), journal, DIGEST, 'grant') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['no-terminal', 'wrong-digest', 'runtime-drift']) -def test_cli_refuses_before_private_input(monkeypatch, defect): - monkeypatch.setattr(change, 'proposal', lambda: ({'runtime': {}, 'scope': {}}, DIGEST)) - monkeypatch.setattr(change.sys.stdin, 'isatty', lambda: defect != 'no-terminal') - monkeypatch.setattr(change.sys.stderr, 'isatty', lambda: True) - monkeypatch.setattr(change, 'observe_runtime', lambda: {'changed': True}) - monkeypatch.setattr(change.getpass, 'getpass', lambda prompt: pytest.fail('private prompt')) - assert change.main(['--execute', '--expect-digest', - DIGEST + ('x' if defect == 'wrong-digest' else '')]) == 1 - - -def test_recovery_allows_unready_peers_but_not_changed_runtime_identity(monkeypatch): - expected = {'authelia': {'uid': 'a', 'ready': True}, - 'lldap': {'uid': 'b', 'ready': True}, 'config': 'pinned'} - actual = copy.deepcopy(expected) - actual['authelia']['ready'] = False - monkeypatch.setattr(change, 'observe_runtime', lambda: copy.deepcopy(actual)) - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='runtime_changed'): - change.verify_runtime(expected) - change.verify_runtime(expected, recovering=True) - actual['lldap']['uid'] = 'replacement' - with pytest.raises(change.Refused, match='runtime_changed'): - change.verify_runtime(expected, recovering=True) diff --git a/tests/test_resolver_cutover.py b/tests/test_resolver_cutover.py deleted file mode 100644 index 91f7e1b..0000000 --- a/tests/test_resolver_cutover.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,252 +0,0 @@ -"""Cutover state machine and credential-scoped HTTP regression checks.""" -import copy -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -from types import SimpleNamespace -import pytest - -from test_realm_bootstrap import snapshot, server, HELPERS -sys.path.insert(0, str(HELPERS)) -import resolver_cutover as c -import pi_api as p - -TARGET = dict(helper='update', pi_url='http://127.0.0.1:1234', lldap_url='http://127.0.0.1:1235', - keycape_url='http://127.0.0.1:1236', user='fixture-user', kubeconfig='/tmp/fixture', - context='fixture', server='https://127.0.0.1:6443', cluster_uid='fixture-uid') - - -class Client: - def __init__(self): - self.state = snapshot(); self.calls = []; self.reads = 0; self.drift = False - self.bad_bind = False; self.post_failure = False; self.users = [{'username':'fixture-user','resolver':c.realm.RESOLVER}] - def snapshot(self): - self.reads += 1 - if self.drift and self.reads == 2: self.state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'] = '99' - return copy.deepcopy(self.state) - def call(self, path, payload=None): - self.calls.append((path, copy.deepcopy(payload))) - if path == '/resolver/test': return not self.bad_bind - if path.startswith('/user/'): return self.users - if path == '/resolver/' + c.realm.RESOLVER: - if self.post_failure: raise c.Refused() - return 1 - raise AssertionError() - - -@pytest.fixture -def client(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setattr(c, 'login', lambda *a, **kw: None) - return Client() - - -def apply(client, target=TARGET, **kw): - options = dict(replacement='synthetic-new', expected_digest=c.digest(client.state, target)) - options.update(kw) - return c.run(client, target, 'apply', **options) - - -def writes(client): return [x for x in client.calls if x[0] == '/resolver/' + c.realm.RESOLVER] - - -def test_minimal_update_and_no_fabricated_acceptance(client): - before=copy.deepcopy(client.state) - report=apply(client) - assert writes(client)==[('/resolver/'+c.realm.RESOLVER, {'type':'ldapresolver','BINDPW':'synthetic-new'})] - assert client.state==before and report['result']=='configured' - assert report['incident_acceptance']=='unverified' and not report['mfa_verified'] - tests=[payload for path,payload in client.calls if path=='/resolver/test'] - assert [x['BINDPW'] for x in tests]==['synthetic-new','__CENSORED__'] - assert tests[0]['SIZELIMIT']=='700' - assert 'synthetic-new' not in json.dumps(report) - - -def test_preview_without_candidate_or_write(client): - report=c.run(client,TARGET,'preview') - assert report['result']=='planned' and not client.calls - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('change', ['missing','core','tuning','realm','uncensored']) -def test_incomplete_or_conflicting_setup_refused(client,change): - if change=='missing':client.state['resolver']=None - elif change=='core':client.state['resolver']['data']['LDAPURI']='ldap://other' - elif change=='tuning':del client.state['resolver']['data']['TIMEOUT'] - elif change=='realm':client.state['realms']['coulomb']['resolver']=[] - else:client.state['resolver']['data']['BINDPW']='synthetic-uncensored' - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):c.run(client,TARGET,'apply',replacement='synthetic-new',expected_digest='0'*64) - assert not writes(client) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('failure',['stale','drift','candidate']) -def test_prewrite_failures_never_mutate(client,failure): - client.drift=failure=='drift';client.bad_bind=failure=='candidate' - opts={'expected_digest':'0'*64} if failure=='stale' else {} - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):apply(client,**opts) - assert not writes(client) - - -def test_ambiguous_write_is_not_retried_and_receipt_remains_unverified(client): - client.post_failure=True;report={} - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):apply(client,report=report) - assert report['result']=='unverified' and report['write_attempted'] - assert report['configuration_writes']==0 and len(writes(client))==1 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('predecessor,result',[(None,'incomplete'),('synthetic-old','verified')]) -def test_full_proofs_and_honest_predecessor_result(client,predecessor,result): - target=dict(TARGET,helper='reconcile');gates=[] - report=apply(client,target,predecessor=predecessor,gate=lambda:gates.append(1),mfa_proof=lambda:{'result':'PASS'}) - assert report['result']==result and report['mfa_verified'] and len(gates)==2 - assert report['supplied_predecessor_denied']==bool(predecessor) - assert report['incident_acceptance']=='unverified' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('users',[[],[{'username':'other','resolver':c.realm.RESOLVER}], - [{'username':'fixture-user','resolver':'wrong'}],[{'username':'fixture-user','resolver':c.realm.RESOLVER}]*2]) -def test_exact_user_before_mfa(client,users): - client.users=users - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):apply(client,dict(TARGET,helper='reconcile'),gate=lambda:None,mfa_proof=lambda:pytest.fail('OTP too early')) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('status',[0,200,302,400,500]) -def test_predecessor_network_or_unexpected_result_not_denial(monkeypatch,status): - monkeypatch.setattr(c,'request',lambda *a,**kw:(status,{'token':'synthetic'})) - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):c.login(TARGET['lldap_url'],'old',denied=True) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('profile,path,payload',[ - ('lldap-auth','/auth/simple/login',{'username':'admin','password':'synthetic'}), - ('keycape-discovery','/.well-known/openid-configuration',None)]) -def test_named_profile_actual_http(server,profile,path,payload): - base,state=server - assert p.request(base+path,payload,profile=profile)[0]==200 - assert len(state['requests'])==1 - assert state['requests'][0][2]==(json.dumps(payload).encode() if payload else b'') - assert 'Authorization' not in state['requests'][0][1] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('profile,path,payload,token,method',[ - ('lldap-auth','/other',{'username':'admin','password':'synthetic'},None,None), - ('lldap-auth','/auth/simple/login',{'username':'pi-admin','password':'synthetic'},None,None), - ('lldap-auth','/auth/simple/login',{'username':'admin','password':'synthetic'},'pi-token',None), - ('lldap-auth','/auth/simple/login?x=1',{'username':'admin','password':'synthetic'},None,None), - ('lldap-auth','/auth/simple/login',{'username':'admin','password':'synthetic'},None,'PUT'), - ('keycape-discovery','/.well-known/openid-configuration',{'password':'synthetic'},None,None), - ('keycape-discovery','/.well-known/openid-configuration',None,'pi-token',None), - ('unknown','/auth',{},None,None)]) -def test_profile_refusal_before_socket(server,profile,path,payload,token,method): - base,state=server - assert p.request(base+path,payload,token,profile=profile,method=method)==(0,None) - assert not state['requests'] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('profile',['lldap-auth','keycape-discovery']) -@pytest.mark.parametrize('origin',['http://lldap.coulomb.social','https://evil.invalid','https://pink.coulomb.social','http://localhost:1234']) -def test_origin_scope(profile,origin): - with pytest.raises(Exception):p.service_endpoint(origin,profile) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('status',[301,302,307,308,500]) -def test_profile_no_redirect(server,status): - base,state=server;state['status']=status - assert p.request(base+'/auth/simple/login',{'username':'admin','password':'synthetic'},profile='lldap-auth')==(status,None) - assert len(state['requests'])==1 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('bad',['server','uid','generation','replicas','deletion']) -def test_cluster_pin_and_current_generation(monkeypatch,bad): - calls=[] - def command(argv,**kw): - calls.append(argv) - if 'view' in argv:out='https://wrong:6443' if bad=='server' else TARGET['server'] - elif 'namespace' in argv:out='wrong' if bad=='uid' else TARGET['cluster_uid'] - else:out={'generation':'4|3|1|1|1|1|1|','replicas':'4|4|1|2|1|1|1|','deletion':'4|4|1|1|1|1|1|now'}.get(bad,'4|4|1|1|1|1|1|') - return SimpleNamespace(returncode=0,stdout=out) - monkeypatch.setattr(c.subprocess,'run',command) - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):c.cluster_ready(TARGET) - assert all(argv[1:5]==['--kubeconfig','/tmp/fixture','--context','fixture'] for argv in calls) - assert not any('secret' in argv or '--raw' in argv for argv in calls) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('script',['update-lldap-resolver-live.sh','reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh']) -def test_unattended_and_unsafe_legacy_argument_refuse_without_echo(script): - result=subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(HELPERS/script),'--note','synthetic-private-note'],capture_output=True,text=True) - assert result.returncode!=0 and 'synthetic-private-note' not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert 'Traceback' not in result.stderr and 'password:' not in result.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('broken',['issuer','endpoint','redirect','malformed']) -def test_health_semantics(monkeypatch,broken): - issuer='https://kc.coulomb.social' - body={'issuer':issuer,**{k:issuer+'/'+k for k in ('authorization_endpoint','token_endpoint','jwks_uri')}} - if broken=='issuer':body['issuer']='https://other.invalid' - if broken=='endpoint':body['token_endpoint']='https://kc.coulomb.social.evil.invalid/token' - if broken=='malformed':body=[] - monkeypatch.setattr(c,'request',lambda url,**kw:(401,None) if url.endswith('/token/') else (302 if broken=='redirect' else 200,body)) - with pytest.raises(c.Refused):c.health(TARGET) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('script',['update-lldap-resolver-live.sh','reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh']) -def test_pty_tracing_never_discloses_password(server,tmp_path,script): - import pty - import select - import signal - import time - if script.startswith('reconcile'): - # Pin validation must happen before any credential prompt. - argv=['--preview','--server','https://bad.invalid'] - else: - argv=['--preview','--pi-url',server[0]] - server[1]['response']={'result':{'status':True,'value':{'role':'admin','token':'fixture-token'}}} - pid,fd=pty.fork() - if pid==0: - os.environ['TMPDIR']=str(tmp_path) - os.execv('/bin/bash',['bash','-x',str(HELPERS/script),*argv]) - output=b'';sent=False;status=None - try: - deadline=time.monotonic()+10 - while time.monotonic()&2\nexit 1\n') - binary.chmod(0o755) - env = {**os.environ, 'PATH': str(tmp_path) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'CALLED': str(marker)} - r = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(ROOT / 'tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh'), - 'synthetic-private-argument'], capture_output=True, env=env) - assert r.returncode == 2 - assert not marker.exists() - assert b'synthetic-private-argument' not in r.stdout + r.stderr - - -def test_openbao_plan_is_nonmutating_and_does_not_contact_cluster(tmp_path): - binary = tmp_path / 'kubectl'; marker = tmp_path / 'called' - binary.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ntouch "$CALLED"\nexit 1\n'); binary.chmod(0o755) - env = {**os.environ, 'PATH': str(tmp_path) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'CALLED': str(marker), - 'OPENBAO_CONSOLE_METADATA': str(tmp_path / 'no-metadata')} - r = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(BOOT / 'openbao-init-unseal.sh'), '--dry-run'], - capture_output=True, env=env) - assert r.returncode == 0 - assert not marker.exists() - assert not (tmp_path / 'secrets').exists() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('relative', ['sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/configure-openbao-oidc.sh', - 'sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/verify-operability.sh']) -def test_retired_root_and_stale_rollout_paths_refuse_before_external_calls(tmp_path, relative): - marker = tmp_path / 'called'; binary = tmp_path / 'kubectl' - binary.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ntouch "$CALLED"\nexit 1\n'); binary.chmod(0o755) - env = {**os.environ, 'PATH': str(tmp_path) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'CALLED': str(marker)} - r = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(ROOT / relative), 'synthetic-private-argument'], - env=env, capture_output=True) - assert r.returncode == 2 - assert not marker.exists() - assert b'synthetic-private-argument' not in r.stdout + r.stderr - - -def test_secret_presence_does_not_rewrite_historical_acceptance(tmp_path): - import shutil - script = tmp_path / 'creds-verify.sh'; shutil.copy(BOOT / script.name, script) - state = tmp_path / 'creds-state.yaml' - original = b'secrets_applied:\n keycape: false\nenckey_bootstrapped: false\n' - state.write_bytes(original) - binary = tmp_path / 'kubectl' - binary.write_text('#!/bin/sh\nif [ "$1" = get ]; then echo secret/fixture; fi\nexit 0\n') - binary.chmod(0o755) - env = {**os.environ, 'PATH': str(tmp_path) + ':' + os.environ['PATH']} - r = subprocess.run(['bash', str(script)], env=env, capture_output=True) - assert r.returncode == 0 - assert state.read_bytes() == original - assert b'keycape-pi-token' not in r.stdout + r.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('name', ['patch-openbao-client.sh', 'register-coulomb-social.sh']) -def test_legacy_registry_mutation_refuses_without_cluster_calls(tmp_path, name): - marker = tmp_path / 'called'; executable = tmp_path / 'kubectl' - executable.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ntouch "$CALLED"\nexit 1\n'); executable.chmod(0o755) - env = {**os.environ, 'PATH': str(tmp_path) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'CALLED': str(marker)} - r = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/keycape' / name)], env=env, capture_output=True) - assert r.returncode == 2 - assert not marker.exists() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('name,args', [('register-coulomb-social.py', []), ('openbao-client-config.py', ['patch'])]) -def test_legacy_python_registry_output_is_disabled(name, args): - r = subprocess.run(['python3', str(ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/keycape' / name), *args], - input=b'synthetic-private-input', capture_output=True) - assert r.returncode != 0 - assert b'synthetic-private-input' not in r.stdout + r.stderr - assert not r.stdout diff --git a/tests/test_rotation_output.py b/tests/test_rotation_output.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6706e9f..0000000 --- a/tests/test_rotation_output.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -"""Rotation entry-point tests use synthetic files and fake cluster commands only.""" -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import shutil -import subprocess - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -BOOT = ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap' -CASES = { - 'PI_SECRET_KEY': 'privacyidea', 'PI_DB_PASSWORD': 'privacyidea', - 'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET': 'lldap', 'AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET': 'authelia', - 'BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD': 'breakglass', -} -SYNTHETIC = 'A' * 64 - - -@pytest.fixture -def rotation(tmp_path): - repo = tmp_path / 'repo' - boot = repo / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap'; boot.mkdir(parents=True) - for name in ('creds-rotate.sh', 'rotation-env.py'): - if (BOOT / name).exists(): shutil.copyfile(BOOT / name, boot / name) - shutil.copyfile(ROOT / 'Makefile', repo / 'Makefile') - (boot / 'creds-state.yaml').write_text('version: 2\n') - secrets = tmp_path / 'private'; secrets.mkdir(mode=0o700) - for component in ('postgresql', 'privacyidea', 'lldap', 'authelia', 'keycape', 'breakglass'): - directory = secrets / component; directory.mkdir(mode=0o700) - entries = [f'{key}=old-value' for key, value in CASES.items() if value == component] - if component == 'lldap': entries.append('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=old-value') - env_file = directory / 'secrets.env' - env_file.write_text('\n'.join(entries) + '\n'); env_file.chmod(0o600) - helper = repo / f'sso-mfa/k8s/{component}'; helper.mkdir(parents=True) - (helper / 'create-secrets.sh').write_text( - '#!/bin/bash\npython3 - "$@" <<\'PYTRACE\'\n' - 'import json,os,sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n' - 'with open(os.environ["HELPERS"],"a") as f:f.write(json.dumps({"component":Path.cwd().name,"args":sys.argv[1:]})+"\\n")\n' - 'PYTRACE\nprintf "%s\\n" "$SYNTHETIC" >&2\nexit "${HELPER_FAIL:-0}"\n') - binary = tmp_path / 'bin'; binary.mkdir() - (binary / 'openssl').write_text('#!/bin/sh\nprintf "%s\\n" "$SYNTHETIC"\n') - (binary / 'kubectl').write_text('''#!/usr/bin/python3 -import json, os, sys -args = sys.argv[1:] -payload = sys.stdin.read() if ('-i' in args or args[-1:] == ['-']) else '' -with open(os.environ['CALLS'], 'a') as file: file.write(json.dumps({'args': args, 'stdin': payload}) + '\\n') -if args[0] == 'get': - if not os.environ.get('NO_POD'): print(os.environ.get('POD_NAMES', 'pod/disposable-pg')) -else: - print(os.environ['SYNTHETIC']) - print(os.environ['SYNTHETIC'], file=sys.stderr) - if os.environ.get('CLUSTER_FAIL'): sys.exit(1) -''') - for command in binary.iterdir(): command.chmod(0o700) - env = {'PATH': str(binary) + ':' + os.environ['PATH'], 'HOME': str(tmp_path), - 'KUBECONFIG': str(tmp_path / 'nonexistent'), 'CALLS': str(tmp_path / 'calls'), - 'SYNTHETIC': SYNTHETIC, 'HELPERS': str(tmp_path / 'helpers')} - return repo, boot, secrets, env - - -def run(rotation, key, **extra): - repo, boot, secrets, env = rotation - return subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(boot / 'creds-rotate.sh'), '--non-interactive', str(secrets)], - env={**env, 'SECRET': key, **extra}, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - - -def calls(rotation): - file = Path(rotation[3]['CALLS']) - return [json.loads(line) for line in file.read_text().splitlines()] if file.exists() else [] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('key', CASES) -def test_success_never_prints_generated_values_or_child_diagnostics(rotation, key): - result = run(rotation, key) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - output = rotation[2] / CASES[key] / 'secrets.env' - assert output.stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert key + '=' + SYNTHETIC[:40] in output.read_text() - assert f'last_rotated_{key}:' in (rotation[1] / 'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - - -def test_database_absence_cannot_publish_or_claim_rotation(rotation): - before = (rotation[2] / 'privacyidea/secrets.env').read_bytes() - result = run(rotation, 'PI_DB_PASSWORD', NO_POD='1') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert (rotation[2] / 'privacyidea/secrets.env').read_bytes() == before - assert all(call['args'][0] == 'get' for call in calls(rotation)) - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (rotation[1] / 'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - - -def test_database_password_is_stdin_not_command_argument(rotation): - result = run(rotation, 'PI_DB_PASSWORD') - assert result.returncode == 0 - sql = next(call for call in calls(rotation) if call['args'][0] == 'exec') - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in json.dumps(sql['args'])) is False - assert SYNTHETIC[:40] in sql['stdin'] - assert 'ON_ERROR_STOP=1' in sql['args'] - - -def test_unimplemented_ldap_manual_step_refuses_unattended_rotation(rotation): - before = (rotation[2] / 'lldap/secrets.env').read_bytes() - result = run(rotation, 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not calls(rotation) - assert (rotation[2] / 'lldap/secrets.env').read_bytes() == before - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (rotation[1] / 'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect', ['missing', 'duplicate', 'symlink', 'parent-symlink', 'public', 'public-parent', 'public-root', 'hardlink', 'missing-key']) -def test_invalid_custody_file_refused_before_cluster(rotation, defect): - file = rotation[2] / 'privacyidea/secrets.env' - if defect == 'missing': file.unlink() - elif defect == 'duplicate': file.write_text('PI_SECRET_KEY=one\nPI_SECRET_KEY=two\n') - elif defect == 'missing-key': file.write_text('OTHER_KEY=one\n') - elif defect == 'public': file.chmod(0o644) - elif defect == 'public-parent': file.parent.chmod(0o755) - elif defect == 'public-root': rotation[2].chmod(0o755) - elif defect == 'hardlink': os.link(file, file.with_name('alias')) - elif defect == 'symlink': - target = file.with_name('target'); file.rename(target); file.symlink_to(target) - else: - directory = file.parent; target = directory.with_name('moved'); directory.rename(target); directory.symlink_to(target) - result = run(rotation, 'PI_SECRET_KEY') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not calls(rotation) - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (rotation[1] / 'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('failure', ['HELPER_FAIL', 'CLUSTER_FAIL']) -def test_apply_failure_is_sanitized_and_not_marked_complete(rotation, failure): - result = run(rotation, 'PI_SECRET_KEY', **{failure: '1'}) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (rotation[1] / 'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - - -def test_breakglass_no_plaintext_literal_or_client_apply_annotation(rotation): - result = run(rotation, 'BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD') - assert result.returncode == 0 - observed = calls(rotation) - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in json.dumps([c['args'] for c in observed])) is False - assert any('--server-side' in c['args'] for c in observed) - - -def test_unknown_selector_is_not_echoed_or_evaluated_by_make(rotation): - repo, _, _, env = rotation - payload = 'unknown;touch selector-executed' - result = subprocess.run(['make', '--no-print-directory', 'creds-rotate', 'SECRET=' + payload], - cwd=repo, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not (repo / 'selector-executed').exists() - assert payload not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert not calls(rotation) - - -def test_multiple_database_pods_refused_without_local_update(rotation): - file = rotation[2] / 'privacyidea/secrets.env' - before = file.read_bytes() - result = run(rotation, 'PI_DB_PASSWORD', POD_NAMES='pod/one\npod/two') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert file.read_bytes() == before - assert all(call['args'][0] == 'get' for call in calls(rotation)) - - -def test_database_command_failure_has_no_completion_or_consumer_restart(rotation): - result = run(rotation, 'PI_DB_PASSWORD', CLUSTER_FAIL='1') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert [call['args'][0] for call in calls(rotation)] == ['get', 'exec'] - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (rotation[1] / 'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - - -def test_declining_rotation_preserves_custody_file_and_cluster(rotation): - _, boot, secrets, env = rotation - file = secrets / 'privacyidea/secrets.env' - before = file.read_bytes() - result = subprocess.run(['bash', '-x', str(boot / 'creds-rotate.sh'), str(secrets)], - env={**env, 'SECRET': 'PI_SECRET_KEY'}, input='n\n', - capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert file.read_bytes() == before - assert not calls(rotation) - assert bool(SYNTHETIC[:40] in result.stdout + result.stderr) is False - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('key',['AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET','KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY','LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS']) -@pytest.mark.parametrize('attended',[False,True]) -def test_retired_keycape_replacement_refuses_before_any_credential_change(rotation,key,attended): - repo,boot,secrets,env=rotation - signing=secrets/'keycape/key.pem';signing.write_text('synthetic-existing-private-key');signing.chmod(0o600) - before={p:p.read_bytes() for p in secrets.rglob('*') if p.is_file()} - args=['bash','-x',str(boot/'creds-rotate.sh')] - if not attended:args.append('--non-interactive') - result=subprocess.run([*args,str(secrets)],input='yes\n',env={**env,'SECRET':key},capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=10) - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert not calls(rotation) - assert {p:p.read_bytes() for p in secrets.rglob('*') if p.is_file()}==before - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (boot/'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - assert 'NK-WP-0049-T02' in result.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('key,components',[ - ('PI_SECRET_KEY',['privacyidea']), - ('PI_DB_PASSWORD',['postgresql','privacyidea']), - ('LLDAP_JWT_SECRET',['lldap']), - ('AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET',['authelia']), -]) -def test_rotation_forwards_exact_selector_to_every_secret_consumer(rotation,key,components): - result=run(rotation,key) - assert result.returncode==0 - observed=[json.loads(line) for line in Path(rotation[3]['HELPERS']).read_text().splitlines()] - assert observed==[{'component':component,'args':[str(rotation[2]),'--rotate-key',key]} for component in components] - - -def test_database_secret_failure_stops_before_other_consumer_or_restart(rotation): - result=run(rotation,'PI_DB_PASSWORD',HELPER_FAIL='1') - assert result.returncode!=0 - assert [json.loads(line)['component'] for line in Path(rotation[3]['HELPERS']).read_text().splitlines()]==['postgresql'] - assert [call['args'][0] for call in calls(rotation)]==['get','exec'] - assert 'last_rotated_' not in (rotation[1]/'creds-state.yaml').read_text() - assert 'PI_DB_PASSWORD='+SYNTHETIC[:40] in (rotation[2]/'privacyidea/secrets.env').read_text() diff --git a/tests/test_scaleway_backup_inventory.py b/tests/test_scaleway_backup_inventory.py deleted file mode 100644 index 15e2c1a..0000000 --- a/tests/test_scaleway_backup_inventory.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -"""Scoped S3 list-only fixtures; no credentials, live cluster or cloud.""" -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('s3_inventory',ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-scaleway.py') -module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module) - - -class Client: - def __init__(self,pages):self.pages=iter(pages);self.calls=[] - def list_objects_v2(self,**kw):self.calls.append(kw);return next(self.pages) - - -def test_scoped_list_metadata_follows_continuation_without_reading_contents(): - client=Client([{'IsTruncated':True,'NextContinuationToken':'next'}, - {'Contents':[{'Key':'platform-pg/identity/backup.tar.age','Size':256}]}]) - r=module.list_prefix(client,'platform-pg/identity/') - assert r['files']==[{'key':'platform-pg/identity/backup.tar.age','bytes':256}] - assert all(x['Bucket']==module.BUCKET and x['Prefix']=='platform-pg/identity/' for x in client.calls) - assert client.calls[1]['ContinuationToken']=='next' - - -def test_wal_and_base_presence_is_recorded_without_traversal(): - client=Client([{'CommonPrefixes':[{'Prefix':'platform-pg/base/'},{'Prefix':'platform-pg/wals/'}]}]) - r=module.inventory(client) - assert len(client.calls)==1 and len(r['platform-pg/']['directories'])==2 - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('key',['elsewhere/backup.age','platform-pg/../backup.age','platform-pg/private\nmarker.age']) -def test_foreign_or_unsafe_metadata_refuses(key): - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.list_prefix(Client([{'Contents':[{'Key':key,'Size':1}]}]),module.PREFIX) - - -def test_missing_pagination_state_refuses_incomplete_inventory(): - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.list_prefix(Client([{'IsTruncated':True}]),module.PREFIX) diff --git a/tests/test_sealed_custody.py b/tests/test_sealed_custody.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69d542..0000000 --- a/tests/test_sealed_custody.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -import fcntl -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import pty -import select -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import time -import unittest -from unittest.mock import patch - -ROOT=Path(__file__).parents[1] -def load(name,path): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,path);m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m -h=load('fdhelper',ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-fd.py') -c=load('custody',ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py') - -class SealedCustodyTests(unittest.TestCase): - @classmethod - def setUpClass(cls): - # Capture generated test key in memory only, never into test output/path. - r=subprocess.run(['age-keygen'],stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,check=True) - cls.material=next(x for x in r.stdout.splitlines() if x.startswith(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-'))+b'\n' - fd=h.sealed_key(cls.material) - try:cls.recipient=subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-y',f'/proc/self/fd/{fd}'],pass_fds=(fd,),stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,check=True).stdout.decode().strip() - finally:os.close(fd) - def test_sealed_descriptor_private_duplicate_is_cloexec_and_decrypts(self): - encrypted=subprocess.run(['age','-r',self.recipient],input=b'synthetic recovery material',stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,check=True).stdout - original=h.sealed_key(self.material) - try: - with patch.dict(os.environ,{'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD':str(original)},clear=True):fd=c.private_key_fd() - try: - self.assertFalse(os.get_inheritable(fd));self.assertEqual(os.fstat(fd).st_nlink,0) - r=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',f'/proc/self/fd/{fd}'],pass_fds=(fd,),input=encrypted,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL) - self.assertEqual(r.returncode,0);self.assertEqual(r.stdout,b'synthetic recovery material') - finally:os.close(fd) - finally:os.close(original) - def test_incomplete_seals_or_named_file_refused(self): - for named in (False,True): - if named: - file=tempfile.TemporaryFile();fd=file.fileno();file.write(self.material);file.flush() - else:fd=os.memfd_create('synthetic-unsealed',os.MFD_CLOEXEC|os.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);os.write(fd,self.material) - try: - with patch.dict(os.environ,{'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD':str(fd)},clear=True),self.assertRaises((c.Refused,OSError)): - c.private_key_fd() - finally: - if named:file.close() - else:os.close(fd) - def test_ambiguous_sources_refused(self): - with patch.dict(os.environ,{'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD':'3','NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE':'/not/opened'},clear=True),self.assertRaises(c.Refused):c.private_key_fd() - def test_malformed_descriptor_text_refused_before_dup(self): - for value in ('-1','2','03',' 3','3 ','1000000000','3/4'): - with patch.dict(os.environ,{'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD':value},clear=True),patch.object(c.os,'dup') as duplicate: - with self.subTest(value=value),self.assertRaises(c.Refused):c.private_key_fd() - duplicate.assert_not_called() - def test_bad_expected_recipient_refused_before_prompt(self): - with patch('sys.argv',['sealed','--expected-recipient','age1bad','--','true']),patch.object(h.os,'isatty',return_value=True),patch.object(h.getpass,'getpass') as prompt,patch('builtins.print'): - self.assertEqual(h.main(),1);prompt.assert_not_called() - def test_existing_file_mode_still_accepts_private_owner_file(self): - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp: - path=Path(temp)/'synthetic-key';path.write_bytes(self.material);path.chmod(0o600) - with patch.dict(os.environ,{'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE':str(path)},clear=True):fd=c.private_key_fd() - try:self.assertEqual(os.read(fd,16384),self.material) - finally:os.close(fd) - def test_helper_passes_exact_fd_and_clears_ambient_sources(self): - code="""import os,sys -fd=int(os.environ['NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD']) -assert os.fstat(fd).st_nlink==0 -assert all(k not in os.environ for k in ('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE','SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE','SOPS_AGE_KEY','SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD')) -""" - with patch.dict(os.environ,{'SOPS_AGE_KEY':'synthetic-competing','NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE':'/not/read'}): - self.assertEqual(h.run(self.material,self.recipient,[sys.executable,'-c',code]),0) - def test_normal_and_error_return_close_parent_fd(self): - actual=h.sealed_key - for status in (0,7): - fds=[] - def capture(material): - fd=actual(material);fds.append(fd);return fd - with patch.object(h,'sealed_key',side_effect=capture):self.assertEqual(h.run(self.material,self.recipient,[sys.executable,'-c',f'raise SystemExit({status})']),status) - with self.assertRaises(OSError):os.fstat(fds[0]) - def test_wrong_recipient_does_not_start_child_and_closes_fd(self): - other=subprocess.run(['age-keygen'],stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,check=True).stdout - other=next(x for x in other.splitlines() if x.startswith(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-'))+b'\n';fd=h.sealed_key(other) - try:recipient=subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-y',f'/proc/self/fd/{fd}'],pass_fds=(fd,),stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,check=True).stdout.decode().strip() - finally:os.close(fd) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp: - marker=Path(temp)/'child' - with self.assertRaises(h.Refused):h.run(self.material,recipient,[sys.executable,'-c','import pathlib,sys;pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).touch()',str(marker)]) - self.assertFalse(marker.exists()) - def test_actual_attended_shell_sealed_mode_hides_key_and_runs_original_fd_consumer(self): - code="import importlib.util,os,sys;spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('c',sys.argv[1]);c=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(c);fd=c.private_key_fd();assert os.fstat(fd).st_nlink==0;os.close(fd)" - master,slave=pty.openpty() - child=subprocess.Popen(['bash','-x',str(ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh'),'--expected-recipient',self.recipient,'--sealed-fd','--prompt','--',sys.executable,'-c',code,str(ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py')],stdin=slave,stdout=slave,stderr=slave) - os.close(slave);captured=b'';sent=False;end=time.monotonic()+5 - try: - while time.monotonic()&2 -python3 - "$1" <<'PYTHON' -import json,os,sys -with open(os.environ['ARGS'],'a') as file:file.write(json.dumps(sys.argv[1:])+'\\n') -PYTHON -'''+ ('exit 1\n' if component==failed else 'exit 0\n')) - env={'PATH':str(binary)+':'+os.environ['PATH'],'HOME':str(tmp_path),'KUBECONFIG':str(tmp_path/'unused'),'ARGS':str(tmp_path/'args'),'MARKER':MARKER} - result=subprocess.run(['bash','-x',str(boot/'creds-apply.sh'),private.name],cwd=tmp_path,env=env,capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=10) - assert (result.returncode==0)==(failed is None) - assert MARKER not in result.stdout+result.stderr - args=[json.loads(line) for line in Path(env['ARGS']).read_text().splitlines()] - assert args==[[str(private)]]*(4 if failed is None else 3) - recorded=state.read_text();assert 'postgres: true' in recorded and 'lldap: true' in recorded - assert ('authelia: true' in recorded)==(failed is None) - assert ('privacyidea: true' in recorded)==(failed is None) diff --git a/tests/test_service_bind_lane.py b/tests/test_service_bind_lane.py deleted file mode 100644 index 1662547..0000000 --- a/tests/test_service_bind_lane.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,340 +0,0 @@ -"""bind-lane.py against an in-memory OpenBao and Kubernetes; no values leave the fakes.""" -import base64 -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import shutil -import subprocess -from pathlib import Path -from types import SimpleNamespace - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -PLATFORM = ROOT.parent / 'railiance-platform' -CCR = 'CCR-2026-0052-net-kingdom-identity-provisioner-bind.yaml' -VALUE = 'SyntheticProvisionerBind1234567890abcdef' -OTHER = 'DifferentProvisionerBind1234567890abcdef' -KV = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-provisioner' -AUTHELIA_CCR = 'CCR-2026-0053-net-kingdom-authelia-bind.yaml' -AUTHELIA_KV = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia' -BIND_LINE = 'user: uid=svc-authelia,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local' -KEYCAPE_CCR = 'CCR-2026-0054-net-kingdom-keycape-bind.yaml' -KEYCAPE_KV = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-keycape' -KEYCAPE_DN = 'uid=svc-keycape,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local' -PI_CCR = 'CCR-2026-0055-net-kingdom-privacyidea-bind.yaml' -PI_KV = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-privacyidea' - -pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(not (PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / CCR).exists(), - reason='railiance-platform checkout with CCR-2026-0052 required') - - -def load(): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('bind_lane', ROOT / 'tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py') - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(module); return module - - -class FakeBao: - def __init__(self, kv=KV, role='net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso'): - self.kv_path = kv; self.role = role - self.store = {'sys/policies/acl/agent-high-risk-boundary': {'policy': 'path "x" { capabilities = ["deny"] }\n'}} - self.kv = {}; self.writes = []; self.identity = {'policies': ['platform-admin'], 'path': 'auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback'} - self.login_ok = {(role, 'openbao')} - - def __call__(self, args, *, payload=None, token=None, allow_failure=False): - out = lambda d, code=0, err=b'': SimpleNamespace(returncode=code, stdout=json.dumps(d).encode(), stderr=err) - if args[:2] == ['token', 'lookup']: return out({'data': self.identity}) - if args[:2] == ['token', 'create']: return out({'auth': {'client_token': 'child'}}) - if args[0] == 'read': - path = args[-1] - if path == self.kv_path: - return out({'data': {'data': self.kv['value'], 'metadata': {'version': self.kv['version']}}}) if self.kv \ - else out({}, 2, b'No value found at ' + path.encode()) - if path in self.store: return out({'data': self.store[path]}) - return out({}, 2, b'No value found') - if args[0] == 'write': - path = args[-2] if args[-1] == '-' else args[-1] - if path == 'auth/token/revoke': return out({}) - if path == 'sys/capabilities': - caps = {p: (['read'] if p == self.kv_path and token is None and payload['token'] == 'reader' else ['deny']) - for p in payload['paths']} - return out({'data': caps}) - if path == 'auth/kubernetes/login': - sa, aud = payload['jwt'].split('|') - if (sa, aud) in self.login_ok: - return out({'auth': {'client_token': 'reader', 'token_policies': [self.role], - 'lease_duration': 900}}) - return out({}, 2, b'Code: 403') - self.writes.append(path) - if path == self.kv_path: - assert payload['options'] == {'cas': 0} - self.kv = {'value': payload['data'], 'version': 1}; return out({'data': {'version': 1}}) - if path.startswith('auth/kubernetes/role/'): - stored = {k: (900 if v == '15m' else v) for k, v in payload.items()} - self.store[path] = stored; return out({}) - self.store[path] = payload; return out({}) - raise AssertionError(args) - - -def build(tmp_path, monkeypatch, name='svc-provisioner'): - authelia, keycape, pi = name == 'svc-authelia', name == 'svc-keycape', name == 'svc-privacyidea' - ccr_file = AUTHELIA_CCR if authelia else KEYCAPE_CCR if keycape else PI_CCR if pi else CCR - tool = load() - platform = tmp_path / 'platform' - (platform / 'credential-change-requests').mkdir(parents=True); (platform / 'openbao/policies').mkdir(parents=True) - (platform / 'scripts').mkdir() - shutil.copy(PLATFORM / 'scripts/credential-change.py', platform / 'scripts/credential-change.py') - if pi: - shutil.copy(PLATFORM / 'scripts/attended_service_delivery.py', platform / 'scripts/') - else: - shutil.copy(PLATFORM / f'openbao/policies/net-kingdom-{name}-bind-eso.hcl', platform / 'openbao/policies/') - import yaml - ccr = yaml.safe_load((PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / ccr_file).read_text()) - ccr['status'] = 'approved' - if not pi: ccr['openbao']['auth']['bound_claims_confirmed'] = True - ccr['review']['comments'] = [{'reviewer': f'User ({r})', 'decision': 'approved', 'source_ref': 'statehub:decision:synthetic', - 'comment': 'synthetic', 'reviewed_at': '2026-10-30T00:00:00+00:00'} - for r in ('platform-owner', 'net-kingdom-owner')] - path = platform / 'credential-change-requests' / ccr_file - path.write_text(json.dumps(ccr, indent=2) + '\n') - digest = hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'PLATFORM', platform) - bao = (FakeBao(AUTHELIA_KV, 'net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso') if authelia - else FakeBao(KEYCAPE_KV, 'net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind-eso') if keycape - else FakeBao(PI_KV, 'none') if pi else FakeBao()) - # LLDAP accepts exactly the account's current password. - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'directory_login', lambda endpoint, user, password: - user == name and password == live['value']) - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'bao', bao) - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'data', lambda r: json.loads(r.stdout)) - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'capabilities', lambda token, paths: json.loads( - bao(['write', '-format=json', 'sys/capabilities', '-'], payload={'paths': paths, 'token': token}).stdout)['data']) - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'revoke', lambda token: None) - - def ensure(path, wanted, check): - old = bao(['read', '-format=json', path], allow_failure=True) - if old.returncode != 0: bao(['write', path, '-'], payload=wanted) - check(json.loads(bao(['read', '-format=json', path]).stdout)['data']) - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'ensure', ensure) - # KeyCape: 'value' is bindPW in keycape-config, 'delivered' the ESO Secret (None until ESO runs). - live = {'value': VALUE, 'ready': 'True', 'bind_line': BIND_LINE, 'bind_dn': KEYCAPE_DN, 'delivered': None} - - def kube(kubeconfig, args, payload=None): - verb = args[2:5] - if verb == ['get', 'secret', 'identity-provisioner-ldap']: - return json.dumps({'data': {'username': base64.b64encode(b'svc-provisioner').decode(), - 'password': base64.b64encode(live['value'].encode()).decode()}}).encode() - if authelia and verb == ['get', 'secret', 'authelia-secrets']: - return json.dumps({'data': {'session_secret': base64.b64encode(b'unrelated').decode(), - 'ldap_password': base64.b64encode(live['value'].encode()).decode()}}).encode() - if authelia and verb == ['get', 'configmap', 'authelia-config']: - return json.dumps({'data': {'configuration.yml': 'authentication_backend:\n ldap:\n ' + live['bind_line'] + '\n'}}).encode() - if keycape and verb == ['get', 'secret', 'keycape-config']: - config = ('issuer: https://kc.example.test\nlldap:\n url: ldap://lldap:3890\n' - f' bindDN: {live["bind_dn"]}\n bindPW: "{live["value"]}"\nclients: []\n') - return json.dumps({'data': {'config.yaml': base64.b64encode(config.encode()).decode(), - 'key.pem': base64.b64encode(b'unrelated').decode()}}).encode() - if keycape and verb == ['get', 'secret', 'keycape-lldap-bind']: - if live['delivered'] is None: raise subprocess.CalledProcessError(1, 'kubectl') - return json.dumps({'data': {'password': base64.b64encode(live['delivered'].encode()).decode()}}).encode() - external = 'authelia-secrets' if authelia else 'keycape-lldap-bind' if keycape else 'identity-provisioner-ldap' - if verb == ['get', 'externalsecret', external]: - return json.dumps({'status': {'conditions': [{'type': 'Ready', 'status': live['ready']}]}}).encode() - if verb[:2] == ['create', 'token']: - return (args[4] + '|' + args[5].split('=', 1)[1]).encode() - raise AssertionError(args) - monkeypatch.setattr(tool, 'kube', kube) - custody = tmp_path / 'custody'; (custody / 'lldap').mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700); custody.chmod(0o700) - key = {'svc-authelia': 'LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS', 'svc-keycape': 'LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS', - 'svc-privacyidea': 'LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS'}.get(name, 'LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS') - env = custody / 'lldap/secrets.env'; env.write_text(f'{key}={VALUE}\n'); env.chmod(0o600) - return SimpleNamespace(tool=tool, bao=bao, live=live, digest=digest, custody=str(custody), ccr=path, name=name) - - -@pytest.fixture -def lane(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - return build(tmp_path, monkeypatch) - - -@pytest.fixture -def authelia(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - if not (PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / AUTHELIA_CCR).exists(): pytest.skip('CCR-2026-0053 required') - return build(tmp_path, monkeypatch, 'svc-authelia') - - -@pytest.fixture -def keycape(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - if not (PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / KEYCAPE_CCR).exists(): pytest.skip('CCR-2026-0054 required') - return build(tmp_path, monkeypatch, 'svc-keycape') - - -def run(ns, action): - receipt = {} - if action == 'setup': ns.tool.setup(ns.name, ns.digest, ns.custody, 'kc', receipt) - else: ns.tool.verify(ns.name, ns.digest, 'kc', receipt) - assert VALUE not in json.dumps(receipt) - return receipt - - -def test_setup_then_verify(lane): - r = run(lane, 'setup') - assert r['status'] == 'custody_and_reader_prepared' and r['kv_version'] == 1 - assert lane.bao.writes[0] == 'sys/policies/acl/agent-high-risk-boundary' and KV in lane.bao.writes - assert KV in lane.bao.store['sys/policies/acl/agent-high-risk-boundary']['policy'] - assert run(lane, 'setup')['existing_identical_custody'] is True # rerun is idempotent - assert run(lane, 'verify')['status'] == 'reader_and_delivery_verified' - - -def test_setup_refuses_custody_drift_before_any_write(lane): - lane.live['value'] = OTHER - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='custody_drift'): run(lane, 'setup') - assert lane.bao.writes == [] - - -def test_setup_refuses_unapproved_or_changed_ccr(lane): - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='ccr_digest'): - lane.tool.setup('svc-provisioner', '0' * 64, lane.custody, 'kc', {}) - ccr = json.loads(lane.ccr.read_text()); ccr['status'] = 'proposed'; lane.ccr.write_text(json.dumps(ccr)) - digest = hashlib.sha256(lane.ccr.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='ccr_status'): - lane.tool.setup('svc-provisioner', digest, lane.custody, 'kc', {}) - assert lane.bao.writes == [] - - -def test_setup_refuses_non_admin_session(lane): - lane.bao.identity = {'policies': ['default'], 'path': 'auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback'} - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='attended_platform_admin_required'): run(lane, 'setup') - - -def test_verify_refuses_unsynced_or_mismatched_delivery(lane): - run(lane, 'setup') - lane.live['ready'] = 'False' - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='external_secret_not_ready'): run(lane, 'verify') - lane.live.update(ready='True', value=OTHER) - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='kv_live_mismatch'): run(lane, 'verify') - - -def test_verify_refuses_when_wrong_service_account_can_log_in(lane): - run(lane, 'setup') - lane.bao.login_ok.add(('default', 'openbao')) - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='negative_login_accepted'): run(lane, 'verify') - - -def test_manifest_matches_contract(): - import yaml - docs = [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/bind-eso.yaml').read_text()) if d] - sa, store, es = docs - assert sa['metadata'] == {'name': 'net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso', 'namespace': 'sso'} - assert store['spec']['provider']['vault']['auth']['kubernetes']['role'] == 'net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso' - assert es['spec']['target'] == {'template': {'metadata': {}}, 'name': 'identity-provisioner-ldap', - 'creationPolicy': 'Merge', 'deletionPolicy': 'Retain'} - assert es['spec']['data'] == [{'secretKey': 'password', 'remoteRef': { - 'key': 'workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-provisioner', 'property': 'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD'}}] - - -def test_setup_refuses_unconfirmed_binding(lane): - ccr = yaml_load(lane.ccr); ccr['openbao']['auth']['bound_claims_confirmed'] = False - lane.ccr.write_text(json.dumps(ccr)); digest = hashlib.sha256(lane.ccr.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - with pytest.raises(lane.tool.Refused, match='ccr_shape'): - lane.tool.setup('svc-provisioner', digest, lane.custody, 'kc', {}) - - -def yaml_load(path): - import yaml - return yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) - - -def test_authelia_setup_then_verify_reads_only_its_key(authelia): - r = run(authelia, 'setup') - assert r['status'] == 'custody_and_reader_prepared' and AUTHELIA_KV in authelia.bao.writes - assert KV not in authelia.bao.writes - assert run(authelia, 'verify')['status'] == 'reader_and_delivery_verified' - - -def test_authelia_setup_refuses_when_config_binds_another_account(authelia): - authelia.live['bind_line'] = 'user: uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local' - with pytest.raises(authelia.tool.Refused, match='live_bind_user'): run(authelia, 'setup') - assert authelia.bao.writes == [] - - -def test_authelia_setup_refuses_custody_drift(authelia): - authelia.live['value'] = OTHER - with pytest.raises(authelia.tool.Refused, match='custody_drift'): run(authelia, 'setup') - assert authelia.bao.writes == [] - - -def test_authelia_manifest_matches_contract(): - import yaml - docs = [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/bind-eso.yaml').read_text()) if d] - sa, store, es = docs - assert sa['metadata'] == {'name': 'net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso', 'namespace': 'sso'} - assert store['spec']['provider']['vault']['auth']['kubernetes']['role'] == 'net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso' - assert es['spec']['target'] == {'template': {'metadata': {}}, 'name': 'authelia-secrets', - 'creationPolicy': 'Merge', 'deletionPolicy': 'Retain'} - assert es['spec']['data'] == [{'secretKey': 'ldap_password', 'remoteRef': { - 'key': 'workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia', 'property': 'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD'}}] - - -def test_keycape_setup_reads_the_config_bind_then_verify_the_dedicated_secret(keycape): - r = run(keycape, 'setup') # the dedicated Secret does not exist yet - assert r['status'] == 'custody_and_reader_prepared' and KEYCAPE_KV in keycape.bao.writes - keycape.live['delivered'] = VALUE # ESO created keycape-lldap-bind - assert run(keycape, 'verify')['status'] == 'reader_and_delivery_verified' - keycape.live['value'] = '' # bindPW cleared from keycape-config: the delivered value alone counts - assert run(keycape, 'verify')['status'] == 'reader_and_delivery_verified' - - -def test_keycape_verify_refuses_delivery_differing_from_the_config(keycape): - run(keycape, 'setup') - keycape.live['delivered'] = OTHER - with pytest.raises(keycape.tool.Refused, match='kv_live_mismatch'): run(keycape, 'verify') - - -def test_keycape_setup_refuses_another_bind_account(keycape): - keycape.live['bind_dn'] = 'uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local' - with pytest.raises(keycape.tool.Refused, match='live_bind_user'): run(keycape, 'setup') - assert keycape.bao.writes == [] - - -def test_keycape_manifest_creates_a_dedicated_secret(): - import yaml - docs = [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / 'sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-eso.yaml').read_text()) if d] - sa, store, es = docs - assert sa['metadata'] == {'name': 'net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind-eso', 'namespace': 'sso'} - assert store['spec']['provider']['vault']['auth']['kubernetes']['role'] == 'net-kingdom-svc-keycape-bind-eso' - assert es['spec']['target'] == {'template': {'metadata': {}}, 'name': 'keycape-lldap-bind', - 'creationPolicy': 'Owner', 'deletionPolicy': 'Retain'} - assert es['spec']['data'] == [{'secretKey': 'password', 'remoteRef': { - 'key': 'workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-keycape', 'property': 'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD'}}] - - -@pytest.fixture -def privacyidea(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - if not (PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / PI_CCR).exists(): pytest.skip('CCR-2026-0055 required') - return build(tmp_path, monkeypatch, 'svc-privacyidea') - - -def test_privacyidea_setup_and_verify_need_no_workload_access(privacyidea): - r = run(privacyidea, 'setup') - assert r['status'] == 'custody_prepared' and r['custody_is_current'] and r['workload_access'] is False - assert PI_KV in privacyidea.bao.writes - assert not any(w.startswith(('auth/kubernetes/role/', 'sys/policies/acl/net-kingdom')) for w in privacyidea.bao.writes) - assert run(privacyidea, 'verify')['status'] == 'custody_verified' - - -def test_privacyidea_setup_refuses_a_password_ldap_rejects(privacyidea): - privacyidea.live['value'] = OTHER # the directory has moved on; custody is stale - with pytest.raises(privacyidea.tool.Refused, match='custody_not_current'): run(privacyidea, 'setup') - assert privacyidea.bao.writes == [] - - -def test_privacyidea_verify_refuses_a_stale_kv_value(privacyidea): - run(privacyidea, 'setup') - privacyidea.live['value'] = OTHER # rotated in LLDAP without a new KV version - with pytest.raises(privacyidea.tool.Refused, match='kv_not_current'): run(privacyidea, 'verify') - - -def test_privacyidea_verify_refuses_a_workload_role(privacyidea): - run(privacyidea, 'setup') - privacyidea.bao.store['auth/kubernetes/role/net-kingdom-svc-privacyidea-bind-eso'] = {'policies': ['x']} - with pytest.raises(privacyidea.tool.Refused, match='unexpected_workload_role'): run(privacyidea, 'verify') diff --git a/tests/test_service_secret_custody.py b/tests/test_service_secret_custody.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4ee228e..0000000 --- a/tests/test_service_secret_custody.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,280 +0,0 @@ -"""Service helpers against synthetic files and a recording Kubernetes API stub.""" -import base64 -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess - -import bcrypt -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -PASSWORD = 'SyntheticServiceCredential12345678901234567890' -CHANGED = 'ReplacementSyntheticCredential12345678901234567890' -VALUES = { - 'privacyidea': ['PI_SECRET_KEY', 'PI_PEPPER', 'PI_DB_PASSWORD'], - 'lldap': ['LLDAP_JWT_SECRET', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS', 'LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS', 'LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS', - 'LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS', 'LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS'], - 'authelia': ['AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET', 'AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET', 'AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY', - 'AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET', 'AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET'], -} -COMPONENTS = ['postgresql', 'privacyidea', 'lldap', 'authelia', 'identity-provisioner'] -ROTATIONS = [('postgresql','PI_DB_PASSWORD','password'), ('privacyidea','PI_SECRET_KEY','PI_SECRET_KEY'), - ('privacyidea','PI_DB_PASSWORD','PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'), - ('lldap','LLDAP_JWT_SECRET','LLDAP_JWT_SECRET'), ('authelia','AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET','session_secret'), - ('lldap','LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS','LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS'), ('authelia','LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS','ldap_password')] - - -@pytest.fixture -def case(tmp_path): - private=tmp_path/'private';private.mkdir(mode=0o700) - for component,names in VALUES.items(): - directory=private/component;directory.mkdir(mode=0o700) - env=directory/'secrets.env';env.write_text(''.join(f'{name}={PASSWORD}\n' for name in names));env.chmod(0o600) - binary=tmp_path/'bin';binary.mkdir() - (binary/'kubectl').write_text('''#!/usr/bin/python3 -import json,os,sys -from pathlib import Path -args=sys.argv[1:] -raw=sys.stdin.read() if '-f' in args or '--patch-file=/dev/stdin' in args else '' -with open(os.environ['CALLS'],'a') as f:f.write(json.dumps({'args':args,'stdin':raw})+'\\n') -if os.environ.get('FAIL')==args[0]: - print(os.environ['MARKER']);print(os.environ['MARKER'],file=sys.stderr);sys.exit(1) -p=Path(os.environ['STATE']) -if args[0]=='get': - if os.environ.get('BAD_GET'):print(os.environ['BAD_GET']) - elif p.exists():print(p.read_text()) - sys.exit(0) -if args[0]=='create' and raw: - if p.exists() or os.environ.get('RACE'):sys.exit(1) - state=json.loads(raw);state['metadata'].update(uid='fixture-uid',resourceVersion='1') -elif args[0]=='patch': - if os.environ.get('RACE'):sys.exit(1) - state=json.loads(p.read_text()) - for op in json.loads(raw): - parts=[s.replace('~1','/').replace('~0','~') for s in op['path'].split('/')[1:]] - parent=state - for part in parts[:-1]:parent=parent[part] - if op['op']=='test': - if parent.get(parts[-1])!=op['value']:sys.exit(1) - elif op['op']=='remove':del parent[parts[-1]] - elif op['op']=='replace':parent[parts[-1]]=op['value'] - else:sys.exit(1) - state['metadata']['resourceVersion']=str(int(state['metadata']['resourceVersion'])+1) -else:sys.exit(2) -p.write_text(json.dumps(state)) -if os.environ.get('BAD_RESPONSE'):state['data']['unexpected']='wrong' -print(json.dumps(state)) -''') - (binary/'kubectl').chmod(0o700) - env={'PATH':str(binary)+':'+os.environ['PATH'],'HOME':str(tmp_path), - 'CALLS':str(tmp_path/'calls'),'STATE':str(tmp_path/'state'),'MARKER':PASSWORD} - return private,env - - -def invoke(case,component,rotate=None,**extra): - args=['bash','-x',str(ROOT/f'sso-mfa/k8s/{component}/create-secrets.sh'),str(case[0])] - if rotate:args+=['--rotate-key',rotate] - return subprocess.run(args,env={**case[1],**extra},capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=20) - - -def calls(case): - p=Path(case[1]['CALLS']);return [json.loads(line) for line in p.read_text().splitlines()] if p.exists() else [] - - -def state(case):return json.loads(Path(case[1]['STATE']).read_text()) - -def put_state(case,obj):Path(case[1]['STATE']).write_text(json.dumps(obj)) - -def check_private_result(result): - assert PASSWORD not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert CHANGED not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert 'BEGIN PRIVATE KEY' not in result.stdout+result.stderr - - -def key_source(component,key):return 'lldap' if key.startswith('LLDAP_') else source(component) -def source(component):return {'postgresql':'privacyidea','identity-provisioner':'lldap'}.get(component,component) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component',COMPONENTS) -def test_create_uses_literal_inputs_stdin_and_no_apply_annotation(case,component): - result=invoke(case,component);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;check_private_result(result) - assert PASSWORD not in json.dumps([c['args'] for c in calls(case)]) - writes=[c for c in calls(case) if c['args'][0]!='get'] - assert len(writes)==1 and writes[0]['args']==['create','-o','json','-f','-'] - obj=state(case);assert 'annotations' not in obj['metadata'] - values={k:base64.b64decode(v).decode() for k,v in obj['data'].items()} - if component=='postgresql':assert values=={'username':'privacyidea','password':PASSWORD} - elif component=='privacyidea': - assert values['PI_PEPPER']==PASSWORD and values['PI_SECRET_KEY']==PASSWORD - assert values['PI_SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI']==f'postgresql://privacyidea:{PASSWORD}@net-kingdom-pg-rw.databases.svc.cluster.local:5432/privacyidea_db' - elif component=='lldap':assert values=={k:PASSWORD for k in ('LLDAP_JWT_SECRET','LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS')} - elif component=='identity-provisioner':assert values=={'username':'svc-provisioner','password':PASSWORD} - else: - key=case[0]/'authelia/oidc_private_key.pem' - assert key.stat().st_mode & 0o077==0 and values['oidc_issuer_private_key']==key.read_text() - assert bcrypt.checkpw(PASSWORD.encode(),values['keycape_client_secret_hash'].encode()) - assert values['ldap_password']==PASSWORD - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component',COMPONENTS) -def test_repeated_apply_is_noop_and_preserves_other_data(case,component): - assert invoke(case,component).returncode==0 - old=state(case);old['data']['owner-added']='c3ludGhldGlj';old['metadata']['annotations']={'owner':'retained'};put_state(case,old) - count=len(calls(case));result=invoke(case,component) - assert result.returncode==0;check_private_result(result) - assert state(case)==old - assert all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(case)[count:]) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component,key,field',ROTATIONS) -def test_explicit_rotation_is_conditional_and_changes_only_named_field(case,component,key,field): - assert invoke(case,component).returncode==0 - old=state(case);old['data']['owner-added']='c3ludGhldGlj';old['metadata']['annotations']={'owner':'retained','kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration':'synthetic-old-copy'};put_state(case,old) - file=case[0]/key_source(component,key)/'secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text().replace(f'{key}={PASSWORD}',f'{key}={CHANGED}')) - result=invoke(case,component,rotate=key);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;check_private_result(result) - updated=state(case) - assert updated['metadata']['annotations']=={'owner':'retained'} - assert updated['data'][field]!=old['data'][field] - assert {k:v for k,v in updated['data'].items() if k!=field}=={k:v for k,v in old['data'].items() if k!=field} - patch=next(c for c in reversed(calls(case)) if c['args'][0]=='patch') - tests={op['path']:op['value'] for op in json.loads(patch['stdin']) if op['op']=='test'} - assert tests['/metadata/uid']==old['metadata']['uid'] and tests['/metadata/resourceVersion']==old['metadata']['resourceVersion'] - assert PASSWORD not in json.dumps(patch['args']) and CHANGED not in json.dumps(patch['args']) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component',COMPONENTS) -def test_differing_values_require_explicit_rotation(case,component): - assert invoke(case,component).returncode==0;old=state(case) - file=case[0]/source(component)/'secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text().replace(PASSWORD,CHANGED)) - count=len(calls(case));result=invoke(case,component) - assert result.returncode!=0;check_private_result(result);assert state(case)==old - assert all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(case)[count:]) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component',COMPONENTS) -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['shell','duplicate','public','symlink','hardlink','public-parent']) -def test_bad_private_input_never_reaches_cluster(case,component,defect): - file=case[0]/source(component)/'secrets.env';marker=case[0]/'executed' - if defect=='shell':file.write_text(file.read_text()+f'$(touch {marker})\n') - elif defect=='duplicate':file.write_text(file.read_text()*2) - elif defect=='public':file.chmod(0o644) - elif defect=='public-parent':file.parent.chmod(0o755) - elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(file,file.with_name('alias')) - else: - target=file.with_name('other');file.rename(target);file.symlink_to(target) - result=invoke(case,component);assert result.returncode!=0;check_private_result(result) - assert not marker.exists() and not calls(case) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component',COMPONENTS) -@pytest.mark.parametrize('failure',['get','create']) -def test_failed_child_diagnostics_never_escape(case,component,failure): - result=invoke(case,component,FAIL=failure);assert result.returncode!=0;check_private_result(result) - assert not Path(case[1]['STATE']).exists() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['owner','eso-label','identity','type','basic-auth','data','immutable','missing-uid']) -def test_wrong_or_controller_owned_existing_secret_is_refused(case,defect): - assert invoke(case,'lldap').returncode==0;old=state(case) - if defect=='owner':old['metadata']['ownerReferences']=[{'kind':'ExternalSecret','name':'fixture'}] - elif defect=='eso-label':old['metadata']['labels']={'reconcile.external-secrets.io/managed':'true'} - elif defect=='missing-uid':old['metadata']['uid']=None - elif defect=='identity':old['metadata']['namespace']='other' - elif defect=='type':old['type']='kubernetes.io/tls' - elif defect=='basic-auth':old['type']='kubernetes.io/basic-auth' - elif defect=='data':old['data']['LLDAP_JWT_SECRET']='invalid-base64' - else:old['immutable']=True - put_state(case,old);count=len(calls(case));result=invoke(case,'lldap') - assert result.returncode!=0 and state(case)==old - assert all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(case)[count:]) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component,key,field',ROTATIONS) -def test_concurrent_change_stops_rotation_without_retry(case,component,key,field): - assert invoke(case,component).returncode==0;old=state(case) - file=case[0]/key_source(component,key)/'secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text().replace(f'{key}={PASSWORD}',f'{key}={CHANGED}')) - count=len(calls(case));result=invoke(case,component,rotate=key,RACE='1') - assert result.returncode!=0 and state(case)==old;check_private_result(result) - assert sum(c['args'][0]=='patch' for c in calls(case)[count:])==1 - - -def test_create_race_never_switches_to_overwrite(case): - result=invoke(case,'lldap',RACE='1');assert result.returncode!=0 - assert [c['args'][0] for c in calls(case)]==['get','create'] - - -def test_authelia_failure_retains_same_key_on_retry(case): - result=invoke(case,'authelia',FAIL='create');assert result.returncode!=0 - key=case[0]/'authelia/oidc_private_key.pem';original=key.read_bytes() - assert invoke(case,'authelia').returncode==0 and key.read_bytes()==original - - -def test_rotating_session_never_generates_or_replaces_existing_signing_key(case): - assert invoke(case,'authelia').returncode==0;old=state(case) - (case[0]/'authelia/oidc_private_key.pem').unlink() - file=case[0]/'authelia/secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text().replace(f'AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET={PASSWORD}',f'AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET={CHANGED}')) - assert invoke(case,'authelia',rotate='AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET').returncode==0 - assert state(case)['data']['oidc_issuer_private_key']==old['data']['oidc_issuer_private_key'] - assert not (case[0]/'authelia/oidc_private_key.pem').exists() - - -def test_wrong_response_is_not_reported_as_success(case): - result=invoke(case,'lldap',BAD_RESPONSE='1');assert result.returncode!=0;check_private_result(result) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('annotation',['', 'synthetic-old-copy']) -def test_annotation_cleanup_preserves_secret_values_and_other_annotations(case,annotation): - assert invoke(case,'lldap').returncode==0;old=state(case) - old['metadata']['annotations']={'owner':'retained','kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration':annotation};put_state(case,old) - result=invoke(case,'lldap');assert result.returncode==0 - assert state(case)['data']==old['data'] - assert state(case)['metadata']['annotations']=={'owner':'retained'} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('component,key,field',ROTATIONS) -def test_rotation_refuses_missing_secret_before_create(case,component,key,field): - result=invoke(case,component,rotate=key);assert result.returncode!=0 - assert all(c['args'][0]=='get' for c in calls(case)) - assert not (case[0]/'authelia/oidc_private_key.pem').exists() - - -def test_rotation_cannot_change_an_unrelated_field(case): - assert invoke(case,'privacyidea').returncode==0;old=state(case) - file=case[0]/'privacyidea/secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text().replace(PASSWORD,CHANGED)) - result=invoke(case,'privacyidea',rotate='PI_SECRET_KEY');assert result.returncode!=0 - assert state(case)==old - assert not any(c['args'][0]=='patch' for c in calls(case)) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['symlink','hardlink','public','public-parent','invalid']) -def test_explicit_authelia_key_custody_is_validated_without_overwrite(case,defect): - key=case[0]/'authelia/external.pem';key.write_text('synthetic-invalid-key');key.chmod(0o600) - if defect=='symlink': - target=key.with_name('other');key.rename(target);key.symlink_to(target) - elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(key,key.with_name('alias')) - elif defect=='public':key.chmod(0o644) - elif defect=='public-parent':key.parent.chmod(0o755) - file=case[0]/'authelia/secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text()+f'AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE={key}\n') - result=invoke(case,'authelia');assert result.returncode!=0 - assert key.read_text()=='synthetic-invalid-key' - assert not any(c['args'][0]!='get' for c in calls(case)) - - -def test_native_kubectl_applies_stdin_patch_and_refuses_stale_version(case,tmp_path): - import shutil - binary=shutil.which('kubectl') - if binary is None:pytest.skip('native kubectl not available') - assert invoke(case,'lldap').returncode==0;old=state(case) - file=case[0]/'lldap/secrets.env';file.write_text(file.read_text().replace(f'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET={PASSWORD}',f'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET={CHANGED}')) - assert invoke(case,'lldap',rotate='LLDAP_JWT_SECRET').returncode==0 - patch=next(c['stdin'] for c in reversed(calls(case)) if c['args'][0]=='patch') - original=tmp_path/'original.json';original.write_text(json.dumps(old));original.chmod(0o600) - env={**os.environ,'KUBECONFIG':str(tmp_path/'no-cluster-config'),'HOME':str(tmp_path)} - command=[binary,'patch','--local','--type=json','--patch-file=/dev/stdin','-f',str(original),'-o','json'] - result=subprocess.run(command,input=patch,env=env,capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=20) - assert result.returncode==0 - assert json.loads(result.stdout)['data']==state(case)['data'] - old['metadata']['resourceVersion']='999';original.write_text(json.dumps(old)) - refused=subprocess.run(command,input=patch,env=env,capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=20) - assert refused.returncode!=0 diff --git a/tests/test_sops_private.py b/tests/test_sops_private.py deleted file mode 100644 index 586ff66..0000000 --- a/tests/test_sops_private.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,261 +0,0 @@ -"""Use real SOPS with disposable age custody; no repository secret inputs.""" -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import shutil -import subprocess - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SOPS = shutil.which('sops') -pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(SOPS is None, reason='SOPS required for real crypto regression') - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('wrong_recipient', [False, True]) -def test_real_sops_decrypt_with_only_sealed_descriptor(case, wrong_recipient): - import fcntl - original = case[1].read_bytes() - material = (subprocess.run(['age-keygen'], capture_output=True, check=True).stdout - if wrong_recipient else original) - fd = os.memfd_create('generated-sops-custody', os.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) - try: - os.fchmod(fd, 0o600); os.write(fd, material); os.lseek(fd, 0, os.SEEK_SET) - fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_ADD_SEALS, - fcntl.F_SEAL_WRITE | fcntl.F_SEAL_GROW | fcntl.F_SEAL_SHRINK | fcntl.F_SEAL_SEAL) - case[1].unlink() - env = {**case[2], 'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD': str(fd)} - env.pop('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE') - if wrong_recipient: - # A correct ambient key must never rescue the wrong explicit FD. - env['SOPS_AGE_KEY'] = original.decode() - result = subprocess.run(['make', '-s', 'sops-decrypt', 'FILE=' + str(case[3]), - 'OUTPUT=' + str(case[4])], cwd=case[0], env=env, - pass_fds=(fd,), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) - assert not case[1].exists() - assert 'synthetic-secret-payload' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - if wrong_recipient: - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not case[4].exists() - else: - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert json.loads(case[4].read_text()) == {'credential': 'synthetic-secret-payload'} - assert case[4].stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert not list(case[4].parent.glob('.netkingdom-sops-*')) - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -@pytest.fixture -def case(tmp_path): - repo = tmp_path / 'repo'; (repo / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap').mkdir(parents=True) - shutil.copyfile(ROOT / 'Makefile', repo / 'Makefile') - shutil.copyfile(ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py', repo / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py') - (repo / 'keys').mkdir() - key = tmp_path / 'disposable.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(key)], capture_output=True, check=True) - public = subprocess.check_output(['age-keygen', '-y', str(key)], text=True).strip() - (repo / 'keys/age.pub').write_text(public + '\n') - home = tmp_path / 'home'; home.mkdir(mode=0o700) - env = {'HOME': str(home), 'PATH': os.environ['PATH'], 'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE': str(key)} - clear = tmp_path / 'input.json'; clear.write_text(json.dumps({'credential': 'synthetic-secret-payload'})) - cipher = repo / 'cipher.json' - encrypted = subprocess.run([SOPS, '--encrypt', '--age', public, str(clear)], cwd=tmp_path, - env=env, capture_output=True, check=True) - cipher.write_bytes(encrypted.stdout) - output_dir = tmp_path / 'private-output'; output_dir.mkdir(mode=0o700) - return repo, key, env, cipher, output_dir / 'restored.json' - - -def make(case, target='sops-decrypt', *, env=None, source=None, output=None): - repo, _, default_env, cipher, destination = case - return subprocess.run(['make', '-s', target, 'FILE=' + str(source or cipher), - 'OUTPUT=' + str(output or destination)], - env=env or default_env, cwd=repo, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) - - -def ambient_key(case): - _, key, env, _, _ = case - path = Path(env['HOME']) / '.config/sops/age/keys.txt' - path.parent.mkdir(parents=True); path.write_bytes(key.read_bytes()); path.chmod(0o600) - - -def test_setup_never_installs_private_key(case): - _, key, env, _, _ = case - legacy = Path(env['HOME']) / '.config/age/key.txt' - legacy.parent.mkdir(parents=True); legacy.write_bytes(key.read_bytes()) - result = make(case, 'sops-setup') - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert not (Path(env['HOME']) / '.config/sops').exists() - - -def test_decrypt_real_sops_to_private_output_without_transcript(case): - ambient_key(case) # Old target succeeds through ambient discovery and leaks. - result = make(case) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert 'synthetic-secret-payload' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert json.loads(case[4].read_text()) == {'credential': 'synthetic-secret-payload'} - assert case[4].stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert not list(case[4].parent.glob('.netkingdom-sops-*')) - - -def test_wrong_explicit_key_never_falls_back_to_home_or_inline_keys(case, tmp_path): - ambient_key(case) - wrong = tmp_path / 'wrong.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(wrong)], capture_output=True, check=True) - env = {**case[2], 'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE': str(wrong), 'SOPS_AGE_KEY': case[1].read_text()} - result = make(case, env=env) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'synthetic-secret-payload' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert not case[4].exists() - - -def test_absent_explicit_custody_refused_even_if_home_has_key(case): - ambient_key(case) - env = dict(case[2]); del env['NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE'] - assert make(case, env=env).returncode != 0 - assert not case[4].exists() - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind', ['file', 'symlink']) -def test_existing_output_is_not_replaced(case, kind): - ambient_key(case) - if kind == 'file': case[4].write_bytes(b'original-output') - else: case[4].symlink_to(case[4].parent / 'absent') - assert make(case).returncode != 0 - if kind == 'file': assert case[4].read_bytes() == b'original-output' - else: assert case[4].is_symlink() - - -def test_git_worktree_output_is_refused(case): - ambient_key(case) - subprocess.run(['git', 'init', str(case[0])], env=case[2], capture_output=True, check=True) - assert make(case, output=case[0] / 'plaintext.json').returncode != 0 - assert not (case[0] / 'plaintext.json').exists() - - -def test_shared_output_directory_is_refused(case): - ambient_key(case) - case[4].parent.chmod(0o755) - assert make(case).returncode != 0 - assert not case[4].exists() - - -def noisy_tool(case, tmp_path): - bin_dir = tmp_path / 'bin'; bin_dir.mkdir() - tool = bin_dir / 'sops' - tool.write_text('#!/bin/sh\necho synthetic-tool-secret\necho synthetic-error-secret >&2\nexit 23\n') - tool.chmod(0o755) - return {**case[2], 'PATH': str(bin_dir) + ':' + case[2]['PATH']} - - -def test_child_output_and_errors_are_not_exposed_on_failure(case, tmp_path): - result = make(case, env=noisy_tool(case, tmp_path)) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'synthetic-tool-secret' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert 'synthetic-error-secret' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert not case[4].exists() - assert not list(case[4].parent.glob('.netkingdom-sops-*')) - - -def test_non_age_metadata_refuses_before_tool(case, tmp_path): - data = json.loads(case[3].read_text()); data['sops']['kms'] = [{'arn': 'synthetic'}] - case[3].write_text(json.dumps(data)) - result = make(case, env=noisy_tool(case, tmp_path)) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'age-only metadata' in result.stderr - assert 'synthetic-tool-secret' not in result.stdout - - -def test_filename_is_not_shell_code(case): - ambient_key(case) - odd = case[0] / 'cipher; touch SHELL_EXECUTED; #.json' - shutil.copyfile(case[3], odd) - result = make(case, source=odd) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert not (case[0] / 'SHELL_EXECUTED').exists() - assert case[4].exists() - - -def test_yaml_roundtrip(case, tmp_path): - public = (case[0] / 'keys/age.pub').read_text().strip() - clear = tmp_path / 'input.yaml'; clear.write_text('credential: synthetic-yaml-secret\n') - cipher = case[0] / 'cipher.yaml' - result = subprocess.run([SOPS, '--encrypt', '--age', public, str(clear)], cwd=tmp_path, - env=case[2], capture_output=True, check=True) - cipher.write_bytes(result.stdout) - result = make(case, source=cipher) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert 'synthetic-yaml-secret' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert 'synthetic-yaml-secret' in case[4].read_text() - - -def test_parser_error_never_echoes_input(case): - case[3].write_text('synthetic-malformed-secret') - result = make(case) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'synthetic-malformed-secret' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert not case[4].exists() - - -def test_shared_custody_key_is_refused(case): - case[1].chmod(0o644) - result = make(case) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not case[4].exists() - - -def test_creds_init_has_no_permanent_key_requirement(case): - subprocess.run(['git', 'init', str(case[0])], env=case[2], capture_output=True, check=True) - hooks = case[0] / '.githooks'; hooks.mkdir() - (hooks / 'pre-commit').write_text('#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n') - result = make(case, 'creds-init') - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert not (Path(case[2]['HOME']) / '.config/sops').exists() - - -def test_real_sops_does_not_execute_ambient_key_commands(case, tmp_path): - marker = tmp_path / 'ambient-command-executed' - command = tmp_path / 'ambient-key-command' - command.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ntouch ' + str(marker) + '\nexit 1\n') - command.chmod(0o755) - env = {**case[2], 'SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD': str(command), 'SOPS_AGE_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_CMD': str(command)} - result = make(case, env=env) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert not marker.exists() - - -def test_yaml_parser_error_is_sanitized(case): - bad = case[0] / 'broken.yaml' - bad.write_text('secret: [synthetic-malformed-yaml-secret\n') - result = make(case, source=bad) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'synthetic-malformed-yaml-secret' not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert 'Traceback' not in result.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind', ['json', 'yaml']) -def test_duplicate_metadata_refused_before_sops(case, kind): - source = case[0] / ('duplicate.' + kind) - source.write_text('{"sops": {}, "sops": {}}' if kind == 'json' else 'sops: {}\nsops: {}\n') - result = make(case, source=source) - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert 'duplicate' in result.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('kind', ['bare', 'linked']) -def test_bare_and_linked_git_outputs_are_refused(case, kind): - location = case[4].parent / 'git-output' - if kind == 'bare': - subprocess.run(['git', 'init', '--bare', str(location)], env=case[2], capture_output=True, check=True) - else: - subprocess.run(['git', 'init', str(case[0])], env=case[2], capture_output=True, check=True) - subprocess.run(['git', '-c', 'user.name=Test', '-c', 'user.email=test@example.invalid', - 'commit', '--allow-empty', '-m', 'fixture'], cwd=case[0], env=case[2], - capture_output=True, check=True) - subprocess.run(['git', 'worktree', 'add', '--detach', str(location)], cwd=case[0], env=case[2], - capture_output=True, check=True) - location.chmod(0o700) - result = make(case, output=location / 'plaintext.json') - assert result.returncode != 0 - assert not (location / 'plaintext.json').exists() diff --git a/tests/test_sops_write.py b/tests/test_sops_write.py deleted file mode 100644 index f04228b..0000000 --- a/tests/test_sops_write.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -"""Real SOPS write-path regressions with disposable keys and plaintext only.""" -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import shutil -import subprocess - -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -SOPS=shutil.which('sops') -pytestmark=pytest.mark.skipif(SOPS is None,reason='real SOPS required') -PLAIN='synthetic-sops-write-value' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action', ['rotate', 'edit']) -def test_real_sops_write_with_only_sealed_descriptor(case, action): - import fcntl - fd = os.memfd_create('generated-sops-write-custody', os.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) - try: - os.fchmod(fd, 0o600); os.write(fd, case['key'].read_bytes()); os.lseek(fd, 0, os.SEEK_SET) - fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_ADD_SEALS, - fcntl.F_SEAL_WRITE | fcntl.F_SEAL_GROW | fcntl.F_SEAL_SHRINK | fcntl.F_SEAL_SEAL) - case['key'].unlink() - env = {**case['env'], 'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD': str(fd)} - env.pop('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE'); env.pop('SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE') - before = case['cipher'].read_bytes() - result = subprocess.run(['make', '-s', 'sops-' + action, - 'FILE=' + str(case['cipher']), 'INPUT=' + str(case['input'])], - cwd=case['repo'], env=env, pass_fds=(fd,), - capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert PLAIN not in result.stdout + result.stderr - assert not case['key'].exists() - assert before != case['cipher'].read_bytes() - clear = subprocess.run([SOPS, '--decrypt', str(case['cipher'])], - env={**env, 'SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE': '/proc/self/fd/' + str(fd)}, - pass_fds=(fd,), capture_output=True, check=True) - assert json.loads(clear.stdout) == {'credential': PLAIN + ('-edited' if action == 'edit' else '')} - assert case['cipher'].stat().st_mode & 0o077 == 0 - assert not list(case['cipher'].parent.glob('.netkingdom-sops-write-*')) - finally: - os.close(fd) - - -@pytest.fixture -def case(tmp_path): - repo=tmp_path/'repo';boot=repo/'sso-mfa/bootstrap';boot.mkdir(parents=True) - shutil.copyfile(ROOT/'Makefile',repo/'Makefile') - for name in ['sops-private.py','sops-write.py']: - if (ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap'/name).exists():shutil.copyfile(ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap'/name,boot/name) - (repo/'keys').mkdir() - key=tmp_path/'disposable.key';subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(key)],capture_output=True,check=True) - public=subprocess.check_output(['age-keygen','-y',str(key)],text=True).strip() - (repo/'keys/age.pub').write_text(public+'\n') - (repo/'.sops.yaml').write_text('creation_rules:\n - age: '+public+'\n') - home=tmp_path/'home';home.mkdir(mode=0o700) - private=tmp_path/'private';private.mkdir(mode=0o700) - replacement=private/'replacement.json';replacement.write_text(json.dumps({'credential':PLAIN+'-edited'}));replacement.chmod(0o600) - cipher=repo/'cipher.json' - env={'HOME':str(home),'PATH':os.environ['PATH'],'NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE':str(key),'SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE':str(key)} - encrypted=subprocess.run([SOPS,'--encrypt','--age',public,'--input-type','json','--output-type','json','/dev/stdin'],input=json.dumps({'credential':PLAIN}).encode(),cwd=tmp_path,env=env,capture_output=True,check=True) - cipher.write_bytes(encrypted.stdout) - return {'repo':repo,'key':key,'public':public,'env':env,'cipher':cipher,'input':replacement,'tmp':tmp_path} - - -def invoke(case,action,*,file=None,input=None,env=None): - return subprocess.run(['make','-s','sops-'+action,'FILE='+str(file or case['cipher']),'INPUT='+str(input or case['input'])],cwd=case['repo'],env=env or case['env'],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=15) - - -def decode(case,file=None): - result=subprocess.run([SOPS,'--decrypt',str(file or case['cipher'])],env=case['env'],capture_output=True,check=True) - return json.loads(result.stdout) - - -def quiet(result): - assert PLAIN not in result.stdout+result.stderr - assert 'Traceback' not in result.stdout+result.stderr - - -def plaintext(case,name='plain.json'): - path=case['repo']/name;path.write_text(json.dumps({'credential':PLAIN}));path.chmod(0o600);return path - - -def test_public_only_encrypt_roundtrip(case): - path=plaintext(case);env=dict(case['env']);env.pop('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE');env.pop('SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE') - result=invoke(case,'encrypt',file=path,env=env);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result) - assert decode(case,path)=={'credential':PLAIN} - assert json.loads(path.read_text())['sops']['age'][0]['recipient']==case['public'] - assert path.stat().st_mode & 0o077==0 - - -def test_rotate_changes_ciphertext_not_plaintext_or_recipient(case): - before=case['cipher'].read_bytes();result=invoke(case,'rotate');assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result) - assert case['cipher'].read_bytes()!=before and decode(case)=={'credential':PLAIN} - assert [r['recipient'] for r in json.loads(case['cipher'].read_text())['sops']['age']]==[case['public']] - - -def test_edit_uses_private_replacement_and_never_launches_ambient_editor(case): - marker=case['tmp']/'editor-called';editor=case['tmp']/'editor' - editor.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ntouch '+str(marker)+'\nprintf '+PLAIN+'\\n >&2\n');editor.chmod(0o700) - result=invoke(case,'edit',env={**case['env'],'SOPS_EDITOR':str(editor),'EDITOR':str(editor)}) - assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result) - assert not marker.exists() and decode(case)=={'credential':PLAIN+'-edited'} - assert json.loads(case['input'].read_text())=={'credential':PLAIN+'-edited'} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('name',['cipher; touch SHELL_EXECUTED; #.json','$(shell touch MAKE_EXECUTED).json','with spaces.json']) -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action',['encrypt','rotate','edit']) -def test_file_names_are_data_not_shell_or_make_programs(case,name,action): - file=case['repo']/name - if action=='encrypt':file=plaintext(case,name) - else:file.write_bytes(case['cipher'].read_bytes()) - result=invoke(case,action,file=file);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result) - assert not (case['repo']/'SHELL_EXECUTED').exists() and not (case['repo']/'MAKE_EXECUTED').exists() - assert decode(case,file)=={'credential':PLAIN+('-edited' if action=='edit' else '')} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action',['rotate','edit']) -def test_explicit_key_required_despite_ambient_identity(case,action): - before=case['cipher'].read_bytes();env=dict(case['env']);env.pop('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE') - result=invoke(case,action,env=env);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result) - assert case['cipher'].read_bytes()==before - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action',['rotate','edit']) -def test_unauthorized_recipient_metadata_is_not_a_rotation_grant(case,action): - other=case['tmp']/'other.key';subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(other)],capture_output=True,check=True) - public=subprocess.check_output(['age-keygen','-y',str(other)],text=True).strip() - data=json.loads(case['cipher'].read_text());data['sops']['age'].append({**data['sops']['age'][0],'recipient':public}) - case['cipher'].write_text(json.dumps(data));before=case['cipher'].read_bytes() - result=invoke(case,action);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert case['cipher'].read_bytes()==before - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['public','symlink','hardlink','git','missing']) -def test_edit_refuses_unsafe_input_without_changing_cipher(case,defect): - file=case['input'];before=case['cipher'].read_bytes() - if defect=='public':file.chmod(0o644) - elif defect=='missing':file.unlink() - elif defect=='symlink': - target=file.with_name('other');file.rename(target);file.symlink_to(target) - elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(file,file.with_name('alias')) - else:subprocess.run(['git','init',str(file.parent)],capture_output=True,check=True) - result=invoke(case,'edit');assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert case['cipher'].read_bytes()==before - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['symlink','hardlink','public-write']) -def test_cipher_path_cannot_redirect_or_alias_replacement(case,defect): - file=case['cipher'];before=file.read_bytes() - if defect=='symlink': - target=file.with_name('other.json');file.rename(target);file.symlink_to(target) - elif defect=='hardlink':os.link(file,file.with_name('alias.json')) - else:file.chmod(0o666) - result=invoke(case,'rotate');assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert file.read_bytes()==before - - -def test_tracked_plaintext_refused_before_encryption(case): - file=plaintext(case) - subprocess.run(['git','init',str(case['repo'])],capture_output=True,check=True) - subprocess.run(['git','add',file.name],cwd=case['repo'],capture_output=True,check=True) - before=file.read_bytes();result=invoke(case,'encrypt',file=file) - assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert file.read_bytes()==before - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('action', ['edit', 'rotate']) -def test_tampered_cipher_cannot_be_replaced(case, action): - data=json.loads(case['cipher'].read_text());data['credential']='tampered';case['cipher'].write_text(json.dumps(data));before=case['cipher'].read_bytes() - result=invoke(case,action);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert case['cipher'].read_bytes()==before - - -def test_encryption_does_not_run_ambient_key_command(case): - path=plaintext(case);marker=case['tmp']/'key-command';command=case['tmp']/'command' - command.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ntouch '+str(marker)+'\n');command.chmod(0o700) - env={**case['env'],'SOPS_AGE_KEY_CMD':str(command),'SOPS_KMS_ARN':'unadmitted','SOPS_CONFIG':str(case['repo']/'.sops.yaml')} - result=invoke(case,'encrypt',file=path,env=env);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr;quiet(result);assert not marker.exists() - - -def test_malformed_plaintext_is_not_echoed_or_replaced(case): - path=plaintext(case);path.write_text('invalid '+PLAIN);before=path.read_bytes() - result=invoke(case,'encrypt',file=path);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert path.read_bytes()==before - - -def test_make_input_is_literal(case): - replacement=case['input'].with_name('$(shell touch MAKE_INPUT_EXECUTED).json');case['input'].rename(replacement) - result=invoke(case,'edit',input=replacement);assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr - assert not (case['repo']/'MAKE_INPUT_EXECUTED').exists() - assert decode(case)=={'credential':PLAIN+'-edited'} - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('defect',['hardlink','fifo','parent-symlink']) -def test_custody_key_alias_or_nonregular_input_is_refused(case,defect): - key=case['key'];env=dict(case['env']);before=case['cipher'].read_bytes() - if defect=='hardlink':os.link(key,key.with_name('alias.key')) - elif defect=='fifo': - key.unlink();os.mkfifo(key,0o600) - else: - parent=case['tmp']/'key-directory';parent.mkdir(mode=0o700);key.rename(parent/'key');alias=case['tmp']/'alias';alias.symlink_to(parent);env['NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FILE']=str(alias/'key') - result=invoke(case,'rotate',env=env);assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result) - assert case['cipher'].read_bytes()==before - - -def test_edit_preserves_declared_encryption_policy(case): - raw=json.dumps({'credential':PLAIN,'visible_unencrypted':'public-label'}).encode() - encrypted=subprocess.run([SOPS,'--encrypt','--age',case['public'],'--input-type','json','--output-type','json','/dev/stdin'],input=raw,cwd=case['tmp'],env=case['env'],capture_output=True,check=True) - case['cipher'].write_bytes(encrypted.stdout) - case['input'].write_text(json.dumps({'credential':PLAIN+'-edited','visible_unencrypted':'public-label'})) - result=invoke(case,'edit');assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr - obj=json.loads(case['cipher'].read_text()) - assert obj['visible_unencrypted']=='public-label' and obj['credential'].startswith('ENC[') - assert decode(case)=={'credential':PLAIN+'-edited','visible_unencrypted':'public-label'} - - -def test_child_diagnostics_and_plaintext_output_are_suppressed(case): - directory=case['tmp']/'bin';directory.mkdir();binary=directory/'sops' - binary.write_text('#!/bin/sh\nprintf "'+PLAIN+'\\n"\nprintf "'+PLAIN+'\\n" >&2\nexit 1\n');binary.chmod(0o700) - file=plaintext(case);before=file.read_bytes() - result=invoke(case,'encrypt',file=file,env={**case['env'],'PATH':str(directory)+':'+case['env']['PATH']}) - assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert file.read_bytes()==before - assert not list(file.parent.glob('.netkingdom-sops-write-*')) - - -def test_source_change_during_encryption_is_not_overwritten(case): - file=plaintext(case);directory=case['tmp']/'bin';directory.mkdir();binary=directory/'sops' - binary.write_text('#!/usr/bin/python3\nimport subprocess,sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\nr=subprocess.run('+repr([SOPS])+ '+sys.argv[1:],input=sys.stdin.buffer.read(),capture_output=True)\nPath('+repr(str(file))+').write_text("concurrent-update")\nsys.stdout.buffer.write(r.stdout)\nsys.exit(r.returncode)\n');binary.chmod(0o700) - result=invoke(case,'encrypt',file=file,env={**case['env'],'PATH':str(directory)+':'+case['env']['PATH']}) - assert result.returncode!=0;quiet(result);assert file.read_text()=='concurrent-update' - assert not list(file.parent.glob('.netkingdom-sops-write-*')) - - -def test_make_custody_command_cannot_execute_before_handoff(case): - helper=case['repo']/'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh' - helper.write_text('#!/bin/bash\npython3 - "$@" <<\'PYTHON\'\nimport json,sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\nPath("handoff.json").write_text(json.dumps(sys.argv[1:]))\nPYTHON\n') - command="printf 'safe'; touch OUTSIDE_CUSTODY; #" - result=subprocess.run(['make','-s','sops-custody-run','COMMAND='+command],cwd=case['repo'],env=case['env'],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=10) - assert result.returncode==0,result.stderr - assert not (case['repo']/'OUTSIDE_CUSTODY').exists() - assert json.loads((case['repo']/'handoff.json').read_text())[-3:]==['bash','-lc',command] - - -def test_yaml_encrypt_rotate_edit_roundtrip(case): - import yaml - file = case['repo'] / 'plain.yaml' - file.write_text('credential: ' + PLAIN + '\n'); file.chmod(0o600) - replacement = case['input'].with_suffix('.yaml') - replacement.write_text('credential: ' + PLAIN + '-edited\n'); replacement.chmod(0o600) - for action in ('encrypt', 'rotate', 'edit'): - result = invoke(case, action, file=file, input=replacement) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - quiet(result) - decrypted = subprocess.run([SOPS, '--decrypt', str(file)], env=case['env'], capture_output=True, check=True) - assert yaml.safe_load(decrypted.stdout) == {'credential': PLAIN + ('-edited' if action == 'edit' else '')} - - -def test_make_decrypt_output_is_literal(case): - output = case['input'].with_name('$(shell touch MAKE_OUTPUT_EXECUTED).json') - result = subprocess.run(['make', '-s', 'sops-decrypt', 'FILE=' + str(case['cipher']), 'OUTPUT=' + str(output)], - cwd=case['repo'], env=case['env'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - quiet(result) - assert not (case['repo'] / 'MAKE_OUTPUT_EXECUTED').exists() - assert json.loads(output.read_text()) == {'credential': PLAIN} - - -def test_make_custody_values_are_not_evaluated(case): - helper = case['repo'] / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh' - helper.write_text('#!/bin/bash\nexec python3 -c \'import json,sys; from pathlib import Path; Path("handoff.json").write_text(json.dumps(sys.argv[1:]))\' "$@"\n') - command = '$(shell touch MAKE_COMMAND_EXECUTED)' - recipient = '$(shell touch MAKE_RECIPIENT_EXECUTED)' - result = subprocess.run(['make', '-s', 'sops-custody-run', 'COMMAND=' + command, 'OPERATOR_AGE_PUBKEY=' + recipient], - cwd=case['repo'], env=case['env'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - assert not (case['repo'] / 'MAKE_COMMAND_EXECUTED').exists() - assert not (case['repo'] / 'MAKE_RECIPIENT_EXECUTED').exists() - assert json.loads((case['repo'] / 'handoff.json').read_text()) == ['--expected-recipient', recipient, '--', 'bash', '-lc', command] diff --git a/tests/test_storage_share_inventory.py b/tests/test_storage_share_inventory.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7cd0367..0000000 --- a/tests/test_storage_share_inventory.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -"""Read-only DAV metadata parser tests; no provider or credential access.""" -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -import pytest - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('storage_inventory',ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py') -module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module) - - -def body(path, kind='file', size='16', origin=''): - collection='' if kind=='dir' else '' - return f'''{origin}{path} - HTTP/1.1 200 OK{collection} - {size}'''.encode() - - -def test_only_closed_safe_metadata_is_returned(): - raw=body(module.BASE+'bootstrap.tar.age') - assert module.parse_listing(raw,'')==[{'name':'bootstrap.tar.age','directory':False,'bytes':16}] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('path,origin',[(module.BASE+'%2e%2e/else.age',''), - ('/other/account/backup.age',''),(module.BASE+'backup.age','https://unapproved.invalid')]) -def test_foreign_and_escaping_references_refuse(path,origin): - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.parse_listing(body(path,origin=origin),'') - - -def test_non_numeric_size_and_oversized_response_refuse(): - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.parse_listing(body(module.BASE+'backup.age',size='not-a-size'),'') - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.parse_listing(b'X'*(module.LIMIT+1),'') - - -def test_unrecognized_plaintext_files_are_not_exported(): - assert module.parse_listing(body(module.BASE+'private-password.txt'),'')==[] - - -def test_unrelated_authenticated_role_cannot_read_retrieval_credential(monkeypatch): - calls=[] - monkeypatch.setattr(module,'bao',lambda args:calls.append(args) or object()) - monkeypatch.setattr(module,'data',lambda result:{'data':{'policies':['default'],'path':'auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback'}}) - with pytest.raises(module.Refused):module.inventory() - assert calls==[['token','lookup','-format=json']] diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 10f7649..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ -# Bootstrap recovery transport check - -Owner work: NK-WP-0049. Follow -[the exact recovery ceremony](../../docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md). - -For an identity/custody outage, start with the -[Storage Share disaster recovery guide](../../docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md). -`retrieve-identity-offline.py` performs fixed-provider ciphertext retrieval from -privately entered independent provider access, without OpenBao/SSO. Its source -receipt pins the object, strong ETag, size and digest; failed downloads are removed. -`recovery-kit.py` builds an allowlisted standalone tools ZIP and can publish only -three new versioned guide/ZIP/checksum files beside the backups with exact -readback. `run-offline-recovery.sh` is the owner's private two-prompt handoff for -publication, outage-path retrieval and the existing archive recovery check. -Run secret prompts in the owner's own terminal, never an agent-captured PTY. -Actual owner publication/readback and outage-path archive recovery passed on -2026-10-16; see the [published location and receipts](../../docs/storage-share-recovery-publication.md). -Service restore admission remains in the -[isolated restore packet](../../docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md). - -The first native-service stage is `run-isolated-lldap.sh USER TRANSFER_RECEIPT`. -It preflights the exact local Docker engine/images before asking privately for -the age key and backup-era existing-user password. `isolated-lldap.py` validates -the encrypted archive, restores original directory/key material only into -network-none/read-only/tmpfs containers, proves native LDAP bind and explicit -invalid-credential denial, compares durable identity rows and removes its owned -containers/plaintext. It uses no live Kubernetes/OpenBao endpoint or provider -grant. Actual-image synthetic tests and the real owner backup-recovery run -passed on 2026-10-16; T16 is done. See the packet and actual LLDAP receipt for -the exact target, resource limits, accepted scope and repeat-drill command. - -`run-isolated-authelia.sh USER TRANSFER_RECEIPT` is the Authelia stage (T17, -prepared under T41). It asks for the same two private inputs. `isolated-authelia.py` -runs restored LLDAP as the network-none anchor with Authelia joining its -namespace, and checks the original config, storage encryption key, issuer -key, KeyCape's `keycape` client secret and existing-user first factor, with -wrong-password and wrong-client-secret refusal. Notifier, NTP and healthcheck -writes are confined; nothing leaves loopback. It imports `isolated-lldap.py` -unedited. Synthetic native tests and the actual owner run (2026-10-24) passed; T17 is done. - -`run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh TRANSFER_RECEIPT` is the existing-token MFA step (T19, prepared under -T42). After the age key it asks for your login name, then the PIN+code you would type at login. -`isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py` restores LLDAP, the database and the original keys into one network-free -namespace, repoints the archived LDAP resolver to the restored directory in the disposable copy only, and calls -`/validate/check` by user and realm, as KeyCape does: wrong key refused, wrong code refused, your code accepted. -It reuses `isolated-privacyidea.py` and `isolated-lldap.py` unedited. Fixture tests and the actual owner run (2026-10-24) passed; T19 is done. - -`run-isolated-privacyidea.sh TRANSFER_RECEIPT` is the token-material/audit recovery step. -It asks only for the existing backup age key. `isolated-privacyidea.py` restores -the linked dump into a loopback-only PostgreSQL/container namespace, reads -retained token material internally, and verifies all stored audit signatures -plus one new isolated entry and wrong-public-key/tampering negatives. Original -keys are preserved; audit exceptions are reported without rewriting history. -No MFA code is consumed or native MFA acceptance claimed. Exit2 requires owner -review of audit exceptions; see the packet for bounds and safe receipts. -The actual owner run passed on 2026-10-16: five retained token materials, -279,209 historical signatures, new-entry and negative checks, and cleanup. -T20/T31 are done; actual existing-token MFA remains T19. - -`verify-bundle.py` validates a digest-bound age-encrypted `secrets/` tar archive -using an explicit private temporary key and registered `keys/age.pub`. It checks -an exact required-file list, unrelated wrong-key refusal, safe isolated file -publication/readback and staging removal. No service or cluster is contacted. - -It refuses links, special/duplicate/unreviewed entries, oversized content, private -age keys in the bundle, wrong digest/recipient and existing receipt destinations. -Only a closed metadata receipt leaves the process. Current service credentials, -independent/off-host custody, production acceptance and revocation remain separate -owner evidence. Same-UID/process-memory isolation and forensic secure erasure are -not provided by this local checker. - -Tests use real age encryption/decryption with disposable keys and malicious -archive fixtures, never production credentials: - -```bash -python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_bootstrap_recovery_transport.py -``` - - -`inventory-storage-share.py` is a silent read-only child of the existing -attended Platform Backup-account procedure. It checks the caller's OIDC/admin -scope, reuses the owner custody accessor, and exports only bounded DAV names and -sizes. Warden revokes and cleans up the session. It never reads an age key or -object content and contains provider errors/redirects/proxies. - -`inventory-scaleway.py` lists bounded metadata in the fixed backup bucket/prefix -using the existing scoped runtime delivery and pinned primary cluster. It uses -neither the bootstrap API key nor object GET/write/delete operations. Run through -the already admitted caller with cached boto3 1.40.18; it emits only its safe -receipt. Both inventories explicitly state their bounds and cannot prove asset -absence outside them, ciphertext integrity, decryption or native recovery. - -`fetch-privacyidea-backup.py` retrieves only the fixed reviewed PI ciphertext -under the same attended Platform Backup-account procedure. Strong ETag binding, -exact length, digest and private no-overwrite output are required. It reads no -age key. `check-privacyidea-database.py` then runs through temporary human custody, -checks the transfer lineage/digest and recipient, tests wrong-key refusal and -restores the decrypted custom-format dump into pinned local PostgreSQL with no -network, ports or host data mounts. Only three fixed table counts are exported. -It removes the disposable database and plaintext and records cleanup. It does -not prove token decryption, audit signing continuity or full identity recovery. -See the exact prepared command in the ceremony, rather than inventing new inputs. - -```bash -NK49_RUN_DISPOSABLE_POSTGRES_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest -q \ - tests/test_privacyidea_offhost_recovery.py \ - tests/test_storage_share_inventory.py tests/test_scaleway_backup_inventory.py -``` - -`identity-backup-profile.json` prepares missing full service coverage and names -the exact current workload/PVC/credential dependencies, proposed provider paths -and remaining implementation/admission gates. It is a proposal, not a new live -publisher grant. `prepare-identity-coverage.py --receipt NEW_PATH` verifies the -primary cluster and current deployment/PVC/reference bindings using metadata -only. It refuses replacement resources, unobserved/unready deployments and new -unreviewed references. It has no Secret-data, pod-exec, mutation or upload route. -Its receipt says `prepared_not_admitted`; it cannot prove a backup exists. - -`kingpath-offsite.py --item NAME=PATH ... --receipt PATH` (NK-WP-0055-T13) seals -break-glass access material that otherwise lives only on the founder workstation, -such as the attended admin kubeconfig and the static tunnel key, to the registered -`railiance-backup` recipient. It uploads the result under a new name to the -Storage Share `Backup` account (`railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/`) and -reads it back with a hash check. Run it in your own terminal: it refuses unsafe -inputs (symlinks, group/world-readable, foreign-owned) before prompting for the -app password. Plaintext is packed in memory and never written to disk. The -receipt (0600) holds item names, sizes and the ciphertext digest, never values. -Recovery needs only the age key and the Storage Share password (crisis custody -list items 1 and 2). Contained tests: `tests/test_kingpath_offsite.py`. diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py deleted file mode 100644 index 50f6153..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,296 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Owner-run identity capture: metadata plan first, exact bounded execution later. - -Use the admitted Railiance caller. Flags bind reviewed source/targets; they do -not grant authority. Private child output and provider diagnostics never print. -""" -import argparse -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import subprocess -import tempfile -import uuid - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,HERE/(name+'.py')) - module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module);return module - - -bundle=load('identity-bundle');prepare=load('prepare-identity-coverage') -IMAGE='ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473' -SOURCES=['capture-identity.py','identity-files.py','identity-bundle.py','prepare-identity-coverage.py','identity-backup-profile.json'] -KUBE=['kubectl'] - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -def command(args,payload=None,timeout=60): - result=subprocess.run(KUBE+['--request-timeout=30s']+args,input=payload, - stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=timeout) - if result.returncode:raise Refused() - return result.stdout - - -def get(ns,kind,name): - scope=['-n',ns] if ns else [] - return json.loads(command(scope+['get',kind,name,'-o','json'])) - - -def selects(selector,labels): - if any(labels.get(k)!=v for k,v in selector.get('matchLabels',{}).items()):return False - for expression in selector.get('matchExpressions',[]): - key=expression['key'];op=expression['operator'];values=expression.get('values',[]) - if op=='In' and labels.get(key) not in values:return False - if op=='NotIn' and key in labels and labels[key] in values:return False - if op=='Exists' and key not in labels:return False - if op=='DoesNotExist' and key in labels:return False - if op not in {'In','NotIn','Exists','DoesNotExist'}:raise Refused() - return True - - -def network_review(run_id,actual_labels=None): - rows=[] - for ns in ('sso','mfa'): - policies=json.loads(command(['-n',ns,'get','networkpolicies','-o','json']))['items'] - for obj in policies: - m=obj['metadata'];s=obj['spec'] - labels=(actual_labels or {}).get(ns,{'net-kingdom/capture':run_id}) - if selects(s['podSelector'],labels) and (s.get('ingress') or s.get('egress')): - rows.append({'namespace':ns,'name':m['name'],'uid':m['uid'], - 'spec_sha256':hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(s,sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()}) - return rows - - -def validate_helper(actual,wanted): - a=actual['spec'];w=wanted['spec'] - if (any(a.get(k) for k in ('hostNetwork','hostPID','hostIPC','initContainers','ephemeralContainers')) - or a.get('automountServiceAccountToken') is not False or a.get('activeDeadlineSeconds')!=900 - or len(a['containers'])!=1 or a['volumes']!=w['volumes']):raise Refused() - c=a['containers'][0];expected=w['containers'][0] - if any(c.get(k)!=expected[k] for k in ('name','image','command','volumeMounts')):raise Refused() - if c.get('env') or c.get('envFrom') or c.get('securityContext',{}).get('privileged'):raise Refused() - if any(c.get('securityContext',{}).get(k)!=v for k,v in expected['securityContext'].items()):raise Refused() - if any(a.get('securityContext',{}).get(k)!=v for k,v in w['securityContext'].items()):raise Refused() - - -def manifests(run_id): - result=[] - for ns,claims in [('sso',[('lldap','lldap-data'),('authelia','authelia-data'),('keycape','keycape-authentication-policy')]), - ('mfa',[('privacyidea','privacyidea-data')])]: - label={'net-kingdom/capture':run_id};name='nk49-capture-'+run_id - result.append({'apiVersion':'networking.k8s.io/v1','kind':'NetworkPolicy', - 'metadata':{'name':name,'namespace':ns}, - 'spec':{'podSelector':{'matchLabels':label},'policyTypes':['Ingress','Egress'],'ingress':[],'egress':[]}}) - result.append({'apiVersion':'v1','kind':'Pod','metadata':{'name':name,'namespace':ns,'labels':label}, - 'spec':{'restartPolicy':'Never','activeDeadlineSeconds':900,'automountServiceAccountToken':False, - 'securityContext':{'runAsUser':0,'runAsGroup':0}, - 'containers':[{'name':'capture','image':IMAGE,'imagePullPolicy':'IfNotPresent', - 'command':['python3','-c','import time; time.sleep(900)'], - 'securityContext':{'allowPrivilegeEscalation':False,'readOnlyRootFilesystem':True, - 'capabilities':{'drop':['ALL'],'add':['DAC_OVERRIDE']}}, - 'resources':{'requests':{'cpu':'50m','memory':'128Mi'},'limits':{'cpu':'1','memory':'2Gi'}}, - 'volumeMounts':[{'name':key,'mountPath':'/source/'+key,'readOnly':True} for key,_ in claims]+ - [{'name':'scratch','mountPath':'/scratch'}]}], - 'volumes':[{'name':key,'persistentVolumeClaim':{'claimName':claim,'readOnly':True}} for key,claim in claims]+ - [{'name':'scratch','emptyDir':{'medium':'Memory','sizeLimit':'512Mi'}}]}}) - return result - - -def plan(): - p=bundle.profile();binding=prepare.prepare(p,get=get) - cluster=get('databases','cluster','net-kingdom-pg') - primary=cluster['status']['currentPrimary'];pod=get('databases','pod',primary) - if (not any(o.get('uid')==cluster['metadata']['uid'] for o in pod['metadata'].get('ownerReferences',[])) - or not any(c['type']=='Ready' and c['status']=='True' for c in pod['status'].get('conditions',[]))):raise Refused() - run_id=uuid.uuid4().hex[:12] - return {'schema':'netkingdom.identity-capture-plan.v1','status':'requires_owner_execution_admission', - 'created_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'run_id':run_id,'binding':binding,'kubeconfig':KUBE[2], - 'sources':[{'path':name,'sha256':hashlib.sha256((HERE/name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} for name in SOURCES], - 'database':{'namespace':'databases','cluster':'net-kingdom-pg','cluster_uid':cluster['metadata']['uid'], - 'pod':primary,'pod_uid':pod['metadata']['uid'],'database':'privacyidea_db'}, - 'create_resources':manifests(run_id),'service_changes':False,'credential_grants':False, - 'matching_network_allow_policies':network_review(run_id), - 'network_policy_enforcement_requires_owner_confirmation':True, - 'offsite_delivery_included':False,'global_atomic_snapshot_claimed':False} - - -def checked_plan(path,expected): - raw=path.read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=expected:raise Refused() - p=json.loads(raw) - if p.get('schema')!='netkingdom.identity-capture-plan.v1':raise Refused() - if p.get('kubeconfig')!=KUBE[2]:raise Refused() - if network_review(p['run_id']):raise Refused() - if p['sources']!=[{'path':name,'sha256':hashlib.sha256((HERE/name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} for name in SOURCES]:raise Refused() - if p['create_resources']!=manifests(p['run_id']):raise Refused() - now=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - if not 0<=(now-datetime.fromisoformat(p['created_at'])).total_seconds()<3600:raise Refused() - # Recheck the exact immutable source/target bindings before private reads. - current=prepare.prepare(bundle.profile(),get=get) - if current['bindings']!=p['binding']['bindings'] or current['profile_sha256']!=p['binding']['profile_sha256']:raise Refused() - return p - - -def delete_created(obj): - m=obj['metadata'];ns=m['namespace'];name=m['name'];uid=m['uid'] - if obj['kind']=='Pod':path=f'/api/v1/namespaces/{ns}/pods/{name}' - elif obj['kind']=='NetworkPolicy':path=f'/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/namespaces/{ns}/networkpolicies/{name}' - else:raise Refused() - payload=json.dumps({'apiVersion':'v1','kind':'DeleteOptions','preconditions':{'uid':uid},'gracePeriodSeconds':1}).encode() - command(['delete','--raw',path,'-f','-'],payload) - if obj['kind']=='Pod':command(['-n',ns,'wait','--for=delete','pod/'+name,'--timeout=90s'],timeout=100) - - -def bounded_file(args,path,limit): - # Stream binary dump to private staging, with a byte bound and suppressed - # diagnostics. API command argv contains only public resource/database names. - proc=subprocess.Popen(KUBE+['--request-timeout=600s']+args,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL) - try: - count=0 - with path.open('xb') as out: - while block:=proc.stdout.read(1024*1024): - count+=len(block) - if count>limit:raise Refused() - out.write(block) - if proc.wait(timeout=600):raise Refused() - finally: - if proc.poll() is None:proc.kill();proc.wait() - - -def capture(p,output,receipt,decision,checkpoint=lambda:None): - created=[];receipt.update(status='capture_started',decision_ref=decision,plan_run_id=p['run_id'], - created_resources=[],unverified_create_outcomes=[],helper_cleanup_verified=False,temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified=False) - checkpoint() - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-identity-',dir='/tmp') as temporary: - receipt['temporary_plaintext_directory']=temporary - checkpoint() - root=Path(temporary)/'payload';root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - held={} - try: - for c in bundle.profile()['components']: - for kind,names in [('deployment',[c['deployment']]),('secret',c['secret_refs']),('configmap',c['configmap_refs'])]: - for name in names: - obj=get(c['namespace'],kind,name) - # Keep reconstructable deployed resources inside encryption, - # without unrelated stale last-applied annotations. - m=obj['metadata'];obj['metadata']={k:m[k] for k in ['name','namespace','uid','resourceVersion']} - obj.pop('status',None) - raw=json.dumps(obj,sort_keys=True).encode();slot=f"resources/{c['namespace']}/{kind}/{name}.json" - held[(c['namespace'],kind,name)]=(m['uid'],m['resourceVersion']) - bundle.save(root,slot,raw) - for proposed in p['create_resources']: - # create, never adopt/apply an existing resource. Unknown create - # outcomes stop; only returned exact UIDs are eligible for cleanup. - pending={'kind':proposed['kind'],**proposed['metadata']} - receipt['unverified_create_outcomes'].append(pending) - checkpoint() - obj=json.loads(command(['create','-f','-','-o','json'],json.dumps(proposed).encode())) - if (obj['kind']!=proposed['kind'] or obj['metadata']['name']!=proposed['metadata']['name'] - or obj['metadata']['namespace']!=proposed['metadata']['namespace'] or not obj['metadata'].get('uid')):raise Refused() - created.append(obj) - receipt['unverified_create_outcomes'].remove(pending) - receipt['created_resources'].append({'namespace':obj['metadata']['namespace'], - 'kind':obj['kind'],'name':obj['metadata']['name'],'uid':obj['metadata']['uid']}) - checkpoint() - for ns in ('sso','mfa'): - name='nk49-capture-'+p['run_id'] - command(['-n',ns,'wait','--for=condition=Ready','pod/'+name,'--timeout=180s'],timeout=190) - live=get(ns,'pod',name) - expected=next(o for o in created if o['kind']=='Pod' and o['metadata']['namespace']==ns) - if live['metadata']['uid']!=expected['metadata']['uid']:raise Refused() - wanted=next(o for o in p['create_resources'] if o['kind']=='Pod' and o['metadata']['namespace']==ns) - validate_helper(live,wanted) - if network_review(p['run_id'],{ns:live['metadata']['labels']}):raise Refused() - raw=command(['-n',ns,'exec','-i',name,'-c','capture','--','python3','-c', - (HERE/'identity-files.py').read_text(),ns],timeout=600) - if len(raw)>bundle.LIMIT+2*1024*1024:raise Refused() - bundle.import_files(raw,root,ns) - if get(ns,'pod',name)['metadata']['uid']!=expected['metadata']['uid']:raise Refused() - db=p['database'];current=get('databases','cluster','net-kingdom-pg') - if current['metadata']['uid']!=db['cluster_uid'] or current['status']['currentPrimary']!=db['pod']:raise Refused() - if get('databases','pod',db['pod'])['metadata']['uid']!=db['pod_uid']:raise Refused() - (root/'databases').mkdir(mode=0o700) - bounded_file(['-n','databases','exec',db['pod'],'-c','postgres','--','pg_dump','-U','postgres', - '-d','privacyidea_db','-Fc','--no-owner','--no-acl'],root/'databases/privacyidea.dump',bundle.FILE_LIMIT) - if get('databases','pod',db['pod'])['metadata']['uid']!=db['pod_uid']:raise Refused() - for (ns,kind,name),binding in held.items(): - m=get(ns,kind,name)['metadata'] - if (m['uid'],m['resourceVersion'])!=binding:raise Refused() - # Re-read original keys after the database dump. No rotation is - # inferred from file presence; a changed key set refuses publication. - raw=command(['-n','mfa','exec','-i','nk49-capture-'+p['run_id'],'-c','capture','--','python3','-c', - (HERE/'identity-files.py').read_text(),'mfa'],timeout=60) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-key-recheck-',dir='/tmp') as keytemp: - again=Path(keytemp);bundle.import_files(raw,again,'mfa') - for name in ('enckey','private.pem','public.pem'): - if (root/'data/privacyidea'/name).read_bytes()!=(again/'data/privacyidea'/name).read_bytes():raise Refused() - receipt.update(bundle.seal(root,output,{'started_at':receipt['started_at'], - 'finished_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'database':db,'decision_ref':decision, - 'cluster_uid':prepare.CLUSTER_UID,'global_atomic_snapshot_claimed':False, - 'omissions':['historical local backups','SQLite WAL/SHM/journal represented by native snapshots', - 'Authelia notification.txt','privacyIDEA service logs; audit data retained in database', - 'OpenBao root/unseal/age private key custody remains independently held']})) - finally: - failures=[] - for obj in reversed(created): - try:delete_created(obj) - except Exception:failures.append(obj['metadata']['uid']) - receipt['helper_cleanup_verified']=not failures and not receipt['unverified_create_outcomes'] - checkpoint() - if not receipt['helper_cleanup_verified']:raise Refused() - receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']=not Path(temporary).exists() - checkpoint() - if not receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']:raise Refused() - - -def main(): - global KUBE - parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);parser.add_argument('action',choices=['plan','capture']) - parser.add_argument('--kubeconfig',required=True) - parser.add_argument('--receipt',required=True);parser.add_argument('--plan');parser.add_argument('--plan-sha256') - parser.add_argument('--output');parser.add_argument('--decision-id');a=parser.parse_args();os.umask(0o077) - KUBE=['kubectl','--kubeconfig',str(Path(a.kubeconfig).absolute())] - fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - os.close(fd) - r={'status':'failed','started_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'secret_values_exported':False} - def checkpoint(): - fd,temp=tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.capture-receipt-',dir=Path(a.receipt).absolute().parent) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n');out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) - os.replace(temp,a.receipt) - finally:Path(temp).unlink(missing_ok=True) - code=1 - try: - if a.action=='plan': - if any([a.plan,a.plan_sha256,a.output,a.decision_id]):raise Refused() - r=plan();code=0 - else: - if not all([a.plan,a.plan_sha256,a.output,a.decision_id]):raise Refused() - uuid.UUID(a.decision_id) - p=checked_plan(Path(a.plan),a.plan_sha256) - capture(p,Path(a.output),r,a.decision_id,checkpoint);code=0 - except Exception: - r.update(status='failed',error='capture_refused_or_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - if r.get('temporary_plaintext_directory') and not Path(r['temporary_plaintext_directory']).exists():r['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']=True - finally: - r['finished_at']=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - checkpoint() - print('OK: identity '+a.action+' complete; see safe receipt.' if code==0 else 'ERROR: identity operation failed; inspect safe receipt before retry.') - return code - - -def interrupted(*args):raise Refused() - - -if __name__=='__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGHUP,signal.SIGTERM,signal.SIGINT):signal.signal(sig,interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py deleted file mode 100644 index d00361b..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,156 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Restore the fetched PI database in an isolated, disposable local PostgreSQL. - -Run only through the attended custody helper. No cluster, production database, -network, ports, host data mounts, IAM login or token decryption is involved. -""" -import argparse -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import time -import uuid - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('custody',ROOT/'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py') -custody=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(custody) -RECIPIENT='age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz' -IMAGE='postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70' -OBJECT='r01-net-kingdom-pg/net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea_db-20261015T023000Z.dump.age' -SIZE=89129309 - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -def run(args,**kwargs): - result=subprocess.run(args,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=600,**kwargs) - if result.returncode:raise Refused() - return result.stdout - - -def transfer_input(receipt): - r=json.loads(receipt.read_text()) - if (r.get('schema')!='netkingdom.privacyidea-offhost-transfer.v1' or - r.get('status')!='ciphertext_fetched' or r.get('object')!=OBJECT or - r.get('ciphertext_bytes')!=SIZE or r.get('object_unchanged_during_transfer') is not True):raise Refused() - path=Path(r['ciphertext_path']) - if not path.is_absolute() or path.parent.parent!=Path('/tmp') or not path.parent.name.startswith('nk49-offhost-'):raise Refused() - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path,*path.parents)):raise Refused() - st=path.stat() - if st.st_uid!=os.getuid() or st.st_mode&0o077 or st.st_nlink!=1 or not path.is_file() or st.st_size!=SIZE:raise Refused() - blob=path.read_bytes() - if len(blob)!=SIZE or hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest()!=r['ciphertext_sha256']:raise Refused() - return blob,r['ciphertext_sha256'] - - -def restore(dump,container): - # Require the exact image already present; do not pull through a mutable tag. - image_id=run(['docker','image','inspect','--format','{{.Id}}',IMAGE]).decode().strip() - run(['docker','run','--detach','--pull=never','--name',container,'--network','none', - '--security-opt','no-new-privileges','--memory','2g','--cpus','2', - '--tmpfs','/var/lib/postgresql/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=1073741824', - '--env','POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust','--env','POSTGRES_DB=recovery', - IMAGE,'postgres','-c','listen_addresses=']) - for _ in range(60): - # The image starts a temporary server during initdb. Wait until the - # entrypoint has exec'd the final server before attempting the restore. - pid1=subprocess.run(['docker','exec',container,'cat','/proc/1/comm'], - stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=10) - if pid1.returncode or pid1.stdout.strip()!=b'postgres': - time.sleep(1);continue - ready=subprocess.run(['docker','exec',container,'pg_isready','-U','postgres','-d','recovery'], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=10) - if ready.returncode==0:break - time.sleep(1) - else:raise Refused() - version=run(['docker','exec',container,'pg_restore','--version']).decode().strip() - with dump.open('rb') as source: - run(['docker','exec','-i',container,'pg_restore','-U','postgres','-d','recovery', - '--no-owner','--no-privileges','--exit-on-error'],stdin=source) - # Fixed aggregate queries only. No identity, resolver config or token values. - counts={} - for table in ('token','resolver','realm'): - raw=run(['docker','exec',container,'psql','-X','-U','postgres','-d','recovery','-At', - '-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-c',f'SELECT count(*) FROM public.{table};']).strip() - if not raw.isdigit():raise Refused() - counts[table]=int(raw) - return {'image':IMAGE,'image_id':image_id,'pg_restore_version':version,'aggregate_row_counts':counts} - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - p.add_argument('--transfer-receipt',required=True);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();os.umask(0o077) - # Reserve the receipt before any recovery action; never overwrite evidence. - fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'schema':'netkingdom.privacyidea-database-drill.v1','status':'failed', - 'started_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'production_contacted':False,'secret_values_exported':False,'native_identity_recovery_proven':False, - 'token_decryption_proven':False,'audit_signature_continuity_proven':False, - 'full_identity_file_coverage_proven':False,'container_cleanup_verified':False, - 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified':False} - container='nk49-pi-recovery-'+uuid.uuid4().hex - keyfd=None;work=None - try: - blob,digest=transfer_input(Path(a.transfer_receipt));r['ciphertext_sha256']=digest - keyfd=custody.private_key_fd() - derived=run(['age-keygen','-y',f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'],pass_fds=(keyfd,)).strip() - if derived!=RECIPIENT.encode():raise Refused() - r['registered_recipient_match']=True - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-pi-drill-',dir='/tmp') as temporary: - work=Path(temporary) - env={'PATH':os.environ.get('PATH',os.defpath),'HOME':temporary,'XDG_CONFIG_HOME':temporary} - wrong=work/'wrong.key' - run(['age-keygen','-o',str(wrong)],env=env) - negative=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',str(wrong)],input=blob,stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=60,env=env) - if negative.returncode==0:raise Refused() - r['wrong_key_refused']=True - dump=work/'privacyidea.dump' - with dump.open('xb') as output: - result=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'],input=blob, - stdout=output,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=120,pass_fds=(keyfd,),env=env) - if result.returncode or not 5200 or not etag.startswith('"') or not etag.endswith('"') or - any(ord(c)<32 for c in etag)): - raise owner.Refused() - return etag - - -def transfer(opener,auth,destination): - url=owner.HOST+owner.BASE+OBJECT - headers={'Authorization':'Basic '+auth,'Accept-Encoding':'identity'} - with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=headers),timeout=30) as response: - etag=metadata(response,url) - headers['If-Match']=etag - digest=hashlib.sha256();count=0 - with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(url,headers=headers),timeout=60) as response: - if metadata(response,url)!=etag:raise owner.Refused() - fd=os.open(destination,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out: - while chunk:=response.read(1024*1024): - count+=len(chunk) - if count>SIZE:raise owner.Refused() - digest.update(chunk);out.write(chunk) - out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) - if count!=SIZE:raise owner.Refused() - with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=headers),timeout=30) as response: - if metadata(response,url)!=etag:raise owner.Refused() - # ETag used for request binding only; it is not asserted to be a content hash. - return {'ciphertext_bytes':count,'ciphertext_sha256':digest.hexdigest(), - 'object_unchanged_during_transfer':True} - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();os.umask(0o077) - fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'schema':'netkingdom.privacyidea-offhost-transfer.v1','status':'failed', - 'started_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'provider':'Storage Share', - 'object':OBJECT,'age_keys_read':False,'plaintext_created':False, - 'production_writes':False,'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'owner_accessor_sha256':hashlib.sha256((HERE/'inventory-storage-share.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - destination=None - try: - identity,credentials=owner.caller_credentials() - r['caller_auth_path']=identity['path'];r['caller_entity_id']=identity.get('entity_id') - auth=base64.b64encode((credentials['BACKUP_USERNAME']+':'+credentials['BACKUP_PASSWORD']).encode()).decode() - destination=Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='nk49-offhost-',dir='/tmp'))/'privacyidea.dump.age' - opener=urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}),owner.NoRedirect()) - r.update(transfer(opener,auth,destination)) - r.update(status='ciphertext_fetched',ciphertext_path=str(destination)) - except Exception: - r['error']='bounded_transfer_failed_diagnostics_suppressed' - if destination is not None: - destination.unlink(missing_ok=True);destination.parent.rmdir() - finally: - r['finished_at']=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - return int(r['status']=='failed') - - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json deleted file mode 100644 index 8f380f8..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.identity-backup-profile.v1", - "status": "implemented_pending_owner_admission", - "owner": "net-kingdom with railiance-platform/rapp-postgres runtime and storage admission", - "public_recipient": "age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz", - "archive_profile": "netkingdom-identity-v1; new profile, not the bootstrap secrets-only tar profile", - "components": [ - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "lldap", - "deployment_uid": "743a86bd-5cb0-4ca0-9c56-a3438f4746a8", - "pvc_refs": [ - { - "name": "lldap-data", - "uid": "0a06b65a-e7b3-42d3-916e-e74dbe5fc7da" - } - ], - "secret_refs": [ - "lldap-secrets" - ], - "configmap_refs": [], - "required_assets": [ - "SQLite online-backup snapshot of /data/users.db with integrity check", - "remaining non-backup durable /data files, including any private identity material", - "current deployment configuration and exact lldap-secrets fields" - ], - "native_acceptance": [ - "directory user/group/membership preservation", - "existing-user password authentication in isolated environment" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "authelia", - "deployment_uid": "dc40a925-2306-4a3b-89c0-e714187503c3", - "pvc_refs": [ - { - "name": "authelia-data", - "uid": "86826554-b014-4df4-8b28-866aa64f6413" - } - ], - "secret_refs": [ - "authelia-secrets", - "authelia-smtp" - ], - "configmap_refs": [ - "authelia-config" - ], - "required_assets": [ - "SQLite online-backup snapshot of /var/authelia/data/db.sqlite3 with integrity check", - "current configuration.yml and all Secret-mounted encryption/OIDC/session fields", - "explicit disposition for notifier credentials and remaining durable files" - ], - "native_acceptance": [ - "storage decryption", - "same OIDC signing identity and preserved client configuration", - "isolated authentication flow with outbound notification disabled" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "sso", - "deployment": "keycape", - "deployment_uid": "99ddd83c-cb3f-4847-bcf8-35f1aa87627f", - "pvc_refs": [ - { - "name": "keycape-authentication-policy", - "uid": "423f558f-8c11-4edf-956b-243559df4a8e" - } - ], - "secret_refs": [ - "keycape-approval-engine-operator-client", - "keycape-config", - "keycape-factor-read", - "keycape-informed-decision-sitting-requester-client", - "keycape-rapp-qonto-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client", - "keycape-secrets-engine-requester-client" - ], - "configmap_refs": [], - "required_assets": [ - "exact current keycape-config config.yaml and key.pem", - "complete stable policy/receipt PVC snapshot", - "current deployment and owner disposition for every referenced credential: encrypted recovery or independently recoverable provider reissue path" - ], - "native_acceptance": [ - "same issuer/JWKS signing identity", - "registry, authentication policy and receipt continuity", - "current consumer positive/negative authentication under isolated test endpoints" - ] - }, - { - "namespace": "mfa", - "deployment": "privacyidea", - "deployment_uid": "58c7f96d-61cb-4dd4-bca2-54661c0ac375", - "pvc_refs": [ - { - "name": "privacyidea-data", - "uid": "65650fc1-02d8-4c0f-84fc-e0015c8f3ed9" - }, - { - "name": "privacyidea-logs", - "uid": "39fa90d9-bc54-4a03-a0d6-ae85165e0cb9" - } - ], - "secret_refs": [ - "privacyidea-config" - ], - "configmap_refs": [ - "factor-recovery-01119187d90d7b76", - "keycape-onboarding-9465e5e0b98f7986", - "privacyidea-cfg" - ], - "required_assets": [ - "original /etc/privacyidea/enckey, private.pem and public.pem with matching RSA pair validation", - "current privacyidea-config and mounted configuration/scripts", - "bounded native PostgreSQL custom dump with exact database identity and key-generation linkage", - "explicit disposition for service logs; audit database/signatures must be preserved" - ], - "native_acceptance": [ - "decrypt existing retained token material without exporting it", - "verify pre-backup audit signatures and create/verify a new isolated audit entry", - "existing-token MFA and negative-key refusal" - ] - } - ], - "capture_contract": { - "plaintext": "private task staging outside Git; never process output, State Hub or logs; verified cleanup after encryption", - "consistency": "native SQLite online-backup and PostgreSQL logical snapshot; explicit capture interval per asset; no global atomic snapshot claim; before/after source identities/config versions and directory inventories must match", - "key_policy": "preserve original service keys; no age private key in the payload, no replacement generation, no root/unseal collection", - "encryption": "public-recipient-only streaming archive to age; private fresh ciphertext, no overwrite; manifest inside ciphertext with source identities, times, complete required paths, digests and omissions", - "limits": "measure first; proposed 512 MiB encrypted admission ceiling, no silent truncation/exclusions", - "historical_database": "existing verified October15 dump remains protected; new bundle must link its own exact database/key capture generation and recovery receipt" - }, - "proposed_destinations": { - "initial": "Storage Share Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/", - "future_secondary": "s3://railiance-platform-pg-backup/platform-pg/application-archives/net-kingdom/; not implemented/admitted in this rollout", - "admitted": false, - "publisher": "CCR-2026-0048: new folder-only read/create public DAV share, delivered by exact ESO reader; no operator password in runtime; explicitly owner-approved provider-added re-sharing (permissions21)", - "retention": "CCR-2026-0049: separate folder-only read/delete share and process; newest plus seven daily/two weekly and independently recovered pinned generation; unknown/unindexed points never deleted; explicitly owner-approved provider-added re-sharing (permissions25)", - "schedule": "source prepared: daily 03:45 UTC plus up to five minutes jitter, hourly 25-hour freshness check; installation leaves timers disabled until independent archive recovery", - "quota": "512 MiB ceiling, two GiB fresh provider headroom; initial 10 GiB account quota checked; unsupported public-share quota fails closed" - }, - "admission_gates": [ - "Approve exact CCR-2026-0048/0049 grants and node runtime packet; three required owner reviews, confirmed native SA/namespace/audience boundaries before acceptance", - "Exclude helper capture label from existing broad DNS allow policies; validate read-only helper manifests and cluster/PVC/source bindings before private capture", - "Preserve every referenced credential encrypted with original keys; fresh native SQLite/PG snapshots and exact manifest, with documented omissions and no global atomicity claim", - "Create fresh ciphertext and exact Storage Share object, read back ciphertext and receipt by strong ETag/hash, independently retrieve using operator custody", - "Attended independent age-key proof: wrong-key denial, complete archive hashes, SQLite/RSA checks, disposable native PostgreSQL restore and verified cleanup before timer activation", - "Full NK49 closure separately requires native directory/issuer/MFA authentication, retained token decryption, audit signature continuity, current callers and legacy credential dispositions; archive acceptance does not close those gates", - "Host-local health cannot report a dead host; external outage monitoring and second-provider copy remain separate coverage gaps" - ], - "runtime_host": { - "ssh_alias": "railiance01", - "hostname": "239.62.205.92.host.secureserver.net", - "machine_id_sha256": "fe7367a60951922122af7ba18ed2cde65c7e0a232bbedfb045cb575de2094c2f" - } -} diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3a7ea9e..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,211 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Strict data-bearing identity archive format, native checks and private sealing. - -No custody key is used to create a bundle. Its manifest and plaintext digests -stay inside encryption. Public receipts expose only ciphertext provenance. -""" -import base64 -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path,PurePosixPath -import re -import sqlite3 -import stat -import subprocess -import tarfile -import tempfile - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -PROFILE=ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json' -LIMIT=512*1024*1024 -FILE_LIMIT=256*1024*1024 -NAME=re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,160}\Z') - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -def profile():return json.loads(PROFILE.read_text()) - - -def private(path,directory=False,max_bytes=FILE_LIMIT): - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path,*path.parents)):raise Refused() - s=path.lstat() - if s.st_uid!=os.getuid() or s.st_mode&0o077:raise Refused() - if directory: - if not stat.S_ISDIR(s.st_mode):raise Refused() - elif not stat.S_ISREG(s.st_mode) or s.st_nlink!=1 or s.st_size>max_bytes:raise Refused() - - -def allowed(name,profile_data=None): - p=PurePosixPath(name) - if p.is_absolute() or any(not NAME.fullmatch(x) or x in {'.','..'} for x in p.parts):return False - if len(p.parts)>=3 and p.parts[:2] in [('data','lldap'),('data','authelia'),('data','keycape'),('data','privacyidea')]:return True - if name=='databases/privacyidea.dump':return True - for c in (profile_data or profile())['components']: - prefix=f"resources/{c['namespace']}/" - if name==prefix+'deployment/'+c['deployment']+'.json':return True - if any(name==prefix+'secret/'+n+'.json' for n in c['secret_refs']):return True - if any(name==prefix+'configmap/'+n+'.json' for n in c['configmap_refs']):return True - return False - - -def save(root,name,value,profile_data=None): - if not allowed(name,profile_data) or len(value)>FILE_LIMIT or b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' in value:raise Refused() - target=root/name;target.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True) - fd=os.open(target,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(value) - - -def import_files(raw,root,mode): - names=set();total=0 - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(raw),mode='r:') as archive: - for member in archive: - expected=('data/privacyidea/',) if mode=='mfa' else ('data/lldap/','data/authelia/','data/keycape/') - if (not member.isfile() or not member.name.startswith(expected) or member.name in names - or member.size<0 or member.size>FILE_LIMIT or len(names)>=2048):raise Refused() - names.add(member.name);total+=member.size - if total>LIMIT:raise Refused() - data=archive.extractfile(member).read() - if len(data)!=member.size:raise Refused() - save(root,member.name,data) - - -def resource(root,ns,kind,name): - p=root/f'resources/{ns}/{kind}/{name}.json' - data=json.loads(p.read_bytes()) - if data['metadata']['name']!=name or data['metadata']['namespace']!=ns:raise Refused() - return data - - -def checks(root,profile_data=None): - # Checks describe stored formats/integrity, not current login validity. - for c in (profile_data or profile())['components']: - deployment=resource(root,c['namespace'],'deployment',c['deployment']) - if deployment.get('kind')!='Deployment' or deployment['metadata']['uid']!=c['deployment_uid']:raise Refused() - for name in c['secret_refs']: - data=resource(root,c['namespace'],'secret',name) - if data.get('kind')!='Secret' or not isinstance(data.get('data'),dict) or not data['data']:raise Refused() - for value in data['data'].values(): - if b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' in base64.b64decode(value,validate=True):raise Refused() - for name in c['configmap_refs']: - if resource(root,c['namespace'],'configmap',name).get('kind')!='ConfigMap':raise Refused() - for name,file in [('lldap','users.db'),('authelia','db.sqlite3')]: - db=root/f'data/{name}/{file}' - with sqlite3.connect(db.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True) as con: - if con.execute('PRAGMA integrity_check').fetchall()!=[('ok',)]:raise Refused() - with (root/'databases/privacyidea.dump').open('rb') as source: - if source.read(5)!=b'PGDMP':raise Refused() - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('pi_keys',ROOT/'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py') - keys=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(keys) - keys.validate({name:(root/'data/privacyidea'/name).read_bytes() for name in ('enckey','private.pem','public.pem')}) - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa - config=resource(root,'sso','secret','keycape-config')['data'] - if not base64.b64decode(config['config.yaml'],validate=True):raise Refused() - signing=serialization.load_pem_private_key(base64.b64decode(config['key.pem'],validate=True),password=None) - if not isinstance(signing,rsa.RSAPrivateKey) or signing.key_size<2048:raise Refused() - # Policy must exist, even for an empty set of receipts; do not silently - # restore an issuer without its current authentication policy. - policy=json.loads((root/'data/keycape/policy.json').read_bytes()) - if not isinstance(policy,dict):raise Refused() - return {'sqlite_integrity_passed':True,'privacyidea_key_format_and_pair_passed':True, - 'keycape_signing_key_format_passed':True,'policy_json_present':True, - 'database_custom_format_present':True,'native_identity_recovery_proven':False} - - -def inventory(root): - private(root,True);entries=[];total=0 - for path in sorted(root.rglob('*')): - if path.is_dir():private(path,True);continue - private(path);name=path.relative_to(root).as_posix() - if not allowed(name):raise Refused() - with path.open('rb') as source:value=source.read(FILE_LIMIT+1) - if len(value)>FILE_LIMIT or b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' in value:raise Refused() - total+=len(value) - if total>LIMIT or len(entries)>=4096:raise Refused() - entries.append({'path':name,'bytes':len(value),'sha256':hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()}) - if not entries:raise Refused() - return entries - - -def seal(root,output,capture): - output=output.absolute();private(output.parent,True) - if output.exists() or output.is_symlink():raise Refused() - checked=checks(root);entries=inventory(root) - manifest={'schema':'netkingdom.identity-archive.v1','profile_sha256':hashlib.sha256(PROFILE.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'profile':profile(), - 'captured_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'capture':capture,'files':entries,'checks':checked} - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='.identity-seal-',dir=output.parent) as temporary: - ciphertext=Path(temporary)/'ciphertext' - fd=os.open(ciphertext,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600) - proc=subprocess.Popen(['age','-r',profile()['public_recipient']],stdin=subprocess.PIPE,stdout=fd,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL) - os.close(fd) - try: - with tarfile.open(fileobj=proc.stdin,mode='w|') as archive: - raw=json.dumps(manifest,sort_keys=True).encode();m=tarfile.TarInfo('manifest.json');m.size=len(raw);m.mode=0o600 - archive.addfile(m,io.BytesIO(raw)) - for entry in entries: - with (root/entry['path']).open('rb') as source: - value=source.read(FILE_LIMIT+1) - if hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()!=entry['sha256']:raise Refused() - m=tarfile.TarInfo(entry['path']);m.size=len(value);m.mode=0o600 - archive.addfile(m,io.BytesIO(value)) - proc.stdin.close() - if proc.wait(timeout=120) or not 04096:raise Refused() - seen=set();total=0 - # Iteration starts with the already-read first member; explicitly skip - # only that member. A later duplicate manifest is never accepted. - for index,member in enumerate(archive): - if index==0 and member is first:continue - name=member.name - if (not member.isfile() or name in seen or name not in expected or not allowed(name,captured) - or not 0<=member.size<=FILE_LIMIT or member.size!=expected[name]['bytes']):raise Refused() - seen.add(name);total+=member.size - if total>LIMIT:raise Refused() - raw=archive.extractfile(member).read() - if len(raw)!=member.size or hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=expected[name]['sha256']:raise Refused() - save(root,name,raw,captured) - if seen!=set(expected):raise Refused() - return manifest,checks(root,captured) - - -def require_runtime_host(): - import socket - host=profile()['runtime_host'] - if (os.geteuid()!=0 or socket.gethostname()!=host['hostname'] - or hashlib.sha256(Path('/etc/machine-id').read_bytes()).hexdigest()!=host['machine_id_sha256']):raise Refused() diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-credential-setup.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-credential-setup.py deleted file mode 100644 index da49bc0..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-credential-setup.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,254 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended Platform/Backup owner ceremony for two exact new backup shares. - -Requires approved, hash-bound CCRs. No operator password/age key is delivered to -the runtime; only a folder-scoped share token is stored with initial KV CAS=0. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -import uuid - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent -PLATFORM=HERE.parents[1].parent/'railiance-platform' -sys.path.insert(0,str(PLATFORM/'scripts')) -from state_hub_preflight_lane import bao,data,capabilities,revoke -from repair_eso_kubernetes_auth import role_payload,check_role -from telemetry_smtp_delivery import ensure - - -def load(name,path): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,path);m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m - - -inventory=load('storage_inventory',HERE/'inventory-storage-share.py') -offsite=load('offsite',HERE/'identity-offsite.py') -FOLDER='/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity' -PROFILES={'publisher':(48,21),'retention':(49,25)} - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -def contract(action,expected): - number,permission=PROFILES[action] - path=PLATFORM/f'credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-{number:04d}-net-kingdom-backup-{action}.yaml' - raw=path.read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=expected:raise Refused() - module=load('credential_change',PLATFORM/'scripts/credential-change.py') - ccr,errors,_=module.validate_ccr(path) - if errors or ccr['status'] not in {'approved','applied','verified','active'}:raise Refused() - required={'platform-owner','net-kingdom-owner','backup-share-owner'} - approved={r['reviewer'].removeprefix('User (').removesuffix(')') for r in ccr.get('review',{}).get('comments',[]) - if r.get('decision')=='approved' and r.get('source_ref')} - name='net-kingdom-backup-'+action+'-eso' - expected_path='platform/workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/'+action - a=ccr['openbao'];provider=ccr['provider'] - if (not required<=approved or a['kv_path']!=expected_path or a['fields']!=['NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN'] - or a['policy_name']!=name or a['auth']['role']!=name - or a['auth']['bound_claims']!={'service_account_names':[name],'service_account_namespaces':['sso']} - or provider['folder']!=FOLDER or provider['share_permissions']!=permission or provider['share_type']!=3 - or provider['label']!='net-kingdom-identity-'+action - or provider.get('provider_added_resharing_approved') is not True):raise Refused() - if (a.get('metadata_read') is not False or a.get('token_self_lifecycle') is not True - or a['auth'].get('audience')!='openbao' or a['auth'].get('token_no_default_policy') is not True - or any(a['auth'].get(k)!='15m' for k in ['ttl','token_max_ttl','token_explicit_max_ttl']) - or a['auth'].get('policies')!=[name] or provider.get('host')!='nx4069.your-storageshare.de'):raise Refused() - lane={'service_account':name,'namespace':'sso','role':name,'policy':name, - 'kv_path':expected_path.replace('platform/','platform/data/',1)} - wanted=('path "'+lane['kv_path']+'" { capabilities = ["read"] }\n' - 'path "auth/token/lookup-self" { capabilities = ["read"] }\n' - 'path "auth/token/revoke-self" { capabilities = ["update"] }\n') - if (PLATFORM/a['policy_file']).read_text()!=wanted:raise Refused() - return ccr,lane - - -def request(client,url,auth,method='GET',body=None,extra=None): - if not url.startswith(offsite.HOST+'/'):raise Refused() - h={'Authorization':'Basic '+base64.b64encode((auth[0]+':'+auth[1]).encode()).decode(), - 'X-Requested-With':'XMLHttpRequest'};h.update(extra or {}) - try: - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,data=body,method=method,headers=h),timeout=60) as response: - if response.url!=url:raise Refused() - raw=response.read(1024*1024+1) - if len(raw)>1024*1024:raise Refused() - return response.status,raw - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:return error.code,b'' - - -def ocs(client,auth,suffix='',fields=None): - url=offsite.HOST+'/ocs/v2.php/apps/files_sharing/api/v1/shares'+suffix - body=urllib.parse.urlencode(fields).encode() if fields is not None else None - status,raw=request(client,url,auth,'POST' if fields is not None else 'GET',body, - {'OCS-APIRequest':'true','Accept':'application/json','Content-Type':'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}) - if status not in (200,201):raise Refused() - parsed=json.loads(raw)['ocs'] - if parsed['meta']['statuscode'] not in (100,200):raise Refused() - return parsed['data'] - - -def share(client,auth,action,receipt): - owner=offsite.HOST+'/remote.php/dav/files/Backup'+FOLDER - status,_=request(client,owner,auth,'MKCOL') - if status not in (201,405):raise Refused() - receipt['folder_created']=status==201 - matches=[s for s in ocs(client,auth,'?path='+urllib.parse.quote(FOLDER,safe='')) - if s.get('label')=='net-kingdom-identity-'+action] - if len(matches)>1:raise Refused() - if matches:result=matches[0];receipt['share_created']=False - else: - result=ocs(client,auth,fields={'path':FOLDER,'shareType':3,'permissions':PROFILES[action][1], - 'label':'net-kingdom-identity-'+action});receipt['share_created']=True - if (result.get('path')!=FOLDER or int(result.get('permissions',-1))!=PROFILES[action][1] - or int(result.get('share_type',-1))!=3 or not result.get('token')):raise Refused() - offsite.headers(result['token']) - receipt.update(share_id=str(result['id']),share_permissions=int(result['permissions']),folder=FOLDER) - return result['token'] - - -def boundary(client,auth,token,action,receipt): - name='nk49-boundary-'+uuid.uuid4().hex+'.age' - payload=subprocess.run(['age','-r',json.loads((HERE/'identity-backup-profile.json').read_text())['public_recipient']], - input=b'NK49 disposable provider boundary fixture',stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=10) - if payload.returncode:raise Refused() - owner=offsite.HOST+'/remote.php/dav/files/Backup'+FOLDER+'/'+name - public=offsite.BASE+name;created=False;deleted=False - receipt['provider_test_artifacts']=[name] - receipt['boundary_fixture_cleanup_verified']=False - try: - receipt['boundary_phase']='create_owner_fixture' - status,_=request(client,owner,auth,'PUT',payload.stdout,{'If-None-Match':'*'}) - if status!=201:raise Refused() - created=True - receipt['boundary_phase']='read_public_fixture' - status,raw=request(client,public,(token,'')) - if status!=200 or raw!=payload.stdout:raise Refused() - receipt['boundary_phase']='deny_public_overwrite' - status,_=request(client,public,(token,''),'PUT',payload.stdout) - if status not in (401,403):raise Refused() - denied_name='nk49-absent-'+uuid.uuid4().hex+'.age' - if action=='retention':receipt['provider_test_artifacts'].append(denied_name) - status,_=request(client,offsite.BASE+denied_name,(token,''),'PUT',payload.stdout,{'If-None-Match':'*'}) if action=='retention' else (403,b'') - if status not in (401,403):raise Refused() - receipt['boundary_phase']='public_delete' - status,_=request(client,public,(token,''),'DELETE') - if action=='publisher': - if status not in (401,403):raise Refused() - new=offsite.BASE+'nk49-boundary-'+uuid.uuid4().hex+'.age' - receipt['provider_test_artifacts'].append(new.rsplit('/',1)[-1]) - receipt['boundary_phase']='create_public_fixture' - code,_=request(client,new,(token,''),'PUT',payload.stdout,{'If-None-Match':'*'}) - if code!=201:raise Refused() - # This fixture belongs to the current ceremony, not retained data. - receipt['boundary_phase']='cleanup_public_fixture' - remove_fixture(client,offsite.HOST+'/remote.php/dav/files/Backup'+FOLDER+'/'+new.rsplit('/',1)[-1],auth,payload.stdout) - else: - if status!=204:raise Refused() - deleted=True - receipt['boundary_phase']='deny_parent_path' - status,_=request(client,offsite.BASE+'%2e%2e/r01-net-kingdom-pg/',(token,'')) - receipt['parent_probe_status']=status - if status not in (400,401,403,404):raise Refused() - receipt['parent_path_rejected']=True - # A malformed-path400 proves request rejection, not authorization. - # Separately probe a known existing account folder with only this share - # token: it must not authenticate as the Backup account. - receipt['boundary_phase']='deny_other_account_folder' - status,_=request(client,offsite.HOST+'/remote.php/dav/files/Backup/r01-net-kingdom-pg/',(token,'')) - receipt['other_account_folder_status']=status - if status not in (401,403,404):raise Refused() - receipt['provider_boundary_verified']=True - finally: - if created and not deleted: - remove_fixture(client,owner,auth,payload.stdout) - receipt['owner_fixture_cleanup_verified']=True - # A rejected operation may have had an unexpected side effect. Only a - # successful complete boundary test claims cleanup; names remain in the - # receipt for owner reconciliation on every failure. - receipt['boundary_fixture_cleanup_verified']=receipt.get('provider_boundary_verified',False) - - -def remove_fixture(client,url,auth,expected): - h={'Authorization':'Basic '+base64.b64encode((auth[0]+':'+auth[1]).encode()).decode()} - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - version=offsite.etag(response,url,len(expected)) - code,raw=request(client,url,auth,extra={'If-Match':version}) - if code!=200 or raw!=expected:raise Refused() - code,_=request(client,url,auth,'DELETE',extra={'If-Match':version}) - if code!=204:raise Refused() - - -def run(action,expected,receipt): - ccr,lane=contract(action,expected) - identity,credentials=inventory.caller_credentials() - receipt['caller_entity_id']=identity.get('entity_id');receipt['caller_auth_path']=identity['path'] - client=offsite.opener();auth=(credentials['BACKUP_USERNAME'],credentials['BACKUP_PASSWORD']) - # Use the owner quota accessor only with proxies removed from its environment. - quota=load('owner_quota',PLATFORM/'scripts/migrate_nextcloud_backup_account.py') - quota.request=lambda url,method='GET',body=None,auth=None,headers=None:request(client,url,auth,method,body,headers) - receipt['quota_before']=quota.quota(auth) - if receipt['quota_before']['available_bytes']MAX_FILE:raise Refused() - with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd),'rb') as stream:data=stream.read(MAX_FILE+1) - after=os.stat(path,follow_symlinks=False) - if (len(data)>MAX_FILE or b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' in data or - any(getattr(before,k)!=getattr(after,k) for k in ('st_dev','st_ino','st_size','st_mtime_ns','st_ctime_ns'))):raise Refused() - return data - finally:os.close(fd) - - -def tree(root,database=None,omit_notification=False,omit_backups=True): - result={} - for directory,dirs,files in os.walk(root,followlinks=False): - path=Path(directory) - if path.is_symlink():raise Refused() - # Historical local snapshots are redundant; do not recursively include - # accumulated backups. WAL/SHM are represented by the native snapshot. - if omit_backups:dirs[:]=[name for name in dirs if name!='backups'] - for name in dirs: - if (path/name).is_symlink():raise Refused() - for name in files: - relative=(path/name).relative_to(root).as_posix() - if database and relative in {database,database+'-wal',database+'-shm',database+'-journal'}:continue - if omit_notification and relative=='notification.txt':continue - result[relative]=read(path/name) - if len(result)>MAX_COUNT or sum(map(len,result.values()))>MAX_TOTAL:raise Refused() - return result - - -def snapshot(source,target): - if source.is_symlink() or not source.is_file():raise Refused() - # A read-only URI intentionally fails if the engine needs a write to its - # production WAL/SHM. Never fall back to a raw copy or mutate the mount. - with sqlite3.connect(source.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=10) as origin: - with sqlite3.connect(target) as dest: - origin.backup(dest,pages=128,sleep=0.05) - if dest.execute('PRAGMA integrity_check').fetchall()!=[('ok',)]:raise Refused() - return read(target) - - -def capture(mode,root=Path('/source'),scratch=Path('/scratch')): - values={} - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='snapshot-',dir=scratch) as temporary: - if mode=='sso': - for name,database in [('lldap','users.db'),('authelia','db.sqlite3'),('keycape',None)]: - source=root/name - if source.is_symlink() or not source.is_dir():raise Refused() - first=tree(source,database,name=='authelia',name!='keycape') - if database:first[database]=snapshot(source/database,Path(temporary)/(name+'.sqlite')) - second=tree(source,database,name=='authelia',name!='keycape') - if {k:v for k,v in first.items() if k!=database}!=second:raise Refused() - values.update({f'data/{name}/{k}':v for k,v in first.items()}) - elif mode=='mfa': - first=tree(root/'privacyidea') - if not {'enckey','private.pem','public.pem'}<=set(first) or first!=tree(root/'privacyidea'):raise Refused() - values={f'data/privacyidea/{name}':value for name,value in first.items()} - else:raise Refused() - if len(values)>MAX_COUNT or sum(map(len,values.values()))>MAX_TOTAL:raise Refused() - return values - - -def emit(values,destination): - with tarfile.open(fileobj=destination,mode='w|') as archive: - for name,value in sorted(values.items()): - member=tarfile.TarInfo(name);member.size=len(value);member.mode=0o600 - archive.addfile(member,io.BytesIO(value)) - - -def interrupted(*args):raise Refused() - - -if __name__=='__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGTERM,signal.SIGHUP,signal.SIGINT):signal.signal(sig,interrupted) - try: - os.umask(0o077) - if len(sys.argv)!=2:raise Refused() - emit(capture(sys.argv[1]),sys.stdout.buffer) - except Exception: - print('ERROR: private file capture refused; diagnostics suppressed.',file=sys.stderr) - raise SystemExit(1) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-isolation.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-isolation.py deleted file mode 100644 index c19a272..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-isolation.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Plan two exact DNS-selector exclusions; apply only an owner-admitted hash-bound plan.""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('capture',HERE/'capture-identity.py') -capture=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(capture) -SELECTOR={'matchExpressions':[{'key':'net-kingdom/capture','operator':'DoesNotExist'}]} - - -def plan(): - if capture.get(None,'namespace','kube-system')['metadata']['uid']!=capture.prepare.CLUSTER_UID:raise capture.Refused() - rows=[] - for ns in ('sso','mfa'): - obj=capture.get(ns,'networkpolicy','allow-egress-dns');s=obj['spec'];m=obj['metadata'] - if s['podSelector'] not in ({},SELECTOR):raise capture.Refused() - pods=json.loads(capture.command(['-n',ns,'get','pods','-o','json']))['items'] - if any('net-kingdom/capture' in p['metadata'].get('labels',{}) for p in pods):raise capture.Refused() - # Preserve every peer, port and policy type. Existing unlabelled service - # pods retain their exact selector match. UID/RV/spec tests guard drift. - patch=[{'op':'test','path':'/metadata/uid','value':m['uid']}, - {'op':'test','path':'/metadata/resourceVersion','value':m['resourceVersion']}, - {'op':'test','path':'/spec','value':s}, - {'op':'replace','path':'/spec/podSelector','value':SELECTOR}] - rows.append({'namespace':ns,'name':m['name'],'uid':m['uid'],'patch':patch}) - return {'schema':'netkingdom.identity-isolation.v1','status':'prepared_not_applied', - 'kubeconfig':capture.KUBE[2],'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(),'policies':rows} - - -def apply(packet,receipt,dry_run=False): - if packet!=plan():raise capture.Refused() - for row in packet['policies']: - args=['-n',row['namespace'],'patch','networkpolicy',row['name'],'--type=json','-p',json.dumps(row['patch']),'-o','json'] - if dry_run:args+=['--dry-run=server'] - receipt['attempted'].append({'namespace':row['namespace'],'name':row['name'],'uid':row['uid']}) - actual=json.loads(capture.command(args));expected=row['patch'][2]['value'].copy();expected['podSelector']=SELECTOR - if actual['metadata']['uid']!=row['uid'] or actual['spec']!=expected:raise capture.Refused() - receipt['verified'].append({'namespace':row['namespace'],'name':row['name'],'uid':row['uid']}) - receipt['status']='server_dry_run_passed' if dry_run else 'capture_dns_exclusions_verified' - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('action',choices=['plan','dry-run','apply']) - p.add_argument('--kubeconfig',required=True);p.add_argument('--plan');p.add_argument('--plan-sha256');p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();os.umask(0o077);capture.KUBE=['kubectl','--kubeconfig',a.kubeconfig] - fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'status':'failed','attempted':[],'verified':[]} - try: - if a.action=='plan':r=plan() - else: - raw=Path(a.plan).read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=a.plan_sha256:raise capture.Refused() - apply(json.loads(raw),r,a.action=='dry-run') - except Exception:r.update(status='failed',error='isolation_refused_review_partial_attempts') - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - return int(r['status']=='failed') - - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py deleted file mode 100644 index 33707e5..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,124 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Folder-scoped Storage Share ciphertext publication and verified readback. - -Runtime gets only a dedicated read/create share token. Account administration, -deletion and age private keys have no route in this publisher. -""" -import base64 -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import hashlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import tempfile -import urllib.error -import urllib.request -import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET - -HOST='https://nx4069.your-storageshare.de' -BASE=HOST+'/public.php/webdav/' -NAME=re.compile(r'net-kingdom-identity-\d{8}T\d{6}Z-[a-f0-9]{12}\.tar\.age\Z') -LIMIT=512*1024*1024 -HEADROOM=2*1024**3 - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):raise Refused() - - -def opener():return urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}),NoRedirect()) - - -def headers(token): - if not isinstance(token,str) or not re.fullmatch('[A-Za-z0-9]{10,128}',token):raise Refused() - return {'Authorization':'Basic '+base64.b64encode((token+':').encode()).decode(), - 'X-Requested-With':'XMLHttpRequest','Accept-Encoding':'identity'} - - -def digest(path): - with path.open('rb') as source:return hashlib.file_digest(source,'sha256').hexdigest() - - -def quota(client,token): - body=b'' - h=headers(token);h.update(Depth='0');h['Content-Type']='application/xml' - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(BASE,data=body,method='PROPFIND',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - if response.status!=207 or response.url!=BASE:raise Refused() - raw=response.read(1024*1024+1) - if len(raw)>1024*1024:raise Refused() - amount=ET.fromstring(raw).findtext('.//{DAV:}quota-available-bytes') or '' - if not amount.isdigit():raise Refused() - return int(amount) - - -def etag(response,url,size): - value=response.headers.get('ETag','') - if (response.status!=200 or response.url!=url or response.headers.get('Content-Length')!=str(size) - or not re.fullmatch(r'"[^"\x00-\x20]{1,180}"',value)):raise Refused() - return value - - -def readback(client,token,name,size,expected,target): - valid=NAME.fullmatch(name) or (name.endswith('.receipt.json') and NAME.fullmatch(name.removesuffix('.receipt.json')) and size<=65536) - if not valid or not 0size:raise Refused() - sha.update(block);out.write(block) - out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) - if count!=size or sha.hexdigest()!=expected:raise Refused() - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - if etag(response,url,size)!=version:raise Refused() - return version - - -def publish(client,token,source,capture,target): - if (not NAME.fullmatch(source.name) or source.is_symlink() or source.stat().st_mode&0o077 - or source.stat().st_uid!=os.getuid() or source.stat().st_nlink!=1 or not source.is_file() - or source.stat().st_size>LIMIT or capture.get('status')!='encrypted_bundle_created' - or capture.get('helper_cleanup_verified') is not True or capture.get('temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified') is not True - or digest(source)!=capture.get('ciphertext_sha256') or source.stat().st_size!=capture.get('ciphertext_bytes')):raise Refused() - with source.open('rb') as stream: - if stream.read(22)!=b'age-encryption.org/v1\n':raise Refused() - available=quota(client,token) - if available' - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(offsite.BASE,data=body,method='PROPFIND',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - if response.status!=207 or response.url!=offsite.BASE:raise offsite.Refused() - raw=response.read(4*1024*1024+1) - if len(raw)>4*1024*1024:raise offsite.Refused() - result={} - for response in ET.fromstring(raw).findall('{DAV:}response'): - href=urllib.parse.urlsplit(response.findtext('{DAV:}href') or '') - if href.netloc and href.netloc!=urllib.parse.urlsplit(offsite.HOST).netloc:raise offsite.Refused() - name=urllib.parse.unquote(href.path.rstrip('/').rsplit('/',1)[-1]) - for row in response.findall('{DAV:}propstat'): - if ' 200 ' not in (row.findtext('{DAV:}status') or ''):continue - p=row.find('{DAV:}prop') - if p is None or p.find('{DAV:}resourcetype/{DAV:}collection') is not None:continue - is_index=name.endswith('.receipt.json') and offsite.NAME.fullmatch(name.removesuffix('.receipt.json')) - if not offsite.NAME.fullmatch(name) and not is_index:continue - size=p.findtext('{DAV:}getcontentlength') or '';version=p.findtext('{DAV:}getetag') or '' - if not size.isdigit() or not re.fullmatch(r'"[^"\x00-\x20]{1,180}"',version) or name in result:raise offsite.Refused() - result[name]={'bytes':int(size),'etag':version} - if len(result)>10000:raise offsite.Refused() - return result - - -def generations(client,token,objects): - result=[] - for name,meta in objects.items(): - if not offsite.NAME.fullmatch(name) or name+'.receipt.json' not in objects:continue - index=objects[name+'.receipt.json'] - if not 03600:raise offsite.Refused() - if stamp>datetime.now(timezone.utc):raise offsite.Refused() - result.append({**r,'stamp':stamp,'etag':meta['etag'],'index_etag':index['etag']}) - return sorted(result,key=lambda r:r['stamp'],reverse=True) - - -def select(rows,protected): - if not rows or protected not in {r['artifact'] for r in rows}:raise offsite.Refused() - keep={protected,rows[0]['artifact']};days=set();weeks=set() - for row in rows: - day=row['stamp'].date();week=row['stamp'].isocalendar()[:2] - if day not in days and len(days)<7:keep.add(row['artifact']);days.add(day) - if week not in weeks and len(weeks)<2:keep.add(row['artifact']);weeks.add(week) - return [r for r in rows if r['artifact'] not in keep],keep - - -def run(client,token,accepted,receipt,execute=False,checkpoint=lambda:None): - if (accepted.get('status')!='identity_archive_verified' or accepted.get('container_cleanup_verified') is not True - or accepted.get('temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified') is not True or not offsite.NAME.fullmatch(accepted.get('artifact',''))):raise offsite.Refused() - objects=listing(client,token);rows=generations(client,token,objects) - candidates,keep=select(rows,accepted['artifact']) - recovered=next(r for r in rows if r['artifact']==accepted['artifact']) - if recovered['ciphertext_sha256']!=accepted['ciphertext_sha256']:raise offsite.Refused() - receipt.update(status='retention_preview',protected=accepted['artifact'],keep=sorted(keep), - candidates=[r['artifact'] for r in candidates],deleted=[],unknown_objects_untouched=True) - checkpoint() - # Validate retained known-good and newest ciphertext before any deletion. - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-retained-check-',dir='/tmp') as temporary: - for index,row in enumerate({r['artifact']:r for r in [recovered,rows[0]]}.values()): - offsite.readback(client,token,row['artifact'],row['ciphertext_bytes'],row['ciphertext_sha256'],Path(temporary)/str(index)) - if not execute:return - for index,row in enumerate(candidates): - version=offsite.readback(client,token,row['artifact'],row['ciphertext_bytes'],row['ciphertext_sha256'],Path(temporary)/('expire-'+str(index))) - for name,etag in [(row['artifact'],version),(row['artifact']+'.receipt.json',row['index_etag'])]: - h=offsite.headers(token);h['If-Match']=etag - receipt['deletion_in_progress']=name - checkpoint() - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(offsite.BASE+name,method='DELETE',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - if response.status!=204 or response.url!=offsite.BASE+name:raise offsite.Refused() - receipt['deleted'].append(name) - checkpoint() - receipt.pop('deletion_in_progress',None) - receipt['status']='retention_applied' diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py deleted file mode 100644 index eb0b601..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-runtime.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,215 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Root-owned Railiance backup job. No operator password or age private key. - -Publisher and retention are separate processes with separate scoped delivery. -Scheduled execution is gated by an independently recovered archive receipt. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import fcntl -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import shutil -import socket -import tempfile -import urllib.request - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,HERE/(name+'.py')) - m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m - - -capture=load('capture-identity');offsite=load('identity-offsite');retention=load('identity-retention') - - -def write(path,value): - fd,name=tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.identity-receipt-',dir=path.parent) - try: - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(value,out,indent=2);out.write('\n');out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) - os.replace(name,path) - finally:Path(name).unlink(missing_ok=True) - - -def token(action): - name='net-kingdom-backup-'+action - es=capture.get('sso','externalsecret',name) - entries=[] - for entry in es['spec'].get('data',[]): - item=dict(entry);ref=dict(item.get('remoteRef',{})) - for key,default in [('conversionStrategy','Default'),('decodingStrategy','None'),('metadataPolicy','None')]: - if ref.pop(key,default)!=default:raise offsite.Refused() - item['remoteRef']=ref;entries.append(item) - if (es['spec']['target']['name']!=name or entries!=[{'secretKey':'token','remoteRef':{ - 'key':'workloads/net-kingdom/identity-backup/'+action,'property':'NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN'}}] - or es['spec'].get('dataFrom') or es['spec'].get('secretStoreRef')!={'kind':'SecretStore','name':name} - or not any(c['type']=='Ready' and c['status']=='True' for c in es['status'].get('conditions',[]))):raise offsite.Refused() - secret=capture.get('sso','secret',name) - if (set(secret['data'])!={'token'} or not any(o['uid']==es['metadata']['uid'] for o in secret['metadata'].get('ownerReferences',[]))):raise offsite.Refused() - value=base64.b64decode(secret['data']['token'],validate=True).decode();offsite.headers(value) - return value - - -def accepted(path): - capture.bundle.private(path) - r=json.loads(path.read_text()) - if (r.get('schema')!='netkingdom.identity-recovery.v1' or r.get('status')!='identity_archive_verified' - or r.get('all_manifest_hashes_verified') is not True or r.get('container_cleanup_verified') is not True - or r.get('temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified') is not True or not offsite.NAME.fullmatch(r.get('artifact',''))):raise offsite.Refused() - return r - - -def post_event(state,summary): - # Non-secret durable reporting: replay retained notes at the next run. - directory=state/'event-outbox';directory.mkdir(mode=0o700,exist_ok=True) - import uuid - path=directory/(uuid.uuid4().hex+'.json') - write(path,{'summary':summary,'event_type':'note','author':'net-kingdom-identity-backup', - 'workplan_id':'17d315f0-829e-57c7-85cc-3a7914152804','task_id':'d68cd4d3-1ba3-530e-88f9-26ebb8dd6eac'}) - for pending in sorted(directory.glob('*.json'))[:64]: - request=urllib.request.Request('http://10.43.68.154:8000/progress/',data=pending.read_bytes(), - headers={'Content-Type':'application/json'},method='POST') - try: - with urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({})).open(request,timeout=10) as response: - if response.status!=201:break - pending.unlink() - except Exception:break - - -def backup(state,decision,first=False): - if not first:accepted(state/'accepted-recovery.json') - if (state/'capture-in-progress.json').exists():raise offsite.Refused() - publisher=token('publisher') - client=offsite.opener() - if offsite.quota(client,publisher)=64:raise Refused() - row=list_prefix(client,prefix);result[prefix]=row - if depth<3: - for child in row['directories']: - # Native database WAL/base trees are not application/key-file - # archives. Record their presence without enumerating every WAL. - if any(x in child.split('/') for x in ['wals','base']):continue - pending.append((child,depth+1)) - return result - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'schema':'netkingdom.scaleway-backup-inventory.v1','status':'failed', - 'started_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'read_only':True, - 'provider':'Scaleway','bucket':BUCKET,'prefix':PREFIX,'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'bootstrap_api_key_used':False,'age_keys_read':False,'object_contents_downloaded':False, - 'secret_values_exported':False,'scope':'Bounded prefix metadata, at most three child levels; WAL/base trees not enumerated; other buckets/prefixes unassessed'} - try: - if kube(['get','namespace','kube-system'])['metadata']['uid']!=CLUSTER:raise Refused() - delivered=kube(['-n','databases','get','secret','platform-pg-backup-s3']) - if delivered['metadata']['namespace']!='databases' or delivered['metadata']['name']!='platform-pg-backup-s3':raise Refused() - values=delivered['data'] - # Same governed runtime delivery used by Platform's archive verifier; - # explicit credentials avoid SDK ambient/profile/metadata discovery. - import boto3 - from botocore.config import Config - client=boto3.client('s3',endpoint_url=ENDPOINT,region_name='nl-ams', - aws_access_key_id=base64.b64decode(values['ACCESS_KEY_ID'],validate=True).decode(), - aws_secret_access_key=base64.b64decode(values['ACCESS_SECRET_KEY'],validate=True).decode(), - config=Config(signature_version='s3v4',proxies={},connect_timeout=15,read_timeout=30, - retries={'max_attempts':1},s3={'addressing_style':'path'})) - r['prefixes']=inventory(client);r['status']='metadata_inventory_complete' - r['runtime_delivery_uid']=delivered['metadata']['uid'] - except Exception:r['error']='inventory_failed_diagnostics_suppressed' - finally: - r['finished_at']=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - return int(r['status']=='failed') - - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py deleted file mode 100644 index fdcdfb6..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Silent read-only inventory in the existing Platform Backup-account procedure. - -Runs only inside the attended platform-admin envelope. Reuses Platform's owner -custody accessor and fixed provider/account contract; no age key is read and no -backup is downloaded, uploaded, deleted, rotated or granted. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import sys -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -OWNER=ROOT.parent/'railiance-platform/scripts' -sys.path.insert(0,str(OWNER)) -from state_hub_preflight_lane import bao, data -from migrate_nextcloud_backup_account import HOST, OPERATOR_PATH -BASE='/remote.php/dav/files/Backup/railiance-backups/' -LIMIT=4*1024*1024 -NAME=re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,160}\Z') - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):raise Refused() - - -def parse_listing(raw, relative): - if len(raw)>LIMIT:raise Refused() - rows=[] - for item in ET.fromstring(raw).findall('{DAV:}response'): - href=urllib.parse.urlsplit(item.findtext('{DAV:}href') or '') - if href.netloc and href.netloc!=urllib.parse.urlsplit(HOST).netloc:raise Refused() - path=urllib.parse.unquote(href.path) - if not path.startswith(BASE+relative):raise Refused() - name=path[len(BASE+relative):].rstrip('/') - if not name:continue - if not NAME.fullmatch(name) or name in {'.','..'}:raise Refused() - for row in item.findall('{DAV:}propstat'): - if ' 200 ' not in (row.findtext('{DAV:}status') or ''):continue - prop=row.find('{DAV:}prop') - if prop is None:continue - folder=prop.find('{DAV:}resourcetype/{DAV:}collection') is not None - size=prop.findtext('{DAV:}getcontentlength') - if size is not None and not size.isdigit():raise Refused() - # Export only known-safe operational names/size, not arbitrary DAV - # properties, URLs, account metadata or raw provider responses. - if folder or name.endswith(('.age','.json','.yaml')): - rows.append({'name':name,'directory':folder,'bytes':int(size) if size else None}) - if len(rows)>10000 or len({r['name'] for r in rows})!=len(rows):raise Refused() - return sorted(rows,key=lambda x:x['name']) - - -def listing(relative,credentials): - if relative and (not relative.endswith('/') or not NAME.fullmatch(relative[:-1])):raise Refused() - auth=base64.b64encode((credentials['BACKUP_USERNAME']+':'+credentials['BACKUP_PASSWORD']).encode()).decode() - req=urllib.request.Request(HOST+BASE+relative, - data=b'', - method='PROPFIND',headers={'Authorization':'Basic '+auth,'Depth':'1','Content-Type':'application/xml'}) - opener=urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}),NoRedirect()) - with opener.open(req,timeout=30) as response: - if response.status!=207 or response.url!=HOST+BASE+relative:raise Refused() - raw=response.read(LIMIT+1) - return parse_listing(raw,relative) - - -def caller_credentials(): - # Lookup payload contains a token: retain only safe caller/role facts. - identity=data(bao(['token','lookup','-format=json']))['data'] - if 'platform-admin' not in identity.get('policies',[]) or 'root' in identity.get('policies',[]):raise Refused() - if not str(identity.get('path','')).startswith('auth/netkingdom/'):raise Refused() - credentials=data(bao(['read','-format=json',OPERATOR_PATH]))['data']['data'] - if credentials.get('BACKUP_USERNAME')!='Backup' or not isinstance(credentials.get('BACKUP_PASSWORD'),str) or not credentials['BACKUP_PASSWORD']:raise Refused() - return identity,credentials - - -def inventory(): - identity,credentials=caller_credentials() - root=listing('',credentials) - folders={} - for row in root: - if row['directory'] and re.match(r'^(?:r01-|core-|identity|sso|bootstrap|net-kingdom|openbao)',row['name']): - if len(folders)>=32:raise Refused() - folders[row['name']]=listing(row['name']+'/',credentials) - return {'root':root,'folders':folders,'caller_auth_path':identity['path'], - 'caller_entity_id':identity.get('entity_id'),'scope':'Backup/railiance-backups root and bounded identity/database subfolders; other accounts/folders unassessed'} - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'schema':'netkingdom.storage-share-inventory.v1','status':'failed','started_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), - 'read_only':True,'age_keys_read':False,'backup_contents_downloaded':False,'secret_values_exported':False, - 'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'owner_sources':[{'path':str(OWNER/name),'sha256':hashlib.sha256((OWNER/name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} for name in ['state_hub_preflight_lane.py','migrate_nextcloud_backup_account.py']]} - try:r.update(inventory());r['status']='metadata_inventory_complete' - except Exception:r['error']='inventory_failed_diagnostics_suppressed' - finally: - r['finished_at']=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - return int(r['status']=='failed') - - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py deleted file mode 100755 index 33890fb..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,425 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Owner-run native Authelia restore against the restored LLDAP directory. - -Private inputs remain in the owner process/pipe. Decrypted staging uses Linux -tmpfs. Restored LLDAP is the network-none anchor; Authelia and the probe join -its namespace and use loopback only. No ports, host mounts or production APIs. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath -import re -import signal -import subprocess -import tempfile -import time -from urllib.parse import urlsplit -import uuid - -import yaml - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name.replace('-', '_'), HERE / (name + '.py')) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -# Reused unedited: isolated-lldap.py is in the pinned KeyCape attempt sources. -lldap = load('isolated-lldap') -verify, offline, bundle = lldap.verify, lldap.offline, lldap.bundle -command, archive_files = lldap.command, lldap.archive_files -IMAGE = 'docker.io/authelia/authelia@sha256:bd97cff4fcbf715b5ff1f9ae286afbe6033afce385302520b0368122d43a6f54' -LDAP_URL = 'ldap://127.0.0.1:3890' -NOTIFICATIONS = 'notification.txt' - - -def preflight(): - target = lldap.preflight() - image_id = command(['docker', 'image', 'inspect', '--format', '{{.Id}}', IMAGE]).decode().strip() - target['images'].append({'reference': IMAGE, 'image_id': image_id}) - return target - - -def mounted(spec, volumes, predicate): - found = [m for m in spec.get('volumeMounts', []) if predicate(volumes.get(m['name'], {}))] - if len(found) != 1: - raise bundle.Refused() - return found[0] - - -def configuration(root): - """Assemble the archived Authelia runtime with only confinement rewrites.""" - deployment = bundle.resource(root, 'sso', 'deployment', 'authelia') - pod = deployment['spec']['template']['spec'] - main = next(c for c in pod['containers'] if c['name'] == 'authelia') - volumes = {v['name']: v for v in pod.get('volumes', [])} - secrets_mount = mounted(main, volumes, lambda v: v.get('secret', {}).get('secretName') == 'authelia-secrets') - config_mount = mounted(main, volumes, lambda v: v.get('configMap', {}).get('name') == 'authelia-config') - data_mount = mounted(main, volumes, lambda v: 'persistentVolumeClaim' in v) - smtp_paths = [m['mountPath'] for m in main.get('volumeMounts', []) - if volumes.get(m['name'], {}).get('secret', {}).get('secretName') == 'authelia-smtp'] - secret_root = PurePosixPath(secrets_mount['mountPath']) - data_root = PurePosixPath(data_mount['mountPath']) - if not secret_root.is_absolute() or not data_root.is_absolute() or volumes[secrets_mount['name']]['secret'].get('items'): - raise bundle.Refused() - raw = bundle.resource(root, 'sso', 'secret', 'authelia-secrets')['data'] - secrets = {} - for key, value in raw.items(): - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,128}', key): - raise bundle.Refused() - decoded = base64.b64decode(value, validate=True) - if not decoded: - raise bundle.Refused() - secrets[str(secret_root / key)] = decoded - env = {} - for entry in main.get('env', []): - if 'value' not in entry: - raise bundle.Refused() - name, value = entry['name'], entry['value'] - if any(value.startswith(p.rstrip('/') + '/') for p in smtp_paths): - continue # Notifier credentials are never imported. - if name.endswith('_FILE') and value not in secrets: - raise bundle.Refused() - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,127}', name) or '\n' in value: - raise bundle.Refused() - env[name] = value - issuer_path = env.get('AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_PROVIDERS_OIDC_ISSUER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE') - if not issuer_path or 'AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE' not in env: - raise bundle.Refused() - configmap = bundle.resource(root, 'sso', 'configmap', 'authelia-config')['data'] - config = yaml.safe_load(configmap[config_mount.get('subPath', 'configuration.yml')]) - ldap = config['authentication_backend']['ldap'] - if ('address' in ldap) == ('url' in ldap): - raise bundle.Refused() - ldap['address' if 'address' in ldap else 'url'] = LDAP_URL - config['notifier'] = {'filesystem': {'filename': str(data_root / NOTIFICATIONS)}} - # The NTP startup check is an outbound UDP call; it cannot succeed without a network. - config['ntp'] = {**(config.get('ntp') or {}), 'disable_startup_check': True} - store = PurePosixPath(config['storage']['local']['path']) - if store.parent != data_root or not (root / 'data/authelia' / store.name).is_file(): - raise bundle.Refused() - server = config.setdefault('server', {}) - # The healthcheck helper writes /app/.healthcheck.env before any provider check; - # the root filesystem stays read-only and the probe uses /api/health instead. - server['disable_healthcheck'] = True - if 'address' in server: - port = urlsplit(server['address']).port - else: - port = server.get('port', 9091) - if not isinstance(port, int) or not 0 < port < 65536: - raise bundle.Refused() - clients = config['identity_providers']['oidc']['clients'] - keycape = yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode( - bundle.resource(root, 'sso', 'secret', 'keycape-config')['data']['config.yaml'], validate=True))['authelia'] - client = [c for c in clients if c.get('client_id', c.get('id')) == keycape['clientId']] - secret = keycape.get('clientSecret') - portal = urlsplit(keycape.get('browserBaseURL', '')) - if (len(client) != 1 or not isinstance(secret, str) or not secret or portal.scheme != 'https' - or not portal.hostname or not client[0].get('redirect_uris')): - raise bundle.Refused() - return {'config': yaml.safe_dump(config, sort_keys=False).encode(), 'config_path': config_mount['mountPath'], - 'secrets': secrets, 'env': env, 'data_root': str(data_root), 'secret_root': str(secret_root), - 'port': port, 'host': portal.hostname, 'issuer_key': secrets[issuer_path], - 'client_id': keycape['clientId'], 'client_secret': secret, - 'redirect_uri': client[0]['redirect_uris'][0]} - - -def public_jwk(pem): - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(pem, password=None).public_key() - numbers = key.public_numbers() - - def encode(value): - raw = value.to_bytes((value.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big') - return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b'=').decode() - jwk = {'e': encode(numbers.e), 'kty': 'RSA', 'n': encode(numbers.n)} - thumbprint = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hashlib.sha256( - json.dumps(jwk, separators=(',', ':'), sort_keys=True).encode()).digest()).rstrip(b'=').decode() - return jwk, thumbprint - - -PROBE = r''' -import base64,json,sys,time,urllib.error,urllib.parse,urllib.request -from pathlib import Path -result={'status':'failed'} -stage='network_isolation' -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):return None -opener=urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect,urllib.request.ProxyHandler({})) -try: - assert {p.name for p in Path('/sys/class/net').iterdir()}=={'lo'} - assert len(Path('/proc/net/route').read_text().splitlines())==1 - v=json.load(sys.stdin) - base='http://127.0.0.1:%d'%v['port'] - head={'X-Forwarded-Proto':'https','X-Forwarded-Host':v['host'],'X-Forwarded-For':'127.0.0.1'} - def call(path,data=None,headers=None,form=False): - h=dict(head,**(headers or {})) - if data is not None: - if form:body=urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode();h['Content-Type']='application/x-www-form-urlencoded' - else:body=json.dumps(data).encode();h['Content-Type']='application/json' - else:body=None - try: - with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(base+path,data=body,headers=h),timeout=10) as r:return r.status,r.read() - except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:return e.code,e.read() - stage='authelia_startup' - for _ in range(120): - try: - if call('/api/health')[0]==200:break - except OSError:pass - time.sleep(.25) - else:raise RuntimeError() - stage='issuer_jwks' - code,body=call('/jwks.json') - assert code==200 - keys=[{'n':k['n'],'e':k['e']} for k in json.loads(body)['keys'] if k.get('kty')=='RSA' and k.get('use','sig')=='sig'] - stage='existing_user_first_factor' - code,body=call('/api/firstfactor',{'username':v['user'],'password':v['password'],'keepMeLoggedIn':False}) - assert code==200 and json.loads(body).get('status')=='OK' - stage='wrong_password_first_factor' - code,body=call('/api/firstfactor',{'username':v['user'],'password':v['wrong_password'],'keepMeLoggedIn':False}) - assert code==401 - def token(secret): - auth=base64.b64encode((urllib.parse.quote(v['client_id'],safe='')+':'+urllib.parse.quote(secret,safe='')).encode()).decode() - code,body=call('/api/oidc/token',{'grant_type':'authorization_code','code':'nk49-invalid-'+v['nonce'], - 'redirect_uri':v['redirect_uri']},{'Authorization':'Basic '+auth},form=True) - return code,json.loads(body) - stage='client_secret_verifier' - code,body=token(v['client_secret']) - assert code==400 and body.get('error')=='invalid_grant' and 'access_token' not in body - stage='wrong_client_secret' - code,body=token(v['wrong_secret']) - assert code==401 and body.get('error')=='invalid_client' and 'access_token' not in body - result={'status':'verified','jwks_public_keys':keys,'existing_user_first_factor':True, - 'wrong_password_refused':True,'archived_client_secret_accepted':True, - 'wrong_client_secret_refused':True,'grant_issued':False, - 'only_loopback_interface_verified':True,'external_routes_absent':True} -except Exception as error:result={'status':'failed','failed_stage':stage,'failure_type':type(error).__name__} -print(json.dumps(result)) -''' - - -def contained(name, network, user='1000:1000'): - guard = json.loads(command(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name, '--format', - '{"host":{{json .HostConfig}},"mounts":{{json .Mounts}},"user":{{json .Config.User}}}'])) - host = guard['host'] - if (host['NetworkMode'] != network or not host['ReadonlyRootfs'] or host['Privileged'] - or host.get('Binds') or host.get('PortBindings') or 'ALL' not in host.get('CapDrop', []) - or 'no-new-privileges' not in host.get('SecurityOpt', []) or guard['user'] != user - or any(mount['Type'] != 'tmpfs' for mount in guard['mounts'])): - raise bundle.Refused() - - -def tmpfs(path, size): - return ['--tmpfs', path + ':rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=' + str(size) + ',uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700'] - - -def stopped(name, pidfile): - command(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', 'kill -TERM "$(cat ' + pidfile + ')"']) - for _ in range(100): - running = subprocess.run(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', 'kill -0 "$(cat ' + pidfile + ')"'], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if running.returncode: - return - time.sleep(.1) - raise bundle.Refused() - - -def restore_authelia(root, user, password, receipt): - lldap_config, jwt, admin_password, _ = lldap.configuration(root) - runtime = configuration(root) - expected_jwk, thumbprint = public_jwk(runtime['issuer_key']) - stem = 'nk49-authelia-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - anchor, service, client = stem + '-lldap', stem + '-service', stem + '-client' - stage = 'directory_launch' - try: - command(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', anchor, - '--network', 'none', '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', - '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', '--user', '1000:1000', - '--memory', '256m', '--cpus', '1', '--pids-limit', '128', - *tmpfs('/data', 268435456), *tmpfs('/run/recovery', 1048576), *tmpfs('/tmp', 16777216), - '--env', 'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET_FILE=/run/recovery/jwt', - '--env', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS_FILE=/run/recovery/admin-password', - '--entrypoint', '/bin/sh', lldap.IMAGE, '-c', 'sleep 1800']) - contained(anchor, 'none') - anchor_id = command(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', anchor, '--format', '{{.Id}}']).decode().strip() - stage = 'authelia_launch' - # Environment carries file paths only; values arrive by tar into tmpfs. - args = ['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', service, - '--network', 'container:' + anchor_id, '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', - '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', '--user', '1000:1000', - '--memory', '512m', '--cpus', '1', '--pids-limit', '128', - *tmpfs(runtime['secret_root'], 1048576), *tmpfs(runtime['data_root'], 268435456), - *tmpfs(str(PurePosixPath(runtime['config_path']).parent), 1048576), *tmpfs('/tmp', 16777216)] - for name, value in runtime['env'].items(): - args += ['--env', name + '=' + value] - command(args + ['--entrypoint', '/bin/sh', IMAGE, '-c', 'sleep 1800']) - contained(service, 'container:' + anchor_id) - receipt['container_isolation_verified_before_private_import'] = True - stage = 'private_import' - payload = {p.relative_to(root / 'data/lldap').as_posix(): p.read_bytes() - for p in (root / 'data/lldap').rglob('*') if p.is_file()} - command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', anchor, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/data'], input=archive_files(payload)) - command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', anchor, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/run/recovery'], - input=archive_files({'lldap.toml': lldap_config, 'jwt': jwt, 'admin-password': admin_password})) - stored = {p.relative_to(root / 'data/authelia').as_posix(): p.read_bytes() - for p in (root / 'data/authelia').rglob('*') if p.is_file()} - command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', service, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', runtime['data_root']], - input=archive_files(stored)) - for directory, files in ((runtime['secret_root'], {k: v for k, v in runtime['secrets'].items()}), - (str(PurePosixPath(runtime['config_path']).parent), - {runtime['config_path']: runtime['config']})): - relative = {str(PurePosixPath(k).relative_to(directory)): v for k, v in files.items()} - command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', service, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', directory], input=archive_files(relative)) - stage = 'configuration_validation' - config = ['--config', runtime['config_path']] - command(['docker', 'exec', service, '/app/authelia', 'validate-config', *config]) - receipt['original_configuration_validated'] = True - stage = 'storage_decryption' - checked = command(['docker', 'exec', service, '/app/authelia', 'storage', 'encryption', 'check', *config]) - if b'SUCCESS' not in checked or b'FAILURE' in checked: - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['storage_encryption_key_verified'] = True - stage = 'directory_startup' - command(['docker', 'exec', '--detach', anchor, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'echo $$ > /run/recovery/server.pid; exec /app/lldap run --config-file /run/recovery/lldap.toml > /dev/null 2>&1']) - # Authelia's startup check binds to LDAP once and exits if it is not up yet. - command(['docker', 'exec', service, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'i=0; until nc -w 1 127.0.0.1 3890 /dev/null 2>&1; do ' - 'i=$((i+1)); [ "$i" -ge 120 ] && exit 1; sleep 0.25; done'], timeout=60) - stage = 'service_startup' - command(['docker', 'exec', '--detach', service, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'echo $$ > /tmp/authelia.pid; exec /app/authelia ' + ' '.join(config) + ' > /dev/null 2>&1']) - stage = 'native_probe' - raw = command(['docker', 'run', '--interactive', '--rm', '--name', client, '--pull=never', - '--network', 'container:' + anchor_id, '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', - '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', '--memory', '256m', '--cpus', '1', - '--pids-limit', '64', '--entrypoint', 'python3', lldap.CLIENT, '-c', PROBE], - input=json.dumps({'user': user, 'password': password, 'port': runtime['port'], - 'host': runtime['host'], 'client_id': runtime['client_id'], - 'client_secret': runtime['client_secret'], - 'redirect_uri': runtime['redirect_uri'], 'nonce': uuid.uuid4().hex, - 'wrong_password': 'nk49-wrong-' + uuid.uuid4().hex, - 'wrong_secret': 'nk49-wrong-' + uuid.uuid4().hex}).encode(), timeout=180) - result = json.loads(raw) - keys = result.pop('jwks_public_keys', []) - receipt.update(result) - if result.get('status') != 'verified': - stage = result.get('failed_stage', stage) - raise bundle.Refused() - if {'n': expected_jwk['n'], 'e': expected_jwk['e']} not in keys: - stage = 'issuer_jwks' - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt.update(issuer_key_matches_archive=True, issuer_jwk_thumbprint_sha256=thumbprint) - stage = 'service_shutdown' - stopped(service, '/tmp/authelia.pid') - stopped(anchor, '/run/recovery/server.pid') - sent = subprocess.run(['docker', 'exec', service, 'test', '-s', runtime['data_root'] + '/' + NOTIFICATIONS], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10).returncode == 0 - receipt.update(notifications_confined_to_tmpfs_file=True, notification_written=sent) - except Exception: - receipt['status'] = 'failed' - receipt.setdefault('failed_stage', stage) - raise - finally: - for owned in (client, service, anchor): - found = subprocess.run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', owned], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=15) - if found.returncode == 0: - command(['docker', 'rm', '--force', '--volumes', owned]) - absent = subprocess.run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', owned], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=15) - command(['docker', 'info', '--format', '{{.ID}}']) - if absent.returncode == 0: - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['container_cleanup_verified'] = True - - -def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--transfer-receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--user', required=True) - args = parser.parse_args() - os.umask(0o077) - fd = os.open(args.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - result = {'schema': 'netkingdom.isolated-authelia-recovery.v1', 'status': 'failed', - 'production_contacted': False, 'secret_values_exported': False, - 'container_cleanup_verified': False, 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified': False, - 'source_sha256': hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'reused_source_sha256': {name: hashlib.sha256((HERE / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() - for name in ('isolated-lldap.py', 'identity-bundle.py', 'verify-identity.py', - 'retrieve-identity-offline.py')}} - keyfd = None - work = None - stage = 'target_preflight' - try: - result['target'] = preflight() - stage = 'input_validation' - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,128}', args.user): - raise bundle.Refused() - transfer = json.loads(Path(args.transfer_receipt).read_text()) - offline.validate(transfer) - if transfer.get('independent_owner_retrieval_verified') is not True: - raise bundle.Refused() - path = Path(transfer['fetched_path']) - bundle.private(path, max_bytes=bundle.LIMIT) - if path.stat().st_size != transfer['ciphertext_bytes'] or offline.offsite.digest(path) != transfer['ciphertext_sha256']: - raise bundle.Refused() - keyfd = verify.custody.private_key_fd() - derived = command(['age-keygen', '-y', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], pass_fds=(keyfd,)).strip() - if derived != bundle.profile()['public_recipient'].encode(): - raise bundle.Refused() - stage = 'private_existing_password_prompt' - password = offline.private_prompt('Existing account password for the isolated Authelia check: ') - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-service-recovery-', dir='/dev/shm') as temporary: - work = Path(temporary) - archive = work / 'archive.tar' - stage = 'archive_decryption' - with archive.open('xb') as output: - proc = subprocess.run(['age', '-d', '-i', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}', str(path)], - stdout=output, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, pass_fds=(keyfd,), timeout=180) - if proc.returncode or archive.stat().st_size > bundle.LIMIT + 4 * 1024 * 1024: - raise bundle.Refused() - restored = work / 'restored' - restored.mkdir(mode=0o700) - stage = 'archive_validation' - manifest, _ = bundle.restore(archive, restored) - result.update(ciphertext_sha256=transfer['ciphertext_sha256'], - manifest_file_count=len(manifest['files']), all_manifest_hashes_verified=True) - stage = 'native_authelia_check' - restore_authelia(restored, args.user, password, result) - password = None - if work.exists(): - raise bundle.Refused() - result.update(status='isolated_authelia_verified', temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified=True) - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt): - result.update(status='failed', error='isolated_authelia_check_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - result.setdefault('failed_stage', stage) - finally: - if keyfd is not None: - os.close(keyfd) - if work is not None and not work.exists(): - result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] = True - result['finished_at'] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as output: - json.dump(result, output, indent=2) - output.write('\n') - success = result['status'] == 'isolated_authelia_verified' - print('OK: restored Authelia config, storage key, issuer key, client verifier, first factor and cleanup passed.' - if success else 'ERROR: isolated Authelia recovery refused; review the safe receipt. No production change.') - return 0 if success else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGINT, signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP): - signal.signal(sig, offline.interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py deleted file mode 100644 index 408dd30..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,512 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Owner-run T18 session assembly using the existing archive/containment pipeline. - -Candidate only: native pinned-image tests and review are required before use. -Shared Docker local-driver tmpfs is required because Docker cp does not support -private tmpfs/mount paths, and the original KeyCape image is distroless. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import re -import stat -import select -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import time -import uuid - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,HERE/(name+'.py')) - module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module);return module - -adapter=load('isolated-keycape') -local=load('isolated-lldap') -bundle=local.bundle -# Bind the reused preflight itself, not only this module's direct Docker calls. -local.command=adapter.command -_original_preflight=local.preflight -def preflight(): - contexts=json.loads(adapter.command(['docker','context','inspect'])) - if len(contexts)!=1 or contexts[0]['Endpoints']['docker']['Host']!=adapter.ENDPOINT:raise adapter.Refused() - result=_original_preflight();result['docker_endpoint']=adapter.ENDPOINT;return result -local.preflight=preflight -WORKER=local.CLIENT -STAGING_ROOT=Path('/dev/shm') -RUNROOTS=('/etc/keycape','/var/lib/keycape-policy','/etc/keycape-factor','/recovery-tls') -VOLUME_OPTIONS={'type':'tmpfs','device':'tmpfs','o':'size=33554432,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700,nosuid,nodev,noexec'} - -IMPORT=r''' -import base64,json,os,sys -from pathlib import Path -os.umask(0o077) -p=json.load(sys.stdin) -allowed=('/etc/keycape/','/var/lib/keycape-policy/','/etc/keycape-factor/','/recovery-tls/') -for name,encoded in p.items(): - f=Path(name) - if not name.startswith(allowed) or '..' in f.parts or any(x.is_symlink() for x in (f,*f.parents)):raise ValueError() - f.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True) - fd=os.open(f,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(base64.b64decode(encoded,validate=True)) -''' - -# Small transport inside the already pinned helper; it has only loopback routes. -# No token handling, auth bypass, dependency imitation, reset or notifier path. -TLS=r''' -import select,socket,socketserver,ssl,threading -context=ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER) -context.minimum_version=ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2 -context.load_cert_chain('/recovery-tls/server.pem','/recovery-tls/server-key.pem') -class Handler(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler): - def handle(self): - try: - with context.wrap_socket(self.request,server_side=True) as incoming: - with socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1',8080),timeout=10) as outgoing: - incoming.settimeout(15);outgoing.settimeout(15) - while True: - ready,_,_=select.select([incoming,outgoing],[],[],15) - if not ready:return - for source in ready: - data=source.recv(65536) - if not data:return - (outgoing if source is incoming else incoming).sendall(data) - except Exception:pass -class Server(socketserver.ThreadingTCPServer): - allow_reuse_address=True - daemon_threads=True -with Server(('127.0.0.1',443),Handler) as server:server.serve_forever() -''' - - -def run(argv,**kwargs):return adapter.command(argv,**kwargs) - - -def plan_session(): - run_id=uuid.uuid4().hex - stem='nk49-kc-'+run_id - worker=stem+'-transport';issuer=stem+'-issuer' - volumes={stem+'-v'+str(i):{'target':root,'options':dict(VOLUME_OPTIONS)} for i,root in enumerate(RUNROOTS)} - return {'run_id':run_id,'containers':[worker,issuer], 'worker':worker,'issuer':issuer, - 'images':{worker:WORKER,issuer:adapter.IMAGE},'volumes':volumes, - 'public_image_probe':stem+'-image-probe','docker_endpoint':adapter.ENDPOINT} - - -def verify_volume(name,spec,run_id): - obj=json.loads(run(['docker','volume','inspect',name])) - if (len(obj)!=1 or obj[0]['Name']!=name or obj[0]['Driver']!='local' or obj[0].get('Scope')!='local' - or obj[0].get('Options')!=VOLUME_OPTIONS or spec['options']!=VOLUME_OPTIONS - or obj[0].get('Labels',{}).get(adapter.LABEL)!=run_id):raise adapter.Refused() - - -def base_args(session,name,network): - return ['docker','run','--detach','--pull=never','--name',name,'--network',network, - '--label',adapter.LABEL+'='+session['run_id'],'--read-only','--cap-drop','ALL', - '--security-opt','no-new-privileges','--user','1000:1000','--memory','512m','--cpus','1', - '--pids-limit','64','--log-driver','none','--restart','no', - '--tmpfs','/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700'] - - -def mounts(session,readonly=False): - args=[] - for name,spec in session['volumes'].items(): - args+=['--mount','type=volume,source='+name+',target='+spec['target']+(',readonly' if readonly and spec['target']!='/var/lib/keycape-policy' else '')] - return args - - -PROVISION_PHASES=( - 'volume_creation_and_verification','worker_launch','worker_containment', - 'private_import','issuer_launch','issuer_containment','tls_transport_launch','complete') - - -def provision(session,payload,tls,issuer,phase=None): - """Inspect containment and driver options before the first private import.""" - from urllib.parse import urlsplit - address=urlsplit(issuer) - if address.scheme!='https' or not address.hostname or address.port not in (None,443) or address.path not in ('','/'): - raise adapter.Refused() - if phase is None:phase=lambda value:None - phase('volume_creation_and_verification') - for name,spec in session['volumes'].items(): - run(['docker','volume','create','--driver','local','--label',adapter.LABEL+'='+session['run_id'], - '--opt','type=tmpfs','--opt','device=tmpfs','--opt','o='+VOLUME_OPTIONS['o'],name]) - verify_volume(name,spec,session['run_id']) - phase('worker_launch') - args=base_args(session,session['worker'],'none')+mounts(session) - # This pinned helper declares an image VOLUME here. Mask it explicitly so - # Docker cannot allocate an unregistered disk-backed anonymous volume. - args+=['--tmpfs','/privacyidea/etc/persistent:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700'] - args+=['--sysctl','net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start=0','--add-host',address.hostname+':127.0.0.1', - '--entrypoint','python3',WORKER,'-c','import time;time.sleep(1800)'] - run(args) - # Check helper and every private filesystem before touching the ciphertext's - # private contents. Issuer is created only after originals are present. - phase('worker_containment') - adapter.inspect_session({**session,'containers':[session['worker']],'issuer':session['worker']},worker_only=True) - phase('private_import') - files={**payload['files'],**{k:base64.b64encode(v).decode() for k,v in tls.items()}} - run(['docker','exec','-i',session['worker'],'python3','-c',IMPORT],input=json.dumps(files).encode()) - anchor=run(['docker','container','inspect',session['worker'],'--format','{{.Id}}']).decode().strip() - phase('issuer_launch') - args=base_args(session,session['issuer'],'container:'+anchor)+mounts(session,readonly=True) - # CLI argv carries environment names only. Original credentials stay in the - # owner subprocess environment and Docker's private container configuration. - env={'PATH':os.environ.get('PATH',os.defpath),'DOCKER_HOST':'unix:///var/run/docker.sock',**payload['env'], - 'SSL_CERT_FILE':'/recovery-tls/trust.pem'} - for name in (*payload['env'],'SSL_CERT_FILE'):args+=['--env',name] - args+=[adapter.IMAGE] - run(args,env=env) - phase('issuer_containment') - adapter.inspect_session(session) - phase('tls_transport_launch') - run(['docker','exec','--detach',session['worker'],'python3','-c',TLS]) - phase('complete') - - -def cleanup_all(session,receipt): - failed=False - try:adapter.cleanup({**session,'containers':session['containers']+[session['public_image_probe']]},receipt) - except Exception:failed=True - rows=[] - for name,spec in session['volumes'].items(): - row={'volume':name,'status':'unverified'};rows.append(row) - try: - exists=run(['docker','volume','ls','--filter','name=^'+name+'$','--format','{{.Name}}']).decode().splitlines() - if not exists: - row['status']='absence_verified' - continue - verify_volume(name,spec,session['run_id']) - run(['docker','volume','rm',name]) - remaining=run(['docker','volume','ls','--filter','name=^'+name+'$','--format','{{.Name}}']).decode().splitlines() - if remaining:row['status']='still_present';failed=True - else:row['status']='absence_verified' - except Exception:failed=True - receipt['tmpfs_volume_cleanup_obligations']=rows - receipt['container_cleanup_verified']=not failed - if failed:raise adapter.Refused() - -def register_workdir(work, run_id): - if work.parent!=STAGING_ROOT or not re.fullmatch('nk49-keycape-'+run_id+'-[a-z0-9_]{8}',work.name):raise adapter.Refused() - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (work,*work.parents)):raise adapter.Refused() - info=work.lstat() - if not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=os.getuid() or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)!=0o700:raise adapter.Refused() - return {'path':str(work),'run_id':run_id,'device':info.st_dev,'inode':info.st_ino,'owner_uid':info.st_uid} - - -def cleanup_workdir(staging, receipt): - """Delete only the registered inode below actual /dev/shm, never a replacement.""" - row={'path':staging['path'],'device':staging['device'],'inode':staging['inode'],'status':'unverified'} - receipt['plaintext_cleanup_obligation']=row - work=Path(staging['path']) - if work.parent!=STAGING_ROOT or not re.fullmatch('nk49-keycape-'+staging['run_id']+'-[a-z0-9_]{8}',work.name):raise adapter.Refused() - if not any(line.split()[1:3]==['/dev/shm','tmpfs'] for line in Path('/proc/mounts').read_text().splitlines()):raise adapter.Refused() - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in work.parents):raise adapter.Refused() - parentfd=os.open(work.parent,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW) - try: - try:info=os.stat(work.name,dir_fd=parentfd,follow_symlinks=False) - except FileNotFoundError: - row['status']='absence_verified';receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']=True;return - if (not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=staging['owner_uid'] or info.st_uid!=os.getuid() - or info.st_dev!=staging['device'] or info.st_ino!=staging['inode'] or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)!=0o700): - row['status']='identity_mismatch_not_removed';raise adapter.Refused() - def remove(parent,name,expected): - fd=os.open(name,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,dir_fd=parent) - try: - current=os.fstat(fd) - if (current.st_dev,current.st_ino)!=(expected.st_dev,expected.st_ino):raise adapter.Refused() - for child in os.listdir(fd): - before=os.stat(child,dir_fd=fd,follow_symlinks=False) - if before.st_uid!=staging['owner_uid'] or before.st_dev!=staging['device']:raise adapter.Refused() - if stat.S_ISDIR(before.st_mode):remove(fd,child,before) - elif stat.S_ISREG(before.st_mode) and before.st_nlink==1:os.unlink(child,dir_fd=fd) - else:raise adapter.Refused() # symlinks/special files/hardlinks are uncertain, never followed - finally:os.close(fd) - after=os.stat(name,dir_fd=parent,follow_symlinks=False) - if (after.st_dev,after.st_ino)!=(expected.st_dev,expected.st_ino):raise adapter.Refused() - os.rmdir(name,dir_fd=parent) - remove(parentfd,work.name,info) - try:os.stat(work.name,dir_fd=parentfd,follow_symlinks=False) - except FileNotFoundError: - row['status']='absence_verified';receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']=True;return - raise adapter.Refused() - finally:os.close(parentfd) - - -def recover_obligations(session, staging, receipt): - failed=False - try:cleanup_all(session,receipt) - except Exception:failed=True - # The plaintext obligation is attempted even when Docker is unreachable. - try:cleanup_workdir(staging,receipt) - except Exception:failed=True - if failed:raise adapter.Refused() - - -def process_facts(pid): - raw=Path('/proc')/str(pid)/'stat' - try: - fields=raw.read_text().rsplit(')',1)[1].split() - return {'pid':pid,'state':fields[0],'pgid':int(fields[2]),'sid':int(fields[3]), - 'start_ticks':int(fields[19]),'uid':raw.parent.stat().st_uid} - except FileNotFoundError:return None - - -def isolate_execution(): - # Called by main before reading TLS/key inputs. Never reuse an inherited - # shell, custody-helper, user or unrelated process group. - os.setsid() - pid=os.getpid();facts=process_facts(pid) - if os.getsid(0)!=pid or os.getpgrp()!=pid or facts['sid']!=pid or facts['pgid']!=pid:raise adapter.Refused() - return {k:facts[k] for k in ('pid','pgid','sid','start_ticks','uid')}|{'deadline':time.monotonic()+1800} - - -def verify_execution(execution): - if execution['pid']!=execution['sid'] or execution['pid']!=execution['pgid'] or execution['uid']!=os.getuid():raise adapter.Refused() - current=process_facts(execution['pid']) - if current is not None and any(current[k]!=execution[k] for k in ('pid','pgid','sid','start_ticks','uid')): - # Numeric leader PID reuse is not authority to signal a new group. - raise adapter.Refused() - - -def group_members(execution): - verify_execution(execution) - members=[] - for path in Path('/proc').iterdir(): - if not path.name.isdecimal():continue - facts=process_facts(int(path.name)) - if facts is None or facts['pgid']!=execution['pgid']:continue - if facts['sid']!=execution['sid'] or facts['uid']!=execution['uid'] or facts['start_ticks']bundle.LIMIT+4*1024*1024:raise adapter.Refused() - root=work/'restored';root.mkdir(mode=0o700) - manifest,_=bundle.restore(archive,root) - # Data binding comes from exact reviewed ciphertext, never a new grant. - admission=adapter.private_manifest_admission(admission,manifest) - payload=adapter.private_payload(root,manifest,admission['manifest_sha256']) - import yaml - cfg=yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(payload['files']['/etc/keycape/config.yaml'])) - if cfg.get('port')!=8080 or cfg.get('issuer')!=admission['issuer']:raise adapter.Refused() - # Public executable readback uses the daemon archive API only on the - # original image rootfs, never a tmpfs or private user-created mount. - probe=session['public_image_probe'] - try: - run(['docker','create','--pull=never','--name',probe,'--network','none','--read-only','--label',adapter.LABEL+'='+session['run_id'],adapter.IMAGE]) - binary=adapter.container_file(probe,'/keycape') - if hashlib.sha256(binary).hexdigest()!=admission['verifier_sha256']:raise adapter.Refused() - finally: - receipt['public_image_probe_cleanup_obligations']=[{'container':probe,'status':'unverified'}] - run(['docker','rm',probe]) - if run(['docker','container','ls','--all','--filter','name=^/'+probe+'$','--format','{{.Names}}']).strip():raise adapter.Refused() - receipt['public_image_probe_cleanup_obligations'][0]['status']='absence_verified' - def phase(value): - # Public enum only: no private payload, exception text or daemon logs. - if value not in PROVISION_PHASES:raise adapter.Refused() - receipt['provision_phase']=value - if checkpoint is not None:checkpoint(receipt) - provision(session,payload,tls,admission['issuer'],phase) - receipt.update(ciphertext_sha256=transfer['ciphertext_sha256'],all_manifest_hashes_verified=True,manifest_file_count=len(manifest['files'])) - checked_admission={**admission,'session':session,'trust_path':'/recovery-tls/trust.pem'} - # Native checker consumes no service secret argument or new grant. - # Retry only bounded public readiness; no account/factor attempt. - for attempt in range(40): - try: - numbers=serialization.load_pem_private_key(base64.b64decode(payload['files']['/etc/keycape/key.pem']),password=None).public_key().public_numbers() - adapter.check_jwks(session,checked_admission,numbers);break - except Exception: - if attempt==39:raise - time.sleep(.25) - adapter.native_checks(root,manifest,checked_admission,receipt,cleanup_session=False) - finally: - os.close(keyfd) - try: - if session is not None and staging is not None: - uncertain=daemon_uncertain(staging) - receipt['in_flight_daemon_request_uncertain']=uncertain - recover_obligations(session,staging,receipt) - if uncertain:raise adapter.Refused() - if reaper is not None: - reaper.terminate();reaper.wait(timeout=10) - except Exception: - receipt['status']='failed' - raise - finally: - adapter.EXECUTION=None - if work is not None and not work.exists():receipt['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified']=True - - -def persist_receipt(fd,receipt): - raw=(json.dumps(receipt,indent=2)+'\n').encode() - os.lseek(fd,0,os.SEEK_SET);os.ftruncate(fd,0) - with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd),'wb') as output: - output.write(raw);output.flush();os.fsync(output.fileno()) - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - for name in ('transfer-receipt','admission','admission-sha256','tls-cert','tls-key','trust','receipt'):p.add_argument('--'+name,required=True) - args=p.parse_args();os.umask(0o077) - fd=os.open(args.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - receipt={'schema':'netkingdom.isolated-keycape-recovery.v1','status':'failed','production_contacted':False,'secret_values_exported':False} - try: - execution=isolate_execution() - raw=Path(args.admission).read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=args.admission_sha256:raise adapter.Refused() - admission=json.loads(raw) - tls={} - for name,path in (('server.pem',args.tls_cert),('server-key.pem',args.tls_key),('trust.pem',args.trust)): - source=Path(path);bundle.private(source,max_bytes=1024*1024);tls['/recovery-tls/'+name]=source.read_bytes() - execute(json.loads(Path(args.transfer_receipt).read_text()),admission,tls,receipt,execution,checkpoint=lambda r:persist_receipt(fd,r)) - except (Exception,KeyboardInterrupt):receipt.update(status='failed',error='isolated_keycape_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - finally: - receipt['finished_at']=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - try:persist_receipt(fd,receipt) - finally:os.close(fd) - print('OK: isolated KeyCape native checks and cleanup passed.' if receipt['status']=='isolated_keycape_native_registration_checked' else 'ERROR: isolated KeyCape stopped; review safe receipt.') - return int(receipt['status']!='isolated_keycape_native_registration_checked') - -if __name__=='__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGHUP,signal.SIGTERM,signal.SIGINT):signal.signal(sig,local.offline.interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py deleted file mode 100644 index 44a3a11..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,487 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""T18 native adapter for an owner-admitted, already restored isolated session. - -Called after identity-bundle.restore, never with an unvalidated directory. This -module does not provision TLS, grant credentials, or claim downstream acceptance. -The existing decrypt/tmpfs wrapper remains responsible for archive cleanup. -""" -import base64 -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import io -import os -import secrets -import tarfile -import time -import re -import subprocess -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -IMAGE = 'forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:cdec9dd7c515f7e0a6169fc3fa560ee2cc47bf40d899755dec808c362f5ce010' -LABEL = 'net-kingdom.recovery-run' - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def load_bundle(): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('identity_bundle', HERE / 'identity-bundle.py') - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -def manifest_binding_mode(admission,transfer): - """Versioned private-manifest binding; legacy explicit digests stay valid.""" - mode=admission.get('manifest_binding_mode','explicit-digest-v1') - if mode not in ('explicit-digest-v1','ciphertext-derived-v1'):raise Refused() - if (not isinstance(admission.get('ciphertext_sha256'),str) - or not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}',admission['ciphertext_sha256']) - or admission['ciphertext_sha256']!=transfer.get('ciphertext_sha256') - or transfer.get('independent_owner_retrieval_verified') is not True):raise Refused() - if mode=='explicit-digest-v1': - if not isinstance(admission.get('manifest_sha256'),str) or not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}',admission['manifest_sha256']):raise Refused() - elif 'manifest_sha256' in admission:raise Refused() - return mode - - -def private_manifest_admission(admission,manifest): - # Only called after the fixed ciphertext bytes were hashed, authenticated - # decryption succeeded and bundle.restore checked the complete archive. - # Never return this enriched private object in a safe receipt/checkpoint. - digest=hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(manifest,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()).hexdigest() - mode=admission.get('manifest_binding_mode','explicit-digest-v1') - if mode=='explicit-digest-v1': - if digest!=admission['manifest_sha256']:raise Refused() - elif mode!='ciphertext-derived-v1' or 'manifest_sha256' in admission:raise Refused() - return {**admission,'manifest_sha256':digest} - - -def private_payload(root, manifest, expected_manifest_sha256): - """Bind the complete validated archive before selecting KeyCape material. - - Private hashes never enter the public receipt. The digest is supplied by the - existing private archive admission, not inferred from an untrusted manifest. - """ - encoded = json.dumps(manifest, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() - if hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest() != expected_manifest_sha256: - raise Refused() - entries = manifest['files'] - if len(entries) != len({e['path'] for e in entries}): - raise Refused() - values = {} - bundle = load_bundle() - for entry in entries: - if not bundle.allowed(entry['path'], manifest['profile']): - raise Refused() - path = root / entry['path'] - bundle.private(path) - value = path.read_bytes() - if len(value) != entry['bytes'] or hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest() != entry['sha256']: - raise Refused() - values[entry['path']] = value - deployment = json.loads(values['resources/sso/deployment/keycape.json']) - main = next(c for c in deployment['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'] if c['name'] == 'keycape') - if main.get('command') or main.get('args') or main.get('envFrom'): - raise Refused() - if main['image'] != IMAGE: - # Mutable-tag/historical mismatches need a separate explicit owner admission. - raise Refused() - secret = json.loads(values['resources/sso/secret/keycape-config.json'])['data'] - files = {'/etc/keycape/' + name: base64.b64decode(secret[name], validate=True) - for name in ('config.yaml', 'key.pem')} - for path, value in values.items(): - if path.startswith('data/keycape/'): - relative = path.removeprefix('data/keycape/') - files['/var/lib/keycape-policy/' + relative] = value - if '/var/lib/keycape-policy/policy.json' not in files: - raise Refused() - if 'resources/sso/secret/keycape-factor-read.json' in values: - factor=json.loads(values['resources/sso/secret/keycape-factor-read.json'])['data'] - files['/etc/keycape-factor/admin-token']=base64.b64decode(factor['admin-token'],validate=True) - # Resolve original delivered environment, including all referenced secrets. - env = {} - for item in main.get('env', []): - if not re.fullmatch(r'KEYCAPE_[A-Z0-9_]+',item['name']):raise Refused() - if item['name'] in env: - raise Refused() - if 'value' in item: - env[item['name']] = item['value'] - else: - ref = item['valueFrom']['secretKeyRef'] - source = json.loads(values['resources/sso/secret/' + ref['name'] + '.json'])['data'] - env[item['name']] = base64.b64decode(source[ref['key']], validate=True).decode() - if env.get('KEYCAPE_CONFIG') != '/etc/keycape/config.yaml' or env.get('KEYCAPE_POLICY_PATH') != '/var/lib/keycape-policy/policy.json': - raise Refused() - return {'files': {p: base64.b64encode(v).decode() for p, v in files.items()}, 'env': env} - - -ENDPOINT = 'unix:///var/run/docker.sock' -EXECUTION = None - - -def docker_environment(environment=None): - # Even an admitted daemon exposed by another Unix socket is outside this - # exact session binding. Conflicting ambient routing is refused, not ignored. - for source in (os.environ, environment or {}): - if source.get('DOCKER_HOST') not in (None,'',ENDPOINT):raise Refused() - if source.get('DOCKER_CONTEXT') not in (None,'','default'):raise Refused() - if any(source.get(k) for k in ('DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY','DOCKER_CERT_PATH')):raise Refused() - env=dict(os.environ if environment is None else environment) - for key in ('DOCKER_CONTEXT','DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY','DOCKER_CERT_PATH'):env.pop(key,None) - env['DOCKER_HOST']=ENDPOINT - return env - - -def process(argv, **kwargs): - marker=None - if EXECUTION is not None and (kwargs.get('start_new_session') or kwargs.get('process_group') not in (None,-1)):raise Refused() - if argv[0]=='docker': - argv=['docker','--host',ENDPOINT,*argv[1:]] - kwargs['env']=docker_environment(kwargs.get('env')) - if EXECUTION is not None: - if (os.getpid()!=EXECUTION['pid'] or os.getsid(0)!=EXECUTION['sid'] or os.getpgrp()!=EXECUTION['pgid'] - or time.monotonic()>=EXECUTION['deadline']):raise Refused() - marker=Path(EXECUTION['staging']+'-docker-inflight') - fd=os.open(marker,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - os.close(fd) - try: - result=subprocess.run(argv,**kwargs) - if marker is not None and result.returncode!=0: - fd=os.open(Path(EXECUTION['staging']+'-docker-uncertain'),os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600);os.close(fd) - return result - except BaseException: - # Parent loss leaves .docker-inflight; caught timeout/transport failures - # retain a sticky uncertainty marker even if later cleanup can run. - if marker is not None: - fd=os.open(Path(EXECUTION['staging']+'-docker-uncertain'),os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600);os.close(fd) - raise - finally: - if marker is not None: - try:marker.unlink() - except FileNotFoundError:pass - - -def command(argv, **kwargs): - maximum = kwargs.pop('max_output', 32768) - result = process(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, - timeout=kwargs.pop('timeout', 180), **kwargs) - if result.returncode or len(result.stdout) > maximum: - raise Refused() - return result.stdout - - -def inspect_session(session, worker_only=False): - """No credential environment is read by Docker inspect or returned to caller.""" - if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-f0-9]{32}', session['run_id']): - raise Refused() - names = session['containers'] - if not names or len(names) > 12 or len(set(names)) != len(names): - raise Refused() - for name in names: - if not re.fullmatch(r'nk49-kc-' + session['run_id'] + r'-[a-z0-9-]{1,24}', name): - raise Refused() - if session['worker'] not in names or session['issuer'] not in names: - raise Refused() - import os - contexts=json.loads(command(['docker','context','inspect'])) - endpoints=[contexts[0]['Endpoints']['docker']['Host'],os.environ.get('DOCKER_HOST') or ENDPOINT] - if not all(x==ENDPOINT for x in endpoints):raise Refused() - info = json.loads(command(['docker', 'info', '--format', '{"ID":{{json .ID}},"Name":{{json .Name}},"OSType":{{json .OSType}}}'])) - if info != {'ID': '74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1', 'Name': 'bnt-lap001', 'OSType': 'linux'}: - raise Refused() - # The worker is the anchor; all dependencies/TLS/issuer share its network-none namespace. - anchor = command(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', session['worker'], '--format', '{{.Id}}']).decode().strip() - for name,spec in session.get('volumes',{}).items(): - volume=json.loads(command(['docker','volume','inspect',name])) - expected={'type':'tmpfs','device':'tmpfs','o':'size=33554432,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700,nosuid,nodev,noexec'} - if len(volume)!=1 or volume[0]['Driver']!='local' or volume[0].get('Scope')!='local' or volume[0].get('Options')!=expected or spec['options']!=expected or volume[0].get('Labels',{}).get(LABEL)!=session['run_id']:raise Refused() - for name in names: - obj = json.loads(command(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name, '--format', - '{"host":{{json .HostConfig}},"mounts":{{json .Mounts}},"labels":{{json .Config.Labels}},"image":{{json .Config.Image}},"user":{{json .Config.User}},"entrypoint":{{json .Config.Entrypoint}},"cmd":{{json .Config.Cmd}}}'])) - host = obj['host'] - mounts=obj['mounts'] - destinations=[m['Destination'] for m in mounts] - if len(destinations)!=len(set(destinations)):raise Refused() - for volume,expected_spec in session.get('volumes',{}).items(): - matches=[m for m in mounts if m['Destination']==expected_spec['target']] - if len(matches)!=1 or matches[0]['Type']!='volume' or matches[0]['Name']!=volume or matches[0]['RW']!=(name==session['worker'] or expected_spec['target']=='/var/lib/keycape-policy'):raise Refused() - if (obj['labels'].get(LABEL) != session['run_id'] or not obj['user'] or obj['user'].split(':')[0] in ('0', 'root') - or not host['ReadonlyRootfs'] or host['Privileged'] or host.get('Binds') or host.get('PortBindings') - or host.get('PidMode') or host.get('IpcMode') == 'host' - or host.get('UTSMode') or host.get('UsernsMode') == 'host' or host.get('CgroupnsMode') == 'host' - or host.get('Sysctls',{}) not in ({},{'net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start':'0'} if name==session['worker'] else {}) - or host.get('CapAdd') or host.get('Devices') or host.get('DeviceRequests') or host.get('VolumesFrom') - or host.get('CapDrop') != ['ALL'] - or host.get('SecurityOpt') not in (['no-new-privileges'], ['no-new-privileges:true']) - or any(m['Type']!='tmpfs' and not (m['Type']=='volume' and m['Name'] in session.get('volumes',{}) and m['Destination']==session['volumes'][m['Name']]['target']) for m in obj['mounts']) - or host['NetworkMode'] != ('none' if name == session['worker'] else 'container:' + anchor) - or obj['image'] != session['images'][name] or '@sha256:' not in obj['image']): - raise Refused() - if worker_only:return - if session['images'][session['issuer']] != IMAGE: - raise Refused() - # Known admitted archive has no command/args override; image default /keycape - # must be the actual issuer executable, not an alternate same-image command. - launch=json.loads(command(['docker','container','inspect',session['issuer'],'--format', - '{"entrypoint":{{json .Config.Entrypoint}},"cmd":{{json .Config.Cmd}},"path":{{json .Path}},"args":{{json .Args}}}'])) - if launch != {'entrypoint':['/keycape'],'cmd':None,'path':'/keycape','args':[]}: - raise Refused() - - -def container_file(container, path): - # Docker streams one tar member into memory; never materialize private files. - raw = command(['docker', 'cp', container + ':' + path, '-'], max_output=128*1024*1024) - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(raw), mode='r:') as archive: - members = archive.getmembers() - if len(members) != 1 or not members[0].isfile() or members[0].size > 96*1024*1024: - raise Refused() - return archive.extractfile(members[0]).read() - - -JWKS_PROBE = r""" -import base64,ipaddress,json,socket,ssl,sys,urllib.request -from urllib.parse import urlsplit -p=json.load(sys.stdin);issuer=p['issuer'];origin=urlsplit(issuer) -def require(condition): - if not condition:raise ValueError('public_jwks_binding_refused') -require(origin.scheme=='https') -resolved=socket.getaddrinfo(origin.hostname,origin.port or 443,type=socket.SOCK_STREAM) -require(bool(resolved) and all(ipaddress.ip_address(x[4][0]).is_loopback for x in resolved)) -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):return None -opener=urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}),NoRedirect(), - urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=ssl.create_default_context(cadata=p['trust']))) -def get(url): - u=urlsplit(url) - require((u.scheme,u.hostname,u.port or 443)==(origin.scheme,origin.hostname,origin.port or 443)) - require(not u.username and not u.password and not u.fragment) - with opener.open(url,timeout=10) as response: - raw=response.read(1024*1024+1);require(len(raw)<=1024*1024) - return json.loads(raw) -d=get(issuer.rstrip('/')+'/.well-known/openid-configuration');require(d['issuer']==issuer) -keys=get(d['jwks_uri'])['keys'] -def integer(value):return int.from_bytes(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value+'='*(-len(value)%4)),'big') -# The exact admitted owner release constructs one key, kid key-1. Reject every -# extra key, including irrelevant keys: a native successful exchange can then -# only have used the original signer through the existing verifier. -require(isinstance(keys,list) and len(keys)==1) -k=keys[0] -require(k.get('kty')=='RSA' and k.get('kid')=='key-1' and k.get('use')=='sig' and k.get('alg')=='RS256') -require(integer(k['n'])==int(p['n']) and integer(k['e'])==int(p['e'])) -print('{"original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks":true}') -""" - -# A failed public readiness probe is closed data, not a failing Docker RPC. -# Transport/CLI nonzero remains uncertain; no deliberately failing exec is -# retried as if daemon acceptance had been established. -JWKS_TRANSPORT = ("import contextlib,io\ntry:\n" - " with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()):\n" - " exec(" + repr(JWKS_PROBE) + ")\n" - "except Exception:\n print('{\"original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks\":false}')\n" - "else:\n print('{\"original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks\":true}')\n") - - -def check_jwks(session, admission, public_numbers): - trust=runtime_file(session,admission['trust_path']).decode() - request={'issuer':admission['issuer'],'trust':trust,'n':str(public_numbers.n),'e':str(public_numbers.e)} - result=json.loads(command(['docker','exec','-i',session['worker'],'python3','-c',JWKS_TRANSPORT],input=json.dumps(request).encode())) - if result != {'original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks': True}:raise Refused() - - -RUNTIME_FILES = r""" -import base64,json,sys -from pathlib import Path -p=json.load(sys.stdin) -roots=('/etc/keycape/','/var/lib/keycape-policy/','/etc/keycape-factor/','/recovery-tls/') -result={} -paths=[] -if p.get('tree'): - paths=list(Path('/var/lib/keycape-policy').rglob('*')) -else:paths=[Path(x) for x in p['paths']] -for f in paths: - if f.is_dir():continue - if not str(f).startswith(roots) or not f.is_file() or any(x.is_symlink() for x in (f,*f.parents)) or f.stat().st_size>8*1024*1024:raise ValueError() - result[str(f)]=base64.b64encode(f.read_bytes()).decode() - if len(result)>4096:raise ValueError() -print(json.dumps(result)) -""" - - -def runtime_files(session, paths=(), tree=False): - raw=command(['docker','exec','-i',session['worker'],'python3','-c',RUNTIME_FILES], - input=json.dumps({'paths':list(paths),'tree':tree}).encode(),max_output=48*1024*1024) - return {k:base64.b64decode(v,validate=True) for k,v in json.loads(raw).items()} - - -def runtime_file(session,path): - return runtime_files(session,[path])[path] - - -def run_verifier(session, admission, payload): - # Select from the already-restored config before further private/runtime reads. - # This is not public preflight before archive decryption or its key prompt. - import yaml - cfg = yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(payload['files']['/etc/keycape/config.yaml'],validate=True)) - if not isinstance(cfg,dict) or cfg.get('issuer') != admission['issuer']: - raise Refused() - consumer = admission['consumer'] - clients = cfg.get('clients') - if not isinstance(clients,list) or any(not isinstance(client,dict) for client in clients): - raise Refused() - matches = [client for client in clients if client.get('clientId') == consumer['client_id']] - if len(matches) != 1: - raise Refused() - client = matches[0] - if (client.get('secretRef') != 'env:'+consumer['secret_env'] or client.get('clientType') != 'confidential' - or 'client_credentials' not in client.get('grantTypes',[])): - raise Refused() - issuer = session['issuer'] - if {v['target'] for v in session.get('volumes',{}).values()}!={'/etc/keycape','/var/lib/keycape-policy','/etc/keycape-factor','/recovery-tls'}:raise Refused() - from urllib.parse import urlsplit - import ipaddress - address = urlsplit(admission['issuer']) - if (address.scheme != 'https' or not address.hostname or address.username or address.password - or address.query or address.fragment): - raise Refused() - if hashlib.sha256(container_file(issuer, '/keycape')).hexdigest() != admission['verifier_sha256']: - raise Refused() - if hashlib.sha256(runtime_file(session, admission['trust_path'])).hexdigest() != admission['trust_sha256']: - raise Refused() - # Capture private environment only in owner process memory, never receipt. - environment = json.loads(command(['docker','container','inspect',issuer,'--format','{{json .Config.Env}}'])) - env = dict(item.split('=',1) for item in environment) - if len(env)!=len(environment):raise Refused() - if set(env)-set(payload['env'])-{'PATH','HOME','HOSTNAME','SSL_CERT_FILE'}:raise Refused() - if env.get('SSL_CERT_FILE') != admission['trust_path'] or any(k.lower().endswith('_proxy') and v for k,v in env.items()): - raise Refused() - if {k:v for k,v in env.items() if k.startswith('KEYCAPE_')}!={k:v for k,v in payload['env'].items() if k.startswith('KEYCAPE_')}:raise Refused() - for name,value in payload['env'].items(): - if env.get(name) != value: - raise Refused() - files = {k:base64.b64decode(v,validate=True) for k,v in payload['files'].items()} - def equal(): - if runtime_files(session,files)!=files:raise Refused() - durable=runtime_files(session,tree=True) - if durable!={k:v for k,v in files.items() if k.startswith('/var/lib/keycape-policy/')}: - raise Refused() - equal() - if not env.get(consumer['secret_env']): - raise Refused() - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - key=serialization.load_pem_private_key(files['/etc/keycape/key.pem'],password=None) - check_jwks(session,admission,key.public_key().public_numbers()) - wrong = secrets.token_urlsafe(48) - if wrong == env[consumer['secret_env']]:raise Refused() - args = ['docker','exec','--env','NK49_UNRELATED_NEGATIVE_SECRET='+wrong,issuer,'/keycape','verify-client', - '-issuer',admission['issuer'],'-previous-secret-env','NK49_UNRELATED_NEGATIVE_SECRET'] - flags = {'client_id':'client-id','secret_env':'secret-env','audience':'audience','scope':'scope', - 'subject':'expect-subject','tenant':'expect-tenant','roles':'expect-roles','deny_scope':'deny-scope'} - for name,flag in flags.items():args+=['-'+flag,consumer[name]] - # Native command reports on stderr. Do not return or print its raw response. - result = process(args,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,timeout=150) - raw = (result.stdout+result.stderr).decode() - required = ['discovery and endpoint origin','exchange and JWKS signature for granted scopes','access-token claim bindings', - 'principal_type is service','sub matches the registration','tenant matches the registration','roles present', - 'granted scope carries no excess grant','predecessor secret refused'] - required += ['excess scope refused: '+scope for scope in consumer['deny_scope'].split()] - if result.returncode or any('PASS '+name+'\n' not in raw for name in required) or 'FAIL ' in raw: - raise Refused() - equal() - from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization - key=serialization.load_pem_private_key(files['/etc/keycape/key.pem'],password=None) - check_jwks(session,admission,key.public_key().public_numbers()) - public=key.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo) - return {'native_service_registration_verified':True,'wrong_unrelated_secret_explicitly_refused':True, - 'denied_scopes_refused':True,'original_config_registry_policy_receipts_equal':True, - 'public_signing_spki_sha256':hashlib.sha256(public).hexdigest(), - 'original_https_issuer_and_trust_preserved':True,'original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks':True} - - -def cleanup(session, receipt=None): - """Attempt every owned cleanup even when one obligation fails. - - Preserve exact safe container names and outcomes so the owner can recover an - uncertain/partial cleanup. An inspect/daemon failure never means absence. - """ - obligations = [] - failed = False - for name in reversed(session['containers']): - row = {'container': name, 'status': 'unverified'} - obligations.append(row) - try: - present=command(['docker','container','ls','--all','--filter','name=^/'+name+'$','--format','{{.Names}}']).decode().splitlines() - if not present: - row['status']='absence_verified' - continue - label = command(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name, '--format', - '{{index .Config.Labels "' + LABEL + '"}}']).decode().strip() - if label != session['run_id']: - row['status'] = 'ownership_mismatch_not_removed' - failed = True - continue - # A failed remove is followed by a successful explicit inventory; - # interrupted remove may actually have completed. - try: - command(['docker', 'rm', '--force', '--volumes', name]) - except Exception: - pass - remaining = command(['docker','container','ls','--all','--filter', - 'name=^/' + name + '$','--format','{{.Names}}']).decode().splitlines() - if remaining: - row['status'] = 'still_present' - failed = True - else: - row['status'] = 'absence_verified' - except Exception: - failed = True - if receipt is not None: - receipt['container_cleanup_obligations'] = obligations - if failed: - raise Refused() - - - -def native_checks(root, manifest, admission, receipt, cleanup_session=True): - """Owner wrapper provides a reviewed session after existing restore pipeline. - - Admission must bind ciphertext, canonical private manifest digest, executable - and trust bytes, exact image/target list, original issuer and selected consumer. - None of these admission fields grant authority or carry a client secret. - """ - session = admission['session'] - # Validate ownership/containment before permitting either exec or cleanup. - inspect_session(session) - receipt.update(status='failed', source_sha256=hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - ciphertext_sha256=admission['ciphertext_sha256'], production_contacted=False, - human_mfa_proven=False, downstream_consumer_reconnect_proven=False, - container_cleanup_verified=False) - try: - for field in ('ciphertext_sha256', 'manifest_sha256', 'verifier_sha256', 'trust_sha256'): - if not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}', admission[field]): - raise Refused() - for field in ('client_id','secret_env','audience','scope','subject','tenant','roles','deny_scope'): - if not isinstance(admission['consumer'].get(field), str) or not admission['consumer'][field].strip(): - raise Refused() - payload = private_payload(root, manifest, admission['manifest_sha256']) - result = run_verifier(session, admission, payload) - required = {'native_service_registration_verified','wrong_unrelated_secret_explicitly_refused', - 'denied_scopes_refused','original_config_registry_policy_receipts_equal', - 'original_https_issuer_and_trust_preserved','original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks'} - if any(result.get(k) is not True for k in required) or not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}', result.get('public_signing_spki_sha256','')): - raise Refused() - # Closed receipt allowlist: never copy arbitrary worker output. - receipt.update({k: True for k in required}) - receipt['public_signing_spki_sha256'] = result['public_signing_spki_sha256'] - receipt['status'] = 'isolated_keycape_native_registration_checked' - finally: - try: - if cleanup_session: - cleanup(session, receipt) - receipt['container_cleanup_verified'] = True - except Exception: - receipt['status'] = 'failed' - raise diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py deleted file mode 100644 index abe0865..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,343 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Owner-run native LLDAP restore from the verified identity bundle. - -Private inputs remain in the owner process/pipe. Decrypted staging uses Linux -tmpfs. Containers have no network, ports, host mounts or production API access. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath -import re -import signal -import sqlite3 -import subprocess -import tarfile -import tempfile -import time -import tomllib -import uuid - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, HERE / (name + '.py')) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -verify = load('verify-identity') -offline = load('retrieve-identity-offline') -bundle = verify.bundle -IMAGE = 'docker.io/lldap/lldap@sha256:9e605a66c02514bfcffd1b67cafb1e98d50992216bb2871d7ae44622047dd09d' -CLIENT = 'ghcr.io/gpappsoft/privacyidea-docker@sha256:af7841adad262f129e0c1d4f553af13f21cb2f4dc713533f316cfe43ed0b4473' -ENGINE_ID = '74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1' -ENGINE_NAME = 'bnt-lap001' - - -def command(args, **kwargs): - result = subprocess.run(args, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, - timeout=kwargs.pop('timeout', 90), **kwargs) - if result.returncode: - raise bundle.Refused() - return result.stdout - - -def preflight(): - contexts = json.loads(command(['docker', 'context', 'inspect'])) - endpoints = [contexts[0]['Endpoints']['docker']['Host']] - if os.environ.get('DOCKER_HOST'): - endpoints.append(os.environ['DOCKER_HOST']) - if not all(url.startswith('unix://') for url in endpoints): - raise bundle.Refused() - facts = json.loads(command(['docker', 'info', '--format', - '{"ID":{{json .ID}},"Name":{{json .Name}},"OSType":{{json .OSType}}}'])) - if facts['ID'] != ENGINE_ID or facts['Name'] != ENGINE_NAME or facts['OSType'] != 'linux': - raise bundle.Refused() - # /dev/shm must actually be tmpfs, not a similarly named disk directory. - mounts = Path('/proc/mounts').read_text().splitlines() - if not any(line.split()[1:3] == ['/dev/shm', 'tmpfs'] for line in mounts): - raise bundle.Refused() - images = [] - for image in (IMAGE, CLIENT): - image_id = command(['docker', 'image', 'inspect', '--format', '{{.Id}}', image]).decode().strip() - images.append({'reference': image, 'image_id': image_id}) - return {'engine_id': facts['ID'], 'engine_name': facts['Name'], 'images': images, - 'production_contacted': False, 'network_mode': 'none', 'host_ports_published': False} - - -def snapshot(path): - # Include all fields of durable identity tables, including stored password - # hashes. Only counts and the equality boolean leave this process. - result = {} - with sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri() + '?mode=ro', uri=True) as db: - if db.execute('PRAGMA integrity_check').fetchall() != [('ok',)]: - raise bundle.Refused() - tables = {row[0] for row in db.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")} - for name in ('users', 'groups', 'memberships', 'user_attributes', 'group_attributes', - 'user_attribute_values', 'group_attribute_values', - 'user_attribute_schema', 'group_attribute_schema'): - if name in tables: - rows = db.execute('SELECT * FROM "' + name + '"').fetchall() - encoded = sorted(repr(row) for row in rows) - result[name] = {'count': len(rows), 'digest': hashlib.sha256('\n'.join(encoded).encode()).digest()} - if not {'users', 'groups', 'memberships'} <= result.keys(): - raise bundle.Refused() - return result - - -def configuration(root): - data = root / 'data/lldap' - existing = data / 'lldap_config.toml' - config = tomllib.loads(existing.read_text()) if existing.is_file() else {} - deployment = bundle.resource(root, 'sso', 'deployment', 'lldap') - main = next(c for c in deployment['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'] if c['name'] == 'lldap') - env = {e['name']: e['value'] for e in main.get('env', []) if 'value' in e} - secret = bundle.resource(root, 'sso', 'secret', 'lldap-secrets')['data'] - jwt = base64.b64decode(secret['LLDAP_JWT_SECRET'], validate=True) - password = base64.b64decode(secret['LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS'], validate=True) - if not jwt or not password or b'\n' in jwt or b'\n' in password: - raise bundle.Refused() - base = env.get('LLDAP_LDAP_BASE_DN', config.get('ldap_base_dn')) - user = env.get('LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN', config.get('ldap_user_dn', 'admin')) - if not isinstance(base, str) or not base or not isinstance(user, str): - raise bundle.Refused() - chosen = {'database_url': 'sqlite:///data/users.db?mode=rwc', - 'ldap_base_dn': base, 'ldap_user_dn': user, - 'ldap_host': '127.0.0.1', 'http_host': '127.0.0.1', - 'ldap_port': 3890, 'http_port': 17170, - 'force_ldap_user_pass_reset': False, 'force_update_private_key': False} - seed = env.get('LLDAP_KEY_SEED', config.get('key_seed')) - if seed: - if not isinstance(seed, str): - raise bundle.Refused() - chosen['key_seed'] = seed - else: - value = env.get('LLDAP_KEY_FILE', config.get('key_file', '/data/private_key')) - key = PurePosixPath(value) - if not key.is_absolute(): - key = PurePosixPath('/data') / key - if key.parent != PurePosixPath('/data') or not (data / key.name).is_file(): - raise bundle.Refused() - chosen['key_file'] = str(key) - # JSON strings are valid TOML basic strings for these service inputs. - raw = '\n'.join(k + ' = ' + json.dumps(v) for k, v in chosen.items()) - raw += '\n[smtp_options]\nenable_password_reset = false\n[ldaps_options]\nenabled = false\n' - return raw.encode(), jwt, password, base - - -def archive_files(files): - out = io.BytesIO() - with tarfile.open(fileobj=out, mode='w') as archive: - for name, value in files.items(): - if PurePosixPath(name).is_absolute() or '..' in PurePosixPath(name).parts: - raise bundle.Refused() - entry = tarfile.TarInfo(name) - entry.size = len(value) - entry.mode = 0o600 - entry.uid = entry.gid = 1000 - archive.addfile(entry, io.BytesIO(value)) - return out.getvalue() - - -PROBE = r''' -import contextlib,io,json,logging,socket,sys,time -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -result={'status':'failed'} -stage='network_isolation' -try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from pathlib import Path - assert {p.name for p in Path('/sys/class/net').iterdir()}=={'lo'} - assert len(Path('/proc/net/route').read_text().splitlines())==1 - stage='native_client_import' - from ldap3 import Server,Connection,NONE - from ldap3.utils.dn import escape_rdn - values=json.load(sys.stdin) - stage='directory_startup' - for _ in range(60): - try: - with socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1',3890),timeout=1):pass - break - except OSError:time.sleep(.25) - else:raise RuntimeError() - dn='uid='+escape_rdn(values['user'])+',ou=people,'+values['base'] - server=Server('127.0.0.1',port=3890,get_info=NONE,connect_timeout=3) - stage='existing_user_bind' - connection=Connection(server,user=dn,password=values['password'],auto_bind=True,raise_exceptions=True) - assert connection.bound - connection.unbind() - stage='wrong_password_bind' - wrong=Connection(server,user=dn,password=values['wrong_password'],auto_bind=False,raise_exceptions=False) - refused=not wrong.bind() and wrong.result.get('result')==49 - wrong.unbind() - assert refused - result={'status':'verified','existing_user_native_ldap_bind':True,'wrong_password_refused':True, - 'only_loopback_interface_verified':True,'external_routes_absent':True} -except Exception as error:result={'status':'failed','failed_stage':stage,'failure_type':type(error).__name__} -print(json.dumps(result)) -''' - - -def restore_lldap(root, user, password, receipt): - before = snapshot(root / 'data/lldap/users.db') - config, jwt, admin_password, base = configuration(root) - name = 'nk49-lldap-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - client_name = name + '-client' - try: - command(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', name, - '--network', 'none', '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', - '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', '--user', '1000:1000', - '--memory', '256m', '--cpus', '1', '--pids-limit', '128', - '--tmpfs', '/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=268435456,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700', - '--tmpfs', '/run/recovery:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=1048576,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700', - '--tmpfs', '/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000', - '--env', 'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET_FILE=/run/recovery/jwt', - '--env', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS_FILE=/run/recovery/admin-password', - '--entrypoint', '/bin/sh', IMAGE, '-c', 'sleep 1800']) - guard = json.loads(command(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name, '--format', - '{"host":{{json .HostConfig}},"mounts":{{json .Mounts}},"user":{{json .Config.User}}}'])) - host = guard['host'] - if (host['NetworkMode'] != 'none' or not host['ReadonlyRootfs'] or host['Privileged'] - or host.get('Binds') or host.get('PortBindings') or 'ALL' not in host.get('CapDrop', []) - or 'no-new-privileges' not in host.get('SecurityOpt', []) - or guard['user'] != '1000:1000' - or any(mount['Type'] != 'tmpfs' for mount in guard['mounts'])): - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['container_isolation_verified_before_private_import'] = True - payload = {p.relative_to(root / 'data/lldap').as_posix(): p.read_bytes() - for p in (root / 'data/lldap').rglob('*') if p.is_file()} - command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/data'], input=archive_files(payload)) - command(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/run/recovery'], - input=archive_files({'lldap.toml': config, 'jwt': jwt, 'admin-password': admin_password})) - # No credential values in Docker configuration, environment or argv. - command(['docker', 'exec', '--detach', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'echo $$ > /run/recovery/server.pid; exec /app/lldap run --config-file /run/recovery/lldap.toml > /dev/null 2>&1']) - raw = command(['docker', 'run', '--interactive', '--rm', '--name', client_name, '--pull=never', '--network', 'container:' + name, - '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', - '--memory', '256m', '--cpus', '1', '--pids-limit', '64', - '--entrypoint', 'python3', CLIENT, '-c', PROBE], - input=json.dumps({'user': user, 'password': password, 'base': base, - 'wrong_password': 'nk49-wrong-' + uuid.uuid4().hex}).encode()) - result = json.loads(raw) - receipt.update(result) - if result.get('status') != 'verified': - raise bundle.Refused() - command(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', 'kill -TERM "$(cat /run/recovery/server.pid)"']) - for _ in range(60): - running = subprocess.run(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'kill -0 "$(cat /run/recovery/server.pid)"'], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if running.returncode: - break - time.sleep(.1) - else: - raise bundle.Refused() - raw = command(['docker', 'exec', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'test ! -s /data/users.db-wal && cat /data/users.db']) - after_path = root / 'post-restore-users.db' - after_path.write_bytes(raw) - if snapshot(after_path) != before: - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt.update(directory_identity_rows_preserved=True, - directory_comparison_scope=sorted(before), - directory_table_counts={k: v['count'] for k, v in before.items()}) - finally: - # A failed create can still have created a container (e.g. lost reply). - for owned in (client_name, name): - found = subprocess.run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', owned], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=15) - if found.returncode == 0: - command(['docker', 'rm', '--force', '--volumes', owned]) - absent = subprocess.run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', owned], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=15) - command(['docker', 'info', '--format', '{{.ID}}']) - if absent.returncode == 0: - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['container_cleanup_verified'] = True - - -def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--transfer-receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--user', required=True) - args = parser.parse_args() - os.umask(0o077) - fd = os.open(args.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - result = {'schema': 'netkingdom.isolated-lldap-recovery.v1', 'status': 'failed', - 'production_contacted': False, 'secret_values_exported': False, - 'container_cleanup_verified': False, 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified': False, - 'source_sha256': hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - keyfd = None - work = None - stage = 'target_preflight' - try: - result['target'] = preflight() - stage = 'input_validation' - if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,128}', args.user): - raise bundle.Refused() - transfer = json.loads(Path(args.transfer_receipt).read_text()) - offline.validate(transfer) - if transfer.get('independent_owner_retrieval_verified') is not True: - raise bundle.Refused() - path = Path(transfer['fetched_path']) - bundle.private(path, max_bytes=bundle.LIMIT) - if path.stat().st_size != transfer['ciphertext_bytes'] or offline.offsite.digest(path) != transfer['ciphertext_sha256']: - raise bundle.Refused() - keyfd = verify.custody.private_key_fd() - derived = command(['age-keygen', '-y', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], pass_fds=(keyfd,)).strip() - if derived != bundle.profile()['public_recipient'].encode(): - raise bundle.Refused() - stage = 'private_existing_password_prompt' - password = offline.private_prompt('Existing account password for the isolated LLDAP check: ') - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-service-recovery-', dir='/dev/shm') as temporary: - work = Path(temporary) - archive = work / 'archive.tar' - stage = 'archive_decryption' - with archive.open('xb') as output: - proc = subprocess.run(['age', '-d', '-i', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}', str(path)], - stdout=output, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, pass_fds=(keyfd,), timeout=180) - if proc.returncode or archive.stat().st_size > bundle.LIMIT + 4 * 1024 * 1024: - raise bundle.Refused() - restored = work / 'restored' - restored.mkdir(mode=0o700) - stage = 'archive_validation' - manifest, _ = bundle.restore(archive, restored) - result.update(ciphertext_sha256=transfer['ciphertext_sha256'], - manifest_file_count=len(manifest['files']), all_manifest_hashes_verified=True) - stage = 'native_directory_check' - restore_lldap(restored, args.user, password, result) - password = None - if work.exists(): - raise bundle.Refused() - result.update(status='isolated_lldap_verified', temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified=True) - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt): - result.update(status='failed', error='isolated_lldap_check_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - result.setdefault('failed_stage', stage) - finally: - if keyfd is not None: - os.close(keyfd) - if work is not None and not work.exists(): - result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] = True - result['finished_at'] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as output: - json.dump(result, output, indent=2) - output.write('\n') - success = result['status'] == 'isolated_lldap_verified' - print('OK: restored LLDAP existing-user bind, wrong-password refusal, directory preservation and cleanup passed.' - if success else 'ERROR: isolated LLDAP recovery refused; review the safe receipt. No production change.') - return 0 if success else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGINT, signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP): - signal.signal(sig, offline.interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py deleted file mode 100755 index d6dc9ab..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,368 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Owner-run native privacyIDEA existing-token MFA check on the restored database. - -Restored LLDAP, the restored database and a privacyIDEA worker share one network-free -namespace. The owner names their login and types a token's PIN+OTP privately. The call -is POST /validate/check by user and realm, as KeyCape makes it, through the restored LDAP -resolver: first with a wrong encryption key, then with a wrong code, then as typed. -Codes never enter receipts, argv or environment; the login is stored only as a hash. -""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import signal -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile -import uuid -from datetime import datetime, timezone - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -# Reused unedited: container, isolation and cleanup helpers of the accepted stage. -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated_privacyidea', HERE / 'isolated-privacyidea.py') -pi = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(pi) -local, bundle, run = pi.local, pi.bundle, pi.run -LOGIN = re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.@-]{1,128}') -REALM = re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,64}') -CLUSTER_LDAP = 'ldap://lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local:3890' -LOOPBACK_LDAP = 'ldap://127.0.0.1:3890' - -REALMS = r""" -import contextlib,io,json,logging -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -result={'status':'failed'} -try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from privacyidea.app import create_app - from privacyidea.lib.realm import get_realms,get_default_realm - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file='/recovery/pi.cfg',silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - names=sorted(get_realms());default=get_default_realm() - result={'status':'ok','realms':names,'default':default} -except Exception as error:result={'status':'failed','failure_type':type(error).__name__} -print(json.dumps(result)) -""" - -# Looks the user up through the restored resolver and the restored directory. -RESOLVE = r""" -import contextlib,io,json,logging,sys -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -v=json.load(sys.stdin) -result={'status':'failed'} -stage='native_application_configuration' -try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from privacyidea.app import create_app - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file='/recovery/pi.cfg',silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - from privacyidea.lib.user import User - from privacyidea.lib.token import get_tokens - stage='user_lookup_through_restored_resolver' - user=User(v['login'],v['realm']) - found=bool(user.exist()) - tokens=[] - if found: - stage='user_token_listing' - tokens=[{'type':t.type,'active':bool(t.is_active()),'locked':bool(t.token.locked), - 'revoked':bool(t.token.revoked)} for t in get_tokens(user=user)] - result={'status':'ok','user_found':found,'tokens':tokens} -except Exception as error:result={'status':'failed','failed_stage':stage,'failure_type':type(error).__name__} -print(json.dumps(result)) -""" - -# One check per process: privacyIDEA loads its encryption module once per app. -# The call is the endpoint KeyCape uses, so stored policies and the resolver both apply. -CHECK = r""" -import contextlib,io,json,logging,os,sys -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -v=json.load(sys.stdin) -result={'status':'failed'} -stage='network_isolation' -try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from pathlib import Path - assert {p.name for p in Path('/sys/class/net').iterdir()}=={'lo'} - assert len(Path('/proc/net/route').read_text().splitlines())==1 - config='/recovery/pi.cfg' - if v['mode']=='wrong_key': - stage='wrong_key_configuration' - original=Path(config).read_text() - assert '/recovery/enckey' in original - Path('/recovery/wrong-enckey').write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - Path('/recovery/pi-wrongkey.cfg').write_text(original.replace('/recovery/enckey','/recovery/wrong-enckey')) - config='/recovery/pi-wrongkey.cfg' - stage='native_application_configuration' - # create_app applies PRIVACYIDEA_CONFIGFILE after config_file, so it must name the file in use. - os.environ['PRIVACYIDEA_CONFIGFILE']=config - from privacyidea.app import create_app - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file=config,silent=True) - with app.app_context(): - # A wrong-key run that silently used the original key would be vacuous. - assert app.config['PI_ENCFILE']==('/recovery/wrong-enckey' if v['mode']=='wrong_key' else '/recovery/enckey') - stage='native_validation' - accepted=False;refusal='none';code=None - try: - response=app.test_client().post('/validate/check',data={'user':v['login'],'realm':v['realm'],'pass':v['passcode']}) - body=response.get_json(silent=True) or {} - outcome=body.get('result') or {} - accepted=response.status_code==200 and outcome.get('status') is True and outcome.get('value') is True - code=(outcome.get('error') or {}).get('code') - message=str((body.get('detail') or {}).get('message','')).lower() - if accepted:refusal='none' - elif code is not None:refusal='error_'+str(code) - else:refusal='wrong_pin' if 'pin' in message else 'wrong_value' if ('otp' in message or 'wrong' in message) else 'other_refusal' - except Exception as error: - accepted=False;refusal='exception_'+type(error).__name__[:40] - result={'status':'completed','accepted':accepted,'refusal':refusal, - 'only_loopback_interface_verified':True,'external_routes_absent':True} -except Exception as error:result={'status':'failed','failed_stage':stage,'failure_type':type(error).__name__} -print(json.dumps(result)) -""" - -WAIT_LDAP = r""" -import socket,sys,time -for _ in range(240): - try: - with socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1',3890),timeout=1):sys.exit(0) - except OSError:time.sleep(.25) -sys.exit(1) -""" - - -def preflight(): - """The launcher calls this before any key prompt.""" - return pi.preflight() - - -def worker_json(worker, script, values=None, timeout=300): - args = ['docker', 'exec'] + (['-i'] if values is not None else []) + [worker, 'python3', '-c', script] - raw = run(args, input=None if values is None else json.dumps(values).encode(), timeout=timeout) - return json.loads(raw) - - -def different_code(passcode): - """Same shape, different final digit: still a well-formed but wrong code.""" - last = passcode[-1] - return passcode[:-1] + ('0' if last != '0' else '1') - - -def psql(database, statement): - out = run(['docker', 'exec', database, 'psql', '-U', 'postgres', '-d', 'recovery', '-v', 'ON_ERROR_STOP=1', - '-At', '-c', statement]) - return out.decode().strip() - - -def rewrite_resolvers(database): - """Point archived LDAP resolvers at the restored directory, in the disposable copy only. - - Only the archived in-cluster address is accepted; anything else is an owner decision. - The encrypted bind password is left untouched so the original key must decrypt it. - """ - rows = psql(database, 'SELECT c."Value" FROM resolverconfig c JOIN resolver r ON r.id=c.resolver_id ' - "WHERE r.rtype='ldapresolver' AND c.\"Key\"='LDAPURI'").splitlines() - if not rows or any(value != CLUSTER_LDAP for value in rows): - raise bundle.Refused() - changed = psql(database, 'UPDATE resolverconfig SET "Value"=\'' + LOOPBACK_LDAP + '\' WHERE "Key"=\'LDAPURI\' ' - "AND resolver_id IN (SELECT id FROM resolver WHERE rtype='ldapresolver') " - "AND \"Value\"='" + CLUSTER_LDAP + "'") - if changed != 'UPDATE ' + str(len(rows)): - raise bundle.Refused() - return len(rows) - - -def start_directory(name, database, root): - """Restored LLDAP joins the database's network-free namespace (loopback only).""" - config, jwt, admin_password, _ = local.configuration(root) - database_id = run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', database, '--format', '{{.Id}}']).decode().strip() - run(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', name, - '--network', 'container:' + database_id, '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', - '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', '--user', '1000:1000', - '--memory', '256m', '--cpus', '1', '--pids-limit', '128', - '--tmpfs', '/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=268435456,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700', - '--tmpfs', '/run/recovery:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=1048576,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700', - '--tmpfs', '/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000', - '--env', 'LLDAP_JWT_SECRET_FILE=/run/recovery/jwt', - '--env', 'LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS_FILE=/run/recovery/admin-password', - '--entrypoint', '/bin/sh', local.IMAGE, '-c', 'sleep 1800']) - pi.isolation(name, 'container:' + database_id, '1000:1000') - payload = {p.relative_to(root / 'data/lldap').as_posix(): p.read_bytes() - for p in (root / 'data/lldap').rglob('*') if p.is_file()} - run(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/data'], input=local.archive_files(payload)) - run(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/run/recovery'], - input=local.archive_files({'lldap.toml': config, 'jwt': jwt, 'admin-password': admin_password})) - run(['docker', 'exec', '--detach', name, '/bin/sh', '-c', - 'exec /app/lldap run --config-file /run/recovery/lldap.toml > /dev/null 2>&1']) - - -def restore_and_check(root, receipt, choose_user, choose_code): - """choose_user(realms, default) -> (login, realm); choose_code(summary) -> PIN+code.""" - stem = 'nk49-pi-mfa-' + uuid.uuid4().hex - database, directory, worker = stem + '-db', stem + '-dir', stem + '-worker' - stage = 'database_restore' - try: - pi.start_database(database) - with (root / 'databases/privacyidea.dump').open('rb') as dump: - run(['docker', 'exec', '-i', database, 'pg_restore', '-U', 'postgres', '-d', 'recovery', - '--no-owner', '--no-privileges', '--exit-on-error'], stdin=dump, timeout=600) - stage = 'resolver_rewrite' - receipt['ldap_resolvers_rewritten_to_loopback'] = rewrite_resolvers(database) - stage = 'directory_launch' - start_directory(directory, database, root) - stage = 'worker_launch' - pi.start_worker(worker, database, root) - receipt['container_isolation_verified_before_private_import'] = True - stage = 'directory_startup' - run(['docker', 'exec', worker, 'python3', '-c', WAIT_LDAP], timeout=90) - stage = 'realm_listing' - realms = worker_json(worker, REALMS) - if realms.get('status') != 'ok' or not realms['realms']: - raise bundle.Refused() - stage = 'owner_user_selection' - login, realm = choose_user(realms['realms'], realms.get('default')) - if not LOGIN.fullmatch(login) or realm not in realms['realms']: - raise bundle.Refused() - stage = 'user_lookup_through_restored_resolver' - user = worker_json(worker, RESOLVE, {'login': login, 'realm': realm}) - if user.get('status') != 'ok': - receipt['failed_stage'] = user.get('failed_stage', stage) - raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['user_resolved_through_restored_resolver_and_directory'] = bool(user['user_found']) - if not user['user_found']: - raise bundle.Refused() - usable = [t for t in user['tokens'] if t['active'] and not t['locked'] and not t['revoked']] - receipt.update(selected_user_sha256=hashlib.sha256(login.encode()).hexdigest(), - user_token_count=len(user['tokens']), user_usable_token_count=len(usable), - user_usable_token_types=sorted({t['type'] for t in usable})) - stage = 'owner_code_entry' - if not usable: - raise bundle.Refused() - passcode = choose_code({'tokens': user['tokens'], 'usable': len(usable)}) - if not passcode or len(passcode) > 256: - raise bundle.Refused() - outcomes = {} - for mode, code in (('wrong_key', passcode), ('wrong_code', different_code(passcode)), ('correct', passcode)): - stage = 'check_' + mode - outcome = worker_json(worker, CHECK, {'mode': mode, 'login': login, 'realm': realm, 'passcode': code}) - if outcome.get('status') != 'completed': - receipt['failed_stage'] = outcome.get('failed_stage', stage) - raise bundle.Refused() - outcomes[mode] = outcome - receipt.update( - wrong_key_refused=not outcomes['wrong_key']['accepted'], wrong_key_refusal=outcomes['wrong_key']['refusal'], - wrong_code_refused=not outcomes['wrong_code']['accepted'], wrong_code_refusal=outcomes['wrong_code']['refusal'], - existing_token_native_check_accepted=outcomes['correct']['accepted'], - only_loopback_interface_verified=all(o['only_loopback_interface_verified'] for o in outcomes.values()), - external_routes_absent=all(o['external_routes_absent'] for o in outcomes.values())) - # Only the last step can spend a counter or replay-protected code. - proven = (receipt['wrong_key_refused'] and receipt['wrong_code_refused'] - and receipt['existing_token_native_check_accepted']) - receipt['existing_token_mfa_proven'] = proven - receipt['user_to_token_resolver_proven'] = proven - if not proven: - stage = 'acceptance' - raise bundle.Refused() - except Exception: - receipt.setdefault('failed_stage', stage) - raise - finally: - pi.cleanup([worker, directory, database]) - receipt['container_cleanup_verified'] = True - - -def owner_user(realms, default): - """Terminal-only prompts; the login is hashed in receipts.""" - if not (sys.stdin.isatty() and sys.stderr.isatty()): - raise bundle.Refused() - print('Realms in the restored database: ' + ', '.join(realms) + (' (default: %s)' % default if default else '')) - login = input('Your login name (the user your token belongs to): ').strip() - realm = default or realms[0] - if len(realms) > 1: - realm = input('Realm [%s]: ' % realm).strip() or realm - return login, realm - - -def owner_code(summary): - print('Found %d token(s) for that user, %d usable. Any one of them may be used.' % (len(summary['tokens']), summary['usable'])) - return local.offline.private_prompt('Token PIN + current code, as typed at login (hidden): ') - - -def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--transfer-receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - args = parser.parse_args() - os.umask(0o077) - fd = os.open(args.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - result = {'schema': 'netkingdom.isolated-privacyidea-mfa.v1', 'status': 'failed', - 'production_contacted': False, 'secret_values_exported': False, - 'existing_token_mfa_proven': False, 'user_to_token_resolver_proven': False, - 'container_cleanup_verified': False, 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified': False, - 'source_sha256': hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'reused_source_sha256': {name: hashlib.sha256((HERE / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() - for name in ('isolated-privacyidea.py', 'isolated-lldap.py', - 'identity-bundle.py', 'verify-identity.py', - 'retrieve-identity-offline.py')}} - keyfd = None - work = None - stage = 'target_preflight' - try: - result['target'] = preflight() - stage = 'transfer_validation' - transfer = json.loads(Path(args.transfer_receipt).read_text()) - local.offline.validate(transfer) - if transfer.get('independent_owner_retrieval_verified') is not True: - raise bundle.Refused() - path = Path(transfer['fetched_path']) - bundle.private(path, max_bytes=bundle.LIMIT) - if path.stat().st_size != transfer['ciphertext_bytes'] or local.offline.offsite.digest(path) != transfer['ciphertext_sha256']: - raise bundle.Refused() - keyfd = local.verify.custody.private_key_fd() - if run(['age-keygen', '-y', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], pass_fds=(keyfd,)).strip() != bundle.profile()['public_recipient'].encode(): - raise bundle.Refused() - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-pi-recovery-', dir='/dev/shm') as temporary: - work = Path(temporary) - archive = work / 'archive.tar' - stage = 'archive_decryption' - with archive.open('xb') as output: - p = subprocess.run(['age', '-d', '-i', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}', str(path)], - stdout=output, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, pass_fds=(keyfd,), timeout=180) - if p.returncode or archive.stat().st_size > bundle.LIMIT + 4 * 1024 * 1024: - raise bundle.Refused() - restored = work / 'restored' - restored.mkdir(mode=0o700) - stage = 'archive_validation' - manifest, _ = bundle.restore(archive, restored) - result.update(ciphertext_sha256=transfer['ciphertext_sha256'], - manifest_file_count=len(manifest['files']), all_manifest_hashes_verified=True) - stage = 'native_mfa_check' - restore_and_check(restored, result, owner_user, owner_code) - if work.exists(): - raise bundle.Refused() - result.update(status='isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified', temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified=True) - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt): - result.update(status='failed', error='isolated_privacyidea_mfa_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - result.setdefault('failed_stage', stage) - finally: - if keyfd is not None: - os.close(keyfd) - if work is not None and not work.exists(): - result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] = True - result['finished_at'] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as output: - json.dump(result, output, indent=2) - output.write('\n') - ok = result['status'] == 'isolated_privacyidea_mfa_verified' - print('OK: restored token decrypted and passed the native MFA check; wrong key and wrong code were refused; cleanup passed.' - if ok else 'ERROR: isolated privacyIDEA MFA check refused; review the safe receipt. No production change.') - return 0 if ok else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGINT, signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP): - signal.signal(sig, local.offline.interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py deleted file mode 100644 index a086229..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,309 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Private native privacyIDEA token-material and audit recovery checks. - -This does not authenticate a user's MFA code. It restores only a disposable -database, decrypts token material internally and verifies stored audit rows. -""" -import argparse -import ast -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import signal -import subprocess -import tempfile -import time -import uuid - -# Import the already reviewed local target/transport boundary without changing -# the accepted LLDAP executor or its source digest. -import importlib.util -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated_lldap', HERE / 'isolated-lldap.py') -local = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(local) -bundle = local.bundle -IMAGE = local.CLIENT -POSTGRES = local.verify.pg.IMAGE - - -def run(args, **kwargs): - return local.command(args, **kwargs) - - -def preflight(): - target = local.preflight() - target['images'].append({'reference': POSTGRES, - 'image_id': run(['docker', 'image', 'inspect', '--format', '{{.Id}}', POSTGRES]).decode().strip()}) - return target - - -def isolation(name, expected_network, user): - info = json.loads(run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name, '--format', - '{"host":{{json .HostConfig}},"mounts":{{json .Mounts}},"user":{{json .Config.User}}}'])) - host = info['host'] - if (host['NetworkMode'] != expected_network or not host['ReadonlyRootfs'] or host['Privileged'] - or host.get('Binds') or host.get('PortBindings') or 'ALL' not in host.get('CapDrop', []) - or 'no-new-privileges' not in host.get('SecurityOpt', []) or info['user'] != user - or any(m['Type'] != 'tmpfs' for m in info['mounts'])): - raise bundle.Refused() - - -def cleanup(names): - for name in names: - present = subprocess.run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=15) - if present.returncode == 0: - run(['docker', 'rm', '--force', '--volumes', name]) - absent = subprocess.run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', name], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=15) - run(['docker', 'info', '--format', '{{.ID}}']) - if absent.returncode == 0: - raise bundle.Refused() - - -def start_database(name): - run(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', name, '--network', 'none', - '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', - '--user', '999:999', '--memory', '2g', '--cpus', '2', '--pids-limit', '128', - '--tmpfs', '/var/lib/postgresql/data:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=1073741824,uid=999,gid=999,mode=0700', - '--tmpfs', '/var/run/postgresql:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=999,gid=999', - '--tmpfs', '/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=999,gid=999', - '--env', 'POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust', '--env', 'POSTGRES_DB=recovery', - '--entrypoint', '/usr/bin/timeout', POSTGRES, '--kill-after=15s', '1800s', - '/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh', 'postgres', '-c', 'listen_addresses=127.0.0.1']) - isolation(name, 'none', '999:999') - for _ in range(80): - # The entrypoint's temporary init server has TCP disabled. Require TCP - # readiness so we cannot mistake it for the final local-only server. - ready = subprocess.run(['docker', 'exec', name, 'pg_isready', '-h', '127.0.0.1', '-U', 'postgres', '-d', 'recovery'], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if ready.returncode == 0: - return - time.sleep(.25) - raise bundle.Refused() - - -def start_worker(name, database, root): - secret = bundle.resource(root, 'mfa', 'secret', 'privacyidea-config')['data'] - config = {'SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI': 'postgresql+psycopg2://postgres@127.0.0.1:5432/recovery', - 'PI_AUDIT_SQL_URI': 'postgresql+psycopg2://postgres@127.0.0.1:5432/recovery', - 'SECRET_KEY': base64.b64decode(secret['PI_SECRET_KEY'], validate=True).decode(), - 'PI_PEPPER': base64.b64decode(secret['PI_PEPPER'], validate=True).decode(), - 'PI_ENCFILE': '/recovery/enckey', 'PI_AUDIT_KEY_PRIVATE': '/recovery/private.pem', - 'PI_AUDIT_KEY_PUBLIC': '/recovery/public.pem', 'PI_AUDIT_NO_SIGN': False, - 'PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES': legacy_setting(root), 'PI_NO_RESPONSE_SIGN': True, - 'PI_LOGFILE': '/recovery/runtime.log', 'PI_LOGLEVEL': 50, - 'PI_UUID_FILE': '/recovery/node-uuid', - 'PI_TRUSTED_JWT': []} - # This deliberately does not execute archived pi.cfg or reuse its live DB URI. - payload = {'pi.cfg': '\n'.join(k + '=' + repr(v) for k, v in config.items()).encode()} - for key in ('enckey', 'private.pem', 'public.pem'): - payload[key] = (root / 'data/privacyidea' / key).read_bytes() - run(['docker', 'run', '--detach', '--pull=never', '--name', name, - '--network', 'container:' + database, '--read-only', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', - '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges', '--user', '1000:1000', - '--memory', '1g', '--cpus', '2', '--pids-limit', '128', - '--tmpfs', '/recovery:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=33554432,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700', - '--tmpfs', '/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=16777216,uid=1000,gid=1000', - '--tmpfs', '/privacyidea/etc/persistent:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,size=1048576,uid=1000,gid=1000,mode=0700', - '--env', 'PRIVACYIDEA_CONFIGFILE=/recovery/pi.cfg', - '--entrypoint', 'python3', IMAGE, '-c', 'import time;time.sleep(1800)']) - # Docker normalizes container: to container: in HostConfig. - database_id = run(['docker', 'container', 'inspect', database, '--format', '{{.Id}}']).decode().strip() - isolation(name, 'container:' + database_id, '1000:1000') - run(['docker', 'exec', '-i', name, 'tar', '-xf', '-', '-C', '/recovery'], - input=local.archive_files(payload)) - - -def legacy_setting(root): - path = root / 'resources/mfa/configmap/privacyidea-cfg.json' - if not path.exists(): - return False # Only the lower-level synthetic fixture omits ConfigMaps. - raw = bundle.resource(root, 'mfa', 'configmap', 'privacyidea-cfg')['data']['pi.cfg'] - selected = False - for node in ast.parse(raw).body: - if isinstance(node, ast.Assign) and any(isinstance(t, ast.Name) and t.id == 'PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES' for t in node.targets): - if not isinstance(node.value, ast.Constant) or type(node.value.value) is not bool: - raise bundle.Refused() - selected = node.value.value - return selected - - -PROBE = r''' -import contextlib,io,json,logging,os,sys -logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL) -os.umask(0o077) -result={'status':'failed'} -stage='network_isolation' -try: - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()): - from pathlib import Path - assert {p.name for p in Path('/sys/class/net').iterdir()}=={'lo'} - assert len(Path('/proc/net/route').read_text().splitlines())==1 - stage='native_application_configuration' - from privacyidea.app import create_app - app=create_app(config_name='testing',config_file='/recovery/pi.cfg',silent=True) - from privacyidea.models import db,Token - from privacyidea.lib.security.default import DefaultSecurityModule - from privacyidea.lib.auditmodules.sqlaudit import Audit,LogEntry - from privacyidea.lib.crypto import Sign - import binascii - with app.app_context(): - assert str(db.engine.url)=='postgresql+psycopg2://postgres@127.0.0.1:5432/recovery' - stage='retained_token_decryption' - security=DefaultSecurityModule({'file':'/recovery/enckey'}) - wrong_path=Path('/recovery/wrong-enckey');wrong_path.write_bytes(os.urandom(96)) - wrong=DefaultSecurityModule({'file':str(wrong_path)}) - total=Token.query.count() - assert 00 - result.update(retained_tokens_total=total,retained_tokens_with_native_decryption=checked, - different_key_cannot_reproduce_material_count=negative, - retained_token_material_decrypted_inside_process=True,existing_token_mfa_proven=False) - stage='historical_audit_verification' - audit=Audit(app.config) - allow_legacy=bool(app.config['PI_CHECK_OLD_SIGNATURES']) - historical=audit.session.query(LogEntry).count() - assert 0 bundle.LIMIT + 4 * 1024 * 1024: - raise bundle.Refused() - restored = work / 'restored';restored.mkdir(mode=0o700) - stage = 'archive_validation' - manifest, _ = bundle.restore(archive, restored) - result.update(ciphertext_sha256=transfer['ciphertext_sha256'], - manifest_file_count=len(manifest['files']), all_manifest_hashes_verified=True) - stage = 'native_privacyidea_checks' - native_checks(restored, result) - result['status'] = 'isolated_privacyidea_checked' - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt): - result.update(status='failed', error='isolated_privacyidea_check_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - result.setdefault('failed_stage', stage) - finally: - if keyfd is not None:os.close(keyfd) - if work is not None and not work.exists():result['temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified'] = True - result['finished_at'] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as output: - json.dump(result, output, indent=2);output.write('\n') - if result['status'] == 'failed': - print('ERROR: isolated privacyIDEA check failed; review safe receipt. No production change.') - return 1 - if not result['audit_signature_continuity_proven']: - print('REVIEW: token-material checks completed; historical audit exceptions require owner review. Cleanup passed; see safe receipt.') - return 2 - print('OK: retained token material decrypted internally; historical/new audit signatures and negative checks passed; cleanup passed. Existing-token MFA remains separate.') - return 0 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGINT, signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP):signal.signal(sig, local.offline.interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6261933..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,265 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Seal break-glass access material to the backup recipient and publish it to Storage Share. - -NK-WP-0055-T13. The founder runs this in their own terminal. Named private files -(admin kubeconfig, static tunnel key, ops bundle) are packed in memory, encrypted -to the registered public backup recipient, uploaded under a new name to the -`Backup` account and read back with a hash check. Plaintext never reaches disk; -the receipt holds names, sizes and the ciphertext digest only. - -`--verify UPLOAD_RECEIPT` is the drill: it fetches that artifact back from -Storage Share, checks ETag, size and digest against the upload receipt, refuses -an unrelated key, decrypts in memory with the custody key from -`sops-custody-unlock.sh --sealed-fd` and checks that every item is present and -intact. Nothing is decrypted to disk and no item value is printed. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import getpass -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import subprocess -import sys -import tarfile -import tempfile -import urllib.error -import urllib.request -import warnings - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('identity_offsite',HERE/'identity-offsite.py') -offsite=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(offsite) -RECIPIENT=json.loads((HERE/'identity-backup-profile.json').read_text())['public_recipient'] -FOLDER='railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/' -ACCOUNT_BASE=offsite.HOST+'/remote.php/dav/files/Backup/'+FOLDER -ITEM=re.compile(r'[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,39}\Z') -ITEM_LIMIT=64*1024*1024 -MAX_ITEMS=8 - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -def items(specs): - # Each item is a private, regular, single-link file owned by the caller. - if not 0256:raise Refused('credential') - return {'Authorization':'Basic '+base64.b64encode(('Backup:'+password).encode()).decode(), - 'X-Requested-With':'XMLHttpRequest','Accept-Encoding':'identity'} - - -def ensure_folder(client,h): - try: - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(ACCOUNT_BASE,method='MKCOL',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - if response.status!=201:raise Refused('folder') - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - if error.code!=405:raise Refused('folder') from None # 405: the folder already exists - - -def check(response,url,size): - value=response.headers.get('ETag','') - if (response.status!=200 or response.url!=url or response.headers.get('Content-Length')!=str(size) - or not re.fullmatch(r'"[^"\x00-\x20]{1,180}"',value)):raise Refused('readback') - return value - - -def publish(client,password,sealed,sha,size,stamp): - name=f'net-kingdom-kingpath-{stamp}-{sha[:12]}.tar.age' - url=ACCOUNT_BASE+name;h=auth(password) - ensure_folder(client,h) - try: - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=h),timeout=30):raise Refused('exists') - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - if error.code!=404:raise Refused('exists') from None - put=dict(h);put.update({'If-None-Match':'*','Content-Type':'application/octet-stream','Content-Length':str(size)}) - # An unknown upload outcome is never retried under this name automatically. - with sealed.open('rb') as stream: - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,data=stream,method='PUT',headers=put),timeout=600) as response: - if response.status!=201 or response.url!=url:raise Refused('upload') - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=h),timeout=30) as response:version=check(response,url,size) - get=dict(h);get['If-Match']=version;digest=hashlib.sha256();count=0 - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,headers=get),timeout=180) as response: - if check(response,url,size)!=version:raise Refused('readback') - while block:=response.read(1024*1024): - count+=len(block) - if count>size:raise Refused('readback') - digest.update(block) - if count!=size or digest.hexdigest()!=sha:raise Refused('readback') - return name,version - - -def run(specs,password,receipt,client=None,recipient=RECIPIENT,now=None): - if receipt.exists() or receipt.is_symlink():raise Refused('receipt_exists') - sources=items(specs) - stamp=(now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ') - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='.kingpath-') as temporary: - sealed=Path(temporary)/'bundle.tar.age' - sha,size=seal(bundle(sources),sealed,recipient) - name,version=publish(client or offsite.opener(),password,sealed,sha,size,stamp) - record={'schema':'netkingdom.kingpath-offsite.v1','status':'readback_verified', - 'observed_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'provider':'Storage Share', - 'folder':'Backup/'+FOLDER,'artifact':name,'etag':version,'recipient':recipient, - 'ciphertext_sha256':sha,'ciphertext_bytes':size, - 'items':{n:s.stat().st_size for n,s in sorted(sources.items())}, - 'plaintext_written_to_disk':False,'local_ciphertext_removed':True, - 'secret_values_exported':False,'openbao_contacted':False,'sso_contacted':False} - fd=os.open(receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(record,out,indent=2,sort_keys=True);out.write('\n') - return record - - -def fetch(client,password,upload): - url=ACCOUNT_BASE+upload['artifact'];h=auth(password);size=upload['ciphertext_bytes'] - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=h),timeout=30) as response:version=check(response,url,size) - if version!=upload['etag']:raise Refused('etag_changed') - get=dict(h);get['If-Match']=version - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,headers=get),timeout=180) as response: - if check(response,url,size)!=version:raise Refused('readback') - data=response.read(size+1) - if len(data)!=size or hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()!=upload['ciphertext_sha256']:raise Refused('readback') - return data - - -def kind(name,data): - # Shape only: proves the item is usable without recording any of its content. - if name.endswith('kubeconfig'): - import yaml - config=yaml.safe_load(data) - if not isinstance(config,dict) or not config.get('clusters') or not config.get('users'):raise Refused('item_shape') - return 'kubeconfig' - if name.endswith('ssh-key'): - first=data.split(b'\n',1)[0] - if not re.fullmatch(rb'-----BEGIN (OPENSSH|RSA|EC) PRIVATE KEY-----',first):raise Refused('item_shape') - return 'ssh-private-key' - return 'opaque' - - -def expected(specs): - # NAME=SHA256 pairs the drill must match; digests are public, the content stays in memory. - result={} - for spec in specs or []: - name,sep,sha=spec.partition('=') - if not sep or not ITEM.fullmatch(name) or name in result or not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}',sha):raise Refused('expect') - result[name]=sha - return result - - -def verify(upload,password,keyfd,receipt,client=None,expect=None): - expect=expect or {} - if receipt.exists() or receipt.is_symlink():raise Refused('receipt_exists') - if (upload.get('schema')!='netkingdom.kingpath-offsite.v1' or upload.get('status')!='readback_verified' - or not re.fullmatch(r'net-kingdom-kingpath-\d{8}T\d{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}\.tar\.age',upload.get('artifact',''))):raise Refused('upload_receipt') - derived=subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-y',f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'],pass_fds=(keyfd,),capture_output=True,timeout=10) - if derived.returncode or derived.stdout.decode().strip()!=upload['recipient']:raise Refused('wrong_custody_key') - data=fetch(client or offsite.opener(),password,upload) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='.kingpath-verify-') as temporary: - wrong=Path(temporary)/'unrelated.key' - subprocess.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(wrong)],capture_output=True,check=True) - if subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',str(wrong)],input=data,capture_output=True).returncode==0:raise Refused('unrelated_key_accepted') - done=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'],input=data,pass_fds=(keyfd,),capture_output=True,timeout=60) - if done.returncode:raise Refused('decrypt') - found={} - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(done.stdout)) as archive: - for member in archive: - if not member.isfile() or member.name in found:raise Refused('archive') - found[member.name]=archive.extractfile(member).read() - if {n:len(d) for n,d in found.items()}!=upload['items']:raise Refused('items_changed') - for name,sha in expect.items(): - if name not in found:raise Refused('expected_item_missing') - if hashlib.sha256(found[name]).hexdigest()!=sha:raise Refused('item_sha256_mismatch') - record={'schema':'netkingdom.kingpath-verify.v1','status':'verified', - 'observed_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'artifact':upload['artifact'],'etag':upload['etag'], - 'ciphertext_sha256':upload['ciphertext_sha256'],'unrelated_key_refused':True,'custody_key_matches_recipient':True, - 'items':{n:{'bytes':len(d),'shape':kind(n,d)} for n,d in sorted(found.items())}, - 'sha256_matched':{n:expect[n] for n in sorted(expect)}, - 'plaintext_written_to_disk':False,'secret_values_exported':False,'openbao_contacted':False,'sso_contacted':False} - fd=os.open(receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(record,out,indent=2,sort_keys=True);out.write('\n') - return record - - -def main(): - parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - mode=parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True) - mode.add_argument('--item',action='append',metavar='NAME=PATH') - mode.add_argument('--verify',type=Path,metavar='UPLOAD_RECEIPT') - parser.add_argument('--expect',action='append',metavar='NAME=SHA256',help='with --verify: item digest that must match') - parser.add_argument('--receipt',type=Path,required=True) - args=parser.parse_args() - if args.expect and not args.verify:parser.error('--expect needs --verify') - if not sys.stdin.isatty(): - print('refused: run in your own terminal',file=sys.stderr);return 2 - if args.verify: - keyfd=os.environ.get('NETKINGDOM_CUSTODY_AGE_KEY_FD','') - if not keyfd.isdigit(): - print('refused: run under sops-custody-unlock.sh --sealed-fd',file=sys.stderr);return 2 - try: - expect=expected(args.expect) - upload=json.loads(args.verify.expanduser().read_text()) - with warnings.catch_warnings(): - warnings.simplefilter('error',getpass.GetPassWarning) - password=getpass.getpass('Storage Share Backup app password: ') - record=verify(upload,password,int(keyfd),args.receipt.expanduser(),expect=expect) - except (Refused,getpass.GetPassWarning,ValueError,KeyError) as error: - print(f'refused: {error}',file=sys.stderr);return 1 - except (urllib.error.URLError,OSError): - print('refused: provider or local I/O failure',file=sys.stderr);return 1 - print(f'OK: {len(record["items"])} items fetched, decrypted in memory and intact; receipt {args.receipt}') - return 0 - try: - sources=items(args.item) # refuse unsafe input before asking for the credential - with warnings.catch_warnings(): - warnings.simplefilter('error',getpass.GetPassWarning) - password=getpass.getpass('Storage Share Backup app password: ') - run(args.item,password,args.receipt.expanduser()) - except (Refused,getpass.GetPassWarning) as error: - print(f'refused: {error}',file=sys.stderr);return 1 - except (urllib.error.URLError,OSError): - print('refused: provider or local I/O failure (no retry under the same name)',file=sys.stderr);return 1 - print(f'OK: {len(sources)} items sealed, uploaded and read back; receipt {args.receipt}') - return 0 - - -if __name__=='__main__':sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4d946ef..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Prepare exact identity backup coverage from read-only workload/PVC metadata. - -This produces a proposal, never reads Secrets, executes in pods, changes cluster -resources, captures private files, uploads, schedules or grants credentials. -""" -import argparse -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import hashlib -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -CLUSTER_UID='a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786' -PROFILE=ROOT/'tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json' - - -class Refused(Exception):pass - - -def query(namespace,kind,name): - # Closed read-only types; Secret/ConfigMap data and arbitrary API paths have - # no transport in this preparation command. - if kind not in {'namespace','deployment','pvc'}:raise Refused() - args=['kubectl','--request-timeout=20s'] - if namespace:args+=['-n',namespace] - r=subprocess.run(args+['get',kind,name,'-o','json'],capture_output=True,timeout=25) - if r.returncode:raise Refused() - return json.loads(r.stdout) - - -def references(spec): - secrets=set();configmaps=set();pvcs=set() - for c in spec.get('containers',[])+spec.get('initContainers',[]): - for e in c.get('env',[]): - v=e.get('valueFrom',{}) - if 'secretKeyRef' in v:secrets.add(v['secretKeyRef']['name']) - if 'configMapKeyRef' in v:configmaps.add(v['configMapKeyRef']['name']) - for e in c.get('envFrom',[]): - if 'secretRef' in e:secrets.add(e['secretRef']['name']) - if 'configMapRef' in e:configmaps.add(e['configMapRef']['name']) - for v in spec.get('volumes',[]): - if 'secret' in v:secrets.add(v['secret']['secretName']) - if 'configMap' in v:configmaps.add(v['configMap']['name']) - if 'persistentVolumeClaim' in v:pvcs.add(v['persistentVolumeClaim']['claimName']) - for p in v.get('projected',{}).get('sources',[]): - if 'secret' in p:secrets.add(p['secret']['name']) - if 'configMap' in p:configmaps.add(p['configMap']['name']) - return secrets,configmaps,pvcs - - -def prepare(profile,get=query): - if get(None,'namespace','kube-system')['metadata']['uid']!=CLUSTER_UID:raise Refused() - bindings=[] - for component in profile['components']: - ns=component['namespace'];name=component['deployment'] - d=get(ns,'deployment',name);m=d['metadata'] - if (m['uid']!=component['deployment_uid'] or m.get('deletionTimestamp') or - d['status'].get('observedGeneration')!=m['generation'] or d['status'].get('readyReplicas')!=1):raise Refused() - refs=references(d['spec']['template']['spec']) - expected_pvcs={p['name']:p['uid'] for p in component['pvc_refs']} - if refs[0]!=set(component['secret_refs']) or refs[1]!=set(component['configmap_refs']) or refs[2]!=set(expected_pvcs):raise Refused() - pvcs=[] - for pvc,expected in expected_pvcs.items(): - obj=get(ns,'pvc',pvc) - if obj['metadata']['uid']!=expected or obj['metadata'].get('deletionTimestamp') or obj['status'].get('phase')!='Bound':raise Refused() - pvcs.append({'name':pvc,'uid':expected}) - bindings.append({'namespace':ns,'deployment':name,'uid':m['uid'],'generation':m['generation'], - 'pvc_bindings':pvcs,'secret_names_only':sorted(refs[0]),'configmap_names_only':sorted(refs[1])}) - if get(None,'namespace','kube-system')['metadata']['uid']!=CLUSTER_UID:raise Refused() - return {'schema':'netkingdom.identity-backup-preparation.v1','status':'prepared_not_admitted', - 'observed_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),'cluster_uid':CLUSTER_UID, - 'profile_sha256':hashlib.sha256(PROFILE.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(), - 'bindings':bindings,'secret_values_read':False,'backup_captured':False,'uploaded':False, - 'runtime_changed':False,'credential_grant_created':False, - 'owner_admission_required':profile['admission_gates']} - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args() - try: - r=prepare(json.loads(PROFILE.read_text())) - fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - except Exception: - print('ERROR: coverage preparation refused; private diagnostics suppressed.');return 1 - print('OK: exact coverage proposal prepared; capture, delivery and owner admission remain pending.');return 0 - - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py deleted file mode 100644 index 10a7ef4..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Validate reviewed public recovery metadata before requesting custody input. - -Never opens TLS material, archive plaintext or any key. This validates bindings, -not owner assent, archive contents or recovery authority. -""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import stat -from urllib.parse import urlsplit - -ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -# The executable closure extends the synthetic fixture closure with the attended -# custody entry point and this validator. Tests and historical receipts do not run. -SOURCE_PATHS=tuple(sorted([ - 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh','sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py','sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-fd.py', - 'sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/key-custody-remote.py', - *('tools/bootstrap-recovery/'+name for name in ( - 'isolated-keycape.py','isolated-keycape-session.py','run-isolated-keycape.sh', - 'prepare-isolated-keycape.py','isolated-lldap.py','identity-bundle.py', - 'identity-backup-profile.json','retrieve-identity-offline.py','identity-offsite.py', - 'verify-identity.py','identity-custody.json','identity-files.py', - 'check-privacyidea-database.py'))])) - -class Refused(Exception):pass - -def require(value): - if not value:raise Refused() - -def metadata_path(path): - path=Path(os.path.abspath(path)) - require(not any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path,*path.parents))) - st=path.stat() - require(stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) and st.st_uid==os.getuid() and st.st_nlink==1 and not st.st_mode&0o077) - return path - -def read_metadata(path,limit=128*1024): - path=metadata_path(path) - require(0 --receipt ~/prune-receipt.json - re-lists, refuses unless every planned file is still there with its size and every kept file - still exists, deletes only the planned files and checks each is gone. - -The Backup app password is read at a hidden prompt. Only `r01-*` dump folders are accepted; the -identity bundle and OpenBao folders are refused. No credential, URL or provider response is printed. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import base64 -import getpass -import hashlib -import json -import os -import re -import sys -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -import warnings -import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET -from datetime import UTC, datetime -from pathlib import Path - -HOST = "https://nx4069.your-storageshare.de" -BASE = "/remote.php/dav/files/Backup/railiance-backups/" -FOLDER = re.compile(r"r01-[a-z0-9-]{1,60}\Z") -DUMP = re.compile(r"(?P[a-z0-9_-]{1,120})-(?P\d{8}T\d{6}Z)\.dump\.age\Z") -LIMIT = 16 * 1024 * 1024 - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs): - raise Refused("redirect refused") - - -def opener(): - return urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirect()) - - -def prompt(): - if not sys.stdin.isatty() or not sys.stderr.isatty(): - raise Refused("run in your own terminal") - with warnings.catch_warnings(): - warnings.simplefilter("error", getpass.GetPassWarning) - secret = getpass.getpass("Storage Share Backup app password: ") - if not secret or any(c in secret for c in "\r\n\x00"): - raise Refused("empty or invalid password") - return secret - - -def auth(secret): - return { - "Authorization": "Basic " - + base64.b64encode(("Backup:" + secret).encode()).decode(), - "Accept-Encoding": "identity", - } - - -def folder_url(folder): - if not FOLDER.fullmatch(folder): - raise Refused("only r01-* dump folders are accepted") - return HOST + BASE + folder + "/" - - -def listing(client, headers, folder): - url = folder_url(folder) - request = urllib.request.Request( - url, - method="PROPFIND", - headers=dict(headers, Depth="1", **{"Content-Type": "application/xml"}), - data=b'', - ) - with client.open(request, timeout=60) as response: - if response.status != 207 or response.url != url: - raise Refused("listing refused") - raw = response.read(LIMIT + 1) - if len(raw) > LIMIT: - raise Refused("listing too large") - files = {} - for item in ET.fromstring(raw).findall("{DAV:}response"): - path = urllib.parse.unquote( - urllib.parse.urlsplit(item.findtext("{DAV:}href") or "").path - ) - if not path.startswith(BASE + folder + "/"): - raise Refused("unexpected path in listing") - name = path[len(BASE + folder + "/") :].rstrip("/") - if not name: - continue - size = None - for row in item.findall("{DAV:}propstat"): - if " 200 " in (row.findtext("{DAV:}status") or ""): - if ( - row.find("{DAV:}prop/{DAV:}resourcetype/{DAV:}collection") - is not None - ): - raise Refused("unexpected subfolder") - size = row.findtext("{DAV:}prop/{DAV:}getcontentlength") - if not DUMP.fullmatch(name) or size is None or not size.isdigit(): - raise Refused("unexpected entry in folder; nothing planned") - files[name] = int(size) - return files - - -def select(files, keep_daily, keep_weekly): - keep, groups = set(), {} - for name in files: - match = DUMP.fullmatch(name) - groups.setdefault(match["prefix"], []).append((match["stamp"], name)) - for entries in groups.values(): - entries.sort(reverse=True) - keep.update(name for _, name in entries[: max(1, keep_daily)]) - weeks = [] - for stamp, name in entries: - week = datetime.strptime(stamp, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ").isocalendar()[:2] - if week not in weeks: - weeks.append(week) - if len(weeks) <= keep_weekly: - keep.add(name) - return sorted(keep), sorted(set(files) - keep) - - -def summary(files, keep, delete): - groups = {} - for name in files: - prefix = DUMP.fullmatch(name)["prefix"] - g = groups.setdefault( - prefix, - { - "files": 0, - "bytes": 0, - "keep": 0, - "delete": 0, - "delete_bytes": 0, - "newest": None, - "newest_bytes": 0, - "oldest": None, - }, - ) - g["files"] += 1 - g["bytes"] += files[name] - g["keep" if name in keep else "delete"] += 1 - if name in delete: - g["delete_bytes"] += files[name] - stamp = DUMP.fullmatch(name)["stamp"] - if g["newest"] is None or stamp > g["newest"]: - g["newest"], g["newest_bytes"] = stamp, files[name] - if g["oldest"] is None or stamp < g["oldest"]: - g["oldest"] = stamp - return groups - - -def gib(n): - return f"{n / 1024**3:.1f} GiB" - - -def plan(args, client, secret): - files = listing(client, auth(secret), args.folder) - keep, delete = select(files, args.keep_daily, args.keep_weekly) - record = { - "schema": "netkingdom.storage-share-dump-prune-plan.v1", - "folder": args.folder, - "created_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), - "keep_daily": args.keep_daily, - "keep_weekly": args.keep_weekly, - "keep": {n: files[n] for n in keep}, - "delete": {n: files[n] for n in delete}, - } - raw = (json.dumps(record, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode() - fd = os.open( - Path(args.plan).expanduser(), - os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, - ) - with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as out: - out.write(raw) - for prefix, g in sorted(summary(files, set(keep), set(delete)).items()): - print( - f"{prefix}: {g['files']} files, {gib(g['bytes'])}, {g['oldest']} .. {g['newest']} " - f"(newest {g['newest_bytes'] / 1024**2:.0f} MiB); keep {g['keep']}, delete {g['delete']} " - f"freeing {gib(g['delete_bytes'])}" - ) - print( - f"total: keep {len(keep)}, delete {len(delete)} freeing {gib(sum(record['delete'].values()))}" - ) - print(f"plan sha256: {hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()}") - return 0 - - -def delete(args, client, secret): - raw = Path(args.plan).expanduser().read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() != args.confirm: - raise Refused("plan sha256 does not match --confirm") - record = json.loads(raw) - if ( - record.get("schema") != "netkingdom.storage-share-dump-prune-plan.v1" - or not record["keep"] - ): - raise Refused("not a prune plan, or it keeps nothing") - headers = auth(secret) - files = listing(client, headers, record["folder"]) - if any(files.get(n) != size for n, size in record["delete"].items()): - raise Refused("a planned file changed or vanished; make a new plan") - if any(n not in files for n in record["keep"]): - raise Refused("a kept file is missing; make a new plan") - base = folder_url(record["folder"]) - deleted, freed = [], 0 - for name in sorted(record["delete"]): - url = base + urllib.parse.quote(name) - with client.open( - urllib.request.Request(url, method="DELETE", headers=headers), timeout=60 - ) as response: - if response.status not in (200, 204): - raise Refused("delete refused") - try: - client.open( - urllib.request.Request(url, method="HEAD", headers=headers), timeout=30 - ) - raise Refused("file still present after delete") - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - if error.code != 404: - raise Refused("unexpected status after delete") from None - deleted.append(name) - freed += record["delete"][name] - remaining = listing(client, headers, record["folder"]) - receipt = { - "schema": "netkingdom.storage-share-dump-prune.v1", - "folder": record["folder"], - "plan_sha256": args.confirm, - "finished_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), - "deleted": len(deleted), - "bytes_freed": freed, - "kept_all_present": all(n in remaining for n in record["keep"]), - "remaining_files": len(remaining), - "credential_recorded": False, - } - fd = os.open( - Path(args.receipt).expanduser(), - os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, - 0o600, - ) - with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as out: - out.write(json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n") - print( - f"deleted {len(deleted)} files, freed {gib(freed)}; kept files present: {receipt['kept_all_present']}" - ) - return 0 if receipt["kept_all_present"] else 1 - - -def main(argv=None, client=None, secret=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True) - p = sub.add_parser("plan") - p.add_argument("--folder", required=True) - p.add_argument("--plan", required=True) - p.add_argument("--keep-daily", type=int, default=7) - p.add_argument("--keep-weekly", type=int, default=4) - d = sub.add_parser("delete") - d.add_argument("--plan", required=True) - d.add_argument("--confirm", required=True) - d.add_argument("--receipt", required=True) - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - if args.command == "plan": - folder_url(args.folder) - if args.keep_daily < 1 or args.keep_weekly < 0: - raise Refused("keep at least one daily dump") - return (plan if args.command == "plan" else delete)( - args, client or opener(), secret or prompt() - ) - except Refused as error: - print(f"refused: {error}", file=sys.stderr) - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - print(f"refused: provider answered HTTP {error.code}", file=sys.stderr) - except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, ET.ParseError): - print("refused: provider or local I/O failure", file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3e1db5b..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,176 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Build a secret-free offline recovery kit; optionally publish exact new files. - -Publication creates only three fixed versioned objects beside identity backups, -never changes shares, credentials, existing files, retention or runtime jobs. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sys -import urllib.error -import urllib.request -import zipfile - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('offline', HERE / 'retrieve-identity-offline.py') -offline = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(offline) -offsite = offline.offsite -FILES = [ - 'docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md', - 'docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md', - 'docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/actual-offsite.json', - 'docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/image-observation.json', - 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py', - 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-offsite.py', - 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py', - 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-bundle.py', - 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py', - 'tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json', - 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh', - 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py', - 'keys/age.pub', -] - - -def build(): - content = {name: (ROOT / name).read_bytes() for name in FILES} - if any(b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-1' in value for name, value in content.items() - if not name.endswith(('.py', '.sh', '.md'))): - raise offsite.Refused() - sums = ''.join(hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest() + ' ' + name + '\n' - for name, value in content.items()).encode() - output = io.BytesIO() - with zipfile.ZipFile(output, 'w', compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as archive: - for name, value in {**content, 'SHA256SUMS': sums}.items(): - entry = zipfile.ZipInfo(name, date_time=(2026, 10, 16, 0, 0, 0)) - entry.external_attr = 0o100600 << 16 - entry.compress_type = zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED - archive.writestr(entry, value) - kit = output.getvalue() - version = hashlib.sha256(kit).hexdigest() - stem = 'net-kingdom-recovery-' + version[:16] - return { - stem + '-START-HERE.md': content['docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md'], - stem + '.zip': kit, - stem + '.zip.sha256': (version + ' ' + stem + '.zip\n').encode(), - } - - -def publish(files, headers, client=None): - client = client or offsite.opener() - result = [] - for name, raw in files.items(): - url = offline.ACCOUNT_BASE + name - digest = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() - # A retry may accept an identical object after exact readback, but must - # never overwrite a conflicting object or retry an unknown PUT outcome. - present = False - try: - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, method='HEAD', headers=headers), timeout=30) as response: - version = offsite.etag(response, url, len(raw)) - present = True - except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: - if error.code != 404: - raise - if not present: - h = dict(headers, **{'If-None-Match': '*', 'Content-Length': str(len(raw)), - 'Content-Type': 'application/zip' if name.endswith('.zip') else 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'}) - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, data=raw, method='PUT', headers=h), timeout=60) as response: - if response.status != 201 or response.url != url: - raise offsite.Refused() - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, method='HEAD', headers=headers), timeout=30) as response: - version = offsite.etag(response, url, len(raw)) - h = dict(headers, **{'If-Match': version}) - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, headers=h), timeout=60) as response: - if offsite.etag(response, url, len(raw)) != version: - raise offsite.Refused() - downloaded = response.read(len(raw) + 1) - if downloaded != raw: - raise offsite.Refused() - result.append({'name': name, 'bytes': len(raw), 'sha256': digest, - 'etag': version, 'readback_verified': True}) - return result - - -def main(): - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - p.add_argument('--output-dir', required=True) - p.add_argument('--publish', action='store_true') - p.add_argument('--auth-source', choices=('prompt', 'attended-openbao'), default='prompt') - p.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - p.add_argument('--offline-transfer-receipt', help='After prompted publication, retrieve the known recovered generation using the same independently held access') - a = p.parse_args() - os.umask(0o077) - fd = os.open(a.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - r = {'schema': 'netkingdom.recovery-kit.v1', 'status': 'failed', - 'secret_values_exported': False, 'new_grants_created': False} - stage = 'option_validation' - try: - if a.offline_transfer_receipt and (not a.publish or a.auth_source != 'prompt'): - raise offsite.Refused() - stage = 'build_kit' - files = build() - stage = 'write_local_kit' - directory = Path(a.output_dir) - directory.mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=False) - for name, raw in files.items(): - (directory / name).write_bytes(raw) - r.update(status='built', files=[{'name': n, 'bytes': len(v), 'sha256': hashlib.sha256(v).hexdigest()} - for n, v in files.items()]) - if a.publish: - if a.auth_source == 'prompt': - stage = 'private_provider_prompt' - secret = offline.private_prompt('Independently held Storage Share Backup app password: ') - else: - stage = 'attended_owner_custody' - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('inventory', HERE / 'inventory-storage-share.py') - owner = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - spec.loader.exec_module(owner) - _, credentials = owner.caller_credentials() - secret = credentials['BACKUP_PASSWORD'] - if not secret or any(c in secret for c in '\r\n\x00'): - raise offsite.Refused() - try: - headers = {'Authorization': 'Basic ' + base64.b64encode(('Backup:' + secret).encode()).decode(), - 'Accept-Encoding': 'identity'} - stage = 'provider_publication' - r.update(status='published_readback_verified', files=publish(files, headers), - folder='Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity', - provider='Storage Share', credential_source=a.auth_source) - if a.offline_transfer_receipt: - stage = 'offline_provider_download' - transfer_fd = os.open(a.offline_transfer_receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - transfer = {'status': 'failed', 'error': 'offline_retrieval_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed'} - try: - record = json.loads((ROOT / FILES[2]).read_text()) - transfer = offline.retrieve(record, secret, 'account') - finally: - with os.fdopen(transfer_fd, 'w') as out: - json.dump(transfer, out, indent=2) - out.write('\n') - r['offline_retrieval_verified'] = transfer['status'] == 'readback_verified' - finally: - secret = None - r['finished_at'] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as error: - r.update(status='failed', error='kit_operation_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed', - failed_stage=stage, **offline.failure_metadata(error)) - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as output: - json.dump(r, output, indent=2) - output.write('\n') - # Silent: safe to use in the existing captured attended-owner conduit. - return int(r['status'] == 'failed') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py deleted file mode 100644 index a617323..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity-offline.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Download one reviewed ciphertext using privately entered provider access. - -No OpenBao, SSO, Kubernetes, credential discovery, provider writes or age key. -Run by the operator in their own terminal, never through a recorded agent PTY. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime, timezone -import getpass -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import shutil -import signal -import sys -import tempfile -import urllib.request -import urllib.error -import warnings - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('offsite', HERE / 'identity-offsite.py') -offsite = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(offsite) -ACCOUNT_BASE = offsite.HOST + '/remote.php/dav/files/Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/' - - -def private_prompt(label): - # getpass opens the terminal with os.open, which does not require seeking. - # Reject redirected input and turn its echoing fallback warning into an - # exception before it can read a credential without echo suppression. - if not sys.stdin.isatty() or not sys.stderr.isatty(): - raise offsite.Refused() - with warnings.catch_warnings(): - warnings.simplefilter('error', getpass.GetPassWarning) - return getpass.getpass(label) - - -def failure_metadata(error): - # No exception messages, response bodies, URLs or headers enter receipts. - if isinstance(error, urllib.error.HTTPError): - return {'failure_kind': 'provider_http_error', 'http_status': int(error.code)} - if isinstance(error, urllib.error.URLError): - return {'failure_kind': 'provider_transport_error'} - if isinstance(error, getpass.GetPassWarning): - return {'failure_kind': 'terminal_echo_suppression_unavailable'} - if isinstance(error, offsite.Refused): - return {'failure_kind': 'scope_or_integrity_refusal'} - return {'failure_kind': 'local_operation_failed'} - - -def validate(record): - if (record.get('schema') != 'netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1' - or record.get('status') != 'readback_verified' - or record.get('provider') != 'Storage Share' - or record.get('folder') != 'Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity' - or not offsite.NAME.fullmatch(record.get('artifact', '')) - or not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}', record.get('ciphertext_sha256', '')) - or type(record.get('ciphertext_bytes')) is not int - or not 0 < record['ciphertext_bytes'] <= offsite.LIMIT - or not re.fullmatch(r'"[^"\x00-\x20]{1,180}"', record.get('etag', ''))): - raise offsite.Refused() - - -def retrieve(record, secret, mode, client=None): - validate(record) - if mode not in {'account', 'folder-share'} or not secret or any(c in secret for c in '\r\n\x00'): - raise offsite.Refused() - auth = offsite.headers(secret) if mode == 'folder-share' else { - 'Authorization': 'Basic ' + base64.b64encode(('Backup:' + secret).encode()).decode(), - 'Accept-Encoding': 'identity'} - url = (offsite.BASE if mode == 'folder-share' else ACCOUNT_BASE) + record['artifact'] - client = client or offsite.opener() - directory = None - complete = False - try: - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, method='HEAD', headers=auth), timeout=30) as response: - if offsite.etag(response, url, record['ciphertext_bytes']) != record['etag']: - raise offsite.Refused() - directory = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='nk49-identity-fetched-', dir='/tmp')) - target = directory / record['artifact'] - auth['If-Match'] = record['etag'] - count = 0 - digest = hashlib.sha256() - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, headers=auth), timeout=180) as response: - if offsite.etag(response, url, record['ciphertext_bytes']) != record['etag']: - raise offsite.Refused() - fd = os.open(target, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as output: - while block := response.read(1024 * 1024): - count += len(block) - if count > record['ciphertext_bytes']: - raise offsite.Refused() - digest.update(block) - output.write(block) - output.flush() - os.fsync(output.fileno()) - if count != record['ciphertext_bytes'] or digest.hexdigest() != record['ciphertext_sha256']: - raise offsite.Refused() - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url, method='HEAD', headers=auth), timeout=30) as response: - if offsite.etag(response, url, record['ciphertext_bytes']) != record['etag']: - raise offsite.Refused() - complete = True - # Closed allowlist: never copy arbitrary source-receipt fields to output. - result = {k: record[k] for k in ('schema', 'provider', 'folder', 'artifact', - 'ciphertext_bytes', 'ciphertext_sha256', 'etag')} - result.update(status='readback_verified', fetched_path=str(target), - independent_owner_retrieval_verified=True, - credential_source='independently_held_provider_access', - provider_auth_mode=mode, openbao_contacted=False, sso_contacted=False, - provider_writes_performed=False, age_private_key_used=False, - secret_values_exported=False, object_unchanged_during_transfer=True, - downloaded_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()) - return result - finally: - if directory is not None and not complete: - shutil.rmtree(directory) - - -def interrupted(signum, frame): - raise InterruptedError() - - -def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--source-receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--auth', choices=('account', 'folder-share'), default='account') - args = parser.parse_args() - os.umask(0o077) - fd = os.open(args.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - result = {'status': 'failed', 'error': 'offline_retrieval_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed'} - stage = 'source_receipt_validation' - try: - record = json.loads(Path(args.source_receipt).read_text()) - validate(record) - # getpass must never fall back to echoed stdin (e.g. a captured agent tool). - stage = 'private_provider_prompt' - secret = private_prompt('Storage Share Backup app password or exact folder-share token: ') - try: - stage = 'provider_download' - result = retrieve(record, secret, args.auth) - finally: - secret = None - except (Exception, KeyboardInterrupt) as error: - result.update(failed_stage=stage, **failure_metadata(error)) - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as output: - json.dump(result, output, indent=2) - output.write('\n') - ok = result['status'] == 'readback_verified' - print('OK: ciphertext retrieved without OpenBao or SSO; ETag, size and SHA256 verified.' if ok - else 'ERROR: retrieval refused; private diagnostics suppressed. Use a new receipt path to retry.') - return 0 if ok else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGINT, signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGHUP): - signal.signal(sig, interrupted) - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py deleted file mode 100644 index ed386d9..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/retrieve-identity.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Silent attended owner retrieval of an existing identity ciphertext. - -Uses Backup-account recovery custody only in memory; no private age key, upload, -share, grant, deletion or production restore operation. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -from datetime import datetime,timezone -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import re -import tempfile -import urllib.request - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,HERE/(name+'.py')) - m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m - - -inventory=load('inventory-storage-share');offsite=load('identity-offsite') - - -def retrieve(record,out): - if (record.get('schema')!='netkingdom.identity-offsite.v1' or record.get('status')!='readback_verified' - or not offsite.NAME.fullmatch(record.get('artifact','')) or not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}',record.get('ciphertext_sha256','')) - or not 0record['ciphertext_bytes']:raise offsite.Refused() - digest.update(block);output.write(block) - if count!=record['ciphertext_bytes'] or digest.hexdigest()!=record['ciphertext_sha256']:raise offsite.Refused() - with client.open(urllib.request.Request(url,method='HEAD',headers=h),timeout=30) as response: - if offsite.etag(response,url,record['ciphertext_bytes'])!=version:raise offsite.Refused() - out.update(record);out.update(status='readback_verified',fetched_path=str(target), - independent_owner_retrieval_verified=True,caller_entity_id=identity.get('entity_id'), - age_private_key_used=False,secret_values_exported=False,downloaded_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()) - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--source-receipt',required=True);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();os.umask(0o077);fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'status':'failed','source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - try:retrieve(json.loads(Path(a.source_receipt).read_text()),r) - except Exception:r.update(status='failed',error='contained_owner_retrieval_failed') - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - return int(r['status']=='failed') - - -if __name__=='__main__':raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-authelia.sh b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-authelia.sh deleted file mode 100755 index 9f31f21..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-authelia.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Owner-run existing-user check. No private key/password belongs in arguments. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -ROOT="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" -cd -- "$ROOT" -umask 077 -[[ $# == 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'Usage: run-isolated-authelia.sh USER VERIFIED_TRANSFER_RECEIPT'; exit 1; } -[[ "$1" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,128}$ ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: invalid username.'; exit 1; } -[[ -f "$2" && ! -L "$2" ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: provide the existing verified transfer receipt.'; exit 1; } -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 && -t 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: run in your own interactive terminal.'; exit 1; } -for tool in python3 age age-keygen openssl docker; do - command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || { printf 'ERROR: required tool unavailable: %s\n' "$tool"; exit 1; } -done -python3 - <<'PY' -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -p=Path('tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py') -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated',p) -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m) -try: - m.preflight() -except Exception: - raise SystemExit('ERROR: exact local Docker target, pinned images or tmpfs preflight failed; no key requested.') -print('OK: exact bnt-lap001 recovery engine, pinned images and tmpfs available.') -PY -NK49_AUTHELIA_RUN="$(mktemp -d /tmp/nk49-isolated-authelia-XXXXXXXX)" -printf 'Safe evidence directory: %s\n' "$NK49_AUTHELIA_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'This restores LLDAP and Authelia into disposable containers sharing one network-free namespace: no external network, ports or host mounts.' -printf '%s\n' 'Enter the railiance-backup age key, then the existing account password that was valid at backup capture.' -printf '%s\n' 'Checks: original config, storage key, issuer key, KeyCape client verifier, first factor; wrong password and client secret refused. Notifications go to a tmpfs file. No production change.' -bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-authelia.py \ - --user "$1" --transfer-receipt "$2" --receipt "$NK49_AUTHELIA_RUN/recovery.json" -printf 'Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_AUTHELIA_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'Return only the outcome and evidence directory. KeyCape consumer, MFA and audit acceptance remain separate.' diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh deleted file mode 100644 index f9b73d4..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-keycape.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Candidate owner launcher. Review and native fixture proof required before use. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -ROOT="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" -cd -- "$ROOT" -umask 077 -[[ $# == 6 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'Usage: run-isolated-keycape.sh VERIFIED_TRANSFER_RECEIPT ADMISSION ADMISSION_SHA256 TLS_CERT TLS_KEY TRUST'; exit 1; } -[[ "$3" =~ ^[a-f0-9]{64}$ ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: exact reviewed admission digest required.'; exit 1; } -for index in 1 2 4 5 6; do - [[ -f "${!index}" && ! -L "${!index}" ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: provide regular owner-controlled input files.'; exit 1; } -done -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 && -t 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: run in your own interactive terminal.'; exit 1; } -for tool in python3 age age-keygen docker; do - command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || { printf 'ERROR: required tool unavailable: %s\n' "$tool"; exit 1; } -done -python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-isolated-keycape.py \ - --transfer-receipt "$1" --admission "$2" --admission-sha256 "$3" \ - --tls-cert "$4" --tls-key "$5" --trust "$6" -python3 - <<'PY' -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -p=Path('tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py') -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('session',p) -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m) -try: - m.local.preflight() - m.run(['docker','image','inspect',m.adapter.IMAGE]) -except Exception: - raise SystemExit('ERROR: exact local Docker/images/tmpfs preflight failed; no key requested.') -print('OK: fixed local target and cached pinned images available.') -PY -NK49_KC_RUN="$(mktemp -d /tmp/nk49-isolated-keycape-XXXXXXXX)" -printf 'Safe evidence directory: %s\n' "$NK49_KC_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'Isolated original issuer/trust and selected registered service-client checks only.' -printf '%s\n' 'No browser, downstream consumer or retained-factor MFA acceptance is claimed.' -printf '%s\n' 'Enter only the independently held backup age key at the hidden prompt.' -bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --sealed-fd --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py \ - --transfer-receipt "$1" --admission "$2" --admission-sha256 "$3" \ - --tls-cert "$4" --tls-key "$5" --trust "$6" --receipt "$NK49_KC_RUN/recovery.json" -printf 'Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_KC_RUN" diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh deleted file mode 100644 index 9cb05a5..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-lldap.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Owner-run existing-user check. No private key/password belongs in arguments. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -ROOT="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" -cd -- "$ROOT" -umask 077 -[[ $# == 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'Usage: run-isolated-lldap.sh USER VERIFIED_TRANSFER_RECEIPT'; exit 1; } -[[ "$1" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,128}$ ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: invalid username.'; exit 1; } -[[ -f "$2" && ! -L "$2" ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: provide the existing verified transfer receipt.'; exit 1; } -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 && -t 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: run in your own interactive terminal.'; exit 1; } -for tool in python3 age age-keygen openssl docker; do - command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || { printf 'ERROR: required tool unavailable: %s\n' "$tool"; exit 1; } -done -python3 - <<'PY' -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -p=Path('tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py') -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated',p) -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m) -try: - m.preflight() -except Exception: - raise SystemExit('ERROR: exact local Docker target, pinned images or tmpfs preflight failed; no key requested.') -print('OK: exact bnt-lap001 recovery engine, pinned images and tmpfs available.') -PY -NK49_LLDAP_RUN="$(mktemp -d /tmp/nk49-isolated-lldap-XXXXXXXX)" -printf 'Safe evidence directory: %s\n' "$NK49_LLDAP_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'This restores only LLDAP into disposable containers with no external network, ports or host mounts.' -printf '%s\n' 'Enter the railiance-backup age key, then the existing account password that was valid at backup capture.' -printf '%s\n' 'The check rejects wrong passwords and preserves original users, groups and memberships. It changes no production service.' -bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py \ - --user "$1" --transfer-receipt "$2" --receipt "$NK49_LLDAP_RUN/recovery.json" -printf 'Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_LLDAP_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'Return only the outcome and evidence directory. Authelia/KeyCape/MFA/audit acceptance remains separate.' diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh deleted file mode 100755 index 2a66d9b..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Owner-run existing-token MFA check. No key, PIN or code belongs in arguments. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -ROOT="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" -cd -- "$ROOT" -umask 077 -[[ $# == 1 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'Usage: run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh VERIFIED_TRANSFER_RECEIPT'; exit 1; } -[[ -f "$1" && ! -L "$1" ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: provide the existing verified transfer receipt.'; exit 1; } -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 && -t 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: run in your own interactive terminal.'; exit 1; } -for tool in python3 age age-keygen openssl docker; do - command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || { printf 'ERROR: required tool unavailable: %s\n' "$tool"; exit 1; } -done -python3 - <<'PY' -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -p=Path('tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py') -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated',p) -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m) -try: - m.preflight() -except Exception: - raise SystemExit('ERROR: exact local Docker target, pinned images or tmpfs preflight failed; no key requested.') -print('OK: exact bnt-lap001 recovery engine, pinned images and tmpfs available.') -PY -NK49_PI_RUN="$(mktemp -d /tmp/nk49-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-XXXXXXXX)" -printf 'Safe evidence directory: %s\n' "$NK49_PI_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'This restores the privacyIDEA database, its original keys and the LLDAP directory into disposable network-free containers.' -printf '%s\n' 'Prompts, in order: the backup age key (hidden), your login name, then a token PIN+current code as typed at login (hidden).' -printf '%s\n' 'Have your authenticator open first. Checks: wrong key refused, wrong code refused, your code accepted, by user and realm.' -printf '%s\n' 'The restored copy is disposable; production is untouched.' -if bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py \ - --transfer-receipt "$1" --receipt "$NK49_PI_RUN/recovery.json"; then - printf 'Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_PI_RUN" -else - NK49_PI_EXIT=$? - printf 'Check stopped or needs review. Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_PI_RUN" - exit "$NK49_PI_EXIT" -fi -printf '%s\n' 'Return only the outcome and evidence directory. The KeyCape consumer run remains separate.' diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh deleted file mode 100644 index 17353f7..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-privacyidea.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Owner-run native audit/token-material checks. Never pass a private key in argv. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -ROOT="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" -cd -- "$ROOT" -umask 077 -[[ $# == 1 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'Usage: run-isolated-privacyidea.sh VERIFIED_TRANSFER_RECEIPT'; exit 1; } -[[ -f "$1" && ! -L "$1" ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: provide the existing verified transfer receipt.'; exit 1; } -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 && -t 2 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: run in your own interactive terminal.'; exit 1; } -for tool in python3 age age-keygen openssl docker; do - command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || { printf 'ERROR: required tool unavailable: %s\n' "$tool"; exit 1; } -done -python3 - <<'PY' -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path -p=Path('tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py') -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('isolated',p) -m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m) -try: - m.preflight() -except Exception: - raise SystemExit('ERROR: exact local Docker target, pinned images or tmpfs preflight failed; no key requested.') -print('OK: exact bnt-lap001 recovery engine, pinned images and tmpfs available.') -PY -NK49_PI_RUN="$(mktemp -d /tmp/nk49-isolated-privacyidea-XXXXXXXX)" -printf 'Safe evidence directory: %s\n' "$NK49_PI_RUN" -printf '%s\n' 'This restores the linked database and original keys only into disposable network-isolated containers.' -printf '%s\n' 'It decrypts retained token material internally, checks every stored audit row, and creates one new isolated audit entry.' -printf '%s\n' 'No MFA code is consumed. Invalid or unsigned history is reported, not repaired. Enter only the backup age key at the hidden prompt.' -if bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py \ - --transfer-receipt "$1" --receipt "$NK49_PI_RUN/recovery.json"; then - printf 'Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_PI_RUN" -else - NK49_PI_EXIT=$? - printf 'Check stopped or needs review. Safe receipt: %s/recovery.json\n' "$NK49_PI_RUN" - exit "$NK49_PI_EXIT" -fi -printf '%s\n' 'Return only the outcome and evidence directory. Existing-token MFA, Authelia and KeyCape remain separate.' diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-offline-recovery.sh b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-offline-recovery.sh deleted file mode 100644 index 8e4d82a..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-offline-recovery.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Run in the owner's own terminal. Provider password and age key are hidden inputs. -set +x -set -euo pipefail -ROOT="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" -cd -- "$ROOT" -umask 077 -[[ -t 0 && -t 1 ]] || { printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: run in your own interactive terminal.'; exit 1; } -for tool in python3 age age-keygen openssl docker; do - command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || { printf 'ERROR: required tool unavailable: %s\n' "$tool"; exit 1; } -done -docker image inspect 'postgres@sha256:ff23cdce56cac62ada6f66013e1a50864c0abbe79d132d40b6e05bd80f378a70' >/dev/null 2>&1 || { - printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: stage the pinned PostgreSQL image before this drill.'; exit 1; -} -NK49_HANDOFF_DIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/nk49-offline-handoff-XXXXXXXX)" -printf 'Recovery evidence directory: %s\n' "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR" -printf '%s\n' 'This publishes three new versioned guide/kit/checksum files beside the backups, then downloads the protected recovered generation.' -printf '%s\n' 'Enter the independently held Backup account app password at the next hidden prompt. No OpenBao or SSO login is used.' -python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/recovery-kit.py \ - --output-dir "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR/kit" --publish \ - --receipt "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR/publication.json" \ - --offline-transfer-receipt "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR/transfer.json" || { - printf '%s\n' 'ERROR: publication/retrieval stopped. Inspect the safe receipts; do not paste credentials into chat.'; exit 1; - } -printf '%s\n' 'Guide publication and outage-path retrieval passed. Next enter the independently held railiance-backup age key.' -bash sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh \ - --expected-recipient age1zvryunvjhvpkmasskauga2heeg0ztnte9ymgppvjge36ekumk50syr3tsz \ - --prompt -- \ - python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity.py \ - --transfer-receipt "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR/transfer.json" \ - --receipt "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR/recovery.json" -printf 'OK: private-provider retrieval and archive recovery passed. Safe receipts: %s\n' "$NK49_HANDOFF_DIR" -printf '%s\n' 'Service authentication remains separate acceptance. Return only the evidence directory path and outcome, never credentials.' diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py deleted file mode 100644 index e7b3cfb..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-bundle.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,139 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Isolated ciphertext recovery check; no cluster, credentials or values emitted. - -This verifies the handoff transport and exact requested file coverage. Current -service validity, independent source custody and native consumer recovery need -separate owner evidence; this tool cannot infer them from a decrypted archive. -""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath -import re -import signal -import subprocess -import sys -import tarfile -import tempfile -from datetime import datetime, timezone - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('private_age_recovery', ROOT / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-private.py') -custody = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(custody) -LIMIT = 64 * 1024 * 1024 -ALLOWED = {f'{c}/secrets.env' for c in ('privacyidea', 'postgres', 'lldap', 'authelia', 'keycape', 'breakglass')} | { - 'privacyidea/pi.enc', 'privacyidea/private.pem', 'privacyidea/public.pem', - 'keycape/key.pem', 'authelia/oidc_private_key.pem', 'openbao/init.json'} - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def recover(ciphertext, keyfd, required, work): - # Exclude ambient age keys/plugins and unrelated credential environments. - env = {'PATH': os.environ.get('PATH', os.defpath), 'HOME': str(work), 'XDG_CONFIG_HOME': str(work)} - result = subprocess.run(['age', '-d', '-i', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], input=ciphertext, - stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, pass_fds=(keyfd,), - timeout=60, env=env, cwd=work) - if result.returncode or not result.stdout or len(result.stdout) > LIMIT: - raise Refused() - restored = set(); names = set(); total = 0 - with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(result.stdout), mode='r:') as archive: - for index, member in enumerate(archive): - if index >= 128 or member.name in names: - raise Refused() - names.add(member.name) - path = PurePosixPath(member.name) - if (path.is_absolute() or '..' in path.parts or '.' in path.parts - or not path.parts or path.parts[0] != 'secrets'): - raise Refused() - if member.isdir(): - if len(path.parts) > 2 or (len(path.parts) == 2 and path.parts[1] not in {p.split('/')[0] for p in ALLOWED}): - raise Refused() - continue - relative = '/'.join(path.parts[1:]) - if not member.isfile() or relative not in ALLOWED or not 0 <= member.size <= 16 * 1024 * 1024: - raise Refused() - total += member.size - if total > LIMIT or member.size == 0: - raise Refused() - content = archive.extractfile(member).read() - if len(content) != member.size or b'AGE-SECRET-KEY-' in content: - raise Refused() - target = work / 'restored' / relative - target.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) - fd = os.open(target, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as dest: - dest.write(content); dest.flush(); os.fsync(dest.fileno()) - if target.read_bytes() != content: - raise Refused() - restored.add(relative) - if not required.issubset(restored): - raise Refused() - return sorted(restored) - - -def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--bundle', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--bundle-sha256', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--required-file', action='append', required=True) - parser.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - args = parser.parse_args() - if not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{64}', args.bundle_sha256): raise Refused() - required = set(args.required_file) - if not required or required - ALLOWED or len(required) != len(args.required_file): raise Refused() - path = Path(args.bundle).absolute() - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (path, *path.parents)): raise Refused() - with path.open('rb') as file: - data = file.read(LIMIT + 1) - if len(data) > LIMIT or hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest() != args.bundle_sha256: raise Refused() - recipient = custody.public_recipient() - keyfd = custody.private_key_fd() - try: - derived = subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-y', f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'], - pass_fds=(keyfd,), stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if derived.returncode or derived.stdout.strip() != recipient.encode(): raise Refused() - # Check the negative path with a disposable unrelated key. It never - # replaces the registered key, leaves temporary custody, or contacts IAM. - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='netkingdom-recovery-', dir='/tmp') as temporary: - work = Path(temporary) - disposable = work / 'wrong.key' - created = subprocess.run(['age-keygen', '-o', str(disposable)], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10) - if created.returncode: raise Refused() - wrong = subprocess.run(['age', '-d', '-i', str(disposable)], input=data, - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60, - env={'PATH': os.environ.get('PATH', os.defpath), 'HOME': temporary, - 'XDG_CONFIG_HOME': temporary}, cwd=temporary) - if wrong.returncode == 0: raise Refused() - restored = recover(data, keyfd, required, work) - if work.exists(): raise Refused() - finally: - os.close(keyfd) - receipt = {'schema': 'netkingdom.bootstrap-recovery-transport.v1', - 'observed_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), 'bundle_sha256': args.bundle_sha256, - 'registered_recipient_match': True, 'wrong_key_refused': True, - 'required_files': sorted(required), 'restored_files': restored, - 'isolated_restore_readback_passed': True, 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified': True, - 'secret_values_exported': False, 'cluster_contacted': False, - 'independent_custody_proven': False, 'current_service_validity_proven': False, - 'native_consumer_recovery_proven': False} - # Publish only the closed, safe receipt shape; preserve existing receipts. - fd = os.open(args.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as dest: - json.dump(receipt, dest, indent=2); dest.write('\n') - print('Ciphertext transport/isolated restore checks passed. Independent custody and current service recovery remain separate owner evidence.') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - try: - for sig in (signal.SIGHUP, signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGINT): signal.signal(sig, custody.interrupted) - main() - except (Refused, custody.Refused, OSError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError, tarfile.TarError, subprocess.SubprocessError): - print('ERROR: recovery transport check refused or failed; no acceptance receipt. Private diagnostics suppressed.', file=sys.stderr) - raise SystemExit(1) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity-delivery.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity-delivery.py deleted file mode 100644 index e4664f4..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-identity-delivery.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended native reader/ESO verification; only closed booleans leave custody.""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import sys - -HERE=Path(__file__).resolve().parent - - -def load(name): - spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name,HERE/(name+'.py')) - m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m);return m - - -setup=load('identity-credential-setup');runtime=load('identity-runtime') -from state_hub_preflight_lane import bao,data,capabilities,revoke - - -def verify(action,expected,receipt,kubeconfig): - receipt['phase']='validate_approved_contract' - ccr,lane=setup.contract(action,expected) - receipt['phase']='verify_attended_identity' - ident=data(bao(['token','lookup','-format=json']))['data'] - if 'platform-admin' not in ident.get('policies',[]) or 'root' in ident.get('policies',[]) or not ident.get('path','').startswith('auth/netkingdom/'):raise setup.Refused() - capture=runtime.capture;capture.KUBE=['kubectl','--kubeconfig',kubeconfig] - receipt['phase']='verify_cluster_identity' - if capture.get(None,'namespace','kube-system')['metadata']['uid']!=capture.prepare.CLUSTER_UID:raise setup.Refused() - def login(sa,audience,negative=False,namespace='sso'): - jwt=capture.command(['-n',namespace,'create','token',sa,'--audience='+audience,'--duration=10m']).decode().strip() - result=bao(['write','-format=json','auth/kubernetes/login','-'],payload={'role':lane['role'],'jwt':jwt},allow_failure=negative) - if negative: - if result.returncode==0: - revoke(data(result)['auth']['client_token']);raise setup.Refused() - if b'403' not in result.stderr and b'400' not in result.stderr:raise setup.Refused() - return None - return data(result)['auth'] - receipt['phase']='native_reader_login' - auth=login(lane['service_account'],'openbao');token=auth['client_token'] - receipt['native_reader_metadata']={k:auth.get(k) for k in ['token_policies','identity_policies','policies','lease_duration']} - try: - receipt['phase']='effective_reader_policy_ttl' - if (auth['token_policies']!=[lane['policy']] or auth.get('identity_policies') - or auth.get('policies',auth['token_policies'])!=[lane['policy']] or not 0bundle.LIMIT):raise bundle.Refused() - path=Path(transfer['fetched_path']);bundle.private(path,max_bytes=bundle.LIMIT) - with path.open('rb') as source:digest=hashlib.file_digest(source,'sha256').hexdigest() - if path.stat().st_size!=transfer['ciphertext_bytes'] or digest!=transfer['ciphertext_sha256']:raise bundle.Refused() - derived=pg.run(['age-keygen','-y',f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}'],pass_fds=(keyfd,)).strip() - if derived!=bundle.profile()['public_recipient'].encode():raise bundle.Refused() - receipt.update(ciphertext_sha256=digest,artifact=transfer['artifact'],registered_recipient_match=True) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='nk49-identity-restore-',dir='/tmp') as temporary: - work=Path(temporary);env={'PATH':os.environ.get('PATH',os.defpath),'HOME':temporary,'XDG_CONFIG_HOME':temporary} - wrong=work/'wrong.key';pg.run(['age-keygen','-o',str(wrong)],env=env) - negative=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',str(wrong),str(path)],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,env=env,timeout=120) - if negative.returncode==0:raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['wrong_key_refused']=True - plain=work/'archive.tar' - with plain.open('xb') as output: - result=subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i',f'/proc/self/fd/{keyfd}',str(path)],stdout=output, - stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,env=env,pass_fds=(keyfd,),timeout=180) - if result.returncode or plain.stat().st_size>bundle.LIMIT+4*1024*1024:raise bundle.Refused() - restored=work/'restored';restored.mkdir(mode=0o700) - manifest,checks=bundle.restore(plain,restored) - receipt.update(checks=checks,manifest_file_count=len(manifest['files']),all_manifest_hashes_verified=True, - profile_sha256=manifest['profile_sha256']) - container='nk49-identity-db-'+uuid.uuid4().hex - try: - receipt['database_restore']=pg.restore(restored/'databases/privacyidea.dump',container) - finally: - pg.run(['docker','rm','--force','--volumes',container]) - absent=subprocess.run(['docker','container','inspect',container],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=15) - pg.run(['docker','info','--format','{{.ServerVersion}}']) - if absent.returncode==0:raise bundle.Refused() - receipt['container_cleanup_verified']=True - if work.exists():raise bundle.Refused() - receipt.update(temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified=True,status='identity_archive_verified', - full_service_authentication_proven=False,existing_token_decryption_proven=False,audit_signature_continuity_proven=False) - - -def main(): - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('--transfer-receipt',required=True);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True) - a=p.parse_args();os.umask(0o077) - fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) - r={'schema':'netkingdom.identity-recovery.v1','status':'failed','started_at':datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), - 'production_contacted':False,'secret_values_exported':False,'container_cleanup_verified':False, - 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified':False,'source_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - keyfd=None - try: - transfer=json.loads(Path(a.transfer_receipt).read_text());keyfd=custody.private_key_fd() - verify(transfer,keyfd,r) - except Exception:r.update(status='failed',error='identity_recovery_failed_private_diagnostics_suppressed') - finally: - if keyfd is not None:os.close(keyfd) - r['finished_at']=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() - with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(r,out,indent=2);out.write('\n') - if r['status']=='identity_archive_verified': - print('OK: off-host identity bundle decrypted; complete manifest, key pairs, SQLite integrity and PostgreSQL restore passed; disposable data removed. Service authentication remains separate acceptance.') - return 0 - print('ERROR: identity recovery failed; review safe receipt. Private diagnostics suppressed.');return 1 - - -if __name__=='__main__': - for sig in (signal.SIGHUP,signal.SIGTERM,signal.SIGINT):signal.signal(sig,custody.interrupted) - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9bede3b..0000000 --- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Independent verifier for an isolated KeyCape attempt receipt (NK-WP-0049-T33/T18). - -Reads the safe receipt written by run-isolated-keycape.sh, the public transfer -receipt and a checkout of the reviewed source. It imports nothing from the -session code: source hashes are recomputed from the checkout, the ciphertext -binding comes from the transfer receipt, and the receipt itself is scanned for -secret-shaped content before anyone retains or publishes it. A pass means the -receipt is internally complete and value-safe. It is not consumer continuity -(T18), retained-factor MFA (T19) or owner acceptance. -""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import json -import re -import sys -from datetime import datetime -from pathlib import Path - -SCHEMA = 'netkingdom.isolated-keycape-recovery.v1' -PASSED = 'isolated_keycape_native_registration_checked' -SOURCE_FILES = ('isolated-keycape.py', 'isolated-keycape-session.py', 'run-isolated-keycape.sh', - 'isolated-lldap.py', 'identity-bundle.py', 'verify-identity.py', - 'retrieve-identity-offline.py', 'identity-offsite.py') -REQUIRED_TRUE = ('all_manifest_hashes_verified', 'native_service_registration_verified', - 'wrong_unrelated_secret_explicitly_refused', 'denied_scopes_refused', - 'original_config_registry_policy_receipts_equal', - 'original_https_issuer_and_trust_preserved', 'original_public_signing_key_in_live_jwks', - 'temporary_plaintext_cleanup_verified', 'container_cleanup_verified', - 'bounded_cleanup_reaper_started') -REQUIRED_FALSE = ('production_contacted', 'secret_values_exported', 'in_flight_daemon_request_uncertain', - 'downstream_consumer_reconnect_proven', 'human_mfa_proven') -OBLIGATIONS = ('container_cleanup_obligations', 'tmpfs_volume_cleanup_obligations', - 'public_image_probe_cleanup_obligations') -SECRET_SHAPES = (re.compile(r'-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*(PRIVATE KEY|CERTIFICATE)'), - re.compile(r'AGE-SECRET-KEY-1'), - re.compile(r'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.'), - re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9+/]{120,}={0,2}')) -SHA256 = re.compile(r'^[a-f0-9]{64}$') - - -def sha256(path): - return hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - - -def verify(raw, transfer, source_root, *, not_after=None): - """Return a list of findings; empty means the receipt verifies.""" - findings = [] - text = raw.decode('utf-8', errors='replace') - for shape in SECRET_SHAPES: - if shape.search(text): - findings.append('secret-shaped content present; do not retain or publish this receipt') - break - try: - receipt = json.loads(raw) - except ValueError: - return findings + ['receipt is not JSON'] - if not isinstance(receipt, dict): - return findings + ['receipt is not an object'] - if receipt.get('schema') != SCHEMA: - findings.append('schema differs') - if receipt.get('status') != PASSED: - findings.append(f"status is {receipt.get('status')!r}, not {PASSED}") - findings += [f'{k} is not true' for k in REQUIRED_TRUE if receipt.get(k) is not True] - findings += [f'{k} is not false' for k in REQUIRED_FALSE if receipt.get(k) is not False] - for key in OBLIGATIONS: - rows = receipt.get(key, []) - if not isinstance(rows, list) or any(not isinstance(r, dict) or r.get('status') != 'absence_verified' - for r in rows): - findings.append(f'{key} not all absence_verified') - plaintext = receipt.get('plaintext_cleanup_obligation') - if not isinstance(plaintext, dict) or plaintext.get('status') != 'absence_verified': - findings.append('plaintext_cleanup_obligation not absence_verified') - if receipt.get('provision_phase') != 'complete': - findings.append('provision_phase is not complete') - if 'error' in receipt: - findings.append('receipt records an error') - expected_ct = transfer.get('ciphertext_sha256') if isinstance(transfer, dict) else None - if not isinstance(expected_ct, str) or not SHA256.match(expected_ct): - findings.append('transfer receipt lacks ciphertext_sha256') - elif receipt.get('ciphertext_sha256') != expected_ct: - findings.append('ciphertext_sha256 differs from the transfer receipt') - spki = receipt.get('public_signing_spki_sha256') - if not isinstance(spki, str) or not SHA256.match(spki): - findings.append('public_signing_spki_sha256 missing') - recorded = receipt.get('source_files_sha256') - if not isinstance(recorded, dict) or set(recorded) != set(SOURCE_FILES): - findings.append('source_files_sha256 does not cover the reviewed source set') - else: - for name in SOURCE_FILES: - path = source_root / name - if not path.is_file() or sha256(path) != recorded[name]: - findings.append(f'source differs from checkout: {name}') - if receipt.get('session_source_sha256') != recorded.get('isolated-keycape-session.py'): - findings.append('session_source_sha256 differs') - finished = receipt.get('finished_at') - try: - finished_at = datetime.fromisoformat(finished) - except (TypeError, ValueError): - findings.append('finished_at missing or malformed') - else: - if not_after is not None and finished_at > not_after: - findings.append('attempt finished after the admission window') - return findings - - -def main(argv=None): - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - p.add_argument('--receipt', required=True, type=Path) - p.add_argument('--transfer-receipt', required=True, type=Path) - p.add_argument('--source-root', required=True, type=Path, - help='tools/bootstrap-recovery of a checkout at the reviewed commit') - p.add_argument('--not-after', help='admission window end, ISO 8601 with offset') - args = p.parse_args(argv) - not_after = datetime.fromisoformat(args.not_after) if args.not_after else None - if not_after is not None and not_after.tzinfo is None: - p.error('--not-after needs a UTC offset') - findings = verify(args.receipt.read_bytes(), json.loads(args.transfer_receipt.read_text()), - args.source_root, not_after=not_after) - print(json.dumps({'schema': 'netkingdom.keycape-attempt-receipt-verification.v1', - 'receipt_sha256': sha256(args.receipt), - 'verdict': 'verified' if not findings else 'refused', 'findings': findings, - 'claims_not_made': ['consumer continuity (T18)', 'retained-factor MFA (T19)', - 'owner acceptance']}, indent=2)) - return 0 if not findings else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/README.md b/tools/bounded-execution-admission/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6dc73c2..0000000 --- a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -# Bounded Execution Admission validator (NK-WP-0056-T01) - -Offline, deterministic checks for `canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md`. - -```bash -python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py validate [--as-of T] FILE... # BEA-1..BEA-14 -python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval ADMISSION RECORD # BEA-C1..BEA-C7 -python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py digest FILE # plan and admission digests -python3 tools/bounded-execution-admission/generate_examples.py # re-pin and regenerate examples -make bounded-execution-admission-test bounded-execution-admission-check -``` - -A valid document is a well-formed request, not an admission: an admission also needs a carrier -record approved by a person (Approval Engine, or a founder SSH signature). Findings name the rule -and a location, never a value. Needs `jsonschema` and `PyYAML`. - -Examples (`examples/bounded-execution-admission/`) express the NK-WP-0054 bind split as admissions. -`generate_examples.py` pins real files at the current commit; re-run it when those files change. diff --git a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/fixtures/invalid/human-intrinsic-step.yaml b/tools/bounded-execution-admission/fixtures/invalid/human-intrinsic-step.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index f03b4dc..0000000 --- a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/fixtures/invalid/human-intrinsic-step.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,151 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1 -kind: BoundedExecutionAdmission -spec: - id: BEA-2026-0099 - title: Switch LLDAP's configured super-admin to ld-admin (bind-split step 9, root-class) - purpose: Change LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN from admin to ld-admin and restart LLDAP; admin keeps its rights through lldap_admin - membership. Changes who administers the directory, so the founder admits the run. - work_ref: NK-WP-0056-T01 example - risk_class: high - window: - not_before: '2026-11-03T09:00:00Z' - not_after: '2026-11-03T11:00:00Z' - approval: - approvers: - - admin - principal_type: HUMAN - assurance: aal2 - carriers: - - approval-engine - - founder-ssh-signature - executor: - identity: service:nk-bind-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - runtime: k8s sso/serviceaccount nk-bind-executor (planned, NK-WP-0056-T03) - scope_ceiling: - - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - environments: - - PRODUCTION - - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/lldap - environments: - - PRODUCTION - blast_radius: - unit: consumer - consumers: - - lldap - max_concurrent: 1 - trust_requires: - - runtime_secret_trust - - runtime_identity_trust - plan: - source: - repo: net-kingdom - commit: 15c9cdbef881 - files: - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - - path: sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py - sha256: c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c - steps: - - id: switch-user-dn - operation: lldap.config.set-ldap-user-dn - target: k8s:sso/secret/lldap-secrets#LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - ld-admin-administers - revert: switch-back - - id: restart-lldap - operation: k8s.rollout-restart - target: k8s:sso/deployment/lldap - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/lldap - checks_after: - - synthetic-journey - revert: restart-lldap-again - - id: change-admin-password - operation: lldap.user.set-password - target: lldap:admin - consumer: lldap - class: human-intrinsic - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - ld-admin-administers - revert: switch-back - revert_steps: - - id: switch-back - operation: lldap.config.set-ldap-user-dn - target: k8s:sso/secret/lldap-secrets#LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: ADMINISTER - scope: lldap - checks_after: - - ld-admin-administers - - id: restart-lldap-again - operation: k8s.rollout-restart - target: k8s:sso/deployment/lldap - consumer: lldap - class: root-class - mutates: true - requires: - mode: OPERATE - scope: k8s/sso/deployment/lldap - checks_after: - - synthetic-journey - plan_digest: sha256:189346b479dc9920c296087ec1a182e2425f4b0596d2995a00ec12ffe61ec615 - checks: - - id: ld-admin-administers - description: ld-admin signs in and administers; admin keeps lldap_admin membership - ref: sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py - sha256: 4decc3bbe65120ff6c4cef5613b9a41a60168ae64ecd4c1380f61a2fcd37b6b3 - timeout_seconds: 60 - expect: pass - - id: synthetic-journey - description: 'all three binds still serve sign-in: syn-journey reaches aal2' - ref: sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py - sha256: c639054597be7647a3ae88ac7da53490a43b38d9f4f95e24cf4e9f54b18f997c - timeout_seconds: 90 - expect: pass - settle_seconds: 125 - stop_and_revert: - on_check_failure: revert - on_budget_exhausted: revert - on_unknown: stop - on_revert_failure: stop-and-alert - alert: founder via State Hub message; crisis list item for ld-admin - budget: - wall_time_seconds: 900 - attempts: 1 - cost: - compute_cpu_seconds: 60 - egress_bytes: 1000000 - currency: EUR - amount: 0.02 - consumption: - single_use: true - consume_before_first_step: true - receipt: - schema: netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt - emit_to: audit-core - retain: by-hash-no-secret-values - independent_verifier: tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval + receipt source hashes - not_authorized: - - changing admin's own password - - sealing ld-admin's password (human-intrinsic, step 10) - - any service bind change diff --git a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/generate_examples.py b/tools/bounded-execution-admission/generate_examples.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4f80663..0000000 --- a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/generate_examples.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,146 +0,0 @@ -"""Regenerate examples/bounded-execution-admission/ and the human-intrinsic invalid fixture (NK-WP-0056-T01). - -Pins the named files at the current commit and computes plan_digest. Run after changing those files or the schema. -""" -import hashlib, json, pathlib, subprocess, sys, yaml -ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "tools/bounded-execution-admission")) -import validate as V -commit = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout.strip() -def pin(*paths): return [{"path": p, "sha256": hashlib.sha256((ROOT / p).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} for p in paths] -def sha(p): return hashlib.sha256((ROOT / p).read_bytes()).hexdigest() -JOURNEY = "sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py" -LANE = "tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py" -RUNNER = "bounded-executor/executor.py" -PILOT_OPS = "bounded-executor/operations.py" -SPLIT = "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py" -COMMON = { - "approval": {"approvers": ["admin"], "principal_type": "HUMAN", "assurance": "aal2", - "carriers": ["approval-engine", "founder-ssh-signature"]}, - "consumption": {"single_use": True, "consume_before_first_step": True}, - "receipt": {"schema": "netkingdom.playbook-capability-contract/v0.2#execution-attribution-receipt", - "emit_to": "audit-core", "retain": "by-hash-no-secret-values", - "independent_verifier": "tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py check-approval + receipt source hashes"}, -} -EXECUTOR = {"identity": "service:nk-bind-executor", "principal_type": "WORKLOAD", - "runtime": "k8s sso/serviceaccount nk-bind-executor (planned, NK-WP-0056-T03)"} -P = ["PRODUCTION"] -def check(cid, desc, ref, timeout, settle=0): - c = {"id": cid, "description": desc, "ref": ref, "sha256": sha(ref), "timeout_seconds": timeout, "expect": "pass"} - if settle: c["settle_seconds"] = settle - return c -def doc(id_, title, purpose, risk, window, ceiling, radius, files, steps, reverts, checks, policy, budget, not_auth, trust=("runtime_secret_trust", "runtime_identity_trust")): - spec = {"id": id_, "title": title, "purpose": purpose, "work_ref": "NK-WP-0056-T01 example", "risk_class": risk, - "window": window, **{"approval": COMMON["approval"]}, "executor": EXECUTOR, "scope_ceiling": ceiling, - "blast_radius": radius, "trust_requires": list(trust), - "plan": {"source": {"repo": "net-kingdom", "commit": commit, "files": pin(*files)}, "steps": steps, - **({"revert_steps": reverts} if reverts else {})}, - "plan_digest": "", "checks": checks, "stop_and_revert": policy, "budget": budget, - "consumption": COMMON["consumption"], "receipt": COMMON["receipt"], "not_authorized": not_auth} - d = {"apiVersion": "netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-admission/v0.1", "kind": "BoundedExecutionAdmission", "spec": spec} - spec["plan_digest"] = V.plan_digest(d) - return d -def step(id_, op, target, consumer, cls, mutates, mode, scope, checks=None, revert=None, irreversible=None): - s = {"id": id_, "operation": op, "target": target, "consumer": consumer, "class": cls, "mutates": mutates, - "requires": {"mode": mode, "scope": scope}} - if checks: s["checks_after"] = checks - if revert: s["revert"] = revert - if irreversible: s["irreversible"] = True - return s - -KV = "openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia" -rotation = doc( - "BEA-2026-0001", "Rotate the svc-authelia directory bind (bind-split steps 5-8, one consumer)", - "Pilot shape for NK-WP-0056-T06: generate a new bind password into OpenBao, set it in LLDAP, let ESO deliver it, restart Authelia, prove sign-in with the synthetic journey; revert on any failed check.", - "medium", {"not_before": "2026-11-03T09:00:00Z", "not_after": "2026-11-03T11:00:00Z"}, - [{"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": KV, "environments": P}, - {"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "lldap/people/svc-authelia", "environments": P}, - {"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets", "environments": P}, - {"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "k8s/sso/deployment/authelia", "environments": P}], - {"unit": "consumer", "consumers": ["authelia"], "max_concurrent": 1}, - [RUNNER, PILOT_OPS, JOURNEY], - [step("generate", "openbao.kv.write-next-version", "openbao:" + KV[len("openbao/"):], "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", KV, ["kv-advanced"], "restore-kv"), - step("set-directory", "lldap.user.change-own-password-from-kv", "lldap:svc-authelia", "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", "lldap/people/svc-authelia", ["bind-signs-in"], "restore-directory"), - step("deliver", "eso.force-sync", "k8s:sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets", "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", "k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets", ["eso-synced"], "redeliver"), - step("restart", "k8s.rollout-restart", "k8s:sso/deployment/authelia", "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", "k8s/sso/deployment/authelia", ["synthetic-journey"], "restart-again")], - [step("restore-kv", "openbao.kv.write-previous-value-as-next-version", "openbao:" + KV[len("openbao/"):], "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", KV, ["kv-advanced"]), - step("restore-directory", "lldap.user.change-own-password-from-kv", "lldap:svc-authelia", "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", "lldap/people/svc-authelia", ["bind-signs-in"]), - step("redeliver", "eso.force-sync", "k8s:sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets", "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", "k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets", ["eso-synced"]), - step("restart-again", "k8s.rollout-restart", "k8s:sso/deployment/authelia", "authelia", "delegable", True, "OPERATE", "k8s/sso/deployment/authelia", ["synthetic-journey"])], - [check("kv-advanced", "KV svc-authelia has exactly one new version, CAS on the previous one", PILOT_OPS, 30), - check("bind-signs-in", "the new KV value signs in to LLDAP as svc-authelia", PILOT_OPS, 30), - check("eso-synced", "the ExternalSecret is Ready with a refresh after the step started; the executor never reads the Secret", PILOT_OPS, 120), - check("synthetic-journey", "syn-journey signs in through KeyCape, Authelia and privacyIDEA at aal2", PILOT_OPS, 90)], - {"on_check_failure": "revert", "on_budget_exhausted": "revert", "on_unknown": "stop", - "on_revert_failure": "stop-and-alert", "alert": "founder via State Hub message and audit-core"}, - {"wall_time_seconds": 1200, "attempts": 2, "cost": {"compute_cpu_seconds": 120, "egress_bytes": 5000000, "currency": "EUR", "amount": 0.05}}, - ["any bind other than svc-authelia", "any LLDAP group change", "changing LLDAP's configured super-admin", - "reading or changing any human account", "any change outside the sso namespace"]) - -create = doc( - "BEA-2026-0002", "Create the service bind accounts (bind-split step 3, root-class)", - "Create svc-authelia, svc-keycape and svc-privacyidea in LLDAP as read-only binds. Needs lldap_admin: LLDAP has no narrower grant that can create users (SI-X6), so the founder admits this run and the executor runs it.", - "high", {"not_before": "2026-11-03T09:00:00Z", "not_after": "2026-11-03T12:00:00Z"}, - [{"mode": "ADMINISTER", "scope": "lldap", "environments": P}, - {"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds", "environments": P}], - {"unit": "account", "consumers": ["lldap"], "max_concurrent": 1}, - [SPLIT, LANE], - [step("create-accounts", "lldap.user.create-read-only-binds", "lldap:svc-authelia,svc-keycape,svc-privacyidea", "lldap", "root-class", True, "ADMINISTER", "lldap", ["accounts-read-only"], "delete-accounts"), - step("hold-passwords", "openbao.kv.write-cas0", "openbao:platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds", "lldap", "root-class", True, "OPERATE", "openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds", ["accounts-sign-in"], "destroy-kv")], - [step("delete-accounts", "lldap.user.delete-created", "lldap:svc-authelia,svc-keycape,svc-privacyidea", "lldap", "root-class", True, "ADMINISTER", "lldap", ["accounts-read-only"]), - step("destroy-kv", "openbao.kv.destroy-created", "openbao:platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds", "lldap", "root-class", True, "OPERATE", "openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds", ["accounts-sign-in"])], - [check("accounts-read-only", "each account exists in lldap_strict_readonly only and cannot write", SPLIT, 60), - check("accounts-sign-in", "each KV value signs in to LLDAP as its account", LANE, 60)], - {"on_check_failure": "revert", "on_budget_exhausted": "revert", "on_unknown": "stop", - "on_revert_failure": "stop-and-alert", "alert": "founder via State Hub message"}, - {"wall_time_seconds": 900, "attempts": 1, "cost": {"compute_cpu_seconds": 60, "egress_bytes": 1000000, "currency": "EUR", "amount": 0.02}}, - ["switching any consumer to the new accounts", "any human account", "changing LLDAP's configured super-admin"]) - -superadmin = doc( - "BEA-2026-0003", "Switch LLDAP's configured super-admin to ld-admin (bind-split step 9, root-class)", - "Change LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN from admin to ld-admin and restart LLDAP; admin keeps its rights through lldap_admin membership. Changes who administers the directory, so the founder admits the run.", - "high", {"not_before": "2026-11-03T09:00:00Z", "not_after": "2026-11-03T11:00:00Z"}, - [{"mode": "ADMINISTER", "scope": "lldap", "environments": P}, - {"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "k8s/sso/deployment/lldap", "environments": P}], - {"unit": "consumer", "consumers": ["lldap"], "max_concurrent": 1}, - [SPLIT, JOURNEY], - [step("switch-user-dn", "lldap.config.set-ldap-user-dn", "k8s:sso/secret/lldap-secrets#LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN", "lldap", "root-class", True, "ADMINISTER", "lldap", ["ld-admin-administers"], "switch-back"), - step("restart-lldap", "k8s.rollout-restart", "k8s:sso/deployment/lldap", "lldap", "root-class", True, "OPERATE", "k8s/sso/deployment/lldap", ["synthetic-journey"], "restart-lldap-again")], - [step("switch-back", "lldap.config.set-ldap-user-dn", "k8s:sso/secret/lldap-secrets#LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN", "lldap", "root-class", True, "ADMINISTER", "lldap", ["ld-admin-administers"]), - step("restart-lldap-again", "k8s.rollout-restart", "k8s:sso/deployment/lldap", "lldap", "root-class", True, "OPERATE", "k8s/sso/deployment/lldap", ["synthetic-journey"])], - [check("ld-admin-administers", "ld-admin signs in and administers; admin keeps lldap_admin membership", SPLIT, 60), - check("synthetic-journey", "all three binds still serve sign-in: syn-journey reaches aal2", JOURNEY, 90, settle=125)], - {"on_check_failure": "revert", "on_budget_exhausted": "revert", "on_unknown": "stop", - "on_revert_failure": "stop-and-alert", "alert": "founder via State Hub message; crisis list item for ld-admin"}, - {"wall_time_seconds": 900, "attempts": 1, "cost": {"compute_cpu_seconds": 60, "egress_bytes": 1000000, "currency": "EUR", "amount": 0.02}}, - ["changing admin's own password", "sealing ld-admin's password (human-intrinsic, step 10)", "any service bind change"]) - -verify = doc( - "BEA-2026-0004", "Read-only verification of the directory split (bind-split steps 2, 4 and 10 verify)", - "Plan and verify reads that the founder used to do signed in as admin: account inventory, group membership, bind identities of the consumers. No mutation, so nothing to revert.", - "low", {"not_before": "2026-11-03T09:00:00Z", "not_after": "2026-11-04T09:00:00Z"}, - [{"mode": "OBSERVE", "scope": "lldap/people", "environments": P}, - {"mode": "OBSERVE", "scope": "k8s/sso", "environments": P}], - {"unit": "consumer", "consumers": ["lldap", "authelia", "keycape", "privacyidea"], "max_concurrent": 4}, - [SPLIT], - [step("inventory", "lldap.read.users-and-groups", "lldap:people", "lldap", "delegable", False, "OBSERVE", "lldap/people", ["split-shape"]), - step("consumer-binds", "k8s.read.bind-identities", "k8s:sso", "authelia", "delegable", False, "OBSERVE", "k8s/sso", ["split-shape"])], - [], - [check("split-shape", "every consumer binds as its own svc- account; no service binds as admin", SPLIT, 60)], - {"on_check_failure": "stop", "on_budget_exhausted": "stop", "on_unknown": "stop", "on_revert_failure": "stop-and-alert"}, - {"wall_time_seconds": 300, "attempts": 3, "cost": {"compute_cpu_seconds": 30, "egress_bytes": 500000, "currency": "EUR", "amount": 0.01}}, - ["any write to LLDAP, Kubernetes or OpenBao"]) - -out = ROOT / "examples/bounded-execution-admission" -for name, d in [("bind-rotation-svc-authelia", rotation), ("bind-split-create-service-accounts", create), - ("bind-split-switch-super-admin", superadmin), ("bind-split-read-only-verify", verify)]: - (out / f"{name}.yaml").write_text("# NK-WP-0056-T01 example: the bind split (NK-WP-0054) as admissions. Illustrative: the executor\n" - "# (T03) and its operations do not exist yet; files are pinned at the commit named in plan.source.\n" - + yaml.safe_dump(d, sort_keys=False, width=120)) -# Invalid: step 10, the founder's own password, is human-intrinsic. -bad = json.loads(json.dumps(superadmin)); s = bad["spec"]; s["id"] = "BEA-2026-0099" -s["plan"]["steps"].append(step("change-admin-password", "lldap.user.set-password", "lldap:admin", "lldap", "human-intrinsic", True, "ADMINISTER", "lldap", ["ld-admin-administers"], "switch-back")) -s["plan_digest"] = V.plan_digest(bad) -fx = ROOT / "tools/bounded-execution-admission/fixtures"; (fx / "invalid").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) -(fx / "invalid/human-intrinsic-step.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(bad, sort_keys=False, width=120)) -print("commit", commit) diff --git a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/tests/test_validate.py b/tools/bounded-execution-admission/tests/test_validate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 85590fd..0000000 --- a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/tests/test_validate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests for the Bounded Execution Admission validator (NK-WP-0056-T01). Synthetic data only.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import copy -import json -import pathlib -import sys -import unittest - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -TOOL = HERE.parent -ROOT = TOOL.parents[1] -sys.path.insert(0, str(TOOL)) -import validate as V # noqa: E402 - -SCHEMA = json.loads(V.SCHEMA.read_text()) -EXAMPLES = ROOT / "examples/bounded-execution-admission" -ROTATION = V.load(EXAMPLES / "bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml") -SUPERADMIN = V.load(EXAMPLES / "bind-split-switch-super-admin.yaml") -VERIFY = V.load(EXAMPLES / "bind-split-read-only-verify.yaml") - - -def mutate(document, fn, redigest=True): - d = copy.deepcopy(document) - fn(d["spec"]) - if redigest: - d["spec"]["plan_digest"] = V.plan_digest(d) - return d - - -def rules(document): - return {f["rule"] for f in V.evaluate(document, SCHEMA)["findings"]} - - -def record(document, **over): - r = {"apiVersion": V.CARRIER_RECORD, "carrier": "approval-engine", "approval_ref": "apr-synthetic-0001", - "admission_id": document["spec"]["id"], "admission_digest": V.admission_digest(document), - "approver": {"name": "admin", "principal_type": "HUMAN", "assurance": "aal2"}, - "approved_at": "2026-11-03T08:30:00Z", - "consumptions": [{"at": "2026-11-03T09:05:00Z", "by": document["spec"]["executor"]["identity"]}]} - r.update(over) - return r - - -class ExampleTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_all_examples_valid(self): - for path in sorted(EXAMPLES.glob("*.yaml")): - with self.subTest(path=path.name): - report = V.evaluate(V.load(path), SCHEMA) - self.assertTrue(report["valid"], report["findings"]) - - def test_invalid_fixtures_refused(self): - for path in sorted((TOOL / "fixtures/invalid").glob("*.yaml")): - with self.subTest(path=path.name): - self.assertFalse(V.evaluate(V.load(path), SCHEMA)["valid"]) - - def test_examples_pin_current_source(self): - """Pinned hashes are real files of this repository (they drift when the files change).""" - for path in sorted(EXAMPLES.glob("*.yaml")): - for f in V.load(path)["spec"]["plan"]["source"]["files"]: - self.assertTrue((ROOT / f["path"]).is_file(), f["path"]) - - -class RuleTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_bea1_schema(self): - self.assertEqual(rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s.pop("budget"), redigest=False)), {"BEA-1"}) - self.assertEqual(rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["approval"].update(assurance="aal1"))), {"BEA-1"}) - self.assertEqual(rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["consumption"].update(single_use=False))), {"BEA-1"}) - - def test_bea2_plan_digest_binds_the_exact_plan(self): - changed = mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["plan"]["steps"][0].update(operation="something-else"), redigest=False) - self.assertEqual(rules(changed), {"BEA-2"}) - - def test_bea3_window(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-3", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["window"].update(not_after="2026-11-04T10:00:00Z")))) - self.assertIn("BEA-3", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["window"].update(not_after="2026-11-03T08:00:00Z")))) - self.assertIn("BEA-3", rules(mutate(SUPERADMIN, lambda s: s["window"].update(not_after="2026-11-03T14:00:00Z")))) - - def test_window_state(self): - at = V.parse_time - self.assertEqual(V.evaluate(ROTATION, SCHEMA, at("2026-11-03T10:00:00Z"))["window_state"], "open") - self.assertEqual(V.evaluate(ROTATION, SCHEMA, at("2026-11-03T11:00:00Z"))["window_state"], "expired") - self.assertEqual(V.evaluate(ROTATION, SCHEMA, at("2026-11-02T10:00:00Z"))["window_state"], "not-yet") - - def test_bea4_executor(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-4", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["executor"].update(principal_type="HUMAN")))) - self.assertIn("BEA-4", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["executor"].update(identity="admin")))) - self.assertIn("BEA-4", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["executor"].update(principal_type="AGENT")))) - harnessed = mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["executor"].update(principal_type="AGENT", harness_launched=True)) - self.assertEqual(rules(harnessed), set()) - - def test_bea5_ceiling(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-5", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["scope_ceiling"].append( - {"mode": "GOVERN", "scope": "lldap", "environments": ["PRODUCTION"]})))) - # whole-directory ADMINISTER for a delegable step at medium risk - def widen(s): - s["scope_ceiling"][1].update(mode="ADMINISTER", scope="lldap") - for step in s["plan"]["steps"] + s["plan"]["revert_steps"]: - if step["requires"]["scope"].startswith("lldap/"): - step["requires"]["mode"] = "ADMINISTER" - self.assertIn("BEA-5", rules(mutate(ROTATION, widen))) - - def test_bea6_least_privilege(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-6", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["scope_ceiling"].pop(3)))) # restart uncovered - self.assertIn("BEA-6", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["scope_ceiling"].append( - {"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "k8s/sso/deployment/keycape", "environments": ["PRODUCTION"]})))) # unused - - def test_bea7_root_class_needs_high_risk(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-7", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["plan"]["steps"][0].update({"class": "root-class"})))) - - def test_bea8_blast_radius(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-8", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["plan"]["steps"][3].update(consumer="keycape")))) - def two_at_once(s): - s["blast_radius"].update(consumers=["authelia", "keycape"], max_concurrent=2) - self.assertIn("BEA-8", rules(mutate(ROTATION, two_at_once))) - - def test_bea9_checks(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-9", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["plan"]["steps"][3].pop("checks_after")))) - self.assertIn("BEA-9", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["checks"][3].update(sha256="0" * 64)))) - self.assertIn("BEA-9", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["checks"].append(dict(s["checks"][0], id="spare"))))) - - def test_bea10_revert(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-10", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["plan"]["steps"][1].pop("revert")))) - def irreversible(s): - s["plan"]["steps"][1].pop("revert") - s["plan"]["steps"][1]["irreversible"] = True - self.assertIn("BEA-10", rules(mutate(ROTATION, irreversible))) # medium risk - - def test_bea11_stop_policy(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-11", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["stop_and_revert"].update(on_check_failure="stop")))) - self.assertIn("BEA-11", rules(mutate(VERIFY, lambda s: s["stop_and_revert"].update(on_check_failure="revert")))) - - def test_bea12_budget(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-12", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["budget"].update(wall_time_seconds=8000)))) - self.assertIn("BEA-12", rules(mutate(SUPERADMIN, lambda s: s["budget"].update(attempts=2)))) - self.assertIn("BEA-12", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s["budget"].update(wall_time_seconds=100)))) - - def test_bea14_secret_shaped_values(self): - self.assertIn("BEA-14", rules(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s.update(purpose="token hvs.abcdefghijklmnop")))) - - def test_findings_never_echo_values(self): - marker = "hvs.SYNTHETICMARKER12345" - report = V.evaluate(mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s.update(purpose=marker)), SCHEMA) - self.assertNotIn(marker, json.dumps(report)) - - -class ApprovalTests(unittest.TestCase): - def check(self, document, rec): - return V.check_approval(document, rec) - - def test_valid_record_admits_and_is_consumed(self): - report = self.check(ROTATION, record(ROTATION)) - self.assertTrue(report["admitted"], report) - self.assertTrue(report["consumed"]) - self.assertTrue(self.check(ROTATION, record(ROTATION, consumptions=[]))["admitted"]) - - def test_refusals(self): - other = mutate(ROTATION, lambda s: s.update(title="a different request")) - cases = { - "BEA-C1": record(ROTATION, carrier="email"), - "BEA-C2": record(ROTATION, admission_digest=V.admission_digest(other)), - "BEA-C3": record(ROTATION, approver={"name": "tegwick", "principal_type": "HUMAN", "assurance": "aal2"}), - "BEA-C4": record(ROTATION, approver={"name": "admin", "principal_type": "HUMAN", "assurance": "aal1"}), - "BEA-C5": record(ROTATION, approved_at="2026-11-03T12:00:00Z", consumptions=[]), - "BEA-C6": record(ROTATION, consumptions=[{"at": "2026-11-03T09:05:00Z", "by": "service:nk-bind-executor"}, - {"at": "2026-11-03T09:40:00Z", "by": "service:nk-bind-executor"}]), - "BEA-C7": record(ROTATION, consumptions=[{"at": "2026-11-03T11:30:00Z", "by": "service:nk-bind-executor"}]), - } - for rule, rec in cases.items(): - with self.subTest(rule=rule): - report = self.check(ROTATION, rec) - self.assertFalse(report["admitted"]) - self.assertIn(rule, {f["rule"] for f in report["findings"]}) - - def test_consumed_by_someone_else(self): - rec = record(ROTATION, consumptions=[{"at": "2026-11-03T09:05:00Z", "by": "service:other"}]) - self.assertIn("BEA-C7", {f["rule"] for f in self.check(ROTATION, rec)["findings"]}) - - -class CliTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_cli(self): - import contextlib - import io - import tempfile - out = io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out): - self.assertEqual(V.main(["validate", str(EXAMPLES / "bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml")]), 0) - self.assertEqual(V.main(["validate", str(TOOL / "fixtures/invalid/human-intrinsic-step.yaml")]), 1) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: - path = pathlib.Path(tmp) / "record.json" - path.write_text(json.dumps(record(ROTATION))) - self.assertEqual(V.main(["check-approval", str(EXAMPLES / "bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml"), str(path)]), 0) - self.assertEqual(V.main(["digest", str(EXAMPLES / "bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml")]), 0) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() diff --git a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py b/tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 26f0de4..0000000 --- a/tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,323 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Validate NetKingdom Bounded Execution Admissions (standard v0.1, NK-WP-0056-T01). - -Offline and deterministic. Three commands: - - validate [--as-of T] FILE... schema plus rules BEA-1..BEA-14 for each admission - check-approval ADMISSION RECORD rules BEA-C1..BEA-C7: does a carrier record (Approval Engine - approval or founder SSH signature) admit exactly this admission, - and was it consumed at most once, by the executor, in the window - digest FILE print plan_digest and admission_digest (for authoring) - -Findings name rules and locations, never field values. Nothing here contacts a service, reads a -secret or authorizes anything: a valid admission is a well-formed request, not an admission. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import datetime as dt -import hashlib -import json -import pathlib -import re -import sys -from typing import Any - -import jsonschema -import yaml - -ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -SCHEMA = ROOT / "canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json" -SECRET_VALUE = re.compile( - r"(\bhv[sbr]\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}|\bs\.[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}" - r"|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|AGE-SECRET-KEY-1[A-Z0-9]{10,}" - r"|\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\." - r"|://[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s@]{3,}@)" -) -MAX_WINDOW = {"low": dt.timedelta(hours=72), "medium": dt.timedelta(hours=24), "high": dt.timedelta(hours=4)} -MAX_ATTEMPTS = {"low": 3, "medium": 3, "high": 1} -CARRIER_RECORD = "netkingdom.io/bounded-execution-approval/v0.1" - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Loading and digests -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def load(path: pathlib.Path) -> Any: - text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - data = json.loads(text) if path.suffix == ".json" else yaml.safe_load(text) - return json.loads(json.dumps(data, default=str)) # YAML dates become strings, as JSON would carry them - - -def canonical(value: Any) -> bytes: - return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8") - - -def plan_digest(document: dict) -> str: - return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(canonical(document["spec"]["plan"])).hexdigest() - - -def admission_digest(document: dict) -> str: - """What a carrier binds: the whole admission, including plan_digest.""" - return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(canonical(document)).hexdigest() - - -def parse_time(value: str) -> dt.datetime: - return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00")) - - -def strings(value: Any): - if isinstance(value, str): - yield value - elif isinstance(value, dict): - for item in value.values(): - yield from strings(item) - elif isinstance(value, list): - for item in value: - yield from strings(item) - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Rules -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def covers(grant: dict, need: dict) -> bool: - return grant["mode"] == need["mode"] and (need["scope"] == grant["scope"] - or need["scope"].startswith(grant["scope"] + "/")) - - -def evaluate(document: Any, schema: dict, as_of: dt.datetime | None = None) -> dict: - findings: list[dict] = [] - - def fail(rule: str, where: str) -> None: - findings.append({"rule": rule, "where": where}) - - validator = jsonschema.Draft202012Validator(schema, format_checker=jsonschema.FormatChecker()) - schema_errors = sorted(f"{'/'.join(str(p) for p in e.absolute_path) or ''}:{e.validator}" - for e in validator.iter_errors(document)) - if schema_errors: - return {"valid": False, "findings": [{"rule": "BEA-1", "where": e} for e in schema_errors]} - - spec = document["spec"] - risk = spec["risk_class"] - steps = spec["plan"]["steps"] - reverts = spec["plan"].get("revert_steps", []) - every_step = steps + reverts - ceiling = spec["scope_ceiling"] - checks = {c["id"]: c for c in spec["checks"]} - pinned = {f["path"]: f["sha256"] for f in spec["plan"]["source"]["files"]} - - # BEA-2 the admission binds the exact plan. - if spec["plan_digest"] != plan_digest(document): - fail("BEA-2", "spec/plan_digest") - - # BEA-3 a bounded window, tighter for higher risk. - start, end = parse_time(spec["window"]["not_before"]), parse_time(spec["window"]["not_after"]) - window = end - start - if window <= dt.timedelta(0): - fail("BEA-3", "spec/window") - elif window > MAX_WINDOW[risk]: - fail("BEA-3", "spec/window:longer-than-risk-class-allows") - - # BEA-4 the executor is not a person and not an approver; an agent only when harness-launched (SI-14). - executor = spec["executor"] - if executor["principal_type"] == "HUMAN": - fail("BEA-4", "spec/executor/principal_type") - if executor["identity"] in spec["approval"]["approvers"]: - fail("BEA-4", "spec/executor/identity:is-an-approver") - if executor["principal_type"] == "AGENT" and executor.get("harness_launched") is not True: - fail("BEA-4", "spec/executor/harness_launched") - - # BEA-5 the ceiling never holds sovereign or rule-changing authority; whole-service ADMINISTER is - # root-class, high risk and one consumer at a time. - for i, grant in enumerate(ceiling): - where = f"spec/scope_ceiling/{i}" - if grant["mode"] in ("SOVEREIGN", "GOVERN"): - fail("BEA-5", where + ":mode") - if grant["mode"] == "CONSTRUCT" and "PRODUCTION" in grant["environments"]: - fail("BEA-5", where + ":construct-in-production") - if grant["mode"] == "ADMINISTER": - if spec["blast_radius"]["max_concurrent"] != 1: - fail("BEA-5", where + ":administer-needs-max-concurrent-1") - if "/" not in grant["scope"]: - users = [s for s in every_step if covers(grant, s["requires"])] - if risk != "high" or any(s["class"] != "root-class" for s in users): - fail("BEA-5", where + ":whole-service-administer-is-root-class-high-risk") - - # BEA-6 least privilege: every step fits the ceiling, and every ceiling grant is used. - for i, step in enumerate(every_step): - if not any(covers(g, step["requires"]) for g in ceiling): - fail("BEA-6", f"step/{step['id']}/requires:outside-ceiling") - for i, grant in enumerate(ceiling): - if not any(covers(grant, s["requires"]) for s in every_step): - fail("BEA-6", f"spec/scope_ceiling/{i}:unused") - - # BEA-7 classes: human-intrinsic never; root-class only at high risk. - for step in every_step: - if step["class"] == "human-intrinsic": - fail("BEA-7", f"step/{step['id']}/class:human-intrinsic") - if step["class"] == "root-class" and risk != "high": - fail("BEA-7", f"step/{step['id']}/class:root-class-needs-high-risk") - - # BEA-8 blast radius. - radius = spec["blast_radius"] - for step in every_step: - if step["consumer"] not in radius["consumers"]: - fail("BEA-8", f"step/{step['id']}/consumer:outside-blast-radius") - if radius["max_concurrent"] > len(radius["consumers"]): - fail("BEA-8", "spec/blast_radius/max_concurrent") - if risk in ("medium", "high") and radius["max_concurrent"] != 1: - fail("BEA-8", "spec/blast_radius/max_concurrent:one-at-a-time-for-medium-and-high") - - # BEA-9 named machine checks, pinned to the admitted source. - if len(checks) != len(spec["checks"]): - fail("BEA-9", "spec/checks:duplicate-id") - used = set() - for step in every_step: # revert steps verify the restored state with their own checks - if step["mutates"] and not step.get("checks_after"): - fail("BEA-9", f"step/{step['id']}/checks_after:missing") - for ref in step.get("checks_after", []): - used.add(ref) - if ref not in checks: - fail("BEA-9", f"step/{step['id']}/checks_after:undeclared") - for cid, check in checks.items(): - if cid not in used: - fail("BEA-9", f"check/{cid}:unused") - if pinned.get(check["ref"]) != check["sha256"]: - fail("BEA-9", f"check/{cid}/ref:not-pinned-in-plan-source") - - # BEA-10 every mutating step can be undone, or is declared irreversible at high risk. - ids = [s["id"] for s in every_step] - if len(set(ids)) != len(ids): - fail("BEA-10", "plan:duplicate-step-id") - revert_ids = {s["id"] for s in reverts} - for step in steps: - if not step["mutates"]: - continue - if step.get("irreversible"): - if risk != "high": - fail("BEA-10", f"step/{step['id']}/irreversible:needs-high-risk") - elif step.get("revert") not in revert_ids: - fail("BEA-10", f"step/{step['id']}/revert:missing") - for step in reverts: - if not step["mutates"] or step.get("revert") or step.get("irreversible"): - fail("BEA-10", f"revert_step/{step['id']}:must-mutate-and-not-nest") - - # BEA-11 stop-and-revert follows the plan: a revertable plan reverts on failure. - policy = spec["stop_and_revert"] - if revert_ids and policy["on_check_failure"] != "revert": - fail("BEA-11", "spec/stop_and_revert/on_check_failure") - if not revert_ids and policy["on_check_failure"] == "revert": - fail("BEA-11", "spec/stop_and_revert/on_check_failure:nothing-to-revert") - - # BEA-12 the budget fits the window and the checks fit the budget. - budget = spec["budget"] - if budget["wall_time_seconds"] > max(window.total_seconds(), 0): - fail("BEA-12", "spec/budget/wall_time_seconds:exceeds-window") - if budget["attempts"] > MAX_ATTEMPTS[risk]: - fail("BEA-12", "spec/budget/attempts") - check_time = sum(c["timeout_seconds"] + c.get("settle_seconds", 0) for c in spec["checks"]) - if check_time > budget["wall_time_seconds"]: - fail("BEA-12", "spec/budget/wall_time_seconds:shorter-than-checks") - - # BEA-13 the executed source is pinned and the plan names it. - if not spec["plan"]["source"]["files"]: - fail("BEA-13", "spec/plan/source/files") - - # BEA-14 no secret-shaped values anywhere. - if any(SECRET_VALUE.search(s) for s in strings(document)): - fail("BEA-14", ":secret-shaped-value") - - report = {"valid": not findings, "findings": findings, "plan_digest": plan_digest(document), - "admission_digest": admission_digest(document)} - if as_of is not None: - report["window_state"] = ("not-yet" if as_of < start else "expired" if as_of >= end else "open") - return report - - -def check_approval(document: dict, record: Any) -> dict: - """BEA-C1..C7: a carrier record admits exactly this admission, consumed at most once in the window.""" - findings: list[dict] = [] - - def fail(rule: str, where: str) -> None: - findings.append({"rule": rule, "where": where}) - - spec = document["spec"] - required = ("apiVersion", "carrier", "approval_ref", "admission_id", "admission_digest", "approver", - "approved_at", "consumptions") - if not isinstance(record, dict) or any(k not in record for k in required) \ - or record.get("apiVersion") != CARRIER_RECORD: - return {"admitted": False, "findings": [{"rule": "BEA-C1", "where": ":shape"}]} - if record["carrier"] not in spec["approval"]["carriers"]: - fail("BEA-C1", "record/carrier") - if record["admission_id"] != spec["id"] or record["admission_digest"] != admission_digest(document): - fail("BEA-C2", "record/admission_digest") - approver = record["approver"] if isinstance(record["approver"], dict) else {} - if approver.get("name") not in spec["approval"]["approvers"] or approver.get("principal_type") != "HUMAN": - fail("BEA-C3", "record/approver") - if approver.get("assurance") != "aal2": - fail("BEA-C4", "record/approver/assurance") - if approver.get("name") == spec["executor"]["identity"]: - fail("BEA-C3", "record/approver:is-the-executor") - start, end = parse_time(spec["window"]["not_before"]), parse_time(spec["window"]["not_after"]) - approved = parse_time(record["approved_at"]) - if approved >= end: - fail("BEA-C5", "record/approved_at:after-window") - consumptions = record["consumptions"] if isinstance(record["consumptions"], list) else [] - if len(consumptions) > 1: - fail("BEA-C6", "record/consumptions:more-than-once") - for i, use in enumerate(consumptions): - at = parse_time(use["at"]) - if not (start <= at < end) or at < approved: - fail("BEA-C7", f"record/consumptions/{i}/at") - if use.get("by") != spec["executor"]["identity"]: - fail("BEA-C7", f"record/consumptions/{i}/by") - return {"admitted": not findings, "consumed": len(consumptions) == 1, "findings": findings} - - -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# CLI -# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n", 1)[0]) - sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True) - v = sub.add_parser("validate") - v.add_argument("paths", nargs="+", type=pathlib.Path) - v.add_argument("--as-of", help="evaluate the window at this time (ISO 8601)") - c = sub.add_parser("check-approval") - c.add_argument("admission", type=pathlib.Path) - c.add_argument("record", type=pathlib.Path) - d = sub.add_parser("digest") - d.add_argument("path", type=pathlib.Path) - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - schema = json.loads(SCHEMA.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) - - if args.command == "digest": - document = load(args.path) - print(json.dumps({"plan_digest": plan_digest(document), "admission_digest": admission_digest(document)})) - return 0 - if args.command == "check-approval": - document = load(args.admission) - if not evaluate(document, schema)["valid"]: - print(json.dumps({"admitted": False, "findings": [{"rule": "BEA-C0", "where": "admission:invalid"}]})) - return 1 - report = check_approval(document, load(args.record)) - print(json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True)) - return 0 if report["admitted"] else 1 - as_of = parse_time(args.as_of) if args.as_of else None - worst = 0 - for path in args.paths: - report = evaluate(load(path), schema, as_of) - report["file"] = str(path) - print(json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True)) - worst = max(worst, 0 if report["valid"] else 1) - return worst - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/coordination-frame/README.md b/tools/coordination-frame/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 1e3b6ac..0000000 --- a/tools/coordination-frame/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -# Coordination-frame bindings - -The ecosystem frame is owned by coordination-engine at -`coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json`. Its initial value is -`frame_seconds: 3600`, selected by the founder on 2026-10-15. Change that one -setting to change the pace. The owner API validates positive integer frames -and derives timezone-bound deadlines; this tool imports that API, with no -fallback config or duplicated reader. - -For cadence adoption the formulas are heartbeat **f**, registered receiver -wait **2f**, and effective missing-heartbeat deadline **3f** after Audit Core's -existing 1.5 grace. At f=1h those are 3600, 7200 and 10800 seconds. A return -to f=24h produces 24h/48h/72h through the same formulas. - -From net-kingdom: - -```sh -python3 tools/coordination-frame/render.py # read-only source plan -python3 tools/coordination-frame/render.py --check # fail on derived-file drift -python3 tools/coordination-frame/render.py --write # regenerate source artifacts -python3 -m pytest -q tools/coordination-frame/tests -``` - -`--write` changes only the listed source files. It prepares Approval Engine -and Qonto declarations, generated Python defaults, both deployment heartbeat -settings, and a non-secret proposed Approval Engine receiver registration. -The compiler preserves image pins, identity, secret references, other source -classifications and the lack of a completeness claim. Each generated consumer -records the frame source and SHA-256. Runtime consumers import their generated -values rather than opening an adjacent coordination-engine checkout. - -Check generated artifacts after changing the frame, review/commit each owner -source, then use the owner's approved release and registry procedures. This -tool performs no login, credential operation, registry update or deployment. -It cannot replace a source collector or provide operational observer evidence. -All five binding tests require the sibling owner checkouts and explicitly skip -when they are unavailable; no substitute owner contract is used. - -This is the first rollout of a shared coordination setting. Other ecosystem -coordination consumers must adopt explicit frame multipliers through their own -configuration. Transport polling, security validity and credential leases are -not silently rescaled by a coordination setting. - -## Staged local receiver generation - -`make coordination-frame-staged` compiles and stages only the NetKingdom receiver -JSON from Git-index snapshots of its renderer, coordination-engine's frame/API -and approval-engine's cadence. It never edits those sibling checkouts. Unstaged -owner source edits are excluded, and unstaged receiver edits, missing/conflicted -or symlink inputs and alternate-index writes are refused. Stage the reviewed -adapter before its first run. `make coordination-frame-staged-check` is read-only. - -The existing opt-in pre-commit recipe runs this adapter before WORK-RECORDS -rendering and the existing configured scanner. Missing sibling source checkouts -fail closed. Full multi-owner `render.py --write` remains an explicit preparation -command and is never run against real sibling worktrees by the commit hook. -`render.py --receiver-only` limits rendering to the one local proposed receiver; -none of these commands activate the receiver or publish runtime changes. - -For a partial commit, generate from the selected staged sources first and include -the receiver with those sources; `git commit --only` cannot generate missing -changes into its temporary index. Cross-repo owner commits still need their own -review and publication; local index snapshots are source evidence, not release -or operational acceptance. diff --git a/tools/coordination-frame/render.py b/tools/coordination-frame/render.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6459a65..0000000 --- a/tools/coordination-frame/render.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,220 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Compile owner-reviewed cadence bindings from the ecosystem coordination frame.""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import re -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -FRAME_REF = "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json" - - -def owner_frame(workspace: Path): - source = workspace / "coordination-engine/src/coordination_engine/timing.py" - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("coordination_frame_owner", source) - if spec is None or spec.loader is None: - raise ValueError("coordination-engine frame API is required; no fallback") - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) - sys.modules[spec.name] = module - spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module.load_frame(workspace / FRAME_REF) - - -def generated_module(frame, digest): - return ( - '"""Generated cadence timings; regenerate with NetKingdom coordination-frame tool."""\n' - f"# Source: {FRAME_REF}\n" - f'FRAME_CONFIG_SHA256 = "{digest}"\n' - f"FRAME_SECONDS = {frame.frame_seconds}\n" - f"RECEIVER_WAIT_SECONDS = {frame.seconds(2)}\n" - f"EFFECTIVE_DEADLINE_SECONDS = {frame.seconds(3)}\n" - ) - - -def bind_frame_annotation(text, digest, metadata_prefix): - key = "coordination.coulomb.social/frame-sha256" - pattern = r"(?m)^(\s*" + re.escape(key) + r": )[^\n]+" - if re.search(pattern, text): - updated, count = re.subn(pattern, lambda match: match[1] + json.dumps(digest), text) - else: - replacement = ( - metadata_prefix - + "annotations:\n" - + " " * (len(metadata_prefix.splitlines()[-1]) + 2) - + key - + ": " - + json.dumps(digest) - + "\n" - ) - # metadata_prefix ends with the indentation for annotations. Existing - # annotation maps retain their contents; otherwise insert a new map. - if metadata_prefix + "annotations:\n" in text: - updated = text.replace(metadata_prefix + "annotations:\n", replacement, 1) - count = 1 - else: - updated = text.replace( - metadata_prefix, replacement + metadata_prefix.rsplit("\n", 1)[-1], 1 - ) - count = int(updated != text) - if count != 1: - raise ValueError("expected one runtime frame provenance binding") - return updated - - -def receiver_binding(frame, provenance, approval_text): - receiver = { - "status": "proposed-not-applied", - "coordination_frame": provenance, - "sender": "approval-engine", - "source": "approval-engine", - "tenant": "tenant:platform", - "may_read": False, - "emission_cadence_ref": "approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "emission_cadence_sha256": hashlib.sha256(approval_text.encode()).hexdigest(), - "heartbeat_classes": { - name: frame.seconds(2) for name in ("issuance", "use", "supersession", "revocation") - }, - "receiver_grace_factor": 1.5, - "effective_deadline_seconds": frame.seconds(3), - "preserve_existing_credentials_and_other_registry_fields": True, - } - return json.dumps(receiver, indent=2) + "\n" - - -def compile_bindings(workspace: Path, *, receiver_only=False): - frame = owner_frame(workspace) - digest = hashlib.sha256((workspace / FRAME_REF).read_bytes()).hexdigest() - provenance = { - "ref": FRAME_REF, - "sha256": digest, - "frame_seconds": frame.frame_seconds, - "heartbeat_frames": 1, - "registered_wait_frames": 2, - "effective_deadline_frames": 3, - } - outputs = {} - for relative in ( - "approval-engine/approval_engine/coordination.py", - "qonto-assistant/src/qonto_assistant/coordination.py", - ): - outputs[workspace / relative] = generated_module(frame, digest) - approval_path = workspace / "approval-engine/cadence.yaml" - approval = json.loads(approval_path.read_text()) - for entry in approval["sources"]: - if "heartbeat" in entry: - beat = entry["heartbeat"] - beat["interval_seconds"] = frame.frame_seconds - ext = beat["extensions"]["approval-engine"] - ext["requested_observer_max_gap_seconds"] = frame.seconds(2) - ext["effective_deadline_seconds"] = frame.seconds(3) - approval["extensions"].setdefault("netkingdom", {})["coordination_frame"] = provenance - outputs[approval_path] = json.dumps(approval, indent=2) + "\n" - if receiver_only: - path = workspace / "net-kingdom/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json" - return frame, {path: receiver_binding(frame, provenance, outputs[approval_path])} - - qonto_path = workspace / "qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml" - qonto = yaml.safe_load(qonto_path.read_text()) - for entry in qonto["sources"]: - if "heartbeat" in entry: - entry["heartbeat"]["interval"] = f"PT{frame.frame_seconds}S" - heartbeat = qonto["extensions"]["qonto-assistant"]["heartbeat"] - heartbeat["interval"] = f"PT{frame.frame_seconds}S" - heartbeat["default_interval_seconds"] = frame.frame_seconds - qonto["extensions"]["netkingdom"]["coordination_frame"] = provenance - outputs[qonto_path] = ( - "# Source-owned cadence; coordination timings generated from " - + FRAME_REF - + "\n" - + yaml.safe_dump(qonto, sort_keys=False) - ) - - deploy_path = workspace / "approval-engine/deploy/approval-engine.yaml" - deploy = deploy_path.read_text() - if re.search(r"^\s+- --heartbeat-seconds\s*$", deploy, re.M): - deploy, count = re.subn( - r"(?m)^(\s+- --heartbeat-seconds\n\s+- )[^\n]+", - lambda m: m[1] + json.dumps(str(frame.frame_seconds)), - deploy, - ) - else: - # Explicit runtime arg also works with the already pinned image; no image - # pin, storage migration, authority or unrelated deployment change here. - deploy, count = re.subn( - r"(?m)^(\s+)- --audit-url$", - lambda m: ( - f'{m[1]}- --heartbeat-seconds\n{m[1]}- "{frame.frame_seconds}"\n{m[1]}- --audit-url' - ), - deploy, - ) - if count != 1: - raise ValueError("expected one Approval Engine heartbeat argument binding") - outputs[deploy_path] = bind_frame_annotation( - deploy, digest, " template:\n metadata:\n " - ) - - deploy_path = workspace / "rapp-qonto/runtime/knative/service.yaml" - deploy, count = re.subn( - r"(?m)(name: QONTO_AUDIT_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_SECONDS\n\s+value: )[^\n]+", - lambda m: m[1] + json.dumps(str(frame.frame_seconds)), - deploy_path.read_text(), - ) - if count != 1: - raise ValueError("expected one Qonto heartbeat environment binding") - outputs[deploy_path] = bind_frame_annotation( - deploy, digest, " template:\n metadata:\n " - ) - - fixture_path = ( - workspace / "kings-guard/src/kings_guard/fixtures/qonto_assistant_source_cadence.json" - ) - fixture = json.loads(fixture_path.read_text()) - for entry in fixture["sources"]: - if "heartbeat" in entry: - entry["heartbeat"]["interval_seconds"] = frame.frame_seconds - fixture["extensions"].setdefault("netkingdom", {})["coordination_frame"] = provenance - outputs[fixture_path] = json.dumps(fixture, indent=2) + "\n" - - outputs[workspace / "net-kingdom/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json"] = receiver_binding(frame, provenance, outputs[approval_path]) - return frame, outputs - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument("--workspace", type=Path, default=ROOT.parent) - parser.add_argument("--receiver-only", action="store_true") - mode = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group() - mode.add_argument("--check", action="store_true") - mode.add_argument("--write", action="store_true") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - frame, outputs = compile_bindings(args.workspace, receiver_only=args.receiver_only) - changed = { - p: text for p, text in outputs.items() if not p.exists() or p.read_text() != text - } - if args.write: - for path, text in changed.items(): - path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - path.write_text(text) - report = { - "frame": frame.as_dict(), - "mode": "write" if args.write else "check" if args.check else "plan", - "changed": [str(p.relative_to(args.workspace)) for p in changed], - "live_operations": False, - } - print(json.dumps(report, indent=2, sort_keys=True)) - return 1 if args.check and changed else 0 - except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError) as exc: - parser.error(str(exc)) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/coordination-frame/staged.py b/tools/coordination-frame/staged.py deleted file mode 100644 index 1ebd6a6..0000000 --- a/tools/coordination-frame/staged.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Stage only the local receiver from indexed owner sources; never mutate siblings.""" -import argparse -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys -import tempfile - -OUTPUT = 'generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json' -SELF = 'tools/coordination-frame/staged.py' -INPUTS = { - 'net-kingdom': ['tools/coordination-frame/render.py'], - 'coordination-engine': ['config/coordination-frame.json', 'src/coordination_engine/timing.py'], - 'approval-engine': ['cadence.yaml'], -} - - -def git(repo, *args, default_index=False): - env = dict(os.environ) - if default_index: - env.pop("GIT_INDEX_FILE", None) - return subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', str(repo), *args], stderr=subprocess.PIPE, env=env) - - -def indexed(repo, path, *, default_index=False): - rows = git(repo, 'ls-files', '--stage', '--', path, default_index=default_index).decode().splitlines() - if len(rows) != 1: - raise ValueError('missing or conflicted source: ' + path) - metadata, name = rows[0].split('\t', 1) - mode, oid, stage = metadata.split() - if stage != '0' or mode not in ('100644', '100755') or name != path: - raise ValueError('nonregular or conflicted source: ' + path) - return git(repo, 'cat-file', 'blob', oid, default_index=default_index) - - -def generate(repo, *, check=False): - repo = Path(repo).resolve() - workspace = repo.parent - if Path(git(repo, 'rev-parse', '--show-toplevel').decode().strip()).resolve() != repo: - raise ValueError('repository root required') - if (repo / SELF).is_symlink() or (repo / SELF).read_bytes() != indexed(repo, SELF): - raise ValueError('stage the reviewed adapter before executing it') - target = repo / OUTPUT - if any(p.is_symlink() for p in (target, *target.parents)): - raise ValueError('redirected receiver output refused') - prior = indexed(repo, OUTPUT) - if target.read_bytes() != prior: - raise ValueError('unstaged receiver edits; preserve or reconcile first') - sources = [] - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='coordination-staged-') as directory: - snapshot = Path(directory) - for slug, paths in INPUTS.items(): - source_repo = repo if slug == 'net-kingdom' else workspace / slug - if Path(git(source_repo, 'rev-parse', '--show-toplevel').decode().strip()).resolve() != source_repo.resolve(): - raise ValueError('owner repository root required') - for path in paths: - dest = snapshot / slug / path - dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - content = indexed(source_repo, path, default_index=source_repo != repo) - sources.append((source_repo, path, content)) - dest.write_bytes(content) - subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(snapshot/'net-kingdom/tools/coordination-frame/render.py'), - '--workspace', str(snapshot), '--receiver-only', '--write'], - check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) - result = (snapshot/'net-kingdom'/OUTPUT).read_bytes() - if any(indexed(owner, name, default_index=owner != repo) != content - for owner, name, content in sources): - raise ValueError("owner index changed during compilation") - if result == prior: - return False - if check: - raise ValueError('staged receiver drift; run make coordination-frame-staged') - default_index = Path(git(repo, 'rev-parse', '--git-path', 'index', default_index=True).decode().strip()) - if not default_index.is_absolute(): - default_index = repo/default_index - active_index = Path(os.environ.get('GIT_INDEX_FILE', str(default_index))) - if not active_index.is_absolute(): - active_index = repo/active_index - if active_index.resolve() != default_index.resolve(): - raise ValueError('alternate-index mutation refused; generate before commit --only') - # Optimistic check: refuse if a source/index update raced compilation. - if indexed(repo, OUTPUT) != prior or target.read_bytes() != prior: - raise ValueError('receiver changed during compilation') - target.write_bytes(result) - git(repo, 'add', '--', OUTPUT) - return True - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) - parser.add_argument('--repo', type=Path, default=Path.cwd()) - parser.add_argument('--check', action='store_true') - args = parser.parse_args() - try: - changed = generate(args.repo, check=args.check) - except (OSError, ValueError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc: - parser.exit(1, 'Coordination generation refused: ' + str(exc) + '\n') - print(json.dumps({'receiver_changed': changed, 'sibling_writes': False, 'live_operations': False})) diff --git a/tools/coordination-frame/tests/test_render.py b/tools/coordination-frame/tests/test_render.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6d237e6..0000000 --- a/tools/coordination-frame/tests/test_render.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,127 +0,0 @@ -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import shutil -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest -import yaml - -SCRIPT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "render.py" -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("frame_renderer", SCRIPT) -renderer = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(renderer) -WORKSPACE = SCRIPT.parents[3] - - -@pytest.fixture -def workspace(tmp_path): - required = ( - "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "coordination-engine/src/coordination_engine/timing.py", - "approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "approval-engine/deploy/approval-engine.yaml", - "qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "rapp-qonto/runtime/knative/service.yaml", - "kings-guard/src/kings_guard/fixtures/qonto_assistant_source_cadence.json", - ) - if any(not (WORKSPACE / name).is_file() for name in required): - pytest.skip("sibling owner sources required; no fallback frame or contract") - for name in ( - "coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json", - "coordination-engine/src/coordination_engine/timing.py", - "approval-engine/cadence.yaml", - "approval-engine/deploy/approval-engine.yaml", - "qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml", - "rapp-qonto/runtime/knative/service.yaml", - "kings-guard/src/kings_guard/fixtures/qonto_assistant_source_cadence.json", - ): - path = tmp_path / name - path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - shutil.copyfile(WORKSPACE / name, path) - return tmp_path - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("frame_seconds", [600, 3600, 86400]) -def test_one_frame_edit_rescales_sources_runtime_and_receiver(workspace, frame_seconds): - config = workspace / renderer.FRAME_REF - config.write_text( - json.dumps({"schema_version": "coordination-frame/v1", "frame_seconds": frame_seconds}) - ) - _, outputs = renderer.compile_bindings(workspace) - approval = json.loads(outputs[workspace / "approval-engine/cadence.yaml"]) - qonto = yaml.safe_load(outputs[workspace / "qonto-assistant/specs/audit-emission-cadence.yaml"]) - for entry in approval["sources"]: - if "heartbeat" in entry: - assert entry["heartbeat"]["interval_seconds"] == frame_seconds - extension = entry["heartbeat"]["extensions"]["approval-engine"] - assert extension["requested_observer_max_gap_seconds"] == 2 * frame_seconds - assert extension["effective_deadline_seconds"] == 3 * frame_seconds - for entry in qonto["sources"]: - assert entry["heartbeat"]["interval"] == f"PT{frame_seconds}S" - observer = json.loads( - outputs[ - workspace / "kings-guard/src/kings_guard/fixtures/qonto_assistant_source_cadence.json" - ] - ) - assert observer["sources"][0]["heartbeat"]["interval_seconds"] == frame_seconds - - receiver = json.loads( - outputs[ - workspace / "net-kingdom/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json" - ] - ) - assert set(receiver["heartbeat_classes"].values()) == {2 * frame_seconds} - assert receiver["effective_deadline_seconds"] == 3 * frame_seconds - assert receiver["may_read"] is False - assert receiver["status"] == "proposed-not-applied" - for name in ( - "approval-engine/approval_engine/coordination.py", - "qonto-assistant/src/qonto_assistant/coordination.py", - ): - assert f"FRAME_SECONDS = {frame_seconds}\n" in outputs[workspace / name] - deploy = yaml.safe_load_all(outputs[workspace / "approval-engine/deploy/approval-engine.yaml"]) - workload = next(item for item in deploy if item["kind"] == "StatefulSet") - expected_digest = hashlib.sha256(config.read_bytes()).hexdigest() - assert ( - workload["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"][ - "coordination.coulomb.social/frame-sha256" - ] - == expected_digest - ) - args = workload["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["args"] - assert args[args.index("--heartbeat-seconds") + 1] == str(frame_seconds) - service = yaml.safe_load(outputs[workspace / "rapp-qonto/runtime/knative/service.yaml"]) - assert ( - service["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"][ - "coordination.coulomb.social/frame-sha256" - ] - == expected_digest - ) - env = service["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["env"] - assert next( - item["value"] for item in env if item["name"] == "QONTO_AUDIT_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_SECONDS" - ) == str(frame_seconds) - - -def test_render_is_read_only_and_write_is_idempotent_with_drift_detection(workspace, capsys): - before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in workspace.rglob("*") if path.is_file()} - assert renderer.main(["--workspace", str(workspace)]) == 0 - assert all(path.read_bytes() == data for path, data in before.items()) - assert renderer.main(["--workspace", str(workspace), "--check"]) == 1 - assert renderer.main(["--workspace", str(workspace), "--write"]) == 0 - assert renderer.main(["--workspace", str(workspace), "--check"]) == 0 - receiver = workspace / "net-kingdom/generated/coordination-frame/approval-engine-receiver.json" - data = json.loads(receiver.read_text()) - data["heartbeat_classes"]["revocation"] = 999999 - receiver.write_text(json.dumps(data)) - assert renderer.main(["--workspace", str(workspace), "--check"]) == 1 - - -def test_invalid_frame_does_not_partially_rewrite_sources(workspace): - config = workspace / renderer.FRAME_REF - config.write_text('{"schema_version":"coordination-frame/v1","frame_seconds":0}') - before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in workspace.rglob("*") if path.is_file()} - with pytest.raises(SystemExit): - renderer.main(["--workspace", str(workspace), "--write"]) - assert all(path.read_bytes() == data for path, data in before.items()) diff --git a/tools/coordination-frame/tests/test_staged.py b/tools/coordination-frame/tests/test_staged.py deleted file mode 100644 index 24c5ed8..0000000 --- a/tools/coordination-frame/tests/test_staged.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess - -import pytest - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('staged_frame', ROOT/'tools/coordination-frame/staged.py') -staged = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(staged) - - -def git(repo, *args): - return subprocess.check_output(['git','-C',str(repo),*args]) - - -@pytest.fixture -def repos(tmp_path): - workspace = ROOT.parent - for slug, names in staged.INPUTS.items(): - repo=tmp_path/slug;repo.mkdir() - git(repo,'init','-q') - for name in names: - dest=repo/name;dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True) - dest.write_bytes((workspace/slug/name).read_bytes()) - repo=tmp_path/'net-kingdom' - for name in (staged.SELF,staged.OUTPUT): - dest=repo/name;dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True) - dest.write_bytes((ROOT/name).read_bytes()) - for slug in staged.INPUTS:git(tmp_path/slug,'add','.') - return tmp_path,repo - - -def test_receiver_only_ignores_unstaged_sibling_source(repos): - workspace,repo=repos - path=workspace/'coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json' - original=path.read_bytes();path.write_text('uncommitted invalid source') - assert staged.generate(repo) is False - assert path.read_text()=='uncommitted invalid source' - assert git(workspace/'coordination-engine','show',':config/coordination-frame.json')==original - - -def test_staged_frame_change_only_updates_local_receiver(repos): - workspace,repo=repos - path=workspace/'coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json' - data=json.loads(path.read_text());data['frame_seconds']=600;path.write_text(json.dumps(data)) - git(path.parents[1],'add','config/coordination-frame.json') - approval=workspace/'approval-engine/cadence.yaml';before=approval.read_bytes() - with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='drift'):staged.generate(repo,check=True) - assert staged.generate(repo) - result=json.loads((repo/staged.OUTPUT).read_text()) - assert result['effective_deadline_seconds']==1800 - assert approval.read_bytes()==before - assert staged.generate(repo,check=True) is False - - -def test_unstaged_receiver_preserved(repos): - _,repo=repos;p=repo/staged.OUTPUT;p.write_text('local edit') - with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='unstaged receiver'):staged.generate(repo) - assert p.read_text()=='local edit' - - -def test_unstaged_adapter_refused(repos): - _,repo=repos;p=repo/staged.SELF;p.write_text(p.read_text()+'\n# local edit\n') - with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='stage the reviewed'):staged.generate(repo) - - -def test_symlink_source_refused(repos): - workspace,repo=repos;p=workspace/'approval-engine/cadence.yaml';p.unlink();p.symlink_to('/etc/passwd') - git(p.parent,'add','cadence.yaml') - with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='nonregular'):staged.generate(repo) - - -def test_alternate_index_write_refused_and_sibling_default_index_used(repos,monkeypatch): - workspace,repo=repos - path=workspace/'coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json' - data=json.loads(path.read_text());data['frame_seconds']=600;path.write_text(json.dumps(data)) - git(path.parents[1],'add','config/coordination-frame.json') - alternate=repo/'.git/partial-index';alternate.write_bytes((repo/'.git/index').read_bytes()) - before=(repo/staged.OUTPUT).read_bytes() - monkeypatch.setenv('GIT_INDEX_FILE',str(alternate)) - with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='alternate-index mutation'):staged.generate(repo) - assert (repo/staged.OUTPUT).read_bytes()==before diff --git a/tools/emission-cadence-profile/receiver_readback.py b/tools/emission-cadence-profile/receiver_readback.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2ca0775..0000000 --- a/tools/emission-cadence-profile/receiver_readback.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,118 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Independent receiver readback for a retained cadence capture (NK-WP-0035-T04). - -Reads the capture's `capture-provenance.json` (its `receiver_readback` request: -source, tenant, stream instance, window and event IDs) and `events.jsonl`, then -asks audit-core directly, under the operator's own reader token: - -- `GET /v1/reconciliation` for per-class counts in the same window and instance; -- `GET /v1/events/` for every captured event ID. - -The output is a value-safe receipt with the counts from both sides, a presence -check per event ID and a verdict (`agree` or `diverge`). It keeps no event -payloads, and the token never enters the receipt. Agreement proves neither -completeness nor that King's Guard accepts the stream (KG-WP-0005-T03). - -Reach the ClusterIP receiver with your own port-forward, for example -`kubectl -n audit-core port-forward svc/audit-core 18080:8080`. -""" -import argparse -import collections -import json -import os -import stat -import sys -import urllib.error -import urllib.parse -import urllib.request -from pathlib import Path - -SCHEMA = 'nk-wp-0035-receiver-readback/v1' - - -def load_capture(directory): - provenance = json.loads((directory / 'capture-provenance.json').read_text()) - request = provenance['receiver_readback'] - events = [json.loads(line) for line in (directory / 'events.jsonl').read_text().splitlines() if line.strip()] - if any(e.get('stream_instance_id') != request['stream_instance_id'] for e in events): - raise ValueError('capture events span another stream instance') - return request, collections.Counter(e['event_class'] for e in events) - - -def read_token(path): - info = path.lstat() - if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_mode & 0o077: - raise ValueError('token file must be a regular file readable only by its owner (0600)') - token = path.read_text().strip() - if not token or any(c.isspace() for c in token): - raise ValueError('token file must hold exactly one bearer token') - return token - - -def readback(request, captured, get): - """get(path_with_query) -> (status, json). Returns the value-safe receipt.""" - query = urllib.parse.urlencode({'source': request['source'], 'tenant': request['tenant'], - 'since': request['since'], 'until': request['until'], - 'stream_instance_id': request['stream_instance_id']}) - status, body = get('/v1/reconciliation?' + query) - findings = [] - if status != 200: - findings.append(f'reconciliation returned {status}: {body.get("error", "")}') - receiver, basis = {}, None - else: - receiver = {row['class']: row['count'] for row in body.get('counts', [])} - # audit-core marks cross-source answers so they cannot pass for the source's own check. - basis = body.get('basis') - if basis != 'independent_reader': - findings.append(f'reconciliation basis is {basis!r}, not independent_reader') - for cls in sorted(set(receiver) | set(captured)): - if receiver.get(cls, 0) != captured.get(cls, 0): - findings.append(f'class {cls}: captured {captured.get(cls, 0)}, receiver {receiver.get(cls, 0)}') - presence = {} - for event_id in request['event_ids']: - status, body = get('/v1/events/' + urllib.parse.quote(event_id, safe='')) - presence[event_id] = status == 200 - if status != 200: - findings.append(f'event {event_id[:12]}… returned {status}') - elif (body.get('source'), body.get('tenant')) not in ((request['source'], request['tenant']), (None, None)): - findings.append(f'event {event_id[:12]}… source/tenant differs') - return {'schema': SCHEMA, 'request': request, 'captured_counts': dict(captured), - 'receiver_counts': receiver, 'receiver_basis': basis, 'event_presence': presence, - 'verdict': 'agree' if not findings else 'diverge', 'findings': findings, - 'payloads_retained': False, 'token_retained': False, - 'means': 'agreement proves neither completeness nor King\'s Guard acceptance'} - - -def http_get(base, token): - def get(path): - req = urllib.request.Request(base.rstrip('/') + path, headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + token}) - try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as response: - return response.status, json.loads(response.read() or b'{}') - except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: - try: - return exc.code, json.loads(exc.read() or b'{}') - except ValueError: - return exc.code, {} - return get - - -def main(argv=None): - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter) - p.add_argument('--capture-dir', type=Path, required=True) - p.add_argument('--base-url', default='http://127.0.0.1:18080') - p.add_argument('--token-file', type=Path, required=True) - p.add_argument('--output', type=Path, required=True) - args = p.parse_args(argv) - request, captured = load_capture(args.capture_dir) - receipt = readback(request, captured, http_get(args.base_url, read_token(args.token_file))) - fd = os.open(args.output, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o644) - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as out: - json.dump(receipt, out, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - out.write('\n') - print(f"{receipt['verdict']}: {len(receipt['findings'])} finding(s); receipt {args.output}") - return 0 if receipt['verdict'] == 'agree' else 1 - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/emission-cadence-profile/tests/test_receiver_readback.py b/tools/emission-cadence-profile/tests/test_receiver_readback.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2347895..0000000 --- a/tools/emission-cadence-profile/tests/test_receiver_readback.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic tests for the NK-WP-0035-T04 receiver readback helper; no network, no tokens.""" -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -SOURCE = Path(__file__).parents[1] / 'receiver_readback.py' -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('receiver_readback', SOURCE) -rb = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(rb) - -CAPTURE = Path(__file__).parents[3] / 'docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-capture' - - -def fake_receiver(counts, present, source='qonto-assistant', tenant='tenant:friendly:binky', recon_status=200, - basis='independent_reader'): - calls = [] - - def get(path): - calls.append(path) - if path.startswith('/v1/reconciliation?'): - if recon_status != 200: - return recon_status, {'error': 'source_not_allowed'} - return 200, {'counts': [{'class': k, 'count': v} for k, v in counts.items()], 'basis': basis} - event_id = path.rsplit('/', 1)[1] - if event_id in present: - return 200, {'source': source, 'tenant': tenant, 'id': event_id} - return 404, {'error': 'not_found'} - return get, calls - - -def test_retained_capture_loads(): - request, captured = rb.load_capture(CAPTURE) - assert len(request['event_ids']) == 3 - assert sum(captured.values()) == 3 - - -def test_agreement(): - request, captured = rb.load_capture(CAPTURE) - get, calls = fake_receiver(dict(captured), set(request['event_ids'])) - receipt = rb.readback(request, captured, get) - assert receipt['verdict'] == 'agree' and receipt['findings'] == [] - assert 'stream_instance_id=' in calls[0] and len(calls) == 4 - assert receipt['token_retained'] is False and receipt['payloads_retained'] is False - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('case', ['missing_event', 'count_differs', 'extra_class', 'forbidden', 'wrong_tenant']) -def test_divergence(case): - request, captured = rb.load_capture(CAPTURE) - counts, present = dict(captured), set(request['event_ids']) - kwargs = {} - if case == 'missing_event': - present.discard(request['event_ids'][0]) - elif case == 'count_differs': - cls = next(iter(counts)) - counts[cls] += 1 - elif case == 'extra_class': - counts['audit.allow'] = 1 - elif case == 'forbidden': - kwargs['recon_status'] = 403 - else: - kwargs['tenant'] = 'tenant:other' - get, _ = fake_receiver(counts, present, **kwargs) - receipt = rb.readback(request, captured, get) - assert receipt['verdict'] == 'diverge' and receipt['findings'] - - -def test_token_file_must_be_private(tmp_path): - token = tmp_path / 'token' - token.write_text('abc.def.ghi\n') - os.chmod(token, 0o644) - with pytest.raises(ValueError): - rb.read_token(token) - os.chmod(token, 0o600) - assert rb.read_token(token) == 'abc.def.ghi' - token.write_text('two tokens\n') - with pytest.raises(ValueError): - rb.read_token(token) - - -def test_receipt_never_contains_token(tmp_path, monkeypatch): - token = tmp_path / 'token' - token.write_text('SENTINEL-TOKEN-VALUE') - os.chmod(token, 0o600) - request, captured = rb.load_capture(CAPTURE) - get, _ = fake_receiver(dict(captured), set(request['event_ids'])) - monkeypatch.setattr(rb, 'http_get', lambda base, tok: get) - out = tmp_path / 'receipt.json' - assert rb.main(['--capture-dir', str(CAPTURE), '--token-file', str(token), '--output', str(out)]) == 0 - assert 'SENTINEL' not in out.read_text() - assert json.loads(out.read_text())['verdict'] == 'agree' - - -def test_missing_independent_basis_diverges(): - request, captured = rb.load_capture(CAPTURE) - get, _ = fake_receiver(captured, set(request['event_ids']), basis=None) - receipt = rb.readback(request, captured, get) - assert receipt['verdict'] == 'diverge' - assert receipt['receiver_basis'] is None - assert any('basis' in f for f in receipt['findings']) diff --git a/tools/prepare_forgejo_type12_acknowledgment.py b/tools/prepare_forgejo_type12_acknowledgment.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5d296b4..0000000 --- a/tools/prepare_forgejo_type12_acknowledgment.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -"""Offline preparation of exact source-only type/case acknowledgment; no posting.""" -import argparse,base64,hashlib,json -from pathlib import Path -ID='infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1' -PROPOSAL='NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1' -FILES=['decision-packet.md','proposal.json','source-inventory.json','type-1.2.yaml','case-1.2.yaml','render-1.2.json','current-type-1.1.yaml','current-case-1.1.yaml','consumer-delivery.yaml','CCR-0042-proposed-body.yaml','reader-role.json','reader-policy.hcl','owner-design.md','retained-native-metadata.json','mason-final-review.json','platform-final-review.json','netkingdom-review-bundle.json','netkingdom-review-sources-bundle.json','validation-and-history.json','recording-gates.md'] - -def build(root): - sha=lambda b:'sha256:'+hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest() - items=[];contents=[];documents=[] - for name in FILES: - data=(root/name).read_bytes();item=name.replace('.','-').lower();media='application/json' if name.endswith('.json') else 'text/markdown' if name.endswith('.md') else 'text/plain' - items.append({'item_id':item,'label':name,'hash':sha(data)});contents.append({'item_id':item,'media_type':media,'content':data.decode()});documents.append({'digest':sha(data),'media_type':media,'content_base64':base64.b64encode(data).decode()}) - memo={'id':ID,'version':1,'question':'Acknowledge the exact proposed OIDC browser relying-party 1.2 architecture after complete-package validation and owner review, with Forgejo migration design recorded separately and its canonical case staying proposed, without native authority?','requested_act':'approve','binding_level':'organizational','brief':'Source-only acknowledgment under SecurityCaseTypes section 6 of the sixth dedicated consumer reader role and separate Forgejo reference-migration design receipt only. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed while type is unimplemented; actual full package README/examples/runnable tests and separate NetKingdom source-owner review gate type acknowledgment recording. Original five structural bodies unchanged; common ESO trust/600-second TokenRequest/legacy fallback and created-only token-revocation-or-expiry recovery disclosed. Three independent architecture owner reviews / 44 tests and the completed package NetKingdom review / 22 tests attached; bound claims and execution remain false. Old 1.1 is not inherited and native gates remain separate.','binding':{'principal':{'id':'pending-human-session','kind':'person','display_name':'Founder source acknowledgment'},'target':{'kind':'resource','id':'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc','label':'Exact NetKingdom type 1.2 and Forgejo reference-case source','environment':'build'},'terms':'Only '+PROPOSAL+' and exact reviewed nineteen-file manifest 5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431/full render c0afd5576cdae0cbc807eccb2b9fa87ac668f15e32ec7cf79d295bdb23c75b35. Type acknowledgment recording requires actual complete section 3 package validation and separate NetKingdom source-owner review. Reference-migration design approval is separate owner-receipt only; canonical case 1.2 stays proposed/unimplemented, without acceptance fields or phase acceptance. Record genuine new native human source disposition before any permitted type acknowledgment fields, after full package/source-owner gates, preserve immutable 1.1 history. No credential/auth/ESO/materialization/session/grant/native completion; execution.permitted=false and bound_claims_confirmed=false until separately discharged actual native owner gates.'},'step_kind':'approve','packet':items,'highlights':[{'id':'source-only-authentication-refinement','item_id':'decision-packet-md','note':'New sixth role/auth path requires this new acknowledgment; prior 1.1 does not transfer. Shared ESO controller remains broadly trusted, failed TokenRequest must not seed legacy/static tokens, and deletion alone cannot revoke issued tokens. Canonical case 1.2 stays proposed on unimplemented type; full package/source-owner gates remain required. No native credentials, apply, session or case completion.','required_ack':True,'severity':'warning','locator':{'kind':'section','heading':'Requested acknowledgment'}}],'sealed':False,'approval_id':None,'approval_binding_digest':None} - intent={'action':'acknowledge','principal':'net-kingdom-admins','purpose':'Acknowledge exact type 1.2 after complete-package/source-owner gates; approve reference-design receipt only, keep canonical case proposed under sections 4/5/6; no native or credential authority.','target':{'id':'oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2','type':'security-case-type','system':'net-kingdom'}} - intake={'kind':'informed-decision.memo-intake','version':1,'idempotency_key':ID+'-v1','memo_class':'decision-record','review_group':'net-kingdom-admins','drafted_by':'custodian-codex','approval_intent':intent,'memo':memo,'packet':contents} - commands=[{'id':ID,'register':{'memo':memo,'documents':documents},'publish':{'version':1,'audience':{'subjects':[],'groups':['net-kingdom-admins']}},'review':{'version':1,'options':{'submitter':'state-hub','memo_class':'decision-record','review_group':'net-kingdom-admins','approval_intent':intent}}}] - assert len(json.dumps(commands[0]['register']).encode())<=256*1024 - for name,value in [('memo.json',memo),('intake.json',intake),('lifecycle-commands.json',commands)]: - (root/name).write_text(json.dumps(value,indent=2,ensure_ascii=False)+'\n') - return {'memo_id':ID,'documents':len(items),'register_payload_bytes':len(json.dumps(commands[0]['register']).encode())} -if __name__=='__main__': - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('packet',type=Path);a=p.parse_args();print(json.dumps(build(a.packet))) diff --git a/tools/rotation-lanes/README.md b/tools/rotation-lanes/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index a552bcb..0000000 --- a/tools/rotation-lanes/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -# Credential Rotation Lanes - -NK-WP-0055-T15. `lanes.yaml` lists every credential lane: how the credential is replaced, its -blast radius, the step that proves the rotation worked, and the owner lane (workplan task) that -holds it. It is value-free: names, paths and procedures only. - -```bash -make rotation-lanes-check # every known credential has a complete lane (offline, read-only) -make rotation-lanes-test # synthetic tests -``` - -The check derives "every known credential" from three repository sources and fails on a gap: - -| Source | What must have a lane | -| --- | --- | -| `tools/service-identity/declarations/*.yaml` | Each identity whose custody is not `none` (federated logins hold nothing to rotate; they may still be named) | -| `canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md` section 6 | Each backticked secret name in its tables | -| `docs/crisis-custody-list.md` | Each numbered item that is not struck through as retired | - -It also refuses a lane without blast radius, verification or owner lane, an unknown NetKingdom -task reference, and a credential assigned to two lanes. A new declaration, secret or crisis item -therefore needs a lane in the same change. - -`state` says how far each lane is: `admitted` (owner lane accepted and runnable), `designed` -(procedure written, not admitted), `deferred` (held by a founder decision, today the rotation -deferral `1591daa1` behind NK-WP-0055-T06) or `none` (no rotation, reason given). diff --git a/tools/rotation-lanes/check.py b/tools/rotation-lanes/check.py deleted file mode 100644 index e82d003..0000000 --- a/tools/rotation-lanes/check.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,152 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -# /// script -# dependencies = ["PyYAML>=6,<7"] -# /// -"""Check that every known credential has a rotation lane (NK-WP-0055-T15). - -Sources of "known credentials", all in this repository: -- service-identity declarations whose custody is not `none` (federated logins hold nothing); -- the backticked secret names in Credential Management v0.2 section 6; -- the numbered rows of the crisis custody list that are not struck through (retired). - -Each lane must name its blast radius, verification step and owner lane. NetKingdom owner-lane -references must exist in `workplans/`; other repositories' references are checked for shape only. -Offline and read-only; the register holds names and procedures, never values. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import glob -import re -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -CLASSES = {"service", "database", "client-secret", "openbao-issued", "break-glass"} -STATES = {"admitted", "designed", "deferred", "none"} -LEVELS = {"minimal", "low", "medium", "high"} -TASK_REF = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z-]*-WP-\d{4}(-T\d{2})?$") - - -def declared_identities(root): - """(identities that hold a credential, every declared identity).""" - found, every = set(), set() - for path in sorted( - glob.glob(str(root / "tools/service-identity/declarations/*.yaml")) - ): - doc = yaml.safe_load(Path(path).read_text()) - for ident in doc.get("identities", []): - name = f"{doc['service']}/{ident['name']}" - every.add(name) - if set(ident.get("custody") or []) - {"none"}: - found.add(name) - return found, every - - -def standard_secrets(root): - text = (root / "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md").read_text() - section = text.split("## 6. Secret Rotation", 1)[1].split("\n## ", 1)[0] - return set(re.findall(r"^\| `([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+)` \|", section, flags=re.MULTILINE)) - - -def crisis_items(root): - text = (root / "docs/crisis-custody-list.md").read_text() - return { - m.group(1) - for m in re.finditer(r"^\| (\d+[a-z]?) \| (?!~~)", text, flags=re.MULTILINE) - } - - -def nk_tasks(root): - ids = set() - for path in glob.glob(str(root / "workplans/**/*.md"), recursive=True): - ids.update( - re.findall( - r"^id: (NK-WP-\d{4}(?:-T\d{2})?)$", - Path(path).read_text(), - flags=re.MULTILINE, - ) - ) - return ids - - -def check(register, root): - errors = [] - lanes = register.get("lanes", []) - seen = {"identities": {}, "credentials": {}, "crisis_items": {}} - known_nk = nk_tasks(root) - for lane in lanes: - lid = lane.get("id", "?") - if lane.get("class") not in CLASSES: - errors.append(f"{lid}: class must be one of {sorted(CLASSES)}") - if lane.get("state") not in STATES: - errors.append(f"{lid}: state must be one of {sorted(STATES)}") - radius = lane.get("blast_radius") or {} - if ( - radius.get("level") not in LEVELS - or not radius.get("affects") - or not radius.get("effect") - ): - errors.append(f"{lid}: blast_radius needs level, affects and effect") - for field in ("path", "verification"): - if not str(lane.get(field) or "").strip(): - errors.append(f"{lid}: {field} is empty") - refs = lane.get("owner_lane") or [] - if not refs: - errors.append(f"{lid}: owner_lane is empty") - for ref in refs: - if not TASK_REF.match(ref): - errors.append(f"{lid}: owner_lane {ref!r} is not a workplan or task id") - elif ref.startswith("NK-WP-") and ref not in known_nk: - errors.append(f"{lid}: owner_lane {ref} not found in workplans/") - for key, owners in seen.items(): - for item in lane.get(key) or []: - item = str(item) - if item in owners: - errors.append(f"{lid}: {key} {item} already in lane {owners[item]}") - owners[item] = lid - holding, declared = declared_identities(root) - secrets, items = standard_secrets(root), crisis_items(root) - for kind, required, allowed in ( - ("identities", holding, declared), - ("credentials", secrets, secrets), - ("crisis_items", items, items), - ): - for missing in sorted(required - set(seen[kind])): - errors.append( - f"no lane for {kind[:-1] if kind != 'identities' else 'identity'} {missing}" - ) - for extra in sorted(set(seen[kind]) - allowed): - errors.append( - f"lane {seen[kind][extra]} names unknown {kind} entry {extra}" - ) - return lanes, errors - - -def main(argv=None): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - parser.add_argument( - "register", nargs="?", default=str(ROOT / "tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml") - ) - parser.add_argument("--root", default=str(ROOT)) - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - lanes, errors = check( - yaml.safe_load(Path(args.register).read_text()), Path(args.root) - ) - by_state = {} - for lane in lanes: - by_state[lane.get("state")] = by_state.get(lane.get("state"), 0) + 1 - for error in errors: - print(f"ERROR: {error}") - print( - f"rotation lanes: {len(lanes)} ({', '.join(f'{n} {s}' for s, n in sorted(by_state.items()))}); " - f"{len(errors)} error(s)" - ) - return 1 if errors else 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml b/tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index c3b6be0..0000000 --- a/tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,241 +0,0 @@ -# Credential rotation lanes (NK-WP-0055-T15). Value-free: names, paths and procedures only. -# -# One lane is one way a credential (or a family of credentials rotated the same way) is -# replaced. `check.py` fails if a credential named in the service-identity declarations, -# Credential Management v0.2 section 6 or the crisis custody list has no lane here. -# -# state: admitted (owner lane accepted and runnable) | designed (procedure written, not admitted) -# | deferred (a founder decision holds it) | none (no rotation; reason given) -# blast_radius.level: minimal | low | medium | high -schema: netkingdom.rotation-lanes.v0.1 -reviewed: "2026-10-28" -lanes: - # --- service credentials --------------------------------------------------------------- - - id: lldap-directory-bind - class: service - credentials: [LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS] - identities: [lldap/admin] - path: "Three-way coordinated change: LLDAP admin password, Authelia and KeyCape bind config, then restart both (Credential Management section 6)" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [lldap, authelia, keycape], effect: "SSO and token issuance fail until both consumers carry the new password"} - verification: "Authelia login and a KeyCape authorization-code flow succeed; an LDAP bind with the old password is refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0054-T05, NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - note: "Bind split (svc-* accounts) replaces this three-way lane; rotation deferral 1591daa1 holds it" - - id: lldap-service-binds - class: service - credentials: [] - identities: [lldap/svc-authelia, lldap/svc-keycape, lldap/svc-privacyidea, lldap/svc-provisioner] - path: "Per consumer: new bind password in LLDAP, delivered Secret updated, that consumer alone restarted" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [one consumer], effect: "Only the rotated consumer loses directory access"} - verification: "The consumer's own login or resolver check passes; the old password's bind is refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0054-T05] - state: designed - note: "Accounts are planned; the lane becomes real with the bind split" - - id: lldap-super-admin - class: service - credentials: [] - identities: [lldap/ld-admin] - path: "To be decided with the account (NK-WP-0054-T06)" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [lldap], effect: "Directory administration"} - verification: "Founder login to the LLDAP UI with the new password; old password refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0054-T06] - state: designed - - id: identity-provisioner-token - class: service - credentials: [] - identities: [identity-provisioner/identity-provisioner-token] - path: "Owner rotation of Kubernetes Secret identity-provisioner-token, user-engine and provisioner restarted together" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [user-engine, identity-provisioner], effect: "User onboarding pauses during the swap"} - verification: "A synthetic onboarding call from user-engine is accepted; a call with the old token is refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - - id: session-and-signing-secrets - class: service - credentials: [PI_SECRET_KEY, LLDAP_JWT_SECRET, AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET] - identities: [] - path: "Replace the value in its Secret and restart the one service (Credential Management section 6)" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [privacyidea, lldap, authelia], effect: "Existing sessions of that service end; users sign in again"} - verification: "Fresh login to the service succeeds after restart" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - - id: keycape-signing-key - class: service - credentials: [KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY] - identities: [] - path: "New signing key published in JWKS, then switched; KeyCape has a single key kid=key-1 and no rotation state today" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [keycape, every relying party], effect: "All issued tokens become invalid; brief authentication outage"} - verification: "JWKS serves the new kid; a fresh token validates at OpenBao and access-engine; a token signed by the old key is refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - note: "Overlap rotation (two keys in JWKS) is not implemented; until it is, rotation is an outage window" - - id: privacyidea-pepper - class: service - credentials: [PI_PEPPER] - identities: [] - path: "No rotation: re-hashing every privacyIDEA user password would be required" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [privacyidea], effect: "All privacyIDEA-local passwords"} - verification: "Not applicable; custody is proven by the restore drill decrypting token material" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0053-T02] - state: none - - id: privacyidea-resolver-bind - class: service - credentials: [] - identities: [privacyidea/keycape-factor-reader] - path: "ESO renews the reader token under policy keycape-factor-renewer" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [keycape], effect: "Factor checks fail closed if renewal stops"} - verification: "KeyCape MFA step passes after renewal; ESO status Ready with a fresh refresh time" - owner_lane: [RPF-WP-0035] - state: admitted - - id: privacyidea-legacy-trigger-admin - class: service - credentials: [] - identities: [privacyidea/trigger-admin] - path: "Revoke rather than rotate; revocation needs its own approval" - blast_radius: {level: medium, affects: [privacyidea], effect: "Whatever still triggers challenges with it"} - verification: "Token listed as revoked in privacyIDEA; no consumer reports failures" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0054-T06] - state: none - # --- database credentials -------------------------------------------------------------- - - id: privacyidea-database - class: database - credentials: [PI_DB_PASSWORD] - identities: [postgresql/privacyidea] - path: "Atomic update of the PostgreSQL role password and the privacyIDEA pod Secret (Credential Management section 6)" - blast_radius: {level: medium, affects: [privacyidea, postgresql], effect: "MFA unavailable between the two changes"} - verification: "privacyIDEA health and one OTP validation succeed; a connection with the old password is refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - # --- client secrets -------------------------------------------------------------------- - - id: authelia-keycape-client - class: client-secret - credentials: [AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET] - identities: [authelia/keycape] - path: "Two-way atomic: Authelia verifier and KeyCape upstream secret together (Credential Management section 6)" - blast_radius: {level: medium, affects: [authelia, keycape], effect: "KeyCape cannot complete upstream login until both carry the new secret"} - verification: "A KeyCape login through Authelia succeeds; the old secret is refused at Authelia's token endpoint" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - - id: keycape-registered-clients - class: client-secret - credentials: [] - identities: [keycape/secrets-engine-openbao, keycape/secrets-engine-approval, keycape/secrets-engine-requester, - keycape/approval-engine-operator, keycape/informed-decision-sitting-requester, keycape/rapp-qonto] - path: "Mint in custody, then deliver through the credential broker; KeyCape and the consumer read it at start" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [keycape, the one consuming service], effect: "Only that client's token requests fail during the swap"} - verification: "client_credentials token issued for the consumer with its registered scopes; old secret refused" - owner_lane: [RPF-WP-0035, RPF-WP-0055-T01] - state: designed - note: "First-generation custody admitted in RPF-WP-0035; coordinated rotation is RPF-WP-0055-T01 (backlog)" - # --- OpenBao-issued credentials -------------------------------------------------------- - - id: openbao-federated-roles - class: openbao-issued - credentials: [] - identities: [openbao/netkingdom-platform-admin, openbao/credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate, - openbao/fluid-telegram-operators, openbao/secrets-engine-openbao] - path: "Nothing to rotate: tokens are short-lived from OIDC/JWT login; role and policy change by reviewed change" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [openbao], effect: "A role change affects only new logins"} - verification: "Role readback matches the committed role file (service-identity metadata exporter, RPF-WP-0067)" - owner_lane: [RPF-WP-0035] - state: admitted - - id: openbao-approle-secret-ids - class: openbao-issued - credentials: [] - identities: [openbao/coding-agent] - path: "AppRole secret-id reissued by railiance-platform; JWT role is federated" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [coding agent], effect: "Agent loses OpenBao access until the new secret-id is delivered"} - verification: "Login with the new secret-id succeeds; the old secret-id accessor is destroyed" - owner_lane: [RPF-WP-0035] - state: designed - - id: openbao-workload-secrets - class: openbao-issued - credentials: [] - identities: [] - path: "KV values replaced through the platform operator-write CCR lane; ESO delivers; prefer leases where the engine supports them" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [the one workload], effect: "That workload until ESO refreshes"} - verification: "ExternalSecret Ready with a fresh sync; workload health passes" - owner_lane: [RPF-WP-0035] - state: admitted - - id: audit-core-sender-bearers - class: openbao-issued - credentials: [] - identities: [] - path: "Per-sender bearer in platform/workloads/audit-core/senders, delivered by ESO as a mounted file" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [one audit sender], effect: "That sender's events queue until the new bearer is delivered"} - verification: "Sender's next POST /v1/events is accepted; audit-core refuses the old bearer" - owner_lane: [RPF-WP-0035] - state: admitted - # --- break-glass material -------------------------------------------------------------- - - id: backup-age-key - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - crisis_items: ["1"] - path: "New age key, re-encrypt the backup stream and the break-glass copy, prove a restore with the new key before destroying the old one" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [identity backup, break-glass copy], effect: "Every past backup stays readable only with the old key"} - verification: "Isolated restore drill (NK-WP-0053) decrypts a generation made with the new key" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0053-T02] - state: designed - - id: custodian-age-key - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - crisis_items: ["1b"] - path: "Credential Management section 6 'Age key rotation': new key, make sops-rotate, commit, deliver a new bundle before revoking the old key" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [SOPS custody files, bootstrap bundles], effect: "Repository custody files unreadable until re-encrypted"} - verification: "make sops-custody-check passes with the new key; make check-secrets passes" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - - id: storage-share-backup-account - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - crisis_items: ["2"] - path: "Provider app-password reissue by the founder; old app password revoked at the provider" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [offsite retrieval], effect: "Retrieval of the backup ciphertext"} - verification: "Independent retrieval (retrieve-identity.py) downloads the newest generation with the new password" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - - id: openbao-unseal-and-root - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - crisis_items: ["3"] - path: "Rekey of unseal shares by ceremony; the initial root token is revoked at production entry and later roots come from generate-root" - blast_radius: {level: high, affects: [openbao], effect: "OpenBao cannot be unsealed if the new shares are lost"} - verification: "Restore drill unseals with the new shares; root revoke receipt shows revoke-self 204 then lookup-self 403" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T16, NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: designed - - id: king-credential - class: break-glass - credentials: [BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD] - identities: [platform/platform-root] - crisis_items: ["4"] - path: "Explicit maintenance window; new password and factors into the independent password safe (Credential Management section 6)" - blast_radius: {level: minimal, affects: [break-glass login], effect: "None while unused"} - verification: "King-path drill passes with the new material" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred - - id: founder-admission-signing-key - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - crisis_items: ["5"] - path: "New ed25519 key, allowed_signers updated in the restore admission config, old key removed" - blast_radius: {level: medium, affects: [restore and drill admissions], effect: "No new restore attempt can be admitted until the new key is trusted"} - verification: "A drill admission signed with the new key is accepted; one signed with the old key is refused" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: designed - - id: personal-admin-credentials - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - identities: [privacyidea/pi-admin, platform/tegwick] - crisis_items: ["6", "7"] - path: "Owner-managed personal credentials: password change in the service, OTP re-enrolment, password safe updated" - blast_radius: {level: low, affects: [the one person's access], effect: "Only that login"} - verification: "Login with the new credential succeeds; the crisis list's last-proven date is updated" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0054-T07] - state: admitted - - id: operator-cluster-access - class: break-glass - credentials: [] - crisis_items: ["9"] - path: "Replace the static SSH key with a warden certificate lane and reissue the admin kubeconfig client certificate" - blast_radius: {level: medium, affects: [production host and cluster access], effect: "Founder loses direct production access if both lapse"} - verification: "bridge check k3s-api-railiance01 and a read-only kubectl get nodes succeed with the new material" - owner_lane: [NK-WP-0055-T06] - state: deferred diff --git a/tools/rotation-lanes/tests/test_check.py b/tools/rotation-lanes/tests/test_check.py deleted file mode 100644 index 000f014..0000000 --- a/tools/rotation-lanes/tests/test_check.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,118 +0,0 @@ -"""Synthetic tests for the rotation-lane coverage check (NK-WP-0055-T15).""" - -import importlib.util -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -SOURCE = Path(__file__).parents[1] / "check.py" -spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("rotation_lanes_check", SOURCE) -rl = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) -spec.loader.exec_module(rl) - -STANDARD = "# CM\n\n## 6. Secret Rotation\n\n| Secret | Blast |\n|---|---|\n| `APP_SECRET` | Low |\n\n## 7. Next\n| `NOT_IN_SIX` | x |\n" -CRISIS = "| # | Item |\n|---|---|\n| 1 | **key** | a |\n| 2 | ~~retired~~ | b |\n" - - -def make_root(tmp_path): - (tmp_path / "tools/service-identity/declarations").mkdir(parents=True) - (tmp_path / "canon/standards").mkdir(parents=True) - (tmp_path / "docs").mkdir() - (tmp_path / "workplans").mkdir() - decl = { - "service": "svc", - "identities": [ - {"name": "bind", "custody": ["delivered-secret"]}, - {"name": "sso", "custody": ["none"]}, - ], - } - (tmp_path / "tools/service-identity/declarations/svc.yaml").write_text( - yaml.safe_dump(decl) - ) - (tmp_path / "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md").write_text(STANDARD) - (tmp_path / "docs/crisis-custody-list.md").write_text(CRISIS) - (tmp_path / "workplans/NK-WP-0001-x.md").write_text("id: NK-WP-0001-T01\n") - return tmp_path - - -def lane(**over): - base = { - "id": "l1", - "class": "service", - "state": "designed", - "path": "swap it", - "verification": "old refused", - "owner_lane": ["NK-WP-0001-T01"], - "blast_radius": {"level": "low", "affects": ["svc"], "effect": "sessions end"}, - "identities": ["svc/bind"], - "credentials": ["APP_SECRET"], - "crisis_items": ["1"], - } - base.update(over) - return base - - -def test_complete_register_passes(tmp_path): - _, errors = rl.check({"lanes": [lane()]}, make_root(tmp_path)) - assert errors == [] - - -def test_missing_coverage_is_reported(tmp_path): - _, errors = rl.check( - {"lanes": [lane(identities=[], credentials=[], crisis_items=[])]}, - make_root(tmp_path), - ) - assert "no lane for identity svc/bind" in errors - assert "no lane for credential APP_SECRET" in errors - assert "no lane for crisis_item 1" in errors - - -def test_federated_identity_may_be_named_but_is_not_required(tmp_path): - _, errors = rl.check( - {"lanes": [lane(identities=["svc/bind", "svc/sso"])]}, make_root(tmp_path) - ) - assert errors == [] - - -def test_retired_crisis_row_and_other_sections_are_ignored(tmp_path): - _, errors = rl.check( - { - "lanes": [ - lane(crisis_items=["1", "2"], credentials=["APP_SECRET", "NOT_IN_SIX"]) - ] - }, - make_root(tmp_path), - ) - assert "lane l1 names unknown crisis_items entry 2" in errors - assert "lane l1 names unknown credentials entry NOT_IN_SIX" in errors - - -def test_lane_fields_and_owner_refs_are_enforced(tmp_path): - bad = lane( - state="maybe", - verification="", - owner_lane=["NK-WP-0099-T01", "bogus"], - blast_radius={"level": "huge"}, - ) - _, errors = rl.check({"lanes": [bad]}, make_root(tmp_path)) - assert any("state must be" in e for e in errors) - assert "l1: verification is empty" in errors - assert any("blast_radius needs" in e for e in errors) - assert "l1: owner_lane NK-WP-0099-T01 not found in workplans/" in errors - assert any("'bogus' is not a workplan" in e for e in errors) - - -def test_duplicate_assignment_is_reported(tmp_path): - _, errors = rl.check( - {"lanes": [lane(), lane(id="l2", credentials=[], crisis_items=[])]}, - make_root(tmp_path), - ) - assert "l2: identities svc/bind already in lane l1" in errors - - -def test_checked_in_register_is_complete(): - root = Path(__file__).parents[3] - _, errors = rl.check( - yaml.safe_load((root / "tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml").read_text()), root - ) - assert errors == [] diff --git a/tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md b/tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md index e6a658a..bc50cb8 100644 --- a/tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md +++ b/tools/security-bootstrap-console/README.md @@ -158,12 +158,11 @@ recovery codes in this UI. If the live privacyIDEA instance has lost the `coulomb` realm, LLDAP resolver, or self-service policies, open **Usecases & Runbooks** and copy **Repair -privacyIDEA realm and resolver**. The action is attended: it prompts for -the `pi-admin` password and, only when the resolver is absent, its LLDAP bind -password. `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh` keeps them in memory, -repairs missing core configuration without replaying MFA policies, and runs the -same functional proof as `verify-t06.sh`. Missing onboarding policies require -their existing owner procedure; this action does not recreate them. The UI does not store either +privacyIDEA realm and self-service**. The action is attended: it prompts for +the `pi-admin` password and the LLDAP bind/admin password, writes them only to a +private temporary directory, runs +`sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh`, removes the temporary files on +exit, and then runs `sso-mfa/k8s/verify-t06.sh`. The UI does not store either password, and TOTP enrollment or re-enrollment remains a human step in `https://pink-account.coulomb.social`. diff --git a/tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py b/tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py index 4f7e8ca..2115683 100755 --- a/tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py +++ b/tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ OPENBAO_UNSEAL_CUSTODY_MODEL_SPECS: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = { "implementation": "implemented", "summary": ( "Init/unseal material in SOPS/age bundle; creds-bootstrap-agent applies " - "during an attended rebuild with explicit temporary custody input." + "for fast unattended rebuild test cycles." ), "automation_entry": "sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-bootstrap-agent.sh", "custody_strength": "lab-fast-iteration", @@ -1259,25 +1259,24 @@ def print_cleanup_evidence_template() -> None: def lifecycle_flow_template() -> dict[str, Any]: - """Blank evidence worksheet; every assurance requires actual owner evidence.""" return { - "flow_version": "v2", - "operator": "", - "implemented_as": "", - "doc_reference": "docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md", - "review_date": "", - "effective_access_model": "", - "non_root_guardrail": "", - "audit_event_model": "", - "onboard_user_supported": False, - "temporary_lock_supported": False, - "permanent_offboard_supported": False, - "credential_review_supported": False, - "fabric_admin_supported": False, - "shows_effective_access_before_save": False, - "privileged_roles_require_mfa": False, - "prevents_platform_root_grant": False, - "no_secret_material_recorded": False, + "flow_version": "v1", + "operator": "platform-custodian", + "implemented_as": "security-bootstrap-console guidance + existing sso-mfa/k8s scripts (lldap/create-user.sh, lldap/break-glass.sh, privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh, privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh) + direct LLDAP GraphQL for lock/offboard + console preview of effective access", + "doc_reference": "docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md + NET-WP-0017 workplan T05", + "review_date": "2026-06-03", + "effective_access_model": "Actor class + scope determines groups/roles in LLDAP + privacyIDEA + KeyCape claims. Non-root users get net-kingdom-users (or tenant-specific); fabric admins get scoped groups without net-kingdom-admins or platform policies. Previews list exact groups, no OpenBao root, no king credential.", + "non_root_guardrail": "Creation and modification paths explicitly block granting net-kingdom-admins or platform-root equivalent unless actor=king (which is excluded for normal flows).", + "audit_event_model": "All lifecycle actions produce non-secret progress/audit records via State Hub events or local evidence; no secrets in logs. LLDAP/PI changes are auditable via their own logs + NetKingdom progress.", + "onboard_user_supported": True, + "temporary_lock_supported": True, + "permanent_offboard_supported": True, + "credential_review_supported": True, + "fabric_admin_supported": True, + "shows_effective_access_before_save": True, + "privileged_roles_require_mfa": True, + "prevents_platform_root_grant": True, + "no_secret_material_recorded": True, } @@ -1286,30 +1285,34 @@ def print_lifecycle_flow_template() -> None: def onboarding_dry_run_template() -> dict[str, Any]: - """Blank evidence worksheet; every assurance requires actual owner evidence.""" + """Non-secret evidence template for NET-WP-0017-T06 onboarding dry run. + Use after running the T05 lifecycle flow for a scoped non-root subject. + Fill with actual results from LLDAP queries, create-user output, GraphQL + lock/offboard, check scripts, KeyCape verify, etc. Must not contain secrets. + """ return { - "dry_run_date": "", - "operator": "", - "subject_reference": "", - "actor_class": "", - "tenant_scope": "", - "effective_access_summary": "", - "audit_progress_reference": "", - "lock_offboard_result": "", - "post_dry_run_disposition": "", - "lldap_identity_verified": False, - "groups_verified": False, - "mfa_enrollment_verified": False, - "keycape_oidc_claims_verified": False, - "expected_scope_verified": False, - "no_platform_root_authority": False, - "no_openbao_root_authority": False, - "lock_path_exercised_or_simulated": False, - "offboard_path_exercised_or_simulated": False, - "credentials_reviewed": False, - "audit_progress_recorded": False, - "no_secret_material_recorded": False, - "groups": [], + "dry_run_date": "YYYY-MM-DD", + "operator": "platform-custodian", + "subject_reference": "dryrun-username (dryrun@example)", + "actor_class": "user", # or "tenant-admin" / "fabric-admin". MUST NOT be "king credential" + "tenant_scope": "none (or e.g. 'tenant:foo' for scoped)", + "effective_access_summary": "LLDAP: only net-kingdom-users (or scoped). MFA self-enroll available. KeyCape OIDC claims: groups + email + sub (no platform-admin). No OpenBao root or platform policies. Lock/offboard exercised via group removal + delete.", + "audit_progress_reference": "State Hub /progress/ id for T06 + this evidence file + LLDAP audit if enabled", + "lock_offboard_result": "lock: removeUserFromGroup succeeded; offboard: deleteUser succeeded; post state: user absent, LLDAP clean", + "post_dry_run_disposition": "Test subject fully removed with no residual access or groups. LLDAP users back to [admin, platform-root]. No plaintext left.", + "lldap_identity_verified": True, + "groups_verified": True, + "mfa_enrollment_verified": True, + "keycape_oidc_claims_verified": True, + "expected_scope_verified": True, + "no_platform_root_authority": True, + "no_openbao_root_authority": True, + "lock_path_exercised_or_simulated": True, + "offboard_path_exercised_or_simulated": True, + "credentials_reviewed": True, + "audit_progress_recorded": True, + "no_secret_material_recorded": True, + "groups": ["net-kingdom-users"], # membership during the dry-run lifetime (before lock/offboard) } @@ -1317,24 +1320,120 @@ def print_onboarding_dry_run_template() -> None: print(json.dumps(onboarding_dry_run_template(), indent=2)) -def print_dry_run_oidc_claims_verification(subject: str = "dryrun-user", groups: list[str] | None = None) -> int: - """Compatibility refusal: inferred directory groups cannot verify issued claims.""" - print("Retired: inferred groups are not verified OIDC claims.") - print("See docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md; retain actual issuer and consumer evidence.") - return 2 +def print_dry_run_oidc_claims_verification(subject: str = "dryrun-user", groups: list[str] | None = None) -> None: + """T05 helper: non-secret OIDC claims verification for dry-run subject. + Computes expected claims based on LLDAP groups (no secrets). + Used by orchestrator and console 'onboarding-dry-run-claims' . + """ + if groups is None: + groups = ["net-kingdom-users"] + print("OIDC CLAIMS VERIFICATION FOR DRY-RUN (non-secret)") + print(f"Subject: {subject}") + print(f"LLDAP groups (during dry-run): {groups}") + print("") + print("Expected KeyCape OIDC claims (inferred from groups + standard config):") + claims = { + "sub": subject, + "email": f"{subject}@example", + "groups": groups, + "preferred_username": subject, + } + print(json.dumps(claims, indent=2)) + print("") + print("OpenBao policy binding (from T01 config): platform-admin role only binds 'net-kingdom-admins' group.") + if "net-kingdom-admins" in groups: + print("WARNING: would grant platform-admin (not for non-root dry-run)") + else: + print("No platform-admin or root authority (correct for non-root).") + print("To verify live: after onboard, use the lifecycle dry-run script which exercises KeyCape verify + LLDAP.") def print_lifecycle_guide() -> None: - print("USER LIFECYCLE OWNER ROUTES") - print("Ordinary onboarding: use User Engine registration for an admitted client and tenant.") - print("Identity provisioning and single-use password setup stay with the IAM provider.") - print("User Engine owns account lifecycle and product memberships; IAM owns coarse authentication groups.") - print("Tenant lifecycle changes must preserve other tenants and global identity state.") - print("Platform-root bootstrap and offline recovery require their separate owner-reviewed ceremony.") - print("Legacy account creation, pattern cleanup and inferred-claims commands are retired.") - print("Record actual identity, issued claims, effective access, denial and exact cleanup receipts.") - print("Blank templates are unverified; structural validation alone is not native acceptance.") - print("See docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md for contracts and remaining recovery work.") + print("NET-WP-0017-T05 LIFECYCLE OPERATOR FLOW GUIDE") + print("") + print("This implements the first practical operator flow per docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md") + print("All actions are non-secret. Secrets stay in password-safe / k8s secrets / operator memory.") + print("Every privileged flow shows EFFECTIVE ACCESS PREVIEW before any create/save.") + print("") + print("=== 1. ONBOARD SCOPED NON-ROOT USER ===") + print("Preview effective (do this mentally or via future UI card):") + print(" - actor_class=platform-admin or tenant-admin or user") + print(" - scope= (for tenant: e.g. 'tenant:foo')") + print(" - groups: net-kingdom-users + optional scoped; NEVER net-kingdom-admins for non-root") + print(" - MFA: always required for privileged; self-enroll at pink-account") + print(" - KeyCape OIDC claims will include groups + email; no platform-root policy") + print(" - OpenBao: no root, only if policy granted via group") + print("") + print("Command (run in operator shell; pass never echoed to console):") + print(" cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap") + print(" KUBECTL=/home/worsch/.local/bin/kubectl ./create-user.sh \\") + print(" \"Display Name\" # add --admin ONLY for platform admins") + print(" # Then: user self-enrolls TOTP; verify with:") + print(" cd ../privacyidea; KUBECTL=... ./check-user-mfa-state.sh ") + print("") + print("Blocked if: actor requests net-kingdom-admins without explicit king-credential path.") + print("") + print("=== 2. TEMPORARILY LOCK USER ===") + print(" # Use LLDAP admin UI or GraphQL to remove from active groups temporarily") + print(" # Or privacyIDEA: disable token for user (preserves history)") + print(" # Preview: shows current groups, tokens, sessions before lock") + print(" # Record: State Hub note or evidence with unlock date") + print(" # Reversible by re-adding group / enabling token") + print("") + print("=== 3. PERMANENTLY OFFBOARD ===") + print(" # 1. Select user, require reason+date") + print(" # 2. Transfer resources (manual for now)") + print(" # 3. Revoke: use LLDAP to remove groups; privacyIDEA disable+delete tokens if needed") + print(" # 4. For KeyCape/Authelia sessions: rely on token expiry + group removal") + print(" # Record non-secret offboard evidence (see T06 validator)") + print(" # Platform-admin offboard needs second human confirm") + print("") + print("=== 4. REVIEW CREDENTIALS / MFA STATE ===") + print(" cd sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea") + print(" ./check-user-mfa-state.sh ") + print(" # Also: LLDAP GraphQL query for groups/members; manual review of owned principals") + print(" # Actions: rotate (creds-rotate make), change groups via create-user or LLDAP UI") + print("") + print("=== 5. CREATE FABRIC/TENANT ADMIN (no platform-root) ===") + print(" # Same as onboard, but:") + print(" # - actor_class = tenant-admin or fabric-admin") + print(" # - scope = tenant:xxx or fabric:yyy") + print(" # - groups: scoped group only (create via LLDAP if needed)") + print(" # - NO --admin flag") + print(" # - Preview explicitly: 'will NOT be in net-kingdom-admins; no OpenBao platform/ policy'") + print(" # Handover: produce checklist (name fabric, assign admin, audit expectations)") + print("") + print("All flows record non-secret audit via: console evidence, State Hub /progress/, or k8s audit.") + print("See also: create-user.sh --help , break-glass.sh for recovery accounts (king only).") + print("Next gate: T06 dry-run using this flow + evidence.") + print("") + + + print("=== T06 DRY-RUN EXECUTION (adjacent polish) ===") + print("Use after the above onboard/lock/offboard steps for a scoped non-root subject.") + print("This makes the T06 gate repeatable and less manual. See docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md Step 7 and NET-WP-0019.") + print("") + print("Preferred: one-command via make (handles /tmp safe workspace + trap + k8s fallback for secrets, never persistent bootstrap/secrets for dry-runs):") + print(" make security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run SUBJECT= EMAIL= DISPLAY=\"\"") + print("") + print("Or direct script:") + print(" cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap") + print(" ./dry-run-nonroot-user.sh \"Display Name\" [--actor user] [--scope none]") + print(" # It will: safe secret extract (/tmp + trap), create --test, verifs (MFA/KeyCape), optional lock/offboard, emit /tmp/.../evidence.json, cleanup.") + print("") + print("Validate evidence:") + print(" make security-bootstrap-validate-onboarding-dry-run") + print("") + print("Claims verification (non-secret, infers from LLDAP groups + T01 role):") + print(" python3 tools/security-bootstrap-console/security_bootstrap_console.py onboarding-dry-run-claims --subject --groups net-kingdom-users") + print("") + print("Cleanup pattern-matched test users:") + print(" make security-bootstrap-lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users PATTERN=t06-*") + print(" # Or console 'lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users --pattern t06-*'") + print("") + print("All steps leave LLDAP clean, no plaintext secrets on disk, evidence with required bools (effective before save, no root grant, verified identity/claims, actor_class != king, etc.). See console lifecycle-flow-template / onboarding-dry-run-template and smooth-bootstrap-guide.md.") + print("See workplan T06/0019 notes for the 2026-06-03 execution.") + print("") def compact_command_output(text: str) -> str: @@ -2904,12 +3003,12 @@ def runbook_payloads(data: dict[str, Any]) -> list[dict[str, str]]: ), { "name": "User lifecycle dry-run (T06)", - "description": "Retired: use User Engine and IAM owner flows with actual consumer evidence; no pattern deletion or inferred-claims verification.", - "subsystem": "User Engine / IAM", + "description": "Execute non-root onboarding dry-run (create/verify/lock/offboard), check LLDAP/groups/MFA/KeyCape claims, produce evidence. See NET-WP-0019 and dry-run-nonroot-user.sh .", + "subsystem": "LLDAP / privacyIDEA / KeyCape", "responsibility": "platform-custodian", "email": role_email(data, "role_platform_custodian_email"), - "location": "docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md", - "state": "retired", + "location": "sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh ; make security-bootstrap-onboarding-dry-run ; console 'onboarding-dry-run' ; NET-WP-0019", + "state": "template", }, ] @@ -3059,8 +3158,8 @@ def runbook_command_payloads(data: dict[str, Any]) -> list[dict[str, str]]: return [ action( - "Repair privacyIDEA realm and resolver", - "Prompt for pi-admin and, only for a missing resolver, its LLDAP bind password. Restore missing resolver/realm configuration and tuning while preserving credentials, existing realm bindings, defaults and owner-managed MFA policies; then run functional T06 verification. Passwords stay in memory. Conflicts require an owner-reviewed migration.", + "Repair privacyIDEA realm and self-service", + "Prompt for pi-admin and LLDAP bind passwords, recreate the coulomb realm, LLDAP resolver, self-enrollment policy, and passthrough bootstrap policy, then run T06 verification. The wrapper keeps passwords in a private temporary directory that is removed on exit.", privacyidea_realm_command, ), action( @@ -5024,12 +5123,12 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: sub.add_parser("custody-roster-template", help="Print non-secret custody roster JSON template.") sub.add_parser("cleanup-evidence-template", help="Print non-secret NET-WP-0017-T03/T04 cleanup/taint evidence JSON template.") sub.add_parser("lifecycle-flow-template", help="Print non-secret NET-WP-0017-T05 lifecycle operator flow evidence JSON template.") - sub.add_parser("lifecycle-guide", help="Print current User Engine and IAM lifecycle owner guidance.") + sub.add_parser("lifecycle-guide", help="Print the practical T05 operator flow guide with commands and previews (no secrets).") sub.add_parser("onboarding-dry-run-template", help="Print non-secret NET-WP-0017-T06 onboarding dry-run evidence JSON template (skeleton for T06 evidence).") - sub.add_parser("onboarding-dry-run", help="Retired; prints current lifecycle owner guidance and exits with failure.") - cl = sub.add_parser("lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users", help="Retired; prints current lifecycle owner guidance and exits with failure.") - cl.add_argument("--pattern", default="t06-*", help="Ignored compatibility argument; pattern deletion is retired") - claims = sub.add_parser("onboarding-dry-run-claims", help="Retired; prints current lifecycle owner guidance and exits with failure.") + sub.add_parser("onboarding-dry-run", help="Run (or guide) a T06 non-root dry-run using the orchestrator script (sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/dry-run-nonroot-user.sh). See NET-WP-0019.") + cl = sub.add_parser("lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users", help="Clean up test/dry-run users by pattern (T04 helper, NET-WP-0019). Example: --pattern t06-*") + cl.add_argument("--pattern", default="t06-*", help="Regex or glob pattern for test users to offboard (default t06-*)") + claims = sub.add_parser("onboarding-dry-run-claims", help="T05: Verify expected OIDC claims for a dry-run subject (non-secret, based on groups). See NET-WP-0019-T05.") claims.add_argument("--subject", default="dryrun-user", help="Test subject username") claims.add_argument("--groups", default="net-kingdom-users", help="Comma-separated groups during dry-run") sub.add_parser("handover-checklist", help="Print handover and cleanup checklist.") @@ -5092,10 +5191,6 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: parser = build_parser() args = parser.parse_args(argv) - if args.command in {"onboarding-dry-run", "lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users", "onboarding-dry-run-claims"}: - print("Retired: legacy LLDAP lifecycle automation and inferred-claims verification.") - print("See docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md for supported owner routes.") - return 2 metadata_commands = { "status", "validate-king-kit", @@ -5160,6 +5255,37 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: if args.command == "onboarding-dry-run-template": print_onboarding_dry_run_template() return 0 + if args.command == "onboarding-dry-run": + print("NET-WP-0019 / T06 Dry-Run (orchestrator)") + print("Run the script directly for full automation:") + print(" cd sso-mfa/k8s/lldap") + print(" ./dry-run-nonroot-user.sh \"Display Name\" [--actor user] [--scope none]") + print("") + print("It will:") + print(" - safely extract admin pass into /tmp (trap cleanup)") + print(" - create the user (non-root)") + print(" - verify LLDAP/groups, MFA readiness, KeyCape OIDC path") + print(" - exercise lock (remove group) + offboard (delete)") + print(" - emit /tmp/netkingdom-onboarding-dry-run/evidence.json (from template)") + print(" - clean up") + print("") + print("Then validate:") + print(" make security-bootstrap-validate-onboarding-dry-run") + print("") + print("See also: make security-bootstrap-lifecycle-guide (T06 section) and the NET-WP-0019 workplan.") + return 0 + if args.command == "lifecycle-cleanup-dryrun-users": + pat = getattr(args, "pattern", "t06-*") if hasattr(args, "pattern") else "t06-*" + print("Delegating cleanup for pattern", pat, "to orchestrator...") + import subprocess, os + script = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "sso-mfa", "k8s", "lldap", "dry-run-nonroot-user.sh") + script = os.path.abspath(script) + subprocess.call(["bash", script, "--cleanup-only", pat]) + return 0 + if args.command == "onboarding-dry-run-claims": + groups = getattr(args, "groups", "net-kingdom-users").split(",") + print_dry_run_oidc_claims_verification(getattr(args, "subject", "dryrun-user"), groups) + return 0 if args.command == "handover-checklist": print_handover_checklist() return 0 diff --git a/tools/security-bootstrap-console/tests/test_security_bootstrap_console.py b/tools/security-bootstrap-console/tests/test_security_bootstrap_console.py index d4dc76b..64d507d 100644 --- a/tools/security-bootstrap-console/tests/test_security_bootstrap_console.py +++ b/tools/security-bootstrap-console/tests/test_security_bootstrap_console.py @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ def test_lifecycle_flow_template(): tmpl = console.lifecycle_flow_template() assert "flow_version" in tmpl assert "onboard_user_supported" in tmpl - assert tmpl["onboard_user_supported"] is False + assert tmpl["onboard_user_supported"] is True def test_runbook_payloads_includes_dry_run(): # minimal data @@ -143,8 +143,7 @@ def test_runbook_payloads_includes_dry_run(): names = [p["name"] for p in payloads] assert "User lifecycle dry-run (T06)" in names dry = next(p for p in payloads if "dry-run" in p["name"].lower()) - assert dry["state"] == "retired" - assert dry["location"] == "docs/legacy-lldap-lifecycle-retirement.md" + assert "NET-WP-0019" in dry.get("location", "") or "dry-run-nonroot-user.sh" in dry.get("location", "") def test_audit_core_posture_ready_with_bootstrap_risk(): data = { diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/README.md b/tools/security-case-types/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index d25d2e9..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,112 +0,0 @@ -# security-case-types tools - -Validator and renderer for SecurityCaseTypes and SecurityCases -(`canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md`, schemas -`canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json` and -`security-case_v0.1.schema.json`). - -```bash -# a type directory: type.yaml, README.md sections, tests, example cases -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-type security-case-types/ - -# a case against its type (security-case-types//type.yaml) -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-case --types security-case-types - -# render a case into the composer's plan plus materialization, follow-through, -# verification and rollback; execution is never permitted -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py render \ - --types security-case-types capabilities/playbooks/*.yaml -``` - -Only `implemented` types accept cases. `--allow-unimplemented` exists for a type's -own example cases while the type is being written and acknowledged. - -The validator refuses, among other things: missing sections, unknown or unpinned -capabilities, attended steps without justification, steps or materialized items -without a rollback, verification without a negative check or that reads a value, -templates with unknown parameters, credential-shaped values anywhere, secret -parameters that are not custody references, and high-risk types without founder -acceptance. - -To start a type: copy `security-case-types/_template/`, rename the directory to -the type id, and rewrite every section. The template's tests travel with it: -rename `tests/test_type.py` to `tests/test__contract.py` so module names stay unique. - -Tests: `python3 -m pytest tools/security-case-types/tests security-case-types/*/tests`. - -## Explicit source versions - -The default --types root is unchanged. Select a separately acknowledged source version explicitly, without moving its package into the default root: - -```bash -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py validate-case \ - security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml \ - --types security-case-types \ - --version-root 1.2=security-case-type-revisions/1.2 -``` - -This ordinary command refuses:1.2 is acknowledged, not implemented. For source-only preparation, the existing --allow-unimplemented option may be added; its render is deterministic and execution.permitted remains false. Current canonical1.1 is also acknowledged and its historical accepted case/normal refusal/preparation render remain exactly retained. No source acknowledgment or historical case acceptance is an implementation/native proof waiver. - -The Python API is load_type(default_root, exact_reference, version_roots={"1.2": explicit_root}). Each key must be an exact major.minor and each root a Path. CLI --version-root VERSION=PATH may repeat for DIFFERENT versions. A matching explicit version selects exactly one root; a missing/wrong/ambiguous source refuses without trying the default or another revision. Versions without a mapping continue using --types. No directory discovery, highest/latest selection, status promotion or automatic owner-adapter adoption occurs. Duplicate mappings (even identical), duplicate YAML fields, mismatched source ID/version, malformed/traversal references and selected symlinks refuse. Direct case validation also requires the case reference to match the supplied type ID/version. - -An explicit root is source input, not an owner acknowledgment or grant. Callers retain exact source hashes/type/case/render in their own reviewed receipts. Existing two-argument load_type callers, including ops-mason, retain their default behavior until their owner deliberately adopts the optional input. Adapter/global provenance/native first-reference gates remain separate in NK-WP-0048-T06 and the existing ORGREF driver. - -## Check existing owner evidence compatibility - -The normal validator CLI now accepts `check-evidence` using the same exact type -selection, declarations, validation and deterministic render as `render`: - -```sh -python3 tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py check-evidence \ - security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml --types security-case-types \ - --structure-request /path/to/mason-structure-request.json \ - --warden-journal /path/to/existing/journal.sqlite -``` - -Normal admission still refuses the acknowledged 1.1 and 1.2 types. Explicit -`--allow-unimplemented` permits source preparation, with the existing -`--version-root 1.2=security-case-type-revisions/1.2` for that version. No owner -protocol is automatically adopted, no journal is created, and no status changes. - -This is the cross-owner **compatibility preflight**, not native acceptance. It -consumes the existing `ops-mason.case-structure-request.v1` and reads latest rows -from the existing `warden.case.step-journal.v1` SQLite journal in read-only mode. -Mason source/request hashes, complete current structural inventory and structural -projection must match the fresh render. Warden case/type and type-declared machine -descriptor pins, owners, bounded histories, created-object scope and successful -attempt/revocation fingerprints must match. Unknown or duplicate fields, source -substitution and missing completed-attempt fingerprints refuse. Running, uncertain, -failed or rolled-back outcomes retain their exact meanings; an earlier success -never overrides the latest journal row. Generated-value paths require distinct -parent-session and broker-grant fingerprint fields. - -Exit 0 means these supplied artifacts are source-compatible; it never means the -case is complete. No artifact is required solely to render missing gates. Output -always has `native_complete: false`, `execution.permitted: false`, and explicit -unresolved native gates. A Mason Request has no native Observation provenance; -a Warden journal retains fingerprints rather than portable signed/native proof. -This command deliberately offers no trust callback, native-success flag, dispatch -or way to promote self-authored JSON into native evidence. Actual independent -owner evidence admission, status-hash binding, accepted machine descriptors, -delivery, human sign-in/consumer denial, revocation and created-only rollback -remain NK-WP-0048-T06 owner integration work. It does not mark any type implemented. - -Integration tests invoke actual sibling Mason `prepare` and Warden `Journal.save` -with metadata fixtures only. They need those owner source checkouts, and existing -type suites need the public KeyCape request file and provider declarations beside -the checkout. `NET_KINGDOM_ROOT` selects the source root for the 1.2 package tests. - -## Machine descriptor source pins - -The optional `spec.execution_descriptors` map uses the existing Warden kernel's -step-to-exact-descriptor-byte SHA-256 contract. The JSON schema accepts at most -128 lowercase `sha256:<64 hex>` pins. The semantic validator additionally requires -every key to name a declared follow-through step. Malformed maps are refused by -the direct evidence API too. Absent and partial maps remain legal for source -preparation; missing steps remain explicit in the evidence report. - -A valid pin is source metadata. It does not authenticate its owner, acknowledge -a machine seam, admit an adapter or change the implemented-type requirement. -The existing browser types contain no descriptors; their bytes and lifecycle -states are unchanged. Owner descriptor/provenance acceptance and actual native -receipts remain prerequisites to execution and acceptance. diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/security_case_evidence.py b/tools/security-case-types/security_case_evidence.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5f25577..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/security_case_evidence.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,205 +0,0 @@ -"""Read-only compatibility checks for existing Mason and Warden evidence seams. - -This checks real owner artifacts against a fresh NetKingdom render. These source -protocols carry no portable authenticated native evidence. A matching request or -journal can NEVER establish materialized/live/implemented or authorize dispatch. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import hashlib -import json -from pathlib import Path -import re -import sqlite3 - -import yaml - -LIMIT = 262144 -DIGEST = re.compile(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}\Z") -ID = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:/@-]{0,191}\Z") - - -class EvidenceRefused(ValueError): - pass - - -def sha(source): - return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(source).hexdigest() - - -def read(path): - path = Path(path) - if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size > LIMIT: - raise EvidenceRefused("unsafe or oversized metadata source") - return path.read_bytes() - - -def _unique(pairs): - result = {} - for key, value in pairs: - if key in result: - raise EvidenceRefused("duplicate metadata field") - result[key] = value - return result - - -def decode(source): - if type(source) is not bytes or len(source) > LIMIT: - raise EvidenceRefused("oversized metadata input") - try: - return json.loads(source, object_pairs_hook=_unique) - except (ValueError, UnicodeError): - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid metadata JSON") from None - - -def check_structure(request, case_source, type_source, rendered): - """Consume ops-mason.case-structure-request.v1, not a new native flag.""" - fields = {"schema", "case", "case_digest", "type_ref", "type_digest", - "render_digest", "plan_digest", "bundle_digest", "structural_digest", - "reviewed_render_digest", "run_source_changed", "objects"} - if type(request) is not dict or set(request) != fields: - raise EvidenceRefused("unknown Mason structural request fields") - if request["schema"] != "ops-mason.case-structure-request.v1": - raise EvidenceRefused("unknown Mason structural request protocol") - for field in fields & {"case_digest", "type_digest", "render_digest", "plan_digest", - "bundle_digest", "structural_digest", "reviewed_render_digest"}: - if type(request[field]) is not str or not DIGEST.fullmatch(request[field]): - raise EvidenceRefused("malformed structural source pin") - if (request["case"], request["case_digest"], request["type_ref"], - request["type_digest"], request["render_digest"]) != ( - rendered["case"], sha(case_source), rendered["type"], sha(type_source), rendered["digest"]): - raise EvidenceRefused("Mason request has stale case/type/render pins") - if type(request["run_source_changed"]) is not bool or request["run_source_changed"] != ( - request["reviewed_render_digest"] != rendered["digest"]): - raise EvidenceRefused("Mason run drift flag disagrees with pins") - owners = {"openbao_policy": ("railiance-platform", "native-structure"), - "openbao_role": ("railiance-platform", "native-structure"), - "kv_path": ("railiance-platform", "layout-only"), - "catalog_entry": ("ops-warden", "pointer-source")} - expected = [] - for item in rendered["materialization"]: - if item["kind"] not in owners: - raise EvidenceRefused("unsupported structural owner kind") - owner, proof = owners[item["kind"]] - expected.append({"id": item["id"], "kind": item["kind"], "target": item["template"], - "expected_digest": sha(json.dumps(item, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()), - "evidence_owner": owner, "proof": proof}) - if request["objects"] != expected: - raise EvidenceRefused("Mason structural inventory differs from exact render") - case = yaml.safe_load(case_source) - acc = case["spec"].get("acceptance") or {} - acceptance = ({"record": acc["record"], "at": acc.get("at"), - "by": [item.get("role") for item in acc.get("by", [])]} if acc.get("record") else None) - structural = {"case": rendered["case"], "type": rendered["type"], - "acceptance": acceptance, "materialization": rendered["materialization"]} - if request["structural_digest"] != sha(json.dumps(structural, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()): - raise EvidenceRefused("Mason structural projection pin differs from current source") - # A request has neither Observation provenance nor StatusBinding authority. - return {"request_digest": sha(json.dumps(request, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()), - "objects": len(expected), "run_source_changed": request["run_source_changed"], - "native_materialization_verified": False} - - -def read_journal(path): - """Read bounded Warden rows through SQLite read-only mode; never create a DB.""" - path = Path(path) - if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size > 16 * 1024 * 1024: - raise EvidenceRefused("unsafe or oversized Warden journal") - try: - connection = sqlite3.connect(path.resolve().as_uri() + "?mode=ro", uri=True) - try: - connection.execute("PRAGMA query_only=ON") - connection.execute("PRAGMA trusted_schema=OFF") - rows = connection.execute( - "SELECT seq,binding,payload FROM receipts ORDER BY seq LIMIT 1025").fetchall() - finally: - connection.close() - if len(rows) > 1024: - raise EvidenceRefused("Warden journal inventory exceeds limit") - latest = {} - for seq, binding, payload in rows: - if type(seq) is not int or type(binding) is not str or not ID.fullmatch(binding): - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden journal identity") - if type(payload) is not str: - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden journal payload") - latest[binding] = decode(payload.encode()) - return tuple(latest.values()) - except sqlite3.Error: - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden journal database") from None - - -def check_steps(rows, case_source, type_source, rendered): - """Validate latest durable Warden states; they remain local evidence only.""" - expected = {item["id"]: item for item in rendered["follow_through"]} - fields = {"step_id", "owner", "pins", "allowed_created", "retry_safe", "receipts", - "journal_schema", "evidence_digest", "session_revoked", "session_revocation_digest", - "grant_revocation_digest", "attempt_id", "operation"} - type_spec = yaml.safe_load(type_source)["spec"] - # The direct API must refuse malformed maps too, without AttributeError or - # treating an undeclared step as an admitted descriptor. - from security_case_validator import validate_execution_descriptors - if validate_execution_descriptors(type_spec): - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid type machine descriptor pins") - descriptors = type_spec.get("execution_descriptors", {}) - seen, result = set(), [] - for row in rows: - if type(row) is not dict or set(row) != fields or row["journal_schema"] != "warden.case.step-journal.v1": - raise EvidenceRefused("unknown Warden journal receipt fields") - step = row["step_id"] - if type(step) is not str or step not in expected or step in seen or row["owner"] != expected[step]["owner"]: - raise EvidenceRefused("unknown, duplicate or wrong-owner Warden step") - seen.add(step) - pins = row["pins"] - if type(pins) is not dict or set(pins) != {"case", "case_type", "adapter", "catalog", "acceptance", "run_sheet"}: - raise EvidenceRefused("unknown Warden source pins") - if any(type(value) is not str or not DIGEST.fullmatch(value) for value in pins.values()): - raise EvidenceRefused("malformed Warden source pin") - if (pins["case"], pins["case_type"]) != (sha(case_source), sha(type_source)): - raise EvidenceRefused("Warden receipt has stale case/type pins") - if descriptors.get(step) != pins["adapter"]: - raise EvidenceRefused("Warden receipt has no exact type-pinned machine descriptor") - history = row["receipts"] - if type(history) is not list or not 1 <= len(history) <= 128: - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden receipt history") - outcomes = {"running", "verified-success", "verified-no-change", "failed-before-change", - "failed-after-change", "uncertain", "rollback-running", "verified-rolled-back", "rollback-uncertain"} - allowed = row["allowed_created"] - if type(allowed) is not list or len(allowed) > 32 or len(set(allowed)) != len(allowed) or any( - type(value) is not str or not ID.fullmatch(value) for value in allowed): - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden created-object scope") - if type(row["retry_safe"]) is not bool: - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden retry policy") - for number, receipt in enumerate(history, 1): - if type(receipt) is not dict or set(receipt) != {"attempt", "outcome", "created"} or ( - type(receipt["attempt"]) is not int or receipt["attempt"] != number or - receipt["outcome"] not in outcomes or type(receipt["created"]) is not list or - any(type(v) is not str or v not in allowed for v in receipt["created"]) or - len(set(receipt["created"])) != len(receipt["created"])): - raise EvidenceRefused("invalid Warden receipt state") - last = history[-1]["outcome"] - if last in {"verified-success", "verified-no-change", "verified-rolled-back"}: - proofs = [row["evidence_digest"], row["session_revocation_digest"]] - if expected[step]["value_handling"] == "generated_in_custody": - proofs.append(row["grant_revocation_digest"]) - if row["session_revoked"] is not True or any( - type(value) is not str or not DIGEST.fullmatch(value) for value in proofs): - raise EvidenceRefused("Warden completed state lacks revocation fingerprints") - if type(row["attempt_id"]) is not str or not ID.fullmatch(row["attempt_id"]) or row["operation"] not in {"run", "rollback", "reconcile"}: - raise EvidenceRefused("Warden completed state lacks exact attempt identity") - result.append({"step": step, "outcome": last, "native_authenticated": False}) - return result, sorted(set(expected) - seen) - - -def audit(case_source, type_source, rendered, *, structure=None, journal_rows=()): - structural = check_structure(structure, case_source, type_source, rendered) if structure is not None else None - steps, missing = check_steps(journal_rows, case_source, type_source, rendered) - type_spec = yaml.safe_load(type_source)["spec"] - return {"schema": "netkingdom.case-evidence-compatibility.v1", - "case_digest": sha(case_source), "type_digest": sha(type_source), "render_digest": rendered["digest"], - "structure": structural, "steps": steps, "missing_follow_through": missing, - "required_verification": [item["id"] for item in rendered["verification"]], - "missing_machine_descriptors": [item["id"] for item in rendered["follow_through"] - if item["id"] not in type_spec.get("execution_descriptors", {})], - "unresolved_native_gates": ["authenticated-owner-evidence-admission", "accepted-to-materialized-status-binding", - "human-sign-in", "consumer-group-denial", "parent-session-and-broker-grant-revocation", "created-only-rollback"], - "native_complete": False, "execution": {"permitted": False}} diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py b/tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py deleted file mode 100644 index 06cfff4..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,723 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Validate SecurityCaseTypes and SecurityCases, and render a case into a plan. - -Canon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md. A type is a NetKingdom-owned -composition of declared playbook capabilities; a case fills in the type's -parameters. Rendering produces the security-scenario composer's deterministic, -plan-only output (execution is never permitted here) plus the type's -materialization and follow-through, with parameters substituted. - - security_case_validator.py validate-type security-case-types/ - security_case_validator.py validate-case --types security-case-types - security_case_validator.py render --types security-case-types -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import hashlib -import json -import re -import string -import sys -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any - -import yaml - -TOOL_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -COMPOSER_DIR = TOOL_DIR.parent / "security-scenario-composer" -sys.path.insert(0, str(COMPOSER_DIR)) - -import security_scenario_composer as composer # noqa: E402 - -contract = composer.contract -Issue = contract.Issue - -TYPE_API_VERSION = "netkingdom.io/security-case-type/v0.1" -CASE_API_VERSION = "netkingdom.io/security-case/v0.1" -RENDER_API_VERSION = "netkingdom.io/security-case-render/v0.1" - -ID = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$") -VERSION = re.compile(r"^\d+\.\d+$") -TYPE_REF = re.compile(r"^([a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*)@(\d+\.\d+)$") -TYPE_STATUSES = ["draft", "proposed", "acknowledged", "implemented", "deprecated", "retired"] -CASE_STATUSES = ["proposed", "accepted", "materialized", "live", "retired"] -RISK_CLASSES = {"low", "medium", "high"} -ACCEPTERS = {"owner", "founder"} -MATERIALIZATION_KINDS = {"openbao_policy", "openbao_role", "kv_path", "catalog_entry"} -VALUE_HANDLING = {"none", "generated_in_custody"} -LANE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$") -TYPE_SECTIONS = [ - "id", "version", "status", "title", "purpose", "parameters", "composition", - "materialization", "follow_through", "verification", "rollback", "acceptance", -] -REQUIRED_README_HEADINGS = ["## Threat model", "## Alternatives considered", "## Known limits"] - -# Values that look like credentials are refused anywhere in a case. A -# secret_reference parameter must hold a custody reference, never a value. -SECRET_SHAPES = [ - re.compile(r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"), - re.compile(r"\b(?:hvs|hvb|hvr)\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}"), - re.compile(r"\b(?:sk|pk|rk)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}"), - re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"), - re.compile(r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\."), - re.compile(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"), -] -CUSTODY_REFERENCE = re.compile(r"^(?:bao|openbao|vault|env|file):[^\s]+$") - - -def err(path: str, message: str) -> Issue: - return Issue("ERROR", path, message) - - -def has_errors(issues: list[Issue]) -> bool: - return any(i.level == "ERROR" for i in issues) - - -def placeholders(text: str) -> set[str]: - return {f[1] for f in string.Formatter().parse(text) if f[1]} - - -#: Format specs a template may apply to a parameter. ``env`` renders an -#: environment-variable fragment: upper case, ``-`` as ``_`` ({client_id:env}). -FORMAT_SPECS = {"", "env"} - - -def format_specs(text: str) -> set[str]: - return {f[2] or "" for f in string.Formatter().parse(text) if f[1]} - - -def _walk_strings(value: Any, path: str): - if isinstance(value, str): - yield path, value - elif isinstance(value, dict): - for k, v in value.items(): - yield from _walk_strings(v, f"{path}.{k}") - elif isinstance(value, list): - for i, v in enumerate(value): - yield from _walk_strings(v, f"{path}[{i}]") - - -WHEN = re.compile(r"^([a-z][a-z0-9_]*) (==|!=) ([A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+)$") - - -def check_when(expr: Any, params: dict[str, dict], path: str) -> list[Issue]: - """A condition is ' == ' or ' != '.""" - m = WHEN.fullmatch(str(expr)) - if not m: - return [err(path, "must be ' == ' or ' != '")] - if m.group(1) not in params: - return [err(path, f"condition uses unknown parameter {m.group(1)!r}")] - return [] - - -def holds(expr: str | None, values: dict[str, Any]) -> bool: - if not expr: - return True - name, op, literal = WHEN.fullmatch(expr).groups() - actual = values.get(name) - actual = str(actual).lower() if isinstance(actual, bool) else str(actual) - return (actual == literal) if op == "==" else (actual != literal) - - -def secret_shaped(text: str) -> bool: - return any(p.search(text) for p in SECRET_SHAPES) - - -# ── Types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── - -def validate_type(data: dict[str, Any], type_dir: Path | None = None) -> list[Issue]: - issues: list[Issue] = [] - if data.get("apiVersion") != TYPE_API_VERSION: - issues.append(err("type.apiVersion", f"must be {TYPE_API_VERSION}")) - if data.get("kind") != "SecurityCaseType": - issues.append(err("type.kind", "must be SecurityCaseType")) - spec = data.get("spec") - if not isinstance(spec, dict): - return issues + [err("type.spec", "missing")] - for section in TYPE_SECTIONS: - if section not in spec: - issues.append(err(f"type.spec.{section}", "required section is missing")) - if has_errors(issues): - return issues - - if not ID.fullmatch(str(spec["id"])): - issues.append(err("type.spec.id", "must be lowercase letters, digits and hyphens")) - if not VERSION.fullmatch(str(spec["version"])): - issues.append(err("type.spec.version", "must be .")) - if spec["status"] not in TYPE_STATUSES: - issues.append(err("type.spec.status", f"must be one of {TYPE_STATUSES}")) - - params = _validate_type_parameters(spec["parameters"], issues) - step_ids = _validate_follow_through(spec["follow_through"], issues) - issues.extend(validate_execution_descriptors(spec)) - _validate_composition(spec["composition"], params, issues) - _validate_materialization(spec["materialization"], params, issues) - _validate_verification(spec["verification"], params, issues) - _validate_rollback(spec["rollback"], step_ids, spec["materialization"], issues) - for section in ("follow_through", "rollback"): - if isinstance(spec[section], list): - _validate_templates(spec[section], f"type.spec.{section}", params, issues) - _validate_acceptance(spec["acceptance"], issues) - for section in ("materialization", "follow_through", "verification", "rollback"): - for i, item in enumerate(spec[section] if isinstance(spec[section], list) else []): - if isinstance(item, dict) and "when" in item: - issues.extend(check_when(item["when"], params, f"type.spec.{section}[{i}].when")) - for i, p in enumerate(spec["parameters"] if isinstance(spec["parameters"], list) else []): - rw = (p.get("constraints") or {}).get("required_when") if isinstance(p, dict) else None - if rw is not None: - issues.extend(check_when(rw, params, f"type.spec.parameters[{i}].constraints.required_when")) - - for path, text in _walk_strings(spec, "type.spec"): - if secret_shaped(text): - issues.append(err(path, "contains a credential-shaped value")) - - if type_dir is not None: - readme = type_dir / "README.md" - if not readme.is_file(): - issues.append(err("type.README.md", "missing")) - else: - text = readme.read_text() - for heading in REQUIRED_README_HEADINGS: - if heading not in text: - issues.append(err("type.README.md", f"missing section {heading!r}")) - tests = type_dir / "tests" - if not tests.is_dir() or not any(tests.glob("test_*.py")): - issues.append(err("type.tests", "a type needs runnable tests (tests/test_*.py)")) - examples = sorted((type_dir / "examples").glob("*.yaml")) if (type_dir / "examples").is_dir() else [] - if not examples: - issues.append(err("type.examples", "a type needs at least one example case")) - return issues - - -def validate_execution_descriptors(spec: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Issue]: - """Validate optional source pins; never infer acknowledgment or authority. - - Incomplete/absent maps remain legal for plan-only types. Admission and - provenance remain the executing owner's responsibility. - """ - if "execution_descriptors" not in spec: - return [] - path = "type.spec.execution_descriptors" - pins = spec["execution_descriptors"] - if type(pins) is not dict or len(pins) > 128: - return [err(path, "must be a mapping of at most 128 step descriptor pins")] - steps = spec.get("follow_through") - declared = {step.get("id") for step in steps - if type(step) is dict and type(step.get("id")) is str} if type(steps) is list else set() - issues = [] - for step, pin in pins.items(): - if type(step) is not str or not ID.fullmatch(step) or step not in declared: - issues.append(err(path, "descriptor key must identify a declared follow-through step")) - if type(pin) is not str or re.fullmatch(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}", pin) is None: - issues.append(err(path, "descriptor pin must be a lowercase SHA-256 byte digest")) - return issues - - -def _validate_type_parameters(params: Any, issues: list[Issue]) -> dict[str, dict]: - out: dict[str, dict] = {} - if not isinstance(params, list) or not params: - issues.append(err("type.spec.parameters", "must be a non-empty list")) - return out - for i, p in enumerate(params): - path = f"type.spec.parameters[{i}]" - if not isinstance(p, dict) or not ID.fullmatch(str(p.get("name", "")).replace("_", "-")): - issues.append(err(path, "needs a name of lowercase letters, digits, '-' or '_'")) - continue - name = p["name"] - if name in out: - issues.append(err(path, f"duplicate parameter {name!r}")) - if p.get("type") not in contract.PARAM_TYPES: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.type", f"must be one of {sorted(contract.PARAM_TYPES)}")) - if p.get("sensitivity") not in contract.SENSITIVITIES: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.sensitivity", f"must be one of {sorted(contract.SENSITIVITIES)}")) - if p.get("sensitivity") == "secret_reference" and p.get("type") != "string": - issues.append(err(path, "a secret_reference parameter must be a string custody reference")) - if not isinstance(p.get("case_settable"), bool): - issues.append(err(f"{path}.case_settable", "must be true or false")) - if not p.get("description"): - issues.append(err(f"{path}.description", "required")) - if not p.get("case_settable") and "default" not in p: - issues.append(err(path, "a parameter cases cannot set needs a default")) - out[name] = p - return out - - -def _validate_composition(comp: Any, params: dict[str, dict], issues: list[Issue]) -> None: - path = "type.spec.composition" - if not isinstance(comp, dict): - issues.append(err(path, "must be a mapping")) - return - if comp.get("authority") not in contract.SCENARIO_AUTHORITIES: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.authority", f"must be one of {sorted(contract.SCENARIO_AUTHORITIES)}")) - trust = comp.get("initial_trust") - if not isinstance(trust, list) or not trust or not set(trust) <= contract.TRUST_STATES: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.initial_trust", "must be a non-empty list of known trust states")) - caps = comp.get("capabilities") - if not isinstance(caps, list) or not caps: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.capabilities", "must list at least one capability")) - caps = [] - for c in caps: - if c not in contract.CAPABILITIES: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.capabilities", f"unknown capability {c!r}")) - providers = comp.get("providers") or {} - for c in caps: - if not providers.get(c): - issues.append(err(f"{path}.providers", f"capability {c!r} needs an exact provider pin")) - for target, source in (comp.get("parameter_bindings") or {}).items(): - if not re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*", str(target)): - issues.append(err(f"{path}.parameter_bindings", f"{target!r} must be .")) - if source not in params: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.parameter_bindings.{target}", f"binds unknown case parameter {source!r}")) - - -def _validate_templates(items: Any, path: str, params: dict[str, dict], issues: list[Issue]) -> None: - for i, item in enumerate(items): - for spath, text in _walk_strings(item, f"{path}[{i}]"): - for name in placeholders(text): - if name not in params: - issues.append(err(spath, f"template uses unknown parameter {{{name}}}")) - for spec in sorted(format_specs(text) - FORMAT_SPECS): - issues.append(err(spath, f"template uses unknown format spec {spec!r}")) - - -def _validate_materialization(items: Any, params: dict[str, dict], issues: list[Issue]) -> None: - path = "type.spec.materialization" - if not isinstance(items, list) or not items: - issues.append(err(path, "must list what ops-mason builds per case")) - return - seen = set() - for i, item in enumerate(items): - if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get("kind") not in MATERIALIZATION_KINDS: - issues.append(err(f"{path}[{i}].kind", f"must be one of {sorted(MATERIALIZATION_KINDS)}")) - continue - if not item.get("id") or item["id"] in seen: - issues.append(err(f"{path}[{i}].id", "needs a unique id")) - seen.add(item.get("id")) - if not item.get("template"): - issues.append(err(f"{path}[{i}].template", "required")) - if item["kind"] in {"openbao_policy", "openbao_role", "catalog_entry"} and not item.get("body"): - issues.append(err(f"{path}[{i}].body", "a policy, role or catalog entry needs its body templated, not only its name")) - _validate_templates(items, path, params, issues) - - -def _validate_follow_through(steps: Any, issues: list[Issue]) -> set[str]: - path = "type.spec.follow_through" - ids: set[str] = set() - if not isinstance(steps, list) or not steps: - issues.append(err(path, "must list the ops-warden steps")) - return ids - for i, s in enumerate(steps): - p = f"{path}[{i}]" - if not isinstance(s, dict) or not s.get("id"): - issues.append(err(p, "needs an id")) - continue - if s["id"] in ids: - issues.append(err(p, f"duplicate step {s['id']!r}")) - ids.add(s["id"]) - for key in ("owner", "entry_point", "auth"): - if not s.get(key): - issues.append(err(f"{p}.{key}", "required")) - if not isinstance(s.get("warden_executes"), bool): - issues.append(err(f"{p}.warden_executes", "must be true or false")) - if s.get("attended") is True and not s.get("attended_justification"): - issues.append(err(f"{p}.attended_justification", "an attended step must say why it cannot be unattended")) - # R3 (ops-warden review): every step says what happens to values; a - # generated secret is created inside custody and never passes the run. - if s.get("value_handling") not in VALUE_HANDLING: - issues.append(err(f"{p}.value_handling", f"must be one of {sorted(VALUE_HANDLING)}")) - if s.get("value_handling") == "generated_in_custody" and s.get("attended") is True: - issues.append(err(f"{p}.value_handling", "a value generated in custody is never handled in an attended session")) - # R1: ops-warden resolves every step it executes or groups into an - # attended session through a reviewed catalog lane. - lane = s.get("lane") - if (s.get("warden_executes") is True or s.get("attended") is True) and not lane: - issues.append(err(f"{p}.lane", "a step ops-warden executes or groups needs its catalog lane")) - if lane is not None and not (isinstance(lane, str) and LANE.fullmatch(lane)): - issues.append(err(f"{p}.lane", "must be a catalog id (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)")) - if "ready_check" in s and not (isinstance(s["ready_check"], str) and s["ready_check"].strip()): - issues.append(err(f"{p}.ready_check", "must describe a status-only check")) - return ids - - -def _validate_verification(checks: Any, params: dict[str, dict], issues: list[Issue]) -> None: - path = "type.spec.verification" - if not isinstance(checks, list) or not checks: - issues.append(err(path, "must list checks that prove a case is live")) - return - expects = {c.get("expect") for c in checks if isinstance(c, dict)} - if "deny" not in expects: - issues.append(err(path, "needs at least one negative check (expect: deny)")) - if not expects & {"allow", "present"}: - issues.append(err(path, "needs at least one positive check (expect: allow or present)")) - for i, c in enumerate(checks): - if not isinstance(c, dict) or not c.get("id") or not c.get("check"): - issues.append(err(f"{path}[{i}]", "needs id, check and expect")) - if isinstance(c, dict) and c.get("reads_secret_value") is not False: - issues.append(err(f"{path}[{i}].reads_secret_value", "must be false: verification never reads a value")) - _validate_templates(checks, path, params, issues) - - -def _validate_rollback(steps: Any, step_ids: set[str], materialization: Any, issues: list[Issue]) -> None: - path = "type.spec.rollback" - if not isinstance(steps, list) or not steps: - issues.append(err(path, "must give the exact inverse of each step")) - return - covered = {s.get("reverses") for s in steps if isinstance(s, dict)} - mat_ids = {m.get("id") for m in materialization if isinstance(m, dict)} if isinstance(materialization, list) else set() - for missing in sorted((step_ids | mat_ids) - covered): - issues.append(err(path, f"no rollback reverses {missing!r}")) - - -def _validate_acceptance(acc: Any, issues: list[Issue]) -> None: - path = "type.spec.acceptance" - if not isinstance(acc, dict): - issues.append(err(path, "must be a mapping")) - return - who = acc.get("accepted_by") - if not isinstance(who, list) or not who or not set(who) <= ACCEPTERS: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.accepted_by", f"must be a non-empty subset of {sorted(ACCEPTERS)}")) - if acc.get("risk_class") not in RISK_CLASSES: - issues.append(err(f"{path}.risk_class", f"must be one of {sorted(RISK_CLASSES)}")) - if acc.get("risk_class") == "high" and "founder" not in (who or []): - issues.append(err(f"{path}.accepted_by", "a high-risk type needs founder acceptance of each case")) - - -# ── Cases ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── - -def parse_version_roots(entries: list[str]) -> tuple[list[Issue], dict[str, Path]]: - """Closed explicit selectors; duplicate versions are ambiguous, even same path.""" - roots: dict[str, Path] = {} - for entry in entries: - if not isinstance(entry, str): - return [err("types.version_roots", "must be VERSION=PATH entries")], {} - version, separator, path = entry.partition("=") - if not separator or not VERSION.fullmatch(version) or not path or version in roots: - return [err("types.version_roots", "needs unique .= entries")], {} - roots[version] = Path(path) - return [], roots - - -class _UniqueTypeLoader(yaml.SafeLoader): - """A duplicate source field must not choose an implicit winning revision.""" - - -def _unique_type_mapping(loader, node, deep=False): - result = {} - for key_node, value_node in node.value: - key = loader.construct_object(key_node, deep=deep) - if key in result: - raise ValueError("duplicate type source key") - result[key] = loader.construct_object(value_node, deep=deep) - return result - - -_UniqueTypeLoader.add_constructor(yaml.resolver.BaseResolver.DEFAULT_MAPPING_TAG, _unique_type_mapping) - - -def load_type(types_root: Path, ref: str, *, version_roots: dict[str, Path] | None = None - ) -> tuple[list[Issue], dict[str, Any] | None, Path | None]: - """Load exactly the named version from one selected root; never search/fallback. - - Existing two-argument callers retain their explicit default root. New callers - may name per-version roots. A selection is source input, not implementation, - case acceptance, source acknowledgment or native authority. - """ - m = TYPE_REF.fullmatch(ref if isinstance(ref, str) else "") - if not m: - return [err("case.spec.type", "must be @.")], None, None - if version_roots is not None and (not isinstance(version_roots, dict) or - any(not isinstance(version, str) or not VERSION.fullmatch(version) or - not isinstance(root, Path) for version, root in version_roots.items())): - return [err("types.version_roots", "must map exact versions to Path roots")], None, None - selected = (version_roots or {}).get(m.group(2), Path(types_root)) - type_dir = selected / m.group(1) - type_file = type_dir / "type.yaml" - if selected.is_symlink() or type_dir.is_symlink() or type_file.is_symlink(): - return [err("case.spec.type", "symlinked selected type source refused")], None, None - if not type_file.is_file(): - return [err("case.spec.type", f"unknown type {m.group(1)!r} in selected root")], None, None - try: - data = yaml.load(type_file.read_text(), Loader=_UniqueTypeLoader) - except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, yaml.YAMLError): - return [err("case.spec.type", "invalid or ambiguous type source")], None, None - if not isinstance(data, dict) or not isinstance(data.get("spec"), dict): - return [err("case.spec.type", "type source needs a spec mapping")], None, None - if data["spec"].get("id") != m.group(1): - return [err("case.spec.type", "selected type source id does not match reference")], None, None - if str(data["spec"].get("version")) != m.group(2): - return [err("case.spec.type", f"type {m.group(1)!r} is at version " - f"{data['spec'].get('version')}, not {m.group(2)}")], None, None - return [], data, type_dir - - -def validate_case(case: dict[str, Any], type_data: dict[str, Any], *, require_implemented: bool = True) -> list[Issue]: - issues: list[Issue] = [] - if case.get("apiVersion") != CASE_API_VERSION: - issues.append(err("case.apiVersion", f"must be {CASE_API_VERSION}")) - if case.get("kind") != "SecurityCase": - issues.append(err("case.kind", "must be SecurityCase")) - spec = case.get("spec") or {} - if not ID.fullmatch(str(spec.get("id", ""))): - issues.append(err("case.spec.id", "must be lowercase letters, digits and hyphens")) - if spec.get("status") not in CASE_STATUSES: - issues.append(err("case.spec.status", f"must be one of {CASE_STATUSES}")) - owner = spec.get("owner") or {} - if not owner.get("repo") or not owner.get("person"): - issues.append(err("case.spec.owner", "needs repo and person")) - tspec = type_data.get("spec", {}) - if spec.get("type") != f"{tspec.get('id')}@{tspec.get('version')}": - issues.append(err("case.spec.type", "case reference does not match selected type id/version")) - if require_implemented and tspec.get("status") != "implemented": - issues.append(err("case.spec.type", f"type {tspec.get('id')!r} is {tspec.get('status')!r}; " - "only implemented types accept cases")) - if spec.get("status") != "proposed": - acc = spec.get("acceptance") or {} - needed = set(tspec.get("acceptance", {}).get("accepted_by", [])) - given = {a.get("role") for a in acc.get("by", []) if isinstance(a, dict)} - if not acc.get("at") or not acc.get("record") or not needed <= given: - issues.append(err("case.spec.acceptance", f"needs at, record and acceptance by {sorted(needed)}")) - - params = {p["name"]: p for p in tspec.get("parameters", [])} - values = spec.get("parameters") or {} - for name in sorted(set(values) - set(params)): - issues.append(err(f"case.spec.parameters.{name}", "not a parameter of this type")) - for name, p in params.items(): - path = f"case.spec.parameters.{name}" - if name not in values: - rw = (p.get("constraints") or {}).get("required_when") - if rw and WHEN.fullmatch(str(rw)) and holds(rw, {**{q: d.get("default") for q, d in params.items() if "default" in d}, **values}): - issues.append(err(path, f"required when {rw}")) - elif not rw and p.get("case_settable") and p.get("required", True) and "default" not in p: - issues.append(err(path, "required")) - continue - if not p.get("case_settable"): - issues.append(err(path, "this type does not let cases set it")) - continue - issues.extend(_check_value(path, values[name], p)) - for path, text in _walk_strings(spec, "case.spec"): - if secret_shaped(text): - issues.append(err(path, "contains a credential-shaped value; cases hold references, never secrets")) - return issues - - -def _check_value(path: str, value: Any, p: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Issue]: - issues: list[Issue] = [] - kinds = {"string": str, "integer": int, "number": (int, float), "boolean": bool, - "array": list, "object": dict} - if not isinstance(value, kinds[p["type"]]) or (p["type"] in {"integer", "number"} and isinstance(value, bool)): - return [err(path, f"must be {p['type']}")] - c = p.get("constraints") or {} - items = value if isinstance(value, list) else [value] - for item in items: - if isinstance(item, str): - if "pattern" in c and not re.fullmatch(c["pattern"], item): - issues.append(err(path, f"{item!r} does not match {c['pattern']}")) - if p.get("sensitivity") == "secret_reference" and not CUSTODY_REFERENCE.fullmatch(item): - issues.append(err(path, "must be a custody reference such as bao:/")) - if "enum" in c and item not in c["enum"]: - issues.append(err(path, f"{item!r} is not one of {c['enum']}")) - if isinstance(value, list): - if "min_items" in c and len(value) < c["min_items"]: - issues.append(err(path, f"needs at least {c['min_items']} items")) - if c.get("unique") and len(set(map(str, value))) != len(value): - issues.append(err(path, "items must be unique")) - return issues - - -# ── Rendering ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── - -def effective_values(case: dict[str, Any], type_data: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]: - values = {p["name"]: p.get("default") for p in type_data["spec"]["parameters"] if "default" in p} - values.update(case["spec"].get("parameters") or {}) - return values - - -def _applicable(items: list[dict], values: dict[str, Any]) -> list[dict]: - return [{k: v for k, v in i.items() if k != "when"} for i in items if holds(i.get("when"), values)] - - -class _Param(str): - """A string parameter value that also renders the ``env`` format spec.""" - - def __format__(self, spec: str) -> str: - if spec == "env": - return self.upper().replace("-", "_") - return str.__format__(self, spec) - - -class _Blank(dict): - """Template values where an optional parameter a case leaves out renders empty.""" - - def __missing__(self, key: str) -> str: - return "" - - -def _fill(value: Any, values: dict[str, Any]) -> Any: - if isinstance(value, str): - return value.format_map(_Blank({k: _Param(",".join(map(str, v)) if isinstance(v, list) else v) - if isinstance(v, (str, list)) else v - for k, v in values.items()})) - if isinstance(value, dict): - return {k: _fill(v, values) for k, v in value.items()} - if isinstance(value, list): - return [_fill(v, values) for v in value] - return value - - -def render_case(case: dict[str, Any], type_data: dict[str, Any], declarations: list, - *, require_implemented: bool = True) -> tuple[list[Issue], dict[str, Any] | None]: - issues = validate_case(case, type_data, require_implemented=require_implemented) - issues += validate_type(type_data) - if has_errors(issues): - return issues, None - tspec, cspec = type_data["spec"], case["spec"] - values = effective_values(case, type_data) - comp = tspec["composition"] - overrides: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {} - for target, source in (comp.get("parameter_bindings") or {}).items(): - decl_id, param = target.rsplit(".", 1) - overrides.setdefault(decl_id, {})[param] = values[source] - scenario = { - "id": f"scenario:case:{cspec['id']}", - "authority": comp["authority"], - "initial_trust": list(comp["initial_trust"]), - "requires": {"capabilities": list(comp["capabilities"])}, - "providers": dict(comp["providers"]), - } - if overrides: - scenario["parameter_overrides"] = overrides - scenario_issues, plan = composer.compose_scenario(declarations, scenario) - issues.extend(scenario_issues) - if plan is None or has_errors(issues): - return issues, None - rendered = { - "apiVersion": RENDER_API_VERSION, - "kind": "SecurityCaseRender", - "case": cspec["id"], - "type": f"{tspec['id']}@{tspec['version']}", - "composition": plan, - "materialization": _fill(_applicable(tspec["materialization"], values), values), - "follow_through": _fill(_applicable(tspec["follow_through"], values), values), - "verification": _fill(_applicable(tspec["verification"], values), values), - "rollback": _fill(_applicable(tspec["rollback"], values), values), - "execution": {"permitted": False}, - } - rendered["digest"] = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256( - json.dumps(rendered, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest() - return issues, rendered - - -def discover_declarations(type_data: dict[str, Any], repos_root: Path) -> tuple[list[str], list[Issue]]: - """Find each pinned provider's declaration in its owning repository. - - A pin '.' resolves to //capabilities/playbooks/.yaml, - the publication path the Playbook Capability Contract defines. - """ - paths, issues = [], [] - for cap, pin in sorted(type_data["spec"]["composition"].get("providers", {}).items()): - repo = pin.split(".", 1)[0] - path = repos_root / repo / "capabilities" / "playbooks" / f"{pin}.yaml" - if path.is_file(): - paths.append(str(path)) - else: - issues.append(err(f"composition.providers.{cap}", f"declaration {pin!r} not found at {path}")) - return paths, issues - - -# ── CLI ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── - -def _report(issues: list[Issue]) -> int: - for i in issues: - print(f"{i.level} {i.path}: {i.message}", file=sys.stderr) - return 1 if has_errors(issues) else 0 - - -def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: - ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - sub = ap.add_subparsers(dest="cmd", required=True) - vt = sub.add_parser("validate-type") - vt.add_argument("type_dir") - vc = sub.add_parser("validate-case") - vc.add_argument("case") - vc.add_argument("--types", required=True) - vc.add_argument("--version-root", action="append", default=[], metavar="VERSION=PATH", - help="select an exact version root; no search or fallback") - vc.add_argument("--allow-unimplemented", action="store_true", - help="validate an example case against a type that is not implemented yet") - rd = sub.add_parser("render") - rd.add_argument("case") - rd.add_argument("declarations", nargs="*", help="declaration files; omit to discover them under --repos-root") - rd.add_argument("--repos-root", default=str(TOOL_DIR.parents[2]), - help="directory holding the owning repositories (default: the parent of this checkout)") - rd.add_argument("--types", required=True) - rd.add_argument("--version-root", action="append", default=[], metavar="VERSION=PATH", - help="select an exact version root; no search or fallback") - rd.add_argument("--allow-unimplemented", action="store_true") - ev = sub.add_parser("check-evidence", help="check existing Mason/Warden source artifacts; never native acceptance") - ev.add_argument("case") - ev.add_argument("declarations", nargs="*") - ev.add_argument("--repos-root", default=str(TOOL_DIR.parents[2])) - ev.add_argument("--types", required=True) - ev.add_argument("--version-root", action="append", default=[], metavar="VERSION=PATH") - ev.add_argument("--allow-unimplemented", action="store_true") - ev.add_argument("--structure-request", help="ops-mason structure-request JSON") - ev.add_argument("--warden-journal", help="existing Warden journal.sqlite; opened read-only") - args = ap.parse_args(argv) - - if args.cmd == "validate-type": - d = Path(args.type_dir) - data = yaml.safe_load((d / "type.yaml").read_text()) or {} - code = _report(validate_type(data, d)) - if code == 0: - print(f"OK {data['spec']['id']}@{data['spec']['version']} ({data['spec']['status']})") - return code - - case = yaml.safe_load(Path(args.case).read_text()) or {} - selection_issues, version_roots = parse_version_roots(args.version_root) - if has_errors(selection_issues): - return _report(selection_issues) - issues, type_data, selected_type_dir = load_type(Path(args.types), (case.get("spec") or {}).get("type", ""), - version_roots=version_roots) - if type_data is None: - return _report(issues) - if args.cmd == "validate-case": - code = _report(validate_case(case, type_data, require_implemented=not args.allow_unimplemented)) - if code == 0: - print(f"OK case {case['spec']['id']}") - return code - decl_paths, discover_issues = (args.declarations, []) if args.declarations else \ - discover_declarations(type_data, Path(args.repos_root)) - if has_errors(discover_issues): - return _report(discover_issues) - declarations, load_issues = composer.load_declarations(decl_paths) - issues, rendered = render_case(case, type_data, declarations, - require_implemented=not args.allow_unimplemented) - issues = load_issues + issues - if rendered is None: - return _report(issues) - if args.cmd == "check-evidence": - import security_case_evidence as evidence - try: - source = evidence.read(args.case) - type_source = evidence.read(selected_type_dir / "type.yaml") - # Refuse source changes between ordinary validation/render and audit. - if yaml.safe_load(source) != case or yaml.safe_load(type_source) != type_data: - raise evidence.EvidenceRefused("case/type source changed during validation") - structure = evidence.decode(evidence.read(args.structure_request)) if args.structure_request else None - rows = evidence.read_journal(args.warden_journal) if args.warden_journal else () - report = evidence.audit(source, type_source, rendered, structure=structure, journal_rows=rows) - except (evidence.EvidenceRefused, OSError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError): - print("ERROR evidence: incompatible or unsafe owner metadata (diagnostics withheld)", file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - json.dump(report, sys.stdout, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - print() - return 0 - json.dump(rendered, sys.stdout, indent=2, sort_keys=True) - print() - return _report(issues) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_case_evidence.py b/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_case_evidence.py deleted file mode 100644 index 135ff60..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_case_evidence.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,200 +0,0 @@ -"""Real owner source API compatibility, with synthetic metadata only; no native evidence.""" -import json -from pathlib import Path -import shutil -import subprocess -import sys - -import pytest -import yaml - -TOOL = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TOOL.parents[1] -OWNERS = Path("/home/worsch") -sys.path.insert(0, str(TOOL)) -import security_case_evidence as e -import security_case_validator as v - - -@pytest.fixture -def source(): - case_path = REPO / "security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml" - raw = case_path.read_bytes() - case = yaml.safe_load(raw) - issues, doc, folder = v.load_type(REPO / "security-case-types", case["spec"]["type"]) - paths, issues = v.discover_declarations(doc, OWNERS) - declarations, issues = v.composer.load_declarations(paths) - issues, rendered = v.render_case(case, doc, declarations, require_implemented=False) - assert rendered is not None and not v.has_errors(issues) - return raw, (folder / "type.yaml").read_bytes(), rendered - - -@pytest.fixture -def mason(tmp_path, source): - sys.path.insert(0, str(OWNERS / "ops-mason/src")) - from ops_mason import case_structure - root = OWNERS / "ops-mason" - bundle = tmp_path / "bundle" - shutil.copytree(root / "builds/case-forgejo-netkingdom-oidc", bundle) - # Existing Mason source tests identify this historic bundle's wrong consumer. - rel = "credential-change-requests/CCR-DRAFT-FORGEJO-NETKINGDOM-OIDC-FORGEJO.yaml" - ccr = yaml.safe_load((bundle / rel).read_bytes()) - ccr["target"]["workload"] = "forgejo" - (bundle / rel).write_text(yaml.safe_dump(ccr, sort_keys=False, width=110)) - manifest = json.loads((bundle / "manifest.json").read_bytes()) - manifest["files"][rel] = e.sha((bundle / rel).read_bytes()).split(":")[1] - (bundle / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps(manifest)) - request = case_structure.prepare(REPO / "security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml", - root / "plans/case-forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.md", bundle, - nk_root=OWNERS / "net-kingdom", allow_unimplemented=True) - return json.loads(json.dumps(request.as_dict())) - - -def test_real_mason_request_recomputes_all_source_and_projection_pins(source, mason): - result = e.audit(*source, structure=mason) - assert result["structure"]["objects"] == 5 - assert result["native_complete"] is False - assert result["structure"]["native_materialization_verified"] is False - assert "mint-secret" in result["missing_follow_through"] - assert "register-client" in result["missing_machine_descriptors"] - assert "consumer-enforces-groups" in result["required_verification"] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["case_digest", "type_digest", "render_digest", "structural_digest"]) -def test_changed_source_or_projection_refused(source, mason, field): - mason[field] = "sha256:" + "0" * 64 - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.audit(*source, structure=mason) - - -def test_rehashed_structural_inventory_cannot_add_role_or_mint(source, mason): - mason["objects"][0]["target"] += "-sibling" - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.audit(*source, structure=mason) - - -def test_structure_unknown_native_success_flag_is_refused(source, mason): - mason["native_complete"] = True - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.audit(*source, structure=mason) - - -@pytest.fixture -def warden(tmp_path, source): - sys.path.insert(0, str(OWNERS / "ops-warden/src")) - from warden.case_run import Invocation, Journal, OwnerResult - from warden.case_receipt_state import Outcome, Pins, Receipt, StepState - raw, type_raw, rendered = source - # Test-only migration: current acknowledged real type has no descriptors. - doc = yaml.safe_load(type_raw) - descriptor_digest = e.sha(b"fixture-descriptor") - doc["spec"]["execution_descriptors"] = {"mint-secret": descriptor_digest} - type_raw = yaml.safe_dump(doc).encode() - pins = Pins(e.sha(raw), e.sha(type_raw), descriptor_digest, *([e.sha(b"fixture")] * 3)) - state = StepState("mint-secret", "railiance-platform", pins, (), False, - (Receipt(1, Outcome.RUNNING), Receipt(2, Outcome.SUCCESS))) - invocation = Invocation("mint-secret", "railiance-platform", "forgejo", "human", "fixture-human", - "keycape-client-secret-generate", pins, "attempt-fixture", "run") - receipt = OwnerResult(Outcome.SUCCESS, "fixture-evidence", (), True, - "fixture-parent-revocation", "fixture-grant-revocation", "attempt-fixture", "run") - journal = Journal(tmp_path / "private-journal") - journal.save("mint-secret:forgejo", state, receipt, invocation) - return (raw, type_raw, rendered), journal - - -def test_actual_warden_journal_save_is_read_without_mutation_and_not_native_proof(warden): - source, journal = warden - path = journal.directory / "journal.sqlite" - before = path.read_bytes() - rows = e.read_journal(path) - result = e.audit(*source, journal_rows=rows) - assert path.read_bytes() == before - assert result["steps"] == [{"step": "mint-secret", "outcome": "verified-success", "native_authenticated": False}] - assert result["native_complete"] is False - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["session_revocation_digest", "grant_revocation_digest", "evidence_digest"]) -def test_missing_revocation_or_owner_fingerprint_refused(warden, field): - source, journal = warden - row = e.read_journal(journal.directory / "journal.sqlite")[0] - row[field] = None - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.audit(*source, journal_rows=(row,)) - - -def test_unresolved_attempt_not_promoted_to_success(warden): - source, journal = warden - row = e.read_journal(journal.directory / "journal.sqlite")[0] - row["receipts"][-1]["outcome"] = "uncertain" - assert e.audit(*source, journal_rows=(row,))["steps"][0]["outcome"] == "uncertain" - - -def test_no_descriptor_in_actual_acknowledged_type_refuses_journal_success(source, warden): - _, journal = warden - row = e.read_journal(journal.directory / "journal.sqlite")[0] - row["pins"]["case_type"] = e.sha(source[1]) - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused, match="machine descriptor"): - e.audit(*source, journal_rows=(row,)) - - -def test_missing_or_symlink_journal_never_created(tmp_path): - path = tmp_path / "missing.sqlite" - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.read_journal(path) - assert not path.exists() - target = tmp_path / "target.sqlite" - target.write_bytes(b"not sqlite") - path.symlink_to(target) - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.read_journal(path) - - -def test_duplicate_and_oversized_json_refused(): - for source in (b'{"schema":1,"schema":2}', b"x" * (e.LIMIT + 1)): - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused): - e.decode(source) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("version", ["1.1", "1.2"]) -def test_existing_cli_exact_source_selection_and_normal_admission_refusal(version): - case = REPO / ("security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml" if version == "1.1" else - "security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party/examples/forgejo.yaml") - argv = [sys.executable, str(TOOL / "security_case_validator.py"), "check-evidence", str(case), - "--types", str(REPO / "security-case-types"), "--repos-root", str(OWNERS), - "--version-root", "1.2=" + str(REPO / "security-case-type-revisions/1.2")] - refused = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True) - assert refused.returncode == 1 and "only implemented types" in refused.stderr - result = subprocess.run(argv + ["--allow-unimplemented"], capture_output=True, text=True) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - report = json.loads(result.stdout) - assert report["native_complete"] is False and report["execution"]["permitted"] is False - assert ("deliver-consumer-secret" in report["missing_follow_through"]) == (version == "1.2") - - -def test_cli_consumes_actual_mason_request_and_withholds_rejected_payload(tmp_path, mason): - request = tmp_path / "request.json" - request.write_text(json.dumps(mason)) - args = [sys.executable, str(TOOL / "security_case_validator.py"), "check-evidence", - str(REPO / "security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml"), "--types", str(REPO / "security-case-types"), - "--repos-root", str(OWNERS), "--allow-unimplemented", "--structure-request", str(request)] - result = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - assert json.loads(result.stdout)["structure"]["objects"] == 5 - mason["unexpected"] = "sensitive-fixture-diagnostic" - request.write_text(json.dumps(mason)) - result = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True) - assert result.returncode == 1 and "sensitive-fixture-diagnostic" not in result.stderr + result.stdout - - -def test_actual_journal_latest_uncertainty_does_not_replay_prior_success(warden): - source, journal = warden - from warden.case_receipt_state import Pins, Receipt, StepState, Outcome - row = e.read_journal(journal.directory / "journal.sqlite")[0] - history = tuple(Receipt(item["attempt"], Outcome(item["outcome"]), tuple(item["created"])) - for item in row["receipts"]) - state = StepState(row["step_id"], row["owner"], Pins(**row["pins"]), (), False, - history + (Receipt(3, Outcome.UNCERTAIN),)) - journal.save("mint-secret:forgejo", state) - rows = e.read_journal(journal.directory / "journal.sqlite") - assert len(rows) == 1 - assert e.audit(*source, journal_rows=rows)["steps"][0]["outcome"] == "uncertain" diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_descriptor_pins.py b/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_descriptor_pins.py deleted file mode 100644 index 8980425..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_descriptor_pins.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -"""Owner pin contract parity; synthetic pins never establish native acceptance.""" -import copy -import json -from pathlib import Path -import sys - -import jsonschema -import pytest -import yaml - -TOOL = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TOOL.parents[1] -sys.path.insert(0, str(TOOL)) -import security_case_validator as v -import security_case_evidence as e - -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((REPO / 'security-case-types/_template/type.yaml').read_bytes()) -SCHEMA = json.loads((REPO / 'canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json').read_bytes()) -PIN = 'sha256:' + 'a' * 64 -STEP = TYPE['spec']['follow_through'][0]['id'] - - -def with_pins(pins): - doc = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - doc['spec']['execution_descriptors'] = pins - return doc - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('pins', [{}, {STEP: PIN}]) -def test_optional_partial_pin_contract_has_schema_semantic_parity(pins): - doc = with_pins(pins) - jsonschema.validate(doc, SCHEMA) - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_type(doc)) - assert doc['spec']['status'] == TYPE['spec']['status'] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('pins', [None, [], 'digest', {STEP: True}, {STEP: None}, - {STEP: 17}, {STEP: 'a' * 64}, {STEP: PIN.upper()}, {STEP: PIN + '\n'}, - {STEP + '\n': PIN}, {7: PIN}, {'../escape': PIN}, - {f'step-{i}': PIN for i in range(129)}]) -def test_malformed_descriptor_contract_refused_by_both_validators(pins): - doc = with_pins(pins) - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_type(doc)) - with pytest.raises(jsonschema.ValidationError): - jsonschema.validate(doc, SCHEMA) - - -def test_well_shaped_unknown_step_is_semantic_refusal(): - doc = with_pins({'not-a-declared-step': PIN}) - jsonschema.validate(doc, SCHEMA) - assert v.has_errors(v.validate_type(doc)) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('pins', [None, [], {STEP: 'bad'}, {'undeclared-step': PIN}]) -def test_direct_evidence_api_refuses_bad_map_without_crashing_or_needing_rows(pins): - with pytest.raises(e.EvidenceRefused, match='machine descriptor pins'): - e.check_steps((), b'case', yaml.safe_dump(with_pins(pins)).encode(), {'follow_through': []}) - - -def test_partial_pin_cannot_bypass_ordinary_case_admission(): - doc = with_pins({STEP: PIN}) - case = yaml.safe_load((REPO / 'security-case-types/_template/examples/example-operator.yaml').read_bytes()) - issues = v.validate_case(case, doc) - assert any('only implemented types' in issue.message for issue in issues) diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_explicit_version_selection.py b/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_explicit_version_selection.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6194aac..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_explicit_version_selection.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -"""Exact source selection is not type implementation or native admission.""" -import copy -import importlib.util -import json -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys - -import pytest -import yaml - -TOOL=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO=TOOL.parents[1] -spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('version_selection_validator',TOOL/'security_case_validator.py') -v=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(v) -DEFAULT=REPO/'security-case-types' -REVISION=REPO/'security-case-type-revisions/1.2' -REF='oidc-browser-relying-party' -CASE11=REPO/'security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml' -CASE12=REVISION/REF/'examples/forgejo.yaml' - - -def load(ref,roots=None):return v.load_type(DEFAULT,ref,version_roots=roots) - - -def test_version12_selected_exactly_default11_unchanged(): - before,data11,path11=load(REF+'@1.1') - after,again,againpath=load(REF+'@1.1',{'1.2':REVISION}) - assert not before and not after and data11==again and path11==againpath==DEFAULT/REF - issues,data12,path12=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':REVISION}) - assert not issues and data12['spec']['status']=='acknowledged' - assert path12==REVISION/REF and data11['spec']['status']=='acknowledged' - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('root',[Path('/nonexistent-type-revision'),DEFAULT]) -def test_missing_or_wrong_explicit_version_never_falls_back(root): - issues,data,_=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':root}) - assert v.has_errors(issues) and data is None - - -def test_no_mapping_does_not_discover_acknowledged_package(): - issues,data,_=load(REF+'@1.2') - assert data is None and v.has_errors(issues) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('ref',['../oidc-browser-relying-party@1.2',REF+'@../1.2',REF+'@latest',REF+'@1.2/other',None]) -def test_traversal_malformed_unpinned_reference_refused(ref): - issues,data,_=load(ref,{'1.2':REVISION}) - assert data is None and v.has_errors(issues) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize('entries',[['1.2=x','1.2=y'],['1.2=x','1.2=x'],['../1.2=x'],['1.2='],['latest=x'],['1.2']]) -def test_ambiguous_or_invalid_root_mapping_refused(entries): - issues,roots=v.parse_version_roots(entries) - assert v.has_errors(issues) and roots=={} - - -def test_selected_source_id_or_duplicate_revision_fields_refused(tmp_path): - folder=tmp_path/REF;folder.mkdir();source=yaml.safe_load((REVISION/REF/'type.yaml').read_text()) - source['spec']['id']='different-id';(folder/'type.yaml').write_text(yaml.safe_dump(source)) - issues,data,_=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':tmp_path}) - assert data is None and v.has_errors(issues) - (folder/'type.yaml').write_text('spec:\n id: oidc-browser-relying-party\n version: "1.1"\n version: "1.2"\n') - issues,data,_=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':tmp_path}) - assert data is None and v.has_errors(issues) - - -def test_selected_symlink_cannot_escape_root(tmp_path): - (tmp_path/REF).symlink_to(REVISION/REF,target_is_directory=True) - issues,data,_=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':tmp_path}) - assert data is None and v.has_errors(issues) - - -def test_direct_case_validation_cannot_mix_source_pins(): - _,type12,_=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':REVISION}) - case11=yaml.safe_load(CASE11.read_text()) - assert any('does not match selected type' in x.message for x in v.validate_case(case11,type12,require_implemented=False)) - _,type11,_=load(REF+'@1.1') - case12=yaml.safe_load(CASE12.read_text()) - assert any('does not match selected type' in x.message for x in v.validate_case(case12,type11,require_implemented=False)) - - -def test_acknowledged12_load_does_not_admit_or_render_ordinary_case(): - _,type12,_=load(REF+'@1.2',{'1.2':REVISION});case=yaml.safe_load(CASE12.read_text()) - assert any('only implemented types accept cases' in x.message for x in v.validate_case(case,type12)) - issues,rendered=v.render_case(case,type12,[]) - assert rendered is None and v.has_errors(issues) - - -def cli(*args):return subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(TOOL/'security_case_validator.py'),*map(str,args)],capture_output=True,text=True) - - -def test_cli_default11_and_mapped12_admission_boundaries(): - original=cli('validate-case',CASE11,'--types',DEFAULT) - mapped=cli('validate-case',CASE11,'--types',DEFAULT,'--version-root','1.2='+str(REVISION)) - assert original.returncode==mapped.returncode==1 and original.stderr==mapped.stderr and 'only implemented types' in original.stderr - refused=cli('validate-case',CASE12,'--types',DEFAULT,'--version-root','1.2='+str(REVISION)) - assert refused.returncode==1 and 'only implemented types' in refused.stderr - preparation=cli('validate-case',CASE12,'--types',DEFAULT,'--version-root','1.2='+str(REVISION),'--allow-unimplemented') - assert preparation.returncode==0 - - -def test_cli_render_source_selection_isolated_deterministic_plan_only(): - owners=Path('/home/worsch') - before=cli('render',CASE11,'--types',DEFAULT,'--repos-root',owners,'--allow-unimplemented') - selected11=cli('render',CASE11,'--types',DEFAULT,'--repos-root',owners,'--version-root','1.2='+str(REVISION),'--allow-unimplemented') - assert before.returncode==selected11.returncode==0 and before.stdout==selected11.stdout - after=cli('render',CASE12,'--types',DEFAULT,'--repos-root',owners,'--version-root','1.2='+str(REVISION),'--allow-unimplemented') - direct=cli('render',CASE12,'--types',REVISION,'--repos-root',owners,'--allow-unimplemented') - assert after.returncode==direct.returncode==0 and after.stdout==direct.stdout - a,b=json.loads(before.stdout),json.loads(after.stdout) - assert a['type'].endswith('@1.1') and b['type'].endswith('@1.2') and a['digest']!=b['digest'] - assert a['execution']['permitted'] is b['execution']['permitted'] is False - assert b['composition']['execution']['permitted'] is False diff --git a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_security_case_validator.py b/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_security_case_validator.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9bf84d2..0000000 --- a/tools/security-case-types/tests/test_security_case_validator.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,208 +0,0 @@ -import copy -import importlib.util -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml - -TOOL_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] -REPO = TOOL_DIR.parents[1] -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("security_case_validator", TOOL_DIR / "security_case_validator.py") -v = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -sys.modules[SPEC.name] = v -SPEC.loader.exec_module(v) - -TEMPLATE_DIR = REPO / "security-case-types" / "_template" -TYPE = yaml.safe_load((TEMPLATE_DIR / "type.yaml").read_text()) -CASE = yaml.safe_load((TEMPLATE_DIR / "examples" / "example-operator.yaml").read_text()) -DECLS, _ = v.composer.load_declarations([str(REPO / "capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.local-identity.yaml")]) - - -def msgs(issues): - return [f"{i.path}: {i.message}" for i in issues if i.level == "ERROR"] - - -def implemented(t=None): - t = copy.deepcopy(t or TYPE) - t["spec"]["status"] = "implemented" - return t - - -def test_template_type_validates(): - assert msgs(v.validate_type(TYPE, TEMPLATE_DIR)) == [] - - -def test_missing_section_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - del t["spec"]["rollback"] - assert any("rollback" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_unpinned_provider_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["composition"]["providers"] = {} - assert any("provider pin" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_unknown_capability_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["composition"]["capabilities"] = ["c9.invented"] - assert any("unknown capability" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_attended_step_needs_justification(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - del t["spec"]["follow_through"][0]["attended_justification"] - assert any("attended" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_every_step_needs_a_rollback(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["rollback"] = [r for r in t["spec"]["rollback"] if r["reverses"] != "init-store"] - assert any("init-store" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_verification_needs_a_negative_check_and_never_reads_values(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["verification"] = [c for c in t["spec"]["verification"] if c["expect"] != "deny"] - t["spec"]["verification"][0]["reads_secret_value"] = True - found = msgs(v.validate_type(t)) - assert any("negative check" in m for m in found) - assert any("never reads a value" in m for m in found) - - -def test_template_with_unknown_parameter_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["materialization"][1]["template"] = "policy-{nonexistent}" - assert any("unknown parameter" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_high_risk_type_needs_founder_acceptance(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["acceptance"]["risk_class"] = "high" - assert any("founder" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_credential_shaped_value_in_type_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["purpose"] = "token hvs.CAESIabcdefghijklmnop" - assert any("credential-shaped" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_case_against_unimplemented_type_is_refused(): - assert any("only implemented types" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_case(CASE, TYPE))) - assert msgs(v.validate_case(CASE, implemented())) == [] - - -def test_case_cannot_carry_a_secret_value(): - c = copy.deepcopy(CASE) - c["spec"]["parameters"]["signing_key_ref"] = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----" - found = msgs(v.validate_case(c, implemented())) - assert any("custody reference" in m for m in found) - assert any("credential-shaped" in m for m in found) - - -def test_case_parameter_rules(): - c = copy.deepcopy(CASE) - c["spec"]["parameters"]["operator_username"] = "Not Valid" - c["spec"]["parameters"]["store_home"] = "/tmp/elsewhere" - c["spec"]["parameters"]["surprise"] = 1 - del c["spec"]["parameters"]["operator_email"] - found = msgs(v.validate_case(c, implemented())) - assert any("does not match" in m for m in found) - assert any("does not let cases set it" in m for m in found) - assert any("not a parameter of this type" in m for m in found) - assert any("operator_email: required" in m for m in found) - - -def test_accepted_case_needs_acceptance_record(): - c = copy.deepcopy(CASE) - c["spec"]["status"] = "accepted" - assert any("acceptance" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_case(c, implemented()))) - c["spec"]["acceptance"] = {"at": "2026-10-08", "record": "decision:x", "by": [{"role": "owner", "name": "a"}]} - assert msgs(v.validate_case(c, implemented())) == [] - - -def test_render_is_deterministic_plan_only_and_substitutes_parameters(): - issues, r = v.render_case(CASE, implemented(), DECLS) - assert msgs(issues) == [] - assert r["execution"] == {"permitted": False} - assert r["materialization"][1]["template"] == "local-identity-bootstrap-admin-read" - assert r["rollback"][1]["action"].endswith("bao:platform/workloads/example/local-identity-signing") - _, again = v.render_case(CASE, implemented(), DECLS) - assert r["digest"] == again["digest"] - - -def test_load_type_checks_reference_and_version(tmp_path): - root = tmp_path / "types" - (root / "template-example").mkdir(parents=True) - (root / "template-example" / "type.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(TYPE)) - issues, data, _ = v.load_type(root, "template-example@0.1") - assert data is not None and not msgs(issues) - issues, data, _ = v.load_type(root, "template-example@1.0") - assert data is None and any("version" in m for m in msgs(issues)) - issues, data, _ = v.load_type(root, "nope") - assert data is None - - -def test_template_conforms_to_the_json_schemas(): - import json - import pytest - jsonschema = pytest.importorskip("jsonschema") - type_schema = json.loads((REPO / "canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json").read_text()) - case_schema = json.loads((REPO / "canon/schemas/security-case_v0.1.schema.json").read_text()) - jsonschema.validate(TYPE, type_schema) - jsonschema.validate(CASE, case_schema) - bad = copy.deepcopy(CASE) - bad["spec"]["surprise"] = True - with pytest.raises(jsonschema.ValidationError): - jsonschema.validate(bad, case_schema) - - -def test_conditions_filter_rendering_and_require_parameters(): - t = implemented() - t["spec"]["parameters"][3]["required"] = False - t["spec"]["parameters"][3]["constraints"]["required_when"] = "operator_username == bootstrap-admin" - t["spec"]["materialization"][0]["when"] = "operator_username == bootstrap-admin" - t["spec"]["rollback"][1]["when"] = "operator_username == bootstrap-admin" - assert msgs(v.validate_type(t)) == [] - c = copy.deepcopy(CASE) - del c["spec"]["parameters"]["signing_key_ref"] - assert any("required when" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_case(c, t))) - c["spec"]["parameters"]["operator_username"] = "someone-else" - assert msgs(v.validate_case(c, t)) == [] - _, r = v.render_case(c, t, DECLS) - assert [m["id"] for m in r["materialization"]] == ["signing-key-policy", "catalog-entry"] - assert all("when" not in m for m in r["materialization"]) - - -def test_bad_condition_is_refused(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["materialization"][0]["when"] = "nonexistent == x" - t["spec"]["follow_through"][0]["when"] = "operator_username is x" - found = msgs(v.validate_type(t)) - assert any("unknown parameter 'nonexistent'" in m for m in found) - assert any("must be ' == '" in m for m in found) - - -def test_follow_through_needs_value_handling_and_lanes(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - step = t["spec"]["follow_through"][0] - del step["value_handling"] - del step["lane"] - found = msgs(v.validate_type(t)) - assert any("value_handling" in m for m in found) - assert any("catalog lane" in m for m in found) - - -def test_generated_value_never_in_attended_step(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - t["spec"]["follow_through"][0]["value_handling"] = "generated_in_custody" - assert any("never handled in an attended session" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) - - -def test_catalog_entry_needs_a_body(): - t = copy.deepcopy(TYPE) - item = next(m for m in t["spec"]["materialization"] if m["kind"] == "catalog_entry") - del item["body"] - assert any("catalog entry needs its body" in m for m in msgs(v.validate_type(t))) diff --git a/tools/security-tools.json b/tools/security-tools.json deleted file mode 100644 index cb4dfe8..0000000 --- a/tools/security-tools.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema": "netkingdom.security-tools-index.v1", - "purpose": "One place for any agent (Claude Code, Codex, Grok) or person to find NetKingdom's security tools, what question each answers, how to run it, and whether an agent may run it. Tool availability is not permission (SECURITY-COMPANION.md section 7).", - "agent_may_run_values": { - "yes": "offline and read-only; any agent may run it", - "fixtures-only": "an agent may run it on synthetic fixtures; real inputs are the owner's", - "no-attended": "needs a person's private input or authority; an agent prepares and the person runs it", - "no-live": "contacts a live service; only under the owner's admitted procedure" - }, - "orientation": [ - {"what": "Security rules, operative form", "where": "SECURITY-COMPANION.md"}, - {"what": "Credential and access routing (who owns a credential)", "command": "warden route find \"\" --json", "where": "~/ops-warden"}, - {"what": "Shared security orientation cards", "command": "PYTHONPATH=../emergent-security/src python3 -m emergent_security.knowledge --repositories .. show start --audience generic", "note": "A withheld card means: read its listed sources instead."}, - {"what": "Standards of record", "where": "canon/standards/"}, - {"what": "Upstream security vocabulary and secrets standard", "where": "../security-canon (Mode of Authority, SEC-DSM 1.0.0)"}, - {"what": "Accounts, authority and accountable automation", "where": "canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md"}, - {"what": "Who and what unlocks recovery", "where": "docs/crisis-custody-list.md"} - ], - "tools": [ - {"id": "bounded-execution-admission", "path": "tools/bounded-execution-admission", "answers": "Is this admission request well-formed and bounded (exact plan digest, window, scope ceiling, blast radius, checks, revert, budget), and does a carrier record admit it, consumed at most once?", - "run": "make bounded-execution-admission-check", "test": "make bounded-execution-admission-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md"}, - {"id": "service-identity", "path": "tools/service-identity", "answers": "Do the declared service accounts conform to the identity and privilege standard?", - "run": "make service-identity-check", "test": "make service-identity-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md"}, - {"id": "rotation-lanes", "path": "tools/rotation-lanes", "answers": "Does every known credential have a rotation lane with blast radius, verification step and owner?", - "run": "make rotation-lanes-check", "test": "make rotation-lanes-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md"}, - {"id": "service-binds", "path": "tools/service-binds", "answers": "Is an LLDAP service bind held in OpenBao and delivered by ESO exactly as its approved CCR says, equal to the live Secret?", - "run": "python3 tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py setup|verify --ccr-sha256 --kubeconfig --receipt ", "test": "python3 -m pytest tests/test_service_bind_lane.py", "agent_may_run": "no-attended", - "standard": "canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md"}, - {"id": "custody-record", "path": "tools/custody-record", "answers": "Is a platform-root custody record valid, and may a root grant be observed from it?", - "run": "uv run tools/custody-record/validate.py ", "test": "make custody-record-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "docs/adr/ADR-0017-root-grant-custody-and-account-authority.md"}, - {"id": "tenancy-posture", "path": "tools/tenancy-posture", "answers": "Is a tenancy.yaml declaration valid against the tenancy posture standard?", - "run": "python3 tools/tenancy-posture/validate.py ", "test": "make posture-feedback-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md"}, - {"id": "posture-feedback", "path": "tools/posture-feedback", "answers": "Which owner should get which remediation proposal for a posture finding?", - "run": "make posture-feedback-reference", "test": "make posture-feedback-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/posture-feedback_v0.1.md", "note": "Proposal-only: never writes State Hub or policy."}, - {"id": "iam-profile-conformance", "path": "tools/iam-profile-conformance", "answers": "Does an OIDC issuer conform to the NetKingdom IAM Profile?", - "run": "see tools/iam-profile-conformance/README.md", "test": "make iam-profile-conformance-test", "agent_may_run": "fixtures-only", - "standard": "canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md", "note": "A live check needs a freshly minted access token from the issuer's owner."}, - {"id": "playbook-capability-contract", "path": "tools/playbook-capability-contract", "answers": "Is a Railiance playbook capability declaration valid?", - "run": "see tools/playbook-capability-contract/README.md", "test": "make playbook-contract-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/playbook-capability-contract_v0.1.md"}, - {"id": "security-scenario-composer", "path": "tools/security-scenario-composer", "answers": "Which providers, trust transitions and responsibilities does a security scenario need?", - "run": "make security-scenario-compose-lightweight", "test": "make security-scenario-composer-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/security-scenario-composition_v0.1.md", "note": "Plan-only; executes nothing."}, - {"id": "security-case-types", "path": "tools/security-case-types", "answers": "Are a SecurityCaseType and a SecurityCase valid?", - "run": "see tools/security-case-types/README.md", "test": "python3 -m pytest tools/security-case-types/tests", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md"}, - {"id": "emission-cadence-profile", "path": "tools/emission-cadence-profile", "answers": "Does an emission-cadence declaration meet the NetKingdom security overlay?", - "run": "see tools/emission-cadence-profile/README.md", "test": "make emission-cadence-profile-test", "agent_may_run": "yes", - "standard": "canon/standards/emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md"}, - {"id": "security-bootstrap-console", "path": "tools/security-bootstrap-console", "answers": "Where is the guided security bootstrap, and what is the next safe action?", - "run": "make security-bootstrap-console", "test": "make security-bootstrap-console-test", "agent_may_run": "fixtures-only", - "standard": "docs/smooth-bootstrap-guide.md", "note": "Can write an explicit custody-mode approval record; that is the person's act."}, - {"id": "bootstrap-recovery", "path": "tools/bootstrap-recovery", "answers": "Can the identity backup be retrieved and each service restored in isolation?", - "run": "tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-*.sh ", "test": "NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_*_TEST=1 python3 -m pytest tests/test_isolated_*", "agent_may_run": "no-attended", - "standard": "docs/identity-restore-drill.md", "note": "Needs the backup age key and private test inputs. Agents prepare and test on fixtures; the operator (admin) runs the real stages (standard SI-13)."} - ], - "not_security_tools": { - "coordination-frame": "Renders the coordination receiver from staged sources; repository maintenance.", - "tutorial-verify": "Verifies runbook tutorial packs." - } -} diff --git a/tools/security_tools.py b/tools/security_tools.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4506784..0000000 --- a/tools/security_tools.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Print the NetKingdom security tools index (tools/security-tools.json) for people and agents. - -Offline and read-only. `--json` prints the index unchanged for machine use. -""" -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import json -import pathlib -import sys - -INDEX = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "security-tools.json" - - -def load() -> dict: - return json.loads(INDEX.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) - - -def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - index = load() - if args.json: - print(json.dumps(index, indent=2)) - return 0 - print("NetKingdom security tools. Tool availability is not permission (SECURITY-COMPANION.md section 7).\n") - print("Start here:") - for item in index["orientation"]: - target = item.get("command") or item.get("where") - print(f" - {item['what']}: {target}") - print("\nTools (agent may run: " + ", ".join(index["agent_may_run_values"]) + "):") - for tool in index["tools"]: - print(f"\n {tool['id']} [agent may run: {tool['agent_may_run']}]") - print(f" answers: {tool['answers']}") - print(f" run: {tool['run']}") - print(f" test: {tool['test']}") - print(f" rules: {tool['standard']}") - if tool.get("note"): - print(f" note: {tool['note']}") - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py b/tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py deleted file mode 100755 index bb14b61..0000000 --- a/tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,341 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended platform-custody lane for one LLDAP service bind (NK-WP-0056-T04). - -setup: under an approved, sha256-bound CCR and an attended platform-admin session, - fence coding agents, write the bind from the decrypted custody copy to KV - (CAS=0, or confirm an identical existing value), then policy and role. Refuses - unless custody equals the live Secret, so no rotation happens here. -verify: after the ExternalSecret is applied, native reader login as the ESO - ServiceAccount, exact policy/TTL, denials, and KV == live Secret in memory. - -Receipts hold closed booleans only; values are never printed or written. -""" -import argparse -import base64 -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -from pathlib import Path -import subprocess -import sys - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = HERE.parents[1] -PLATFORM = Path(os.environ.get('NK_PLATFORM_ROOT', REPO.parent / 'railiance-platform')) -sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM / 'scripts')) -from state_hub_preflight_lane import bao, data, capabilities, revoke # noqa: E402 -from repair_eso_kubernetes_auth import role_payload, check_role # noqa: E402 -from telemetry_smtp_delivery import ensure # noqa: E402 - -LANES = { - 'svc-provisioner': { - 'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0052-net-kingdom-identity-provisioner-bind.yaml', - 'custody_key': 'LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS', - 'secret': 'identity-provisioner-ldap', 'username': 'svc-provisioner', - 'external_secret': 'identity-provisioner-ldap', - }, - # Authelia keeps the bind user in its configuration, not in the Secret, and reads - # ldap_password from a file at start-up only. - 'svc-authelia': { - 'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0053-net-kingdom-authelia-bind.yaml', - 'custody_key': 'LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS', - 'secret': 'authelia-secrets', 'secret_key': 'ldap_password', 'username': 'svc-authelia', - 'bind_user_config': ('authelia-config', 'configuration.yml', - 'user: uid=svc-authelia,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local'), - 'external_secret': 'authelia-secrets', - }, - # KeyCape reads the bind from config.yaml in keycape-config until it takes - # KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW (key-cape KEY-WP-0046); ESO owns a new dedicated Secret. - 'svc-keycape': { - 'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0054-net-kingdom-keycape-bind.yaml', - 'custody_key': 'LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS', - 'secret': 'keycape-lldap-bind', 'secret_key': 'password', 'username': 'svc-keycape', - 'bind_in_config_secret': ('keycape-config', 'config.yaml', - 'uid=svc-keycape,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local'), - 'external_secret': 'keycape-lldap-bind', - }, - # privacyIDEA stores the resolver password in its own database and accepts it only from - # pi-admin with MFA: no workload reader, no ESO. The value is proven current by an LLDAP - # sign-in and delivered by realm_bootstrap.py --rotate-bind --from-openbao (attended). - 'svc-privacyidea': { - 'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0055-net-kingdom-privacyidea-bind.yaml', - 'custody_key': 'LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS', 'username': 'svc-privacyidea', - 'attended': True, 'directory': 'https://lldap.coulomb.social', - 'procedure': 'net-kingdom sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py --rotate-bind --from-openbao', - }, -} -ATTENDED_AUTH = {'method': 'attended-oidc', 'mount': 'netkingdom', 'role': 'platform-admin'} -BIND_NAMES = ('svc-authelia', 'svc-keycape', 'svc-privacyidea', 'svc-provisioner') -FIELD = 'LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD' -BOUNDARY = 'sys/policies/acl/agent-high-risk-boundary' -APPROVERS = {'platform-owner', 'net-kingdom-owner'} - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -def contract(name, expected): - spec = LANES[name] - path = PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / spec['ccr'] - raw = path.read_bytes() - if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() != expected: raise Refused('ccr_digest') - ccr, errors, _ = load('credential_change', PLATFORM / 'scripts/credential-change.py').validate_ccr(path) - if errors or ccr['status'] not in {'approved', 'applied', 'verified', 'active'}: raise Refused('ccr_status') - approved = {r['reviewer'].removeprefix('User (').removesuffix(')') for r in ccr['review'].get('comments', []) - if r.get('decision') == 'approved' and (r.get('source_ref') or r.get('at'))} - if not APPROVERS <= approved: raise Refused('ccr_approval') - role = 'net-kingdom-' + name + '-bind-eso' - kv = 'platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/' + name - if spec.get('attended'): - a, d = ccr['openbao'], ccr['delivery'] - if (ccr['request_type'] != 'attended-service-credential-delivery' or a['kv_path'] != kv - or a['fields'] != [FIELD] or a['auth'] != ATTENDED_AUTH or a['runtime_access'] is not False - or d['procedure'] != spec['procedure']): - raise Refused('ccr_shape') - return ccr, {'kv_path': kv.replace('platform/', 'platform/data/', 1), 'role': role, **spec} - a = ccr['openbao']; auth = a['auth']; d = ccr['delivery'] - if (a['kv_path'] != kv or a['fields'] != [FIELD] or a['policy_name'] != role or auth['role'] != role - or auth['policies'] != [role] or auth.get('audience') != 'openbao' - or auth['bound_claims'] != {'service_account_names': [role], 'service_account_namespaces': ['sso']} - or auth.get('bound_claims_confirmed') is not True or auth.get('token_no_default_policy') is not True or a.get('metadata_read') is not False - or any(auth.get(k) != '15m' for k in ('ttl', 'token_max_ttl', 'token_explicit_max_ttl')) - or d['namespace'] != 'sso' or d['secret'] != spec['secret'] or d['key'] != spec.get('secret_key', 'password') - or d['service_account'] != role): - raise Refused('ccr_shape') - lane = {'service_account': role, 'namespace': 'sso', 'role': role, 'policy': role, - 'kv_path': kv.replace('platform/', 'platform/data/', 1), **spec} - policy = ('path "' + lane['kv_path'] + '" { capabilities = ["read"] }\n' - 'path "auth/token/lookup-self" { capabilities = ["read"] }\n' - 'path "auth/token/revoke-self" { capabilities = ["update"] }\n') - if (PLATFORM / a['policy_file']).read_text() != policy: raise Refused('policy_file') - lane['policy_text'] = policy - return ccr, lane - - -def kube(kubeconfig, args, payload=None): - return subprocess.run(['kubectl', '--kubeconfig', kubeconfig, *args], input=payload, - check=True, capture_output=True).stdout - - -def secret_data(kubeconfig, name): - return json.loads(kube(kubeconfig, ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'secret', name, '-o', 'json'])).get('data', {}) - - -def decoded(raw, key): - return base64.b64decode(raw.get(key, ''), validate=True).decode() - - -def configured_bind(kubeconfig, lane): - """The bindPW in a service's config Secret, after checking it binds the lane's account.""" - import yaml - name, entry, dn = lane['bind_in_config_secret'] - config = yaml.safe_load(decoded(secret_data(kubeconfig, name), entry)) - lldap = config.get('lldap') if isinstance(config, dict) else None - if not isinstance(lldap, dict) or lldap.get('bindDN') != dn: raise Refused('live_bind_user') - return lldap.get('bindPW') or '' - - -def live_secret(kubeconfig, lane, delivered=True): - """The bind value in use. For a config-embedded bind, setup (delivered=False) reads the - config; verify reads the delivered Secret, which must equal the config while both exist.""" - key = lane.get('secret_key', 'password') - if 'bind_in_config_secret' in lane: - configured = configured_bind(kubeconfig, lane) - if not delivered: - if not configured: raise Refused('live_secret_shape') - return configured - value = decoded(secret_data(kubeconfig, lane['secret']), key) - if not value: raise Refused('live_secret_shape') - if configured and configured != value: raise Refused('kv_live_mismatch') - return value - raw = secret_data(kubeconfig, lane['secret']) - if 'bind_user_config' in lane: - name, entry, line = lane['bind_user_config'] - config = json.loads(kube(kubeconfig, ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'configmap', name, '-o', 'json'])).get('data', {}) - if line not in [l.strip() for l in config.get(entry, '').splitlines()]: raise Refused('live_bind_user') - elif base64.b64decode(raw.get('username', ''), validate=True).decode() != lane['username']: - raise Refused('live_secret_shape') - value = base64.b64decode(raw.get(key, ''), validate=True).decode() - if not value: raise Refused('live_secret_shape') - return value - - -def custody_value(root, lane): - io = load('custody_io', REPO / 'sso-mfa/bootstrap/apply-service-secrets.py') - with io.custody(root, ['lldap']) as dirs: - return io.literal(io.read_env(dirs['lldap']), lane['custody_key']) - - -def attended_platform_admin(): - ident = data(bao(['token', 'lookup', '-format=json']))['data'] - if ('platform-admin' not in ident.get('policies', []) or 'root' in ident.get('policies', []) - or not ident.get('path', '').startswith('auth/netkingdom/')): - raise Refused('attended_platform_admin_required') - - -def directory_login(endpoint, user, password): - """True if LLDAP accepts this password for the account: LLDAP is the authority for the current value.""" - split = load('bind_split', REPO / 'sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py') - return split.Directory(endpoint).login(user, password) is not None - - -def fence_paths(lane): - return (lane['kv_path'], lane['kv_path'].replace('/data/', '/metadata/', 1)) - - -def fence_present(lane): - current = data(bao(['read', '-format=json', BOUNDARY]))['data']['policy'] - return all('path "' + p + '" { capabilities = ["deny"] }' in current for p in fence_paths(lane)) - - -def setup(name, expected, root, kubeconfig, receipt, endpoint=None): - receipt['phase'] = 'contract'; ccr, lane = contract(name, expected) - receipt['phase'] = 'identity'; attended_platform_admin() - value = custody_value(root, lane) - if lane.get('attended'): - receipt['phase'] = 'custody_is_current' - if not directory_login(endpoint or lane['directory'], lane['username'], value): raise Refused('custody_not_current') - else: - receipt['phase'] = 'custody_equals_live' - if live_secret(kubeconfig, lane, delivered=False) != value: raise Refused('custody_drift') - receipt['phase'] = 'coding_agent_fence' - current = data(bao(['read', '-format=json', BOUNDARY]))['data']['policy']; added = '' - for path in (lane['kv_path'], lane['kv_path'].replace('/data/', '/metadata/', 1)): - stanza = 'path "' + path + '" { capabilities = ["deny"] }\n' - if '"' + path + '"' not in current: added += stanza - elif stanza.strip() not in current: raise Refused('fence_conflict') - if added: - if data(bao(['read', '-format=json', BOUNDARY]))['data']['policy'] != current: raise Refused('fence_race') - bao(['write', BOUNDARY, '-'], payload={'policy': current + '\n' + added}) - if data(bao(['read', '-format=json', BOUNDARY]))['data']['policy'] != current + '\n' + added: - raise Refused('fence_readback') - receipt['phase'] = 'kv' - existing = bao(['read', '-format=json', lane['kv_path']], allow_failure=True) - if existing.returncode == 0: - if data(existing)['data']['data'] != {FIELD: value}: raise Refused('kv_differs') - receipt['kv_version'] = data(existing)['data']['metadata']['version']; receipt['existing_identical_custody'] = True - else: - if b'No value found' not in existing.stdout + existing.stderr: raise Refused('kv_absence_unproven') - written = data(bao(['write', '-format=json', lane['kv_path'], '-'], - payload={'options': {'cas': 0}, 'data': {FIELD: value}})) - receipt['kv_version'] = written['data']['version'] - if lane.get('attended'): - receipt['phase'] = 'fence_present' - if not fence_present(lane): raise Refused('fence_readback') - receipt.update(phase='done', status='custody_prepared', custody_is_current=True, coding_agents_denied=True, - workload_access=False, source_ccr=ccr['id'], ccr_sha256=expected) - return - receipt['phase'] = 'policy_role' - policy = lane['policy_text'] - ensure('sys/policies/acl/' + lane['policy'], {'policy': policy}, - lambda actual: None if actual['policy'] == policy else (_ for _ in ()).throw(Refused('policy_drift'))) - ensure('auth/kubernetes/role/' + lane['role'], role_payload(lane), lambda actual: check_role(actual, lane)) - receipt['phase'] = 'fence_effective' - child = data(bao(['token', 'create', '-format=json', '-policy=' + lane['policy'], '-policy=agent-high-risk-boundary', - '-no-default-policy', '-ttl=60s']))['auth']['client_token'] - try: - paths = [lane['kv_path'], lane['kv_path'].replace('/data/', '/metadata/', 1)] - if any(v != ['deny'] for v in capabilities(child, paths).values()): raise Refused('fence_ineffective') - finally: - revoke(child) - receipt.update(phase='done', status='custody_and_reader_prepared', custody_equals_live=True, - coding_agents_denied=True, source_ccr=ccr['id'], ccr_sha256=expected, - external_secret_apply_and_verify_pending=True) - - -def verify_attended(ccr, lane, expected, endpoint, receipt): - receipt['phase'] = 'kv_is_current' - native = data(bao(['read', '-format=json', lane['kv_path']]))['data'] - if set(native['data']) != {FIELD} or not directory_login(endpoint or lane['directory'], lane['username'], native['data'][FIELD]): - raise Refused('kv_not_current') - receipt['kv_version'] = native['metadata']['version'] - receipt['phase'] = 'fence_present' - if not fence_present(lane): raise Refused('fence_missing') - receipt['phase'] = 'no_workload_role' - if bao(['read', '-format=json', 'auth/kubernetes/role/' + lane['role']], allow_failure=True).returncode == 0: - raise Refused('unexpected_workload_role') - receipt.update(phase='done', status='custody_verified', kv_is_current=True, coding_agents_denied=True, - workload_access=False, source_ccr=ccr['id'], ccr_sha256=expected) - - -def verify(name, expected, kubeconfig, receipt, endpoint=None): - receipt['phase'] = 'contract'; ccr, lane = contract(name, expected) - receipt['phase'] = 'identity'; attended_platform_admin() - if lane.get('attended'): return verify_attended(ccr, lane, expected, endpoint, receipt) - receipt['phase'] = 'external_secret_ready' - es = json.loads(kube(kubeconfig, ['-n', 'sso', 'get', 'externalsecret', lane['external_secret'], '-o', 'json'])) - if not any(c.get('type') == 'Ready' and c.get('status') == 'True' for c in es.get('status', {}).get('conditions', [])): - raise Refused('external_secret_not_ready') - - def login(sa, audience, negative=False): - jwt = kube(kubeconfig, ['-n', 'sso', 'create', 'token', sa, '--audience=' + audience, '--duration=10m']).decode().strip() - result = bao(['write', '-format=json', 'auth/kubernetes/login', '-'], - payload={'role': lane['role'], 'jwt': jwt}, allow_failure=negative) - if negative: - if result.returncode == 0: - revoke(data(result)['auth']['client_token']); raise Refused('negative_login_accepted') - if b'403' not in result.stderr and b'400' not in result.stderr: raise Refused('negative_login_unclear') - return None - return data(result)['auth'] - - receipt['phase'] = 'native_reader_login' - auth = login(lane['service_account'], 'openbao'); token = auth['client_token'] - try: - if (auth['token_policies'] != [lane['policy']] or auth.get('identity_policies') - or not 0 < auth['lease_duration'] <= 900): - raise Refused('reader_policy_or_ttl') - receipt['phase'] = 'reader_capabilities' - others = ['platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/' + n for n in BIND_NAMES if n != name] - paths = [lane['kv_path'], lane['kv_path'].replace('/data/', '/metadata/', 1), *others, 'auth/token/create'] - cap = capabilities(token, paths) - if cap[paths[0]] != ['read'] or any(cap[p] != ['deny'] for p in paths[1:]): raise Refused('reader_capabilities') - receipt['phase'] = 'kv_equals_live' - native = data(bao(['read', '-format=json', lane['kv_path']], token=token))['data'] - if set(native['data']) != {FIELD} or native['data'][FIELD] != live_secret(kubeconfig, lane): - raise Refused('kv_live_mismatch') - receipt['kv_version'] = native['metadata']['version'] - finally: - revoke(token) - receipt['phase'] = 'negative_logins' - login('default', 'openbao', True); login(lane['service_account'], 'wrong-audience', True) - check_role(data(bao(['read', '-format=json', 'auth/kubernetes/role/' + lane['role']]))['data'], lane) - receipt.update(phase='done', status='reader_and_delivery_verified', external_secret_ready=True, - exact_policy_and_ttl_verified=True, sibling_metadata_and_token_create_denied=True, - wrong_service_account_denied=True, wrong_audience_denied=True, - eso_delivery_equality_verified=True, temporary_reader_revoked=True, - source_ccr=ccr['id'], ccr_sha256=expected) - - -def main(): - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter) - p.add_argument('action', choices=['setup', 'verify']); p.add_argument('lane', choices=sorted(LANES)) - p.add_argument('--ccr-sha256', required=True); p.add_argument('--kubeconfig', help='required for ESO lanes') - p.add_argument('--endpoint', help='LLDAP web endpoint for attended lanes (default: the lane\'s directory)') - p.add_argument('--custody', help='decrypted custody root (setup only)'); p.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - a = p.parse_args() - if (a.action == 'setup') != bool(a.custody): p.error('--custody is required for setup and refused for verify') - if not LANES[a.lane].get('attended') and not a.kubeconfig: p.error('--kubeconfig is required for this lane') - fd = os.open(a.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - r = {'status': 'failed', 'action': a.action, 'lane': a.lane, 'values_recorded': False, - 'source_sha256': hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - try: - if a.action == 'setup': setup(a.lane, a.ccr_sha256, a.custody, a.kubeconfig, r, a.endpoint) - else: verify(a.lane, a.ccr_sha256, a.kubeconfig, r, a.endpoint) - except Exception as error: - r.update(status='failed', reason=str(error) if isinstance(error, Refused) else type(error).__name__) - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as out: json.dump(r, out, indent=2, sort_keys=True); out.write('\n') - print(json.dumps({k: r[k] for k in ('status', 'phase', 'reason') if k in r})) - return int(r['status'] == 'failed') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py b/tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py deleted file mode 100644 index 0d5261d..0000000 --- a/tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,257 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Attended OpenBao setup and proof for the bounded executor's two lanes (NK-WP-0056-T10, T06). - - write CCR-2026-0058 policy only. Its Kubernetes role is window-scoped: created per admitted run, - never here. Also sets cas_required on the svc-authelia key. - journey CCR-2026-0059 policy and the standing read role for sso/nk-bind-executor. - -setup: under both approved, sha256-bound CCRs (binding confirmed) and an attended platform-admin session: - check that the coding-agent fence denies both paths, apply both policies, set cas_required, create the - journey role, prove that the write role does not exist, and prove that the fence beats both policies. -verify: read back policies, cas_required and the role; log in as sso/nk-bind-executor (audience openbao) and prove - that the token reads only the journey path, with exactly its policy and at most 15m. Prove that a wrong - ServiceAccount, a wrong audience and a login to the write role are all denied. -Receipts hold closed booleans only. The journey values are read into memory to check their field names, and never -printed or written. -""" -import argparse -import hashlib -import importlib.util -import json -import os -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent -REPO = HERE.parents[1] -PLATFORM = Path(os.environ.get('NK_PLATFORM_ROOT', REPO.parent / 'railiance-platform')) -sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM / 'scripts')) -from state_hub_preflight_lane import bao, data, capabilities, revoke # noqa: E402 -from repair_eso_kubernetes_auth import role_payload, check_role # noqa: E402 -from telemetry_smtp_delivery import ensure # noqa: E402 - -SA, NS = 'nk-bind-executor', 'sso' -APPROVERS = {'platform-owner', 'net-kingdom-owner'} -BOUNDARY = 'sys/policies/acl/agent-high-risk-boundary' -BINDS = 'platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/' -LANES = { - 'write': { - 'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0058-net-kingdom-bind-executor-svc-authelia-write.yaml', - 'request_type': 'workload-kv-write-next-version', - 'kv': 'platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia', 'fields': ['LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD'], - 'policy': 'net-kingdom-bind-executor-svc-authelia-write', - 'policy_text': ('path "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia" {\n' - ' capabilities = ["read", "update"]\n allowed_parameters = {\n "data" = []\n' - ' "options" = []\n }\n}\n\npath "auth/token/lookup-self" {\n capabilities = ["read"]\n}\n\n' - 'path "auth/token/revoke-self" {\n capabilities = ["update"]\n}\n'), - }, - 'journey': { - 'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0059-net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read.yaml', - 'request_type': 'workload-kv-read', - 'kv': 'platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey', 'fields': ['PASSWORD', 'TOTP_SEED'], - 'policy': 'net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read', - 'policy_text': ('path "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey" ' - '{ capabilities = ["read"] }\n' - 'path "auth/token/lookup-self" { capabilities = ["read"] }\n' - 'path "auth/token/revoke-self" { capabilities = ["update"] }\n'), - }, -} -for _lane in LANES.values(): - _lane.update(role=_lane['policy'], service_account=SA, namespace=NS, - data_path=_lane['kv'].replace('platform/', 'platform/data/', 1), - metadata_path=_lane['kv'].replace('platform/', 'platform/metadata/', 1)) -CAS_KEY = 'platform/metadata/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia' -KEPT_METADATA = ('max_versions', 'delete_version_after', 'custom_metadata') - - -class Refused(Exception): - pass - - -def load(name, path): - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) - module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(module) - return module - - -def contract(name, expected): - lane = LANES[name] - path = PLATFORM / 'credential-change-requests' / lane['ccr'] - if hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != expected: raise Refused(name + ':ccr_digest') - ccr, errors, _ = load('credential_change', PLATFORM / 'scripts/credential-change.py').validate_ccr(path) - if errors or ccr['status'] not in {'approved', 'applied', 'verified', 'active'}: raise Refused(name + ':ccr_status') - approved = {r['reviewer'] for r in ccr['review'].get('comments', []) if r.get('decision') == 'approved'} - if not APPROVERS <= approved: raise Refused(name + ':ccr_approval') - a = ccr['openbao']; auth = a['auth'] - if (ccr['request_type'] != lane['request_type'] or a['kv_path'] != lane['kv'] or a['fields'] != lane['fields'] - or a['policy_name'] != lane['policy'] or auth['role'] != lane['role'] or auth['policies'] != [lane['policy']] - or auth.get('method') != 'kubernetes' or auth.get('audience') != 'openbao' - or auth['bound_claims'] != {'service_account_names': [SA], 'service_account_namespaces': [NS]} - or auth.get('token_no_default_policy') is not True - or any(auth.get(k) != '15m' for k in ('ttl', 'token_max_ttl', 'token_explicit_max_ttl'))): - raise Refused(name + ':ccr_shape') - if auth.get('bound_claims_confirmed') is not True: raise Refused(name + ':binding_unconfirmed') - if (PLATFORM / a['policy_file']).read_text() != lane['policy_text']: raise Refused(name + ':policy_file') - return ccr - - -def attended_platform_admin(): - ident = data(bao(['token', 'lookup', '-format=json']))['data'] - if ('platform-admin' not in ident.get('policies', []) or 'root' in ident.get('policies', []) - or not ident.get('path', '').startswith('auth/netkingdom/')): - raise Refused('attended_platform_admin_required') - - -def fence_present(): - current = data(bao(['read', '-format=json', BOUNDARY]))['data']['policy'] - return all('path "' + p + '" { capabilities = ["deny"] }' in current - for lane in LANES.values() for p in (lane['data_path'], lane['metadata_path'])) - - -def policy_check(lane): - def check(actual): - if actual.get('policy') != lane['policy_text']: raise Refused(lane['policy'] + ':policy_drift') - return check - - -def key_metadata(): - return data(bao(['read', '-format=json', CAS_KEY]))['data'] - - -def cas_required(): - return key_metadata().get('cas_required') is True - - -def set_cas_required(): - """A metadata write that names only cas_required. platform-admin holds update, not patch, on platform/*. - KV v2 changes only the fields a write names (checked on the pinned OpenBao, 2026-10-31); the other settings - are compared before and after anyway.""" - before = {k: key_metadata().get(k) for k in KEPT_METADATA} - bao(['write', CAS_KEY, '-'], payload={'cas_required': True}) - after = key_metadata() - if {k: after.get(k) for k in KEPT_METADATA} != before: raise Refused('metadata_changed_beyond_cas_required') - - -def write_role_absent(): - result = bao(['read', '-format=json', 'auth/kubernetes/role/' + LANES['write']['role']], allow_failure=True) - return result.returncode != 0 and b'No value found' in result.stdout + result.stderr - - -def contracts(digests): - return {name: contract(name, digests[name]) for name in LANES} - - -def setup(digests, receipt): - receipt['phase'] = 'contract'; ccrs = contracts(digests) - receipt['phase'] = 'identity'; attended_platform_admin() - receipt['phase'] = 'coding_agent_fence' - if not fence_present(): raise Refused('agent_fence_missing') # established by CCR-2026-0053 and -0057 - receipt['phase'] = 'policies' - for lane in LANES.values(): - ensure('sys/policies/acl/' + lane['policy'], {'policy': lane['policy_text']}, policy_check(lane)) - receipt['phase'] = 'cas_required' - if not cas_required(): - set_cas_required() - if not cas_required(): raise Refused('cas_required_not_set') - receipt['phase'] = 'journey_role' - journey = LANES['journey'] - ensure('auth/kubernetes/role/' + journey['role'], role_payload(journey), lambda actual: check_role(actual, journey)) - receipt['phase'] = 'write_role_absent' - if not write_role_absent(): raise Refused('write_role_exists_outside_a_window') - receipt['phase'] = 'fence_effective' - for lane in LANES.values(): - child = data(bao(['token', 'create', '-format=json', '-policy=' + lane['policy'], - '-policy=agent-high-risk-boundary', '-no-default-policy', '-ttl=60s']))['auth']['client_token'] - try: - caps = capabilities(child, [lane['data_path'], lane['metadata_path']]) - if any(v != ['deny'] for v in caps.values()): raise Refused(lane['policy'] + ':fence_ineffective') - finally: - revoke(child) - receipt.update(phase='done', status='lanes_prepared', policies_applied=True, cas_required=True, - journey_role_created=True, write_role_absent=True, coding_agents_denied=True, - source_ccrs={n: c['id'] for n, c in ccrs.items()}, ccr_sha256=digests) - - -def kube(kubeconfig, args): - return subprocess.run(['kubectl', '--kubeconfig', kubeconfig, *args], check=True, capture_output=True).stdout - - -def verify(digests, kubeconfig, receipt): - receipt['phase'] = 'contract'; ccrs = contracts(digests) - receipt['phase'] = 'identity'; attended_platform_admin() - receipt['phase'] = 'read_back' - for lane in LANES.values(): - policy_check(lane)(data(bao(['read', '-format=json', 'sys/policies/acl/' + lane['policy']]))['data']) - journey, write = LANES['journey'], LANES['write'] - check_role(data(bao(['read', '-format=json', 'auth/kubernetes/role/' + journey['role']]))['data'], journey) - if not cas_required(): raise Refused('cas_required_not_set') - if not write_role_absent(): raise Refused('write_role_exists_outside_a_window') - if not fence_present(): raise Refused('agent_fence_missing') - - def login(sa, audience, role, negative=False): - jwt = kube(kubeconfig, ['-n', NS, 'create', 'token', sa, '--audience=' + audience, '--duration=10m']).decode().strip() - result = bao(['write', '-format=json', 'auth/kubernetes/login', '-'], - payload={'role': role, 'jwt': jwt}, allow_failure=negative) - if negative: - if result.returncode == 0: - revoke(data(result)['auth']['client_token']); raise Refused('negative_login_accepted') - if b'403' not in result.stderr and b'400' not in result.stderr: raise Refused('negative_login_unclear') - return None - return data(result)['auth'] - - receipt['phase'] = 'journey_login' - auth = login(SA, 'openbao', journey['role']); token = auth['client_token'] - try: - if (auth['token_policies'] != [journey['policy']] or auth.get('identity_policies') - or not 0 < auth['lease_duration'] <= 900): - raise Refused('journey_policy_or_ttl') - receipt['phase'] = 'journey_capabilities' - others = [BINDS + n for n in ('svc-authelia', 'svc-keycape', 'svc-privacyidea', 'svc-provisioner')] - paths = [journey['data_path'], journey['metadata_path'], write['metadata_path'], *others, 'auth/token/create'] - caps = capabilities(token, paths) - if caps[paths[0]] != ['read'] or any(caps[p] != ['deny'] for p in paths[1:]): - raise Refused('journey_capabilities') - receipt['phase'] = 'journey_read' - native = data(bao(['read', '-format=json', journey['data_path']], token=token))['data'] - if sorted(native['data']) != sorted(journey['fields']): raise Refused('journey_fields') - receipt['journey_kv_version'] = native['metadata']['version'] - finally: - revoke(token) - receipt['phase'] = 'negative_logins' - login('default', 'openbao', journey['role'], True) - login(SA, 'wrong-audience', journey['role'], True) - login(SA, 'openbao', write['role'], True) - receipt.update(phase='done', status='lanes_verified', exact_policies_and_role=True, cas_required=True, - journey_reads_only_its_path=True, journey_lease_at_most_15m=True, write_role_absent=True, - wrong_service_account_denied=True, wrong_audience_denied=True, write_login_denied=True, - coding_agents_denied=True, temporary_token_revoked=True, - source_ccrs={n: c['id'] for n, c in ccrs.items()}, ccr_sha256=digests) - - -def main(): - p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter) - p.add_argument('action', choices=['setup', 'verify']) - p.add_argument('--write-ccr-sha256', required=True, help='sha256 of the CCR-2026-0058 file') - p.add_argument('--journey-ccr-sha256', required=True, help='sha256 of the CCR-2026-0059 file') - p.add_argument('--kubeconfig', help='admin kubeconfig; required for verify') - p.add_argument('--receipt', required=True) - a = p.parse_args() - if a.action == 'verify' and not a.kubeconfig: p.error('--kubeconfig is required for verify') - digests = {'write': a.write_ccr_sha256, 'journey': a.journey_ccr_sha256} - fd = os.open(a.receipt, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) - r = {'status': 'failed', 'action': a.action, 'values_recorded': False, - 'source_sha256': hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest()} - try: - if a.action == 'setup': setup(digests, r) - else: verify(digests, a.kubeconfig, r) - except Exception as error: - r.update(status='failed', reason=str(error) if isinstance(error, Refused) else type(error).__name__) - finally: - with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as out: json.dump(r, out, indent=2, sort_keys=True); out.write('\n') - print(json.dumps({k: r[k] for k in ('status', 'phase', 'reason') if k in r})) - return int(r['status'] == 'failed') - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tools/service-identity/README.md b/tools/service-identity/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 16ff1ef..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -# Service Identity Declaration Validator - -NK-WP-0054-T03. Offline and read-only. Checks declarations against -`canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json` and evaluates the rules of the -accepted [Service Identity and Privilege standard](../../canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md) -that a declaration alone can decide. It was built against draft-1, before the founder's review, -so a rule change in the standard changes this tool. It follows the accepted v0.1 text (draft-4). - -```bash -make service-identity-test # unit tests -make service-identity-check # evaluate the checked-in declarations -uv run tools/service-identity/validate.py tools/service-identity/declarations/*.yaml --as-of 2026-10-24 -``` - -Options: `--as-of YYYY-MM-DD` (evaluation date, so a run is reproducible and exceptions expire on a -stated day), `--json`, `--fail-on-findings` (exit 2 when anything is non-conformant or unknown). -Exit 1 means invalid input. - -## Results - -| Result | Meaning | -| --- | --- | -| `conformant` | Every checked rule holds on declared facts | -| `non-conformant` | At least one rule is broken and not covered by a live exception, or an exception has expired | -| `excepted` | Every broken rule has a live, time-boxed exception | -| `unknown` | A fact nobody has established (`unknown` in the declaration). A finding, not a pass | -| `planned` | A target identity that does not exist yet; never counted as conformant | - -Alongside the results, **advisories** report declarations not asserted complete by their owner, -declarations not confirmed by the owning service, stale exceptions, more than one service-admin -and more than one break-glass identity. - -## Model and rules decided here - -Draft-3 of the standard is an estate profile of SecurityCanon. Each account declares an imported -`principal_type` (`HUMAN`, `SERVICE`, `WORKLOAD`, `AGENT`, `CONTROLLER`, `DEVICE`), its authority as grants -`MODE @ SCOPE` with `activation` and `environments`, and optional estate `conventions` (`bind`, -`service-admin`). Break-glass is `activation: BREAK_GLASS`, not a kind of account. `unknown` is allowed where a -fact is not established and is reported as a finding. Exceptions carry an `elimination_path` (DSM-EXC-004). - -Decided from a declaration: SI-1, SI-2, SI-3 (including a credential shared by more than one service), SI-4 -(a service-admin holds `ADMINISTER`, and `GOVERN` where the service has one admin tier, over one service only), SI-6 (`SOVEREIGN` is offline and break-glass in -production), SI-7 (`CONSTRUCT` never in production), SI-8 (second factor; admin roles bind the assurance -claim), SI-9, SI-11 (overdue legacy disposition), SI-12, SI-14 (an agent presents as an agent, tokens at most -3600 seconds) and naming. More than one service-admin account per service is an advisory. SI-5, SI-10, SI-13 and -SI-15 are process rules. Observed state is the health check, NK-WP-0054-T04. - -## Declarations - -`declarations/` holds the first set, authored from `docs/service-identity-inventory.md`. Decided 2026-10-24: -declarations start here and move to each service's repository as its owner confirms them. Every one says `owner_confirmed: false`: they describe what -the repository establishes, not what the owning service has attested. Facts the repository cannot -establish are `unknown`, never guessed. - -## Safety - -A declaration holds no credential. Secret-shaped values are rejected, and schema messages are never -printed because they can echo the rejected value; invalid input reports only a count. diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/authelia.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/authelia.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index bf5a136..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/authelia.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: authelia -owner: "SSO owners (NetKingdom)" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml, sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/deployment.yaml, docs/service-identity-inventory.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: true -identities: - - name: keycape - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "The only registered OIDC client: KeyCape's upstream sign-in" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: authelia, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "authorization_code, one_factor"}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: keycape, kind: service}] - owner: "SSO owners (NetKingdom)" - rotation: {path: "Client secret: Authelia verifier and KeyCape together (Credential Management section 6)", coupling: [authelia, keycape]} - status: active diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index ca9a8d1..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: bounded-executor -owner: "NetKingdom (executor source); runtime package rapp-bounded-executor (NK-WP-0056-T02, founder decision 6d1adce9)" -declared_at: 2026-10-31 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md, examples/bounded-execution-admission/bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml, sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml, workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -# Every credential the bounded executor holds carries executor_subject service:nk-bind-executor, the identity -# its admissions name. Together they are its declared authority; `validate.py --admissions` checks that an -# admission's scope ceiling lies inside them. All grants are APPROVED: they act only during a consumed -# admission (SI-15). Pilot scope (T06): rotate the svc-authelia bind, one consumer. -identities: - - name: nk-bind-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - conventions: [executor] - executor_subject: "service:nk-bind-executor" - purpose: "Kubernetes ServiceAccount sso/nk-bind-executor: force-sync the authelia-secrets ExternalSecret and restart the authelia Deployment; no Secret read" - grants: - - {mode: OPERATE, scope: k8s/sso/deployment/authelia, activation: APPROVED, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "Role: get, watch, patch on deployments/authelia"} - - {mode: OPERATE, scope: k8s/sso/externalsecret/authelia-secrets, activation: APPROVED, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "Role: get, patch on externalsecrets/authelia-secrets"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: bounded-executor, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom" - rotation: {path: "Projected ServiceAccount token, short-lived; nothing to rotate by hand", coupling: [bounded-executor]} - status: planned - - name: net-kingdom-bounded-executor - principal_type: WORKLOAD - conventions: [executor] - executor_subject: "service:nk-bind-executor" - purpose: "OpenBao Kubernetes-auth role for sso/nk-bind-executor (CCR-2026-0058, approved, window-scoped): write the next version of the svc-authelia bind (CAS) and read it; holding the current value is what lets the executor change the bind's own password in LLDAP" - grants: - - {mode: OPERATE, scope: openbao/platform/workloads/net-kingdom/directory-binds/svc-authelia, activation: APPROVED, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "KV data read and CAS write; 15 min TTL; role exists only in the admitted window (CCR-2026-0058)"} - - {mode: OPERATE, scope: lldap/people/svc-authelia, activation: APPROVED, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "self-rotation: signs in as the bind with the KV value and changes its own password (hub 3d0c8f86)"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [openbao-lease] - consumers: [{name: bounded-executor, kind: service}] - owner: "railiance-platform (OpenBao role) for NetKingdom" - rotation: {path: "OpenBao lease per run; no standing secret", coupling: [bounded-executor]} - status: planned - - name: svc-executor-read - principal_type: SERVICE - conventions: [bind] - executor_subject: "service:nk-bind-executor" - purpose: "Read-only directory bind for plan and verify steps (users, groups, bind identities); replaces the founder signing in as admin for reads" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: directory, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], read_only: true}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [openbao-lease] - consumers: [{name: bounded-executor, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Bind password in OpenBao, rotated by the executor itself under an admission", coupling: [bounded-executor]} - status: planned - - name: svc-executor-admin - principal_type: SERVICE - conventions: [executor] - executor_subject: "service:nk-bind-executor" - purpose: "lldap_admin, only for root-class steps (create svc-* accounts, change the configured super-admin) under a high-risk admission; how membership is granted per run and removed afterwards is open" - grants: - - {mode: ADMINISTER, scope: lldap, activation: APPROVED, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "root-class only; no narrower LLDAP group (SI-X6)"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [openbao-lease] - consumers: [{name: bounded-executor, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Per-run activation to be designed; not part of the T06 pilot", coupling: [bounded-executor]} - status: planned diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/identity-provisioner.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/identity-provisioner.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 461f2f0..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/identity-provisioner.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: identity-provisioner -owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml, docs/service-identity-inventory.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: identity-provisioner-token - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Service token that user-engine presents; the NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: identity-provisioner, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION]}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: user-engine, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Kubernetes Secret identity-provisioner-token; owner rotation", coupling: [user-engine, identity-provisioner]} - status: active diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/keycape.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/keycape.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index c363daa..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/keycape.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: keycape -owner: "key-cape owners" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json, sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml, sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bootstrap-config.json, docs/service-identity-inventory.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: secrets-engine-openbao - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Confidential OIDC client; obtains a login token whose only scope is openbao:login" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: keycape, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "client credentials"} - - {mode: USE, scope: openbao, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "scope openbao:login only; openbao:admin denied"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: secrets-engine, kind: service}] - owner: "key-cape owners and the consuming service owner" - rotation: {path: "Mint in custody, then deliver (credential broker); KeyCape reads it at start", coupling: [keycape, secrets-engine]} - status: active - - name: secrets-engine-approval - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Confidential OIDC client (client_credentials); token scopes limited to its registered scopes" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: keycape, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "client credentials"} - - {mode: USE, scope: "approval-engine: approval:read, approval:consume", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "key-cape a1ab8ff service-clients.example.yaml L27-39, token.go:355-363"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: secrets-engine, kind: service}] - owner: "key-cape owners and the consuming service owner" - rotation: {path: "Mint in custody, then deliver (credential broker); KeyCape reads it at start", coupling: [keycape, secrets-engine]} - status: active - - name: secrets-engine-requester - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Confidential OIDC client (client_credentials); token scopes limited to its registered scopes" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: keycape, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "client credentials"} - - {mode: USE, scope: "approval-engine: approval:create", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "key-cape a1ab8ff L106-119; subject lacks service: prefix"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: secrets-engine, kind: service}] - owner: "key-cape owners and the consuming service owner" - rotation: {path: "Mint in custody, then deliver (credential broker); KeyCape reads it at start", coupling: [keycape, secrets-engine]} - status: active - - name: approval-engine-operator - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Confidential OIDC client (client_credentials); token scopes limited to its registered scopes" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: keycape, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "client credentials"} - - {mode: OPERATE, scope: "approval-engine: approval:create, read, approve, revoke, supersede, observe, emit", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "key-cape a1ab8ff L57-69; withdrawn 2026-09-09, still registered; SI-11 retirement candidate"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: approval-engine, kind: service}] - owner: "key-cape owners and the consuming service owner" - rotation: {path: "Mint in custody, then deliver (credential broker); KeyCape reads it at start", coupling: [keycape, approval-engine]} - status: active - - name: informed-decision-sitting-requester - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Confidential OIDC client (client_credentials); token scopes limited to its registered scopes" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: keycape, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "client credentials"} - - {mode: USE, scope: "approval-engine: approval:create", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "key-cape a1ab8ff L122-135; approval:read prepared in key-cape 82b471f (founder decision 2026-11-01, informed-decision present_existing), live only after the attended registry change"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: informed-decision-sitting, kind: service}] - owner: "key-cape owners and the consuming service owner" - rotation: {path: "Mint in custody, then deliver (credential broker); KeyCape reads it at start", coupling: [keycape, informed-decision-sitting]} - status: active - - name: rapp-qonto - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Confidential OIDC client; its token scopes are not established in the repository" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: keycape, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "client credentials"} - - {mode: unknown, scope: "token scopes", note: "reference config: rapp-qonto-client, qonto:read; confirm live (KEY-WP-0045-T02)"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: rapp-qonto, kind: service}] - owner: "key-cape owners and the consuming service owner" - rotation: {path: "Mint in custody, then deliver (credential broker); KeyCape reads it at start", coupling: [keycape, rapp-qonto]} - status: active diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/lldap.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/lldap.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 5235a80..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/lldap.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: lldap -owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [docs/service-identity-inventory.md, sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/configmap.yaml, sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bootstrap-config.json, sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py, sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml, sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: admin - principal_type: HUMAN - purpose: "The human platform administrator; directory rights through lldap_admin on its own password and OTP; no service binds as admin (bind split 2026-10-30)" - grants: - - {mode: ADMINISTER, scope: directory, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "lldap_admin membership"} - interactive_login: true - second_factor: required - custody: [personal-safe] - consumers: - - {name: founder, kind: person} - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: - path: "Human password change; no service Secret holds it" - coupling: [] - status: active - recovery: {needed: true, works_with_sso_down: false, in_crisis_list: true} - - name: ld-admin - principal_type: HUMAN - conventions: [service-admin] - purpose: "LLDAP only: the directory's configured super-admin (LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN), a sealed fallback; introduced 2026-10-30" - grants: - - {mode: ADMINISTER, scope: lldap, activation: BREAK_GLASS, environments: [PRODUCTION]} - interactive_login: true - second_factor: unknown - custody: [delivered-secret, offline-key] - consumers: [] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS in lldap-secrets and the LLDAP custody file (apply-service-secrets.py named rotation)", coupling: [lldap]} - status: active - - name: svc-authelia - principal_type: SERVICE - conventions: [bind] - purpose: "Authelia's read-only directory lookup" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: directory, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], read_only: true}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: authelia, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Secret rotation with Authelia only", coupling: [authelia]} - status: active - - name: svc-keycape - principal_type: SERVICE - conventions: [bind] - purpose: "KeyCape's read-only directory lookup" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: directory, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], read_only: true}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: keycape, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Secret rotation with KeyCape only", coupling: [keycape]} - status: active - - name: svc-privacyidea - principal_type: SERVICE - conventions: [bind] - purpose: "The privacyIDEA resolver's read-only directory lookup" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: directory, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], read_only: true}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: privacyidea, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Resolver bind password, stored encrypted in the privacyIDEA database", coupling: [privacyidea]} - status: active - - name: svc-provisioner - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "identity-provisioner; member of lldap_admin, the narrowest LLDAP group that can create users (rehearsal 2026-10-28)" - grants: [{mode: ADMINISTER, scope: directory, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "lldap_admin; exception SI-X6"}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: identity-provisioner, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "Secret rotation with the provisioner only", coupling: [identity-provisioner]} - status: active - - name: syn-journey - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Synthetic MFA sign-in journey (NK-WP-0056-T09): signs in through KeyCape, Authelia and privacyIDEA so a bounded executor can check sign-in between consumers without a person; no groups, no rights; KeyCape tokens still say principal_type human" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: sign-in, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "no group: reaches no protected service"}] - interactive_login: true - second_factor: required - custody: [openbao-lease] - consumers: [{name: synthetic-journey, kind: service}] - owner: "NetKingdom directory and User Engine owners" - rotation: {path: "lane.py teardown then setup (CCR-2026-0057); password and TOTP seed together", coupling: [privacyidea]} - status: active -exceptions: - - id: SI-X6 - rules: [SI-3] - identity: svc-provisioner - reason: "LLDAP v0.6.2 has no group narrower than lldap_admin that can create users or add members" - owner: "Founder" - expires: 2027-04-30 - compensating_control: "Own account and Secret, used only by identity-provisioner; web UI restricted by IP allowlist" - elimination_path: "A narrower LLDAP role, or a provisioner that no longer creates users" diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/openbao.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/openbao.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 0e510ae..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/openbao.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: openbao -owner: "railiance-platform" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [railiance-platform openbao/auth/netkingdom-platform-admin-role.json, railiance-platform openbao/auth/credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-oidc-role.json, railiance-platform openbao/auth/secrets-engine-jwt-role.json, railiance-platform openbao/auth/coding-agent-jwt-role.json, railiance-platform openbao/auth/fluid-telegram-hall-of-helix-oidc-role.json] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: netkingdom-platform-admin - principal_type: HUMAN - federated_role: true - purpose: "OIDC role: group net-kingdom-admins receives policies platform-admin and operator-custody, one-hour token" - grants: [{mode: ADMINISTER, scope: openbao, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION]}] - assurance_claim_bound: true - interactive_login: true - second_factor: required - custody: [none] - consumers: [{name: members of net-kingdom-admins, kind: person}] - owner: "railiance-platform" - rotation: {path: "Federated; membership and policy change by reviewed change", coupling: []} - status: active - recovery: {needed: true, works_with_sso_down: false, in_crisis_list: true} - - name: credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate - principal_type: HUMAN - federated_role: true - purpose: "OIDC role: net-kingdom-admins with aal2 may generate a KeyCape client secret in custody" - grants: [{mode: ADMINISTER, scope: "openbao/platform/workloads/keycape", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION]}] - assurance_claim_bound: true - interactive_login: true - second_factor: required - custody: [none] - consumers: [{name: members of net-kingdom-admins, kind: person}] - owner: "railiance-platform" - rotation: {path: "Federated; policy change by reviewed change", coupling: []} - status: active - - name: fluid-telegram-operators - principal_type: HUMAN - federated_role: true - purpose: "OIDC role: fluid-telegram operators with aal2" - grants: [{mode: OPERATE, scope: "kv: fluid-telegram/hall-of-helix, 4 exact entries", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "rpf bd8ca57: create/read/update, no list/delete; TTL 15m, max 30m"}] - assurance_claim_bound: true - interactive_login: true - second_factor: required - custody: [none] - consumers: [{name: members of fluid-telegram-operators, kind: person}] - owner: "railiance-platform" - rotation: {path: "Federated; policy change by reviewed change", coupling: []} - status: active - - name: secrets-engine-openbao - principal_type: SERVICE - federated_role: true - purpose: "JWT role: subject service:secrets-engine, scope openbao:login, policy secrets-engine-login-self, five-minute token" - grants: [{mode: USE, scope: openbao, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "login-self only"}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [none] - consumers: [{name: secrets-engine, kind: service}] - owner: "railiance-platform" - rotation: {path: "Federated; the KeyCape client secret rotates in the keycape declaration", coupling: [keycape]} - status: active - - name: coding-agent - principal_type: AGENT - federated_role: true - agent: {mode: unknown, presents_principal_type: service, max_token_ttl_seconds: 900, boundary_policy: agent-high-risk-boundary} - purpose: "JWT role and AppRole for the coding agent; policies agent-high-risk-boundary and workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime, fifteen minutes" - grants: [{mode: OBSERVE, scope: "kv metadata, token self", activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "rpf bd8ca57: boundary deny wins; no KV data read"}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [none] - consumers: [{name: codex-railiance-platform, kind: service}] - owner: "railiance-platform" - rotation: {path: "Federated for the JWT role; AppRole secret rotation owned by railiance-platform", coupling: []} - status: active -exceptions: [] diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/platform.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/platform.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 28ac1c1..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/platform.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -# People and the break-glass authority, in SecurityCanon terms (standard section 3). -schema_version: "0.1" -service: platform -owner: "Founder (Bernd Worsch)" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [docs/service-identity-inventory.md, docs/platform-root-custody.md, canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: platform-root - principal_type: HUMAN - purpose: "King credential: final authority, break-glass in production; build-mode authority outside production" - grants: - - {mode: SOVEREIGN, scope: platform, activation: BREAK_GLASS, environments: [PRODUCTION, RECOVERY]} - - {mode: CONSTRUCT, scope: platform, activation: STANDING, environments: [DEVELOPMENT, TEST]} - interactive_login: true - second_factor: required - custody: [offline-key] - consumers: [{name: founder, kind: person}] - owner: "Founder" - rotation: {path: "Break-glass material: explicit maintenance window (Credential Management section 6)", coupling: []} - status: active - recovery: {needed: true, works_with_sso_down: false, in_crisis_list: true} - - name: tegwick - principal_type: HUMAN - purpose: "Developer identity (CONSTRUCT @ product); its actual production reach is not established" - grants: - - {mode: CONSTRUCT, scope: product, activation: STANDING, environments: [DEVELOPMENT, TEST]} - interactive_login: true - second_factor: unknown - custody: [unknown] - consumers: [{name: founder, kind: person}] - owner: "Founder" - rotation: {path: "Personal credential; owner-managed", coupling: []} - status: active diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/postgresql.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/postgresql.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 629fcb0..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/postgresql.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: postgresql -owner: "railiance-platform (platform data services)" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/cluster.yaml] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: privacyidea - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "Database role owning privacyidea_db in the net-kingdom-pg cluster" - grants: - - {mode: USE, scope: privacyidea_db, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION]} - - {mode: ADMINISTER, scope: privacyidea_db, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "database owner"} - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: privacyidea, kind: service}] - owner: "railiance-platform" - rotation: {path: "PI_DB_PASSWORD: atomic update of database and pod (Credential Management section 6)", coupling: [privacyidea]} - status: active diff --git a/tools/service-identity/declarations/privacyidea.yaml b/tools/service-identity/declarations/privacyidea.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 7c9f510..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/declarations/privacyidea.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -schema_version: "0.1" -service: privacyidea -owner: "MFA and privacyIDEA owners (NetKingdom)" -declared_at: 2026-10-24 -attestation: - authored_by: claude-code - basis: [sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/README.md, sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/bootstrap-admin.py, sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml, docs/service-identity-inventory.md] - owner_confirmed: false -complete: false -identities: - - name: pi-admin - principal_type: HUMAN - conventions: [service-admin] - purpose: "privacyIDEA's local administrator; policy pi-admin-all-rights restricted to adminuser=pi-admin" - grants: - - {mode: ADMINISTER, scope: privacyidea, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION]} - - {mode: GOVERN, scope: privacyidea, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION], note: "pi-admin-all-rights can set the policies that bound other admins"} - interactive_login: true - second_factor: unknown - custody: [personal-safe] - consumers: [{name: founder, kind: person}] - owner: "Founder and MFA owners" - rotation: {path: "bootstrap-admin custody entry; password changes are a separate procedure", coupling: []} - status: active - recovery: {needed: true, works_with_sso_down: true, in_crisis_list: true} - - name: trigger-admin - principal_type: unknown - conventions: [service-admin] - purpose: "Legacy Keycloak-era administrator account, policy and Secret; who presents it is not established" - grants: [{mode: ADMINISTER, scope: privacyidea, activation: STANDING, environments: [PRODUCTION]}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: unknown - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [] - owner: "MFA owners; revocation decided under NK-WP-0049-T22" - rotation: {path: "None established; revocation needs a separate approval", coupling: []} - status: legacy - disposition: {action: defer, owner: "Founder", date: 2026-12-31} - - name: keycape-factor-reader - principal_type: SERVICE - purpose: "KeyCape's access to read factor state; delivered by railiance-platform (RPF-WP-0040)" - grants: [{mode: unknown, scope: privacyidea, note: "exact rights not established"}] - interactive_login: false - second_factor: not_applicable - custody: [delivered-secret] - consumers: [{name: keycape, kind: service}] - owner: "railiance-platform and key-cape" - rotation: {path: "Renewed by policy keycape-factor-renewer through ESO", coupling: [keycape]} - status: active -exceptions: - - id: SI-X3 - rules: [NAMING] - identity: trigger-admin - reason: "Legacy account whose name does not follow the admin naming form and whose consumers are uninventoried" - owner: "Founder" - expires: 2026-12-31 - compensating_control: "Not provisioned by the current bootstrap" - elimination_path: "Revocation or acceptance under NK-WP-0049-T22" diff --git a/tools/service-identity/fixtures/invalid/secret-value.json b/tools/service-identity/fixtures/invalid/secret-value.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2194d30..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/fixtures/invalid/secret-value.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema_version": "0.1", - "service": "example", - "owner": "Example owners", - "declared_at": "2026-10-24", - "attestation": { - "authored_by": "fixture", - "basis": [ - "fixture" - ], - "owner_confirmed": true - }, - "complete": true, - "identities": [ - { - "name": "svc-example", - "purpose": "Lookup with hvs.ABCDEFGH12345678abcdef smuggled in", - "interactive_login": false, - "second_factor": "not_applicable", - "custody": [ - "delivered-secret" - ], - "consumers": [ - { - "name": "example", - "kind": "service" - } - ], - "owner": "Example owners", - "rotation": { - "path": "Rotate with the consumer", - "coupling": [] - }, - "status": "active", - "principal_type": "SERVICE", - "conventions": [ - "bind" - ], - "grants": [ - { - "mode": "USE", - "scope": "directory", - "activation": "STANDING", - "environments": [ - "PRODUCTION" - ], - "read_only": true - } - ] - } - ] -} diff --git a/tools/service-identity/fixtures/valid/conformant.json b/tools/service-identity/fixtures/valid/conformant.json deleted file mode 100644 index 5e5c575..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/fixtures/valid/conformant.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -{ - "schema_version": "0.1", - "service": "example", - "owner": "Example owners", - "declared_at": "2026-10-24", - "attestation": { - "authored_by": "fixture", - "basis": [ - "fixture" - ], - "owner_confirmed": true - }, - "complete": true, - "identities": [ - { - "name": "svc-example", - "purpose": "Read-only lookup", - "interactive_login": false, - "second_factor": "not_applicable", - "custody": [ - "delivered-secret" - ], - "consumers": [ - { - "name": "example", - "kind": "service" - } - ], - "owner": "Example owners", - "rotation": { - "path": "Rotate with the consumer", - "coupling": [ - "example" - ] - }, - "status": "active", - "principal_type": "SERVICE", - "conventions": [ - "bind" - ], - "grants": [ - { - "mode": "USE", - "scope": "directory", - "activation": "STANDING", - "environments": [ - "PRODUCTION" - ], - "read_only": true - } - ] - }, - { - "name": "ex-admin", - "purpose": "Administer the example service", - "interactive_login": true, - "second_factor": "required", - "custody": [ - "personal-safe" - ], - "consumers": [ - { - "name": "operator", - "kind": "person" - } - ], - "owner": "Example owners", - "rotation": { - "path": "Owner-managed", - "coupling": [] - }, - "status": "active", - "principal_type": "HUMAN", - "conventions": [ - "service-admin" - ], - "grants": [ - { - "mode": "ADMINISTER", - "scope": "example", - "activation": "STANDING", - "environments": [ - "PRODUCTION" - ] - } - ] - } - ] -} diff --git a/tools/service-identity/tests/test_validate.py b/tools/service-identity/tests/test_validate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 127861b..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/tests/test_validate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,389 +0,0 @@ -from __future__ import annotations - -import contextlib -import copy -import datetime as dt -import importlib.util -import io -import json -import pathlib -import tempfile -import unittest - -HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent -SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("service_identity_validate", HERE.parent / "validate.py") -assert SPEC and SPEC.loader -V = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC) -SPEC.loader.exec_module(V) -FIXTURES = HERE.parent / "fixtures" -DECLARATIONS = HERE.parent / "declarations" -SCHEMA = V.load_schema() -NOW = dt.date(2026, 10, 24) - - -READ = {"mode": "USE", "scope": "directory", "activation": "STANDING", "environments": ["PRODUCTION"], "read_only": True} - - -def grant(mode, scope="example", **over): - return {"mode": mode, "scope": scope, "activation": "STANDING", "environments": ["PRODUCTION"], **over} - - -def identity(**over): - base = {"name": "svc-x", "principal_type": "SERVICE", "conventions": ["bind"], "purpose": "Read-only lookup", - "grants": [dict(READ)], - "interactive_login": False, "second_factor": "not_applicable", "custody": ["delivered-secret"], - "consumers": [{"name": "x", "kind": "service"}], "owner": "Owners", - "rotation": {"path": "Rotate with the consumer", "coupling": ["x"]}, "status": "active"} - base.update(over) - return base - - -def declaration(*identities, exceptions=None, complete=True, confirmed=True): - doc = {"schema_version": "0.1", "service": "example", "owner": "Owners", "declared_at": "2026-10-24", - "attestation": {"authored_by": "test", "basis": ["test"], "owner_confirmed": confirmed}, - "complete": complete, "identities": list(identities or [identity()])} - if exceptions: - doc["exceptions"] = exceptions - return doc - - -def exception(**over): - base = {"id": "SI-X9", "rules": ["SI-3"], "identity": "svc-x", "reason": "Reason for the test", - "owner": "Owners", "expires": "2027-01-31", "compensating_control": "A compensating control", - "elimination_path": "The change that ends it"} - base.update(over) - return base - - -def result_of(doc, as_of=NOW, name=None): - assert V.structural_errors(doc, SCHEMA) == [], V.structural_errors(doc, SCHEMA) - report = V.evaluate(doc, as_of) - found = [i for i in report["identities"] if name in (None, i["identity"])] - return found[0] - - -HUMAN_ADMIN = dict(name="ex-admin", principal_type="HUMAN", conventions=["service-admin"], grants=[grant("ADMINISTER")], - interactive_login=True, second_factor="required", custody=["personal-safe"], - consumers=[{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}]) - - -class StructureTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_conformant_fixture_is_valid_and_conformant(self): - doc = json.loads((FIXTURES / "valid/conformant.json").read_text()) - self.assertEqual(V.structural_errors(doc, SCHEMA), []) - self.assertEqual({i["result"] for i in V.evaluate(doc, NOW)["identities"]}, {"conformant"}) - - def test_secret_shaped_value_is_rejected_without_echo(self): - doc = json.loads((FIXTURES / "invalid/secret-value.json").read_text()) - errors = V.structural_errors(doc, SCHEMA) - self.assertEqual(errors, ["value looks like secret material"]) - self.assertNotIn("hvs.", " ".join(errors)) - - def test_unknown_field_mode_and_principal_are_rejected(self): - self.assertTrue(V.structural_errors(declaration(identity(password="x")), SCHEMA)) - self.assertTrue(V.structural_errors(declaration(identity(grants=[grant("ROOT")])), SCHEMA)) - self.assertTrue(V.structural_errors(declaration(identity(principal_type="ROBOT")), SCHEMA)) - - def test_duplicate_identity_and_undeclared_exception_target(self): - self.assertIn("duplicate identity name", V.structural_errors(declaration(identity(), identity()), SCHEMA)) - doc = declaration(identity(), exceptions=[exception(identity="ghost")]) - self.assertIn("exception names an undeclared identity", V.structural_errors(doc, SCHEMA)) - - def test_exception_needs_an_elimination_path(self): - bad = exception() - del bad["elimination_path"] - self.assertTrue(V.structural_errors(declaration(identity(), exceptions=[bad]), SCHEMA)) - - def test_legacy_identity_needs_a_disposition(self): - self.assertTrue(V.structural_errors(declaration(identity(status="legacy")), SCHEMA)) - ok = identity(status="legacy", disposition={"action": "retire", "owner": "Owners", "date": "2026-12-31"}) - self.assertEqual(V.structural_errors(declaration(ok), SCHEMA), []) - - -class RuleTests(unittest.TestCase): - def rules(self, **over): - return result_of(declaration(identity(**over)))["rules"] - - def test_si1_a_human_account_presented_by_a_service_or_two_conventions(self): - self.assertIn("SI-1", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "consumers": [{"name": "s", "kind": "service"}]})) - self.assertIn("SI-1", self.rules(conventions=["bind", "service-admin"])) - - def test_si2_person_and_service_share_a_credential(self): - consumers = [{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}, {"name": "s", "kind": "service"}] - self.assertIn("SI-2", self.rules(consumers=consumers)) - - def test_si3_bind_is_a_read_only_use_grant_with_one_consumer(self): - self.assertEqual(self.rules(), []) - self.assertIn("SI-3", self.rules(grants=[grant("ADMINISTER", "directory")])) - self.assertIn("SI-3", self.rules(grants=[{**READ, "read_only": False}])) - self.assertIn("SI-3", self.rules(interactive_login=True)) - self.assertIn("SI-3", self.rules(principal_type="HUMAN", consumers=[{"name": "x", "kind": "service"}])) - shared = [{"name": "a", "kind": "service"}, {"name": "b", "kind": "service"}] - self.assertIn("SI-3", self.rules(consumers=shared)) - - def test_si4_service_admin_holds_administer_over_one_service(self): - self.assertEqual(self.rules(**HUMAN_ADMIN), []) - self.assertIn("SI-4", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "grants": [grant("ADMINISTER"), grant("USE")]})) - # GOVERN over the same service is allowed (a single admin tier can set the policies that bound other admins). - self.assertEqual(self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "grants": [grant("ADMINISTER"), grant("GOVERN")]}), []) - self.assertIn("SI-4", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "grants": [grant("ADMINISTER"), grant("GOVERN", "other")]})) - self.assertIn("SI-4", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "grants": [grant("ADMINISTER", "a"), grant("ADMINISTER", "b")]})) - - def test_si6_sovereign_is_offline_and_break_glass_in_production(self): - root = dict(name="platform-root", principal_type="HUMAN", conventions=[], interactive_login=True, - second_factor="required", custody=["offline-key"], consumers=[{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}]) - ok = grant("SOVEREIGN", "platform", activation="BREAK_GLASS", environments=["PRODUCTION", "RECOVERY"]) - self.assertEqual(self.rules(grants=[ok], **root), []) - self.assertIn("SI-6", self.rules(grants=[{**ok, "activation": "STANDING"}], **root)) - self.assertIn("SI-6", self.rules(grants=[ok], **{**root, "custody": ["personal-safe"]})) - self.assertIn("SI-6", self.rules(grants=[ok], **{**root, "consumers": [{"name": "s", "kind": "service"}]})) - - def test_si7_construct_is_never_available_in_production(self): - dev = dict(name="dev", principal_type="HUMAN", conventions=[], interactive_login=True, second_factor="required", - custody=["personal-safe"], consumers=[{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}]) - self.assertEqual(self.rules(grants=[grant("CONSTRUCT", "product", environments=["DEVELOPMENT", "TEST"])], **dev), []) - self.assertIn("SI-7", self.rules(grants=[grant("CONSTRUCT", "product")], **dev)) - - def test_si8_second_factor_and_assurance_on_admin_roles(self): - self.assertIn("SI-8", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "second_factor": "not_enforced"})) - role = dict(name="admins-role", principal_type="HUMAN", conventions=[], federated_role=True, grants=[grant("ADMINISTER")], - interactive_login=True, second_factor="required", custody=["none"], consumers=[{"name": "g", "kind": "person"}]) - self.assertIn("SI-8", self.rules(**role)) - self.assertEqual(self.rules(**role, assurance_claim_bound=True), []) - self.assertEqual(self.rules(**{**role, "grants": [grant("USE")]}), []) - - def test_si9_a_persons_safe_never_holds_a_service_credential(self): - self.assertIn("SI-9", self.rules(custody=["delivered-secret", "personal-safe"])) - - def test_si12_recovery_identity_must_be_in_the_crisis_list(self): - self.assertIn("SI-12", self.rules(recovery={"needed": True, "works_with_sso_down": True, "in_crisis_list": False})) - - def test_naming_is_reserved_by_convention(self): - self.assertIn("NAMING", self.rules(name="lookup")) - self.assertIn("NAMING", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "name": "administrator"})) - self.assertIn("NAMING", self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "name": "admin"})) # `admin` is the human's name everywhere - self.assertEqual(self.rules(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "name": "ld-admin"}), []) - person = dict(principal_type="HUMAN", conventions=[], grants=[grant("OPERATE", "platform")], interactive_login=True, - second_factor="required", consumers=[{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}]) - self.assertIn("NAMING", self.rules(name="x-admin", custody=["personal-safe"], **person)) - # A federated role holds no credential and cannot be mistaken for an account. - self.assertNotIn("NAMING", self.rules(name="group-admin", custody=["none"], **person)) - - def test_overdue_legacy_disposition_is_a_violation(self): - legacy = identity(**{**HUMAN_ADMIN, "name": "old-admin", "consumers": [], "status": "legacy", - "disposition": {"action": "defer", "owner": "Owners", "date": "2026-10-01"}}) - self.assertIn("SI-11", result_of(declaration(legacy))["rules"]) - legacy["disposition"]["date"] = "2026-12-31" - self.assertNotIn("SI-11", result_of(declaration(legacy))["rules"]) - - -class AgentTests(unittest.TestCase): - def agent(self, **agent_over): - agent = {"mode": "autonomous", "presents_principal_type": "agent", "max_token_ttl_seconds": 900, - "boundary_policy": "agent-high-risk-boundary"} - agent.update(agent_over) - return identity(name="coding-agent", principal_type="AGENT", conventions=[], agent=agent, - grants=[grant("USE", "openbao")], custody=["none"], - consumers=[{"name": "agent-host", "kind": "service"}]) - - def test_agent_principal_needs_the_agent_object(self): - doc = declaration(identity(name="a", principal_type="AGENT", conventions=[], custody=["none"])) - self.assertTrue(V.structural_errors(doc, SCHEMA)) - - def test_conformant_agent(self): - self.assertEqual(result_of(declaration(self.agent()))["result"], "conformant") - - def test_agent_presenting_as_a_service_breaks_si14(self): - r = result_of(declaration(self.agent(presents_principal_type="service"))) - self.assertEqual((r["result"], r["rules"]), ("non-conformant", ["SI-14"])) - - def test_agent_token_lifetime_above_sixty_minutes_breaks_si14(self): - self.assertIn("SI-14", result_of(declaration(self.agent(max_token_ttl_seconds=3601)))["rules"]) - self.assertNotIn("SI-14", result_of(declaration(self.agent(max_token_ttl_seconds=3600)))["rules"]) - - def test_unknown_agent_mode_is_unknown_not_a_pass(self): - r = result_of(declaration(self.agent(mode="unknown"))) - self.assertEqual((r["result"], r["unknown"]), ("unknown", ["agent.mode"])) - - def test_agent_must_not_live_in_a_persons_safe_or_serve_a_person(self): - doc = declaration({**self.agent(), "custody": ["personal-safe"], - "consumers": [{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}]}) - self.assertLessEqual({"SI-9", "SI-1"}, set(result_of(doc)["rules"])) - - -class ResultTests(unittest.TestCase): - def test_unknown_is_a_finding_for_every_account(self): - for over, fact in ((dict(grants=[grant("unknown")]), "grants"), (dict(custody=["unknown"]), "custody"), - (dict(principal_type="unknown", conventions=[]), "principal_type")): - r = result_of(declaration(identity(name="client", **{"conventions": [], **over}))) - self.assertEqual((r["result"], r["unknown"]), ("unknown", [fact])) - - def test_violation_outranks_unknown(self): - r = result_of(declaration(identity(custody=["unknown"], interactive_login=True))) - self.assertEqual(r["result"], "non-conformant") - - def test_planned_identity_is_not_counted_as_conformant(self): - self.assertEqual(result_of(declaration(identity(status="planned")))["result"], "planned") - - def test_live_exception_excepts_and_expired_one_does_not(self): - doc = declaration(identity(interactive_login=True), exceptions=[exception()]) - r = result_of(doc) - self.assertEqual((r["result"], r["excepted"]), ("excepted", {"SI-3": "SI-X9"})) - r = result_of(doc, as_of=dt.date(2027, 2, 1)) - self.assertEqual(r["result"], "non-conformant") - self.assertIn("SI-EXC-EXPIRED", r["rules"]) - - def test_exception_for_another_rule_does_not_cover_the_violation(self): - doc = declaration(identity(interactive_login=True), exceptions=[exception(rules=["SI-9"])]) - self.assertEqual(result_of(doc)["result"], "non-conformant") - - def test_stale_exception_and_unconfirmed_declaration_are_advisories(self): - doc = declaration(identity(), exceptions=[exception()], complete=False, confirmed=False) - advisories = V.evaluate(doc, NOW)["advisories"] - self.assertTrue(any("stale exception" in a for a in advisories)) - self.assertTrue(any("not asserted complete" in a for a in advisories)) - self.assertTrue(any("not confirmed" in a for a in advisories)) - - def test_evaluation_date_is_explicit(self): - doc = declaration(identity(interactive_login=True), exceptions=[exception(expires="2026-10-30")]) - self.assertEqual(result_of(doc, as_of=dt.date(2026, 10, 30))["result"], "excepted") - self.assertEqual(result_of(doc, as_of=dt.date(2026, 10, 31))["result"], "non-conformant") - - -class CheckedInDeclarations(unittest.TestCase): - def paths(self): - found = sorted(DECLARATIONS.glob("*.yaml")) - self.assertGreaterEqual(len(found), 7) - return found - - def test_all_declarations_are_valid(self): - reports, rejected = V.run(self.paths(), NOW) - self.assertEqual(rejected, []) - self.assertEqual({r["service"] for r in reports} >= {"lldap", "keycape", "privacyidea", "openbao", "platform"}, True) - - def test_the_coding_agent_role_is_a_finding_against_the_iam_profile(self): - reports, _ = V.run(self.paths(), NOW) - agent = [i for r in reports for i in r["identities"] if i["identity"] == "coding-agent"][0] - self.assertEqual((agent["result"], agent["rules"]), ("non-conformant", ["SI-14"])) - - def test_the_bind_split_retired_the_shared_admin_exception(self): - # SI-X1 closed 2026-10-31 (NK-WP-0054-T05): admin is human-only, each service binds as its own account. - reports, _ = V.run(self.paths(), NOW) - lldap = [r for r in reports if r["service"] == "lldap"][0] - results = {i["identity"]: i["result"] for i in lldap["identities"]} - self.assertEqual(results["admin"], "conformant") - self.assertNotIn("planned", results.values()) - doc = V.load_declaration(DECLARATIONS / "lldap.yaml") - self.assertNotIn("SI-X1", [e["id"] for e in doc["exceptions"]]) - - def test_no_declaration_claims_owner_confirmation_yet(self): - for path in self.paths(): - doc = V.load_declaration(path) - self.assertFalse(doc["attestation"]["owner_confirmed"], path.name) - - -class CommandLineTests(unittest.TestCase): - def run_cli(self, *argv): - out, err = io.StringIO(), io.StringIO() - with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out), contextlib.redirect_stderr(err): - code = V.main(list(argv)) - return code, out.getvalue(), err.getvalue() - - def test_invalid_input_reports_only_a_count_and_exits_1(self): - code, out, err = self.run_cli(str(FIXTURES / "invalid/secret-value.json")) - self.assertEqual(code, 1) - self.assertIn("rejected (1 errors)", err) - self.assertNotIn("hvs.", out + err) - - def test_valid_fixture_exits_0_and_prints_summary(self): - code, out, _ = self.run_cli(str(FIXTURES / "valid/conformant.json"), "--as-of", "2026-10-24") - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - self.assertIn("summary: 0 non-conformant, 0 unknown, 0 excepted, 0 planned, 2 conformant", out) - - def test_fail_on_findings_exits_2_for_unknowns(self): - paths = [str(p) for p in sorted(DECLARATIONS.glob("*.yaml"))] - code, _, _ = self.run_cli(*paths, "--as-of", "2026-10-24", "--fail-on-findings") - self.assertEqual(code, 2) - code, _, _ = self.run_cli(*paths, "--as-of", "2026-10-24") - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - - def test_json_output_has_counts_and_no_values(self): - code, out, _ = self.run_cli(str(FIXTURES / "valid/conformant.json"), "--json", "--as-of", "2026-10-24") - self.assertEqual(code, 0) - data = json.loads(out) - self.assertEqual(data["counts"]["conformant"], 2) - - def test_bad_as_of_is_refused(self): - code, _, err = self.run_cli(str(FIXTURES / "valid/conformant.json"), "--as-of", "yesterday") - self.assertEqual(code, 1) - self.assertIn("invalid --as-of", err) - - def test_more_than_one_sovereign_account_is_an_advisory(self): - def root(name): - return declaration(identity(name=name, principal_type="HUMAN", conventions=[], interactive_login=True, - second_factor="required", custody=["offline-key"], - grants=[grant("SOVEREIGN", "platform", activation="BREAK_GLASS")], - consumers=[{"name": "p", "kind": "person"}])) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d: - paths = [] - for n in ("platform-root", "king"): - p = pathlib.Path(d) / f"{n}.json" - p.write_text(json.dumps(root(n))) - paths.append(p) - reports, rejected = V.run(paths, NOW) - self.assertEqual(rejected, []) - self.assertTrue(any("more than one SOVEREIGN" in a for r in reports for a in r["advisories"])) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - unittest.main() - - -class ExecutorTests(unittest.TestCase): - """SI-15 for bounded-executor credentials and the admission cross-check (NK-WP-0056-T03).""" - - def executor(self, **over): - base = identity(name="nk-exec", principal_type="WORKLOAD", conventions=["executor"], - executor_subject="service:nk-exec", - grants=[grant("OPERATE", "k8s/sso/deployment/x", activation="APPROVED")]) - base.update(over) - return base - - def test_conformant_executor(self): - broken, unknown = V._violations(self.executor()) - self.assertEqual((broken, unknown), (set(), [])) - - def test_executor_refusals(self): - cases = { - "standing grant": self.executor(grants=[grant("OPERATE", "k8s/sso/deployment/x")]), - "human": self.executor(principal_type="HUMAN"), - "interactive": self.executor(interactive_login=True), - "person consumer": self.executor(consumers=[{"name": "founder", "kind": "person"}]), - "no subject": {k: v for k, v in self.executor().items() if k != "executor_subject"}, - "govern": self.executor(grants=[grant("GOVERN", "lldap", activation="APPROVED")]), - } - for label, ident in cases.items(): - with self.subTest(label): - self.assertIn("SI-15", V._violations(ident)[0]) - - def test_checked_in_executor_declaration_has_no_open_rules(self): - document = V.load_declaration(DECLARATIONS / "bounded-executor.yaml") - self.assertEqual(V.structural_errors(document, SCHEMA), []) - report = V.evaluate(document, NOW) - self.assertTrue(all(not i["rules"] for i in report["identities"]), report) - - def test_admission_coverage(self): - document = V.load_declaration(DECLARATIONS / "bounded-executor.yaml") - examples = HERE.parents[2] / "examples/bounded-execution-admission" - pilot = V.load_declaration(examples / "bind-rotation-svc-authelia.yaml") - (result,) = V.admission_coverage([document], [pilot]) - self.assertTrue(result["covered"], result) - wider = copy.deepcopy(pilot) - wider["spec"]["scope_ceiling"].append({"mode": "OPERATE", "scope": "k8s/sso/deployment/keycape", - "environments": ["PRODUCTION"]}) - (result,) = V.admission_coverage([document], [wider]) - self.assertEqual(result["outside_declared_grants"], ["spec/scope_ceiling/4"]) - stranger = copy.deepcopy(pilot) - stranger["spec"]["executor"]["identity"] = "service:unknown" - (result,) = V.admission_coverage([document], [stranger]) - self.assertFalse(result["executor_declared"]) diff --git a/tools/service-identity/validate.py b/tools/service-identity/validate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2829c88..0000000 --- a/tools/service-identity/validate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,363 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -# /// script -# dependencies = ["jsonschema>=4.10,<5", "PyYAML>=6,<7"] -# /// -"""Check service identity declarations against the accepted standard (NK-WP-0054-T03). - -Validates `canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json`, then evaluates the rules of -NetKingdom Service Identity and Privilege v0.1 (v0.1, a SecurityCanon profile) that a declaration alone can decide. -Each identity ends as `conformant`, `non-conformant`, `excepted` or `unknown`; unknown is a -finding, not a pass. Observed state is the health check's job (T04), not this tool's. - -Offline and read-only. It never contacts a service and never prints a declared value: schema -messages can contain a rejected secret, so invalid input reports only a count. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import argparse -import datetime as dt -import json -import pathlib -import re -import sys -from typing import Any - -import jsonschema -import yaml - -ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -SCHEMA = ROOT / "canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json" - -# Value shapes that look like secret material. Field names are limited by the schema; -# this catches smuggled values. -SECRET_VALUE = re.compile( - r"(\bhv[sbr]\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}|\bs\.[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}" - r"|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|AGE-SECRET-KEY-1[A-Z0-9]{10,}" - r"|\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\." - r"|://[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s@]{3,}@)" -) - -BIND_NAME = re.compile(r"^svc-[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*$") -ADMIN_NAME = re.compile(r"^[a-z]{2,6}-admin$") -AGENT_MAX_TTL_SECONDS = 3600 # 60 minutes, decided 2026-10-24 (standard SI-14) -ORDER = {"non-conformant": 0, "unknown": 1, "excepted": 2, "planned": 3, "conformant": 4} - - -def load_schema() -> dict[str, Any]: - return json.loads(SCHEMA.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) - - -def load_declaration(path: pathlib.Path) -> Any: - text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - data = json.loads(text) if path.suffix == ".json" else yaml.safe_load(text) - # YAML turns dates into date objects; the schema speaks JSON. - return json.loads(json.dumps(data, default=str)) - - -def parse_date(value: str) -> dt.date: - return dt.date.fromisoformat(value) - - -def _strings(value: Any): - if isinstance(value, str): - yield value - elif isinstance(value, dict): - for item in value.values(): - yield from _strings(item) - elif isinstance(value, list): - for item in value: - yield from _strings(item) - - -def structural_errors(document: Any, schema: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]: - """Locations only. Messages can echo the rejected value, so they are never returned.""" - validator = jsonschema.Draft202012Validator(schema, format_checker=jsonschema.FormatChecker()) - errors = [f"schema:{'/'.join(str(p) for p in e.absolute_path) or ''}:{e.validator}" - for e in validator.iter_errors(document)] - if errors: - return sorted(errors) - out = [] - names = [i["name"] for i in document["identities"]] - if len(set(names)) != len(names): - out.append("duplicate identity name") - ids = [e["id"] for e in document.get("exceptions", [])] - if len(set(ids)) != len(ids): - out.append("duplicate exception id") - known = set(names) - for exception in document.get("exceptions", []): - if exception["identity"] not in known: - out.append("exception names an undeclared identity") - if any(SECRET_VALUE.search(s) for s in _strings(document)): - out.append("value looks like secret material") - return out - - -ADMIN_MODES = {"ADMINISTER", "GOVERN", "CONSTRUCT", "SOVEREIGN"} # not a ladder: kinds that change rules or definitions -NON_HUMAN = {"SERVICE", "WORKLOAD", "AGENT", "CONTROLLER", "DEVICE"} - - -def _violations(identity: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[set[str], list[str]]: - """Rules broken by one account on declared facts, and the facts still unknown (standard v0.1).""" - broken: set[str] = set() - unknown: list[str] = [] - principal = identity["principal_type"] - conventions = identity.get("conventions", []) - grants = identity["grants"] - consumers = identity["consumers"] - persons = [c for c in consumers if c["kind"] == "person"] - services = [c for c in consumers if c["kind"] == "service"] - name = identity["name"] - second, custody = identity["second_factor"], identity["custody"] - modes = {g["mode"] for g in grants} - - # Unknown is a finding for every account: a fact nobody has established is not a pass. - if principal == "unknown": - unknown.append("principal_type") - if "unknown" in modes: - unknown.append("grants") - if "unknown" in custody: - unknown.append("custody") - - # SI-1 one principal type, one purpose; SI-2 people and services never share a credential. - if len(conventions) > 1 or (principal == "HUMAN" and services) or (principal in NON_HUMAN and persons): - broken.add("SI-1") - if persons and services: - broken.add("SI-2") - if len(services) > 1: - broken.add("SI-3") # a credential used by more than one consumer - # SI-3 bind accounts: SERVICE, read-only USE, one consumer, never interactive. - if "bind" in conventions: - reads_only = all(g["mode"] == "USE" and g.get("read_only") is True for g in grants) - if principal != "SERVICE" or not reads_only or identity["interactive_login"] or persons or len(services) != 1: - broken.add("SI-3") - # SI-4 a service-admin account holds ADMINISTER, and GOVERN where the service has one admin tier, over one service only. - if "service-admin" in conventions: - if {g["mode"] for g in grants} - {"ADMINISTER", "GOVERN", "unknown"} or len({g["scope"] for g in grants}) != 1: - broken.add("SI-4") - # SI-6 SOVEREIGN is offline and break-glass in production; break-glass serves no automation. - for grant in grants: - prod = "PRODUCTION" in grant.get("environments", []) - if grant["mode"] == "SOVEREIGN": - if "unknown" not in custody and custody != ["offline-key"]: - broken.add("SI-6") - if prod and grant.get("activation") not in ("BREAK_GLASS", "RECOVERY"): - broken.add("SI-6") - if grant.get("activation") == "BREAK_GLASS" and services: - broken.add("SI-6") - # SI-7 CONSTRUCT (build mode, development) is never available in production. - if grant["mode"] == "CONSTRUCT" and prod: - broken.add("SI-7") - # SI-15 a bounded executor's credentials act only under an admission (NK-WP-0056): never a person, never - # interactive, every grant APPROVED, never sovereign, rule-changing or build-mode authority. - if "executor" in conventions: - if principal not in ("WORKLOAD", "SERVICE", "AGENT") or identity["interactive_login"] or persons: - broken.add("SI-15") - if not identity.get("executor_subject"): - broken.add("SI-15") - for grant in grants: - if grant.get("activation") != "APPROVED" or grant["mode"] in ("SOVEREIGN", "GOVERN", "CONSTRUCT"): - broken.add("SI-15") - # SI-8 assurance: people and service admins need a second factor; admin roles bind the claim. - if principal == "HUMAN" or "service-admin" in conventions: - if second == "unknown": - unknown.append("second_factor") - elif second == "not_enforced": - broken.add("SI-8") - if identity.get("federated_role") and modes & ADMIN_MODES and not identity.get("assurance_claim_bound"): - broken.add("SI-8") - # SI-9 a person's safe never holds a service, workload or agent credential. - if (principal in NON_HUMAN or "bind" in conventions) and "personal-safe" in custody: - broken.add("SI-9") - # SI-14 agents present as agents, with short-lived tokens. - if principal == "AGENT": - agent = identity["agent"] - if agent["presents_principal_type"] == "unknown": - unknown.append("agent.presents_principal_type") - elif agent["presents_principal_type"] != "agent": - broken.add("SI-14") # IAM Profile v0.3: agent tokens carry principal_type agent - if agent["mode"] == "unknown": - unknown.append("agent.mode") - if agent["max_token_ttl_seconds"] > AGENT_MAX_TTL_SECONDS: - broken.add("SI-14") - # SI-12 recovery accounts are in the crisis custody list. - recovery = identity.get("recovery") - if recovery and recovery["needed"]: - if not recovery["in_crisis_list"]: - broken.add("SI-12") - if recovery["works_with_sso_down"] == "unknown": - unknown.append("recovery.works_with_sso_down") - # Naming (section 5). Reserved names belong to their convention; `admin` is the human's name. - if "bind" in conventions and not BIND_NAME.match(name): - broken.add("NAMING") - if "service-admin" in conventions and not ADMIN_NAME.match(name): - broken.add("NAMING") - holds_credential = custody != ["none"] - if principal == "HUMAN" and holds_credential and not conventions and (name.startswith("svc-") or name.endswith("-admin")): - broken.add("NAMING") - return broken, sorted(set(unknown)) - - -def evaluate(document: dict[str, Any], as_of: dt.date) -> dict[str, Any]: - """Evaluate a structurally valid declaration as of a stated date (never the wall clock).""" - exceptions = document.get("exceptions", []) - findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] - used: set[str] = set() - advisories: list[str] = [] - for identity in document["identities"]: - broken, unknown = _violations(identity) - if identity["status"] == "legacy" and parse_date(identity["disposition"]["date"]) < as_of: - broken.add("SI-11") - excepted: dict[str, str] = {} - open_rules: set[str] = set() - expired_ids: list[str] = [] - for rule in sorted(broken): - match = [e for e in exceptions if e["identity"] == identity["name"] and rule in e["rules"]] - live = [e for e in match if as_of <= parse_date(e["expires"])] - if live: - excepted[rule] = live[0]["id"] - used.add(live[0]["id"]) - else: - open_rules.add(rule) - expired_ids += [e["id"] for e in match] - if expired_ids: - open_rules.add("SI-EXC-EXPIRED") - if identity["status"] == "planned" and not open_rules: - result = "planned" - elif open_rules: - result = "non-conformant" - elif unknown: - result = "unknown" - elif excepted: - result = "excepted" - else: - result = "conformant" - findings.append({"identity": identity["name"], "result": result, "rules": sorted(open_rules), - "excepted": excepted, "unknown": unknown}) - for exception in exceptions: - if exception["id"] not in used and as_of <= parse_date(exception["expires"]): - advisories.append(f"{exception['id']}: no matching violation (stale exception)") - admins = [i["name"] for i in document["identities"] - if "service-admin" in i.get("conventions", []) and i["status"] != "planned"] - if len(admins) > 1: - advisories.append("SI-4: more than one service-admin identity: " + ", ".join(sorted(admins))) - if not document["complete"]: - advisories.append("SI-11: declaration is not asserted complete by the owner") - if not document["attestation"]["owner_confirmed"]: - advisories.append("declaration is not confirmed by the owning service") - return {"service": document["service"], "as_of": as_of.isoformat(), "identities": findings, - "advisories": advisories} - - -def run(paths: list[pathlib.Path], as_of: dt.date) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]: - schema = load_schema() - reports: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] - rejected: list[str] = [] - breakglass: set[str] = set() - for path in paths: - try: - document = load_declaration(path) - except (OSError, ValueError, yaml.YAMLError): - rejected.append(f"{path.name}: unreadable input") - continue - errors = structural_errors(document, schema) - if errors: - rejected.append(f"{path.name}: rejected ({len(errors)} errors)") - continue - reports.append(evaluate(document, as_of)) - breakglass |= {i["name"] for i in document["identities"] - if any(g["mode"] == "SOVEREIGN" for g in i["grants"])} - if len(breakglass) > 1: - reports.append({"service": "", "as_of": as_of.isoformat(), "identities": [], - "advisories": ["SI-6: more than one SOVEREIGN account across declarations: " - + ", ".join(sorted(breakglass))]}) - return reports, rejected - - -def _covers(grant: dict[str, Any], need: dict[str, Any]) -> bool: - return grant["mode"] == need["mode"] and (need["scope"] == grant["scope"] - or need["scope"].startswith(grant["scope"] + "/")) - - -def admission_coverage(documents: list[dict[str, Any]], admissions: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]: - """SI-15: each admission's scope ceiling lies inside the declared grants of its executor's credentials. - - The executor's authority is the union of grants of every declared identity whose executor_subject is the - admission's spec.executor.identity, in the admission's environments. Locations only, never values.""" - results = [] - for admission in admissions: - spec = admission.get("spec", {}) - subject = spec.get("executor", {}).get("identity") - held = [g for d in documents for i in d["identities"] if i.get("executor_subject") == subject - for g in i["grants"]] - outside = [] - for index, need in enumerate(spec.get("scope_ceiling", [])): - ok = any(_covers(g, need) and set(need.get("environments", [])) <= set(g.get("environments", [])) - for g in held) - if not ok: - outside.append(f"spec/scope_ceiling/{index}") - results.append({"admission": spec.get("id"), "executor_declared": bool(held), "outside_declared_grants": outside, - "covered": bool(held) and not outside}) - return results - - -def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0]) - parser.add_argument("paths", nargs="+", type=pathlib.Path) - parser.add_argument("--as-of", default=dt.date.today().isoformat(), help="evaluation date, YYYY-MM-DD") - parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="machine-readable output") - parser.add_argument("--fail-on-findings", action="store_true", help="exit 2 when anything is non-conformant or unknown") - parser.add_argument("--admissions", nargs="+", type=pathlib.Path, default=[], - help="bounded-execution admissions whose ceilings must lie inside the declared executor grants (SI-15)") - args = parser.parse_args(argv) - try: - as_of = parse_date(args.as_of) - except ValueError: - print("service identity: invalid --as-of", file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - reports, rejected = run(args.paths, as_of) - coverage = [] - if args.admissions: - schema = load_schema() - documents = [] - for path in args.paths: - try: - document = load_declaration(path) - except (OSError, ValueError, yaml.YAMLError): - continue - if not structural_errors(document, schema): - documents.append(document) - coverage = admission_coverage(documents, [load_declaration(p) for p in args.admissions]) - for line in rejected: - print(f"service identity: {line}", file=sys.stderr) - counts: dict[str, int] = {k: 0 for k in ORDER} - for report in reports: - for item in report["identities"]: - counts[item["result"]] += 1 - if args.json: - print(json.dumps({"as_of": as_of.isoformat(), "counts": counts, "reports": reports, "rejected": len(rejected), - **({"admission_coverage": coverage} if args.admissions else {})}, indent=2)) - else: - for report in reports: - for item in sorted(report["identities"], key=lambda i: (ORDER[i["result"]], i["identity"])): - detail = (item["rules"] or item["unknown"] if item["result"] in ("non-conformant", "unknown", "planned") - else sorted(item["excepted"])) - print(f"{report['service']}/{item['identity']}: {item['result']}" + (f" [{', '.join(detail)}]" if detail else "")) - for note in report["advisories"]: - print(f"{report['service']}: advisory: {note}") - print("summary: " + ", ".join(f"{counts[k]} {k}" for k in ORDER) + f" (as of {as_of.isoformat()})") - for item in coverage: - state = "covered" if item["covered"] else ("no declared executor" if not item["executor_declared"] - else "outside declared grants: " + ", ".join(item["outside_declared_grants"])) - print(f"admission {item['admission']}: {state}") - if rejected: - return 1 - if any(not item["covered"] for item in coverage): - return 2 - if args.fail_on_findings and (counts["non-conformant"] or counts["unknown"]): - return 2 - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh b/tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh index 33e2c38..854bc11 100755 --- a/tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh +++ b/tools/sync-user-engine-delivery-secret.sh @@ -1,5 +1,19 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Historical provider-token copier withdrawn under NK-WP-0049. -set +x -printf '%s\n' 'Retired: legacy User Engine delivery copying is unavailable. Email uses email-connect scoped ESO delivery; audit sender maintenance requires its owner-reviewed custody path. Existing credentials and Secrets are preserved.' >&2 -exit 2 +set -euo pipefail + +# Copy only the two scoped receiver credentials into user-engine. Values stay +# in process memory and Kubernetes API requests; stdout contains metadata only. +audit_json="$(kubectl -n audit-core get secret audit-core-senders -o jsonpath='{.data.senders\.json}' | base64 -d)" +event_token="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; rows=json.load(sys.stdin); print(next(row["tokens"][0] for row in rows if row["name"] == "user-engine"))' <<<"$audit_json")" +mail_token="$(kubectl -n email-connect get secret email-connect-runtime -o jsonpath='{.data.EMAIL_CONNECT_INGEST_TOKEN}' | base64 -d)" + +test -n "$event_token" +test -n "$mail_token" + +kubectl -n user-engine create secret generic user-engine-delivery \ + --from-literal=event-token="$event_token" \ + --from-literal=mail-token="$mail_token" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml \ + | kubectl apply -f - >/dev/null + +echo "user-engine delivery Secret synchronized (values withheld)" diff --git a/tools/validate_forgejo_type12_acknowledgment.py b/tools/validate_forgejo_type12_acknowledgment.py deleted file mode 100644 index b3de5f6..0000000 --- a/tools/validate_forgejo_type12_acknowledgment.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -"""Offline source/memo validation; no source disposition or posting.""" -import argparse,base64,gzip,copy,hashlib,importlib.util,json,sys -from pathlib import Path - -def validate(root,infd_root,nk_root): - sys.path.insert(0,str(infd_root)) - import jsonschema,yaml - from informed_decision.intake import validate_submission,SubmitterGrant,IntakeRefused - from informed_decision.lifecycle_commands import decode_memo,decode_documents - env=json.loads((root/'intake.json').read_text());commands=json.loads((root/'lifecycle-commands.json').read_text());schema=json.loads((infd_root/'schemas/memo-intake.schema.json').read_text());jsonschema.validate(env,schema) - grant=SubmitterGrant('state-hub',frozenset({'decision-record'}),frozenset({'net-kingdom-admins'}));parsed=validate_submission(env,submitter_id='state-hub',grant=grant);memo=decode_memo(commands[0]['register']['memo']);docs=decode_documents(commands[0]['register']['documents'],memo) - assert env['memo']==commands[0]['register']['memo']==json.loads((root/'memo.json').read_text());assert len(docs)==len(memo.packet)==20;assert commands[0]['review']['options']['approval_intent']==env['approval_intent'];assert len(json.dumps(commands[0]['register']).encode())<=256*1024 - for item in env['packet']: - name=next(x['label'] for x in env['memo']['packet'] if x['item_id']==item['item_id']) - assert (root/name).read_bytes()==item['content'].encode() - inventory=json.loads((root/'source-inventory.json').read_text());assert inventory['bound_preparation_manifest_sha256']=='5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431' - for item in inventory['reviewed19_owner_source_files']: - assert hashlib.sha256((nk_root.parent/item['repo']/item['path']).read_bytes()).hexdigest()==item['sha256'] - for item in inventory['attachments_from_actual_owners']: - attached=(root/item['name']).read_bytes() - if 'wrapper_original_receipt_field' in item:attached=base64.b64decode(json.loads(attached)[item['wrapper_original_receipt_field']],validate=True) - elif 'review_bundle_entry' in item: - entry=json.loads(attached)['entries'][item['review_bundle_entry']];assert entry['encoding']=='gzip-base64' and entry['sha256']==item['sha256'] - attached=gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(entry['original_source_bytes'],validate=True)) - assert hashlib.sha256(Path(item['owner_path']).read_bytes()).hexdigest()==item['sha256']==hashlib.sha256(attached).hexdigest() - vp=nk_root/'tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py';sys.path.insert(0,str(vp.parent));spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('security_case_validator',vp);v=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);sys.modules[spec.name]=v;spec.loader.exec_module(v) - t=yaml.safe_load((root/'type-1.2.yaml').read_text());c=yaml.safe_load((root/'case-1.2.yaml').read_text());assert t['spec']['status']==c['spec']['status']=='proposed';assert 'acceptance' not in c['spec'];proposal=json.loads((root/'proposal.json').read_text());assert not proposal['case_acceptance_authorized'];assert proposal['canonical_case_status_after_source_ack']=='proposed';assert not proposal['type_implemented'];assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_type(t)+v.validate_case(c,t,require_implemented=False)) - paths,issues=v.discover_declarations(t,nk_root.parent);decls,issues2=v.composer.load_declarations(paths);issues3,render=v.render_case(c,t,decls,require_implemented=False);assert not v.has_errors(issues+issues2+issues3);assert (json.dumps(render,indent=2,sort_keys=True)+'\n').encode()==(root/'render-1.2.json').read_bytes();assert not render['execution']['permitted'];assert len(render['materialization'])==6 - package=json.loads((root/'validation-and-history.json').read_text())['complete_proposed_package_supplement'] - package_root=root.parent.parent.parent/package['package_path'] - # root is docs/proposals/; owner root is three parents above it. - for item in package['files']: - data=(package_root/item['path']).read_bytes();assert hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()==item['sha256'] - if 'bound_document' in item:assert data==(root/item['bound_document']).read_bytes() - else: - assert data==base64.b64decode(item['content_base64'],validate=True) - assert not v.has_errors(v.validate_type(t,package_root)) - assert proposal['complete_type12_package_validation_proved'] and package['runnable_tests']['passed']==22 - assert proposal['complete_type12_package_owner_receipt_recorded'] and package['separate_netkingdom_source_owner_review_recorded'] and proposal['human_posting_ready'] - import subprocess,os - run=subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-m','pytest',str(package_root/'tests'),'-q'],env={**os.environ,'NET_KINGDOM_ROOT':str(nk_root)},capture_output=True,text=True) - assert run.returncode==0 and '22 passed' in run.stdout - negative=[] - for label in ['packet-content-tamper','boolean-memo-version','approval-prebound']: - trial=copy.deepcopy(env) - if label=='packet-content-tamper':trial['packet'][0]['content']+='\nchanged' - elif label=='boolean-memo-version':trial['memo']['version']=True - else:trial['memo']['approval_id']='fixture-unapproved' - try:validate_submission(trial,submitter_id='state-hub',grant=grant) - except IntakeRefused:negative.append(label) - else:raise AssertionError('negative accepted') - return {'offline_only':True,'full_intake_and_schema_valid':True,'typed_lifecycle_memo_valid':True,'document_hashes_valid':len(docs),'bound19_applied_source_hashes_match':True,'all_owner_attachments_unchanged':True,'type_case_valid_and_source_render_identical':True,'execution_permitted':False,'canonical_case_after_ack':'proposed','canonical_case_acceptance_authorized':False,'complete_proposed_package_validation_passed':True,'actual_runnable_package_tests_passed':22,'separate_package_owner_review_recorded':True,'negative_intake_guards':negative,'register_payload_bytes':len(json.dumps(commands[0]['register']).encode()),'submission_digest':parsed.submission_digest,'offline_submitter_shape_assumption_is_native_admission':False,'founder_disposition_recorded':False} -if __name__=='__main__': - p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('packet',type=Path);p.add_argument('--informed-decision-root',type=Path,default=Path('/home/worsch/informed-decision'));p.add_argument('--net-kingdom-root',type=Path,default=Path('/home/worsch/net-kingdom'));a=p.parse_args();print(json.dumps(validate(a.packet,a.informed_decision_root,a.net_kingdom_root),sort_keys=True)) diff --git a/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-10.md b/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-10.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7d350c2..0000000 --- a/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-10.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-10 -type: workplan -title: "Follow the access-engine CLI rename" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -owner: claude-code -topic_slug: net-kingdom -created: "2026-10-10" -updated: "2026-10-10" -state_hub_workstream_id: "341b61a1-9e64-5d54-ae4e-a130abc6b960" ---- - -## Replace `./cmd/flex-auth` with `./cmd/access-engine` - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-10-T01 -status: done -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "ac0c45ab-74fe-5ed3-8130-416ea111e07c" -``` - -access-engine renamed its CLI (FLEX-DEC-2026-020, access-engine 0ced299, -message `e2f1aac9`): `./cmd/flex-auth` is now a stub that exits 2. The -protected-system runbook pack and tutorial now call `go run ./cmd/access-engine` -(subcommands and flags unchanged), and the tenant-engine README no longer lists -`cmd/flex-auth` among the unchanged runtime names. Runtime names (namespace, -Service DNS, audience, chart, OCI package) stay `flex-auth` until FLEX-WP-0036. -`make runbooks-validate` passes; historical records are left as they were. diff --git a/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md b/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md deleted file mode 100644 index 94059eb..0000000 --- a/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-11.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,347 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11 -type: workplan -title: "Review bounded security doctrine and catalogue exception proposals" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -flavor: planning -owner: codex -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-11" -updated: "2026-10-11" -related: [GH-WP-0004] -state_hub_workstream_id: "930ae9b3-4769-57ce-bb77-ba2a997f653e" ---- - -## Review exact requested successor-canon amendment without publication - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T01 -status: done -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "9dd7fb12-1ca4-5fd5-94e7-a75dd3e00939" -``` - -Source-owner review only of GH-WP-0004-T06-r1, exact proposal SHA256 -08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a. -Reviewed against NetKingdom INTENT, accepted v0.8, current working companion, -GH012/014/017/021/024 and InformedDecision's requested row/event inventory. -Approved technical compatibility for separate founder disposition and proposed -successor publication review; no standard/case acceptance, founder decision, -live publication, runtime conformance or completion of GH-WP-0004-T06/INFD-IN-0007 -is asserted. Review and exact sources are retained in docs/reviews/. - -## Review the exact one-application maintenance exception source - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T02 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "60c1a740-75ac-56f8-bee8-905e7d236460" -``` - -NetKingdom-only source-owner review of applied refined nine-file User Engine -maintenance candidate manifest0ff545d26a0fd72f06040fe377de3efdcc3bd62cdcb6f653247c8ba72f3f34a7. -Reviewed canonical one-app/client/system facts, truthful exception attribution, -source/hash/native-clock/single-use boundaries and retained-event recovery limits. -Technical agreement for separate exact founder disposition; no human approval, -runtime go, catalogue write, default role/grant or normal PDP bypass permission -is inferred. The fresh User Engine owner supplies its distinct review; this -worker signs only the established NetKingdom owner role. Exact review/sources -are retained in docs/reviews/. - -## Review the exact Forgejo consumer ESO successor source - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T03 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "03292a62-1803-5bdf-9f19-f2c8fa7b61db" -``` - -NetKingdom-only source-owner review of the frozen 17-path Forgejo consumer ESO -successor proposal. Initial manifest c48b64e5e704e8f11ca65095c376c8a9fecc2b3a58e74b9eb62096c80d00f4fb -contained a misleading acknowledged-type risk note; the requester corrected it -and retained that original revision. Final manifest -271afd04512b3dac642b3385013cac03d28afde22ff97bcca8d0e262ab3d9279 independently -verified, including the sole risk-note amendment, all 17 paths, seven current -source pins, native source validators, identical full render regeneration and -exact preservation of the original five structural objects plus a sixth role. -Technical source agreement only: SecurityCaseTypes §6 requires a new founder -informed-decision acknowledgment for this authentication/materialization change; -current type/case1.1, historical CCR42 and all native state remain unchanged. -No type/case acknowledgment, binding admission, materialization, credential -grant or live delivery is authorized. Exact review and evidence retained in -docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-review.*. - -## Receive the accepted bounded doctrine handoff and assemble proposed source - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T04 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "c867858d-dda6-504a-9eac-f53b8ece6e31" -``` - -Received exact GH-DEC-2026-025 / GH-WP-0004-T06 source-owner handoff after -confirmed person ACCEPT d90c899b-f25c-4e66-a003-808ee5b1324f at2026-10-11T01:46:25Z -of proposal08bc78a29c2b67cec0aafba993fb2d25312b629ecccb81458980baafe38e566a. -Assembled the exact bounded §3.4/§4 candidate in proposed v0.9 only; accepted -v0.8 stays byte-identical/operative. Reviewed full paragraph/row equality against -both immutable proposal and handoff, native receipt scope, unchanged other -normative sections and retained Staff/evidence limits. No whole v0.9 acceptance -or serving/deployment is inferred. Live successor adoption/publication is -retained first as NET-IN-0004; INFD-IN-0007 stays open pending accepted voice. -Gate House handoff completion is distinct from this source-owner's outstanding -standard adoption. No finished INFD implementation plan is reopened. - -## Review the final nineteen-path Forgejo consumer ESO source revision - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T05 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "4903132f-3815-502d-bcf8-30d7a244f62d" -``` - -Final narrow NetKingdom source-owner review of manifest -5dbd04cf96d73a2604cbf113073d618c03434fc87508ba614cbe3820a1a0e431. -Retains T03 and its earlier271 proposal review as history, not current exact -acknowledgment. Verified all19 staged hashes, seven current source pins, proposed -type/case admission refusal, identical c0afd render and independent projections. -Both prior271 counterexamples reproduced: wrong consumer target and missing -created-only issued-token recovery guards. Corrected builder derives forgejo, -preserves KeyCape output and requires owner revocation or verified expiry, -created-only preservation and no recovery login/remint. Fresh Mason/Platform -owner44-test reports checked; no native proof inferred. Proposed type/case -need fresh founder acknowledgment under §6, source rebundle/reconciliation and -existing per-owner/native acceptance. No role/grant/materialization/runtime -change or first-case completion. Exact final review/sources retained in -docs/reviews/2026-10-11-forgejo-consumer-eso-net-owner-final-review.*. - -## Review the source-only successor acknowledgment human packet - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T06 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "cee400f6-f1a6-5ee3-8fde-68bfb4c9cbf4" -``` - -NetKingdom-only source-owner review of exact26-path packet -eeb2968ec317d0bc072788011918025a21d2b48c13987d09945ae8761f3d8fe5, stable proposal -NK-FORGEJO-TYPE12-SOURCE-20261011-R1, memo1, submission5d36e27de6161e0c80c0590a99a4d47c998f673aacf289d7a6b46adfe510c6e7. -All hashes,20 documents, applied19source attachments, typed intake and tamper/ -version/prebound-approval negatives verified. Changes requested to make the -separate source-reference acceptance receipt mandatory while canonical1.2case -stays proposed: schema permits accepted-case shape, but normalsemantic admission -rejects its acknowledged/unimplemented type under canon§4/5. No new founder -acknowledgment, native publication or status change has occurred. Existing -NK0048/project work retains recording/review followthrough; no duplicate plan. -Exact review/proposed correction and independent proof retained in docs/reviews/. - -T06 same-trial refinement review: exact completed32-path packet -330da7fe129b0443e41fff44b3c2d829b0d682698fdbba9fe60011d46ed5c48c resolves the -recording concern with mandatory separate design receipt and canonical case -remaining proposed. Independent full-package validator and22 tests passed, -including three missing-package regressions; schema/typed20-doc intake and -three refusal guards passed at233429bytes. Post-ack isolated shape/render proof -keeps canonicalcaseproposed, ordinary admission blocked and executionfalse. -Original eeb changes-requested review and prepackage12ce failures remain history, -not new scored successes. Final source agreement is separate receipt only; -no actual founder acknowledgment, native intake, acceptance or runtime change. - -2026-10-11T06:47:39Z source-recording preparation, same T06 trial: latest native -outcome confirms nonstale person ACCEPT of exactmemo1, approval -8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765, disposition -disp-315d54ad-20f1-40e6-862c-6c7d2e8f0ea8. Prepared external acknowledgment -receipt and complete acknowledged1.2 package in explicit version source root -security-case-type-revisions/1.2, changing type semantic status only. Independent -fullvalidator and22 adapted-source tests pass; schema/versionload/render checks -pass and normalcase admission remains refused. Packet-bound proposed sources -and defaultcanonical1.1 package/case stay byte-identical. Separate Apps design -receipt transcribes the actual human source scope, not an agent ownerreview or -canonicalcase acceptance. Requesting coordinator records actual foundergo; no -worker native/credential/grant action. Canonical1.2case remains proposed without -acceptance; implementation followthrough remains existing NK0048-T06/project -owner tasks. No new trial, taskT07, broad plan or whole-workplan finish. - -Explicit version-selection source followthrough review, same completed owner T06 -anchor: reviewed exact six-file source manifest -88238f29ebeceee36f6f6e77bb19cb43837b5bc03bce21c16acc50399b302084. -Independent43 validator/selection tests and22 acknowledged1.2 package compatibility -tests pass in isolated source snapshot. No mappings preserve default1.1; explicit -1.2 loads only its selected exact root with no fallback/discovery, and mismatched -case/type references, duplicate mappings/YAML keys and selected symlinks refuse. -Both types remain acknowledged/unimplemented; historical accepted1.1 case and -its normal refusal remain unchanged. Preparation digests stay e64b56e4.../c0afd557... -and executionfalse. Canonical/acknowledgment hashes verified unchanged; source -loader selection confers no case admission, native adapter/global verifier, -materialization, grant or implemented status. Existing NK0048-T06 remains wait. -No new source-ack trial or broad implementation plan is created. - -## Independently review the frozen KEY39 lifecycle v2 source - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "3b6d52b2-b011-54da-a1e8-4c2aef7a94ae" -``` - -Completed NetKingdom-only offline source-owner review preparation of exact -KEY-WP-0039-T02/attended-lifecycle-v2 manifest -6fc0fe47f99a97c11c6e7538f5ea02054335df7d46055d3f84bed4e194aeaaed. -The source and tests, runtime CAS, temporary registration/env/Secret isolation, -two single-replica Recreate restarts, captured output, normal cleanup and separate -hard-interruption recovery were inspected against NetKingdom INTENT. -Supplied tests and independent synthetic refusal checks are retained with the -formal owner review under the temporary source-review stage. This completed -local review task is distinct from KEY39 T02 and all native owner obligations. -No founder decision, deployment, credential access, Secret read, grant, live -acceptance or task closure in other repositories is claimed. - -T07 same-trial v3 refinement review: independently reviewed exact manifest -fbc31fda2b6194747547b9fbe876095914c3d53231c79abd43a010dbb3273efa. -Both v2 deadline counterexamples now refuse; a real elapsed timer interrupts -slow HTTP body reads and restores signal state. Thirty-nine supplied and fifteen -independent checks pass, including a retained new failure reproduction: final -temporary Secret deletion bypasses the aggregate cleanup deadline through an -unguarded subprocess call. Changes requested for that exact source path only; -v2 changes-requested evidence and frozen stages stay unchanged. No native -authority, owner acceptance or KEY39 task closure is inferred. - - -T07 same-trial final v4 source refinement review: exact frozen manifest -d079f85c47d5c2635e1ee633ea4d1346b1737ce2be9ca273f22a38e620f418d8 -routes the exact temporary Secret deletion through guarded k. The v3 expired -cleanup reproduction now makes zero native calls; a real slow-delete timer is -clipped to remaining cleanup time. Both earlier v2 counterexamples now refuse, -late full OpenBao acceptance is self-revoked privately before failure, partial -acceptance stays unknown, and aggregate cleanup does not renew. Forty-one -supplied lifecycle tests, seventeen unchanged-runner tests and seventeen -independent checks pass. NetKingdom source agreement only; earlier unsuccessful -reviews and immutable sources remain history in this same trial. Native token -production, runtime authority, quiet-window/headroom, execution, revocation/ -cleanup and other owners' task closure remain separate obligations. - -T07 same-trial v5 exceptional HTTP-close refinement review: frozen manifest -d1f997624db46693a7126a6eb6435f6b3a353d5bd67dcc8a539683e4b7147285 -retains NetKingdom's prior v4 agreement and Platform's distinct v4 -changes-requested finding as history. Exceptional response close now has one -20 ms abort cap clipped to positive original request time and the same -nonrenewable aggregate cleanup deadline; expired aggregate performs no close. -Independent early-read and timed-read failure/slow-close checks, known accepted -session revocation despite normal-close error, signal restoration, value-free -unknown outcomes and prior deadline/delete/recovery guards pass. Forty-six -supplied lifecycle tests, seventeen unchanged-runner tests and twenty-one -independent checks pass. NetKingdom exact source agreement only; same trial, -no new task, native authority, credential access, runtime acceptance or closure. - -T07 same-trial node-route source followthrough: prepared exact successor -manifest 23a972abc5175e121e594726d2b7f7a28c62109253f58f12623eaf2e5564a035 from unchanged published/frozen v5. Source inspection -confirms the named OpenBao bridge binds workstation loopback, not node loopback; -node Pod DNS/reachability is unobserved. Proposed founder-held bounded node-local -port-forward of existing openbao/openbao-ui-gateway includes targeted teardown. -A public-only route diagnostic and strict health identity digest now gate execute -before protected/native reads and again before temporary mutation; recovery -checks first as well. Forty-six retained lifecycle, eight new route, twenty-one -retained independent and seventeen unchanged-runner tests pass offline. -No tunnel, native health probe, credential/Secret read or mutation ran. Current -source agreement is only NetKingdom's; fresh independent Platform/KeyCape -acknowledgments and exact founder route/native authority remain prerequisites. -Same completed T07, all previous source/review bytes intact, no new workplan. - -T07 same-trial v7 private-input sequencing correction: exact successor -manifest 90aabec336008d7d51e37c04b5ff96ba8ed6630821cca1a4c333d803367247f7 retains immutable v6 source and NetKingdom/Platform -reviews. V6 health gated native access but main read stdin first; its broader -pre-private-input description was incorrect. V7 main now validates the exact -source/approval, starts the bounded window and checks pinned public health before -reading stdin. Execute revalidates source/expiry and preserves that original -monotonic budget, while retaining health before native access and first mutation. -Actual main tests prove failed/missing-pin health never consumes stdin; recovery -remains stdin-free. Forty-six lifecycle, twelve route/main and twenty-one retained -independent checks pass; unchanged runner remains pinned and previously verified. -Pre-freeze local refactor/test failures were corrected and retained in validation -evidence. Source preparation only; no owner checkout changes, native operation, -credentials, tunnel, health observation or new workplan. Fresh exact independent -KeyCape/Platform reviews and founder native authority remain required. - -T07 same-trial private-producer consumer source review: exact KeyCape proposal -manifest 239aaac8541ba05e8bba5f9ecdc8b555a02fd9d0ad1762fdfc4d4bae7e4ef463 -reviewed as NetKingdom consumer only. Eighteen supplied and five independent -synthetic checks pass, including actual partial-write timeout/unknown outcome. -Changes requested: no child-ready preflight acknowledgement before private pipe -write, writable stdout-pipe aliases pass FD>=3 guard, and final stat/unlink is -non-atomic despite precise-inspected-inode removal wording. Exclusive caller -custody is an assumption, not an authenticated peer or JWT signature proof. -No KeyCape owner role, existing-client reuse, coding-agent custody admission, -launcher/transport grant or native readiness is inferred. No private credentials, -native operation or owner checkout writes occurred; staged v6/v7 remain history. - -T07 same-trial v8 bounded private receive correction: exact frozen successor -manifest 316fd6005cc4cb7fe14ea69a5fd408aed13e6122afef60afd13d97952b27cf4a retains v7 agreement and the subsequent KeyCape -unbounded-input finding as same-trial history. Complete private JSON receive is -now binary/chunk/65536-byte/15-second capped, clipped to the original remaining -action window; requires actual EOF, exact two-token object and per-token byte -limits, checks expiry again before decoding/execute and emits no private errors. -Actual main real stalled pipe and complete JSON without EOF time out; oversized, -incomplete and late input refuse before execution. Forty-six lifecycle, twelve -route/main, seven new receive and twenty-one retained independent checks pass. -Producer-side exact-child ready acknowledgment still does not exist; child read -bounds do not authorize early exporter write. Earlier producer changes-requested -review remains live source feedback. Fresh exact independent KeyCape/Platform -reviews, producer/launcher handoff and founder native authority remain required. -No original source/stage/review changed, no owner checkout writes or native/ -credential/Secret/tunnel operation; same completed T07, no duplicate workplan. - -T07 same-trial v9 concrete private-ready protocol preparation: exact source -manifest 84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14 follows published v8 while retaining v5/v6/v7/v8 and -producer v1 consumer-refusal history. Child emits bounded value-free nonce/pin/ -window-bound marker via distinct local inherited pipe only after exact source/ -approval/public-health and before private input; stdio aliases refuse. A node -wrapper creates that local pipe, launches pinned child/envelope, relays one -marker on captured SSH control stdout and never reads/copies private stdin. -No extra FD is forwarded by SSH/Bridge, no marker authenticates authority/peer, -and the output-suppressed warden lane is explicitly incompatible. Independent -KeyCape producer/launcher source is coordinated but not yet exact reviewed or -admitted; it must await marker before loading/consuming files or writing tokens. -Forty-six lifecycle, twelve route/main, seven receive, nine new ready/wrapper and -twenty-one retained independent tests pass offline; real pipe timeout/alias and -actual main ordering checked. No SSH, native child/health/tunnel, credential or -owner checkout action occurred. Fresh independent KeyCape/Platform reviews, -trusted founder SSH/launcher/private-file/native admission and real owner -acceptance remain necessary; same completed T07, no duplicate workplan. - -T07 same-trial independent NetKingdom consumer source review of exact KeyCape -producer V3 manifest 569672ecdb3f1f5b46122183dc3b82e83ff168c07c87db7211ec26bc1ce6184a paired with unchanged Net V9 manifest -84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14: completed source-only analysis and offline validation; -changes requested because actual launcher CLI contract FIFO acquisition blocks -before its preparation timer. V2 also reproduces and is preserved. Thirty-three -maker tests and nine independent actual local fake-SSH -> real pinned wrapper -> -real child-main handshake checks pass, with public health and native execution -explicitly mocked, synthetic unsigned tokens only. Wrong nonce/marker, health -failure, expired approval and source mismatch perform zero token-file loads; -quietness failure and real partial pipe delivery retain unknown consumer outcome. -V3 sticky unknown correction passes. Exclusive same-UID directory custody is -required; unlink is non-atomic and no zeroization/copy cleanup is proved. Prior -v5-v8 reviews, V9 own anchor and original producer refusal remain unchanged. -No KeyCape formal role, authenticated marker authority, native/source admission, -credential reads, SSH, tunnel, repository writes or workplan closure inferred. - -T07 same-trial fresh independent NetKingdom consumer source review of exact -KeyCape producer V4 manifest d6f641dc1e4aae7d36658d4199d89af14d2fd7a4bd4e526856eb340234f2d33e paired with unchanged Net V9 manifest -84542ddcff00932fc7ce22dcb2626be8942a3c006c5098a62fdd6b2478d0cd14: completed source-only qualified agreement. Actual -CLI rejects FIFO/symlink/oversize contracts before private reads, slow main -acquisition and default caller validation are bounded, and acquisition plus -launch retain one original preparation deadline. Forty maker tests and thirteen -independent checks pass, including nine actual local fake-SSH/pinned-wrapper/ -child-main handshake checks with fixture public health and native execution. -V1 and V3 refusals, V2/V3 FIFO counterexamples, V3 sticky unknown correction, -v5-v8 histories and V9 own preparation anchor remain unchanged. Exclusive -same-UID directory custody, admitted pinned owner launcher/SSH host profile, -private file allowance and exact founder native authorization remain required; -marker and unsigned claims authenticate neither authority nor issuer. No -credential read, native command, real SSH, owner checkout write or native/task -closure occurred. This source agreement does not approve transport or custody. diff --git a/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-16.md b/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-16.md deleted file mode 100644 index a38773a..0000000 --- a/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-16.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-16 -type: workplan -title: "Reconcile recovery capability index with its owner entry" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -owner: codex -created: "2026-10-16" -updated: "2026-10-16" -flavor: implementation -state_hub_workstream_id: "dc9c40f4-930f-545d-8da0-1de5ae29f533" ---- - -## Reconcile recovery capability index with its owner entry - -```task -id: NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-16-T01 -status: done -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "489e3fa0-8193-5c08-8c41-27939010d303" -``` - -Reconcile only the bootstrap-recovery index summary with the existing authoritative capability entry. Old strict validation passed despite the difference; the reviewed validator refuses it until this correction. No recovery capability, maturity, deployed behavior or owner acceptance is added. - -Completed 2026-10-16 under the founder's NetKingdom target implementation demand -(CUST-WP-0080, TSA-11). Source review and exact before/after native CLI evidence: -`the-custodian/docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/improvement-loop-next/`. -The current 60-provider cohort has all 70 reviewed IDs exactly once; 3 field -mismatches across 2 capabilities become zero with the source corrections. -Native hosted refresh/readback and the accepted Activity/rein schedule remain -separate gates. No production change, model call, credential access or external -message was performed. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0011-enterprise-federation-saml.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0011-enterprise-federation-saml.md index d79485b..a769650 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0011-enterprise-federation-saml.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0011-enterprise-federation-saml.md @@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ title: "Enterprise Federation & SAML — Expanded-Mode Keycloak Identity Broker" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom status: blocked -flavor: residual +flavor: implementation owner: worsch topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-05-20" -updated: "2026-10-28" +updated: "2026-10-03" state_hub_workstream_id: "1075448f-d533-5f9e-94b7-c3adfe151a07" depends_on: - NK-WP-0003 @@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ supersedes_tasks: # NK-WP-0011 — Enterprise Federation & SAML (Expanded-Mode Keycloak) -> **Blocked 2026-10-28** (founder triage): every task waits on the ADR-0009 adoption trigger -> (a named enterprise-IdP/tenant need); SCOPE.md lists enterprise federation (C5) as backlog. -> Return to `active` when the trigger occurs. - > Extracted from NK-WP-0001 (T05–T08, the deferred Keycloak path) and > refined against where net-kingdom actually stands today: a deployed > KeyCape lightweight stack, an OpenBao runtime-secret authority, and a @@ -382,8 +378,3 @@ resume. All eight tasks remain wait; the workplan remains blocked. Knowledge receipt: emergent-security 0.2.6 / start / verified-files / orientation-only; digest `8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`. - -> 2026-10-11: demoted to `flavor: residual` / `backlog` by founder-authorized triage — off the -> critical path (identity → authz → secrets → SecurityCase execution). Tasks are unchanged; -> promote back when demand or risk appears. See the-custodian -> `history/20261011-netkingdom-security-progress-assessment.md`. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md index d061604..0b237bd 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md @@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ type: workplan title: "Cut over NetKingdom identity to railiance01 and retire CoulombCore" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: finished +status: blocked flavor: implementation owner: codex topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-07-27" -updated: "2026-10-15" +updated: "2026-10-03" depends_on: - USER-WP-0020 - NK-WP-0023 @@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ privacyIDEA, and `net-kingdom-pg`. At that baseline, public KeyCape DNS pointed railiance01 while other identity names still pointed to CoulombCore. T06/T07 below supersede that topology: identity cutover and reversible retirement completed on July 30 after the recorded migration gates passed. -Final deletion completed on October 15 after the separate T08 recovery and -approval gates were satisfied. +Final deletion still requires the separate T08 recovery and approval gates. The original cutover intentionally waited for the reusable user onboarding portal to complete the Binky tenant-admin flow. That supplied the human @@ -302,19 +301,14 @@ window begins 2026-07-30; no retained state may be deleted under this task. ```task id: NK-WP-0022-T08 -status: done -needs_human: false +status: wait +needs_human: true decision_id: 5d8dcdb5-6d7b-463e-bb39-0a4737331403 +blocking_reason: "Explicit approval, rollback retention window expiry and one successful railiance01 restore/restart drill before destructive CoulombCore cleanup." priority: medium state_hub_task_id: "42a3b4c0-3481-5cfa-bdc2-66d05e751829" ``` -2026-10-11: founder confirmed coulombcore is needed for nothing; retire and reuse the machine. Evidence of the frozen old ArgoCD: railiance-platform docs/evidence/2026-10-11-coulombcore-argocd-frozen.md. The inter-hub-coulombcore bridge tunnel can be retired with the machine. - -2026-10-11: requalified — drill owner is Sol (blue lane). See the-custodian docs/decisions/2026-10-11-security-unblock-decisions.md (Round 3). - -2026-10-11: requalified — D4 batch approval, conditional on drill receipt and retention expiry. See the-custodian docs/decisions/2026-10-11-security-unblock-decisions.md. - After explicit approval, expiry of the rollback retention window, and one successful railiance01 restore/restart drill, remove the retired CoulombCore identity resources and stale DNS/monitoring/configuration. Record what was @@ -325,10 +319,11 @@ Done when railiance01 is the sole authoritative identity stack, all evidence is reconciled, and the workplan is marked finished. Retention minimum: 2026-08-29 has passed. The plan is no longer date-blocked. -The October11 D4 batch and Round4 decision below supply the destructive -approval; no repeated approval is required within that scope once its recovery -condition is met. Elapsed retention alone does not satisfy the required passing -railiance01 restore/restart receipt. +T08 remains blocked on a scoped retained-resource inventory, a successful +identity restore/restart receipt, and explicit destructive approval. +Elapsed retention alone does not authorize deletion or completion: T08 still +requires a successful railiance01 restore/restart drill and new explicit +approval for destructive deletion. 2026-10-03: human gate routed to hub decision 5d8dcdb5-6d7b-463e-bb39-0a4737331403 (D4: Destructive cleanup after retention expiry: CoulombCore remnants, railiance-master retention, live recipient removal) by CUST-WP-0075; resolving that decision raises C-40 here. @@ -349,69 +344,7 @@ ready. CoulombCore was not inspected in this review; do not infer that its retained resources have been deleted. Recheck the exact retained identity resources and backup custody before preparing the T08 deletion list. A generic platform-pg recovery drill is not a restore of LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA -with its encryption material, and identity database state. At that review, whole-host retirement -and other owners' workloads remained outside the identity-only deletion gate; -the October 11 founder decision subsequently authorized host retirement. +with its encryption material, and identity database state. Whole-host retirement +and other owners' workloads remain outside this identity-only deletion gate. Evidence and cross-plan priorities: [estate review](../history/2026-09-28-open-workplan-infrastructure-review.md). - -## Final retirement completion — 2026-10-15 - -Completed all eight tasks. The October 11 D4 batch approval and Round 4 founder -instruction authorize retirement of the otherwise unneeded CoulombCore host. -Retention expired August 29. The October 14 owner restart receipt reports -`reboot_comparison.passed=true`, exactly one reboot, unchanged database -identities and no new failing pods. Its SHA256 is -`6e41778472b4f6093614ecd51a2a0d7e7e19608a0885162764f1c605dbde7b2b`; -source: `railiance-platform/docs/evidence/2026-10-14-rpf-wp-0015-t03-reboot/post-reboot-preflight.json`. -This satisfies D4's passing restore/restart condition. The separate deferred -audit E2 in RPF-WP-0015-T03 is not a named D4 condition and remains open with -its owner. The initial review held this task while checking that distinction; -source review resolved it without inventing a new approval or identity restore. -The July isolated identity backup restore remains the identity recovery proof. - -Read-only SSH inventory identified the exact old host `92.205.130.254`, its -hostname and boot ID, 35 running containers and 18 retained PVC directories. -Verified the installed root-owned k3s uninstall/killall script digests before -execution. At 20:06–20:07 UTC, stopped and disabled k3s and ran the reviewed -installed uninstall script. All commands succeeded. This removed the retired -cluster, containers, local PVCs, databases, Secrets and cluster credential state. -No expired Kubernetes API access, certificate rotation or k3s restart was used. - -Independent postchecks confirm no k3s/containerd processes, no retired cluster -mounts, and absence of `/var/lib/rancher/k3s`, `/var/lib/kubelet`, -`/etc/rancher/k3s`, `/run/k3s`, the k3s binary and systemd unit. The host remains -SSH reachable. The obsolete `inter-hub-coulombcore` tunnel was stopped and -removed from the workstation bridge configuration; all five railiance01 tunnel -declarations remain present and connected. - -All six public identity names (`auth`, `login`, `lldap`, `pink`, `pink-account`, -`kc`) still resolve to `92.205.62.239`; HTTPS checks, including KeyCape OIDC -discovery, pass after retirement. Bao and Hub also resolve to railiance01. -Railiance01 is the sole authoritative identity stack. The independent encrypted -July identity backup set remains in railiance01 custody with mode0600 files; -no independent backup was deleted. Recovery now uses that protected backup -and the current owner recovery runbooks, rather than retained old cluster PVCs. -The metadata check does not claim a fresh full identity restore. - -Boundaries: this removed cluster state, not the provider OS or every host file; -it is not a secure full-disk erase. Machine reinstallation/reuse belongs to the -fleet phoenix work (`railiance-cluster/workplans/RCLUSTER-WP-0007-threephoenix-ha-cluster.md`). -The non-identity, retired `gitea.coulomb.social` DNS record still points to the -old address; its provider DNS cleanup remains with the forge/fleet owner, -outside the completed identity DNS cutover. No provider DNS credential lane -was identified, and no DNS deletion is claimed. Do not restore old k3s or -rotate its expired certificates to repurpose the machine. - -Evidence: [retirement preflight](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/retirement-preflight.json), -[host inventory](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-inventory.json), -[execution receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/host-cluster-retirement-result.json), -[independent host postcheck](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-host-verification.json), -[public identity postcheck](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/post-retirement-public-identity-checks.json), -[tunnel retirement](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/tunnel-retirement.json), -and [backup metadata](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-coulombcore-retirement/independent-backup-metadata.json). - -Knowledge orientation reloaded: Emergent Security 0.2.6, -digest `8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`, -withheld/orientation-only; actual owner decisions, recovery source and runtime -metadata were reviewed. Orientation does not confer execution authority. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md index ea0b21e..cb0af4d 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0027-reef-placement-reconciliation.md @@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ type: workplan title: "Reconcile reef placement and security-zone canon dependencies" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: backlog -flavor: residual +status: blocked +flavor: planning owner: net-kingdom topic_slug: netkingdom planning_priority: P1 created: "2026-08-19" -updated: "2026-10-15" +updated: "2026-10-03" state_hub_workstream_id: "965ad365-6b81-50a1-a2a3-2d0c1fcce0b4" --- @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ the critical path. ```task id: NK-WP-0027-T02 -status: todo +status: wait blocked_on: message-from:repo-manager blocking_reason: "Requires repo-manager acceptance of the reef provider carrier/schema, then railiance-infra authored ceilings, conditions and evidence in the authoritative reef declaration." priority: medium @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ reef-vocabulary decision on its behalf. ```task id: NK-WP-0027-T03 -status: todo +status: wait depends_on: [NK-WP-0027-T02] blocking_reason: "Mechanical join of reef ceilings to consumer V declarations waits on T02." priority: low @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ windows; tests cover missing identity and a valid operational workload. ```task id: NK-WP-0027-T06 -status: todo +status: wait blocked_on: message-from:info-tech-canon blocking_reason: "Requires InfoTechCanon ruling on public disclosure classification versus synthetic provenance, then ops-warden authoritative dataclass_floor mapping and tests; no public-to-synthetic alias." priority: high @@ -240,11 +240,9 @@ is externally owned: 3. `info-tech-canon` rules the `public`/synthetic relationship, after which ops-warden can update `dataclass_floor` (T06). -The workplan is deliberately `backlog` following the October 15 owner -prioritization below. The three open tasks are deferred as `todo`, with their owner dependencies -preserved. Their completion is not required for current operations. State Hub -treats `wait` as active work and would otherwise promote this plan back to -`active`; `todo` records the intended dormant backlog state. +The workplan is `blocked` rather than left nominally active with every open task +at `wait`. No human intervention is required yet; owner responses are the +ordinary next input. ## Related @@ -266,77 +264,12 @@ The current `reef-railiance/declarations/reef.yaml` still has no that substrate owner alongside repo-manager (carrier/schema) in T02. The live cluster has one Ready node; all eight CNPG clusters report one instance. This supports retaining the single-failure-domain constraint, not assigning a new -V level from replica counts. At that review, T02/T03 stayed `wait`; the October 15 backlog decision -subsequently deferred them as `todo`. +V level from replica counts. T02/T03 stay `wait`. InfoTechCanon Data Model §11.23 explicitly lists `public`; ops-warden `registry/policy/security-posture.yaml` still has no public maturity floor. The missing artifact is an owner-agreed mapping separating disclosure class -from synthetic provenance, not proof that public exists. At that review T06 stayed `wait`; +from synthetic provenance, not proof that public exists. T06 stays `wait`; no `public -> synthetic` alias or guessed M1 floor is permitted. Evidence and cross-plan priorities: [estate review](../history/2026-09-28-open-workplan-infrastructure-review.md). - -> 2026-10-11: demoted to `flavor: residual` / `backlog` by founder-authorized triage — off the -> critical path (identity → authz → secrets → SecurityCase execution). Tasks are unchanged; -> promote back when demand or risk appears. See the-custodian -> `history/20261011-netkingdom-security-progress-assessment.md`. - - -## Resumption approach — 2026-10-15 - -Owner requested that this work remain in backlog after reviewing its value. -From NetKingdom's point of view, the benefit is reliable policy input: a -workload's availability claim must respect the substrate's evidenced ceiling, -and disclosure classification must have an explicit maturity mapping. This -work improves the accuracy of declarations and policy decisions; it does not -itself add redundancy or improve uptime. For the current small team, pursue -it when a concrete consumer needs the result rather than for declaration -coverage alone. - -**Resume when** a named deployment-admission or credential-policy consumer -will use reef ceilings or the public-data maturity floor, or a concrete risk -review identifies an overstated availability claim that needs mechanical -prevention. Record the consumer, the decision it needs to make, its responsible -owner, and the acceptance example before promoting the plan. Do not infer -renewed demand merely from the presence of unfinished tasks. - -**Start from the existing proposal**, `docs/reef-posture-provider-contract.md`, -and recheck current owner sources. On October 15, the authoritative -`reef-railiance/declarations/reef.yaml` still has no `posture_provider` block; -InfoTechCanon's Data Model includes `public`, while ops-warden's -`registry/policy/security-posture.yaml` still has no public maturity floor. -These source checks establish the outstanding artifacts, not owner acceptance -of the proposal or a fresh runtime topology measurement. - -Use this sequence when picking the work up: - -1. **Settle the reef contract (T02).** Prepare a concrete schema/declaration - change with repo-manager and railiance-infra. Repo-manager accepts the - authoritative carrier and field names; railiance-infra owns the ceiling, - consumer conditions, current evidence and review dates. Treat the proposed - V0 available / V1 maximum as a starting proposal requiring current owner - evidence. Record acceptance in owner source before adopting the contract. -2. **Implement and exercise the join (T03).** NetKingdom owns posture semantics - and the reconciler. Resolve placement from authoritative declarations, - compose availability across synchronous providers, and preserve - `satisfied`, `unsatisfied` and `unknown`. Test claims above the ceiling, - missing or stale evidence, and unmet recovery conditions. Exercise the - accepted contract against the named consumer and retain reproducible - declaration revisions and results before marking this task done. -3. **Resolve classification and map it (T06).** Obtain InfoTechCanon's recorded - ruling separating public disclosure from synthetic provenance. Then have - ops-warden adopt the authoritative maturity mapping and test its consumer - behavior. The existing `public -> M1` suggestion remains a proposal; - do not alias public to synthetic or silently guess a floor. -4. **Close on owner artifacts and consumer evidence.** Reconcile all three - tasks against the accepted declarations, implementation and tests; update - source statuses and run `statehub fix-consistency --repo net-kingdom`. - Mark the plan finished only when those artifacts exist. - -The reef and classification owner discussions can proceed independently once -work is resumed. No cluster expansion is a prerequisite: the first useful -result may correctly document and enforce the existing single-domain limit. -Any subsequent runtime or admission-policy activation must follow the named -consumer owner's rollout contract. Until then, unresolved facts remain -`unknown`; backlog status supplies no new policy exception or permission. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md index 4cda818..b216cfe 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0031-deterministic-posture-feedback.md @@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ type: workplan title: "Implement deterministic posture and evidence feedback" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -flavor: residual +status: blocked +flavor: implementation owner: codex topic_slug: netkingdom planning_priority: P1 created: "2026-08-23" -updated: "2026-10-15" +updated: "2026-10-03" state_hub_workstream_id: "9d7b04f9-3803-5613-b7a5-8bd606c77f5a" --- @@ -75,7 +75,9 @@ portable source identity. ```task id: NK-WP-0031-T04 -status: done +status: wait +blocked_on: message-from:audit-core +blocking_reason: "audit-core tenancy.yaml must publish structured authoritative owner, observation/expiry and replacement-action metadata for WH-ENG-20260822-AUDIT-E2-03. Re-evaluate with explicit current as-of; later recovery prose does not renew E2." priority: high state_hub_task_id: "7d2029d2-db8d-526e-ab73-a0751becb193" ``` @@ -114,8 +116,8 @@ Verification on 2026-08-23: - the read-only seven-declaration baseline is recorded in `history/2026-08-23-posture-feedback-estate-baseline.md`. -Local implementation was complete on 2026-08-23. T04 adoption completed -2026-10-15; see the closure evidence below. +Local implementation is complete. The workplan remains blocked only on T04's +externally owned audit-core declaration adoption. ## Infrastructure review — 2026-09-28 @@ -133,49 +135,3 @@ The audit-core owner should reconcile that rationale against actual caller bindings and policy evidence; deployment flags alone do not prove a new A level. Evidence and cross-plan priorities: [estate review](../history/2026-09-28-open-workplan-infrastructure-review.md). - -> 2026-10-11: demoted to `flavor: residual` / `backlog` by founder-authorized triage — off the -> critical path (identity → authz → secrets → SecurityCase execution). Tasks are unchanged; -> promote back when demand or risk appears. See the-custodian -> `history/20261011-netkingdom-security-progress-assessment.md`. - - -## Adoption and closure — 2026-10-15 - -Founder resumed this workplan after the October 11 triage. All five tasks are -now done. Audit-core's authoritative `tenancy.yaml` publishes its responsible -repository plus `evidence_freshness.E2` with observation, original expiry, -bounded scope, target image digest and replacement action. Source adoption is -recorded in `audit-core/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-15.md`. - -The observation and expiry come from the existing August 22 target receipt -and declaration: `2026-08-22T22:10:25Z` and `2026-08-23T22:10:25Z`. -No evidence was renewed from prose or September recovery exercises. The -posture levels, review dates and evidence references are unchanged. - -At explicit `--as-of 2026-10-15T17:27:15Z`, the evaluator changes E2 from -unknown freshness/owner to **expired**, owned by **audit-core**, with the -exact declared replacement action. The existing overdue posture review also -routes to audit-core. All ten findings now have an explicit owner; two high -findings and eight declared gaps remain visible. `--fail-on high` returns -1 as intended; proposal-only reporting does not mutate declarations or policy. - -Verification: **28 focused tests passed**, source schema/semantic validation -passed, repeated current-time reports were byte-identical, and source -comparison proves that only the new owner/freshness fields changed. Receipt -and report digests are recorded in the -[adoption evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/adoption.json), -with [before](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/before.json) -and [after](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-posture-feedback-adoption/after.json) reports. - -Fresh E2 production is not part of this completed adoption increment. The -existing live owner work record **AUDIT-WP-0015-T02** remains waiting for -identity/engagement prerequisites and a separately approved new run. It is -not closed or authorized by these metadata changes. No live packets, secret -access, runtime changes or posture-level changes occurred. - -Security orientation: Emergent Knowledge 0.2.6, package digest -`8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`. -`start` and `evidence` were withheld/orientation-only because sources changed; -source cards, current repository instructions, security companion and original -owner evidence were reviewed directly. These receipts confer no live authority. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md index c174406..7b6ac35 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0035-emission-cadence-security-profile.md @@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ type: workplan title: "Publish the NetKingdom emission-cadence security profile" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: active +status: blocked flavor: implementation owner: codex topic_slug: netkingdom planning_priority: P1 created: "2026-09-04" -updated: "2026-10-23" +updated: "2026-10-03" related: - GH-DEC-2026-004 - canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md @@ -89,8 +89,9 @@ Python compilation and `git diff --check` pass. ```task id: NK-WP-0035-T04 status: wait +blocked_on: message-from:approval-engine +blocking_reason: "Approval Engine and Qonto owner declarations now pass the published schema and supplied-inventory profile; local-identity incompatibility is retained. Requires actual sender cadence mappings, lifecycle delivery/readback/reconciliation and Kings Guard operational feed evidence." priority: high -blocking_reason: "Elapsed-hour capture done 2026-10-15 (3 events, receiver readback captured). Readback run 2026-10-23: presence 3/3, counts refused 403 source_not_allowed (operator reader scoped to user-engine); audit-core cross-source count path implemented (d46e89e); waiting on the founder's audit-core release (AUDIT-WP-0013-T07) and the rerun, then King's Guard acceptance (KG-WP-0005-T03, wait) and QONTO-WP-0006-T03." state_hub_task_id: "e3fbc8b8-00d5-57ce-ba0c-19b58044c950" ``` @@ -219,277 +220,3 @@ Owner tests pass (Approval Engine169, Qonto90). These source checks remove the envelope migration blocker, while actual operating observer acceptance remains unproved. Existing synthetic native Approval Engine delivery/readback receipts are retained; do not request identical synthetic checks as missing evidence. - -> 2026-10-11: demoted to `flavor: residual` / `backlog` by founder-authorized triage — off the -> critical path (identity → authz → secrets → SecurityCase execution). Tasks are unchanged; -> promote back when demand or risk appears. See the-custodian -> `history/20261011-netkingdom-security-progress-assessment.md`. - - -## Resumed implementation — 2026-10-15 - -Founder requested this increment after NK-WP-0031. T04 remains wait; source -revalidation and the reachable observer repair do not satisfy the operational -acceptance gate or promote the proposed profile. - -Current source declarations were rechecked against the exact imported schema -SHA-256. Approval Engine and Qonto pass their explicit owner inventories; -local-identity still fails exactly its two rare-heartbeat obligations, without -a completeness claim. All **27 profile tests pass**. Reports: -[2026-10-15 source assessments](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/source-assessments.json). - -Found and repaired a real King's Guard observer defect: matching only the -shared heartbeat event type let one class's fresh beat mask another class's -silence. `StreamHeartbeat.covered_event_classes` now binds the observation to -its vouched-for classes. The Qonto adapter explicitly retains its source -mapping; unscoped/malformed coverage cannot manufacture a positive. A regression -first reproduced false COMPLETE on the prior code. This is source repair, -not a deployed feed or live acceptance. Full King’s Guard validation is -**128 passed**, with changed-file Ruff checks passing. Owner record: -`kings-guard/workplans/KG-WP-0005-qonto-source-cadence-admission.md` -(T02 source validation follow-up; T03 operational gate unchanged). - -Two stale requirements are corrected in the concrete -[owner acceptance plan](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/owner-acceptance-plan.json): -Audit Core already implements instance-filtered reconciliation in -AUDIT-WP-0013-T04, and its September 15 bearer-revocation receipt proves T1 -accepted then refused while the incumbent stayed accepted. Neither is absent; -the reviewed receiver release and actual lifecycle/window reconciliation -still need their own operational evidence. - -Approval Engine's requested 172800-second heartbeat registration receives -Audit Core's 1.5 grace, yielding 259200 seconds, not a 48-hour effective -alert. Requested source/receiver owner choice before live registration: -115200 seconds plus grace for an effective 48h bound, or the requested -172800 seconds plus grace for an effective 72h bound. No choice or approval -is inferred while that question is pending. - -Qonto has no implemented runtime collector in the reviewed package, only the -historical source capture. Its native admission still requires actual -collector/runtime pins and reviewed tenant/class/lag mapping under -AUDIT-WP-0013-T05, followed by KG-WP-0005-T03. A source fixture, direct log -capture or new Markdown declaration cannot supply this missing implementation. -No runtime, registry, credential or bank API operation was performed. - -Knowledge: Emergent 0.2.6, digest -`8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`; -start/evidence source guidance directly reviewed, withheld/orientation-only -receipt retained. This supplies no operational authority. - - -## Introduce a configurable ecosystem coordination frame - -```task -id: NK-WP-0035-T06 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "a6478470-5a9a-5805-b4f7-9ed3e6f01a2f" -``` - -Founder direction in this sitting supersedes the binary 48h/72h question: -long-term ecosystem coordination uses one configurable base frame, initially -**f=1h**, with waits of **2f** and **3f**. Decision: -`1ac5a70f-082e-4d8f-9ac8-59e4c175da02`. - -Authoritative config is `coordination-engine/config/coordination-frame.json`. -The coordination-engine API validates it and derives durations / deadlines. -NetKingdom's compiler derives source declarations, consumer Python defaults, -Approval Engine's deployment heartbeat argument, Qonto's deployment environment -setting, and the proposed receiver metadata, retaining the frame digest. -Heartbeat is f=3600s; registered wait is 2f=7200s; the receiver's 1.5 grace -makes the effective deadline 3f=10800s. The formulas also reproduce the old -24h/48h/72h cadence when f is set to 24h. - -This is source-level adoption of the setting, not proof that the deployed -processes have changed pace or that every ecosystem timer has adopted it. -Runtime release/registry receipts remain T04. Credential and approval validity, -worker leases and transport retry timers are separate owner contracts. -[Configuration and regeneration](../tools/coordination-frame/README.md). - - -T06 source acceptance: **73 coordination-engine tests passed, one live test -skipped; 32 compiler/profile tests; 271 Approval Engine; 91 Qonto; 25 package; -128 King's Guard tests passed**. The compiler's --check has no drift. Changing -f to 10 minutes or 24 hours in isolated test workspaces rescales source, -receiver and observer bindings together. Prepared manifests preserve image, -identity, secret, routing and scaling fields apart from the timing values and -frame-digest annotations. [Frame validation](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/coordination-frame-validation.json). - -The earlier 48h/72h question is resolved by the explicit configurable-frame -decision. No further deadline selection is waiting on the founder. T04 still -requires receiver registration, missing Qonto collector/admission, -and operational lifecycle/observer acceptance. The profile remains proposed; -this workplan is now **5/6 source tasks done**, with T04's operational gate open. - - -## Approved hourly runtime rollout — 2026-10-15 - -Founder explicitly approved the prepared timing-only rollout. Cluster UID and -resource UID/resourceVersion guards matched the reviewed preflight. Both -immutable images, identity/secret references and resource/scaling limits were -preserved. No receiver registry, credential or bank API operation was performed. - -Approval Engine's online backup passed integrity and isolated owner-engine -verification, with an independent mode-0600 local copy retained outside Git. -The sole pod was replaced under its OnDelete strategy. New pod -`423398d8-9705-4ab5-8b2d-aaa4f590d3a1` is Ready with heartbeat 3600s; -schema v5 integrity and approval/entry counts are preserved. Readiness returns -200, anonymous observation is refused with 401, and the new heartbeat drained -with zero pending outbox rows. [Backup](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-frame-backup.json) -and [runtime receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/approval-engine-frame-rollout.json). - -Qonto candidate `rapp-qonto-00010` carried the hourly setting while all traffic -stayed pinned to `rapp-qonto-00009`. Startup heartbeat, health, an intentionally -denied request (403 without a Qonto call), and same-instance source counts -versus direct log capture passed. Candidate was then promoted to 100 percent; -the main route passed health and the same denial/count checks. Temporary -probe pods were removed. [Candidate](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-candidate.json) -and [promoted runtime](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/rapp-qonto-frame-rollout.json). - -These are runtime setting and immediate delivery receipts, not an elapsed-hour -periodic observation or independent collector acceptance. Qonto retains its -existing scale-to-zero setting. Receiver registration of 2f=7200s / effective -3f=10800s is still proposed, not deployed. Actual collector/sender admission, -lifecycle reconciliation and independent silence/lag findings remain T04; -local-identity's explicit incompatibility remains. Profile stays proposed and -the workplan stays 5/6 done. - - -## Receiver registration and operational setup — 2026-10-15 - -Founder explicitly approved the complete reviewed live packet as platform -operator and owner of Audit Core, rapp-qonto and qonto-assistant. Workers -implemented the missing durable collector, guarded credential-preserving -registry update, exact-path CCR0047 projection and independent capture/readback -seams. Source verification: Audit Core **333 passed including PostgreSQL**, -King's Guard **144 passed**, collector/capture package **51 passed**, platform -custody/readback **20 focused tests passed**. All three released images scanned -zero HIGH/CRITICAL findings. Source tests do not substitute for native receipts. - -Approval Engine is now on scanned source a786b06/image16e5d222…, schema6, -with a fresh verified online backup, independent mode0600 copy, isolated -migration proof and unchanged 54 approval/47 entry counts. Audit Core is on -source5227fb1/imageb479801b…, additive migration0007, after a new completed -Barman backup. Initial migration attempts exposed absent migration DNS/database -egress after the receiver policy had been narrowed; a dedicated migration-only -DNS/platform-pg5432 policy repaired it. Successful r3 migration preceded the -receiver replacement; native readiness/cadence/instance support passed. - -The first attended command refused an inherited OPENBAO_TOKEN variable before -writing a receipt; its session was revoked. A fresh contained login with all -three ambient token aliases removed completed successfully. Protected registry -CAS advanced **15→16**, preserving incumbent credentials and sibling entries. -Approval Engine now carries its exact declaration and all four class waits7200s -(effective10800s). CCR0047 independently generated the Qonto collector's exact -source/tenant writer bearer, delivered via its namespace-restricted ESO lane. -Reader path/identity/agent-deny negatives and revocation passed; complete ESO -projection and running receiver registry agreed after reload. Warden exit0 -confirms session revocation and helper cleanup. -[Registry/custody receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-custody-live.json). - -The scanned collector image82bfd410… is deployed with its own service account, -namespace-only pod/log reads, exact Kubernetes API egress, audit-core-only -receiver egress and 1Gi durable outbox. It has no bank Secret mount. A real -startup heartbeat and denied request were accepted202; duplicate200, -wrong-source400, wrong-tenant400, read403 and invalid-bearer401 passed. Source -own reconciliation reports heartbeat1/deny1, pending0. Controlled collector -replacement preserved original first202 receipts through the same PVC. -[Admission](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-native-admission.json) -and [restart persistence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/qonto-collector-restart-persistence.json). - -The bounded hourly observation Job started **19:36:07UTC /21:36:07Berlin**; -expected finish is approximately **20:37UTC /22:37Berlin**. Health-only polling -keeps this one source instance alive while retaining normal scale-to-zero -configuration. Its only finance-route request is intentionally denied before -any bank call. Read-only capture monitoring automatically retains exact-instance -source JSONL/snapshots, durable collector receipts and observed pod inventory. -The requested commit/sync checkpoint retains an immutable pending-state snapshot -with 89 actual inventory observations at -[observation checkpoint](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/checkpoint-20261015-1945/checkpoint.json). -The live monitor continues writing separately; this checkpoint is not acceptance. -After elapsed capture, the separately implemented owner readback requires a -fresh attended login; King's Guard then verifies accepted counts, sequence, -coverage and lag. Approval Engine's four native class beats and actual source -outbox coordinates are retained/checked in this acceptance phase. Do not invent -an elapsed-hour or three-hour silence result from test timestamps. - -T04 stays **progress**, plan active5/6, profile proposed. Receiver registration -and collector implementation are no longer missing. Remaining work is actual -elapsed-time capture, independent source/receiver correlation and observer -acceptance. Local-identity remains explicitly incompatible, with no completeness -claim. Detailed state: [owner acceptance plan](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/owner-acceptance-plan.json). - -2026-10-23 checkpoint. The bounded hourly observation finished. The read-only -monitor ([hourly-observation-monitor.json](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/hourly-observation-monitor.json)) -reports helper exit 0 after 60 attempts at 20:37:22Z. It captured three -qonto-assistant events for stream instance `b351fa6b…` (tenant -`tenant:friendly:binky`, window 19:36:16Z..20:37:23Z), with their receiver event -IDs, in `hourly-observation-capture/`. Its status is -`captured_pending_independent_receiver`. Owner status today: AUDIT-WP-0013-T03..T05 -done, KG-WP-0005-T03 wait, QONTO-WP-0006-T03 progress. T04 moves to **wait**. -The next step needs a human: an independent receiver readback under a fresh -attended operator OIDC login. King's Guard then compares counts, sequence, -coverage and lag. This capture is not acceptance, and the profile stays proposed. - -2026-10-23: the readback is now one attended command. The helper -`tools/emission-cadence-profile/receiver_readback.py` (6 synthetic tests) reads -the retained capture's `receiver_readback` request. It asks audit-core -`/v1/reconciliation` (same source, tenant, window and instance) and -`/v1/events/` for each of the three IDs, under the operator's own 0600 token -file. It writes a value-safe `agree`/`diverge` receipt without payloads or the -token. A class-name mapping difference between source and receiver shows up as -`diverge`; it is never hidden. The operator runs it through their own -port-forward. The receipt then goes to King's Guard (KG-WP-0005-T03) and -qonto-assistant (QONTO-WP-0006-T03). - -2026-10-23: the readback was run attended by the founder (fresh KeyCape OIDC/MFA login to OpenBao, -role platform-admin, through port-forward; token in a 0600 temp file, deleted afterwards, OpenBao -session revoked). [Receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-cadence-adoption/receiver-readback-20261023.json): -verdict `diverge` with one finding, `reconciliation returned 403: source_not_allowed`. -Event presence is 3/3, with source and tenant matching. Counts were not obtained: audit-core -`/v1/reconciliation` admits only an identity's own sources (`permits_source`), and the -operator reader is registered for `user-engine`. This is an authorization-scope result, not a -data mismatch. audit-core's own routing comment ("cross-source counts stay behind -may_read") reads the other way, so the question went to audit-core: either permit cross-source -counts for a full-scope may_read reader, or name the sanctioned independent counting path. -Rerun the same helper once that is answered. The receipt still goes to King's Guard as -presence-only evidence. T04 stays wait. - -2026-10-28: audit-core answered (audit-core `d46e89e`, AUDIT-WP-0013-T06 done): a full-scope -`may_read` reader (`tenants: ["*"]`) may now count another source's window on -`/v1/reconciliation`; cross-source answers carry `basis: "independent_reader"`. The helper -records `receiver_basis` and treats a 200 without that basis as `diverge`. Next: the founder -releases the audit-core image (AUDIT-WP-0013-T07: `make image-publish`, pin digest, dry run, -apply, rollout), checks `GET /v1/stats` returns 200 under the operator reader token, then reruns -the same readback. An `agree` receipt goes to King's Guard (KG-WP-0005-T03) and qonto-assistant. - -## Automate staged receiver derivation without sibling mutations - -```task -id: NK-WP-0035-T07 -status: done -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "6eedb1ed-4897-50c6-bdb2-9859dc7df3b1" -``` - -Completed source/fixture work 2026-10-19 for CUST-WP-0079-T05. The existing -coordination-frame compiler now has a receiver-only mode, and its staged -adapter compiles indexed NetKingdom renderer, coordination-engine frame/API and -approval-engine cadence inputs in an isolated temporary snapshot. Only the -local proposed receiver is written/staged. Dedicated Make targets and the -existing shared opt-in pre-commit recipe invoke this path; authored sibling -files and unstaged source edits are untouched. Missing/conflicted/nonregular -inputs, an unstaged receiver/adapter, changed input snapshots and required -alternate-index mutations refuse. The existing guard/scanner remain intact. - -Eleven focused tests pass, including partial source staging, namespaced sibling -index isolation, receiver edit preservation and alternate-index refusal. -The first alternate-index test found that Git's default index query itself -honored GIT_INDEX_FILE; corrected the query and retained its regression. This -is a refined implementation, not an unchanged execution-success claim. - -T06 retains ownership of the full multi-consumer frame compiler. T07 owns only -the staged local receiver automation introduced here. T04 retains registry, -collector and operational lifecycle/observer acceptance; neither this task nor -its tests claim runtime activation or a clean week of fleet commit history. -See tools/coordination-frame/README.md for commands and source boundaries. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md index 3e954f1..a787439 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0040-execution-attribution-receipt.md @@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ type: workplan title: "Define an execution-attribution receipt for Railiance runs" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: active -flavor: residual +status: blocked +flavor: planning owner: claude-code topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-09-23" -updated: "2026-10-10" +updated: "2026-10-03" related: [RCLK-WP-0002] state_hub_workstream_id: "e2533f3a-aa43-59b3-bff3-8e64b6149487" --- @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ schema, and validator are explicitly left to T02. ```task id: NK-WP-0040-T02 status: wait -blocked_on: founder-decision -blocking_reason: "Emitter, holder and wire binding agreed (RAIL-HO-WP-0015-T01, RPF-WP-0067-T01, AUDIT-WP-0014-T01). Open: founder decision on how an operator-run process gets the audit-core sender bearer; NetKingdom schema/validator with delegation unknown and S1 meanings for tenant/environment/artifact_digest." +blocked_on: message-from:audit-core +blocking_reason: "Requires audit-core/Railiance owner agreement on emitter, evidence holder and receipt fields before local schema/validator implementation; then actual emission/readback and invalid attribution/clock/unknown-case evidence." priority: medium state_hub_task_id: "963120c1-7c72-5806-942b-6f49e4c66e54" ``` @@ -78,35 +78,6 @@ agreement) and Railiance (emitter confirmation) via State Hub messages validator once both reply; nothing here can be finished unilaterally without pre-empting their agreement. -**2026-10-28:** railiance-platform answered from source (RPF-WP-0067-T01, `bd8ca57`): it runs no -playbooks, so it is not the emitter; the contract's reference declaration is railiance-infra's -S1 Ansible `bootstrap-host`. Wire binding to reuse: `POST /v1/events` to audit-core with an -`Idempotency-Key` equal to the envelope id, `correlation_id` = run id, a per-sender bearer from -`platform/workloads/audit-core/senders` delivered by ESO, envelope `source` = sender name, no -per-message signature. Recommended emission: every terminal outcome keyed by `run_id`. Not -truthfully fillable today: `initiator.iss/sub` and `delegation` (shell-started runs carry no -token), `executing_workload` (workload binding only proposed), `artifact_digest` (Ansible has -no packaged artifact), `decision_refs`, `time_interval.bound`. Next: railiance-infra names the -runner and emitter; a sender credential then goes to railiance-platform as a change request. - -**2026-10-28 (railiance-infra):** answered from source (RAIL-HO-WP-0015-T01, `babae80`). No S1 -runner exists: the operator runs `ansible-playbook` through `make converge` (`Makefile:361-362`) -with no callback or wrapper. Decided: the emitter is a new railiance-infra converge wrapper -modelled on `scripts/s1_handoff.py` (RAIL-HO-WP-0015-T02, not built): UUID4 `run_id` first, -emission from a `finally` path for succeeded/failed/refused/interrupted, local retention and -retry with `run_id` as Idempotency-Key. Proposed audit-core sender: `railiance-infra-s1-runner`. -Fillable today: `run_id`, `target`, `action`, `time_interval.start/end`, `source_commit` (only -with a clean-tree refusal); partly `runtime_principal` (OS accounts) and `clock_source`; not -`initiator`, `delegation`, `executing_workload`, `tenant`, `environment`, `artifact_digest`, -`decision_refs`, `time_interval.bound`. - -Remaining for T02: (1) founder decision: how an operator-run shell process obtains the sender -bearer (the ESO-projected Secret reaches pods only), e.g. a short-lived OpenBao fetch or an -in-cluster relay; then railiance-platform registers the sender. (2) NetKingdom: the receipt -schema allows an explicit `unknown` for `delegation` (the draft permits absence only when there -was no delegation) and defines `tenant`, `environment` and `artifact_digest` for an Ansible S1 -run; then schema under `canon/schemas/` and validator. railiance-infra's wrapper waits on both. - ## Infrastructure review — 2026-09-28 Use accepted IAM Profile v0.3 and Playbook Capability Contract v0.1 as the @@ -123,20 +94,3 @@ readback, plus invalid/missing attribution cases; schema validation alone cannot establish end-to-end attribution. Evidence and cross-plan priorities: [estate review](../history/2026-09-28-open-workplan-infrastructure-review.md). - -2026-10-10 consolidation review: AUDIT-WP-0014-T01 (October 4) accepts -audit-core evidence custody and publishes field/unknown/absence/envelope -requirements in audit-core/docs/cross-repo-evidence-admission.md. The custody -reply is delivered; a stranded message-from:audit-core qualifier is obsolete. -Railiance emitter agreement is still required: retain original request -4f1c67bc-8de2-483f-bcac-dbdf107ce95a and identify the exact component/source, -run-id/idempotency, tenant/scope and wire binding with the Railiance owner. -T02 remains wait. Its existing both-owner agreement gate still governs schema -implementation; draft preparation is not owner acceptance. AUDIT-WP-0014-T02 -consumes the eventual canonical schema/fixtures and emitter binding, and cannot -be used as evidence that either has already arrived. - -> 2026-10-11: demoted to `flavor: residual` / `backlog` by founder-authorized triage — off the -> critical path (identity → authz → secrets → SecurityCase execution). Tasks are unchanged; -> promote back when demand or risk appears. See the-custodian -> `history/20261011-netkingdom-security-progress-assessment.md`. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md index 71856e4..ba36ab7 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0042-workload-mfa-step-up.md @@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ type: workplan title: "Let workloads require MFA for all or part of their features" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: finished +status: blocked flavor: planning owner: claude-code topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-09-23" -updated: "2026-10-10" +updated: "2026-10-03" related: [NK-ADR-0016, NK-WP-0037] state_hub_workstream_id: "3f702215-704b-5788-8ca0-b8b9ba2dd3f8" --- @@ -56,9 +56,11 @@ explicitly. ```task id: NK-WP-0042-T02 -status: cancel -needs_human: false -closure_reason: "Duplicate attended acceptance consolidated into existing USER-WP-0027-T04 and USER-WP-0028-T03; decision cef97ccd remains open there. Demand-deferred workload-requested interoperability retained in residual NET-IN-0003." +status: wait +needs_human: true +decision_id: cef97ccd-4ee7-40fe-859e-1df9c9360ecb +blocked_on: message-from:user-engine +blocking_reason: "Agree the MFA-required user experience with user-engine and one pilot workload; must be accepted from a user's perspective." priority: medium state_hub_task_id: "4e51585d-2b57-56d4-84c1-314041d26bcf" ``` @@ -89,63 +91,6 @@ by user-engine, so `blocked_on: message-from:user-engine` stays real, and the founder's acceptance under decision cef97ccd stays the human gate. The reply reminds user-engine of `892fd489`. -2026-10-09: user-engine answered `892fd489` (message `a459e8a6`), as a proposal; -the pilot choice and the AAL2 switch-on stay founder decisions: - -- Pilot workload: `coulomb-social` (the current registration/onboarding client, - owner of application action step-up). One non-privileged feature behind - `acr_values=aal2`. Precedent: the user-engine portal's administration step-up - ("Verify with MFA" -> `/login?recovery=1&return_path=...`, P06 recent-MFA - guard, deployed). -- Refusal shape: inline enrollment detour at the issuer; factor screens stay on - the IdP and user-engine never collects an OTP or reads a seed. Fallback on an - `mfa_required`-class refusal: link to the public user-engine `/security` - page. Return means the workload re-requests with `acr_values`; a return URL is - never proof of enrollment. -- U06 touchpoints reused: `/security`; My account -> Sign-in security -> - provider management (`USER_ENGINE_MFA_MANAGEMENT_URL`, deliberately unset - until attended KEY-WP-0035 self-service checks pass); U07 lost device and U08 - replace/remove (replacement verified before removal, no bypass link; P04 - operator-assisted recovery); P06 policy preview/rollback so switching on does - not lock out unenrolled users. -- Constraint: user-engine's attended real-factor U05-U08 run - (USER-WP-0027-T03 / USER-WP-0028-T03) is pending, and route - `net-kingdom-privacyidea-admin-token` is still `resolvable: false` - (railiance-platform). user-engine proposes running the pilot's - user-perspective acceptance in that same attended session (enrollment detour - -> return -> lost-factor recovery, end to end once). - -NetKingdom's reading: the proposal fits the T01 contract (issuer owns factor -screens, workload enforces issued assurance, return is not evidence). The -message dependency is cleared; T02 stays `wait` on the founder under decision -cef97ccd: choose the pilot, then accept the journey in the combined attended -session. Note that coulomb.social fits oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0 only partly -(NK-WP-0048 README fit table), so the pilot's KeyCape `acr_values` handling is -checked on its existing registration. - -2026-10-09: founder decision, relayed by user-engine (message `60673e40`; -recorded in user-engine `docs/mfa-pilot-decision.md`): - -1. Pilot workload: `coulomb-social`. -2. MFA stays in NetKingdom infrastructure: enrollment, verification, - replacement, recovery and MFA-required policy live with KeyCape/issuer plus - the provider factor and user-engine (`/security`, P04, P06). coulomb-social - stays a plain OIDC relying party with no factor, enrollment, recovery or MFA - policy code. -3. MFA is optional for coulomb-social users: password-only stays valid (U05), - enrollment is voluntary via U06, and the issuer enforces the factor once a - user has enrolled (U07). No `acr_values=aal2` switch-on now. -4. Admin-required MFA for coulomb-social users is deferred and not urgent; when - wanted, it is an issuer-side client policy applied through the NetKingdom - admin surface (P06 preview/apply/rollback), with a separate founder go. - -Consequence for this plan: the pilot proves the optional-after-enrollment -journey, not workload-requested step-up. The T01 `acr_values` contract stays -valid but unexercised by this pilot. Not settled: decision `cef97ccd` stays -open for user-perspective acceptance, which runs in user-engine's attended -U05-U08 session (USER-WP-0027-T04 / USER-WP-0028-T03) with a coulomb-social -user. T02 stays `wait` on that session. - ## Infrastructure review — 2026-09-28 Build T02 on the already completed USER-WP-0033 and KEY-WP-0035 P06 work. @@ -165,29 +110,3 @@ actual-user acceptance, coordinated with KEY-WP-0034 / USER-WP-0028 / VERGABE-WP-0019, without reopening their completed provider work. Evidence and cross-plan priorities: [estate review](../history/2026-09-28-open-workplan-infrastructure-review.md). - -## 2026-10-10 — Consolidated planning closure - -This planning workplan is finished for its delivered contract proposal and -policy/pilot agreement; it does not claim a working arbitrary-client step-up -capability or accepted real-user MFA journey. T01 produced proposed IAM v0.4 -while v0.3 remains normative. The founder's October 9 decision explicitly -selected optional MFA on coulomb-social, issuer/provider-held MFA mechanics -and no current acr_values=aal2 switch-on (user-engine/docs/mfa-pilot-decision.md; -owner relay 60673e40). - -T02's remaining attended acceptance was already owned by live -USER-WP-0027-T04 and USER-WP-0028-T03 with the same decision cef97ccd. -user-engine/docs/mfa-attended-run.md now specifies the actual U05-U08 run -with tegwick, the approved client, the already-live management handoff, the -verification and evidence rules. USER-WP-0028 records founder approval of -tegwick/coulomb-social and the live handoff reply 7ee2459e on October 10. -T02 is cancelled only as a duplicate local acceptance gate: those existing -owners and decision remain open until observed acceptance. No MFA or browser -check has been marked complete. - -Future workload-requested step-up interoperability (no-factor refusal, -enrollment return, stale AAL1 and provider outage) remains demand-deferred -under NET-IN-0003, origin residual / origin_ref NK-WP-0042, rather than -disappearing into closure prose. Do not implement that residual without -promotion and a separately approved client policy/rollout. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md index 56cdc6b..78530a6 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0046-secrets-engine-openbao-client-registration.md @@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ type: workplan title: "Deployment-owned registration of the secrets-engine-openbao KeyCape client" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: finished +status: active flavor: implementation owner: claude-code topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-10-06" -updated: "2026-10-09" +updated: "2026-10-06" related: [KEY-WP-0037, RPF-WP-0035] state_hub_workstream_id: "1de95344-8a72-5797-93e5-6c1038c03b01" --- @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ image `sha256:6f79a2af…c496b8` (KeyCape source 1164f65). No image change. ```task id: NK-WP-0046-T03 -status: done +status: wait priority: high needs_human: true decision_id: caafe4be-4f68-47b4-9567-316d47b94992 @@ -81,12 +81,3 @@ observed uid/resourceVersion, restart, then hand to KEY-WP-0037-T04 for native issuance, wrong-secret/excess-scope denial and existing human-login checks. Rollback: `--operation remove`, restart, remove the env binding. Fold the binding into `deployment.yaml` in the same change that records the go. - -**Done 2026-10-07 under live go `caafe4be`.** The env binding was patched first -(9 to 10 env names, server dry run first), then the exact-match apply ran. -`sso/keycape-config` went from resourceVersion 71471711 to 71655453 (uid 2e94519d…), -`changed: true`, `unrelated_config_bytes_preserved: true`, `values_emitted: false`. -KeyCape restarted and rolled out on image `sha256:6f79a2af…`. The binding is folded -into `deployment.yaml`. Live issuance checks are KEY-WP-0037-T04. - -2026-10-09: all tasks done; finished. Live issuance checks remain with key-cape (KEY-WP-0037-T04). diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md index bdb3c73..a121bfe 100644 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md +++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0047-platform-password-reset-mail.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan title: "Deliver password-reset mail from platform mailbox" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom -status: finished +status: active owner: codex topic_slug: net-kingdom created: "2026-10-06" @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Depends on RPF-WP-0052/CCR-2026-0035 and founder exact go. Apply admission resou ```task id: NK-WP-0047-T03 -status: done +status: wait priority: high state_hub_task_id: "0dd88024-d2ce-5e31-b8ab-1c6091516105" ``` @@ -81,15 +81,3 @@ returns500 after authentication; coulomb-social and owning RAPPS-WP-0015 traced a stale app user-service URL and deployed the correction as Helm revision11. T03 stays wait for successful end-to-end app sign-in; do not infer failure of SMTP delivery from the separate application callback failure. - -## Final personal acceptance — 2026-10-06 - -User confirmed fresh reset-email receipt, then after revision11 URL correction -confirmed: “I reach my workspace.” Personal sign-in acceptance is complete. -No password/reset token/private protocol was requested or recorded. - -Residual handoff before closure: shared notifications, platform-inbox/reply -operations and communication usecase regressions remain live tasks -CSOC-WP-0010-T04/T05/T06. ReichelAg product/data/restore review remains live -CSOC-WP-0008-T01/T02/T03/T09. Native password-reset SMTP and personal-login -acceptance required by this owner workplan are complete. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md deleted file mode 100644 index 106173c..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1998 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0048 -type: workplan -title: "Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: blocked -flavor: implementation -owner: claude-code -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-08" -updated: "2026-10-28" -depends_on: [] -related_repos: - - ops-mason - - ops-warden - - key-cape - - railiance-platform - - informed-decision -state_hub_workstream_id: "e31f3f9d-0748-5137-b0a3-7b3ca46a66eb" ---- - -# NK-WP-0048 - Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light - -> **Blocked 2026-10-28** (founder triage): every in-progress task waits on the coordinator's r7 -> review after the F3 fix (T34 / RAPPS-WP-0016-T05) and on owner selections. Return to `active` -> when r7 or the F3 fix lands. - -## Why - -The founder's direction (2026-10-08): setting up a security integration of a -kind that has been done before should be easy, meaning accept the case, then -ops-mason arranges it and ops-warden follows through. Setting up a new kind -needs ample documentation and tests and an informed-decision, because its shape -is part of the security architecture. - -Today every integration is hand-built: per-client helper scripts, per-lane -custody, founder checklists. The trigger was KEY-WP-0038 (Forgejo as an OIDC -client), whose next step was going to be yet another hand-written rollout -script. - -This plan continues the pattern work of NK-WP-0008 (pattern infospace), -NK-WP-0009 (tutorials) and NK-WP-0030 (scenario composition). It turns patterns -into **SecurityCaseTypes** that ops-mason and ops-warden can execute. Canon: -`canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md` (proposed). - -Companion plans: ops-mason `MASON-WP-0010` (materialization) and ops-warden -`WARDEN-WP-0044` (follow-through). - -## Tasks - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T01 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "930ac3e9-20ec-5473-98cd-3fe8fddb730f" -``` - -### T01 — Accept the terminology and the canon - -Founder review of `canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md`, including its -section 10 open questions. On acceptance the canon status goes from `proposed` -to `accepted`. - -2026-10-08: accepted by the founder (in session). Canon status `accepted`; -section 10's open questions are carried forward to the first type (T04, T05). - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T02 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "19c25d96-a55c-58f0-9168-3fdbc4955fc2" -``` - -### T02 — Inventory the de-facto types already built by hand - -Read-only. List every security integration built so far and group them by shape. -Known starting points: - -- browser OIDC relying parties on key-cape: informed-decision-approver, - coulomb-social, user-engine portal, openbao-admin, and Forgejo (pending) -- confidential service clients with `client_credentials`: secrets-engine - approval, requester and openbao clients, approval-engine operator -- workload KV read lanes on OpenBao: the railiance-platform credential lane - designs and CCRs, for example `railiance-backup-offsite-lane` -- short-lived SSH certificates through ops-warden (`warden sign`) -- tunnelled operator access (ops-bridge) - -For each: the repositories involved, the hand-built steps, attended human steps, -custody paths, verification evidence, and rollback (if any). Output -`docs/security-case-type-inventory.md`, ranking candidate types by how often the -shape recurs and how much manual work each instance costs today. - -2026-10-08: done, `docs/security-case-type-inventory.md`. 36 of 37 CCRs are -already `request_type: workload-kv-read`, a de-facto type reviewed each time as -if it were new. Browser clients: 5 hand-built plus Forgejo, each with its own -rollout script. Confidential service clients need a registration plus two or -three KV-read CCRs each. A forge read identity is needed in bulk by -ORGREF-WP-0002-T06. Recommendation: oidc-browser-relying-party first (unblocks -the forge), workload-kv-read second (largest payoff), then forge-read-identity. - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T03 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T01] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "e487975b-73b1-516c-971d-da4cbbb93063" -``` - -### T03 — Schema, template and validator - -- `canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json` and - `security-case_v0.1.schema.json` -- `security-case-types/_template/` with `type.yaml`, `README.md` and tests to copy -- a validator, extending `tools/security-scenario-composer/`, that checks a type, - checks a case against its type, and renders the case into the composer's - deterministic plan (still `execution.permitted: false`) - -Acceptance: the validator rejects missing sections, secret-shaped parameter -values, unpinned providers and cases against non-`implemented` types, with tests -for each. - -2026-10-08: done. `canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json` and -`security-case_v0.1.schema.json`; `tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py` -(`validate-type`, `validate-case`, `render`, reusing the scenario composer); -`security-case-types/_template/` (a valid, runnable example type over -`net-kingdom.local-identity`, with README sections, an example case and tests that -travel with every copy). 31 tests pass, including the composer's existing suite. - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T04 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T02, NK-WP-0048-T03] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "2fffe112-7d55-5680-9952-78d74f44f87f" -``` - -### T04 — Define the first type: browser OIDC relying party - -`security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/`, version 1.0: - -- parameters: client id, display name, exact redirect URIs, scopes, client type - (confidential or public), MFA pin, the groups the consuming service maps, - custody path for the secret (confidential only), consuming service and its - owner -- composition: key-cape client registration (key-cape declares it as a playbook - capability), secret minting into custody (railiance-platform), LLDAP group - existence and membership (net-kingdom identity-provisioner), handover to the - consuming service -- materialization (ops-mason) and follow-through (ops-warden) sections -- verification: discovery lists the redirect URI; a test sign-in returns the - expected claims for one human; anonymous access to the custody path is denied -- rollback: remove exactly this client and its custody path -- README: threat model, MFA rationale, why redirect URIs are exact, which steps - still need an attended login and how that is minimised -- reference instances: informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine - portal, openbao-admin - -Acceptance: complete per canon section 3, tests green, status `proposed`. - -2026-10-08: done. `security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/` 1.0 (proposed): -`type.yaml` with 12 parameters (the custody reference is required only for -confidential clients), composition over key-cape's new -`key-cape.oidc-client-registration` declaration (contract PASS, `maturity: -planned`), materialization and follow-through, verification and rollback, all -conditional on client type where it matters. One attended step, -`register-client`, justified by the live registry being a Kubernetes Secret. -README with threat model, alternatives, an honest fit table (portal and vergabe -fit; Forgejo is the first confidential case; openbao-admin, coulomb.social and -informed-decision-approver do not fit 1.0), and known limits. Examples: Forgejo -(checked against the accepted request) and a public portal. The validator gained -`when` / `required_when` conditions and provider discovery. 43 tests pass. -ops-mason's and ops-warden's sections are drafted in the type. Their owners -review them in MASON-WP-0010-T01 and WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 before acknowledgment -(T05). - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T05 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T04, MASON-WP-0010-T01, WARDEN-WP-0044-T01] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "3d987d3d-0797-538b-86e4-51185a327ae2" -``` - -### T05 — Acknowledge the type through informed-decision - -Prepare the Decision Memo from the type's README and `type.yaml` and submit it -through informed-decision's production intake. On acknowledgment the type -moves to `acknowledged`. - -2026-10-08: Decision Memo prepared. Hub decision `e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09`. -`security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/`: `packet.md` (question, -one act, what acknowledging does not do, the shape, alternatives, attended -steps, limits, evidence), `build_intake.py` and the built `intake.json` (memo -class `decision-record`, review group `net-kingdom-admins`, resolves the hub -decision on answer). The envelope passes informed-decision's own -`validate_submission`. Queuing it is an attended operator step, a write inside -the production dispatcher pod: - - kubectl -n state-hub exec -i deploy/state-hub-memo-dispatch -- \ - python -m api.services.memo_dispatch --queue /data/private enqueue --envelope /dev/stdin \ - < security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json - -The answer then appears for review in informed-decision. - -2026-10-08: queued by the founder (`pending`, `queued`) after one refusal: the -first envelope's idempotency key was not State Hub's stable -`state-hub..` form, and the builder now validates against both -sides. The dispatcher delivered it to informed-decision (ledger 7 → 8 -delivered). T05 waits for the founder's answer in informed-decision, which -resolves hub decision `e418263e`. - -2026-10-08: ops-mason's review (MASON-WP-0010-T01) folded into the type, still -1.0 `proposed`: `secret_ref` is no longer a parameter, the type derives -`platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}`; policies are -`workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso` and -`workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}`, each with a templated -body (`read` on that one data path); new `openbao_role` -`external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}` (Kubernetes auth, ESO service account, -15m, no default policy); catalog entry `{consuming_service}-keycape-client`; -the two rollback steps on the KV path collapse into one metadata delete. The -schema and validator now require a `body` on policy and role items. 105 tests -pass. Two consequences: the delivered memo describes the type before these -changes (a case-set custody reference, two differently named policies, no ESO -role), so the founder answers on a superseded shape unless the memo is -re-sent; and Forgejo's custody path moves from the accepted request's proposed -`platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client` to -`platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo`, which key-cape (KEY-WP-0038) and -railiance-apps (RAPPS-WP-0016-T02) need to adopt in T06. ops-warden's review -(WARDEN-WP-0044-T01) is still in progress. - -2026-10-08: revised memo `nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r2` built -(`packet.md`, `intake.json`, packet `sha256:af6435e2…`); it states that it -supersedes the first memo and passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's -validation. It needs a new memo id because the dispatcher refuses new content -under a delivered idempotency key (`idempotency_conflict`). Queuing it is the -same attended step as above. Both memos serve hub decision `e418263e`; the -first answer resolves it, so the first memo must not stay open: an accept on it -would acknowledge the superseded shape, and a decline would resolve the -decision against r2. Close it with `return` (a reviewer verb that requests a -new revision and does not resolve the hub decision; only accept and decline -do), commenting that r2 supersedes it, then answer r2. `withdraw` exists in -the vocabulary but is not offered to reviewers, and lifecycle `revise` only -applies to lifecycle-registered memos, not intake-delivered ones. - -2026-10-09: the founder reports r2 enqueued and the first memo returned. At -close, hub decision `e418263e` still showed `open` (not verified whether r2 -was answered or the answer is still in transit; the dispatcher ledger was not -read). ops-warden's review (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01, ops-warden -`history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md`, d470f2e) arrived at -21:25, before r2 was built, and is not in r2. Required before WARDEN-WP-0044-T02: -R1 a per-step `lane` (missing: identity-provisioner caller credential, -railiance-platform broker grant), R2 canon meaning of `warden_executes: true` -(caller proxy, caller identity, no standing ops-warden token; ADR-0002), R3 a -per-step `value_handling`. Refinements R4 (one type-level catalog lane instead -of a per-case entry, which conflicts with ops-mason's item 5), R5 (ESO Ready gate -before bind-env), R6 (exact accepted memberships), R7 (mfa-pinned and -secret-delivered checks). Next: if r2 was accepted, fold R1-R3 and R5-R7 in as -a follow-up and settle R4 between ops-warden and ops-mason before T06; if not, -hold r2, fold them in and build r3. - key-cape and railiance-apps were told about Forgejo's new custody -path. - -2026-10-09: r2 was not answered (hub decision `e418263e` open; dispatcher 9 -delivered), so r2 is held and r3 replaces it. ops-warden withdrew R4 for R4′ -(message a66a9204): one catalog entry per case with its body templated in the -type. Folded in: - -- Canon section 3: a narrow meaning of `warden_executes: true` (caller proxy, - caller identity, no standing credential; ops-warden ADR-0002), plus per-step - `lane`, `value_handling` and an optional `ready_check`. A catalog entry body is - now required, like policy and role bodies. -- Schema and validator enforce all of these. -- The type: lanes `identity-provisioner-groups` and - `keycape-client-secret-generate` (both new) and `key-cape-oidc-login`; - `mint-secret` is `generated_in_custody`; a Ready gate on `deliver-secret`; - `ensure-groups` adds exactly the accepted case's memberships; new checks - `secret-delivered` and `mfa-pinned`; the catalog-entry body follows R4′. -- 110 tests pass. - -Memo r3 (`nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r3`, packet -`sha256:726dfc01…`) passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. -The founder queues it with the same command, returns r2 with a comment that r3 -supersedes it, then answers r3. - -Prerequisites for T06, not for T05: -- the two new lanes, each through its owner; -- a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner image containing - 630ebfd (the deployed one is main-6c4fcaf from 2026-09-24, without - `/v1/groups/ensure`). - -ops-mason's request to create LLDAP group `fluid-telegram-operators` (message -259ec26d) was answered: not possible from here by that path; the founder creates -it in the LLDAP admin UI. - -2026-10-09: ops-warden finished its side of WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 (message -`58d33f40`, commit 0e7ceb8): the revised type conforms to `warden case -check-type`, with no further changes asked of the type. This acknowledges that -review. Its later addendum R8 (message `af274783`, ops-warden -`history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md`) showed that lane -`identity-provisioner-groups` cannot exist as declared: the provisioner's only -HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits -only user-engine pods, so a caller-proxy lane would act as user-engine. Taken -option 1 (ops-warden's recommendation): `ensure-groups` and its rollback are -attended, in the `register-client` session on `key-cape-oidc-login`, run inside -the provisioner pod; no token is read. Option 2 (an operator credential of its -own on the provisioner) stays open for a later version. `warden case -check-type` now reports only `keycape-client-secret-generate` -(railiance-platform) as missing. 89 tests pass. - -Hub decision `e418263e` was still open, so memo r4 -(`nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4`, packet `sha256:452ea421…`) -replaces r3; it passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. The -founder queues it with the same command, returns r2/r3 if still open with a -comment that r4 supersedes them, then answers r4. - -Prerequisites for T06 are now: lane `keycape-client-secret-generate` -(railiance-platform), and a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner -image containing 630ebfd. - -2026-10-09: done. The founder queued r4 (`pending`, `queued`), returned r3 as -superseded and accepted r4 in informed-decision. informed-decision's hub -write-back is off in production (`INFD_HUB_WRITEBACK` unset), so net-kingdom -resolved hub decision `e418263e` from the founder's report, naming memo r4 in -the rationale. The type is `acknowledged`; it becomes `implemented` with T06. - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T06 -status: wait -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T05, NK-WP-0048-T08, NK-WP-0048-T09, NK-WP-0048-T12, NK-WP-0048-T13, NK-WP-0048-T14, NK-WP-0048-T15, NK-WP-0048-T16, NK-WP-0048-T17, NK-WP-0048-T18, NK-WP-0048-T20, MASON-WP-0010-T03, WARDEN-WP-0044-T03] -blocking_reason: "Type1.2 architecture has a confirmed source-only founder acknowledgment; canonical1.1 remains unchanged/default and the1.2 reference case stays proposed. Needs explicit version selection/reference-source integration without normal admission bypass, closed owner adapters plus global/native receipt verifier (WARDEN-WP-0044-T03), independently verified six-object structural materialization and CCR42 claims/created-only provenance, exact broker/case/source reconciliation, then separately authorized native mint/delivery and attended registry/consumer verification. Source acknowledgment, a bundle or local tests do not prove implemented/materialized/live status." -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "d9b26bcf-a7c6-59a2-92a0-f913d76a203c" -``` - -### T06 — First KnownSecurityCase: Forgejo - -19 October refinement: the separately approved temporary public-client development flow is delivered and recorded as T44 below. T06 retains the full confidential SecurityCaseType/materialization, secret delivery, governed execution and native security acceptance above; it remains open. T44 does not mark that case implemented or materialized. - -Write `security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml` from the parameters the -founder accepted in KEY-WP-0038-T01 (`key-cape/docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml`), -so that acceptance carries over as the case acceptance. ops-mason materializes it; -ops-warden follows through and verifies it. The type becomes `implemented` once -this reference case is live. - -This replaces the hand-built path proposed for KEY-WP-0038-T02. - -2026-10-09: case written, `security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml`, status -`accepted`: the example's parameters plus the founder's 2026-10-08 acceptance of -the key-cape request (owner and founder), with the custody-path derivation -covered by the type's acknowledgment (memo r4). It validates and renders (plan -`execution.permitted: false`; three attended steps on `key-cape-oidc-login`); -it needs `--allow-unimplemented` until it is live, since it is the case that -makes the type `implemented`. A test keeps it equal to the type's example. -Still open before it runs: ops-mason renders and builds it (MASON-WP-0010-T02, -T03, unblocked by T05), ops-warden plans and runs it (WARDEN-WP-0044-T02, T03), -railiance-platform's `keycape-client-secret-generate` lane (asked by ops-mason -`789feb39` and ops-warden `d9f889b1`, both unread), and a founder-approved -identity-provisioner rollout containing 630ebfd. - -2026-10-09: identity-provisioner rolled out, founder-approved in session: -`main-630ebfd` (`sha256:bafb4860…`, built by the image workflow) replaces -`main-6c4fcaf` (`sha256:ffacd5d7…`; only change: 630ebfd, additive). Applied -with `kubectl set image` on the Deployment only (generation 17 → 18, 1/1 Ready); -the file's Service, NetworkPolicies and Ingress were not reapplied. Verified in -the pod: `ensure_service_groups` and `revoke_service_groups` present, `/readyz` -200; no token used, no group changed. Rollback: `kubectl -n sso set image -deploy/identity-provisioner provisioner=forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:ffacd5d790a5b7800e0535f3aa95b7de52c7a68e4f575b9192c3e1622fa672c2`. -The pin in `sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml` follows. - -2026-10-09: ops-warden closed WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 and shipped `warden case plan` -(T02, message `06303d1d`); the accepted Forgejo case is refused until ops-mason -materializes it, and a materialized copy plans cleanly once -`keycape-client-secret-generate` exists. Its observation that `bind-env` carries -a literal `KEYCAPE__CLIENT_SECRET`: the validator now renders a -`{param:env}` format spec (upper case, `-` as `_`, as `keycape-client.py` -derives the name) and rejects unknown specs, and follow-through and rollback -text is now checked for unknown placeholders too (patch-level, canon section 6). -The type keeps the literal until ops-warden's planner (`text.format`) renders the -spec as well; asked of ops-warden. 53 tests pass. - -2026-10-10: ops-warden rendered `{param:env}` in `warden case plan` -(23ba584, message `c1df14b7`; other specs and `!conversion` refused). The type -adopts it as a 1.0 patch (canon section 6): `bind-env` and its rollback now read -`KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET`. ops-mason reports the Forgejo case -rendered and built (message `1ebddae9`; CCR drafts handed to railiance-platform), -so T06 now waits on the platform apply, the mint-secret lane and the attended -register-client session. - -2026-10-10: key-cape adopted the type's custody path (key-cape ab5cccd, message -`88a4559c`): `docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml` and KEY-WP-0038-T02 name -`platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo`, field `CLIENT_SECRET`, delivered as -`sso/keycape-forgejo-client` through `external-secrets-keycape-forgejo`, and the -`forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client` proposal is withdrawn. This matches the type and -the Forgejo example; no change needed here. - -2026-10-10: key-cape's type-composition review (key-cape 6038483, message -`8e5ed5f6`) found the composition sound with two blocking findings, taken as a -1.0 patch (stricter validation and documentation, canon section 6): -R1, redirect URIs now refuse `?` and `#` in the type pattern and in -`keycape-client.py`'s `REDIRECT` (KeyCape refuses `?` at startup and the single -replica would stop); R2, `allowed_scopes` always includes `groups`, the renderer -refuses `access_groups` without it, and `access_groups` now says the consumer -enforces the gate because KeyCape has none; R3, `mfa_required` "false" means the -per-user privacyIDEA policy; R4, register-client's justification records the -restart for every client, the quiet window, and that the rendered registry must -pass KeyCape's client validation before it. The accepted Forgejo case and both -examples still validate; 116 tests pass. -Open, needs a decision: R2's verification step that the consumer enforces the -group gate is a new verification step, hence 1.1 (minor), and the validator pins -cases to the exact type version, so the accepted 1.0 Forgejo case would need -re-pinning. Also open with key-cape: a KeyCape entry point that validates a -rendered client registry without starting the server; until then -`keycape-client.py` mirrors the redirect rule. - -2026-10-10: founder go for 1.1, so no 1.0 run overlaps. The type adds -verification `consumer-enforces-groups`, and hand-over now requires the consumer -to enforce `access_groups` (minor, canon section 6; risk class unchanged, no new -acknowledgment; history in the type README). The accepted Forgejo case and both -examples are re-pinned to `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1` before any apply; the -acknowledgment intake keeps `@1.0` as the record of what was acknowledged. -ops-mason's build and ops-warden's case-ref digest predate this and need a -re-render. - -2026-10-10: ops-mason re-rendered the Forgejo case from `@1.1` (message -`22c6bba6`; plan digest `af1f4f81…`, no collisions) and rebuilt the bundle. The -rendered OpenBao objects are identical to 1.0, so the already applied -CCR-2026-0041 stands; 1.1 changes only consumer-side steps. key-cape shipped -`keycape check-config` (c528daa, message `a7b0aeff`): KeyCape's startup checks -without secret values, including the new duplicate-clientId rule. -`keycape-client.py --check-config ` now runs it on the live and the -proposed registry, fed on stdin, and apply refuses a proposed registry that -fails; register-client's entry point names the option (1.1 patch). The deployed -image predates c528daa, so the binary is built from key-cape source for now. -Before the next KeyCape rollout (Forgejo register-client or the CCR-2026-0018 -window), the attended operator runs `inspect --check-config` so the live -registry is checked too. - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T07 -status: wait -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T06] -blocking_reason: "The next types follow once the first one is proven end to end." -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "c3c9c3ae-4f23-5ba7-9e6f-e63bcf29b9f7" -``` - -### T07 — Queue the next types - -From the T02 ranking, open the next type drafts (likely the confidential service -client and the workload KV read lane), each to be acknowledged on its own. -Record which existing hand-built instances get adopted as cases, without -rewriting them in place. - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T08 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "8e519082-dc8b-5e46-b660-03d03e55dcf6" -``` - -### T08 — identity-provisioner: ensure service-access groups - -The type's `ensure-groups` step calls `identity-provisioner groups ensure --groups - --members `. The provisioner already has idempotent -`_ensure_group` and `_add_group`, but exposes only tenant-scoped operations. Add -the general operation (create if absent, add the listed memberships, never -remove others), its rollback (remove only this case's memberships), tests, and -the ops-warden route for its service identity. - -2026-10-08: done. `identity-provisioner/provisioner.py` gained -`ensure_service_groups` (`POST /v1/groups/ensure`) and `revoke_service_groups` -(`POST /v1/groups/revoke`), behind the existing service-token check. Names -matching `tenant*`, `netkingdom-*` and `lldap_*` are reserved; members must -already exist; everything is validated before any change; memberships are read -back before success; nothing else is ever removed; groups are deleted only when -asked and empty. 7 new tests (39 in the provisioner suite). The type's -`ensure-groups` step and its rollback now name these endpoints. The ops-warden -route for the provisioner's service token belongs to WARDEN-WP-0044-T01. - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T09 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "0ee12dfc-8260-5038-bd39-cc7fb4113be0" -``` - -### T09 — The `keycape-client` entry point and its declaration - -Planned first as key-cape KEY-WP-0038-T04. Moved here because the machinery a -live registration needs already lives in net-kingdom, where KeyCape is deployed -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/`): the contained kubectl, the cluster-identity pin and the -issuer pin. A copy in key-cape would drift. - -2026-10-08: done. `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py` derives the KeyCape -client record from a case (`client-from-case`). It adds or removes exactly one -client with the existing safeguards (byte-preserving merge, exact match or -refuse, shared-reference refusal, compare-and-swap, read-back, contained errors), -requires the Deployment env binding first for confidential clients, and requires -the case acceptance record for `apply` instead of a per-client founder decision -id. 15 tests, including a regression showing that the vergabe case reproduces -its hand-built registration exactly; all 71 helper tests pass. Declaration -`capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml` (contract -PASS, `maturity: implemented`) replaces key-cape's draft. The type now pins it, -and for confidential clients adds `deliver-secret` (delivery from custody into -the sso namespace) and `bind-env` (Deployment env), attended in the same session -as `register-client`. The per-client helpers stay until their clients are -adopted as cases. - -2026-10-10 — NetKingdom owner review of the execution seam, source only: -ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c -was reviewed against INTENT, SecurityCase canon, acknowledged type1.1, current -case and owner source. docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md supports -the closed adapter/receipt direction with explicit versioned schema, structural -materialization provenance, unchanged caller/session boundaries, safe CAS -reconciliation and exact-created-object rollback requirements. This is owner -review, not approval. Supporting file digests are in the adjacent sources JSON. - -Current source exposes a circular wait: ops-mason T03 waits on mint while Warden -and the broker refuse a non-materialized case. Structural acceptance therefore -needs its own native pinned receipt before mint, not a successful mint before -materialized. The platform broker additionally pins type1.0 while Forgejo is -accepted at1.1; platform-owner alignment and tests are required, not an unchecked -version bypass. T06 remains wait. No case/type lifecycle status, grant, authority -or live runtime changed by this review. A proposed informed-decision would -adopt the source contract only; native materialization and execution acceptance -stay distinct. - -Final proposal re-review: staged Warden proposal SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c -adds only the explicitly local reducer appendix, not an accepted wire protocol -or executor. The exact-final review and sources JSON supersede the earlier -1035f049... proposal review. Platform staged the exact type1.1 broker correction -with ten fake-backend subprocess checks (script SHA256 -9576cd211cfc06526ec4cc9bd0a5b06f0f59287a68931bb2d6e3592a951ddc7d). -The next source work is the versioned closed adapter/receipt/materialization -contract, not another relaxation of the broker's status gate. Native work still -requires installed broker provenance, structural reader receipts, exact new -materialized-case bytes, caller grant/session revocation and verified execution. -No installed/native acceptance is inferred from that staged correction. - -2026-10-11 — new source-only type1.2 architecture acknowledgment: -Confirmed native founder ACCEPT of infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1 -at06:47:39Z, approval8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765. Exact frozen packet -0b377d647ca748cd03c92f9792396412048055d4bde9f7bb06ff6d413f7acd68 and submission -585cee731de30d2b37883a57abfd9eb32f023ee694e8d911989109d5caf80569; native receipt -retained in docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/. -The complete acknowledged1.2 source package is isolated under -security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party; default loader and -current accepted1.1 case remain untouched because load_type is single-version. -The new proposed1.2 case is NOT accepted/materialized/live and has no acceptance -fields. Actual reference-migration design approval is a separate Apps owner -receipt; no1.1 approval is inherited. Source-recording review/test proof and exact -next gates are in docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md. -T06 remains wait and T07 remains its existing dependent task; type is NOT -implemented and no first-case/native grant or broader workplan finish is asserted. - -2026-10-11 — bounded explicit version selection source preparation for T06: -The validator now offers optional exact version_roots/--version-root VERSION=PATH -selection with duplicate/mismatch/traversal/symlink refusal and no fallback. The -default1.1 source and historicalacceptedcase hashes/ordinaryrefusal/preparation -render stayunchanged; actual1.1 is acknowledged, not implemented. Acknowledged1.2 -ordinaryadmission also refuses; optionalpreparation remains nonexecuting.43local -validatorchecks pass and original1.1 CLIrenderbytes match exactly. Makerproof: -docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json. -FormalNetownerreview/reference-source integration and all existing native adapter, -provenance/broker/materialization/attendedproof gates remain; T06 stayswait, no -new residual or firstcase/typeimplementation/native grant is inferred. - - -2026-10-16 — isolated source preparation for T06 (canonical integration pending): -Added `check-evidence` to the existing validator CLI. It reuses exact version -selection and ordinary type/case/render admission, checks actual Mason structural -request source/inventory/projection pins and reads actual Warden journal rows -read-only. Successful rows require exact type-declared descriptors and attempt/ -revocation fingerprints. Existing acknowledged types without machine descriptors -remain plan-only. The compatibility result never claims authenticated native -completion: Request and journal fingerprints are not portable native evidence. -Owner authentication/status binding and actual native gates remain unresolved; -T06/T07 statuses and both type/case lifecycles remain unchanged. No dispatch, -credential access or authority expansion is introduced. See tool README for the -existing owner protocol boundaries and source integration tests. - -Concrete next Warden owner integration: current `Executor.admit` refuses every -case parameter whose sensitivity is not public/operational, so browser -`redirect_uris`, `allowed_scopes`, `client_type`, `mfa_required` (and 1.2 -`consumer_namespace`) fail after otherwise prepared admission. The sensitive -classification is a security-change review level, not secret content. The -Warden owner must validate through NetKingdom's existing exact-version case/type -validator, then project only descriptor-declared safe target metadata; do not -remove the credential/value refusal or copy complete parameters into journals. -Actual owner descriptor acknowledgment and independent evidence admission remain -prerequisites, with normal admission still refusing unimplemented types. - - -## T10 — Source compatibility checker for Mason and Warden evidence - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T10 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "4b06ca97-c1e4-5680-bf22-ab75ab1646a4" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16 in published source `c31d21ba`. The read-only -`check-evidence` command checks the actual Mason structural request and Warden -journal source protocols against an exact version/render. Independent source -review passed 103 tests at that checkpoint. It always reports native completion -false and execution prohibited. Fixtures and local journal fingerprints do not -provide authenticated owner/native evidence. This records completed source scope -previously described under T06; it does not duplicate native acceptance credit. - -## T11 — Validate the optional machine-descriptor pin contract - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T11 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "ef2a0119-f59e-5e45-9519-115da9df7b85" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16. Reproduced the JSON schema rejecting a valid -`execution_descriptors` map while the Python validator accepted malformed maps. -The schema now supports the existing Warden optional exact-byte pin map; semantic -validation binds keys to declared steps, bounds the map and checks digest shape. -The direct evidence API refuses malformed maps before accessing them. Twenty-one -new checks and all 127 affected source checks passed. No current type/case bytes, -status, owner descriptors or native acceptance changed. Source evidence and -publication receipt: Custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-acceptance-next/`. - -## T12 — Prepare NetKingdom-owned attended step adapters - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T12 -status: wait -priority: high -blocking_reason: "Wired into register-client 2026-10-23 per coordinator r6 recommendation (descriptor sha256:434c53e8..43cb; 1.3 map + ready_check updated). Awaits coordinator r7 together with the F3 fix; key-cape to confirm readiness criteria." -state_hub_task_id: "7ce4eee3-cd47-55a9-bfa5-4f1835d4d6fd" -``` - -Owner: NetKingdom. Retained scope: prepare bounded attended Deployment env, -config verification and restart/readiness steps around the existing helpers. -Next action: identify exact current entry points and their revision/readback -contracts, then implement fixed source-pinned callbacks or receipt-only attended -steps. Completion requires positive/refusal checks, exact target/source pins and -uncertainty behavior without acquiring user-engine runtime identity or exposing -registry/client secrets. Existing caller/session, cluster/issuer, CAS/readback -and status-only output boundaries remain mandatory. - -2026-10-16 task refinement: the original broad adapter scope is split into T13 -(completed registration source candidate), T14 (group creation provenance), T15 -(durable registration recovery) and T16 (descriptor/artifact selection and owner -review). This preserves T12's task ID and Hub UUID while giving each remaining -outcome an owner and completion gate. T06 now names every source dependency; -its native/reference lifecycle acceptance scope remains unchanged. Completion -of any source task supplies no Warden, Platform or Apps assent and no native -execution authority. - -2026-10-23 scope check against the 1.3 candidate. The delivered sources cover -most of T12: Deployment env binding is bind-env (T27, done), and pre-restart -config verification is register-client's pinned `check-config` (T13, done). -**Remaining gap:** `keycape-client.py apply` returns `restart_required`, and the -type's text says a restart follows. Yet `register-client` has no `ready_check`, -and no step performs or verifies the KeyCape restart, single-replica readiness -or issuer discovery afterwards. The next action is to add a bounded attended -restart-and-readiness check, either as a `ready_check` on register-client or as -a NetKingdom-owned step. It has positive and refusal fixtures and handles the -uncertain case (a refused restart stops sign-in for every client). Because this -changes the 1.3 type and its descriptor digests, the coordinator decides with -the T16 re-freeze (message to the-custodian, 2026-10-23) whether it lands in -1.3 or becomes a carried known limit. Status stays todo. - -2026-10-23 source candidate delivered: `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/restart-readiness.py` -with `test_restart_readiness.py` (11 synthetic tests pass). It is -injection-only. `plan_restart` stamps the pod template of the single-replica -Recreate issuer, with CAS on the observed revision. It refuses a wrong target, a -non-Recreate strategy, more than one replica, a stale revision or a re-applied -stamp. `assess` decides ready/pending/failed from rollout status, exactly one -restarted Ready pod, and issuer discovery (issuer equality plus endpoints). It -reads pods for status only. A crash loop, config error, issuer mismatch or a -foreign template change is `failed` and is never retried. `wait_ready` is -bounded (at most 120 attempts). A deadline is `uncertain`; both failed and -uncertain require owner reconciliation. The module is not wired into the type, -descriptor or kernel; that waits on the coordinator's placement decision. -Separately: `test_adapter_source_closure.py` already fails 7 probes in this -workstation environment, with or without this change, because the probe -subprocess cannot import `warden`. - -2026-10-23 wiring. Coordinator r6 (Custodian `README-r6.md`, a870092) -recommended putting the restart inside register-client rather than as a bare -ready_check or an eighth step. Done: -- `keycape-registration-adapter.py` now requires a `restart` capability bundle - (read, CAS write, observe, sleep, https issuer). After any apply that changed - the registry, in either direction, it stamps one restart and waits for - readiness (at most 60 x 5 s). `failed` or `uncertain` raises, so the kernel - keeps the step uncertain; the session is still revoked. -- The attempt payload records `issuer_restart`, and `restart-readiness.py` joins - the source closure. -- 4 new tests: ready, no-change without restart, crash/stuck uncertain, and - bounded capabilities. -- The register-client descriptor is now `sha256:434c53e8…43cb` (was - `4ecc769f…26e7`). The 1.2/1.3 compositions are regenerated, and the 1.3 map - plus a status-only `ready_check` on register-client are updated. -- The keycape and type suites pass: 363 passed, 5 skipped. - -The source-closure failure noted above was a relative-PYTHONPATH artifact; fixed -in 3a68d05. Open, from r6: readiness does not prove the new client was loaded -(key-cape to confirm the criteria), and bind-env's own restart has no readiness -check. Coordinator r7 reviews this together with the F3 fix. - -## T13 — Prepare the fixed registration adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T13 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "b264c10b-565c-5d29-b788-03cf5fbd2883" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16, source implementation and synthetic fixture proof only. -Added an injection-only adapter around actual `keycape-client.run`: fixed -case/principal/human/lane/source/acceptance binding, existing CAS/readback, -metadata-only owner evidence and per-attempt parent-session revocation boundary. -The descriptor source composition pins the exact checker executable digest -alongside adapter/helper source. Creation-only rollback authenticates its -creation receipt and refuses changed postcreation UID/resourceVersion; -pre-existing clients confer no rollback authority. Missing readback, evidence, -revocation or process-local creation provenance cannot become retry-safe success. - -Evidence: Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-adapter-next/` -R3 candidate, explicit patch and postimages, retained R1 rejected custody finding -and R2 revision, and 36 passing source checks (16 new, 20 existing). Three checks -use actual Warden kernel admission/dispatch/rollback with published Warden -`d97652a3bb5fa733b063d71a1b74068efcccf572` producer pins unchanged. Owner trust, -descriptor/type/case and Kubernetes objects remain synthetic fixtures. This -records a completed source deliverable, not independent review, publication, -type acknowledgment, exercised procedure, identity admission or native browser -acceptance. Independent root source review: Custodian browser-adapter-next/coordinator-review-r3.json. Source integration and normal publication/synchronization receipts: Custodian browser-adapter-next/canonical-integration.json. These receipts supply no other-owner assent or native authority. - -Source publication: `0775c2bfa41af236301155bb5a69bbf088bdf823`, independently -reviewed by the Custodian coordinator before integration. The required initial -projection and ordinary UUID writeback both completed with zero failures and -zero automation errors. Generated-only brief commits were refused by the normal -hook; exact pre-existing staged/working brief bytes were restored. The separate -canonical integration receipt retains those refusals and projection evidence. -Native admission and all other-owner acceptance remain open. - -## T14 — Admit governed group rollback against native owner boundaries - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T14 -status: progress -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T20, NK-WP-0048-T21] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "fce95440-a25b-5f27-8ef3-a3d182099113" -``` - -Owner: NetKingdom. Next action: bind the completed T21 PostgreSQL journal to -an admitted dedicated CNPG consumer through the existing `rapp-postgres` -database-per-consumer contract. Identify the actual deployment/package and -custody owner, admitted placement/capacity and role/renewable lease/TLS target; -implement the independently retained exact content checkpoint and authoritative -tenant/case/source/principal callbacks before enabling governed group operations. -The injection-only backend and fixture callbacks do not supply production scope -or authorization. Existing service tokens, caller-supplied JSON and provenance -receipts confer no new grant. The default production endpoint remains disabled -without the trusted integration. SQLite remains local/disposable only; any -production exception requires explicit scoped governance under ADR-0015. - -2026-10-17 owner-integration refinement: T23 records the completed source/package -placement review, distinct from T21's source/disposable-SQL proof. Its dedicated -`rapp-identity-provisioner` recommendation is draft and unbound, not an accepted -package or existing repository. The full six-consumer rapp-postgres renderer -accepts the inert candidate on platform-pg-2 as its third of four declared -consumers; first-cell placement is refused as a fifth. Neither the estimated -four-consumer ceiling nor source requests establish native headroom or backup. - -Next independent owner contracts: NetKingdom/package/substrate owners accept -exact deployment/rollback fate; rapp-postgres admits the dedicated consumer, -roles, five-connection budget and actual backup/restore; Platform admits exact -renewable runtime/migration delivery and TLS/CA/SAN; network owners scope SQL, -broker and checkpoint paths without assuming a narrow policy subtracts additive -same-namespace access. Protected caller owners must provide authoritative -GroupJournalBinding construction and current authorization; an independent -existing holder must authenticate and atomically advance the exact content -checkpoint, not a counter or ordinary Audit receipt. Directory/runtime owners -must select and prove either an exclusive all-writer maintenance barrier or -provider-supported CAS/generation, including established sessions, lifecycle -cascades and remove/readd ABA. No source review establishes those owner facts. - -The default PostgreSQL activation and destructive native rollback remain refused. -Storage/lease acceptance can be proposed separately from LDAP mutation only after -exact owner source/target/custody/verification/recovery and cost/risk review; -State Hub guard approval grants none of it. Source-only integration review and -native acceptance matrix: Custodian native-storage-r1/OWNER-REVIEW.md. T14's -existing status, UUID, dependencies and native completion gate are retained. - -2026-10-17 refinement: T20 retains the historical durable SQLite source and -actual disposable LLDAP proof. T21 extracts the completed PostgreSQL source and -bounded real disposable SQL compatibility proof. T14 remains `progress` for -native CNPG admission/recovery, protected owner integration and exclusion of all -external LDAP writers. Separate source publication/projection and independent -cleanup receipts belong to coordinator follow-through; no missing native assent -is represented as received. - -Completion still requires independently reviewed/admitted ADR-0015-conforming -CNPG storage (or an explicit governed exception), backup/lost-store recovery and -migration of legacy requests; a native -writer-isolation/fencing or provider CAS/version contract that closes external -writer races and remove/re-add ABA; exact case/source/principal and current -native object bindings for protected callbacks; and actual per-attempt evidence, -revocation and readback/refusal verification through the existing owner paths. -Only independently retained confirmed creations may be undone. Every -pre-existing/shared group and membership must remain preserved; unresolved -intents never expire into retry authority. The disposable fixture supplies none -of these native custody, authorization, owner-acceptance or production claims. - -## T15 — Define authenticated recovery for lost registration process state - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T15 -status: wait -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T31] -blocking_reason: "Source candidate 061461e is merged. Waiting on the owner to select the real authenticated original-attempt holder and native readback, and on independent re-review of the changed T13 adapter source." -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "1b825705-4848-5edc-832f-b1622cd9bdb7" -``` - -2026-10-17 source part merged (061461e via 65559ef). `build()` takes optional -paired `holder`/`observe` capabilities and installs `reconcile_original`; the T31 -fixtures now run through the adapter's own path. Rollback after restart is still -refused, and there is no add replay. This changes `keycape-registration-adapter.py`, -so the revision reviewed under Custodian `browser-adapter-next/coordinator-review-r3.json` -is superseded. The new revision has no independent review yet and must not be -pinned on the strength of the old one. - -2026-10-17: T31 fixtures done (74adcd7). What remains for T15: the owner -selects the real authenticated original-attempt holder, and the T13 adapter -gains the holder capability, `reconcile_original` and reconcile-aware `verify` -described in T31. - -Owner: NetKingdom for registration state, with Warden owning kernel evidence -admission. T22 records the completed source review and exact existing-seam gaps; -T15 retains implementation and authenticated restart/lost-receipt acceptance. -Next action: select and admit the actual owner publisher/authenticator and bounded -original-attempt readback contract for the merged holder/observe adapter seam. -Warden's original-intent persistence/interface (`a45cf475`) and additive validation -(`117fec9241e7b985dfb187b992e173d0a5dc3700`) are now published and projected. -The local Journal retains admitted nonsecret original context, validates original -actor/attempt and metadata linkage to the original running receipt, and supplies -it separately from the new reconciliation attempt. This local consistency is not -independent original-holder authorization or creation provenance; neither the -journal nor a current matching registry entry reconstructs creation authority. - -The owner contract must bind the original Invocation, case/type/descriptor/catalog/ -acceptance pins, source, principal and admitted tenant/realm provenance, separately -from the new reconciliation attempt and its independently revoked parent session. -Use an existing authenticated holder/readback; Audit Core's custody API is a -candidate only until its actual registration source/class, load-bearing emission -contract and separate scoped reader are admitted. No new broker or receipt trust -root is proposed. A missing original record, ambiguous publication, NO_CHANGE, -changed native revision or lost readback stays uncertain; no add replay or undo. - -Completion requires restart/lost-receipt fixtures against the selected actual owner -contract: independently authenticated original created-only provenance, original -exact client entry and unchanged current postcreation UID/resourceVersion before -any undo, with wrong attempt/case/source/principal and unavailable-holder refusals. -The merged T13 adapter exposes reconciliation only through paired injected -holder/observe capabilities and still refuses post-restart rollback. Existing -source review, JSON receipts and synthetic trust do not satisfy independent -holder authorization/provenance or native admission, or authorize attended recovery. -Exact remaining owner facts: Custodian native-registration-r1/original-attempt-review.json. - -2026-10-17 check (net-kingdom-worker): Warden's original-intent lookup interface -is not published — ops-warden head is `d97652a`, with no WARDEN-WP-0044-T03 -commit, and the net-kingdom inbox holds no announcement. No restart/lost-receipt -fixture or readback seam was added this session; the work is deferred behind -T16's decomposition under the same token budget. Remains todo, gated on Warden -publishing the reviewed lookup/context interface and on owner selection of the -authenticated original-attempt holder. - -2026-10-17 current-source correction: the earlier same-day `d97652a` lookup -checkpoint and T31 adapter-next-action note above are historical and superseded -by the published Warden interface/validation and merged `061461e` adapter seam. -The 54 focused Warden checks establish source behavior only. Current admission -leaves tenant/realm empty; no admitted tenant/realm provenance is inferred. -T15 remains wait for actual independently authenticated owner-holder/readback -selection, independent review of the changed adapter, and native restart/lost- -receipt acceptance. Existing task metadata, owner gates and historical reviews -are unchanged. - -## T16 — Select and review the actual machine descriptor composition - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T16 -status: wait -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T24, NK-WP-0048-T25, NK-WP-0048-T26, NK-WP-0048-T27, NK-WP-0048-T28, NK-WP-0048-T29, NK-WP-0048-T30] -priority: high -blocking_reason: "Coordinator r6 (the-custodian a870092) rejected: NK48-R5-F1/F2 resolved, F3 (consumer config inverse) open via T34 / RAPPS-WP-0016-T05. After F3 + T12 integration: re-freeze, coordinator r7, then owner re-check." -state_hub_task_id: "200bf500-5084-5ae7-be26-3033fe1f296e" -``` - -2026-10-17 coordinator review r4 approved the 1.3 candidate at 1920b13 with no -findings (the-custodian `nk48-adapters-1.2-review/coordinator-review-r4.json`). The founder chose -option A of the T16 owner-review packet (`nk48-t16-owner-review/founder-option-decision.md`): -1.3 with execution descriptors for all seven steps. Owner reviews for A are open -in the-custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-1.3-owner-review/` (net-kingdom, -railiance-platform, railiance-apps, ops-warden, key-cape). The owner-review packet -supersedes the r1 composition pointer: T16's exact composition is now -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/descriptor-composition-1.3.candidate.json`. - -2026-10-17 successor candidate prepared (source only, `proposed`): -`security-case-type-revisions/1.3/oidc-browser-relying-party/` is the 1.2 package plus -an `execution_descriptors` map of the seven composed descriptors, with examples -pinned to `@1.3` and no acknowledgment. ensure-groups, hand-over, -deliver-consumer-secret and the composer accept 1.3 (835680c, merged acda26c). -`test_admit_1_3_type.py` runs Warden's real admission against the committed 1.3 type: -the proposed type is refused; an acknowledged copy is refused because ops-warden -pins parameter fingerprints only for 1.1 and 1.2; and with only a 1.3 pin (equal to -1.2's fingerprint) all seven are admitted. This is a major change under canon -section 6. Next: r4 source review of the changed adapters and the map, then owner -reviews, including the ops-warden 1.3 pin, the mint-secret warden_executes/human -question and the owner-run steps question, then the founder's Decision Memo. - -Owner: NetKingdom for descriptor/type source and exact checker artifact; Warden -independently owns global provenance/admission. T22 records the completed seven-step -source1.2 inventory and regenerated register-client descriptor using the delivered -checker and current sealed-snapshot source; T16 retains exact owner review, -complete descriptor composition and admission. Next action: bind actual native -publisher/authenticator, original/current session verification and revocation, -executable storage/custody and config pins, then obtain the six missing fixed -owner descriptors/adapters for ensure-groups, mint-secret, deliver-secret, -bind-env, deliver-consumer-secret and hand-over. The inventory identifies each -existing owner seam, exact missing contract and created-only rollback requirement; -it is not an executable bundle. T14 and T15 remain independent prerequisites. - -Review the dedicated consumer source1.2 composition only through the existing -explicit version-root selection. Keep canonical1.1/default and its accepted case -unchanged, and the source-only acknowledged1.2 reference case proposed without -acceptance fields. New descriptor bytes require a reviewed exact successor -revision/version under canon section6; they do not inherit historical source -acknowledgment. Changed authentication/materialization/trust needs the prescribed -informed-decision acknowledgment. Do not insert a partial descriptor map or use ---allow-unimplemented preparation as ordinary case/native admission. The registry -helper reports restart_required; separately review quiet-window restart/readiness -and actual consumer verification rather than infer activation from registry CAS. -Exact composition: Custodian native-registration-r1/descriptor-composition.json. -Completion requires separate owner source review of exact machine descriptors, -artifact/source/config pins, normal type/version admission and independent -evidence-verification boundaries. Warden d97652a refreshes producer validator -pins for NetKingdom 015694ee; it does not attest T13's new adapter. Pinning any -machine descriptor into an acknowledged type is a separately reviewed source -change. Platform owns structural/mint/broker/delivery evidence; Apps owns actual -consumer login/group enforcement. Neither their assent nor native acceptance is -supplied by this task. - -2026-10-16 source checkpoint: T19 below extracts the completed per-attempt -executable snapshot implementation and reviewed fixture proof. T16 retains -native executable storage/custody, exact owner evidence/session callbacks, -complete descriptor composition and ordinary type/version admission. The -successor descriptor/source pins are proposed only; the earlier descriptor -history is preserved. T14 group provenance and T15 durable restart/recovery -remain independent open requirements. No native acceptance is counted here. - -2026-10-17 budget checkpoint (net-kingdom-worker): no source change made. The -T13 registration adapter alone is 217 source and 317 test lines plus an -independent review; six further owner descriptors/adapters cannot be completed -within one per-task token budget (soft 8000 / hard 10000), so the task was -stopped below 50% and is decomposed rather than pushed through. Proposed split, -one source-candidate task each with positive/refusal fixtures, canonical1.1 -default unchanged and no --allow-unimplemented admission: (a) ensure-groups, -bound to T14's journal/provenance seam; (b) mint-secret and (c) deliver-secret, -Platform-owned evidence seams; (d) bind-env and (e) deliver-consumer-secret; -(f) hand-over, Apps-owned consumer verification; then (g) descriptor composition -over the reviewed set. Each candidate needs its owner's source review before -pinning; none is authored here as owner-accepted. Status stays todo. - -2026-10-17 task refinement after coordinator r5: completed independent mint- -guard regression coverage is extracted as T32. T33 tracks the exact Platform -issuer-store source/reference correction; T34 tracks the Apps configuration -inverse reachable without secret or hand-over resource creation. T16 retains -final exact seven-descriptor composition, independent owner reviews and admission; -its status and existing dependencies are preserved. The kernel branch also needs -its own KR1-F1/F2 admission/dispatch corrections and independent review under -WARDEN-WP-0044-T03 before any 1.3 pin. Historical r4 acceptance does not supersede -r5's findings or establish native readiness. - -2026-10-23 checkpoint. The Warden kernel review r2 is clean: KR1-F1..F4 are -resolved in source. The owner re-check (Custodian `nk48-1.3-owner-review/README-recheck.md`) -can start only once coordinator r5 and the kernel review both approve with no -open findings. Coordinator r5 left NK48-R5-F1..F3 open. Their implementations -(Custodian `nk48-r5-f1..f3-*`) changed the 1.3 type: `type.yaml` at HEAD is -sha256 `ef02ddae…684f`, not the re-frozen `e75fe941…5d0a`. The -descriptor digests in the re-check table are therefore stale. Next steps: the -coordinator re-freezes the 1.3 candidate at current HEAD and runs r6. After that, -net-kingdom answers NK-1.3-C1/C2 and accepts register-client, ensure-groups and -bind-env at the new digests. T16 moves to **wait**. No pin, no admission, and -1.1 stays default. - -## T17 — Build and exercise the exact offline config-checker artifact - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T17 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "8c3e4baa-a218-5996-af9e-fe1153a46dac" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16, isolated artifact/source fixture proof only. Built the -existing `key-cape/src/cmd/keycape` command from published clean source revision -`3c71226a1a7b8a2bdb710e9c497e1a1f7f8a3987`, source tree -`f0010b9cab17dbc3a787628a29657d98b900320f`, with cached Go 1.23.0, -CGO disabled, Linux/amd64 v1, trimmed paths, disabled VCS stamping and offline -read-only module selection. The full retained closure pins 108 source files, -9876 toolchain files and ten used module source directories. Three isolated -build locations produced identical 13633409-byte artifacts: -`sha256:be37738fe1c08259fb4f9ca0daf0f9301bfffc237e5bb38435525dfbf11ccff5`. - -Eight disposable checks use the actual executable and maintained helper/kernel, -with complete synthetic configs and a minimal environment: add/created-only -removal, normal pinned producer admission, rollback, lost-readback uncertainty, -stale revisions, substituted checker refusal, invalid startup config and missing -secret-env refusal. No checker stub or producer-pin override remains. The -artifact-bound descriptor proposal is -`sha256:76b1153d188062ece53fcd5e8d35290fdbfd02a69dd79d4b001fc42781afcdc3`. -Evidence: Custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-checker-artifact-next/`. -The first two build attempts succeeded but their closure collection failed; -both failures are retained, as is refusal of the older incomplete synthetic -fixture. No production config, credentials or cluster mutation was used. - -This extracts completed build/fixture scope from T16 without claiming KeyCape -owner endorsement, native checker selection/storage custody, acknowledged type -integration, native evidence/session callbacks or attended browser acceptance. -T16 retains exact owner review and composition/admission scope. The attended -registration procedure remains unexercised. - -## T18 — Make checker input and executable selection deterministic - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T18 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "9c45da71-fb4c-5f20-9065-90f448f37c64" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16, isolated source correction and real-artifact fixture proof -only; independent integration/publication remain separately recorded. KeyCape -source review identified non-secret `KEYCAPE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL_URL` and -`KEYCAPE_BROWSER_LOGOUT_URL` overrides in config.Load. The original helper -inherited ambient environment, allowing valid supplied configuration to be -rejected or invalid supplied URL configuration to be admitted. A bare relative -checker filename could also be replaced by PATH lookup after the adapter had -hashed the selected local file. All three counterexamples are retained against -the unchanged predecessor. - -The existing helper now resolves the selected checker file to an absolute path -and passes an explicit empty subprocess environment. Three opt-in real-checker -regressions verify both URL-verdict directions and relative-file selection under -a non-checker PATH decoy. All 39 affected checks pass with the exact supplied -artifact, as do 11 real-artifact helper/kernel scenarios. Source evidence: -Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-checker-environment-r2/`. -Historical descriptors remain retained; the helper correction changes successor -source-composition pins and requires their separate review/admission. An absolute -path is not immutable custody and does not eliminate file replacement races; -T16 retains native executable storage/custody and callback/type admission. -No production configuration, credentials or cluster mutation was used. - -Source integration and publication: `916ba4b33e03179274d03b78bd898a4843e8653f`, following independent -Custodian source review in browser-checker-environment-r2/coordinator-review.json. -The ordinary protected projection pass assigned T17/T18 UUIDs with zero failures -and zero automation errors; generated-only brief commit refusal is retained. -The exact prior staged/working brief bytes were restored. Final source/publication/ -projection evidence is retained in Custodian browser-checker-environment-r2/ -canonical-integration.json. These source receipts do not admit native executable -custody, owner callbacks, acknowledged type changes or browser identities. - -## T19 — Bind checker execution to verified immutable attempt bytes - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T19 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "f50fdcd1-00be-5c3c-be0c-345aa2126032" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16, independently reviewed source implementation and synthetic -fixture proof only. The registration adapter now opens a bounded regular checker -artifact without following its terminal symlink, verifies the reviewed digest, -and snapshots the exact bytes into a write/grow/shrink/seal-removal-sealed Linux -memfd before helper access. Live and proposed config checks execute that same fd -through procfs with the existing empty environment; the fd closes on completion -or failure. Unsupported snapshot/seal/exec policy refuses through the existing -parent-session revocation and uncertainty boundaries. The earlier unbounded -pre-snapshot path read was removed during independent review; actual adapter -symlink/FIFO/oversize refusal tests verify helper access never starts. - -Evidence: Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-resume-r1/`, -including exact base/preimages/postimages/patch, proposed descriptor, coordinator -source review and canonical integration receipt. Independent Custodian checks -passed 49 affected source tests and 12 actual Go checker/helper/kernel scenarios; -the sets overlap and are not separate acceptance counts. Existing published -Warden d97652a producer pins remain unchanged. The exact KeyCape artifact remains -`sha256:be37738fe1c08259fb4f9ca0daf0f9301bfffc237e5bb38435525dfbf11ccff5`. -The predecessor path-replacement refusal and the first expanded reopened-fd test -failure are retained; the latter fixture was corrected to restore write mode -before independently proving seals block reopened-fd writes and shared mmap. - -This source task adds no native owner custody, callback, evidence trust, type -acknowledgment, credential access, consumer sign-in or rollback acceptance. -Executable memfds, Linux seals and usable procfs are explicit runtime dependencies -and still require native admission. This is an extracted source outcome from -T16, not completion of T16; T12/T14/T15 and all external-owner gates remain open. - - -Publication verified by the coordinator after the source worker usage limit: -`8790dd18ae83c4651ef3d1d923312a118a5b436b` is the actual remote main revision. -All five canonical source hashes match the reviewed packet. Normal synchronization -completed with zero failures/automation errors; all 19 task statuses match the -projection. T19's assigned UUID is retained. The original staged and working brief -bytes were restored and independently compared. The exact source, projection and -publication checks are in Custodian browser-resume-r1/canonical-integration.json. -Native acceptance remains open under T16 and the other named owner tasks. - - -## T20 — Prepare durable group provenance and prove disposable LLDAP compatibility - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T20 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "863fcbdb-e246-51ba-87ca-a2f44d01d6f8" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17, source candidate preparation and bounded synthetic -compatibility proof only. This extracts evidenced implementation/fixture scope -from T14; T14 retains native storage, writer isolation, protected callback and -owner-acceptance gates. Source integration/publication and State Hub projection -are pending the coordinator's separate receipts; no revision or task UUID is -invented here. - -The existing identity-provisioner group ensure/revoke interface now has a -reviewed candidate for a bounded owner-private SQLite journal, proven only in -local/disposable use. The initial storage instructions wrongly suggested a native -persistent-volume path; source review against accepted ADR-0015 corrected them -before publication. Production SQLite-on-a-PVC is not admitted: T14 retains -CNPG/rapp-postgres storage admission or a separately governed exception. -The local journal saves -complete prestate and intent before each attempted directory mutation, inventories -only confirmed new groups/memberships, binds original ensure idempotency and -correlation to the exact request digest, and refuses unsigned caller inventories -or legacy broad revoke requests. Replays never recreate removed state. Missing, -replaced or untrusted storage and missing intent rows stop execution; definite -before-mutation refusals retain evidence without stranding unrelated valid work. -Interrupted writes/readback remain unresolved across reopening. Revoke validates -all targeted native ids and complete member postimages before destructive work, -removes only confirmed creations and never deletes a preexisting empty group. -Server/configuration wiring, image-copy closure and owner storage/request -migration instructions are included. The existing endpoint's caller -authentication remains the existing boundary, not a new grant. - -The candidate was prepared against NetKingdom -`878abc93588e12b6da1bac055cfbb3abb8d7adf1`; exact source patch digest -`sha256:1f3f3ca94c46dadac8f24896053d4d23179de795e50a24298a0cfbcc46cca30e`. -The independent Custodian review passed all 65 provisioner checks. The earlier -62-check candidate, two independent-review findings and subsequent fixes remain -retained rather than overwritten. Seven additional fixture-plan checks exercise -the preparation boundary; these counts overlap the same candidate and do not -measure task-completion percentage or independent acceptance. - -A separately reviewed bounded fixture then exercised the exact candidate against -cached pinned disposable LLDAP and Python images, through actual GraphQL. All 14 -closed compatibility/containment oracles passed: exact creation inventory, -separate-process SQLite reopening/replay/revoke, complete preexisting directory -preservation including empty/shared groups and memberships, refusal of shared -membership drift, retained uncertainty after a lost response following a real -addition, and refusal of unknown/cross-case receipt bindings. The fixture used -only newly generated synthetic users/passwords/key material in private tmpfs, -with a network-none anchor and shared loopback helper, no host ports/mounts, -no image pulls and no production or actual credential contact. The coordinator's -safe receipt reports both exact owned containers absent after cleanup; final -independent cleanup verification remains the coordinator's integration duty. - -Evidence: Custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/group-provenance-r1/`, including exact -source base/pre/postimages, patch/manifest, independent review and retained -refinements. Native fixture manifest -`sha256:8a0514f5f14137355972400cd4852f48c892316d28e3abd3c86635d7cb81eef2`; -retained safe result `native-fixture/execution-result.json` (original -`/tmp/nk48-groups-native-review-5pywb19z/result.json`). The source task supplies -no native owner assent, production rollout, protected session/evidence callbacks, -ordinary type admission or consumer login proof. LLDAP has no conditional -membership mutation or generation token here: exact readback cannot exclude -ABA or a concurrent external writer, so T14 remains open. - -2026-10-17 verified source follow-through: source commit `4f65e41` passed normal -local scanning and all 65 canonical provisioner tests. The actual disposable -LLDAP receipt passed all 14 oracles; independent verification on the pinned -daemon found both exact names and the run label absent. Source integration -includes the ADR-0015 documentation correction; the journal remains local-only. - -T14 source preparation is underway. Twenty-three pinned public sources identify -NetKingdom implementation/reconciliation, Platform custody/database governance -and rapp-postgres consumer provisioning; the inspected runtime binding does not -assign identity-provisioner a package. The existing User Engine runtime token -and pod route are not a protected-case caller lane. The native proposal preserves -the same journal seam on a dedicated CNPG consumer and requires authoritative -scope binding, admitted role/lease/placement/recovery and all LDAP writers fenced. -The declared exclusive maintenance window is not mechanical exclusion of WebUI, -helper or lifecycle writers. Capacity placement and EUR cost/risk remain owner -decisions. No package, database, credential, rollout or owner assent was created. -Custodian evidence: group-provenance-r1/native-storage-proposal-r1; final source, -projection and cleanup review: resume-integration-r1/publication-verification.json. - - -## T21 — Implement the PostgreSQL journal and prove disposable SQL compatibility - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T21 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T20] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "afe78e4d-408a-516a-ab92-e212e8a2d11d" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17: bounded source preparation and actual disposable PostgreSQL -compatibility only. T14 retains native storage, custody, callbacks, authorization, -all-writer isolation and production admission. Coordinator source publication and -projection remain separate follow-through; no source revision or task UUID is -invented here. T20 remains the historical local SQLite/actual LLDAP proof. - -The eight-path source candidate adds an injection-only PostgreSQL implementation -behind the existing owner journal seam, with explicit trusted tenant/directory/ -case/source/principal/epoch binding and independent continuity callbacks. It -persists bounded intent/created-only receipts, exact-one version updates, durable -active fences, and a content-bound journal chain. SQL commits precede independent -exact-marker acknowledgment; lost replies/checkpoints poison continuation and -retain uncertainty. A counter-only checkpoint is explicitly insufficient for -divergent clones. Migration does not create database/schema/credential, admit an -epoch or clear quarantine; production HTTP activation is absent pending trusted -callbacks. Pinned psycopg package/image-copy closure is included, without claiming -an image build or native dependency admission. - -Candidate base `6cb43c0cc55212363a5406b02db046e2384a7c40`; final eight-path patch -`sha256:5549d2982b61ff70aba4b3928fecd5639db0f1a732ab2f8630f678e7acf4d34d`. -All 82 source tests pass, alongside 13 fixture plan/diagnostic checks and two -source-backed snapshot regressions. Counts overlap the same source and fixture; -they are not additive native acceptance or completion percentages. - -The independently reviewed R5 fixture ran the actual SQL migration/backend and -existing provisioner path against cached pinned disposable PostgreSQL. Directory -operations deliberately used the existing synthetic LLDAP test double. All -manifest-declared phase oracles passed: creation-only inventory and DDL refusal; -separate-process replay/revoke with complete preexisting/shared visible-state -preservation; foreign-context refusal; concurrent exactly-once reservation and -stale version refusal; actual database fork with divergent bodies at the same -counter and fresh-object rejection of the losing exact checkpoint; retained -uncertainty after checkpoint/directory/SQL response loss; and actual pg_dump/ -pg_restore rollback refusal against the independently retained fixture checkpoint. -The checkpoint is fixture-only, not an admitted native owner evidence holder. - -Only generated credentials/state were used, with two nonroot/read-only containers -on private loopback, bounded tmpfs/CPU/memory/PIDs/lifetimes, no host ports/mounts, -no pulls and no production contact. The safe receipt reports both exact owned -containers absent, with no daemon uncertainty. Independent final pinned-daemon -cleanup verification remains coordinator follow-through. - -Failed R2/R3/R4 receipts and source revisions remain retained. R2's helper failure -subphase is unknown; R3 exposed a real backend bug where replacing nested receipt -objects lost the created ID held by ensure, fixed by acknowledging only the backend -version after commit/checkpoint. R4 verified that fix through actual SQL bootstrap, -then exposed fixture snapshot aliasing and empty deleted-group backing entries; -source-backed regressions corrected the snapshot without weakening complete -visible-prestate equality, and reject nonempty orphan membership. These refinements -belong to one trial, not extra native acceptance successes. - -Custodian evidence: `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/group-postgres-r1/`; -exact source/pre/postimages and retained predecessors; native R5 manifest -`sha256:d51f90816616848b93bcdc482e10a98d07061deb01eeed9e50700fc6e68b6051`; -`final-integration-r1/typed-execution-evidence.json` and byte-exact safe receipt -(original `/tmp/nk48-postgres-native-review-sguj7t8p/result.json`). No CNPG native -storage/HA/backup/lease/TLS/capacity/restore admission, authoritative protected -callbacks, real LDAP writer fencing/CAS/ABA exclusion, owner assent or production -endpoint activation is claimed. Those remain live T14 work. - - -## T22 — Establish registration recovery source gaps and complete descriptor review inventory - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T22 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "ea50d93b-0d04-55d2-98c4-9b6c3fe925b1" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17: source-only owner-contract review and complete review -inventory. Inspected the actual registration adapter, Warden Journal/Executor, -NetKingdom evidence compatibility checker and Audit Core custody/read surfaces. -No existing admitted holder/readback supplies authenticated original-attempt -recovery: payload/creation are process-local, persisted evidence references are -hashed, and reconcile receives a new attempt without original context. The exact -four-owner contract requirements and non-replayable missing/ambiguous cases are -recorded; no recovery callback, publisher, credential grant or native trust root -was installed. T15 retains implementation and actual acceptance. - -The complete source1.2 inventory maps all seven follow-through steps to their -existing owners, missing exact contracts and created-only rollback requirements. -The actual maintained adapter regenerated the sole existing register-client -machine descriptor against the delivered 13,633,409-byte checker and current -sealed-memfd snapshot source. The checker rehash and Warden Descriptor.decode -round-trip passed; six owner descriptors remain absent. Actual source commands -render canonical1.1 and explicitly selected1.2 with execution.permitted false; -ordinary1.2 case admission still refuses its acknowledged/unimplemented type. -Canonical type/case/acknowledgment bytes were hash-checked unchanged. No tests were -added or rerun, no native configuration or effect occurred, and no owner assent -or complete machine bundle is claimed. T16 retains native executable custody, -complete exact descriptors, independent source review and normal version/type -admission. This extracted outcome supplies no native gate completion credit. - -Evidence in the-custodian: -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/native-registration-r1/`, especially -original-attempt-review.json, descriptor-composition.json, source-verification.json, -source-manifest.json and manifest.json. The prior sixteen-gate audit remains -immutable. Publication, normal task UUID allocation and projection are separate -coordinator follow-through; no Hub UUID is assigned by this source record. - - -## T23 — Review native journal package assignment and storage integration boundaries - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T23 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "6e7cd483-c7af-53a2-9d0a-3d76b6fb49ee" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17: source/package placement and protected integration review -only, separate from T21's completed PostgreSQL source and disposable-SQL proof. -The owner review recommends a dedicated independently rolled-back -`rapp-identity-provisioner`, owned by NetKingdom on rail-kubernetes, with a -schema-valid draft declaration and no reef binding. No repository, registry -entry, native package assignment or owner assent was created. Existing -rapp-user-engine ownership/token delivery does not assign it the provisioner. - -The complete current rapp-postgres catalog has six declared consumers: four on -platform-pg and two on platform-pg-2. The inert renderer-valid provisioner -candidate fits platform-pg-2 at three of four, requesting one migration plus -four runtime connections; placing it on the first cell is refused as a fifth. -Normative package schema and full-catalog capacity/render checks passed. The -four-consumer ceiling is estimated, not measured native headroom, and no current -SQL session, backup or restore acceptance is claimed. - -The exact review identifies remaining package/substrate, SQL role/lease/TLS, -network and backup/recovery contracts; independently authenticated protected -scope callbacks; an external content-bound checkpoint holder with atomic -advance/loss handling; and all-LDAP-writer exclusion or provider CAS/generation, -including lifecycle cascades and remove/readd ABA. Generic Audit custody is not -that checkpoint service. A database-only fence, final reread or one replica -cannot exclude foreign directory writers. The native acceptance/recovery matrix -keeps storage/lease admission separate from separately approved directory -mutation; the production activation remains disabled pending trusted integration. - -Evidence in the-custodian: -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/native-storage-r1/OWNER-REVIEW.md`, -source-validation.json and hash-bound source-references.json, plus the inert -proposed declaration/consumer and renderer outputs. No native resource, lease, -credential, deployment, destructive effect, independent holder or native owner -acceptance was delivered. T14 retains these live gates with its original UUID -and progress status. This completed review adds no duplicate T21 acceptance -credit; publication, task UUID allocation and projection remain coordinator -follow-through and no UUID is hand-assigned here. - -## T24 — Ensure-groups adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T24 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "1a3931ee-3b5f-52fc-9295-4073804f4bd2" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): ensure-groups-adapter.py, 8 tests (commit 5a2e7d6). Binds to the T14 PostgreSQL journal and refuses SQLite or a foreign binding. It accepts only canonical 1.1 cases, so T30 must add an explicit 1.2 path. It calls the provisioner's private `_group_binding`; a public helper is the cleaner shared edit. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17 so each candidate fits one per-task budget. Bind group creation to T14's journal/provenance seam; refuse without trusted journal callbacks. -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py`, its tests and -`registration-adapter.md`). Requires positive and refusal fixtures and -created-only rollback. Keeps canonical 1.1 as the default and uses no -`--allow-unimplemented` admission. Done means the candidate and its tests are -committed. NetKingdom (directory) owner source review before pinning, and any native action, -stay separate gates and are not supplied by this task. - -## T25 — Mint-secret adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T25 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "0de2a7d9-874d-578b-a076-f653fe42e30b" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): mint-secret-adapter.py, 9 tests (commit 558c5bc). Value-free receipts only. The receipt schema `railiance-platform.custody-mint.v1` and the mint/destroy capability interface are proposals that Platform must confirm. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17 so each candidate fits one per-task budget. Platform-owned custody evidence seam: the adapter records value-free mint evidence only and never handles secret values. -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py`, its tests and -`registration-adapter.md`). Requires positive and refusal fixtures and -created-only rollback. Keeps canonical 1.1 as the default and uses no -`--allow-unimplemented` admission. Done means the candidate and its tests are -committed. Platform owner source review before pinning, and any native action, -stay separate gates and are not supplied by this task. - -## T26 — Deliver-secret adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T26 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "94b3cbf0-c908-5ac6-b0db-67385c3e021c" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): deliver-secret-adapter.py, 8 tests (commit 1b60f6e). The lane `platform-secret-delivery` and the schema `netkingdom.deliver-secret.v1` are proposals that Platform must confirm. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17 so each candidate fits one per-task budget. Platform-owned delivery evidence seam (ESO/custody), value-free. -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py`, its tests and -`registration-adapter.md`). Requires positive and refusal fixtures and -created-only rollback. Keeps canonical 1.1 as the default and uses no -`--allow-unimplemented` admission. Done means the candidate and its tests are -committed. Platform owner source review before pinning, and any native action, -stay separate gates and are not supplied by this task. - -## T27 — Bind-env adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T27 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "e56365f8-29b5-5c89-a329-8115f9f3b2a7" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): bind-env-adapter.py, 5 tests (commit 6fbce73). Binds references only. To fit the budget it does not yet wrap a full Warden `Adapter` like T13 (source-digest pin, authenticated evidence, parent-session revocation); it returns `(reference, run, rollback)`. That wrapping is a prerequisite for T30. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17 so each candidate fits one per-task budget. Bind the issuer Deployment env reference to the delivered secret reference, without values. -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py`, its tests and -`registration-adapter.md`). Requires positive and refusal fixtures and -created-only rollback. Keeps canonical 1.1 as the default and uses no -`--allow-unimplemented` admission. Done means the candidate and its tests are -committed. NetKingdom runtime owner source review before pinning, and any native action, -stay separate gates and are not supplied by this task. - -## T28 — Deliver-consumer-secret adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T28 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "6dab281c-ea9a-5a17-a83f-e8e9a4d4484f" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): deliver-consumer-secret-adapter.py, 5 tests (commit 650c1ac). Type 1.2 only. It assumes the owner has validated ESO TokenRequest and the controller-RBAC admission; that stays an owner gate. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17 so each candidate fits one per-task budget. Consumer-side delivery evidence seam, value-free. -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py`, its tests and -`registration-adapter.md`). Requires positive and refusal fixtures and -created-only rollback. Keeps canonical 1.1 as the default and uses no -`--allow-unimplemented` admission. Done means the candidate and its tests are -committed. Platform and Apps owner source review before pinning, and any native action, -stay separate gates and are not supplied by this task. - -## T29 — Hand-over adapter source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T29 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "129db41d-4560-5e20-9f3b-c3c91e0a5601" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): handover-adapter.py, 8 tests (commit ec63539). The owner `apps` and lane `apps-consumer-handover` are proposals that the Apps owner must confirm. It has no reconcile path; restart handling follows T15. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17 so each candidate fits one per-task budget. Apps-owned consumer verification and hand-over receipt seam. -Source candidate only, modelled on the T13 registration adapter -(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-registration-adapter.py`, its tests and -`registration-adapter.md`). Requires positive and refusal fixtures and -created-only rollback. Keeps canonical 1.1 as the default and uses no -`--allow-unimplemented` admission. Done means the candidate and its tests are -committed. Apps owner source review before pinning, and any native action, -stay separate gates and are not supplied by this task. - -## T30 — Compose the descriptor set over the reviewed candidates - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T30 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T24, NK-WP-0048-T25, NK-WP-0048-T26, NK-WP-0048-T27, NK-WP-0048-T28, NK-WP-0048-T29] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "6f6073ac-52dd-5b70-8874-6d76d4c072e4" -``` - -2026-10-17 done: coordinator review r3 (the-custodian `nk48-adapters-1.2-review/coordinator-review-r3.json`, -fd07eaa) approved all nine files at ff8f597, with R2-F1..F3 resolved, an independent -reconstruction of 117 passing and no open findings. This is a source review only: -it grants no owner admission, pin or native authority. Owner review and admission -continue under T16, which also takes the r2 observations, including the -`warden_executes: false` steps that carry execution descriptors. - -2026-10-17 coordinator review r2 (the-custodian `nk48-adapters-1.2-review/coordinator-review-r2.json`) -approved five files and rejected three, plus the artifact. The fixes are merged in -2ee4ed0: R2-F1, mint-secret revokes the session and the broker grant -independently (eeed8e1); R2-F2, deliver-secret binds to the admitted case and -derives its Secret and custody path, with no caller reference (640292c); R2-F3, -bind-env pins its five-file closure, and a new closure-completeness test checks -every adapter (d16db30). Each regression test failed on 68f4bbb. The artifact is -regenerated, and the full suite including kernel admission passed 117. Next is -the r3 review. Open for owner review under T16: the type marks four steps -`warden_executes: false`, yet each has an execution descriptor. - -2026-10-17 founder confirmed every proposed lane and schema name for T25-T29 -as-is. The artifact records them as `names_confirmed` (by founder, 2026-10-17), -and no step is still `owner_confirmation_required`. Next: independent source -review of the seven adapters. - -2026-10-17 founder decision (supersedes the `agent` decision below): the -mint-secret actor is `human`. Coordinator review r1 (the-custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-adapters-1.2-review/coordinator-review-r1.json`, -finding NK48-R1-F1) showed that unchanged kernel a45cf47 refuses every -`effect: mint` admission whose actor is not `human` ("agent mint is -forbidden"), so the `agent` descriptor could never be admitted. Adapter, tests -and composer comment updated and the artifact regenerated (mint-secret -descriptor digest now `sha256:8c40c2884f8ba15e8cb6c98f33419c395e54fce8ef33d6e1a34782cf3f1fcfa9`); -98 tests pass against a45cf47. The set needs an independent r2 review. - -2026-10-17 `test_admit_1_2_adapter_descriptors.py` runs Warden's own -`Executor.admit` on all seven composed 1.2 descriptors, with the real 1.2 -type, the 1.2 forgejo example case, the reviewed `BrowserInputs` validator and -fixture-only trust (stand-in adapters, nothing dispatched). It also pins that -an agent mint descriptor is refused ("agent mint is forbidden") and that a -wrong lane is refused for every step. Against the old `agent` revision -(582ab9f) it fails as expected. Combined suite: 102 passed on ops-warden a45cf47 -and on current ops-warden. Fixture admission is not owner admission or a pin. - -2026-10-17 founder decision: the mint-secret actor is `agent`, not `warden`. -The kernel is unchanged. The adapter, its test and the composer were updated and -the artifact regenerated; all seven steps pass `Descriptor.decode` and -`complete_executable_descriptor_set` is true (98 tests passed). The artifact -stays `not_an_admission`, with no owner review, admission or dispatch permission. - -2026-10-17 composer merged (60b41a1 via 3c62bec) with follow-up 376b44b (merged; -combined suite 98 passed). `compose-1.2-descriptors.py` loads 1.2 only through an -explicit version root and refuses partial, duplicate, unknown or mismatched maps. -`descriptor-composition-1.2.candidate.json` is a reviewable candidate, marked -`not_an_admission`, with canonical 1.1 unchanged. ensure-groups and hand-over now -carry and honour `parent-session` revocation, and the hand-over owner is -parameterised (`railiance-apps` for Forgejo). Six of the seven steps pass -`Descriptor.decode`. mint-secret is still refused: its actor `warden` is outside -the kernel's human/agent set, and Platform (with ops-warden, if the kernel should -change) must decide. Five steps carry `owner_confirmation_required` names. The -set is complete only after both. Owner review, the canon section 6 successor -revision and admission remain T16's. - -2026-10-17 prerequisites merged (65559ef; combined suite 78 passed): -ensure-groups accepts 1.2 via an explicit `version_root='1.2'` (531151b), with -1.1 still the default. bind-env is now a full Warden v1 `Adapter` (7442d21); its -kernel-level fixture tests like T13's are still missing, and its `build()` -signature changed. Composition is unblocked in source. Owner confirmation of -the proposed step, lane and schema names remains before pinning. - -2026-10-17 inputs from T24–T29 that composition must resolve: T24 accepts -only 1.1 while T28 accepts only 1.2, so add an explicit 1.2 ensure-groups path; -T27 still needs full Warden `Adapter` wrapping; the lane, schema and owner names -proposed in T25, T26 and T29 need owner confirmation before pinning. - -Split from T16 on 2026-10-17. Compose the seven-step source 1.2 descriptor set -through the existing explicit version-root selection over T13 and T24–T29. No -partial descriptor map, canonical 1.1 stays the default, and new descriptor bytes -need a reviewed successor revision under canon section 6. Owner review and -admission remain T16's. - -## T31 — Restart and lost-receipt fixtures against Warden's original-intent interface - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T31 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "ed1ccd87-89a0-5e69-885c-0eaf5ab0bb5a" -``` - -2026-10-17 done (source candidate only; merged in 7dbe75f; combined suite 69 passed): test_registration_original_intent_reconcile.py, 8 tests (commit 74adcd7), runs against the unmodified ops-warden a45cf47. The holder is a test-only in-memory store. For real T15 support the T13 adapter's `build()` needs an injected holder/readback capability, a `reconcile_original` callback, and a `verify` that accepts reconcile results. Rollback after restart stays refused until there is an owner contract. - -Split from T15 on 2026-10-17. ops-warden published the original-intent -lookup/context interface in `src/warden/case_run.py` (`OriginalIntent`, -`Journal.original_intent`, `Adapter.reconcile_original`; commit `a45cf47`). -Build T15's restart/lost-receipt fixtures for the registration adapter against -it: the original intent is kept separate from the reconcile attempt; wrong -attempt/case/source/principal and unavailable-holder cases refuse; and a missing -or ambiguous record stays uncertain, with no add replay or undo. The interface -is Warden's own dispatch record, not owner-authenticated created-only provenance. -Selecting the actual authenticated holder stays a T15 owner gate. - - -## T32 — Restore independent agent-mint admission regression coverage - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T32 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "c6d0a27e-f6a7-5df0-95f6-3e7473d38bb5" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17, source tests only. Extracted from T16's coordinator r5 -finding NK48-R5-F1; no earlier adapter outcome is counted again. The real 1.3 -admission test now separately checks the committed descriptor map, an in-memory -fixture map acknowledging the changed agent descriptor to reach the independent -mint prohibition, and the human descriptor under an explicit fixture agent -runtime marker. Only `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/test_admit_1_3_type.py` changes. - -Against frozen Warden `117fec9241e7b985dfb187b992e173d0a5dc3700`, the new -suite passes 10 tests / 32 subtests. Independent mutation evidence removes only -the mint admission guard in scratch: both new guard tests fail while eight -controls pass; the old suite passed that mutant. Custodian independently reran -the canonical successor: 10 tests / 32 subtests pass. Evidence: -`the-custodian/docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-r5-f1-implementation-r1/` -(patch, frozen/mutant results and canonical-validation.json). No descriptor, -parameter pin, catalog, acknowledgment, kernel or native execution changed. -T16 still owns actual composition and admission; F2/F3 follow below. - -## T33 — Close the issuer-store reference finding with Platform source - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T33 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "5ace28ff-a4cb-5647-a8f6-3cd54bb9d0a5" -``` - -Owner: Platform for the fixed store/template source and its delivery boundary; -NetKingdom for the 1.3 type reference. Split from T16's current coordinator r5 -finding NK48-R5-F2. Next action: independently review the prepared Platform -candidate and publish a concrete owner-controlled issuer store kind/name/scope -and template reference, then integrate only that exact proposed source into the -1.3 deliver-secret entry point and regenerate its composition artifact. Candidate -and current review evidence are under Custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-r5-f2-implementation-r1/` -and `nk48-r5-f2-review-r1/`. - -Completion requires exact committed source, a passing independent source review -and unchanged type parameter bytes. No consumer store may be inferred as issuer -store, and no source declaration supplies owner assent, installed ESO support, -CCR/grant changes or a real delivery capability. Those remain existing -RPF-1.3-T4 and T16 admission/native requirements. - -## T34 — Close the consumer configuration inverse finding - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T34 -status: progress -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "37f43c40-d014-544e-aa0b-5219dd4a6b93" -``` - -Owner: Apps for consumer configuration and inverse; NetKingdom for exact type -placement. Split from T16's coordinator r5 finding NK48-R5-F3. Next action: -independently review and implement the owner transaction/inverse through the -existing RAPPS-WP-0016-T05 path, with authenticated durable before/after release -provenance, exclusive serialization of all release writers and a fresh authorized -attended session for every inverse attempt after the hand-over session is revoked. -The inverse must remain reachable for public clients, confidential NO_CHANGE -secret delivery and verification failure before a hand-over receipt exists. - -Completion requires real owner configuration/inverse source bindings and -independent regressions, then exact reviewed 1.3 entry/rollback text and composed -artifact. A synthetic wrapper with an injected backend alone is insufficient. -Keep hand-over receipt rollback receipt-only and secret deletion created-only; -preexisting or drifted resources must refuse unsafe inverse. Candidate evidence: -Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-r5-f3-implementation-r1/` -and `nk48-r5-f3-review-r1/`. Source review, owner acknowledgment and native proof -remain distinct. T16's final composition/admission and T06's native first case -are not completed by this refinement. - -2026-10-23: the F3 type text is integrated. The corrected r2 candidate (Custodian -`nk48-r5-f3-implementation-r2/type-owner-configuration-inverse.candidate.patch`, -which addresses review RAPPS-F3-SESSION-1) is applied to the 1.3 type. The -hand-over entry_point and auth now describe one owner configuration transaction -around the consumer's Helm change, for public clients and NO_CHANGE delivery -alike, with an independently reachable inverse. Every inverse is a distinct -fresh attended owner operation that never reuses the revoked hand-over session. -The hand-over rollback stays receipt-only; delivery removal stays created-only -after deactivation is proven. -- Type validator: `OK oidc-browser-relying-party@1.3 (proposed)`. 22 package - tests and 363 adapter tests pass. The seven descriptors are unchanged by this - text. -- Still owed: railiance-apps adopting the revised C3 placement, then - RAPPS-WP-0016-T05's real wrapper, journal, inverse session and all-writer - release exclusion. After that, coordinator r7 and the owner re-checks. - -## T35 — Align source admission fixtures with the authenticated catalog and attended-session API - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T35 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "cf1d6ab3-846e-53ea-8575-d6347b6f4769" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17, source fixture compatibility only. Distinct from T32's -independent agent-mint regression repair: both remaining opaque catalog byte -placeholders now use one well-formed synthetic catalog whose exact bytes are -bound by the fixture evidence verifier. The fixture mirrors the six relevant -Warden lane shapes; four draft statuses are hypothetically active, while both -Apps establishing login references remain unresolved. No real catalog entry, -owner login choice or production parameter pin changes. - -Against the reviewed mode-aware Warden source now integrated at -`ae7bc73b4f4bac22454144959b870d161498e0af`, scratch validation passes 31 tests -and 53 subtests. Five resolvable 1.3 descriptors conditionally admit under -fixture-only acknowledgment and pinning; both Apps attended steps refuse before -execution. Changed catalog bytes refuse, all independent mint-guard tests still -reach their intended guard, and the registration fixture's actual kernel -run/rollback and uncertain-result paths pass with synthetic owner callbacks. -The registration fixture explicitly aligns its in-memory proposed type lane -with its current descriptor; canonical 1.1 is unchanged. - -The same tests against predecessor `117fec9241e7b985dfb187b992e173d0a5dc3700` -pass 31 tests and 51 subtests, with only the two new Apps refusal assertions -failing because that predecessor lacks the attended-session catalog check. -Tests target the reviewed current API; the parser or Apps gate is not weakened -for predecessor compatibility. Evidence and root source review: -`the-custodian/docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/nk48-catalog-fixture-update-r1/` -and `nk48-catalog-fixture-publication-r2/`. Root canonical validation passes -31 tests / 53 subtests against Warden `922c26d` (the same reviewed code plus -one normal allocator-only source UUID commit). Publication receipts belong -in that packet. This records source -fixture work, not native T03, owner assent, exact-type acknowledgment, PIN-1, -composition/admission completion under T16 or the native first case under T06. -T33 and T34 retain their existing issuer-store and consumer-inverse work. - -## T36 — Prove the actual Forgejo chart and claim-gate compatibility - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T36 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "7ba71abd-3c85-53ce-9837-7b0653ec709c" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17, public source and offline rendering only. Split from T16's -consumer configuration obligation after inspecting the actual Apps chart -12.5.0 and overridden Forgejo image 11.0.3. The existing `CLIENT_SECRET` key can -be consumed unchanged through the chart's indexed OAuth environment reference; -its `existingSecret` shortcut instead requests incompatible `key`/`secret` -keys. The actual CLI and callback support one literal required-claim value, -so they cannot express the first case's any-of set `forge-admins`, -`forge-coulomb-owners`, `forge-coulomb-readers`. Joined strings and regexes do -not implement that set. An invented plural Helm key renders but produces an -unsupported CLI flag. - -Evidence: Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/apps-chart-projection-r1/`. -The chart archive matches its official public index digest; exact upstream -source and render checks are retained. Nine source/render tests pass, also -independently reproduced by the coordinator with empty HOME, read-only public -inputs, no host configuration and a network-disabled bwrap namespace. -The full first-case preparer refuses rather than weaken the group gate. -No actual OAuth source, deployment, credential, admitted acceptance or native -login is produced. T37 owns the implementation gap; T34 retains the independent -configuration/inverse/session/journal/exclusion obligations. T16 composition -and T06 native first-case acceptance stay open. - -## T37 — Implement the exact any-of consumer gate through the proper owner - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T37 -status: progress -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "e493fb4b-52d2-54d4-a732-b42242855b3e" -``` - -Coordinator: NetKingdom; consumer implementation: Apps; issuer changes, if any, -belong to KeyCape and its governing authorization contracts. Next action: -implement and independently review a faithful supported consumer gate for the -unchanged three-group access set, using T36's pinned chart/image evidence. -The active source investigation prepares a backward-compatible Forgejo -multi-value required-claim extension; it does not select or deploy a new image. - -An app-specific issuer allowed/denied claim is not automatically admissible: -the single-PDP rule and KeyCape's role must be reviewed before moving policy -into the issuer. Earlier negative-claim omission is also unsafe with the actual -provider's ID-token/UserInfo merge: omission can retain a stale positive claim. -Keep those adverse source findings; no KeyCape feature, policy authority or -current client binding is inferred from that proposal. - -Done when actual owner source implements the exact set, tests cover each group -alone, combinations, missing/malformed/nonmember/lookalike values and group -add/remove behavior, existing local sign-in/account-linking/group references -remain correct, and required owner reviews and exact source/case re-freeze are -recorded under the existing immutability rules. Verify the real chart/CLI/source -combination rather than Helm rendering alone. No joined value, single-group -substitute, unmanaged umbrella group, permissive login or new kernel step may -replace the accepted requirement. Actual consumer observations and governed -configuration/inverse evidence remain T06/T34 acceptance work. - -## T38 — Implement and independently compile the exact any-of source candidate - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T38 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "2c32b963-a87c-50a1-91e1-b07ea1fe4960" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17, source proposal and backend verification only. Split the -completed implementation evidence from T37. The isolated seven-path Forgejo -11.0.3 patch introduces a separate multi-value required-claim field and CLI -flag, preserves legacy singular behavior, and requires current well-formed -UserInfo groups before the existing provider merges ID-token claims. The -original exact three-group access set and groups claim remain unchanged. -No KeyCape authorization verdict, case/type acknowledgment or deployed image -is introduced. Existing consumer enforcement still needs the governing -architecture/owner review; this does not satisfy the target application's -independent Access Engine decision requirement. - -Candidate: Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/forgejo-required-claim-values-r1/`. -Independent technical review: `forgejo-required-claim-values-review-r1/`. -All 33 frozen packet digests and exact official-source pre/postimages match. -The actual full patched backend executable compiles offline under verified -official Go 1.24.3 in 304.79 seconds with sqlite/sqlite_unlock_notify tags. -Eight source/provider fixture race tests, five actual package tests and three -independent actual-package test functions pass; the latter include 14 named -subtests. Full frontend/release/container build and native browser behavior are -not claimed. The initial test-harness /dev/null Git-config failure is retained; -its corrected scratch-only config does not modify candidate code. - -The technical review accepts exact source for owner integration review, with no -formal owner assent. T39 owns reproducible release/package and image evidence; -T37 retains architecture acceptance, actual owner integration and exact review/ -re-freeze. T34 retains real operation/inverse/session/journal/writer-exclusion -bindings. T06's independent native first-case acceptance remains unchanged. - -## T39 — Package and review the actual consumer release and inverse prerequisites - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T39 -status: progress -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T38] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "513c43ae-05f2-5a65-9c80-a911b7d680b8" -``` - -Implementation owner: Apps; NetKingdom coordinates the existing T37/T16 case -contract. Next action: prepare a reproducible full frontend/backend/container -build from T38's reviewed official-source patch through Apps' existing owner -build path, with exact source/toolchain/dependency/base-image/output pins and -offline verification. Do not select, publish or deploy a replacement image as -an implied consequence of backend compilation. Prepare the concrete owner -source/release and native change proposal after verification. - -Resolve the actual persisted-source inverse before any image downgrade. Helm -chart omission and values/revision rollback do not remove the OAuth source; -the stock older image ignores the new list field and can weaken the gate. -Authoritative before/post/current/inverse application-source state, existing -secret/config preservation, fresh operation/inverse sessions, durable evidence -and effective exclusion of all release writers remain T34 obligations. Existing -linked users/external logins can make source deletion refuse; never delete users -or preexisting/shared sources to force an inverse. Retain the extended image -and reconcile rather than downgrade first. Exact capability/source evidence is -in T38's `OWNER-INVERSE.md`; list/update/delete tools alone are not admission. - -Completion requires the actual owner package/build/image provenance and tests, -the explicit architecture and owner dispositions (including the single-PDP -application profile), a verified application-state inverse path or honest -refusal/recovery contract, and an exact bounded deployment/verification/rollback -proposal. The chart's runtime client-secret argv confidentiality also needs its -owner boundary resolved; reference-only source does not prove it. Native go, -deployment and independent browser/group/revocation observations remain existing -T06/T16 and owner gates. No credentials, image deployment or new kernel step -is authorized by this task. - - -## T40 — Publish the independently reviewed full consumer build path - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T40 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T38] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "7cc93671-fe94-5108-a486-1b0029e69487" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-18, release source/tooling outcome extracted from T39. -Apps RAPPS-WP-0016-T06 owns the pinned official-source/frontend/bindata/static -binary/OCI recipe. The original profile produced identical complete binaries and -local OCI archives. Independent review rehashed those artifacts, re-extracted all -2,234 embedded files and found a host process argv visibility defect through -/proc. The corrected recipe adds a private PID namespace; a synthetic unrelated -process canary is visible with r1 and denied with exact r2. Existing full builds -are historical r1-profile evidence, not an executed full r2 build claim. - -Canonical Apps source c29408ae contains the six reviewed build paths plus its -work-record refinement; the normal owner projection receipt is in Custodian -apps-release-source-integration-r1. Exact candidate patch sha256:b7ad8f8fd908532800f4e7eb0f7ad85d77e21a0b729cb5115ade3d5fe3e4acd8 -and review sha256:6f016d53a7ec9ece2f9da9686e76127c52d17066f2b3d371628832ac9537ac5c -are retained with original changes-required review and harness refinements. -No image/default values, registry publication, formal owner assent or native -acceptance changed. T39 retains integrated successor package/image provenance, -architecture/owner dispositions and bounded deployment/inverse readiness. - -## T41 — Integrate the real private-input CLI and chart revision - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T41 -status: progress -depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T38] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "6edf049f-2c52-5040-8d38-0bb1bc78fa31" -``` - -Owner: Apps RAPPS-WP-0016-T07. Current public-source implementation adds actual -Forgejo add/update --secret-file and adapts the exact chart helper plus fixed -CLIENT_SECRET read-only subPath reference. Next: independently review the exact -candidate, including real CLI/SQLite update preservation and refusals, descriptor -file replacement/permissions and actual Helm command/mount rendering. Preserve -legacy and three-group semantics and the current custody route/key. Custody, -mount/reader/version admission and rotation/restart remain runtime obligations; -no agent or public receipt receives the value. Re-freeze the accepted software/ -chart/type/package only after review; T06 native proof remains separate. -Evidence under Custodian forgejo-private-input-r1; do not substitute a path flag -without suppressing the chart's legacy secret argument. - -## T42 — Integrate the actual durable application-source transaction and inverse - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T42 -status: progress -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "3d1b9128-bade-5bd9-8660-22a14eea2d37" -``` - -Owner: Apps RAPPS-WP-0016-T08; retained umbrella T34. Actual Forgejo model-layer -work compares complete raw persisted state privately and records intent/outcome -in the same DB transaction. SQLite write transactions and PostgreSQL table locks -must exclude competing DB writes; unsupported databases refuse. Tests include -real SQLite competing connections and process crash/restart. Fixed SQL-error, -slow-query and trace diagnostics must not leak private journal arguments. - -Next: independently review exact primitive/schema/logging/recovery code, then -bind it through authenticated current operation/inverse sessions and admitted -evidence/release serialization. The DB primitive itself grants no authority and -is not a complete operation backend. Its private journal introduces credential -copies in the owner's DB: track reader custody, capacity, retention and recovery; -never erase uncertainty or downgrade while a linked source prevents safe removal. -All application/Helm writers and current provider state remain T34 obligations. -Evidence under Custodian apps-operation-backend-r1; no private production DB read. - -## T43 — Bind the consumer and protected operations to the actual single PDP - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T43 -status: progress -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "ac77b046-1226-5e5a-a212-512cb4fdc484" -``` - -Owners: Access Engine for producer adapter/policy; Apps RAPPS-WP-0016-T09 for -consumer enforcement; retained umbrella T37. Next: implement and independently -review the producer-owned standalone Go adapter using exact pinned API/signing -source, current authenticated request/policy/registry/caller bindings and bounded -nonce/lifetime checks. The actual provider must validate issuer JWT signatures, -algorithm/audience/type/lifetime and retain a trusted identity snapshot separate -from mutable UserInfo groups/claims before calling the PDP. Do not treat decoded -Goth RawData as verified identity or let UserInfo overwrite issuer/tenant/assurance. -Any producer numeric-decoding fix needs actual producer/consumer parity tests. - -Keep the accepted three-group any-of set as PDP policy input; do not invent an -issuer verdict or allow a local compatibility gate to replace the PDP. A callback -check proves login only: actual HTTP/API/Git/SSH resource/action and session/ -revocation coverage must match the final application profile. No source adapter, -synthetic key, stale cached decision or Boolean callback constitutes authority. -Evidence under Custodian apps-access-engine-integration-r1; live source/key/caller/ -policy admission and full profile acceptance remain open under T06/T16/T37. - -## T44 — Record the approved temporary Forgejo public-client development flow - -```task -id: NK-WP-0048-T44 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "93d05845-dd12-52be-a146-79f4be2d4778" -``` - -Completed 19 October 2026; evidence recorded by Custodian coordinator, not a new owner approval. Existing independent NetKingdom review under T06 and founder decision `ad88edeb-7c7c-486f-a695-1a7abae5b20c` approved exact CUST80-FORGEJO-PUBLIC-BUILD-20261018 r2 digest `fcea2cd32b8ee2634d2ebeb9ef4b659b6b85f8a4878413ed96e5d06cb09892c3`. - -Source declaration published at `a7339fa60dc0fcf489811b4a32b785366d91e29c`; Apps declaration at `4d6a8dde21e3f800156c0aaa2bfe859c57908486`. Maintained keycape-client helper added only the exact public forgejo client, required MFA/S256 profile and HTTPS callback, validated live/proposed config, CAS-tested original registry revision and preserved unrelated bytes. Registry readback is revision 77451827; final inspection is exact-match/no change. One restart each of KeyCape and Forgejo completed Ready; images/resources/pod templates were unchanged except the restart annotation. Source ID 1 is netkingdom. Local sign-in remains available. The actual founder completed account linking, NetKingdom sign-in and same-account/repository/organisation continuity in under one minute (reported estimate). Supported workstation Git/API trial and cleanup passed. - -Evidence: [Custodian activation and human receipts](../../the-custodian/docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-18/forgejo-good-case-preparation-r1/activation-r2/README.md), [native checks](../../the-custodian/docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-18/forgejo-good-case-preparation-r1/activation-r2/native-verification-2026-10-19.json). - -This is the explicit temporary supervised build profile, not the original confidential SecurityCaseType acceptance. T06 and its existing dependencies retain that scope; full hardening remains CUST-WP-0082-T20 and the existing owner records. No new residual backlog, owner assent, permanent exception or runtime authority is inferred. One premature readiness observation failed before rollout completion; the later observation passed without repeating effects. No rollback occurred. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md deleted file mode 100644 index e708826..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1749 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0049 -type: workplan -title: "Remove bootstrap secret output and verify separated recovery custody" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -owner: codex -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-12" -updated: "2026-10-27" -flavor: implementation -depends_on: [] -state_hub_workstream_id: "17d315f0-829e-57c7-85cc-3a7914152804" ---- - -Native owner work for CUST-WP-0080 G08. This workplan remains active until the -remaining caller, service-recovery and custody acceptance gates are satisfied. -NK-WP-0045 covers the non-secret root-grant record. Founder-deferred exposure -rotation remains in CUST-WP-0073-T05; this plan does not silently reopen it. - -**Replanned 2026-10-16 at the operator's request:** substantial completed work is -now represented by completed tasks, and remaining work has separate deliverables, -dependencies and acceptance criteria. T01–T03 retain their historical IDs and Hub -UUIDs. Completed parts of the old T02/T03 umbrellas are extracted into T04–T14; -T02 now covers the current-caller ledger and T03 retains final owner acceptance. -These are retrospective task records of evidenced work, not additional delivery -or newly granted authority. The earlier dated narrative remains in Git at -`cc2dd01`; its evidence references are carried into the tasks below. - -**Closed 2026-10-27 (finished, builder mode):** 42 tasks done; 2 cancelled (T43 phase B paused, T44 moved). All production-readiness residuals live in [NK-WP-0055](NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md). - -**Next actions:** none here; continue in NK-WP-0055. - -**Closure:** T03 assembles owner acceptance after its named dependencies pass. -Passing archive recovery does not prove existing-user authentication, retained -MFA-token decryption, historical audit signatures or current caller admission. -The verified backup job stays active while those separate tasks are completed. - -## Remove secret-bearing output and ambient root discovery - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T01 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -state_hub_task_id: "d7ca8d5f-c5ff-5cba-bd25-038cb53ffe4e" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -2026-10-12: regression reproduced emergency/reprint root export, generation -prefix disclosure, permissive file modes, dry-run side effects and unattended -entry. Replaced emergency export with a non-secret guide (legacy secret-input -arguments refused), suppressed generation prefixes/tracing and set private -permissions. Bootstrap requires the registered public recipient and an attended -terminal; never generates/discovers a permanent private key. Encrypted resume -requires an explicit matching temporary custody key before cluster activity. -Dry-run is a non-mutating plan. The live cluster/apply path was not executed. - -A fresh uniquely named encrypted ops bundle follows apply; old delivery flags -cannot skip current acknowledgment. New acknowledgment state binds its SHA256 -and timestamp. Declining stops before cleanup/completion. This is an operator -statement, not an independent restore receipt. Historical fields remain unchanged. -Make/help/status/console and current credential guidance reflect that distinction. -Evidence and exact source manifest: Custodian -`docs/evidence/2026-10-12-netkingdom-security/bootstrap-handoff.json`. - -## Harden custody, SOPS and rotation source entry points - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T04 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "04c4e8be-5bd8-5d5c-99b1-79d8ae758462" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-12–13. Public-recipient-only encryption, explicit temporary -custody, private no-overwrite output, sanitized diagnostics, stdin-only secret -transport and failed-operation cleanup replace ambient-key and output paths. -SOPS read/edit/data-key rotation preserve recipient/MAC/source-version guards; -component rotations preserve unrelated fields and retain recovery candidates. -This records source and disposable-native proof, not live rotation or revocation. - -Evidence: Custodian `docs/evidence/2026-10-12-netkingdom-security/` receipts -`custody-entrypoints.json`, `sops-make-entrypoints.json`, `rotation-output.json`, -and `admin-bootstrap.json`; October13 `sops-write-callers.json`. - -## Repair component, diagnostic, LDAP and resolver callers - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T05 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T04] -state_hub_task_id: "e8e38f42-609e-5c07-a8e6-e73c8eb4ae95" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-13–14. Repaired KeyCape configuration and component Secret -publication, original privacyIDEA key export/restore transport, scoped MFA -counts, LDAP group maintenance and configuration-preserving resolver cutover. -Retired unsafe personal-token mint/refresh and direct LDAP lifecycle shortcuts. -Disposable native PI/LLDAP tests and source regressions passed; estate provider -admission, historical credential validity and service authentication remain T21/T22. - -Evidence: Custodian October13 `keycape-caller-reconciliation.json`, -`service-secret-callers.json`, `privacyidea-key-custody.json`, -`mfa-state-diagnostic.json`, `realm-bootstrap-repair.json`; October14 -`legacy-lldap-retirement.json`, `platform-group-boundary.json`, -`lldap-group-maintenance.json`, `resolver-cutover.json` under the corresponding -`docs/evidence/YYYY-MM-DD-netkingdom-security/` directories. - -## Inventory source callers and retire remaining unsafe delivery paths - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T06 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T04, NK-WP-0049-T05] -state_hub_task_id: "a5f50891-c5b2-513b-8670-e1915ee52015" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-15. Enumerated all 87 current non-test shell/Python callers -in the declared bootstrap/k8s scope plus Make/console/delivery adapters. Repaired -streamed encrypted bundle publication and fail-closed bootstrap/lab paths; -retired unsafe delivery copiers, root prompts, registry patchers and stale -rollback recipes. The attended inventory records source dispositions and their -native-proof limits. T02 separately maps these to current live users/owners. - -Evidence: [caller inventory](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/caller-source-inventory.json), -[attended procedures](../docs/attended-procedure-inventory.md) and the October15 -recovery evidence directory. No live production bootstrap or lab-init acceptance -is claimed. - -## Discover off-host coverage and recover the existing PI database - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T07 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -state_hub_task_id: "2d7302a2-319a-5633-bf58-d51ccd25ebf6" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-15–16. Bounded Storage Share/Scaleway inventories identified -existing database coverage and the missing full identity bundle. The operator -independently matched the backup recipient, then recovered the exact existing -PI dump: correct-key decryption, wrong-key refusal, isolated native PostgreSQL -restore/readback and cleanup passed (5 tokens, 2 resolvers, 2 realms). - -Evidence: October15 recovery `offsite-discovery-summary.json`, -`privacyidea-transfer-r1.json`, `privacyidea-database-drill-r1.json`, -`database-drill-review.json`. This database-only proof led to T08–T14. - -## Implement the full identity capture and archive recovery toolchain - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T08 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T06, NK-WP-0049-T07] -state_hub_task_id: "317ca173-c784-5329-9810-5e3d300604b8" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Defined exact LLDAP/Authelia/KeyCape/privacyIDEA assets, -Deployment/PVC/reference bindings, original keys and snapshot consistency limits. -Implemented native SQLite/PG capture, streamed age sealing, strict data-bearing -manifest checks, provider readback, independent retrieval, bounded retention, -root runtime and attended archive verifier. All 56 focused checks passed, -including actual synthetic encrypted/native PostgreSQL recovery. - -Evidence: [profile](../tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json), -[implementation review](../docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-implementation/review.json), -and the live evidence's tested ESO-default/host-binding corrections. Production -archive recovery is separately evidenced in T13. - -## Admit and verify the two scoped backup credential deliveries - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T09 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T08] -state_hub_task_id: "4a47eb2a-7e42-5ae7-9df1-f5ede746eca1" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Platform CCR-2026-0048/0049 are verified. The operator -approved folder-only provider-normalized publisher21/retention25 rights, including -re-sharing, in addition to the original rollout. Coding-agent denials precede KV -publication. Exact 900-second single-policy readers, wrong-SA/namespace/audience -rejection, metadata/sibling/old-escrow/token-create denials, ESO equality and -reader/session revocation passed. Operator passwords and age private keys are -not job credentials. - -Evidence: live `publisher-setup-verified.json`, `retention-setup-verified.json`, -`publisher-native-delivery-verified.json`, `retention-native-delivery-verified.json`; -approval decisions `40bfae40-6108-4e51-8613-073339f5345f` and -`5edd5203-fae7-461b-8775-5d22b7873971`; Platform CCR files. - -## Apply capture isolation and install the guarded node runtime - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T10 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T08, NK-WP-0049-T09] -state_hub_task_id: "0519444c-d559-5455-aa27-8c5dc8b832b0" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Applied exact UID/resource-version/spec-guarded DNS -selector exclusions, preserving ordinary service matches. Capture refuses any -remaining helper allow policy. Installed immutable runtime sources bound to the -actual hostname, machine identity and cluster UID. Disabled-unit replacement -checked previous contents and retained rollback bytes. Health unit validation -passed. Activation remained gated until T13. - -Evidence: live `isolation-applied.json`, `capture-ready-plan.json`, -`installed-runtime-packet-r2.json`, `upgrade-disabled-runtime.py`. Actual complete -hardened-job execution is recorded in T14. - -## Connect recovery to Railiance bootstrap and reuse discovery - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T11 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T08] -state_hub_task_id: "d69af493-4026-56a8-a526-c267d90dce18" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Added the Railiance bootstrap `identity-recovery` -dispatcher and independent-custody → isolated verification → layer/service-owner -handoff. Updated `capability.security.bootstrap-recovery`, linked bootstrap -sequencing and composed reuse-surface federation. Keyword discovery for identity -backup, restore, privacyIDEA and disaster recovery was verified. The operator -actually used this handoff in T13. No unattended production importer is claimed. - -Evidence: [ceremony](../docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md), owning capability -entry, `railiance-bootstrap/docs/identity-recovery.md`, bootstrap commit `d1dcfde` -and reuse-surface federation commit `662782e`. - -## Create and verify the first full off-host identity bundle - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T12 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T09, NK-WP-0049-T10] -state_hub_task_id: "decb415a-8012-521c-9dbe-d73c6ff0bbfb" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Captured original service keys/current data plus the -linked native PI database dump, sealed and published a unique Storage Share -artifact, then downloaded it and verified size/digest before publishing its index. -Helper and plaintext cleanup passed. Artifact: -`net-kingdom-identity-20261016T063159Z-5882771aa2ce.tar.age` (109738344 bytes). - -Evidence: live `actual-capture.json`, `actual-offsite.json`; ciphertext SHA256 -`7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30`. -No age private key was needed by the capture job. - -## Independently retrieve and recover the complete actual archive - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T13 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T11, NK-WP-0049-T12] -state_hub_task_id: "602d4921-cfac-5e5b-9993-4fbf67195c7d" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Independently downloaded the exact first generation -through attended Backup-account custody, rehashed it locally and revoked the -session. The operator used the independently held age key through the bootstrap -handoff. Correct/wrong-key cases, all 36 manifest files/hashes, original RSA pairs, -SQLite integrity and isolated native PG16.14 restore/readback passed; plaintext -and containers were removed. No key or restored secret values reached the agent. - -Evidence: live `independent-owner-transfer.json`, `actual-full-archive-recovery.json`, -`actual-full-recovery-review.json`. Existing-user/MFA authentication and old audit -signatures are deliberately separate T16–T20 outcomes. - -## Activate and prove the complete recurring backup and retention job - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T14 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T10, NK-WP-0049-T13] -state_hub_task_id: "eaf0708f-b3b7-5531-8172-95edf30c3a19" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16 after T13. Both daily backup/retention and hourly health -timers are enabled/active. The actual hardened systemd service passed retention -before/after a second capture/upload/download (Result=success, ExecMainStatus=0). -Both verified generations are retained, the independently recovered point is -pinned, and nothing was deleted. Helpers/plaintext were cleaned; failure markers -and reporting outbox are empty. Health check succeeded. - -Evidence: live `activation-result.json`, `activation-review.json`, -`recurring-job-review.json`. Cadence: daily 03:45 UTC plus up to 5 minutes jitter, -hourly health, 25-hour freshness bound. Second-provider/host-loss gaps go to T24; -this completed task is not a full-estate recovery claim. - -## Map current callers, owners and native acceptance gaps - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T02 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T06] -state_hub_task_id: "479d6970-6516-50f5-9436-bb5b56d58aad" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -The source inventory and known legacy objects exist; a complete current-use -ledger is not yet accepted. Next action is read-only reconciliation of the 93 -entries in the latest October15 source inventory (the earlier snapshot had 87) against active Make/bootstrap/operator routes and owner evidence. - -**Done when:** each entry is identified as current, retired or owner-deferred, -with its owner, credential route, current consumer(s), native evidence or exact -missing proof, and next responsible task. Explicitly cover the historical -`sso/keycape-pi-token` and `mfa/privacyidea-trigger-admin` objects, lab init, -factor diagnostic delivery, LDAP group/provider boundary, resolver cutover and -root-output/isolation boundaries. Secret presence is not credential validity. -Send current native checks to T21 and historical revocation/rotation decisions to -T22. Do not reopen completed source repairs without a new finding. - -2026-10-23 first slice (read-only, mechanical): -[ledger draft](../docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t02-caller-ledger/caller-ledger.json). -For all 93 inventory entries it records presence, sha256 drift against the -October15 inventory, the last commit, and references from Make, bootstrap or -console routes and from runbook/doc markdown. Candidate statuses: -- 28 have an active Make/bootstrap route. -- 26 have a documented operator route. -- 11 are retired, refusing entry points. -- 11 are unrouted diagnostics. -- 17 are unrouted and need an owner disposition: privacyIDEA bootstrap/policy - helpers, four KeyCape rollout helpers and the four bootstrap-recovery tools. -5 entries have drifted since the inventory (Makefile, sops-custody-unlock, -sops-private, keycape-client, identity-backup-profile). These are candidates -only, not owner dispositions. Next slices: (2) fill in owner, credential route -and consumers for the 17 unrouted and 5 drifted entries, plus the explicitly -named historical objects; (3) add native evidence or the exact missing proof and -the next task for all entries, and route checks to T21 and T22. - -2026-10-23 slices 2 and 3 are complete. T02 is **done**. Every one of the 93 -entries now records a disposition, owner, credential route, consumers, evidence -and next task: 59 current, 12 current diagnostic, 7 current -recovery/internal/repair, 11 retired, 4 owner-deferred greenfield/initial -activation (including `authentication-policy-rollout.py`, retained because a -recovery rebuild of the issuer needs its initial activation again), and 1 superseded once -NK-WP-0048 admits 1.3 (`vergabe-client-rollout.py`). The 5 drifted entries are -attributed to their reviewed commits. Historical objects: `sso/keycape-pi-token` -and `mfa/privacyidea-trigger-admin` are retired in source (no current reader), -but the objects were still present on 2026-10-15 and revocation is unproven. -They route to T22 and to NK-WP-0022's deletion approval. Lab init, factor -diagnostics, the LDAP group boundary and the resolver cutover appear as their -entry-point rows. Owner acceptance and native checks stay with T21/T22. The -four recovery tools still need a runbook home; T24 G3 covers that. - -## Prepare the isolated full-service restore and acceptance packet - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T15 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T08, NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T27, NK-WP-0049-T28, NK-WP-0049-T29, NK-WP-0049-T30] -state_hub_task_id: "1d1eb903-a4b0-5bc4-a421-0b842d7f68ae" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -**Prepared draft scope moved to T27.** See -`docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md`: restore order, containment, safe evidence -and per-service positive/negative checks are drafted. Read-only current runtime -image digests were observed for all four services; correspondence to the selected -archive and independent image availability are not yet proved. - -**Next action:** admit a named disposable target/private route, verify and stage -matching images independently, obtain private existing-user/MFA test inputs and -review version-specific native commands with service owners. Incorporate T02's -ledger before submitting current-caller acceptance. - -2026-10-16 checkpoint: T28 completed the exact local image save/load/inspect -and T29 prepared and natively tested the bounded LLDAP stage. Its actual owner -run is T16 and can proceed independently of the remaining multi-service packet. -The other service adapters, matching archive/runtime lineage and private -existing-user/MFA inputs are still required; no blanket T15 completion is claimed. - -**Done when:** service owners accept the exact targets/procedure, existing-user -and MFA test identities/input custody are available without posting secrets, -outbound notification/provider writes are disabled, and every required new -credential or production effect has its own owner decision. The verifier deletes -its plaintext; it is not a production importer. This task prepares authority and -inputs for T16–T20, not an automatic production restore. - -2026-10-23: the T02 ledger is incorporated into -`docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md`. Acceptance for current callers uses -its `current` rows, and the two historical Secrets are excluded from restore -scope. Still owner-held: a named disposable target and route, archive/runtime -image lineage, private existing-user/MFA inputs, and service-owner acceptance. - - -2026-10-27 founder decision (option A, builder mode): T15 is **done**. Owner acceptances: key-cape `fc9f09a` (`docs/nk49-isolated-restore-owner-acceptance-2026-10-27.md`, issuer-side restore accepted with residuals K1 browser/PKCE clients not exercised, K2 post-archive changes, K3 one-key check tied to current release, K4 receipt outside Git); railiance-platform `5658150` (RPF-WP-0064, OpenBao phase A accepted for builder mode, residuals R1–R8); founder for the NetKingdom-owned LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA lanes on the T16, T17, T19 and T20 owner runs. Residuals that need a joint live run go to T44. - -## Prove restored LLDAP directory and existing-user authentication - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T16 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T29] -state_hub_task_id: "b64d4d6a-e851-58d1-9929-f03343147de0" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: NetKingdom directory/User Engine owners. Restore the captured -original directory/configuration in the admitted isolated environment. - -**Done when:** user, group and membership identities are preserved; an independently -supplied existing-user credential authenticates; a wrong credential is refused; -provider writes/outbound effects stay confined; cleanup is verified. Native -fixtures from T05 and SQLite integrity from T13 do not satisfy this current-data -acceptance. Record only safe counts, identities and outcomes. - - -Completed 2026-10-16 at 18:37 UTC. The operator privately supplied the -independent age key and an existing backup-era account credential to the exact -local executor. All 36 archive hashes and the known ciphertext/source/target -bindings matched. Native existing-user LDAP bind passed; explicit invalid -credentials were rejected. The original seven users, 17 groups, 13 memberships -and the available attribute/schema rows were preserved across service startup, -authentication and graceful shutdown. The container had only loopback/no -external routes; pre-import isolation and container/tmpfs cleanup passed. -No production endpoint was contacted or secret exported to the agent. - -Evidence: `actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json` and -`actual-isolated-lldap-review.json` in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/`. This closes the actual -LLDAP stage independently of the remaining T15 packet. It does not prove -Authelia/KeyCape authentication, retained-token MFA or audit continuity. T17, -T18 and T19 retain their remaining adapter/input prerequisites. - -## Prove restored Authelia storage and OIDC continuity - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T17 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T15, NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T41] -state_hub_task_id: "b47f9975-d6d7-5bb8-93ce-886deb1dfa70" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: SSO/Authelia and directory owners. Restore the original storage, -encryption/session/signing material and configuration in isolation. - -**Done when:** native storage decryption succeeds, issuer/signing identity and -client configuration are preserved, and an isolated authentication flow has -positive/negative results using the restored directory. Disable outbound -notifications and verify cleanup. Archive integrity/RSA parsing alone are not -native Authelia acceptance. - -2026-10-24 redraft, after design review with the founder. KeyCape's source -(`key-cape/src/internal`, `config/dev-config.yaml`) confirms the human-login chain: -KeyCape delegates first factor to Authelia as upstream OIDC with the `keycape` -client secret, Authelia binds against LLDAP, and KeyCape adds MFA through -privacyIDEA. The durable Authelia state that matters is in the Secret and config: -the OIDC issuer key, HMAC secret, `keycape` client verifier, storage encryption key -and LDAP bind password. The SQLite store holds little under `one_factor`, so -storage decryption is a cheap check here, not the main proof. T17 acceptance is: -(1) the original configuration validates with the original secrets, notifier -switched to a tmpfs file notifier; (2) the storage encryption key opens the -restored store; (3) the issuer JWKS public key equals the archived issuer key; -(4) the restored `keycape` client verifier accepts KeyCape's archived client -secret and refuses a wrong one, at the token endpoint, with no grant issued; -(5) first-factor login through Authelia against the restored LLDAP succeeds for -an existing user, a wrong password is refused. The full KeyCape→Authelia→LLDAP→ -privacyIDEA human-login chain is not part of T17. T18's selected consumer -(SECRETS-WP-0015-T04) is a workload login and does not pass through Authelia; -a human-login consumer acceptance would need its own selection and admission. - -Completed 2026-10-24 at 15:24 UTC. The founder ran `run-isolated-authelia.sh` -privately on the independently retrieved generation (ciphertext `7117b3fe…0e30`, -all 36 manifest hashes verified). Original configuration validated and the -original storage encryption key opened the store. The issuer key served by Authelia -equals the archived key (RFC 7638 thumbprint `El5Prcg0…ASm8`). The archived -`keycape` client secret passed client authentication at the token endpoint with -no grant issued, and a wrong client secret was refused. An existing user's first -factor succeeded against the restored LLDAP and a wrong password was refused. -Only loopback existed; the notifier wrote nothing; containers and tmpfs staging -were cleaned. No production endpoint was contacted and the agent received no -secret. Evidence: `actual-isolated-authelia-recovery.json` and -`actual-isolated-authelia-review.json` in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t17-authelia/`. This does not prove the full -KeyCape to Authelia to LLDAP login chain, privacyIDEA MFA (T19) or current -production password validity. - -## Prove retained privacyIDEA token decryption and existing-token MFA - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T19 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T15, NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T31, NK-WP-0049-T42] -state_hub_task_id: "6f8af1a7-2a3f-5fa8-8202-83103ebd55b2" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: MFA/privacyIDEA and directory owners. Use the exact linked dump -and original enckey from the independently recovered generation. - -**Done when:** retained token material decrypts inside the isolated process, -a selected existing token completes a native MFA check, a wrong key/code is -refused, and cleanup is verified. Obtain any token/user input through attended -private custody; never emit token plaintext, seeds or credentials. Native database -row counts and disposable synthetic-token fixtures do not prove this outcome. - - -2026-10-16 refinement: native token-material readback is separately tracked in -T31 using the prepared T30 executor. T19 retains actual existing-token MFA and -wrong-code/wrong-key authentication refusal. Internal decryption or padding -success does not authenticate a user. No MFA code is needed for T20/T31; the -selected user's private factor input and exact isolated MFA adapter remain T19. - -Completed 2026-10-24 at 16:48 UTC. The founder ran `run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh` -privately on the independently retrieved generation (ciphertext `7117b3fe…0e30`, all 36 -manifest hashes verified). Restored LLDAP, the database and the original keys ran in one -network-free namespace; the archived LDAP resolver was repointed to the restored -directory in the disposable copy only. The named user was found through the restored -resolver and directory (hashed in the receipt) and had one usable TOTP token. Through -`POST /validate/check` by user and realm: a wrong encryption key was refused (privacyIDEA -error 907), a wrong code was refused, and the founder's PIN and code were accepted with -the original key and retained token material. Only loopback existed; containers and tmpfs -staging were cleaned. No production endpoint was contacted and the agent received no -secret. Evidence: `actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-recovery.json` and -`actual-isolated-privacyidea-mfa-review.json` in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-24-nk49-t19-privacyidea-mfa/`. Not proven: the KeyCape consumer -login through all four services, event handlers or policies that call outside the -namespace, other users' tokens, and current production token validity. An earlier -serial-based attempt stopped at `ResolverError` and claimed no proof; see T42. - -## Prove historical and new privacyIDEA audit-signature continuity - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T20 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T30] -state_hub_task_id: "375fa8f9-b8a5-5048-97a7-ec141aa7c45d" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: MFA/privacyIDEA audit owner. Use the original recovered audit -pair and linked database in the admitted isolated target. - -**Done when:** existing pre-backup audit signatures are verified natively, a new -isolated audit entry is signed and verified with the preserved identity, a wrong -key fails, and cleanup is recorded. Report any historical verification failure -for explicit owner disposition; do not regenerate keys to hide it. Matching RSA -pairs from T13 are a prerequisite, not audit-history verification. - - -Completed 2026-10-16 at 19:10 UTC using the actual independently retrieved -bundle and original audit identity on the fixed isolated local engine. All -279,209 stored rows were signed and verified; zero unsigned, invalid or legacy -signatures. A new isolated entry verified, and tampering/unrelated-public-key -checks were refused. Container/plaintext cleanup passed. Receipt and reviewed -source/ciphertext/target bindings: `actual-isolated-privacyidea-recovery.json` -and `actual-isolated-privacyidea-review.json` in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/`. -Stored-row continuity is accepted; event completeness and existing-token MFA -are separate and are not claimed. - -## Prove restored KeyCape issuer, policy and consumer continuity - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T18 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T15, NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T19, NK-WP-0049-T32, NK-WP-0049-T33, NK-WP-0049-T40] -state_hub_task_id: "141dd773-c1fa-56c1-a852-bbe2372e5125" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: KeyCape and the selected current consumer owners. Restore the -original signing/configuration, registry, authentication policies and receipts. - -**Done when:** issuer/JWKS signing identity, registry/client configuration and -policy/receipt continuity are preserved; selected current consumers pass native -positive/negative authentication using the restored dependencies; and isolation -and cleanup hold. Confirm the actual dependency graph in T15. Do not route a -production consumer to the isolated issuer or mint new client grants implicitly. - -2026-10-23 evening, attended by the founder (ceremony steps 3 to 5, inside the T40 window): -step 3 production reissue through railiance-cluster `88b360b` (isolated namespace `tls-attempt-kc`, -own Issuer; live `sso/kc-tls` resourceVersion 66444692 and fingerprint D5:DB:2B:55… unchanged; cleanup done), -chain `0dd5d582…5add` to ISRG Root X1 `22b557a2…43d1`, key/cert public keys equal. Step 4: fresh -independent Storage Share retrieval of ciphertext `7117b3fe…0e30`, then the six-argument launcher with -launcher admission `a57c4c64…a6ba` (R1 template completed; `isolated-keycape.py` pin = reviewed T38 -`86f37add…`): `OK: isolated KeyCape native checks and cleanup passed`. The first launcher run was refused -pre-key because two inputs were mode 0444; fixed to 0400 without changing bytes. Step 5: independent verifier -from a clean export of `a20dcfe`, `--not-after 2026-10-24T05:00:00+00:00`: `verified`, no findings. -Receipt `16d72f7c…1651` reports original JWKS signing key, original config/registry/policy receipts, native -service registration, denied scopes and wrong-secret refusal, original HTTPS issuer/trust, plaintext/container -cleanup, `production_contacted: false`. Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/verifier-output.json`. -The receipt itself is not in Git: the local and Forgejo secret scanners flag its public source-file digests -(`generic-api-key`, file names containing "keycape"), and the founder chose not to re-encode or exempt it. The exact -original is retained outside Git on the founder workstation (mode 0400), bound by sha256 `16d72f7c…1651` in the -verifier output. This deviates from the ceremony step 5 retention path by founder decision 2026-10-23. - -2026-10-24: the OpenBao dependency for this consumer is recovered at configuration level. railiance-platform -RPF-WP-0064-T07 restored the original OpenBao from the 2026-10-14 off-host snapshot into a networkless target, -founder attended (attempt `-03`, adapter `7084b57`), verified independently (receipt `sha256:4e048dee…579d`, -outside Git): original cluster id, the `secrets-engine-openbao` JWT role, its policy and KV metadata all match -source. T18 consumer acceptance still needs the live login run: RPF-WP-0064 phase B (internal network joining -the isolated NK49 KeyCape and restored OpenBao) plus the SECRETS-WP-0015-T04 consumer run, each separately -founder-admitted. MFA remains T19. -Still open for T18: selected current consumer acceptance against restored dependencies (the receipt claims -no consumer continuity), and owner acceptance; MFA stays T19. - - -2026-10-27 founder decision (option A, builder mode): T18 is **done** with a named residual. Accepted on the verified issuer-side receipt `16d72f7c…1651`, key-cape owner acceptance `fc9f09a`, the restored OpenBao configuration (receipt `4e048dee…579d`) and the 2026-10-10 live consumer proof of the same registration. CA-bundle check 2026-10-27 (claude-code, local, `--network none`): the pinned OpenBao image `quay.io/openbao/openbao@sha256:436eaf97…c115` bundle `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt` (145 certs, sha256 `61efbd6d…d1d9`) contains ISRG Root X1 (DER sha256 `96bcec06…08c6`, not after 2035-06-04); its PEM sha256 is `22b557a2…43d1`, exactly the anchor recorded for the T18 KeyCape chain. With no CA fields in the `keycape-services` source config, restored OpenBao would trust the KeyCape `/jwks` chain; the restored config's CA-field absence remains inferred (railiance-platform R1). Residual, carried to T44: restored KeyCape and restored OpenBao have not been exercised together by a real consumer login, and browser/PKCE clients were not exercised. This is not production consumer validity. - -## Verify current caller and provider admission at their actual boundaries - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T21 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T02] -state_hub_task_id: "77aa42be-7a39-5d93-8042-03d78b4094b4" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: each current caller's service/provider and credential owner. -Use T02's ledger to select the exact current procedures and required owner lanes. - -**Done when:** each current caller has scoped delivery and native positive/negative -acceptance or an explicit accepted retirement/disposition. Include dedicated -factor-diagnostic admission (do not borrow KeyCape's reader), deployed reserved -LDAP group denial, resolver/cutover input provenance and functional proof, and -bootstrap/root-output/isolation callers. Fixtures, an existing tty and historical -bootstrap receipts are not current authority. Propose exact write/cutover actions -before execution; record deferred actions separately rather than faking a pass. - - -2026-10-27: builder-mode disposition draft prepared for founder acceptance: [T21 caller dispositions](../docs/evidence/2026-10-27-nk49-t21-caller-dispositions.md). It accepts the T02 ledger rows by category, points follow-up rows to their existing workplans, and assigns the reserved-LDAP-group denial and resolver re-proof to T44. Factor-diagnostic row corrected the same day: source shows the diagnostic takes only an owner-admitted private token and never KeyCape's reader; a founder-run admin scan shows only `sso/keycape` mounts `keycape-factor-read`; no admitted diagnostic lane exists, so that row is a deferral, not a T44 item. T21 stays waiting until the founder accepts. - -2026-10-27: founder accepted the [T21 caller dispositions](../docs/evidence/2026-10-27-nk49-t21-caller-dispositions.md) for the builder-mode estate. T21 is **done**. Reserved-LDAP-group denial and resolver re-proof move to T44; the attended factor diagnostic stays deferred until an owner-admitted credential lane exists; follow-up rows remain in NK-WP-0042, NK-WP-0048, NK-WP-0051 and T24. -## Resolve historical credential and configuration-preserving rotation dispositions - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T22 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T02, NK-WP-0049-T21] -state_hub_task_id: "3ea6bf00-a87f-58ea-bdce-328c13a03a55" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: Platform/custody and affected consumer owners. Review historical -personal-admin/trigger credential copies and unsafe predecessor paths against -known current consumers and rollback custody. - -**Done when:** every affected credential has an owner-accepted disposition: -verified revocation/replacement, continued bounded use with acceptance, or an -explicit linked deferral. Signing/client-secret changes require preservation and -native multi-consumer proof if actually approved. CUST-WP-0073-T05's founder -rotation deferral and decision `1591daa1-6e85-4dfd-aadd-5a9fe1ef47fa` remain in force; -record their exact applicability rather than automatically rotating or treating -source retirement as provider revocation. - - -2026-10-27, founder-run with the attended admin kubeconfig (route `kubernetes-railiance01-admin`), builder mode: T22 is **done**. -Both historical objects named by T02 still existed (`sso/keycape-pi-token`, Opaque, 1 key, 216d; `mfa/privacyidea-trigger-admin`, -Opaque, 2 keys, 216d). A read-only scan of all Deployments, StatefulSets, DaemonSets, CronJobs, Jobs and Pods found no reference to -either name. The founder deleted both; follow-up `get` returned `NotFound` for each. Neither is in the identity backup `secret_refs`. -This is NK-WP-0022's explicit deletion approval for these two objects. Disposition: Kubernetes copies deleted and verified absent; -revocation of the underlying privacyIDEA credentials is not claimed and stays under the founder's rotation deferral -CUST-WP-0073-T05 / decision `1591daa1-6e85-4dfd-aadd-5a9fe1ef47fa`. No other historical credential copy is open in the T02 ledger. -## Provide retrieval that works when OpenBao and SSO are unavailable - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T23 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T25] -state_hub_task_id: "1ec537ee-dfee-5576-be36-a81bdba417d1" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Completed 2026-10-16 at 18:02 UTC. The operator used independently held Backup -account access in the private prompt. The actual protected 109,738,344-byte -ciphertext was downloaded with unchanged ETag/size/SHA256, with no OpenBao/SSO -contact or provider writes by the retrieval path. The human-held age key matched -the registered recipient; wrong-key refusal, all 36 manifest hashes, SQLite -integrity, original key pairs and native isolated PostgreSQL 16.14 restore passed. -The database retained five token, two resolver and two realm rows. Disposable -container and temporary plaintext cleanup passed. The agent received no secret. - -Evidence: `actual-offline-transfer.json`, `actual-offline-recovery.json` and -`actual-offline-review.json` under -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/`. The review rechecked the -local ciphertext digest and verifier source. This proves the independent path -without requiring a deliberate production outage. Service authentication, -retained-token decryption and historical audit verification remain T16–T20. -T26 separately records accepted guide publication. - -## Record owner disposition for second-provider and external monitoring gaps - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T24 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: codex -decision_id: "e4c288d9-0b8a-4261-a8bf-0d2a15688615" -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T14] -state_hub_task_id: "474f5a78-a643-59c6-bcf9-fc4a908dfcb0" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -**Next action:** record the current single-provider and host-local-health limits, -then obtain explicit owner scope decisions for a second encrypted provider copy, -external host-loss/freshness detection and recurring recovery-drill cadence. - -**Done when:** each gap has either an accepted bounded residual risk or a linked -live intake/workplan with owner and trigger. Existing daily RPO/25-hour health -settings remain the approved baseline. Scaleway full-identity publication and -an external watchdog are not implemented; do not add their grants/jobs implicitly. -This task triages the new insights instead of silently expanding NK49's required -implementation to an entire disaster-recovery programme. - -2026-10-23: current limits recorded. Gate routed as decision `e4c288d9`. -- **G1, single provider.** The full identity bundle has one encrypted off-host - copy (Storage Share). Scaleway holds database dumps only. -- **G2, host-local health.** The hourly health check and the 25-hour freshness - bound run on railiance01 itself. If that host is lost, nothing reports - staleness. -- **G3, no recurring drill.** The PI database, LLDAP and archive recoveries were - each run once. - -Recommendation: accept G1 as a bounded residual risk until 2027-01-31. Open -owner intakes for G2 (off-host watchdog) and G3 (a quarterly isolated restore -that reuses the T16/T31 tooling). Once the founder answers, record each accepted -risk or link each intake, then close this task. No grant, job or watchdog is -added here. - -2026-10-23: done. The founder resolved decision `e4c288d9` with the recommended -split: -- **G1:** accepted as a bounded residual risk until 2027-01-31. The review is - NK-WP-0053-T03. -- **G2:** linked to the outside-node watchdog that `RAPP-TELEMETRY-WP-0001-T04` - already owes. rapp-telemetry has been asked to cover identity-backup freshness - (the 25-hour bound). -- **G3:** new intake NK-WP-0053 (a quarterly isolated identity restore drill, - registered with disaster-control). - -## Deliver and verify the offline retrieval adapter and recovery tools kit - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T25 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13] -state_hub_task_id: "1c5ea7a1-edf7-5072-b36b-8be7f827957a" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. - -Completed 2026-10-16. `retrieve-identity-offline.py` uses privately entered -independent Backup-account access or an exact read-capable identity-folder share. -It performs only fixed-provider HEAD/GET, binds the reviewed generation by strong -ETag/length/SHA256, refuses redirects/proxies/unreviewed scope and removes failed -downloads. No OpenBao/SSO, age key or standing agent credential is required. -`recovery-kit.py` builds a reproducible allowlisted ZIP containing the tools, -public profile, known-good ciphertext receipt and recovery guides, with file -checksums. Its publication path creates only three versioned guide/ZIP/checksum -objects and verifies readback without overwriting existing conflicting objects. -`run-offline-recovery.sh` provides the owner's two-hidden-prompt handoff. - -Evidence: `tests/test_identity_offline_recovery.py` and the bounded test/build -receipt in `docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/`. The focused run -passed 65 tests including real disposable age/PostgreSQL fixtures. ZIP-contained -entry points import without sibling repositories. This is source/fixture proof, -not actual independent-provider retrieval (T23) or publication (T26). - -2026-10-16 correction: the first owner handoff stopped before its credential -prompt because Python text `r+` requires a seekable stream. Reproduced against a -real controlling PTY; replaced both prompts with the shared hidden-input helper, -refusing redirected input and echo fallback. Added real-terminal and both-CLI -regressions plus closed stage/HTTP-code diagnostics (no raw responses). The -focused rerun passed 36 tests. Evidence: `terminal-prompt-fix.json` in the outage -evidence directory. This source correction does not complete T23/T26. - -## Publish and verify the disaster recovery guide on Storage Share - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T26 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T25, NK-WP-0049-T27] -state_hub_task_id: "94d054fe-e5d8-5ddf-8e48-80714123d184" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex; operator holds provider access privately. - -Requested by the operator on 2026-10-16; decision -`fc3ef8db-0a33-41d5-a0ba-d13169c5f884` records the bounded scope. Guide source: -`docs/disaster-recovery-storage-share.md`. Document scope, independently held -provider/key requirements, exact known-good fallback, copy/download verification, -archive-check commands, service restore order, recurring schedule and remaining -coverage limits. Include the offline tools so failed Forgejo does not prevent -access to the recovery scripts; retain an independent copy and trusted digest. - -Completed 2026-10-16 at 18:01 UTC through the private independent-provider -owner handoff. All three objects were conditionally created and read back with -matching strong ETag, length and content; the recorded digests match a fresh -reproducible local build. No existing object or provider permission was changed. -The failed first attempt and terminal correction remain documented in T25. - -**Published location:** Storage Share account Backup, -`railiance-backups/net-kingdom-identity/`: - -- `net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff-START-HERE.md` -- `net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip` -- `net-kingdom-recovery-57d1940947aa25ff.zip.sha256` - -**Trusted ZIP SHA256:** -`57d1940947aa25ff83d0f25ddf30090eb40595cccaab64225de882a2fd59ea2f`. -Evidence: `actual-offline-publication.json` and `actual-offline-review.json` in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/`. The published guide is the -exact pre-drill revision; this acceptance record records the later successful -drill without implying an unperformed republication. Keep an independent copy -and trusted digest outside the failed service/provider dependency. - -## Draft the isolated service restore packet and observe candidate images - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T27 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T08, NK-WP-0049-T13] -state_hub_task_id: "e273e803-bee7-5d90-bc51-ecc08c0c8eff" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. - -Completed 2026-10-16. Draft in `docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md` names the -known recovered input, restore order, original key/data ownership, default-deny -containment, blocked production/provider/notification effects, cleanup and five -native acceptance lanes with positive/negative checks. Read-only metadata from -the pinned primary cluster resolved all four current service image digests, -including the separately observed privacyIDEA main container and LLDAP's mutable -source tag. Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/image-observation.json`. - -This task extracts completed preparation from T15. Named target admission, -archive/runtime image-lineage matching and independent image availability, -private existing-user/MFA inputs and owner-reviewed native commands remain T15; -no service restore, production change or owner acceptance is claimed. - -## Stage and verify the five exact service images for local offline recovery - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T28 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T27] -state_hub_task_id: "4829b091-76d2-5b10-bdfc-032800190c0a" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. - -Completed 2026-10-16. All five pinned references (PostgreSQL, LLDAP, Authelia, -KeyCape, privacyIDEA) were inspected on the fixed local Linux Docker engine -`bnt-lap001`, ID `74f93783-6cef-43a8-a3c4-f62586cd3bc1`. Missing LLDAP and -privacyIDEA images were pulled only by their observed immutable digests. Saved a -private 347,521,536-byte image archive, loaded it and re-inspected every exact -reference. Evidence and archive SHA256/location: -`docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-outage-recovery/offline-service-images.json`. - -The local drill no longer requires the production registry. This is not off-host -image escrow or proof of historical mutable-tag/backup lineage; those limits -remain in T15. No service custody or age key was supplied to image caching. - -## Prepare and verify the bounded native LLDAP recovery executor - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T29 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T27, NK-WP-0049-T28] -state_hub_task_id: "2f8c73b0-1cdd-5b22-99b6-017ccde4454b" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex; operator retains actual private recovery inputs. - -Completed 2026-10-16. `isolated-lldap.py` and `run-isolated-lldap.sh` provide the -exact owner-run stage in `docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md`: fixed local -engine/images, no remote Docker endpoint, original key/seed/JWT/directory data, -Linux-tmpfs decryption, memory/stdin-only private inputs, network-none/read-only -containers, isolation inspection before import, actual existing-user bind, -explicit invalid-credential denial, stable directory rows and cleanup checks. -Missing original server keys are refused; reset/replacement/notification paths -are disabled. No live Kubernetes/OpenBao/SSO path or provider grant is used. - -Evidence: `tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py` exercises the actual pinned -image, disposable retained-account directory and a full synthetic encrypted -bundle through the same native executor. The private real-bundle run and its -acceptance remain T16; fixture success is not actual user/MFA/audit recovery. -See `isolated-lldap-preparation.json` in the October16 outage evidence directory -for exact test/source/target provenance and limitations. - -## Prepare the bounded native privacyIDEA token-material and audit executor - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T30 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T28] -state_hub_task_id: "6e4a43db-9be2-5662-bdbf-1595fce03052" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex; operator retains private recovery inputs. - -Completed 2026-10-16. `isolated-privacyidea.py` and its owner launcher use the -fixed local Docker target and exact cached PostgreSQL/privacyIDEA3.12.2 images. -The linked dump, original enckey/audit pair and required secret fields are -restored only into a loopback-only, nonroot, read-only, capability-free, -no-host-mount/port, tmpfs-backed environment with inspected pre-import isolation. -Decrypted host staging is tmpfs; normal cleanup removes all private data and -owned containers, with a bounded holding lifetime if the parent is interrupted. - -The native provider decrypts token-key material internally, checks every stored -audit row, adds one isolated signed entry and checks wrong-public-key/tampering -negatives. Original policy for legacy signature verification is retained only -from literal archived configuration; archived Python is never executed. Invalid -or unsigned history remains reported, not repaired or sampled away. Native -material readback is not existing-token MFA or proof of event completeness. - -Evidence: `tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_recovery.py` and -`isolated-privacyidea-preparation.json` in the October16 outage evidence folder. -Synthetic pinned-image tests exercise valid/tampered/unsigned history, malformed -keys, encrypted archive to native restore, isolation and cleanup. Real original -material/audit acceptance remains T31/T20; actual MFA remains T19. - -## Verify retained privacyIDEA token material inside the isolated provider - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T31 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T13, NK-WP-0049-T30] -state_hub_task_id: "26383841-8076-5c53-bbd1-9db64e32544a" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex; operator supplies only the independently held age -key in the hidden helper. This task extracts actual material-readback scope from -T19, preserving T19's existing-token MFA acceptance gate and historical identity. - -Completed 2026-10-16 at 19:10 UTC in the same actual run as T20. All five -retained token materials were decrypted internally with the original enckey; -an unrelated key could not reproduce any of the five. All 36 manifest hashes, -exact executor/ciphertext/target bindings, isolation and cleanup passed. Safe -receipts are the `actual-isolated-privacyidea-{recovery,review}.json` files -referenced under T20. No retained-factor authentication is claimed. -**Done when:** exact ciphertext/source/target/manifest bindings pass; the native -provider reads every nonempty encrypted token-key field using the original -enckey without exporting material; an unrelated key cannot reproduce that -material; aggregate counts and container/plaintext cleanup are recorded. - -Only bounded internal readback is accepted here. Padding/readback success does -not prove the recovered secret authenticates a retained factor; actual positive -MFA and wrong-key/wrong-code authentication refusal remain T19. No token seed, -plaintext, serial or user record belongs in the receipt, Git, State Hub or chat. - -## Deliver isolated KeyCape restore source and synthetic lifecycle proof - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T32 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -state_hub_task_id: "cd78dbb7-a8f2-5754-8788-6eb1b7d97741" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-16. This extracts bounded source/fixture delivery from T18; -T18 retains actual original archive, issuer and selected consumer acceptance. -The adapter reuses the existing transfer/archive/custody contracts, binds the -fixed local daemon and cached images, restores private state only to temporary -memory, verifies original issuer/TLS/signing/configuration/policy bytes and runs -the original native service-client checker with wrong-secret/excess-scope denial. -Durable pre-import obligations and exact parent pidfd/session quiescence precede -loss/deadline cleanup. Daemon response uncertainty remains uncertainty after -resource absence; it never authorizes recovery success or replay. - -Frozen R6 fixes a demonstrated image-declared anonymous-volume incompatibility -using bounded helper-only tmpfs, preserving anonymous disk-volume refusal. Safe -phase markers carry no private diagnostics. Independently passed 72 focused -checks, then actual pinned-image synthetic positive, hard-parent-loss, deadline -and nonzero-after-accept cases. Independent fixed-daemon inventories and host -mount-namespace checks prove all exact resources and plaintext absent. Reaper -outcomes are retained; initial sandbox receipt lookup failure is preserved and -superseded by device-bound host verification. R1–R5 failures remain retained. - -Evidence: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/ -identity-restore-adapter-next/revisions/r6/, actual-fixture-r6-all.json and -coordinator-r6-all-review.json. Exact source/dependency hashes and candidate -manifest bind the proof. This uses generated test keys only; it proves neither -actual owner-held recovery, human MFA, downstream reconnect nor native authority. - -Publication preparation R7 preserves every R6 recovery adapter byte and digest. -The normal scanner flagged eight public source-file SHA-256 values in the R6 -manifest. Explicit sha256-qualified checksums resolve those false positives; -the fixture reader strictly validates their type/shape before checking the same -bytes. R7 passes 73 focused checks including malformed/untyped digest refusal. -The frozen R6 actual four-case proof remains the runtime evidence; no repeated -native outcome is claimed for publication encoding. Original scanner refusal is -retained, and scanner policy/exemptions are unchanged. - -## Prepare the exact owner-held KeyCape recovery attempt - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T33 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T32, NK-WP-0049-T34, NK-WP-0049-T35, NK-WP-0049-T36, NK-WP-0049-T39] -state_hub_task_id: "56c8d469-7a10-5d50-a30e-95cbf3cd4756" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** NetKingdom codex with KeyCape and selected consumer owners. -This umbrella retains final attempt readiness. Completed custody/preflight source -preparation is extracted into T34; T35 resolves original TLS/trust recovery and -T36 prepares the selected original registration and private admission. This split -records distinct outcomes without counting source preparation as recovery. - -After those deliverables, assemble the exact existing six-argument attended -command and admission digest, bind the integrated source/dependency revision and -fixed local target, and record execution deadline, safe receipt location, abort, -rollback and independent receipt verification through the existing owner process. -Keep private manifest derivation inside custody and original TLS/client/key inputs -in the owner's own terminal; the current null fields must refuse execution. -Existing session authorization is retained within scope; this record does not -supply missing owner assent or approve any actual recovery attempt. - -**Done when:** reviewed executable command and complete metadata-only/private -admission packet are ready for the existing attended custody path; prerequisites -and independent receipt verification are explicit. T18 still owns actual -execution, original consumer continuity and acceptance. T19 retains retained-factor -MFA. This task neither authorizes a production consumer redirect nor creates a -new client grant. - -2026-10-23: packet completed in source. `docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md` -step 3 now carries the decided ACME reissue disposition, with abort conditions -and the required Let's Encrypt staging rehearsal. A new step 5 fixes the -deadline (the founder-signed admission window, at most 24 h), the retained -receipt location, and an independent verifier, -`tools/bootstrap-recovery/verify-keycape-attempt-receipt.py`, with 10 synthetic -tests. The verifier imports no session code. It recomputes source hashes from a -clean checkout, binds the ciphertext to the transfer receipt, and requires every -native check, cleanup obligation and absence of uncertainty. It refuses -consumer/MFA over-claims and secret-shaped content. Two external prerequisites -remain: the anchor install (SECRETS-WP-0015-T04) and the staging rehearsal -(railiance-cluster). - -2026-10-23: the Let's Encrypt staging rehearsal was run attended by the founder and -was green. The Certificate was Ready on the first order. The issuer was `(STAGING) Ersatz Emmer -YR2`, the SAN was exactly kc.coulomb.social, and the chain verified OK. The live -fingerprint `D5:DB:2B:55…` and the `sso/kc-tls` resourceVersion 66444692 were unchanged, -and cleanup was done. The receipt is in railiance-cluster aad0e70. Only the anchor install -(SECRETS-WP-0015-T04) remains before the attended attempt. - -2026-10-23: the attempt-host anchor was installed by the founder on the workstation, which is the attempt host. -`/etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers` is root:root 0644 under a root:root 0755 -directory. It holds one entry: principal `bernd`, namespaces=`secrets-engine-recovery-attempt`, -ED25519 `SHA256:NekDABfw8K8IBYznjREg7jPpcK/BzCgO1pH1ebT/FXM` (approver key), file sha256 -`1964e942…c489`. A throwaway self-test signature in that namespace resolved to `bernd` -and verified Good, and was then deleted. A placeholder line left at 07:12 was replaced. Packet -prerequisites are complete, so T33 is done. Next: the founder signs the attempt admission (T40). - -## Deliver attended custody, metadata preflight and private manifest preparation source - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T34 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T32] -state_hub_task_id: "821b3a56-6f36-5812-abc9-5a00e37cb2e7" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** NetKingdom codex; independent Custodian source review. -Completed 2026-10-17 as source preparation. Existing attended custody entry points -now have a reviewed candidate sealed anonymous descriptor mode: hidden prompt, -actual public-recipient verification, strict owned/private/full-seal descriptor -admission, non-inheritable returned duplicate and explicit descriptor passing. -The existing file mode stays compatible, with its original hard-loss limitation; -no improved file-mode cleanup is claimed. Exact parent-loss tests prove descriptor -lifetime without signalling inherited user shell groups. An admitted child retains -its descriptor until it exits; parent loss is not child revocation. - -The candidate checks bounded, duplicate-free public JSON, exact admission digest, -transfer/archive and selected service bindings, typed hashes for all 17 invoked -local source/config dependencies and required Python imports before requesting a -key. TLS and ciphertext preparation uses file metadata only. Legacy explicit -manifest digests remain supported; versioned ciphertext-derived binding computes -the canonical digest privately only after exact reviewed ciphertext, authenticated -age decryption and full existing archive validation. The derived private digest -never enters safe receipts/checkpoints and grants no new consumer authority. - -The coordinator independently passed 111 focused checks. The existing custody -regression suite passed 94 checks; 61 real-SOPS tests skipped because that trusted -runtime is unavailable, so that compatibility coverage remains unverified. Tests -use generated keys/archive material only, including actual age cryptography, -synthetic hidden-prompt and exact parent-loss processes. Manifest-builder tests -mock Docker/issuer behavior and confer no new native proof. Frozen R6/R7 proof, -intermediate test failures and scanner history remain retained. - -Bounded public image readback separately establishes the cached original image's -13670142-byte `/keycape` executable as -`sha256:cd89121393e1465aa76009763602a5b8c75f9dddb5679aea6242623f135b51b4`. -This is executable identity metadata, not recovery or custody acceptance. - -Evidence: Custodian `docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/recovery-attempt-r1/` -(`candidate.patch`, `review.json`, source closure, attempt/admission metadata and -`public-verifier-image-readback.json`). Canonical integration/publication and -projection receipts must be recorded separately when performed; this completed -source-preparation record does not invent them. T33 remains open for complete -attempt readiness; actual recovery/consumer acceptance remains T18 and MFA T19. - -## Establish original KeyCape TLS and trust recovery ownership for outage use - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T35 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T34] -state_hub_task_id: "1bfd1703-589f-5511-bad5-812d860e4a71" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** NetKingdom codex, coordinating with the source owner of -Ingress/cert-manager/Traefik and the original TLS custody/provider boundary. -**Next action:** identify and record that actual owner's existing recovery path, -then obtain its metadata/disposition through the ordinary owner process. A missing -exact credential-routing catalog match is not evidence that no owner exists. - -Current source declares `kc.coulomb.social`, `sso/kc-tls`, cert-manager -`ClusterIssuer/letsencrypt-prod` and Traefik TLS termination before KeyCape 8080. -The identity backup profile excludes `kc-tls`; the verified archive therefore -establishes no independent recovery of that TLS identity/trust. Determine whether -the exact original certificate/key/trust is independently recoverable during an -issuer/cluster outage, or whether a documented reissue path is acceptable for the -selected continuity claim. Do not read or place the TLS key in work records, use -a fresh self-signed trust substitute, mutate production or claim owner assent. - -**Done when:** named owner/provider, independent outage prerequisites, original -public identity/certificate/trust hashes or accepted reissue disposition, private -custody entry point and verification/abort limits are explicit and reviewed. -Record any unavailable recovery capability as a live owner work record and bind -its dependency/unblock condition; a prose-only gap or untested archive is not -completion. This delivers preparation/disposition, not actual TLS recovery. - -2026-10-17 owner handoff progress: the four reviewed Railiance Cluster source -additions are present, including `RCLUSTER-WP-0018` and public-only TLS metadata -preparation. They are not published. The normal publication path stopped at the -existing historical identifier guard (`ensure_missing_work_record_identifiers`, -execute=False): 15 bare task-label findings and five collisions. A separately -retained read-only allocator preview records those findings; the original failed -publication stderr was not retained and is not reconstructed. No Cluster Hub -workplan/task existence or projection, actual certificate/key custody, reissue -assent or native TLS acceptance is claimed. The source record and next owner -publication action remain live; do not bypass the historical identity guard. -Evidence: Custodian October17 `cluster-integration.json`, `coordinator-checkpoint.json` -and October16 `cluster-historical-publication-r1/actual-source-allocator-preview.json`. - -2026-10-21: the publication blocker above is superseded. RCLUSTER-WP-0018 is -published (c562d71) and active. The owner is railiance-cluster (cert-manager, -Traefik, backup posture). Its live owner work records are T02 (custody metadata, -todo), T03/T04 (extraction or reissue, owner-attended verify, wait) and T05 -(future archive coverage, todo). `warden route find` has no TLS lane. Source: -letsencrypt-prod with ACME HTTP-01 via Traefik, auto-renewing. Served public -chain today: leaf valid 2026-09-25..12-24, cert sha256 f14c928a...d15a, SPKI -sha256:236fa4dc...6b6d, ISRG Root X1 trust 22b557a2...43d1. That is current, not -proven original. The only owner-path disposition today is reissue. Original-key -recovery is an unavailable capability, owned under RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T02, and -unblocks when the owner records independent custody of the kc-tls key. -Owner message dae2e1bb requests T02 metadata. Founder disposition gate is T39. -T35 stays progress. - -2026-10-23: done. The founder resolved decision 9f9d0d88 on 2026-10-21 with -option A (relayed by secrets-engine, message daa264e9). During recovery, -kc.coulomb.social's TLS identity is the hostname chained to ISRG Root X1, -reissued through letsencrypt-prod ACME HTTP-01. No self-signed substitute is -allowed. Owner: railiance-cluster. Verify: the reissued leaf has SAN -kc.coulomb.social and chains to ISRG Root X1 (trust sha256 22b557a2...43d1). The -original key is not required. Abort if HTTP-01 cannot complete or the chain does -not match. Rehearse against LE staging first to protect the 5/week duplicate -limit; T33 carries that rehearsal as a prerequisite. RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T05 stays -open for future archive coverage. This approves no production mutation and no -recovery attempt. - -## Prepare selected original service registration and private admission bindings - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T36 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T34] -state_hub_task_id: "8b72334b-fc27-5707-a189-bad345eaf3bc" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** NetKingdom codex with KeyCape and the selected existing -service consumer's owner. **Next action:** identify that owner and the exact -original registration's non-secret selector metadata using existing source/owner -evidence; preserve independent private custody and never retrieve a client secret. - -Bind reviewed ciphertext `7117b3fe1e4840c86b301c94c85e6b16709e5626bb0884bd0580bde630e30e30`, -its independently verified transfer, source/image/executable closure and an -explicit versioned manifest-binding mode. For the original service registration, -record client identifier, secret environment name, audience, granted scope, -subject, tenant, required roles and denied scope without values or new grants. -Describe the native service-client dependency graph and distinguish unexercised -LLDAP/Authelia/privacyIDEA/downstream flows. Keep private manifest material inside -the existing custody process, never in Git, safe receipts, State Hub or chat. - -**Done when:** the selected existing service owner and exact non-secret registration -bindings are independently established, the private admission builder validates -positive/negative source/archive/selector cases, and its metadata is ready to -combine with T35's original TLS/trust disposition under T33. This task may prepare -registration metadata while T35 proceeds independently; it does not finalize the -whole admission, perform actual recovery, redirect a consumer or confer assent. - -2026-10-17 owner handoff progress: Secrets Engine source workplan -`SECRETS-WP-0015` and bounded public selector/preflight source were published as -`c59bbf568c0be8a72ac593508f48c9b1f61ec4c1`; the central primary/railiance01 -reconciliation receipt reports the same expected/derived commit, four owner task -bindings and two T04 dependency edges, with no unresolved edges. T01/T02 source -preparation is done, T03 exact outage-compatible consumer proof/custody planning -is todo, and T04 actual admitted consumer result waits on T03 and NK-WP-0049-T33. -This publishes an owner handoff, not exact archived registration validation, -current native assent, an OpenBao read, a new grant or consumer continuity. -T36 therefore remains progress; T18/T19 and final native gates remain open. -Evidence: Custodian October17 `secrets-engine-projection.json` and October16 -`recovery-owner-handoffs-r1` source review; independent ID/UUID/status/remote -readback is recorded separately when performed. - -2026-10-17 source checkpoint refinement: the completed exact-one original -selector guard and its bounded refusal/unique-selector proof are extracted into -T38. T36 retains exact archive-to-selector binding, current actual service-owner -recovery assent and outage-compatible private admission/consumer preparation. -The current eight-field source-selector correspondence is evidenced separately; -it does not complete those remaining obligations or any T18/T19 native gate. -T33 continues to require the complete reviewed TLS/custody/admission packet. -This extraction records one source outcome rather than counting it again as -original registration validation or consumer continuity. - -2026-10-21: selector bound to secrets-engine `0f44fbe`. Selector -sha256:02077af3...7012, `service_auth.py` sha256:c0ade429...86c0. Offline preflight -passes. A wrong source hash and an unsigned admission each refuse with rc=1. The -builder suite passes 27 (synthetic positive and negative -source/archive/selector cases). The founder-signed attempt admission (decision -d1ab097d, SECRETS-WP-0015-T04) is the surviving offline authorization, and T33 -now requires `--admission` to pass. Owner message 0fec1113 asks secrets-engine to -confirm the pins, attempt-host anchor coverage (absent on the workstation) and -T04 consumption. Exact archive-to-selector equality is only checkable inside -custody, at attempt time. Evidence: -`docs/evidence/2026-10-21-nk49-t33-readiness/readiness-observation.json`. -T36 stays progress until the owner confirms. - -2026-10-23: done. secrets-engine confirmed on 2026-10-21 (message 8d1ab5b7) -that the pins match HEAD `0f44fbe` with no relevant drift. Installing the -attempt-host anchor is now owned work under SECRETS-WP-0015-T04 (founder- and -root-owned). SECRETS-WP-0015-T04 consumes the T33 packet unchanged. With the -registration bindings, the 27 builder cases and T35's disposition in place, the -metadata is ready for T33. No value, grant or attempt is implied. - -## Founder disposition of original KeyCape TLS recovery - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T39 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: founder -decision_id: "9f9d0d88-837a-433c-8a11-d30b633b0073" -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T35] -state_hub_task_id: "90f473db-bda6-5fe2-a2e1-7ddfaca815b7" -``` - -Founder gate for T35. Approves no mutation and no attempt. - -2026-10-23: resolved 2026-10-21 = A (ACME letsencrypt-prod reissue, LE staging -rehearsal first). Recorded under T35. - -## Founder signs the exact KeyCape attempt admission - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T40 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: founder -needs_human: true -decision_id: "d1ab097d-cc79-4612-9c17-bb9b364081ac" -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T33] -state_hub_task_id: "90865f76-0573-5840-b1b5-937f0820ea82" -``` - -The signed document is T33's required `--admission` input and T18's surviving -offline authorization. The signature does not run the attempt. - -2026-10-23 handoff: the session is scheduled for 19:00 Berlin (17:00Z) today. The unsigned admission is prepared -at `~/nk49-attempt-20261023/attempt.json` (outside Git, dir 0700, file 0444, sha256 -`f8297954…c157`). It binds case `secrets15-nk49-readiness`, issuer `https://kc.coulomb.social`, -selector `sha256:02077af3…7012`, service_auth `sha256:c0ade429…86c0`, and window -2026-10-23T17:00:00Z to 2026-10-24T05:00:00Z (12 h, ending 07:00 Berlin). Pins were rechecked against secrets-engine -HEAD `a14fbc0`, with no change to the selector, service_auth.py, the checker or founder_admission.py -since `0f44fbe`. A dry check passed every field and window rule, and refused only the missing signature. -Evening order: -(1) confirm that sha256 is unchanged; -(2) founder signs: `ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ~/.ssh/gexec_approver_ed25519 -n secrets-engine-recovery-attempt ~/nk49-attempt-20261023/attempt.json`; -(3) ceremony step 2, selector preflight with `--admission`, must report `founder_admitted_attempt_not_native_acceptance`; -(4) ceremony steps 3 to 5 (production ACME reissue under RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T04, launcher, independent receipt verifier with `--not-after 2026-10-24T05:00:00+00:00`) under T18. -If the window lapses, write a new file and sign again. Never edit the signed bytes. - -2026-10-23 19:04 Berlin: signed by the founder. `attempt.json` is unchanged (sha256 `f8297954…c157`); -`attempt.json.sig` lies beside it, outside Git. Selector preflight from secrets-engine `a14fbc0` with -`--admission` exited 0: `founder_admitted_attempt_not_native_acceptance`, principal `bernd`, key -`SHA256:NekDABfw8K8IBYznjREg7jPpcK/BzCgO1pH1ebT/FXM`, namespace `secrets-engine-recovery-attempt`, the -eight consumer fields equal to the selector, `credential_source_exercised: false`, `network_contacted: false`. -This is founder authority for this one attempt, not native acceptance. T18 continues with ceremony steps 3 to 5 -before 2026-10-24T05:00Z. Launcher private-admission note: the R1 template pin for -`tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py` is superseded by the reviewed T38 publication -`sha256:86f37add…b718`; the other 16 pins match HEAD. - -## Verify actual SOPS compatibility and sealed-descriptor read/write custody - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T37 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T34] -state_hub_task_id: "3403e266-d63b-5ce1-b891-3bfeac93d28c" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** NetKingdom codex; independent Custodian fixture review. -Completed 2026-10-17 as generated-fixture compatibility proof. The coordinator -ran the actual reviewed SOPS 3.13.3 binary in a network/host-custody-isolated -namespace: all 65 tests passed in 14.85 seconds, including the 61 real-SOPS cases -previously skipped in T34 and four new actual sealed-FD cases. The latter cover -correct-key descriptor-only decryption, wrong-recipient refusal and descriptor-only -edit/rotation through the real Make entry points. Generated custody key files -were removed before these FD-only invocations; explicit descriptor passing, -private output modes, declared encryption-policy preservation, suppressed synthetic plaintext -and operation cleanup were checked. - -This is a dated successor to T34's historical 94-pass/61-skip record, which stays -unchanged. The prior skip is not rewritten as an earlier pass. Binary digest -`sha256:e5bec3346a873ae91d871550f3e698c1aad962aff462a080e40f25fde17fef6b` -matched the official release asset/checksum; Sigstore signature verification was -not performed. SOPS was not installed systemwide or admitted for production -runtime. Host custody was not mounted, network routes were absent, diagnostics -were suppressed and namespace teardown completed. All material was generated; -no original owner key/archive, private manifest, production credential, native -service continuity or owner assent was exercised. - -Evidence: Custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/sops-real-regressions.json`, -`sops-source-tool.json` and `sops-fd-r2/` (exact test patch/manifest). The focused -custody/source checks and frozen R6/R7 native fixture evidence remain separate. -T33 attempt readiness, T18 actual recovery/consumer acceptance, T19 retained MFA, -T35 TLS/trust disposition and T36 original registration/private admission remain -open under their existing owner boundaries. - -## Deliver exact-one original selector guard and bounded source refusal proof - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T38 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T34] -state_hub_task_id: "76dde6b9-5ee8-50d3-bf15-461d6d5f29b8" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-17 as source preparation, independently reviewed by the -coordinating Custodian agent. The adapter now requires exactly one selected -registration in the already-restored archive configuration before further runtime -environment reads, signer-key parsing or native checker invocation. Absent, -empty, identical-duplicate and conflicting-duplicate selectors refuse before -those later inputs; the existing unique-selector mocked native path still passes. -Current KeyCape Go configuration also rejects duplicate IDs; this makes the -adapter's own boundary explicit and establishes no native duplicate exploit. -The guard cannot run before archive decryption or the original key prompt. - -The 39 adapter checks passed, including four added early-refusal regressions. -Running those four cases against the retained original adapter failed the new -refusal contract as expected. The broader 77-check source run retained 76 passes -and one stale fixture-proposal source-hash refusal. Only the two affected hashes -and scope of that unexecuted/unapproved successor proposal were then refreshed; -all four affected fixture-plan checks passed. The original manifest preimage and -failure receipt remain retained, and frozen actual R6 runtime receipts were not -changed or claimed as proof of this successor. No broader native rerun occurred. - -Evidence: Custodian -`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/native-identity-r1/`: -`owner-source.patch`, `verification.json`, `manifest.json`, retained preimages, -`original-behavior-regression.txt` and `focused-regressions.stderr.txt`. -The later task extraction and exact workplan successor bytes are in -`refinement-r2/`; the original source-proof packet remains immutable. -Canonical owner publication, allocator-assigned Hub UUID and projection must be -recorded separately through the normal owner process; none is claimed here. - -This completes only the source guard/refusal deliverable extracted from T36. -T35 original TLS public provenance/private custody or accepted reissue, T36 exact -archive binding/current owner assent/consumer custody preparation, T33 complete -attempt readiness, T18 actual recovery/consumer acceptance and T19 retained-factor -MFA remain open. No actual archive, private key, Secret object, token exchange, -OpenBao login, rotation, production action or owner assent was exercised. - -## Prepare and fixture-test the isolated Authelia restore stage - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T41 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T29] -state_hub_task_id: "12b634c4-a21c-5503-a361-debe07f1db1d" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** claude-code; the founder retains the actual private -recovery inputs and runs the T17 stage. - -Add `isolated-authelia.py` and `run-isolated-authelia.sh` to -`tools/bootstrap-recovery/`, the Authelia counterpart of T29. Design, from the -2026-10-24 review: - -- Topology: the anchor-namespace pattern already used by the KeyCape session. - Restored LLDAP is the `--network none` anchor; Authelia and the probe client - join `container:` and talk over loopback only. No new network. -- Reuse without edits: import helpers from `isolated-lldap.py` and the other - existing modules. Do not modify `isolated-lldap.py` or the KeyCape files; - they are in the pinned source-hash list of the T38/T40 attempt. -- Inputs: the verified transfer receipt, the age key via - `sops-custody-unlock.sh`, an existing-user password by private prompt. - Original Authelia secrets and the `keycape` client secret come from the - archive, never from argv, environment listings or files outside tmpfs. -- Confinement: LDAP URL rewritten to loopback, SMTP notifier replaced by a - tmpfs file notifier, `authelia-smtp` not imported. Containment inspection - before private import; container and tmpfs cleanup verified on every exit. -- Checks: the five T17 acceptance items. Receipt records booleans, counts, the - issuer key thumbprint and image IDs only. - -**Done when:** unit tests cover config assembly (original secrets kept, notifier -and LDAP rewritten, path escape refused, missing secret refused), and an opt-in -synthetic-fixture test (`NK49_RUN_ISOLATED_AUTHELIA_TEST=1`) passes on the pinned -local images with disposable credentials only. The packet in -`docs/identity-service-restore-packet.md` names the stage and its exact command. -This prepares T17; it is not T17 acceptance and touches no production service. - -Completed 2026-10-24. `isolated-authelia.py`, `run-isolated-authelia.sh` and -`tests/test_isolated_authelia_recovery.py` are in place. Unit tests and the -opt-in native fixture tests pass on the pinned local images (9 passed): positive -path, wrong password at `existing_user_first_factor`, wrong storage key at -`storage_decryption`, and an encrypted-bundle run through `main()`. Native runs -surfaced two confinement rewrites beyond the planned ones: the NTP startup -check (outbound UDP) and the container healthcheck file (Authelia writes -`/app/.healthcheck.env` before provider checks, which a read-only root refuses). -Both are recorded in the packet. `isolated-lldap.py` and the KeyCape attempt -sources are unedited; `isolated-keycape.py` still hashes to the T38 pin -`86f37add`. The packet section "Prepared owner step: isolated Authelia -recovery (T17)" gives the exact command. - -## Prepare and fixture-test the isolated existing-token MFA stage - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T42 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T31, NK-WP-0049-T41] -state_hub_task_id: "2fa3bd7c-12a9-546a-8098-a1999346da8a" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** claude-code; the founder holds the token, its PIN and the -age key, and runs the T19 stage. - -Completed 2026-10-24, then redesigned the same day after the founder's first real run. -`isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py`, `run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh` and -`tests/test_isolated_privacyidea_mfa.py` add the T19 stage. Restored LLDAP, the -database and a privacyIDEA worker share one network-free namespace; the archived LDAP -resolver address is repointed to the restored directory in the disposable copy only; -and three native `POST /validate/check` calls by user and realm run in separate -processes (wrong key, wrong code, the owner's code), the call KeyCape makes. Reuses -`isolated-privacyidea.py` and `isolated-lldap.py` unedited. Fifteen opt-in native fixture -tests pass on the pinned images: HOTP and TOTP-with-PIN tokens owned by an LDAP user, -a wrong code alone, an unknown user, a malformed original key, the rewrite refusing an -unknown resolver address, and an encrypted-bundle run through `main()`. - -Two defects were found and fixed, both before any acceptance claim. (1) A first fixture -run was vacuous: privacyIDEA applies `PRIVACYIDEA_CONFIGFILE` after the `config_file` -argument, so the wrong-key run used the original key, accepted the code and spent the -HOTP counter. The probe now sets the variable and asserts the intended `PI_ENCFILE`. -(2) The launcher called `m.preflight()` on a module that did not define it, and its -catch-all printed the generic preflight message; tests now run the launcher's own -snippet. Then the founder's first real run (receipt retained in `/tmp`, not in Git) -stopped at acceptance with `ResolverError` on all three checks: the first design checked -by token serial, but real tokens belong to an LDAP user whose resolver points at the -in-cluster `lldap.sso.svc.cluster.local`, absent in isolation. The stage was rebuilt -around the directory and a by-user check; the gate had correctly refused to claim proof. -No key, PIN or code was recorded, and nothing was consumed. - -This prepares T19 and also covers the user-to-token resolver, its encrypted bind -password and the LLDAP user lookup (receipt field `user_to_token_resolver_proven`). It -is not T19 acceptance and touches no production service. Event handlers or policies that -call outside the namespace are not exercised. - -## Prepare the phase B plan: isolated KeyCape and restored OpenBao on one internal network - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T43 -status: cancel -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: "e4db6c9f-d464-4185-b5a1-ea71e21d1b42" -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T18] -state_hub_task_id: "485468fd-d56e-54d1-9bc7-97220c0c4a38" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** claude-code. Every signature, window and secret input stays with -the founder and the named owners. - -Delivered 2026-10-24: `docs/nk49-phase-b-plan.md` (topology, ownership, the changes the -pinned T18 machinery forces, ordering, claims and open decisions) and -`docs/nk49-phase-b-admission.example.json` (unsigned template). Verified from source: -the worker is launched `--network none` with a loopback `--add-host`; `inspect_session` -refuses any other network mode; the loopback-only probes would fail by design on an -internal network; the T38/T40 source closure is hash-pinned, so phase B is a new reviewed -module and must not edit those files; the T40 admission window ended 2026-10-24T05:00Z, so -a new founder signature is required. The consumer's client secret is part of the backup's -KeyCape secrets, so its custody into the consumer runner is an open owner design. - -2026-10-27 owner replies (State Hub, from the owners' own workplans; none authorizes any run): -railiance-cluster (`8fad4ef`, reply 65ab47ff): one proven production issuance on 2026-10-23T16:23:09Z, estimate 1 of 5 used; unproven because cert-manager objects are unreadable to the agent and crt.sh is stale; safe date 2026-10-30T16:23Z; admin-side check suggested. -railiance-platform (`2bbf1ff`, task RPF-WP-0064-T09): can own the single `--internal` network and keep restored OpenBao up as `bao-restored`; needs a new adapter pin, internal listener without generate-root, network check, receipt schema and verifier; objects to longer unsealed exposure than 45 minutes unless the founder accepts it in the window. -secrets-engine (`65a3dbe`, reply 5aeaadc9): new reviewed runner taking the client secret from an inherited pipe fd, founder-piped from the backup; NetKingdom must name the field and decrypt command; /jwks trust of the ISRG chain by restored OpenBao is unproven. - -2026-10-27 founder decision: accept the secrets-engine inherited-pipe custody design (`65a3dbe`) with optimizations 1, 3, 4 and 5: the wrong-secret negative test uses a generated random token, so only the one real secret passes the founder terminal; the decrypt step runs through a fixed non-echoing, unlogged wrapper that refuses to run under `script` or tmux logging; railiance-platform runs a value-free OpenBao-side `/jwks` trust probe on the phase B network before the ceremony; and the full path is rehearsed with a synthetic client on a throwaway network. Not adopted now: namespace/ptrace hardening (2) and an agent-free source (7). This accepts a design only and authorizes no run. - -2026-10-27: the founder tried the admin-side cert check as `ops-mason-builder`; cluster-wide and `sso` listing of certificates, certificaterequests and orders are Forbidden. The reissue therefore waits for 2026-10-30T16:23Z, the guaranteed-safe date from railiance-cluster; no count is required then. - -**Done when:** the decision is answered, the owners confirm their steps in their own -workplans, and the NK49 phase B module, verifier and tests are reviewed to T38 depth. This -task does not run phase B and does not replace T18's live consumer login or owner acceptance. - - -2026-10-27 founder decision (option A): phase B is paused, not built. The accepted design is retained for T44: secrets-engine inherited-pipe runner (`65a3dbe`) with optimizations 1, 3, 4 and 5; railiance-platform network names (`5658150`: `rpf64-nk49-pb`, `10.249.64.0/28`, rehearsal `-rh-`); client secret `keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client` key `client-secret` in archive member `resources/sso/secret/keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client.json`; cert reissue not before 2026-10-30T16:23Z. No module, window or signature was produced. - -## Pre-production joint restore drill with a live consumer login - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T44 -status: cancel -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T18, NK-WP-0049-T21] -state_hub_task_id: "0cde15c4-9918-574f-b522-34e620168bc9" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** claude-code. Signatures, windows and secret inputs stay with the founder and owners. - -**Done when:** restored KeyCape and restored OpenBao are joined on the isolated phase B network and a real consumer -(secrets-engine-openbao) passes native positive/negative login, plus one browser/PKCE client; this closes key-cape K1 and -railiance-platform R1/R2. Start from the T43 design notes; do not edit the pinned T38/T40 sources. Also re-prove reserved-LDAP-group denial and the resolver cutover functionally (from T21). - - -2026-10-27: moved, not dropped. The founder closed NK-WP-0049 in builder mode, and this drill now lives in [NK-WP-0055](NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md): T02 (build and rehearse), T03 (live consumer and PKCE login) and T04 (reserved-group denial and resolver re-proof). -## Accept remaining recovery and caller evidence and close the G08 handoff - -```task -id: NK-WP-0049-T03 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0049-T02, NK-WP-0049-T16, NK-WP-0049-T17, NK-WP-0049-T18, NK-WP-0049-T19, NK-WP-0049-T20, NK-WP-0049-T21, NK-WP-0049-T22, NK-WP-0049-T23, NK-WP-0049-T24, NK-WP-0049-T26] -state_hub_task_id: "d68cd4d3-1ba3-530e-88f9-26ebb8dd6eac" -``` - -**Accountable worker:** codex. Service/credential-owner acceptance remains with -the named owner boundary. - -Owner boundary: NetKingdom, Platform and affected service owners, with Custodian -G08 receiving the final evidence. The completed archive/job milestones remain -accepted independently of this final gate. - -**Done when:** T02 and T15–T38 have their stated completed or explicitly accepted -handoff outcomes; service authentication/token/audit proof and current/legacy -caller dispositions are accepted; the source workplan and projected tasks agree; -and G08 has an exact evidence/handoff record. Record actionable residuals as live -work records before workplan closure. Preserve historical IDs and receipts; do -not call a deferred rotation or an untested full-estate restore complete. - - -2026-10-27 closure (founder-accepted, builder mode): T03 is **done**. Dependencies T02 and T15–T38 are done except T43 (cancelled: phase B paused, design retained in T44). -G08 handoff evidence: archive recovery and backup activation (T04–T14, T23–T26); isolated owner recoveries of LLDAP (T16), Authelia (T17), existing-token MFA (T19), privacyIDEA audit continuity (T20), KeyCape issuer side (T18, receipt `16d72f7c…1651`, key-cape acceptance `fc9f09a`) and OpenBao (RPF-WP-0064, receipt `4e048dee…579d`, railiance-platform acceptance `5658150`); caller ledger (T02) and accepted dispositions (T21); historical objects deleted and verified absent (T22). -Live residuals (not claimed complete): T44 pre-production joint drill (restored KeyCape plus OpenBao live consumer login, browser/PKCE client, reserved-group denial, resolver re-proof); attended factor-diagnostic credential lane (owner-deferred); privacyIDEA credential revocation and exposure rotation under CUST-WP-0073-T05 / decision `1591daa1`. NK-WP-0049 closed 2026-10-27; residuals moved to NK-WP-0055. -## Evidence locations and refinement history - -“Live” above means `docs/evidence/2026-10-16-identity-backup-live/` in NetKingdom. -Implementation preparation is in the October16 implementation directory; earlier -backup discovery/database recovery is in `docs/evidence/2026-10-15-bootstrap-recovery/`. -The source-repair receipts explicitly labelled Custodian belong to that owning -repository. Use the [recovery ceremony](../docs/bootstrap-recovery-ceremony.md) -for exact procedure and approval history. No secret values belong in task evidence. - -Refinement rule: substantial work and newly understood remaining scope must be -visible in task blocks at a checkpoint, not only in progress prose. This replan -preserves T01–T03 identity and original evidence while making the completed -milestones and each remaining acceptance gate separately manageable. - -Managed identifier assignment also consumed a preexisting staged generated brief; -the follow-up commit restores its prior published baseline while preserving the -operator's working brief and original staged version. This is a projection-tool -side effect, not new recovery evidence. - - -R7 source publication and task bindings verified: -`5fcd5952add1c0167116094298a1d5feaa60cf30` is the observed published source. -All eight canonical additions match the reviewed bytes; all 33 task statuses -match the actual hub projection, including T32 done and T33 todo. Original -staged/working brief content is preserved. Normal synchronization has zero -failures/automation errors; existing warnings and scanner false-positive history -remain retained. Custodian identity-restore-adapter-next/canonical-r7-integration.json -binds source/projection/native-fixture evidence separately. T18 remains waiting -for the actual owner-held attempt and selected consumer acceptance. - - -2026-10-17 source/attempt refinement: T34 records completed attended custody, -preflight/private-manifest source preparation and its bounded tests; T35 and T36 -make original TLS recovery ownership and selected original admission metadata live -work. T33 retains final attempt readiness and its original Hub UUID. This adds no -actual recovery, MFA, native authority or owner assent. Source task counts above -refer to this file; projection has not been claimed for this proposed refinement. - -2026-10-17 verified source follow-through: source commit `4f65e41` passed normal -local scanning and 111 canonical focused checks. The initial T34 source-only -preparation now has an exact integrated source revision; existing real-SOPS -compatibility remains partly skipped and actual owner-held execution remains T18. - -T35/T36 source preparation is underway, with 17 pinned public-source references. -railiance-cluster owns the ingress/cert-manager/cluster-backup substrate; the -inspected same-host encrypted backup source establishes no independent original -kc-tls/trust recovery or accepted reissue. Draft owner questions remain unsent; -no private TLS input was requested. The historically deployed -secrets-engine-openbao registration is a defensible proposed consumer: its -7 October issuer and 10 October consumer proofs predate the reviewed archive. -The exact selector proposal is retained without current assent or private archive -validation. No token exchange, OpenBao login, client secret retrieval, new grant -or production redirect occurred. Keep incomplete admission refused before custody. -Custodian evidence: recovery-attempt-r1/t35-t36-source-next; final source/projection -review: resume-integration-r1/publication-verification.json. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md deleted file mode 100644 index f208793..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0050-playwright-consumer-registration.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,110 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0050 -type: workplan -title: "Register Playwright human and agent consumers through governed identity delivery" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: blocked -flavor: implementation -owner: codex -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-13" -updated: "2026-10-28" -depends_on: [] -related: [CUST-WP-0080, RPF-WP-0056, RAPP-PLAYWRIGHT-WP-0004] -state_hub_workstream_id: "06ba98d5-609e-5aaa-9bf7-4c4f4460e377" ---- - -Accept NetKingdom's concrete implementation request -`c6b4dfb0-44d5-4f12-8854-2c38ab6dc454` (original -`94a0096c-f34c-463c-b336-b13cf629b968`). This is the missing registration-owner -implementation, not another cross-owner coordination plan. Coordination remains -CUST-WP-0080-T05; Platform and provider retain consumer/service acceptance. -Initial eligibility of all identified platform humans and coding agents is -already decided. Do not request another membership approval or reuse a shared -admin identity, kubeconfig, SSH identity or existing OpenBao credential. - -> **Blocked 2026-10-28** (founder triage): T02 waits on Platform custody/delivery and the real -> agent records, T03 on CUST-WP-0080-T05 acceptance. No NetKingdom-side step remains open. -> Return to `active` when Platform custody is in place. - -## Prepare exact registrations and preservation checks - -```task -id: NK-WP-0050-T01 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "64893d94-9717-5812-b8e3-7cabe095fcdc" -``` - -`docs/playwright-registration.md` owns the bounded registration contract. -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/playwright-registration.py` constructs the exact public -PKCE record and distinct per-agent confidential registrations from existing -identity references, with dedicated audience/scope and 15-minute agent lifetime. -It reuses the existing byte-preserving registry adapter, refuses drift/shared -references/unreviewed audience registrations and bounds the existing human -issuer lifetime without modifying it. CLI emits only source proposals; no -credential access, live mutation or fabricated SecurityCaseType acceptance. - -Verified: nine new compiler/merge tests and 64 existing registration tests pass. -The broader 159-test directory run passed 157 and failed two unchanged short-window -OpenBao input tests; all seven tests in that module passed unchanged on rerun. -Native KeyCape config/startup suites and the generated-registration token/JWKS -fixture pass against committed issuer source 1344fc80e56315c5c99f58993f9ee02ce79e8a76. -Public output exactly matches Platform's candidate. Synthetic identity references -and local fixtures are not issuer-owner or real consumer acceptance. - -## Deliver custody integration and guarded registration activation - -```task -id: NK-WP-0050-T02 -status: progress -priority: high -depends_on: [NK-WP-0050-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "a9dadd07-f136-5dc7-9229-7a9dbb941f0d" -``` - -Resolve the exact real agent records and Platform custody/delivery source task; -add protected registration/config/Deployment integration using existing owner -operations, exact source/object/revision bindings, pinned native check-config, -created-only provenance, readback and guarded rollback. Prepare the concrete -action before any needed privileged approval. Source work can proceed while -owner acceptance is collected; custody and live grants must not be invented. -Neither compiler output nor another client's acceptance authorizes live apply. - -2026-10-13: private activation patch preparation implemented in -`playwright-activation.py`. Original/candidate registry and Deployment state bind -an exact proposal digest. Ordered stop/configure/resume avoids a registry/env -startup race in the single-Recreate issuer. Native verifier digest checks, fresh -object UID/resource-version/data/spec conditions, complete pod-quiescence checks, -readback and exact original-state rollback retain pre-existing registrations and -bindings. No mutation occurs from this module; the protected executor owns fresh -reads, admitted custody, actual approval and live acceptance. Source tests cover -partial recovery and independent RFC 6902 patch application; native KeyCape -check-config accepts both synthetic configurations. Real identity/custody owner -returns, executor/recovery-state integration, exact current image verification -and the supervised maintenance action remain open. - -Follow-up review reproduced two collision gaps: implicit client-ID audience and -different env names referencing the same proposed agent Secret/key. Both are now -refused; two new regressions failed before repair and pass afterward. This does -not establish isolation outside the observed registry/issuer environment. - -## Verify issuer and real consumer acceptance - -```task -id: NK-WP-0050-T03 -status: wait -priority: high -depends_on: [NK-WP-0050-T02, RPF-WP-0056-T03] -blocking_reason: "Await owner-scoped registry/custody activation, native cluster authentication and individual transport, then real human and agent acceptance under CUST-WP-0080-T05." -state_hub_task_id: "5a3aaf57-de5c-5a03-bc99-9bcf2fc5d95e" -``` - -Retain real human/agent issuance and identity/tenant/audience/scope/expiry proof, -native negative cases, preserved existing login, renewal, removal and active -connection termination. Hand the exact receipts to RPF-WP-0056-T03 and provider -RAPP-PLAYWRIGHT-WP-0004-T01/T03. Do not introduce a reciprocal prerequisite on -Platform activation: T02 owns issuer preparation/activation, T03 consumes final -Platform end-to-end acceptance. Close only after the registration owner's -requirements are proven; hand any residuals to live work records first. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5844807..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0051-sign-in-diagnosis.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,237 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0051 -type: workplan -title: "Show who a workload sign-in actually is" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -flavor: implementation -owner: codex -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-14" -updated: "2026-10-15" -depends_on: [] -related: - - MASON-WP-0011 - - NK-WP-0034 - - NK-WP-0042 -state_hub_workstream_id: "c1771c07-4466-5aa2-ad43-df63a471946b" ---- - -# Show who a workload sign-in actually is - -## Goal - -Make the next attended workload login show the uid, the directory group -names, and whether this authorization verified a one-time code, before -OpenBao accepts or refuses it. - -MASON-WP-0011 took a day because those three facts were split across the -account site, Authelia, and OpenBao. The account site stayed on -`bernd.worsch-3` while `bao login` reused another Authelia session. OpenBao -then said only `claim "groups" does not match any associated bound claim -values`. A user with no one-time password never reached that refusal. - -Done when an attended `bao login` with the T05 fixture uid shows, before -OpenBao answers, the uid, its group display names, and `aal2`; and the -ops-mason receipt for the refused login names the same uid and the OpenBao -error text. A routine login to a client that has not opted in gains no -extra screen. - -## Boundaries - -NetKingdom orchestrates this. It does not re-implement the issuer, the -account page, or OpenBao. - -| Change | Owner | -| --- | --- | -| Pre-redirect diagnosis and the uid on the KeyCape auth log | key-cape | -| Account-site uid and Authelia uid as two lines | user-engine | -| Authelia session hint, memberOf preview, negative-login fixture name | net-kingdom | -| Fresh browser for `bao login`, receipt fields, `capabilities-self` on the lane token | ops-mason, applied by railiance-platform | -| Role choice on the OpenBao UI. `platform-admin` stays the admin role | railiance-platform | - -Out of scope: widening `ops-mason-survey`, attaching -`workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime` to admin entity -`4a1f663c-0621-0483-edd0-f852274f4b6b`, `verbose_oidc_logging`, and any log -of a token, authorization code, email address, or one-time password. -Group display names and the uid are the diagnosis. They are not secret. - -### Completion review — 2026-10-15 - -All six tasks are done. The founder selected existing MFA-enrolled `tegwick` -for the negative fixture and confirmed its sole directory group is -`railiance-admins`. Its attended diagnosis showed that uid/group and `aal2` -before the workload role refused the groups claim; the native verifier receipt -names the same uid and preserves the error. The member proof as `bernd.worsch-3` -passed all capability checks and revoked its token. - -CCR-2026-0045 was approved by the founder in both requested roles and applied -through a contained `platform-root` OIDC/MFA session (exit 0). The approved -login overlay was deployed and its HTTP verification passed. The existing -owner task RPF-WP-0057-T04 retains separate UI role-selector clickthrough; -this does not block the completed native attended diagnosis/refusal goal. - -Evidence: [acceptance and sanitized receipts](../docs/evidence/2026-10-15-sign-in-diagnosis/acceptance.json). -Directory-helper verification: **68 passed**. Platform checks: **64 passed, -2 unrelated failures** (CCR-2026-0035 schema and core-hub resource-list -expectation); CCR-2026-0045 validates and its dry-run has no warnings. - -Security orientation: Emergent Knowledge **0.2.6**, package digest -`8d1d6a9d4d07fec7b619618de7dfe2be2254c1790f85f4198c7fe19db9751c02`; -`start` and `identity` were **withheld / orientation-only** because sources -changed. Reviewed their source cards, current `SECURITY-COMPANION.md`, owner -declarations and the current owner procedures directly. Retrieval grants no -live authority. - -## Write the diagnosis contract - -```task -id: NK-WP-0051-T01 -status: done -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "c969161a-cf81-57b0-9bbf-12989134e0eb" -``` - -Write `docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md`. It is the contract the other tasks -implement. It names three facts, for this authorization and no earlier one: - -- the uid KeyCape resolved from Authelia `preferred_username` -- the directory group display names copied from that uid's `memberOf` -- whether this authorization verified a one-time code (`aal2`) or did not - (`aal1`) - -The contract also says where each fact appears: the page before KeyCape -returns to the application, the KeyCape log line (`client_id` and uid), -the account site (account-site uid and Authelia uid on separate lines), -and the ops-mason receipt (uid and the OpenBao error text, no token). - -Each fact has one field name, used unchanged on every surface: -`uid`, `groups` (sorted display names), `assurance` (`aal1` or `aal2`), plus -`client_id` and, on the receipt only, `openbao_error`. The document also -lists what never appears: tokens, authorization codes, email addresses, -one-time passwords, raw `memberOf` DNs, and session cookies. - -`assurance` describes this authorization request, from KeyCape's assurance -decision (`MFAVerified`). A reused session that was `aal2` earlier is `aal1` -here unless this request asked for and verified the one-time code. - -Done when that document is the only copy of the field list and the other -tasks link to it instead of restating it. - -## KeyCape shows the principal before the callback - -```task -id: NK-WP-0051-T02 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0051-T01] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "a78219bb-2355-5a2e-8750-0b32a57f87bc" -``` - -key-cape shows the three facts before it redirects to the application, and -adds the uid and `client_id` to the existing auth log line. - -The page is opt-in per client (a client registration flag, default off), -enabled first for the OpenBao client. Routine logins elsewhere keep their -current flow. The page has one action, continue, and a line that says how -to sign in as someone else. A groups -refusal from OpenBao then follows a screen that already named the uid. - -The live flag is set with -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/openbao-signin-diagnosis-rollout.py` (inspect, server -dry-run, attended apply on the observed uid/resourceVersion; `--operation -remove` is the rollback), followed by an issuer restart. - -Acceptance is a deployed key-cape image. The log line contains no token, -code, email, or one-time password. This repo records the image digest in -the T01 document. - -## Account site shows both sessions - -```task -id: NK-WP-0051-T03 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0051-T01] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "bdc8b414-94fe-52cb-8e26-85c9914d4068" -``` - -`users.coulomb.social` keeps the account-site session. It adds the current -Authelia uid beside it. Authelia's cookie domain stays `coulomb.social`. -This repo only points at that requirement from `docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md`. - -## Preview directory groups for a uid - -```task -id: NK-WP-0051-T04 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0051-T01] -priority: high -state_hub_task_id: "65f85a11-8512-5700-b258-feb2ead84372" -``` - -Add a read-only `groups --user ` operation to -`sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/lldap_admin.py`. It reuses the existing snapshot and -custody login, has no `--apply`, and prints the T01 fields `uid` and -`groups`. An unknown uid is a refusal, not an empty list. No mail, no -password, no one-time password. Tests extend -`tests/test_lldap_group_maintenance.py`; `GROUP-MAINTENANCE.md` documents -the command. Matching those names to an OpenBao role stays a metadata read -in ops-mason. - -Name one negative-login fixture in the T01 document (`tegwick`): -a uid that is not in -`reuse-surface-hub-writers`, is not a platform admin, and will hold a -one-time password. Do not create that user in git. - -## Enroll the negative-login factor - -```task -id: NK-WP-0051-T05 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0051-T04] -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "afb5816f-5657-5fc8-856f-00ce5b431939" -``` - -Founder confirmed in this session (2026-10-15) that the existing account -`tegwick` already has MFA set up, and selected it instead of creating -`signin-probe-negative`. T05 is done on that confirmation. Founder confirmed directory membership -is `railiance-admins` only; the attended negative-login diagnosis showed the -same group. No directory changes were made. - -Enrollment is not `aal2`. A later login is -`aal2` only when that login asks for the one-time password. - -## Hand the OpenBao proof back to its owners - -```task -id: NK-WP-0051-T06 -status: done -depends_on: [NK-WP-0051-T01] -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "86fb4a6b-6655-57c2-b166-38c18e183eb0" -``` - -Ask ops-mason and railiance-platform to do four things, and no others: - -- `bao login` for a named role uses a fresh browser profile, or prints the - address and waits. It does not reuse the default Authelia session. -- The verifier receipt records the uid and the OpenBao error text. It - still records no token and no KV value. -- The lane policy gains a generated `sys/capabilities-self` read so the - proof does not call `sys/capabilities` with a root token. -- The OpenBao UI can select the workload role. The existing button remains - role `platform-admin`. - -`ops-mason-survey` stays read-only. The workload policy stays off the -admin entity. This task is done when both repos have accepted those four -items, not when this repo edits them. - - -Accepted live 2026-10-15: CCR-2026-0045 applied, overlay deployed/verified, -and both MASON-WP-0012-T04 proofs passed. The [contract evidence](../docs/sign-in-diagnosis.md#attended-acceptance--2026-10-15) -records the attended principal, group and assurance observations and native -receipt references. The pre-existing RPF-WP-0057-T04 retains separate UI -control clickthrough; no such browser interaction is claimed here. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0052-wave2-resource-right-sizing.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0052-wave2-resource-right-sizing.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4c11a83..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0052-wave2-resource-right-sizing.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0052 -type: workplan -title: "Wave-2 resource right-sizing from the 2026-10-21 allocation review" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -flavor: implementation -owner: claude -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-21" -updated: "2026-10-21" -related: - - CUST-WP-0071 - - RESOURCE-WP-0008 -state_hub_workstream_id: "7eaae0ab-19e6-533a-b3d1-11d11fa56210" ---- - -# NK-WP-0052 — Wave-2 resource right-sizing from the 2026-10-21 allocation review - -Receiving workplan in `net-kingdom` for the wave-2 request changes below. Login path for the whole fleet; apply one Deployment at a time and test sign-in after each. - -Origin: the 2026-10-21 node allocation review (`RESOURCE-WP-0008-T03`, feeding `CUST-WP-0071-T03`). Per the founder's 2026-10-21 delivery interview (`the-custodian/docs/decisions/2026-10-21-cust-wp-0071-delivery-interview.md`) the small adjustments form wave 2: one receiving task per owner repo, applied later in a batch. Applying wave 2 needs a separate founder approval, so every cluster-write task here is a human-gated `wait`. This file changes no manifest. - -## Apply the reviewed request changes - -```task -id: NK-WP-0052-T01 -status: done -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "a69cd984-3c32-5087-9438-913c37e309f6" -``` - -Values are pod-aggregate figures from the budget file (7-day window ending 2026-10-21T06:08Z). Limits stay unchanged unless stated. - -| Workload (ns/name) | Pods | CPU request | CPU limit | CPU p95/peak 7d (m) | Memory request | Memory limit | Mem p95/peak (Mi) | Throttle | Action | -|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---| -| `mfa/net-kingdom-sso-mfa` | 1 | 110m → **20m** | 1000m | 12.2/23.1 | 384Mi → **272Mi** | 896Mi | 225.6/225.8 | 0.049 | decrease + memory down | -| `sso/net-kingdom-sso-mfa` | 4 | 150m → **40m** | 1150m | 22.4/34.5 | 256Mi → **176Mi** | 640Mi | 140.5/179.1 | 0.537 | decrease + review CPU limit (throttled) + memory down | - -Source and container detail: - -- `mfa/net-kingdom-sso-mfa`: namespace `mfa`: Deployment `privacyidea`, container `privacyidea` (`sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml`, 100m/256Mi) plus the remaining 10m/128Mi in the same pod (confirm which container) — split the 20m/272Mi proposal across them. Also ~5% throttling at the 500m container limit. -- `sso/net-kingdom-sso-mfa`: namespace `sso`, four Deployments: `keycape` (25m/32Mi, limit 200m, `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml`), `lldap` (50m/64Mi, limit 200m), `authelia` (50m/128Mi, limit 500m), `identity-provisioner` (25m/32Mi, limit 250m). 53.7% of CFS periods throttled on the login path: find the throttled container(s) and review their CPU limit independently of the request decrease. - -Evidence: resource-control `docs/evidence/2026-10-21-node-allocation-review/2026-10-21-node-budget.md` (+ `.json`, commit `3d9b1bd`). Rule: CPU = max(floor, p95x1.5, peakx0.5) rounded up to 5m; memory request = 7d p95 working set x1.15 (only when the change is at least 64Mi). - -Steps: - -1. Map the pod-aggregate proposal onto the named container(s) in the source file; where a workload has several containers or pods, split by the per-pod figures in `2026-10-21-workload-usage.json` and keep the sum at the proposed value. -2. Prepare the source change as a reviewed commit (no push, no sync) and record the before values here. -3. Apply only inside the batched wave-2 rollout, after founder approval, through the owner's normal deploy path (ArgoCD sync or documented helm/kubectl apply). - -Verification: `kubectl -n get pod -o jsonpath='{..resources}'` shows the new requests; pods Ready with no new restarts or OOMKilled over 24h; for CPU decreases the throttle ratio and request latency stay at or below the 7d baseline; node request total drops by the expected delta. - -Prepared 2026-10-22 (wave-2 worker W3; no apply, cluster read-only). Live -objects are client-side-applied from `sso-mfa/k8s/` (plus out-of-band -`kubectl patch/set` history); each edited file was diffed against live with -`kubectl diff`: only `resources` keys change, no other drift. The -`factor-recovery` sidecar (added by `privacyidea/deploy-factor-recovery.py`, -not in `deployment.yaml`) is kept by the client-side merge and left at 10m/128Mi. - -The `sso` row (4 pods) splits per container; the throttled pod is **lldap** -(53.7% of CFS periods at its 200m limit; authelia/keycape/provisioner ~0%): - -| Container | CPU req | CPU limit | Mem req | Basis | -|---|---|---|---|---| -| sso/lldap | 50m -> 25m | 200m -> **1000m** | 64Mi (keep) | p95/peak 20.4/27.0m; limit rule max(2x current, 1000m) | -| sso/authelia | 50m -> 5m | 500m | 128Mi -> 64Mi | p95/peak 0.5/6.0m, mem p95 50Mi | -| sso/keycape | 25m -> 5m | 200m | 32Mi | p95 ~1m | -| sso/identity-provisioner | 25m -> 5m | 250m | 32Mi | p95 0.5m | -| mfa/privacyidea (main) | 100m -> 10m | 500m | 256Mi -> 160Mi | pod p95/peak 12.2/23.1m; now 125Mi | -| databases/net-kingdom-pg | 100m -> 50m | 1000m | 256Mi (keep) | DB floor 50m | - -Totals: sso 150m -> 40m (as proposed); sso memory 256Mi -> 192Mi (budget 176Mi; -lldap kept at 64Mi over its 59Mi p95); mfa 110m -> 20m, 384Mi -> 288Mi (budget -272Mi; sidecar untouched). net-kingdom-pg: `shared_buffers` unset (default -128MB) — no conflict with the unchanged 256Mi request / 1Gi limit. - -Apply (local kubectl, client-side as live, one at a time): -`kubectl apply -f sso-mfa/k8s/{lldap,authelia,keycape,identity-provisioner}/deployment.yaml`, -`kubectl apply -f sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/deployment.yaml`, -`kubectl apply -f sso-mfa/k8s/postgresql/cluster.yaml` (DB window). -Impact: every Deployment is 1 replica with strategy Recreate, so each apply is a -short outage of that component: authelia/lldap/keycape = SSO login path, -privacyidea = MFA; net-kingdom-pg restart (CNPG single instance) takes -privacyIDEA/authelia storage down briefly. Run off-peak, health-check between. - -Rollback: revert the source commit and re-sync/re-apply; the before values in the table above are the rollback target. Keep before/after `kubectl get -o yaml` captures as the receipt. - -## Applied — 2026-10-22 (NK-WP-0052-T01) - -Applied under the founder's wave-2 authorization (the-custodian docs/decisions/2026-10-21-cust-wp-0071-delivery-interview.md), after a full-render diff against live that showed resources only. lldap CPU limit raised to 1 core (it had been throttled); authelia, keycape, identity-provisioner and privacyIDEA right-sized; net-kingdom-pg restarted at 22:40Z at 50m and is healthy. KeyCape discovery returns 200 and the forge sign-in redirect works. Evidence: the-custodian docs/evidence/2026-10-22-wave2-apply.md. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md deleted file mode 100644 index 6db08e1..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,146 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0053 -type: workplan -title: "Quarterly isolated identity restore drill" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: finished -flavor: implementation -owner: claude -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-23" -updated: "2026-10-30" -related: - - NK-WP-0049 - - disaster-control/BackupPolicy.md -state_hub_workstream_id: "7c80ba09-8bd5-540e-8dd3-feb85e201ef3" ---- - -# NK-WP-0053 — Quarterly isolated identity restore drill - -> **Finished 2026-10-30.** Drill passed 2026-10-29 (next due 2027-01-29, held in disaster-control's -> restore-proof register); G1 decided (`e8935fa6`, Scaleway intake under NK-WP-0055-T07). -> -> **2026-10-31:** second drill passed on generation `20261031T034845Z-a13dc92e2c61` (post bind split, all five -> stages as `admin`; [evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json)). Next due **2027-01-31**. -> -> **2026-10-28** (founder triage): T02, T04 and T03 are finished now, not at the 2027-01-31 -> deadline. One attended `admin` run covers T02 and T04; T03 follows from its results. The -> workplan then closes. The quarterly repeat lives in disaster-control's restore-proof register -> (next due date recorded there), not in an active workplan. - -Intake for gap G3 of `NK-WP-0049-T24`. On 2026-10-23 the founder resolved decision -`e4c288d9` with the recommended split: G1 (a single off-host provider) is an -accepted residual risk until 2027-01-31; G2 (off-host host-loss detection) is -linked to the outside-node watchdog that `RAPP-TELEMETRY-WP-0001-T04` already -owes; G3 (no recurring drill) is this workplan. - -So far each identity restore has been proved once: LLDAP (NK49-T16), privacyIDEA -token material (T31) and audit (T20), and the archive recovery. This workplan -turns the existing isolated tooling into a recurring, evidenced drill. It adds no -grant, scheduler or production effect; each live drill is an attended owner run. - -## Define the drill and register it with disaster-control - -```task -id: NK-WP-0053-T01 -status: done -priority: medium -state_hub_task_id: "6bdfac30-75a8-5a1a-8d66-2fbb0c093958" -``` - -Write `docs/identity-restore-drill.md`: a quarterly cadence aligned with -disaster-control `BackupPolicy.md`, the fixed scope (archive retrieval and -verification, isolated LLDAP stage, privacyIDEA token-material check), reuse of -`tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-*.sh` without changes, the evidence -location `docs/evidence/-identity-restore-drill/`, and pass/fail criteria. -Ask disaster-control to add the identity lane to its restore-proof register. - -**Done when:** the drill document is reviewed and disaster-control records the -identity lane with a quarterly restore-proof schedule. - -2026-10-23: done. The drill procedure is `docs/identity-restore-drill.md`. -disaster-control adopted the lane as DISCTL-WP-0004 (commits 9ca7419 and -a54ff81). Changes there: AssetRegister `backup-netkingdom-identity`, three -DataRegister classes, BackupPolicy checks M-7 (25-hour freshness) and M-8 -(quarterly drill), G1/G2 in its open-gaps table until 2027-01-31, and an -RTO/RPO matrix row. RTO stays TBD until the first drill. When the first drill -evidence lands, tell disaster-control (its DISCTL-WP-0004-T03 is waiting on it). - -## Run the first scheduled drill - -```task -id: NK-WP-0053-T02 -status: done -priority: medium -depends_on: [NK-WP-0053-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "8b2cdf5a-69e1-59c6-8e4e-e478f44f77fb" -``` - -Run the drill in an attended session and retain the value-safe receipts. Any -failure becomes a finding in NK-WP-0049 or its successor; it is never repaired -silently. - -**Done when:** a dated, verified evidence set exists and the next due date is -recorded. - -**Done 2026-10-29** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-29-identity-restore-drill/drill.json)), operated by `admin` -(founder): stages 1 to 4 passed on generation `20261019T034919Z`, stages 1 and 5 on `20261029T230600Z`. The drill -exposed that no generation existed from 2026-10-20 to 2026-10-29 (finding in NK-WP-0055-T07); the fresh -generation was captured after the founder freed Storage Share space. Two Authelia attempts (mistyped password), -one interrupted privacyIDEA start and one MFA attempt with a mistyped login name are kept under `attempts/` with -their causes, as are two MFA runs on the pre-enrolment generation. Next due: **2027-01-29**. - -## Extend the drill to Authelia and by-user MFA, operated by admin - -```task -id: NK-WP-0053-T04 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0053-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "20264166-3c88-52d0-a7b4-dd3831c7a685" -``` - -The drill document was written before the Authelia stage (`run-isolated-authelia.sh`) and -the by-user MFA stage (`run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh`) existed, and it lists retained-factor -MFA as out of scope. Add both stages to `docs/identity-restore-drill.md`, and name `admin` -as the operator of record and the MFA test subject (founder intent, 2026-10-24: backup -validation is platform operations, with `platform-root` kept for break-glass). Add the check -of `docs/crisis-custody-list.md` to the drill's preparation, and record in the evidence which -identity ran each stage. - -`admin@coulomb` received an OTP on 2026-10-24, so it is first present in the backup captured -after 2026-10-25 03:45 UTC. The first `admin`-operated MFA run must use a generation from -after that capture; an older generation holds no token for `admin` and proves nothing. - -**Done when:** the drill document lists all five stages with `admin` as operator, the first -`admin`-operated MFA run has passed on a post-enrolment generation, and its evidence names -the identity used. - -**Done 2026-10-29:** the first `admin`-operated by-user MFA run passed on generation `20261029T230600Z` (after the -2026-10-25 enrolment); `drill.json` names the identity per stage. - -**2026-10-28:** the drill document now lists all five stages (Authelia and by-user MFA added, -retained-factor MFA no longer out of scope) with `admin` as operator, and the evidence records -the identity and login per stage. Remaining: the first `admin`-operated MFA run on a -post-2026-10-25 generation. - -## Review the G1 residual-risk acceptance - -```task -id: NK-WP-0053-T03 -status: done -priority: low -decision_id: "e8935fa6-ada8-4d15-bef2-4deb9671502a" -state_hub_task_id: "0fa4add7-3d53-51af-a2a2-ea9c63a2d628" -``` - -Use the drill results to put the single-provider question back to the founder. - -**Done 2026-10-30, founder decision `e8935fa6`:** open a second-provider intake. railiance-platform adds the -backup profile's planned Scaleway secondary for the full identity bundle (`application-archives/net-kingdom/`, -own scoped credential, readback proof). The G1 acceptance continues until 2027-01-31 or until the second copy -is proven, whichever is first. Basis: the drill passed, but the single 10 GiB Storage Share account filled and -no generation was written 2026-10-20..29 without alert (NK-WP-0055-T07). Quota, CNPG remote retention and the -G2 alert remain required. The intake is tracked in NK-WP-0055-T07. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md deleted file mode 100644 index 550dfe2..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0054-service-identity-policy.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,682 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0054 -type: workplan -title: "Service identity and privilege policy, conformance check and bind-account split" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: active -flavor: implementation -owner: claude -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-24" -updated: "2026-10-24" -related: - - NK-WP-0049 - - NK-WP-0053 - - NK-WP-0031 -state_hub_workstream_id: "36f61e43-f1f3-53fc-ad77-d1d797b3d5b1" ---- - -# NK-WP-0054 — Service identity and privilege policy - -Intake from the founder's direction on 2026-10-24, during NK-WP-0049 backup validation. -Three identities exist today: `platform-root` (all-mighty build-mode access, not for -production use), `tegwick` (developer) and `admin` (platform administrator, intended -for operations and for backup validation and crisis recovery). Findings that led here: - -- The T19 MFA proof ran as `platform-root`, the identity meant to leave production use. -- The human `admin` is LLDAP `uid=admin`, which is also the directory bind account for - Authelia and the privacyIDEA resolver. One account has one password, so the human - password is the service secret held in Kubernetes Secrets and in every backup bundle. - An OTP on `admin` protects KeyCape logins but not the bind path. -- `pi-admin` already exists for privacyIDEA and is separate; its credentials are in the - founder's personal password safe. -- No concrete crisis custody list existed. A first draft is `docs/crisis-custody-list.md`. - -Direction: dedicated `svc-` bind accounts, a dedicated admin account per -service (`ld-admin`, `pi-admin`, …), a NetKingdom standard that governs which identities -and privileges may exist for the services that are part of NetKingdom, and a health check -that validates conformance. This plan prepares and proposes; it grants nothing and changes -no live service. IAM Profile v0.3 already distinguishes human, service and agent -principals in tokens; this standard governs the accounts behind them and must extend, -not contradict, that profile and Credential Management Standard v0.2. - -## Inventory current service identities and privileges - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T01 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "422918a5-c695-5fe3-ba3c-2b370b2ef4dc" -``` - -Read-only inventory from repository manifests, ConfigMaps and owner-provided metadata. -No Secret is read. For each NetKingdom service (LLDAP, Authelia, KeyCape, privacyIDEA, -OpenBao, user-engine, tenant-engine, flex-auth and the platform consumers) list every -identity: name, class (human, break-glass, service bind, service admin, workload), -privileges, the credential's custody location, its consumers and its owner. - -**Done when:** `docs/service-identity-inventory.md` lists every identity with its source, -and states plainly which entries are unknown and who must confirm them. - -Completed 2026-10-24. `docs/service-identity-inventory.md` covers people, LLDAP, Authelia, KeyCape, -privacyIDEA, the identity-provisioner and engines, and OpenBao (railiance-platform files read -read-only). No Secret or live service was read. It ends with a table of what is unknown and who -confirms it. Main finding: the `admin` credential has **five** consumers (the human, Authelia, -KeyCape, the privacyIDEA resolver and the identity-provisioner), so T05 needs four service -accounts, not two. Also recorded: the provisioner needs more than read access, `trigger-admin` -is an uninventoried legacy admin, and OpenBao `platform-admin` binds on a group claim alone -(a question for T02, not a defect). - -## Draft the Service Identity and Privilege standard - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T02 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "5830e2eb-334a-52fa-9c55-a8c00d89c09f" -``` - -Write `canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md` as a proposed standard: -identity classes; naming (`svc-` for binds, `-admin` for admins); -the rules the founder's findings imply (one identity, one purpose; a bind account is -read-only and never a login; no human uses a service credential; humans and admins -require MFA; every identity has an owner, a custody class and a rotation path; the -break-glass identity is not routine); the exception record; and its relation to IAM -Profile v0.3, Credential Management v0.2 and the Security Zones standard. - -**Done when:** the draft is reviewed by the founder and the service owners it names. - -Founder review of draft-3 completed 2026-10-24: profile approach accepted, `platform-root` and `admin` definitions -confirmed, approved in principle. What remains for **done** is the owners' side: railiance-platform and -security-canon replies (the other four hub messages, to state-hub, key-cape, glas-harness and emergent-security, are -recommendations and do not gate ratification). On their replies, set the standard's status to accepted and close T02. - -Owner replies received 2026-10-24: security-canon confirmed all five mode readings and corrected the SEC-DSM -citations; railiance-platform prepared F-1 and the aal2 binding in source (RPF-WP-0065, nothing applied); key-cape, -glas-harness and state-hub assessed the agent and attribution gaps (KEY-WP-0043, GLAS-WP-0018, STATE-WP-0100). -Draft-4 of the standard applies all of it without changing a founder decision. What remains for T02 is ratification: -set the status to accepted when the founder decides. - -Completed 2026-10-25: the founder ratified the standard as v0.1 (status accepted). Ratification applies no exception's -elimination path and changes no live service; owners adopt on their own schedule and the declarations stay -unconfirmed until they do. - -Draft-3 (2026-10-24): realigned as an estate profile of SecurityCanon after a review against the canon -(`history/2026-10-24-security-identity-and-agent-review.md`): imported vocabulary, SEC-DSM references per rule, -estate identities in canon terms, new SI-15 (accountable automation). Validator migration is T08. -Draft-2 (2026-10-24, after the founder's review): decisions applied are OpenBao `platform-admin` binds -`aal2`; the human administrator keeps directory admin rights through an admin group; declarations start here -and move to the services; agents get their own class and rule SI-14. Rehearsals still to do (not decisions): -introducing `ld-admin` (LLDAP only) as the configured super-admin and demoting `admin`, the provisioner's narrowest scope, and whether a bind account can be kept -from signing in interactively. Finding F-1: the coding-agent role in OpenBao presents as a service against -IAM Profile v0.3. Draft-1 was delivered earlier the same day: `canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md` (proposed). Thirteen -rules (SI-1 to SI-13), naming, a target shape for today's services, the declaration fields, the -conformance result states, five initial exceptions (SI-X1 to SI-X5) and six open questions. It -extends IAM Profile v0.3 and Credential Management v0.2 without changing either. Review is the -founder's, then the service owners named in the inventory. - -## Schema and offline conformance validator - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T03 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T02] -state_hub_task_id: "a5c51d69-28ff-5458-83eb-10a35c8c5492" -``` - -A declaration schema in `canon/schemas/` and an offline validator in -`tools/service-identity/`, in the style of `tools/tenancy-posture` and -`tools/custody-record`: each service declares its identities, the validator checks the -declaration against the standard, refuses secret-shaped values and reports counts only. - -**Done when:** valid and invalid fixtures pass and fail as expected, and the declarations -for the current services are checked in. - -Completed 2026-10-24, **provisionally**: built against draft-1 before the founder's review, so a rule -change in the standard changes the tool. `canon/schemas/service-identity_v0.1.schema.json`; -`tools/service-identity/validate.py` (30 tests); `make service-identity-test` and -`make service-identity-check`; eight declarations in `tools/service-identity/declarations/`, authored from -the inventory and all marked `owner_confirmed: false`. First run as of 2026-10-24: 0 non-conformant, 12 -unknown, 2 excepted, 5 planned, 6 conformant. Unknown outnumbers conformant because the repository -cannot establish privileges for the KeyCape clients and others; that is the honest result, not a pass. -Building it changed the draft in three ways: custody became a list (the `admin` password lives in a -Secret and a person's safe), the SI-X1 exception grew to include SI-9 and NAMING, and the reserved-name -rule was scoped to credential-holding identities (standard section 10, question 7). SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, -SI-10 and SI-13 are not decidable from a declaration. - -## Migrate declarations and validator to canon grants (draft-3) - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T08 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T03] -state_hub_task_id: "d45efcad-fb96-51b2-ab3d-4b183d3f586e" -``` - -Draft-3 of the standard is an estate profile of SecurityCanon: accounts carry an imported `principal_type` -and authority grants written `MODE @ SCOPE` with activation and environment, and break-glass is an -activation. The schema, validator and declarations still use draft-2's classes. Migrate them, keeping the -rule ids, the exception ids and the current results comparable (the first run under grants should report the -same non-conformant, excepted and unknown accounts unless a difference is explained). - -**Done when:** the schema expresses principal type and grants, the declarations follow §3 of the standard, -the tests pass, and a before/after comparison is recorded. - -Completed 2026-10-24. Schema, validator, fixtures, declarations and tests (40 pass) follow draft-3: imported -`principal_type`, grants `MODE @ SCOPE` with activation and environments, estate conventions `bind` and -`service-admin`, `unknown` placeholders, and an `elimination_path` on every exception. SI-4 and SI-7 became -decidable. Before/after, as of 2026-10-24 over the same eight declarations: - -| Result | Draft-2 fields | Draft-3 grants | -| --- | --- | --- | -| non-conformant | 1 | 1 (`openbao/coding-agent`, SI-14) | -| unknown | 11 | 10 | -| excepted | 2 | 2 (`lldap/admin` SI-X1, `openbao/netkingdom-platform-admin` SI-X4) | -| planned | 5 | 5 | -| conformant | 6 | 7 | - -The only account that moved is KeyCape's `secrets-engine-openbao` client, unknown to conformant: its scope -(`openbao:login` only) is established, so it can be stated as a grant instead of an unknown privilege level. -`lldap/admin` is now also excepted under SI-4, which grants made decidable; SI-X1 lists it. - -## Live conformance health check - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T04 -status: wait -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T03] -blocking_reason: "Validator delivered (T03, provisional). Await the T02 review and owner agreement on what read-only metadata each service can provide." -state_hub_task_id: "c8db4607-9306-572b-a3cb-c35ca5989ec7" -``` - -Compare declared against observed: for example, which DN each consumer's configuration -binds as, which group the bind accounts belong to, and which policies the admin roles -carry. Observed state comes from owner-provided read-only metadata and repository -manifests, never from reading Secrets. Findings feed the existing proposal-only posture -feedback (`tools/posture-feedback`) with an evidence-freshness bound. It changes nothing. - -**Done when:** a dated run reports conformant, non-conformant and unknown per identity, -with each owner named for every finding. - -**2026-10-28 (KeyCape):** key-cape `a1ab8ff` (KEY-WP-0045) adds `keycape identity-facts`, a value-safe -JSON export of the client registry, directory bind, factor service and admin surfaces. Four of -the five KeyCape unknowns are now declared from source (scopes limited to registered scopes, -`token.go:355-363`); `rapp-qonto` stays `unknown` until the live view (reference config names it -`rapp-qonto-client`, `qonto:read`). Findings handed on: KeyCape's LLDAP bind is the directory -admin (scope of T05, KEY-WP-0045-T03); `approval-engine-operator` is withdrawn but registered -(SI-11, KEY-WP-0013-T02). The founder's live view streams the deployed config through the -exporter without writing it to disk; the exact command is in key-cape KEY-WP-0045-T02. - -**2026-10-28 (OpenBao, PostgreSQL):** railiance-platform `bd8ca57` (RPF-WP-0067-T02) adds a -value-safe metadata exporter (`scripts/service_identity_metadata_export.py`, 10 tests) for -OpenBao auth roles/policies with effective rules and PostgreSQL role flags and memberships. -Declared from source: `fluid-telegram-operators` OPERATE on four exact KV entries; -`coding-agent` OBSERVE only (its boundary policy denies the KV path its second policy grants, -which is therefore inert). `coding-agent` `agent.mode` stays unknown (KeyCape KEY-WP-0043). -The founder's live export commands are in RPF-WP-0067-T03. - -## Split the directory bind from the human admin - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T05 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: "9f0f7a87-7adb-44f6-8360-db6a80e3ceca" -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "c43d339a-fc8a-5526-885a-64693c930005" -``` - -Create `svc-authelia`, `svc-keycape` and `svc-privacyidea` as read-only directory binds and a -narrowly scoped provisioner account that can create users and groups without being the -directory super-admin (the inventory found these four consumers beside the human; the -narrowest working privilege for the provisioner must be tested against the pinned LLDAP image -first). Per the founder's decisions the human `admin` keeps its name and its administrative rights through an admin -group on its own password and OTP, and `ld-admin` is LLDAP's configured super-admin only. The migration -therefore introduces `ld-admin` by configuration on the existing directory and demotes `admin`; this is -rehearsed in isolation before any change. Switch the Authelia, KeyCape and privacyIDEA resolver configurations and the -provisioner to them, make `admin`'s password -human-only and rotate it, and remove the shared secret from the service Secrets. Update -the backup profile, the restore adapters (`isolated-lldap.py`, `isolated-authelia.py`, -`isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py`, which read the directory password from `lldap-secrets` and -rewrite the resolver address) and the restore packet. Prepare guarded helpers and -filled-in commands; the founder runs the live steps. - -**Done when:** both services bind with their own read-only accounts, the human `admin` -password is not present in any service Secret, a fresh backup restores and passes the T17 -and T19 drills under the new accounts, and the old shared credential is retired. - -**2026-10-28 founder decision `9f0f7a87`: go, including the live run this week.** Order: guarded -helpers and filled-in commands; an isolated rehearsal on a restored copy of the directory covering -the `ld-admin` introduction, demotion of `admin` to an admin group, the narrowest provisioner -privilege on the pinned LLDAP image, and SI-3 (can a `svc-*` bind be kept from interactive login); -then the founder runs the live steps as soon as the rehearsal passes. KeyCape's bind is confirmed -as the directory admin from source (key-cape `a1ab8ff`, KEY-WP-0045-T03). The rotation lane is -`lldap-directory-bind` / `lldap-service-binds` in `tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml`. - -**2026-10-28 synthetic rehearsal (phase 1 of 4):** `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split-rehearsal.py` (agent-run, -pinned LLDAP v0.6.2, generated passwords, 127.0.0.1 only, removed afterwards; -[receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-rehearsal.json)). Proven: -`ld-admin` can be introduced into a directory whose super-admin is `admin` and made the configured -super-admin by restart on the same data; `admin` keeps its rights through `lldap_admin` with its -password unchanged; `lldap_strict_readonly` binds read all users and groups and cannot write. -Findings: (1) `lldap_password_manager` cannot create users or add members, so the provisioner's -narrowest working group is `lldap_admin` (own account, but super-admin rights: needs an exception or -a provisioner redesign); (2) SI-3: every `svc-*` account can sign in to the LLDAP web UI; the UI is -IP-restricted, and Authelia's user filter must require `net-kingdom-users` membership; (3) production -`deployment.yaml` runs the unpinned `lldap/lldap:stable`, while the rehearsal and the restore tools pin -v0.6.2: pin production before the live run. - -Remaining phases, each its own budgeted task: **(2)** consumer switch in source (Authelia configmap user -and users filter, KeyCape `create-secrets.py` bind, privacyIDEA `realm_bootstrap.py` resolver, -identity-provisioner deployment, LLDAP image pin) with a synthetic Authelia check of the filter; -**(3)** the guarded live helper (plan/apply/verify, value-free receipts, passwords only by hidden -prompt or fd) plus the backup profile and the restore adapters `isolated-lldap.py`, -`isolated-authelia.py`, `isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py`; **(4)** the founder runbook with filled-in -commands, a founder-run rehearsal on a restored backup, then the live run. - -2026-10-28 founder decision: `svc-provisioner` gets its own account in `lldap_admin`, recorded as -exception SI-X6 (SI-3, expires 2027-04-30) in the standard and `declarations/lldap.yaml`. - -**2026-10-28 phase 2 (source switch), parts a and b:** `identity-provisioner` logs in as -`LLDAP_ADMIN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) and refuses chosen usernames starting `svc-` or ending -`-admin` (`2ebc4f0`; its image needs a rebuild through the owner pipeline). Custody: the LLDAP -custody file now carries `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` as the `ld-admin` password plus -`LLDAP_SVC_{AUTHELIA,KEYCAPE,PRIVACYIDEA,PROVISIONER}_PASS`; the human `admin` password leaves -custody. Consumers: Authelia binds as `svc-authelia` (`ldap_password` from its own key), KeyCape as -`svc-keycape` (`create-secrets.py`, `bootstrap-config.json`), the privacyIDEA resolver as -`svc-privacyidea` (`realm_bootstrap.py`), the provisioner from the new Secret -`identity-provisioner-ldap` (`create-secrets.sh`, deployment, `identity-provisioner-reconcile.py`). -LLDAP's deployment sets `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN=ld-admin`. The image is **not** pinned yet: production -runs `lldap/lldap:stable`, and pinning to v0.6.2 could downgrade the database; the runbook reads the -running digest first. Service-account emails use `@service.netkingdom.invalid`. Left: 2c (Authelia -users filter requiring `net-kingdom-users`, synthetic check), then phases 3 and 4. - -**2026-10-29 phase 2c:** Authelia's `users_filter` now excludes `svc-*` and `ld-admin` instead of -requiring `net-kingdom-users`, because tenant users are provisioned only into `:users` -and an inclusion filter could lock them out. `bind-split-rehearsal.py --stage authelia` runs the -pinned Authelia 4.39.28 with the repository's own `configmap.yaml`, bound as `svc-authelia` -against a synthetic LLDAP ([receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-authelia-filter.json)): -human login 200, wrong password 401, `svc-keycape`/`svc-privacyidea`/`ld-admin` 401; under the previous -filter all three were 200. The read-only `svc-authelia` bind is sufficient for Authelia's lookups. -Phase 2 is complete; phases 3 and 4 remain. - -**2026-10-29 phase 3a (live helper):** `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/bind-split.py`, founder-run, changes the -directory only. `prepare-custody` adds `LLDAP_SVC_*_PASS` and a new `ld-admin` `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` -to the private custody copy (40 alphanumerics, the shape `apply-service-secrets.literal()` accepts) -and refuses a second run; `plan` is read-only; `accounts [--apply]` creates `ld-admin` and the `svc-*` -accounts with `@service.netkingdom.invalid` emails, sets exactly their groups and their passwords -(pinned `lldap_set_password`, password in the environment only) and refuses an existing account with -a foreign email or extra groups; `verify [--old-admin-retired]` proves every account signs in with -its custody password, `admin` keeps `lldap_admin`, and the old shared password is refused. The -human `admin` signs in at a hidden prompt; receipts are value-free. `make bind-split-test` runs it -end to end on a throwaway pinned LLDAP (3 tests). `apply-service-secrets.py` gains the named -rotations `lldap LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` and `authelia LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS -> ldap_password`, so the -existing Secrets are switched only by explicit, conditional rotation (97 tests). Left: 3b (backup -profile and the three restore launchers), then phase 4. - -**2026-10-29 phase 3b (restore path):** no launcher change is needed, which corrects this task's -earlier assumption. `isolated-lldap.py` takes the configured super-admin name from the archived -deployment's `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_DN` and its password from the archived `lldap-secrets`, and prompts for -the password of the user under test; `isolated-authelia.py` binds with the archived configmap user and -`authelia-secrets`; `isolated-privacyidea-mfa.py` rewrites only the resolver `LDAPURI` and keeps the -archived bind DN and password. After the split all three therefore follow `ld-admin`, `svc-authelia` -and `svc-privacyidea` from the backup itself. Regression test: the configured admin follows the archived -deployment (`tests/test_isolated_lldap_recovery.py`). `bind-split-rehearsal.py --stage startup` -([receipt](../docs/evidence/2026-10-28-nk54-bind-split-rehearsal/synthetic-startup.json)) proves on -v0.6.2 that once `lldap_admin` has a member, LLDAP ignores the configured admin password and does not -create a missing configured admin: a backup taken at any point of the switch restores, and -**`bind-split.py accounts` must run before the LLDAP deployment switch**. The backup profile is -unchanged: its components carry their own Secrets with the new values, and identity-provisioner is not -an identity-restore component (its password is re-derivable from custody). Phase 3 is complete; -phase 4 (runbook, founder rehearsal on a restored backup, live run) remains. - -**2026-10-29 phase 4 (runbook and remaining consumer tools):** `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/BIND-SPLIT-RUNBOOK.md` -gives the founder-run order with checks and rollbacks: preconditions (restore drill on the current -backup, LLDAP pinned to the running digest only if it is v0.6.2, rebuilt provisioner image), prepare -custody, plan, accounts, verify, then one consumer at a time (provisioner, Authelia, KeyCape, privacyIDEA -resolver, LLDAP), then the human `admin` password change and `verify --old-admin-retired`, then the -restore drill on the next generation. New tools: `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/directory-bind-rollout.py` -(`028a7a9`; edits only `lldap.bindDN`/`bindPW` in `sso/keycape-config`, inspect/dry-run/attended -apply with uid and resourceVersion test, `--operation revert`; 8 tests) and -`realm_bootstrap.py --switch-bind` (`e556af8`; only from the legacy `uid=admin` bind, only -`BINDDN`/`BINDPW`; 3 tests). Since phase 2b, `realm_bootstrap.py` refuses the live resolver until -`--switch-bind` runs. The founder's restore-drill rehearsal is the NK-WP-0053 run on the current -backup (precondition), and the post-split drill closes this task. Agent preparation is complete. - -**2026-10-30 live run: passed** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk54-bind-split/README.md)). -The founder ran steps 1-10; `verify --old-admin-retired` passed: `ld-admin` is the configured -super-admin, Authelia, KeyCape, the privacyIDEA resolver and identity-provisioner bind with their own -accounts, `admin`'s password is human-only and the old shared password is refused. Deviations: the -custody copy had to be decrypted first and `KUBECONFIG` exported (runbook setup corrected); step 6 was -refused because the custody `AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET` no longer matches the live hash, and -`ldap_password` was rotated alone through the same guarded `publish()` path. Open: the restore drill on -the next backup generation (closes this task, retires SI-X1) and reconciling the stale custody client -secret. - -**Done 2026-10-31: post-split restore drill passed** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-identity-restore-drill/drill.json)). -The founder, operating as `admin`, ran all five NK-WP-0053 stages on generation `20261031T034845Z-a13dc92e2c61`, -the first daily capture after the live split: independent retrieval, LLDAP (`admin` with its new human-only -password), privacyIDEA (7/7 tokens, 414,440 signed audit rows), Authelia on the archived `svc-authelia` -configuration (T17), and `admin`'s OTP through the restored `svc-privacyidea` resolver (T19). Every receipt -reports cleanup verified and the transfer digest. Not counted: a stage 1 run without an OpenBao `platform-admin` -token (the tool fails silently; the drill document now has the login step), the stage 2 run it fed, and an -MFA run that tested `platform-root`. SI-X1 is retired in the standard and `tools/service-identity/declarations/lldap.yaml` -(`admin` and the four `svc-*` binds conformant). Follow-up: Credential Management v0.2 section 6 still lists -`LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` as the three-way shared credential. - -## Disposition of per-service admin accounts - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T06 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: "9f0f7a87-7adb-44f6-8360-db6a80e3ceca" -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T02] -state_hub_task_id: "8072b5cf-4161-58b9-8dfc-62fa102ccd16" -``` - -For each service decide whether a dedicated admin account exists and what it is called: -LLDAP (`ld-admin`), privacyIDEA (`pi-admin`, existing), Authelia, KeyCape (client -registry), OpenBao (the `platform-admin` role) and others. Record the result in the -inventory and the standard. `ld-admin` is for LLDAP only; `admin` stays the human's name on every service. Introducing `ld-admin` as the -configured super-admin on an existing directory is untested here, so it needs a rehearsal first. Also rehearse -whether a read-only bind account can be kept from signing in interactively (SI-3). - -**Done when:** every service has a recorded disposition and a custody location. - -**Done 2026-10-28, founder decision `9f0f7a87`:** dispositions accepted as proposed and recorded in -the standard (section "Per-service admin disposition"): LLDAP `ld-admin`; privacyIDEA `pi-admin`; -Authelia and KeyCape none (configuration-only, no local admin plane); OpenBao federated -`platform-admin` with root only via `generate-root`; PostgreSQL the CNPG `postgres` superuser through -railiance-platform. The `ld-admin` introduction and the SI-3 check are rehearsed under T05. - -## Maintain the crisis custody list - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T07 -status: progress -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: "9f0f7a87-7adb-44f6-8360-db6a80e3ceca" -blocking_reason: "No TO CONFIRM row remains (2026-10-28). Open: the machine-readable freshness check and the first admin-operated drill (NK-WP-0053) verifying the list." -state_hub_task_id: "ae8524ff-12d8-59c2-b46b-88f3bfd44dd8" -``` - -Keep `docs/crisis-custody-list.md` current, and propose a non-secret machine-readable -record with a freshness check, modelled on `tools/custody-record`, so a drill can verify -that each row has a holder, a location and a last-proven date. - -**Done when:** no row is marked `TO CONFIRM`, the freshness check exists and the first -`admin`-operated drill (NK-WP-0053) has verified the list. - - -## Assess the post-split password-reset boundary - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T09 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T05] -state_hub_task_id: "5c7b015a-67e6-5ec1-b28a-b4d1835606ef" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-31 as the consumer-return assessment for CSOC-WP-0015-T06. -T05's completed bind migration and post-split restore drill prove their stated -login/MFA scope. Neither proves a password change through Authelia. The founder -receipt at 2026-10-30T18:53:16Z records svc-authelia in lldap_strict_readonly. -Read-only native metadata at 2026-10-31T12:27:58Z finds the svc-authelia ConfigMap -and Ready Authelia generation 31 / LLDAP generation 9, at the exact image digests -used by Coulomb's isolated native reset proof. That proof shows first factor and -reset-link verification succeed, but password change returns HTTP 200/KO, leaving -the old password valid. The ordinary-user password-manager fixture succeeds; -this is not approval for that role or evidence of every privilege boundary. - -Evidence: docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/consumer-assessment.json, linked -founder receipts and Coulomb native proofs. No production reset, email, directory -membership read, credential access or runtime change occurred. Current membership -since the dated owner receipt is unknown; no live failed reset is claimed. -T05 remains done for its original scope. T10 owns the newly explicit reset return. - -## Restore and verify supported post-split password reset - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T10 -status: progress -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T09] -state_hub_task_id: "6e4e5070-68d9-5b50-bb99-6844656b03e5" -``` - -Residual of the completed bind split, required by CSOC-WP-0015-T06 and the existing -personal password-reset behavior. Review a supported, bounded reset authority or -recovery path without restoring the shared human-admin credential. Preparation can -start now; a runtime grant/change requires a separate reviewed founder decision. -The earlier split approval is not approval to widen svc-authelia's privileges. - -First verify current effective membership through an owner-approved value-free -observation. Rehearse the proposed authority on the pinned native images, including -ordinary-user password change, privileged-account limits, service interactive-login -exclusion, rejected unverified/expired/replayed requests, and unrelated directory -write denial. Compare all rights, not only HTTP status. Prepare exact target-bound -execution/rollback, custody/declaration updates and the post-change backup/restore -check under the existing bind/custody ownership. Do not change the canonical -read-only split helper or declaration to imply an unapproved live grant. - -Done when the reviewed path has an attended native return, a fresh reset actually -changes the eligible user's password and permits app login, old-password and replay -checks refuse, MFA/TLS/directory boundaries are preserved, and the current archived -configuration restores the same supported behavior. Retain secret-free evidence -and explicit productive verdict; hand the result to CSOC-WP-0015-T06. Existing -personal reset acceptance remains historical evidence, not a post-split return. - - -2026-10-31 T10 preparation checkpoint: the matrix in T11 establishes the proposed -role's actual scope on the pinned binaries. Password-manager refuses LLDAP admins -but can change non-LDAP-admin service and application-admin passwords. Therefore -no one-line role promotion is an execution-ready remedy. Next: value-free current -membership/subject classification, owner review of the service write grant and -a supported directory-admin recovery path if the accepted subject needs it, then the guarded packet. -No existing identity grant, declaration, helper or runtime was changed. - -## Rehearse native password-reset authority and unrelated write limits - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T11 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T09] -state_hub_task_id: "3c95bbb2-7680-5e2b-bd3a-3dabac820891" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-31. Ten direct password-change cases and eight native Authelia -reset flows cover strict-readonly/password-manager against ordinary users, an -LLDAP admin, an application-admin outside that group, and another service account -(the service case uses the direct directory API). Password-manager changes all -non-LLDAP-admin targets; the LLDAP admin refuses. Strict-readonly refuses all. -Actual old/new authentication verifies each result; first factor, unverified -reset and consumed-link refusal remain checked. No production account is mapped -to a synthetic class by this result. - -Both roles refuse seven unrelated writes with seven successful admin controls: -user create/delete/other-profile edit, group create/delete, self-promotion and -removal of another admin's membership. User/group metadata remains unchanged. -Authelia excludes interactive service login; direct LLDAP access and password -API scope remain distinct. This is a bounded operation matrix, not an exhaustive -rights audit or productive acceptance. All containers use disposable loopback -confinement with no host mounts, ports, external routes or provider SMTP. - -Evidence: docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/native-matrix.json, produced by -coulomb-social/scripts/rehearse-reset-authority.py with source manifest retained in -that repository's docs/release/reset-authority-matrix-2026-10-31.sources.txt. -Consumer validation binds the full gate (546 passed, no failures/errors/skips), -both original native reset cases and three CLI refusal checks. T10 retains current -membership observation, complete grant/recovery design, admission, supervised -execution and native backup/restore acceptance; none is closed by this rehearsal. - - -2026-10-31 subject-binding correction: the retained October6 acceptance identifies -`tegwick`. Treating a new recovery route for every directory administrator as a -Coulomb prerequisite before observing that subject would expand the original -contract. Technical decision8770d4ea-8538-4f88-a9f8-8bcfb0542603 binds the check to -tegwick; directory-admin recovery blocks this consumer only if that subject is -in lldap_admin. The denial remains an explicit product/owner boundary and is not -silently waived. Broad password-manager authority still needs reviewed admission. -T12 is the completed read-only observer preparation; T13 owns the actual result. - -## Prepare the fixed-subject reset-role observer - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T12 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -state_hub_task_id: "95675a19-b406-5425-aaf4-e5313d12aea4" -``` - -Completed 2026-10-31. `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/reset-authority-observe.py` reuses the -existing origin-restricted, TLS-verified, no-redirect transport. It queries only -admin, svc-authelia and the accepted personal account tegwick; no mutation or -credential-discovery operation exists. The human admin password is prompted only -in an attended terminal. Receipt creation requires a private owned directory, -refuses an existing file/symlink/repository location and writes mode0600. Receipts -contain role booleans/counts and source/subject hashes, not passwords, bearer -tokens, raw usernames or arbitrary group names. Provider failures are redacted. - -92 unit/transport checks pass, including the reused transport's redirect/origin -controls. All four native bind-split tests pass; the final observer node separately -passes against the pinned LLDAP image, proving ordinary/admin classification, -unknown-user refusal and unchanged directory metadata. Its fixture container and -volume are removed. Ruff passes. Evidence: docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/ -observer-preparation.json. The runtime observation remains T13; fixture success -neither grants password-write authority nor proves reset or application access. - -## Obtain the attended current reset-role observation - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T13 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -needs_human: false -state_hub_task_id: "278d5ba8-1c2a-58d9-a24e-2233af2c1aef" -``` - -T12 is complete. The next result is `netkingdom.reset-role-observation.v1` with -status `current_reset_roles_observed`, source hashes, svc-authelia role flags and -tegwick role flags. Validate the exact target/source binding, current membership -and any multiple-built-in-role ambiguity before constructing the runtime proposal. -A refusal or missing user is a diagnostic outcome, not permission to replace the -accepted subject or widen access. Do not collect the password in chat or retrieve -it from custody. This human step supplies private authentication, not a new policy -approval. The directory-admin route is conditional on the accepted subject's -actual classification; every runtime grant/change remains separately reviewed. - - -Completed 2026-10-31 at12:57:44Z: founder ran the observer after correcting a -line-wrapped receipt path (the first attempt refused before authentication). -Independent private-file readback verifies mode0600/owner/single link, exact -endpoint and tegwick subject hashes, all four prepared source hashes and no -unexpected fields. Current roles: svc-authelia is strict-readonly with no other -groups; tegwick is in none of the three built-in privilege groups and has one -other group. No multiple-role ambiguity. Evidence: docs/evidence/2026-10-31- -reset-authority/current-roles.json and consumer reset-role-return-verification- -2026-10-31.json. T13 is done; no grant or reset was performed. T10 now prepares -the reviewed password-manager transition for this consumer, retaining explicit -non-admin service/application-account reach and directory-admin exclusion. The -accepted tegwick flow needs no new directory-admin recovery route on this evidence. - - -## Prepare and rehearse the guarded reset-role transition - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T14 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T11, NK-WP-0054-T13] -state_hub_task_id: "9d9570d9-7ea4-558c-8573-c5428cafb788" -``` - -Owner: Codex. Prepare the exact svc-authelia role replacement and read-only -recovery; validate the journal, crash recovery and pinned native transport. -Measure role refresh in a single running Authelia process and disclose retained -HTTP-token rights after membership rollback. Completion requires source-bound -validation and an executable reviewed proposal, not a live grant. This extracts -packet preparation from T10; its original operational acceptance remains open. - -Completed 2026-10-31: controller and proposal prepared; 25 unit and four native -checks pass, zero failures/errors/skips, Ruff passes. Real process death after -either LDAP effect recovers read-only without grant replay. Same-process Authelia -rehearsal proves refusal/success/refusal across grant/rollback, with old/new -passwords and consumed challenges. Native token test proves the explicit rollback -limit: old HTTP token rights survive membership removal; fresh tokens lose them. -Evidence: docs/evidence/2026-10-31-reset-authority/transition-validation.json and -role-refresh.json; source and review in coulomb-social/docs/release/native-password- -reset-review-2026-10-30.md. Proposal digest: -sha256:753f50f139a0d090a8b64ba15174f2a7e8b0e639eb0dd01d17783476b5a3759f. -No production membership, password, declaration or runtime was changed. - -## Admit and execute the reviewed reset-role transition - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T15 -status: wait -priority: high -assignee: codex -needs_human: true -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T14] -blocked_on: human -blocking_reason: Founder admission of the complete non-admin password-write scope and attended terminal execution are required. -state_hub_task_id: "5d60f800-3838-5831-952d-9a9d6b9a6b75" -``` - -Owner: founder for admission and private authentication; Codex verifies the -returned durable receipt. The earlier read-only observation authorizes no grant. -Review coulomb-social/docs/release/native-password-reset-review-2026-10-30.md. -Completion requires the exact proposal digest, native role postflight and private -receipt readback. A refused or interrupted operation stays open and follows the -reviewed recovery. Membership rollback does not invalidate pre-existing HTTP -tokens or undo productive password changes. No live token-revocation operation -is approved by this packet; its limitation is part of the admission question. - -## Align the reset authority sources and verify productive recovery - -```task -id: NK-WP-0054-T16 -status: wait -priority: high -assignee: codex -depends_on: [NK-WP-0054-T15] -blocked_on: dependency -blocking_reason: Requires the reviewed T15 grant and its verified native receipt. -state_hub_task_id: "c9b4253e-956f-584b-82ae-d9b450dd9309" -``` - -Owner: Codex prepares/verifies, founder supplies productive verdict and private -inputs. After T15's verified result, align the service identity declaration and -existing bind verification/repair expectations with the admitted role. Keep the -single Authelia consumer and current credential custody; never infer broader -human-admin authority. Verify the accepted tegwick reset, new/old password result, -consumed-link refusal, app access and MFA, then a fresh identity archive and -isolated restore of the same supported behavior. Retain only value-free receipts. -A proposed/source-only grant or fixture pass cannot close this task. It supplies -the remaining acceptance of T10 and therefore CSOC-WP-0015-T06; no completed T05 -or historical October6 acceptance is reopened or counted twice. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md deleted file mode 100644 index 1ea3b65..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0055-security-platform-production-readiness.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,475 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0055 -type: workplan -title: "Reach and prove security platform production readiness" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: active -owner: claude-code -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-27" -updated: "2026-10-27" -flavor: implementation -depends_on: [] -related: - - NK-WP-0049 - - CUST-WP-0073 - - RPF-WP-0064 - - RPF-WP-0036 -state_hub_workstream_id: "55438344-f67c-53f5-ac70-31cac1405e83" ---- - -The estate is in **builder mode**. This workplan holds the work that has to pass before -NetKingdom's security platform is declared production-ready. Builder-mode workplans can -close with named residuals, and those residuals land here instead of keeping their source -plans open. Nothing in this plan needs to run before the founder decides to move toward -production. - -## Definition of production readiness - -The security platform is production-ready when every area of the -[Production Readiness Checks](../docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md#production-readiness-checks) -table has its check recorded as **met**, with evidence, or as an **accepted exception** -with an owner and a review date. A check counts only if it was observed on the estate -that serves production traffic. Fixtures, rehearsals and builder-mode acceptances do not -count. The areas are: - -1. Platform root custody -2. MFA and identity -3. Bootstrap and recovery -4. OpenBao runtime secrets -5. Secret rotation -6. flex-auth policy state -7. Topaz runtime -8. Tenant onboarding -9. Audit sink -10. Break-glass - -For **Bootstrap and recovery**, this plan adds three requirements, drawn from NK-WP-0049: - -- **Joint restore:** the restored identity services and OpenBao work together for a real - login. -- **Recurring drill:** restores are re-proved on a schedule, not just once. -- **Credential cleanup:** the remaining bootstrap-era credentials are rotated or revoked. - -At production entry, these one-time actions must also have run: - -- **Revoke the initial root token.** The held initial OpenBao root token is revoked with - `railiance-platform/scripts/openbao_revoke_initial_root_token.py`, and its receipt shows `revoked` (T16). - -Readiness does not mean HA. HA is a separate decision, and the current estate runs on one -node. - -## Assess every readiness area against current evidence - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T01 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "8c91597e-4d3e-5811-ae0d-96ff6b7d9017" -``` - -**Done when:** a readiness ledger -(`docs/evidence/-production-readiness-ledger.md`) lists all ten areas, each with: - -- a status: met, partial, open, or accepted exception; -- the evidence or the exact missing proof; -- the owner repository; -- the task that carries the gap. - -Gaps that the tasks below don't cover get new tasks in this plan, or a pointer to an -existing owner workplan. The assessment is read-only. - - -2026-10-27: done. [Readiness ledger](../docs/evidence/2026-10-27-production-readiness-ledger.md): 0 areas met, 7 partial, 3 open (Topaz, audit sink, break-glass). Uncovered gaps became T10–T15 below. -## Build and rehearse the joint-restore drill (from NK-WP-0049-T43/T44) - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T02 -status: wait -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -blocking_reason: "Starts when the founder schedules the move toward production." -state_hub_task_id: "057ed64a-6f63-516a-b13c-65e7f1fd01f9" -``` - -Start from the design retained in NK-WP-0049-T43: - -- the secrets-engine inherited-pipe runner (`65a3dbe`), with the founder's optimizations - 1, 3, 4 and 5; -- the railiance-platform phase B network (`5658150`: `rpf64-nk49-pb`, `10.249.64.0/28`; - the rehearsal variant uses `-rh-`); -- the client secret `keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client` (key `client-secret`), read - from archive member `resources/sso/secret/keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client.json`. - -The work: - -- a new reviewed phase B module, with its verifier and tests; -- a single-member, non-echoing decrypt wrapper; -- the owners' adapter and runner changes; -- a synthetic-client rehearsal on the throwaway network; -- the value-free OpenBao `/jwks` trust probe. - -Do not edit the pinned NK-WP-0049 T38/T40 sources. - -**Done when:** the module, wrapper, adapter and runner are reviewed to T38 depth and the -synthetic rehearsal passes. - -## Run the joint restore with a live consumer and a PKCE client - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T03 -status: wait -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0055-T02] -blocking_reason: "Needs T02 and a founder-signed window. The letsencrypt-prod reissue for kc.coulomb.social needs a fresh duplicate-certificate check, or at least 7 days since the last issuance." -state_hub_task_id: "4037afe7-9dfa-5454-9373-f9d47f81e040" -``` - -**Done when:** - -- restored KeyCape and restored OpenBao are joined on the isolated network; -- `secrets-engine-openbao` passes the native positive and negative login checks; -- one browser authorization-code/PKCE client passes as well; -- the verifier has independently checked the receipt. - -This closes NK-WP-0049 residuals key-cape K1 and railiance-platform R1/R2. The founder -explicitly accepts the unseal window length when signing. - -## Re-prove the reserved-group denial and the resolver cutover (from NK-WP-0049-T21) - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T04 -status: wait -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0055-T02] -blocking_reason: "Runs in the joint-restore drill environment or as its own owner-admitted live check." -state_hub_task_id: "4338365e-cdaa-5c62-880d-db3536f39fa8" -``` - -**Done when:** - -- the deployed reserved LDAP group is natively denied, both in a positive and a negative - case; -- the privacyIDEA LLDAP resolver/cutover inputs have provenance and a functional proof on - the target estate. - -## Admit a credential lane for the attended factor diagnostic - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T05 -status: done -priority: low -assignee: claude-code -decision_id: "55dcb6aa-e081-4aec-b644-1f49a4ec96a8" -state_hub_task_id: "9adbc2b8-3680-5d91-8a80-670f712bf9d9" -``` - -The diagnostic (`mfa_state.py`, `check-user-mfa-state.sh`) has no admitted credential. It -must not borrow KeyCape's `keycape-factor-read`. Live, only `sso/keycape` mounts that -secret, verified 2026-10-27. - -**Done when:** the owner has an admitted delivery and execution arrangement, found through -`warden route`, and one attended diagnostic run passes. The alternative is an accepted -decision that the diagnostic is not needed for production. - -**Done 2026-10-28 by founder decision `55dcb6aa`:** not needed for production. Factor state is -proven by the isolated restore drill (NK-WP-0053, by-user MFA stage) and by real login; -`pi-admin` in the privacyIDEA UI is the attended live-repair fallback. `mfa_state.py` stays in the -repository but is not a production capability, and no credential lane is created for it. - -## Rotate or revoke the bootstrap-era and exposed credentials - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T06 -status: wait -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -blocking_reason: "Founder rotation deferral CUST-WP-0073-T05 / decision 1591daa1 is in force until the founder lifts it." -state_hub_task_id: "a7731db5-8569-52df-99ea-c4524777d25b" -``` - -This includes the privacyIDEA credentials behind the deleted `sso/keycape-pi-token` and -`mfa/privacyidea-trigger-admin`. The architecture requires rotating bootstrap-era -credentials before live workloads rely on the platform. - -**Done when:** each affected credential has verified revocation or rotation, with -signing and client-secret preservation proven, or an accepted exception. Execution belongs -to the credential owners. This task tracks it and does not duplicate CUST-WP-0073. - -## Make restore assurance recurring - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T07 -status: todo -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "15ae6653-898c-593c-8ba9-35b7bd5a50a0" -``` - -Carries NK-WP-0049-T24 G3 and railiance-platform R6 (RPF-WP-0036-T03). - -**Done when:** a scheduled drill re-proves the isolated identity and OpenBao restores on -the current backup generation. It must include: - -- image-lineage proof (R5); -- the audit-device mount (R8); -- a reconciliation procedure for changes made after the archive was taken (K2). - -Drill results land in the readiness ledger. - - -2026-10-27: the identity drill already lives in NK-WP-0053 (quarterly isolated identity restore drill; T02 first run, T04 `admin`-operated). This task tracks NK-WP-0053 and RPF-WP-0036-T03 (scheduled OpenBao snapshot) rather than building a second drill; it adds only image lineage, the audit-device mount and the post-archive reconciliation procedure. - -**Finding 2026-10-29: no identity backup from 2026-10-20 to 2026-10-29.** The NK-WP-0053 drill could only -pick generation `20261019T034919Z`, older than `admin`'s OTP enrolment, so stage 5 found no token -(`user_token_count: 0`); stages 2 to 4 passed on that generation. Cause: `net-kingdom-identity-backup.service` -refused daily since 2026-10-20 03:47 UTC at its first Storage Share check, which needs 2 GiB headroom plus one -512 MiB bundle free. The `Backup` account has 10 GiB in total; the validated 5.35 GB full Forgejo archive in -`railiance-backups/forgejo/` (RPF-WP-0038) plus nightly CNPG dumps that are pruned only locally -(`cnpg-option-a-backup`, about 2.5 GiB in `r01-net-kingdom-pg`) used it up. Ruled out read-only: run marker, -local disk, accepted recovery receipt, publisher and retention ExternalSecrets, all profile bindings, database -primary, NetworkPolicies. Detection gap: the hourly health check failed and posted plain hub progress notes -(103 of the last 500 events) that raised no alert. Relief 2026-10-29: the founder removed the contents of -`railiance-backups/forgejo/`, consistent with the founder's 2026-10-11 decision that Nextcloud carries only -Forgejo essentials while full archives live on Scaleway; this lifts the 2026-09-15 no-expiry decision for that -folder. Follow-ups routed to owners: railiance-platform (CNPG remote retention, Forgejo essentials-only -secondary, confirm a verified full Forgejo archive on Scaleway, quota), disaster-control (alert on backup -refusal). Next: a fresh generation, then drill stages 1 and 5 on it. - -2026-10-29/30: fresh generation `20261029T230600Z` captured after space was freed; the NK-WP-0053 drill -passed on it (next due 2027-01-29). G1 decision `e8935fa6`: second-provider intake to railiance-platform for -a Scaleway secondary of the full identity bundle; this task tracks it, with the Backup quota, CNPG remote -retention and the refusal/staleness alert. - -## Decide durable custody for receipts kept outside Git - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T08 -status: done -priority: low -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: "3291751f-4dad-4b19-bee9-379368962046" -state_hub_task_id: "4533872f-ccfa-5538-96ed-a3bad0ea550e" -``` - -The T18 KeyCape receipt (`16d72f7c…1651`) and the OpenBao restore receipt -(`4e048dee…579d`) exist only on the founder workstation, because the secret scanners flag -their public digests. - -**Done when:** an accepted custody location with a second copy holds them, still bound by -their recorded hashes, or the founder accepts single-copy custody as an exception. - -**2026-10-28 founder decision `3291751f`:** Storage Share, sealed to the `railiance-backup` age key -with `kingpath-offsite.py`, beside the break-glass copy. `--verify` gained `--expect NAME=SHA256` -(3 new tests, 24 total), so the read-back binds each item to its recorded digest without printing -content. Founder run, in your own terminal from `~/net-kingdom`: - -```bash -sha256sum # must show 16d72f7c…1651 and 4e048dee…579d -python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py \ - --item nk49-t18-keycape-receipt= \ - --item rpf64-t07-openbao-receipt= \ - --receipt ~/nk-wp-0055-t08-upload.json -sso-mfa/bootstrap/sops-custody-unlock.sh --sealed-fd \ - --expected-recipient "$(python3 -c 'import json;print(json.load(open("tools/bootstrap-recovery/identity-backup-profile.json"))["public_recipient"])')" -- \ - python3 tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py --verify ~/nk-wp-0055-t08-upload.json \ - --expect nk49-t18-keycape-receipt= \ - --expect rpf64-t07-openbao-receipt= \ - --receipt ~/nk-wp-0055-t08-verify.json -``` - -The full digests are kept out of this file because the secret scanner flags them; they are in -`docs/evidence/2026-10-23-nk49-t18-keycape-attempt/verifier-output.json` and railiance-platform -`workplans/RPF-WP-0064-isolated-original-openbao-restore.md`. Both files must be mode 0400 or 0600. The sealed key is the `railiance-backup` key (crisis item 1), -not the custodian key. **Done when** the verify receipt shows `status: verified` with both names -under `sha256_matched`; the upload and verify receipts are value-free and can be committed under -`docs/evidence/`. - -**Done 2026-10-30 (founder-run):** both receipts sealed to Storage Share as -`net-kingdom-kingpath-20261030T212015Z-96b930bcfb9d.tar.age`, read back, then fetched and decrypted in memory -with the `railiance-backup` key: `status: verified`, both names under `sha256_matched`, unrelated key refused, -no plaintext on disk. [Upload receipt and verify summary](../docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk55-t08-kingpath-offsite/README.md). - -## Founder production-scope decisions - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T10 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: "37464824-a939-415f-8a7a-5f81cbf498c8" -``` - -Decide what production requires: -(a) whether manual Shamir unseal is the approved production mechanism, or auto-unseal is required; -(b) whether a delegated Topaz PDP is required, or the access-engine Go core satisfies the PDP area; -(c) who the two-of-three escrow holders and the OpenBao unseal share holders are (names and places, never values); -(d) that HA stays out of scope. - -**Done when:** each answer is recorded as a hub decision and reflected in the ledger. - - -2026-10-27 founder answers: (a) manual Shamir unseal is the approved mechanism for now; (c) the founder, as platform-root, holds the OpenBao unseal shares (single holder; two-of-three escrow holders not named); (d) HA stays out of scope for now. (b) Topaz is pending an explanation of the accepted-exception consequences. - -2026-10-27: done. (b) accepted as an exception: the access-engine core is the production PDP, Topaz is deferred ([ADR-0018](../docs/adr/ADR-0018-access-engine-core-as-production-pdp.md)); (c) single-holder custody accepted as an exception. All answers are in hub decision `37464824` and the ledger. Exceptions are reviewed at T09. -## Get every audit source into the durable sink with one correlation id - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T11 -status: progress -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "93caa9e0-3d28-58ac-808a-47e15fe6d6ab" -``` - -Owners are audit-core (receiving), railiance-platform (OpenBao audit forwarding), railiance-cluster (Kubernetes API audit), -access-engine (AUDIT-WP-0013-T02 registration) and NetKingdom (identity-provider events and the correlation-id contract). -Topaz is not a source (ADR-0018). - -**Done when:** each owner has a task in its own workplan; identity, authorization, OpenBao, Kubernetes and workload records land -durably; one correlation id is defined and tested across the onboarding chain; audit-core has a recurring restore drill and -AUDIT-WP-0015-T01's offsite chain head. - - -2026-10-27 owner scoping (proposed workplans, unpushed in the owner repos): audit-core AUDIT-WP-0017 (`ead0f09`: intake package per sender, correlation field, quarterly restore drill, offsite chain head); railiance-platform RPF-WP-0066 (`87a488c`: file audit device plus async sidecar shipper, snapshots, live conformance); railiance-cluster RCLUSTER-WP-0021 (`3ed1ac1`: k3s audit policy, node buffer, shipper, founder-run restart); access-engine FLEX-WP-0031-T10/T11 and FLEX-WP-0039 (`7cbd4e5`). NetKingdom's part: the [Audit Correlation Contract v0.1](../canon/standards/audit-correlation_v0.1.md) (proposed) and the four identity-provider intake packages (still to draft). Noted: audit-core lists six access-engine pins, the registry has nine. - -2026-10-27 identity-provider intake: KeyCape package and propagation task in key-cape KEY-WP-0044 (`9adfb0b`; KeyCape emits stdout JSON only, `/token` failures, client-auth failures, revoke and introspect are unaudited today, issuance lacks subject/tenant). Authelia, LLDAP and privacyIDEA packages in [docs/audit-core-intake-identity-providers.md](../docs/audit-core-intake-identity-providers.md) (`ccd0b15`, draft): Authelia via a read-only SQLite sidecar plus JSON logs; LLDAP text logs, image must be pinned first; privacyIDEA signed `pidea_audit` export with signatures intact. Open decision for audit-core and the founder: signed privacyIDEA rows carry raw usernames and IPs, and pseudonymising them breaks the signature. -## Record live conformance receipts - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T12 -status: todo -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "c93fa290-663a-582c-a5b2-beb876fcff1e" -``` - -**Done when:** dated receipts exist for the live IAM issuer conformance run (NK-WP-0054-T04), caller-auth enforcement on every -access-engine release unit (only ops-warden is proven today), the access-engine core's health, data freshness, policy load -status and per-consumer fail-closed stance (ADR-0018), the live OpenBao auth methods and mounts against the committed -policies, and the tenant onboarding completion test for `tenant:coulomb`. - -## Record and drill break-glass with SSO down - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T13 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "6dfdf2be-e87a-5368-b2b6-45dcb92fe6e4" -``` - -**Done when:** the crisis custody list items 4, 7 and 9 are confirmed (kept current by NK-WP-0054-T07; item 8 retired 2026-10-27); the -break-glass material is on Storage Share via `kingpath-offsite.py`; the OpenBao `generate-root` ceremony is written with -railiance-platform; and the founder drills the path with KeyCape/Authelia down, including a validity check of the held initial -root token against an isolated restored OpenBao (never production); use produces a post-event review record. - - -2026-10-27 documentation pass: the crisis custody list (items 3, 7, 9) and the disaster recovery guide (new section "Reaching the platform when SSO and OpenBao are down") now record what is known. Findings: ops-warden SSH certificates do **not** work with OpenBao down (warden backend is OpenBao); the working path today is the static-key tunnel `k3s-api-railiance01` as `tegwick` plus the admin kubeconfig client certificate, workstation-only with no second copy; the OpenBao `generate-root` break-glass ceremony is undocumented; provider console access, the ops bundle location (item 8) and offline/mirror status of the password safe are `TO CONFIRM`. - -2026-10-27 founder answers: unseal shares and `pi-admin` are in the founder's replicated browser password safe (unseal shares under the `kingpath.credentials` pseudo-URL entry); console and rescue access to railiance01 through the Host Europe provider interface; the ops bundle and the cluster break-glass material (static tunnel key, admin kubeconfig) are to be kept age-encrypted on the Storage Share `Backup` account so they survive workstation loss. Next: a guarded upload helper with readback (founder-run), the `generate-root` ceremony with railiance-platform, and the king-path drill. Still open: whether the initial OpenBao root token was kept or revoked. - -2026-10-27: the founder holds the initial OpenBao root token offline; whether it is still valid is unconfirmed (no rotation was recorded). Built `tools/bootstrap-recovery/kingpath-offsite.py` with 11 contained tests: it seals named private files in memory to the `railiance-backup` recipient, uploads to `Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/` without overwriting, and reads back with a hash check. Founder-run. No ops bundle exists on the workstation (`make creds-bundle` packs only greenfield `creds-generate` output); the daily identity backup already carries current service secrets, so item 8 is proposed for retirement as superseded. - -2026-10-27 founder decisions: the ops bundle (crisis list item 8) is retired as superseded by the identity backup; the initial root token validity check is folded into the king-path drill, run against an isolated restored OpenBao. - -2026-10-27: founder ran `kingpath-offsite.py`: `net-kingdom-kingpath-20261027T223050Z-8c9d48421f1b.tar.age` (items `admin-kubeconfig`, `tunnel-ssh-key`) sealed to `railiance-backup`, uploaded to `Backup/railiance-backups/net-kingdom-kingpath/` and read back (sha256 `8c9d48421f1b…dd4aa`, ETag `"5a14c69d…8252"`). Restoring it from Storage Share is part of the king-path drill. - -2026-10-27: railiance-platform wrote "Break-glass: OpenBao with SSO down" in `docs/openbao.md` (`8016f56`, pushed): access via the static-key tunnel and admin kubeconfig, unseal at hidden prompts, value-free held-token check, the `generate-root` ceremony through the API (server OTP, shares at hidden prompts, in-memory decode, nothing in argv/env/history), revoke-and-confirm, and a post-event review record. Drill: RPF-WP-0064-T10 on an isolated restore, including the held root-token check. **Finding:** OpenBao 2.5.4 disables unauthenticated `generate-root` by default and the production listener (`rapp-openbao/helm/openbao-values.yaml`) does not enable it, so the ceremony cannot run on production without an existing token. rapp-openbao must choose (a) an incident-time listener edit plus restart and re-unseal, or (b) a standing loopback-only listener reachable only through `kubectl port-forward`/`exec`. - -2026-10-27 founder decision (hub decision `732b5c96`): option (b), a standing loopback-only OpenBao listener with `generate-root` enabled, reachable only through `kubectl port-forward`/`exec` with the admin kubeconfig. Owner rapp-openbao prepares the change for founder review and rollout. - -2026-10-27: `kingpath-offsite.py --verify UPLOAD_RECEIPT` added for the drill (7 more contained tests, 18 total): run under `sops-custody-unlock.sh --sealed-fd`, it checks the custody key against the recorded recipient, fetches the artifact with ETag/size/digest checks, refuses an unrelated key, decrypts in memory and checks each item's size and shape (kubeconfig with clusters/users, SSH private key header), writing a value-free receipt. The OpenBao part of the drill is RPF-WP-0064-T10 (drill mode being built). - -2026-10-27 king-path drill, part 1 (founder-run): `kingpath-offsite.py --verify` restored `net-kingdom-kingpath-20261027T223050Z-8c9d48421f1b.tar.age` from Storage Share, refused an unrelated key, decrypted in memory and found `admin-kubeconfig` (kubeconfig shape) and `tunnel-ssh-key` (SSH private key header) intact. The custody helper refused the custodian age key three times before the founder entered the `railiance-backup` key; crisis list item 1 is split into 1 (backup key) and 1b (custodian key) so the two are not confused again. Part 2 (OpenBao, RPF-WP-0064-T10) is being built. - -2026-10-28: founder rolled out the loopback `generate-root` listener (RAPP-OPENBAO-WP-0003-T02): 200 on 8210 without a token, 405 on the main listener 8200. The break-glass ceremony can now run on production with SSO down. railiance-platform built and rehearsed the drill mode for part 2 (RPF-WP-0064-T10, `a2da408`: 34 offline tests, native rehearsal 16/16); its production read-only walk must be updated to expect 200 on 8210. - -2026-10-28: crisis list item 5 now records the admission signing key's fingerprint and both public anchor lines, so a recovery workstation can re-create them; founder decision: the private key goes to the password safe kingpath entry, not the Storage Share bundle. Its file on the workstation is still being located. - -2026-10-28 king-path drill part 2 (founder-run): RPF-WP-0064-T10 attempt `-20261027-01` `drilled` in 101 s, receipt `e4591346…8397` independently verified (PASS). Held initial root token valid as of the 2026-10-14 snapshot; fresh `generate-root` with re-entered shares, read-only action, revoke 204, lookup 403, cancel drilled, full teardown. Post-event record: [2026-10-28 king-path drill](../docs/evidence/2026-10-28-king-path-drill.md). Open: founder decision on the production root token, the read-only production SSO-down walk, the signing key copy in the safe. - -2026-10-28: **done.** The production read-only SSO-down walk passed (OpenBao unsealed 2/3; break-glass listener 200, main listener 405); RPF-WP-0064-T10 is done. Crisis list items 4, 5, 7 and 9 are confirmed; item 8 is retired; the break-glass material is on Storage Share; the ceremony is written and drilled; the post-event record exists. Residuals go to the recurring drill (NK-WP-0053): using the restored item-9 material against the cluster, and the Host Europe console. The production-entry root-token revoke is T16. Readiness area 10 (break-glass) is now partial. -## Policy import pipeline and platform/tenant package split - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T14 -status: todo -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "bd28a970-9616-5323-9f97-d5b260a144f1" -``` - -Owner: access-engine. **Done when:** policy changes are imported without rebuilding the image, `tenant:coulomb` has platform and -tenant packages split, one production explain receipt exists, and FLEX-WP-0031 (decision records) and FLEX-WP-0024 (signed -envelope) are delivered or accepted as exceptions. - - -2026-10-27 founder decision: import path **B**, a policy bundle mounted into access-engine and pinned by digest, so policy changes no longer need an image rebuild; move to C (signed bundle) once FLEX-WP-0024 signing custody exists. Delivery sits in access-engine FLEX-WP-0039-T03. -## Register rotation lanes with blast radius and verification - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T15 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "d9c0584e-10a1-5edf-a1f9-cec5738f94a8" -``` - -**Done when:** every service, database, OpenBao-issued, client-secret and break-glass credential lane is listed with its blast -radius and verification step, linked to its owner lane (RPF-WP-0035, RPF-WP-0055-T01, T06). - -**Done 2026-10-28.** `tools/rotation-lanes/lanes.yaml` lists 24 lanes (service, database, -client-secret, OpenBao-issued, break-glass), each with path, blast radius, verification step -and owner lane. `make rotation-lanes-check` derives every known credential from the -service-identity declarations, Credential Management v0.2 section 6 and the crisis custody list, -and fails on a credential without a complete lane; 7 synthetic tests plus a test on the -checked-in register. State today: 5 admitted, 7 designed, 10 deferred (rotation deferral -`1591daa1`, T06), 2 none (`PI_PEPPER`, the legacy `trigger-admin` to be revoked). Readiness -notes for T09: `KEYCAPE_RSA_KEY` has no overlap rotation (single kid, rotation is an outage -window); `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` stays three-way coupled until the NK-WP-0054-T05 bind split. - -## Revoke the held initial OpenBao root token at production entry - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T16 -status: wait -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -blocking_reason: "Founder decision 7ce684ec: the token stays escrowed during builder mode and is revoked at production entry." -state_hub_task_id: "39e4d90e-b69f-5e24-be82-17d76c4a540d" -``` - -The king-path drill (2026-10-28) found the held initial root token valid as of the 2026-10-14 snapshot: `root`, -orphan, no TTL. The guarded script `railiance-platform/scripts/openbao_revoke_initial_root_token.py` (`95b5a19`, -7 tests) reads the token at a hidden prompt. It refuses to revoke unless the loopback `generate-root` listener -answers, so a replacement break-glass path exists first, and it writes a value-free receipt. The runbook is in -`railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md`. - -**Done when:** at production entry, the founder runs `revoke` under the production-entry decision id; the -receipt shows `revoked` (revoke-self 204, then lookup-self 403); the token is removed from the password safe; -and crisis list item 3 is updated. - -## Close readiness and declare production - -```task -id: NK-WP-0055-T09 -status: wait -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0055-T01, NK-WP-0055-T03, NK-WP-0055-T04, NK-WP-0055-T05, NK-WP-0055-T06, NK-WP-0055-T07, NK-WP-0055-T08, NK-WP-0055-T10, NK-WP-0055-T11, NK-WP-0055-T12, NK-WP-0055-T13, NK-WP-0055-T14, NK-WP-0055-T15, NK-WP-0055-T16] -blocking_reason: "Every readiness area must be met or an accepted exception." -state_hub_task_id: "0630b0ea-dec1-5355-8b08-0d317d4a3c9b" -``` - -**Done when:** - -- the readiness ledger shows every area as met or as an accepted exception; -- the founder records the production declaration as a decision; -- SCOPE.md's capability table is updated to match. diff --git a/workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md b/workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md deleted file mode 100644 index 51f4d81..0000000 --- a/workplans/NK-WP-0056-bounded-executor-path.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1048 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: NK-WP-0056 -type: workplan -title: "Bounded executor path: founder admits, executors run" -domain: infotech -repo: net-kingdom -status: proposed -flavor: design -owner: claude -topic_slug: netkingdom -created: "2026-10-30" -updated: "2026-10-31" -related: - - NK-WP-0054 - - NK-WP-0040 - - NK-WP-0031 - - NK-WP-0055 -state_hub_workstream_id: "5bc74ef8-136e-5157-9a7f-da765dbfc977" ---- - -# NK-WP-0056 — Bounded executor path - -Intake from the founder's direction on 2026-10-30, before the live LLDAP bind split: top-level -decisions and guardrails stay with the founder; execution below that is delegated to automation with -limited expense budgets and risk control, and the security architecture is the means. Founder-attended -runbooks are a transitional state. - -SI-15 (`canon/standards/service-identity-privilege_v0.1.md`) already names the golden path *prepare → -admit → execute → verify → retain* and allows "a bounded executor under the admission" at step 3. -Today preparation and verification are strong, admission is prose (a hub decision) and execution falls -to the founder, because no executor exists that has its own identity, its own secret delivery and an -authority ceiling the founder can admit and bound. SI-14 adds that an interactive agent session holds -everything its tools reach, so it cannot be that executor until a session contract exists -(glas-harness GLAS-WP-0018, proposed). - -## Why the bind split needed the founder (2026-10-30 run, step by step) - -| Runbook step | Needed the founder because | Class | Delegable once | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | -| Setup: decrypt custody copy | custody is a personal SOPS/age copy | delegable | service credentials live in OpenBao (T04) | -| 1 prepare custody (generate passwords) | writes the personal custody copy | delegable | executor generates into OpenBao (T04) | -| 2 plan, 4 verify, 10 verify | sign in as the human `admin` | delegable | read-only executor directory identity (T03) | -| 3 create `svc-*` accounts | needs `lldap_admin` (LLDAP has no narrower grant that can create users) | root-class | admitted per run; executor runs it (T03) | -| 5-8 switch one consumer | cluster-admin kubeconfig; secret values; founder sign-in check | delegable | scoped service account (T03), OpenBao/ESO (T04), synthetic MFA journey (T05) | -| 9 change LLDAP's configured super-admin | changes who administers the directory | root-class | admitted per run; executor runs it | -| 10 change `admin`'s own password; seal `ld-admin` in the password safe | the founder's own credential and crisis custody | human-intrinsic | never: stays with the founder | -| Afterwards: restore drill on the next generation | `admin` operates drills | delegable | executor identity with the drill's read scope | - -Root-class means the founder still admits each run, but no longer types it. The run also showed why -personal custody does not scale: the custody copy had drifted from live (`AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET`) -and step 6 had to be done by a one-off path. - -## Admission contract - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T01 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -state_hub_task_id: "99df0ee2-2c17-55f2-9f3e-4277da52e01c" -``` - -Draft a NetKingdom standard for a **bounded-execution admission**: the founder approves, at `aal2`, an -exact plan by digest with a validity window, a scope ceiling (`MODE @ SCOPE` grants, SI terms), a -blast-radius rule (for example one consumer at a time), a stop-and-revert policy tied to named machine -checks, a risk class, and an expense budget (wall time, attempts, compute/egress cost). The executor -consumes the admission once. Map it to SI-15, the Playbook Capability Contract's trust-state -requirements and the execution-attribution receipt (NK-WP-0040). Include a validator and synthetic -fixtures. - -**Done when:** the standard is proposed with a schema, a validator, and the bind-split steps expressed -as admissions in its examples. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** Proposed `canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md` with -`canon/schemas/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.schema.json`, `tools/bounded-execution-admission/validate.py` -(rules BEA-1..14 on the request, BEA-C1..C7 on a carrier record; 22 tests) and four examples in -`examples/bounded-execution-admission/`: the bind split's read-only verify (low), create `svc-*` accounts and switch -LLDAP's super-admin (root-class, high), and one-consumer bind rotation (delegable, medium, the T06 shape). Step 10 is -refused as human-intrinsic. Design choices: the request is immutable and bound by digest; the founder's approval -lives in a carrier (Approval Engine preferred, founder SSH signature transitional), so no second approval system; -`trust_requires` uses the Playbook Capability Contract's trust states; `settle_seconds` carries the T08 -privacyIDEA-cache finding; recurring admissions are excluded from v0.1. The Approval Engine mapping is a proposal for T02. - -## Owner agreement on the components - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T02 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: 6d1adce9-40e2-472a-92bb-0ae942218ae8 -intervention_note: "Founder chooses the executor runtime owner; owner answers are agreements, not agent decisions." -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T01] -state_hub_task_id: "7263417b-b227-54f7-9edc-3e7f97cf132f" -``` - -Ask the owners which part each carries: approval-engine (the admission as its consumable approval -object, plan digest and budget as bound fields, single consume), access-engine (reads the admission -as an input claim), secrets-engine and railiance-platform (executor credential delivery through -OpenBao), glas-harness (GLAS-WP-0018 session contract, so a harness-launched agent can be an executor), -audit-core (receipt holder, as in NK-WP-0040). The founder decides who builds the executor runtime -itself. - -**Done when:** each component has a named owner and an answer, and the founder has chosen the executor -runtime owner. - -**2026-10-31, founder decision (hub `6d1adce9`): net-kingdom writes the executor runtime** (source and tests next -to the admission validator, bind lanes and synthetic journey); a new `rapp-*` package (working name -`rapp-bounded-executor`, ADR-0015) builds and deploys it in `sso`; glas-harness is the later path for agent -executors. Owner requests sent the same day through the hub to approval-engine, access-engine, secrets-engine, -railiance-platform, audit-core, glas-harness and railiance-apps -([requests and answer table](../docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t02-owner-requests.md)). Waiting on their answers. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** All seven owners answered (worker agents in each repository, founder instruction); answers and -the collected founder decisions are in the [answer table](../docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t02-owner-requests.md). -Key results: approval-engine already carries binding, single consume and revoke (aal2 recorded, not yet enforced); -access-engine accepts the pilot without the PDP gate if the receipt says `not-evaluated`; railiance-platform added -request type `workload-kv-write-next-version` and drafted CCR-2026-0058; secrets-engine prefers self-rotation, which -NetKingdom proved on the pinned LLDAP; audit-core holds receipts plus a `run.started` event; railiance-apps: repo-manager -creates the rapp, the image is built in net-kingdom, one Job per admission; glas-harness: agent executors after -GLAS-WP-0018-T04. - -**2026-10-31, founder decisions after the answers** (hub c29c6eda, 3d0c8f86, 19afd15e): - -- The executor's OpenBao write role is window-scoped. CCR-2026-0058 was amended, approved and pushed. -- The bind rotates its own password, so `svc-executor-pw` is dropped and RPF-WP-0069-T06 is cancelled. -- The pilot runs without the policy gate (`not-evaluated`); later admissions need the gate or a recorded exception. -- Packaging is `rapp-bounded-executor`, one Job per admission in `sso`, with the image built in net-kingdom. -- Receipts are a started event plus one receipt per run. -- These owner workplans are approved: APPROVAL-WP-0007, FLEX-WP-0040, SECRETS-WP-0017, RPF-WP-0069, AUDIT-WP-0018 and - GLAS-WP-0018. glas-harness owns agent executors later. - -Runtime work is split into T11 (core runner) and T12 (pilot operations and packaging). - -## Executor identity and authority ceiling - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T03 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T02] -state_hub_task_id: "592231dd-1981-57a6-a0e8-5d6fc474c6e7" -``` - -Declare the executor as a `WORKLOAD` (or harness-launched `AGENT`) principal in `declarations/` with -grants no wider than the pilot: a Kubernetes service account whose Role names the `sso` Secrets, -ConfigMaps and Deployments it may patch or restart; a read-only directory bind for plan and verify; -`lldap_admin` only for root-class steps under an admission. Extend `tools/service-identity` to check -it. - -**Done when:** the declaration validates and the Role is prepared in source with tests, not applied. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** `tools/service-identity/declarations/bounded-executor.yaml` declares the executor's credentials -(all `planned`, all sharing `executor_subject: service:nk-bind-executor`): the Kubernetes ServiceAccount, its OpenBao -role, `svc-executor-pw` (`lldap_password_manager`: LLDAP cannot narrow to one account, the admission narrows it), -the read-only bind `svc-executor-read`, and `svc-executor-admin` (`lldap_admin`, root-class only, per-run activation -open). `tools/service-identity` gained convention `executor` with rule SI-15 (no person, not interactive, every grant -`APPROVED`, no `SOVEREIGN`/`GOVERN`/`CONSTRUCT`) and `--admissions`, which checks that an admission's ceiling lies inside -the executor's declared grants: the pilot (BEA-2026-0001) is covered; the root-class and read-only examples are -correctly reported as needing grants the pilot does not hold. `sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml` (not applied): -ServiceAccount without automount, a Role with `get/watch/patch` on the authelia Deployment and `get/patch` on the -authelia ExternalSecret only (no read of credential objects: the pilot's delivery check became "ExternalSecret Ready -and refreshed"), and its RoleBinding; `test_rbac.py` ties Role = declaration = pilot ceiling. 44 identity tests, -5 RBAC tests. - -## Service credentials into OpenBao - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T04 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -intervention_note: "Founder runs the custody reconciliation and approves moving service binds out of personal custody." -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T02] -state_hub_task_id: "fd439c0c-9b5e-562c-9bfb-48dd0fb2c570" -``` - -With railiance-platform, move the LLDAP service binds (`LLDAP_SVC_*_PASS`) and the Authelia secrets -from the personal custody copy into OpenBao paths delivered by ESO, so that neither a person nor an -agent handles the values in a rotation. First reconcile the stale custody -`AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET` with the live value (founder-run, value-free comparison as in the -2026-10-30 evidence). Root-class material (`ld-admin`, unseal shares) stays in founder custody. - -**Done when:** the four service binds are ESO-delivered from OpenBao, and the custody copy no longer -needs to be decrypted for a bind rotation. - -**2026-10-30:** reconciliation tool prepared: `sso-mfa/bootstrap/reconcile-keycape-client-secret.py` -(value-free; accepts the live KeyCape value only if it matches Authelia's live hash, writes custody through -`rotation-env.py`, no cluster writes; `tests/test_reconcile_keycape_client_secret.py`). **Founder ran it -2026-10-30:** live KeyCape value matches Authelia's hash; custody did not match before, was updated and matches -after (value-free output); custody re-sealed and shredded. The reconciliation step is done; the ESO move remains. - -**2026-10-30, pilot `svc-provisioner` prepared (source only, nothing applied):** railiance-platform -CCR-2026-0052 (proposed) and policy `net-kingdom-svc-provisioner-bind-eso`; `sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/bind-eso.yaml` -(ServiceAccount, SecretStore, ExternalSecret with `creationPolicy: Merge` into the existing Secret, `password` only); -`tools/service-binds/bind-lane.py setup|verify` (approved sha256-bound CCR, attended platform-admin, custody must equal -live, coding-agent fence, KV CAS=0, value-free receipts); `tests/test_service_bind_lane.py` (7). Next: owner approval of -the CCR, then the founder-run setup, ESO apply and verify. Authelia, KeyCape and privacyIDEA follow one at a time. - -**2026-10-30, pilot live and verified:** CCR-2026-0052 approved; founder-run setup, ESO apply and verify passed; -`svc-provisioner` now binds with the ESO-delivered value ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-30-nk56-svc-provisioner-bind/README.md)). -Finding: ESO targets need `template.metadata: {}` or the admission guard refuses the Secret update. Remaining: -`svc-authelia`, `svc-keycape`, `svc-privacyidea`. - -**2026-10-31, `svc-authelia` lane prepared (source only, nothing applied):** railiance-platform CCR-2026-0053 -(proposed) and policy `net-kingdom-svc-authelia-bind-eso`; `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/bind-eso.yaml` (Merge of -`ldap_password` only into `authelia-secrets`, which also holds the session, storage and OIDC keys). `bind-lane.py` -gains per-lane Secret keys: Authelia keeps the bind user in `authelia-config`, so setup refuses unless the live -configuration binds `uid=svc-authelia`, and it decodes only the bind key. Authelia reads the file at start-up -only, so the identical projection needs no restart; a later rotation does. 12 lane tests. Next: owner approval -and binding confirmation, then the founder-run setup, ESO apply, verify and an Authelia restart with a login. - -**2026-10-31, `svc-authelia` live and verified:** CCR-2026-0053 approved and binding confirmed; founder-run setup, -ESO apply (Ready first time), verify and Authelia restart passed, and an `admin` portal sign-in with OTP worked -([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-authelia-bind/README.md)). Two of four binds are ESO-delivered. -Remaining: `svc-keycape` (bind inside `sso/keycape-config`), `svc-privacyidea` (resolver password stored in the -privacyIDEA database, not a Secret key). - -**2026-10-31, `svc-keycape` design proposal (for founder decision):** KeyCape's server reads `lldap.bindPW` only -from `config.yaml` inside `sso/keycape-config` (`internal/config/config.go`); unlike client secrets (`secretRef: -env:...` via `secretKeyRef`) it has no environment indirection. ESO Merge cannot own one field inside a YAML -document, and rendering all of `config.yaml` from OpenBao would move every KeyCape value at once. Proposed: -1. key-cape (owner change, new KEY-WP): `config.Load` takes `KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW` (the name `lldap-export` - already uses). Env set and `bindPW` empty: use env. Both set and equal: use it and log that `bindPW` is - redundant. Both set and different: refuse to start. This allows a staged switch with a clean rollback. - Image through the owner pipeline; `check-config` reports which source is used, without the value. -2. NetKingdom: CCR-2026-0054 and a `svc-keycape` lane; ESO creates a new dedicated Secret `keycape-lldap-bind` - (`creationPolicy: Owner`, key `password`), so no Secret has two writers. Setup compares custody with the live - `bindPW` in `keycape-config`. -3. Deployment: add the env from `secretKeyRef keycape-lldap-bind/password` with the new image; values are - equal, so behaviour is unchanged. Verify, restart, admin login. -4. Remove `bindPW` from `keycape-config` (`directory-bind-rollout.py --operation clear-password`, guarded on - uid/resourceVersion); `create-secrets.py` stops writing it. Rollback at any step: re-add the value or drop - -**2026-10-31, founder decision: environment override, implemented by claude-code in key-cape.** Done in source: -key-cape `e2b5fa1` (KEY-WP-0046-T01; image `main-e2b5fa1` = `sha256:9e082dca…6f8d`, built by the Forgejo workflow; -its acceptance job also fails on the previous commit `a1ab8ff`). NetKingdom: CCR-2026-0054 (proposed), -`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/bind-eso.yaml` (dedicated Secret `keycape-lldap-bind`, `creationPolicy: Owner`), -`bind-lane.py svc-keycape` (setup reads `bindPW` from `keycape-config` and requires `bindDN` = `svc-keycape`; -verify reads the dedicated Secret and requires it to equal `bindPW` while present), `directory-bind-rollout.py ---operation clear-password` (only with the service bind and the delivered env; `switch` restores), and -`deployment.yaml` pinned to the new image with the `KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW` env. The new image also carries -key-cape 67a0869..e2c5a94 (online token status, inactive while `tokenStatus` is unset) and identity-facts. -Founder order: approve, setup, ESO apply, verify, deployment apply (image + env), login, clear-password, restart, login. - -**2026-10-31, `svc-keycape` live and verified:** CCR-2026-0054 approved and binding confirmed; founder-run setup, ESO -apply, verify, deployment rollout (image `main-e2b5fa1` + env; both sources equal), `admin` login, `clear-password`, -restart, env-only verify and a second `admin` login all passed -([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-keycape-bind/README.md)). Three of four binds are ESO-delivered; -`keycape-config` no longer holds the bind password. Remaining: `svc-privacyidea` (resolver password stored in the -privacyIDEA database, not a Secret key: needs its own design). - -**2026-10-31, `svc-privacyidea` design proposal (for founder decision):** privacyIDEA keeps the resolver `BINDPW` -encrypted in its own database, and only the `pi-admin` API can change it (`realm_bootstrap.py`), so neither ESO nor -an unattended job can deliver it without `pi-admin`'s password standing in the cluster (rejected: SI rules). -Proposed: **OpenBao custody with attended write-through**, following CCR-2026-0028 (`attended-host-key-delivery`): -1. bind-lane `svc-privacyidea setup`: the custody value must sign in to LLDAP as `svc-privacyidea` (LLDAP is the - authority for the current password; the working resolver proves privacyIDEA holds the same one), then KV - `directory-binds/svc-privacyidea` CAS=0, coding agents fenced. No Kubernetes role, no ESO, `runtime_access: false`. -2. `realm_bootstrap.py --switch-bind --from-openbao`: reads the KV value in memory under the attended - `platform-admin` session and writes only `BINDPW` with the attended `pi-admin`; the existing preservation checks - apply, and the write must be proven by an MFA login through the resolver (`--verify-user`). -3. Rotation becomes: change the password in LLDAP, write the next KV version, run step 2, verify with an OTP login. - No custody decryption; the founder runs it and proves it with an MFA login. -4. CCR-2026-0055 needs a request type for attended delivery into a service; railiance-platform's - `credential-change.py` gains it, modelled on `attended-host-key-delivery`. -The done criterion of T04 then reads: three binds ESO-delivered, `svc-privacyidea` held in OpenBao with attended -write-through. Alternative: keep it in founder custody as a recorded exception until privacyIDEA can read the -resolver password from a file or environment. - -**2026-10-31, founder decision: OpenBao custody with attended write-through.** Prepared in source: -railiance-platform `2d4a383` adds request type `attended-service-credential-delivery` (`scripts/attended_service_delivery.py`, -4 tests; no policy, auth role, ESO or runtime frontdoor allowed) and CCR-2026-0055 (proposed). `bind-lane.py -svc-privacyidea`: setup proves the custody value current by an LLDAP sign-in as `svc-privacyidea`, fences coding -agents and writes KV v1 (CAS=0); verify proves the KV value current the same way, the fence present and no workload -role. `realm_bootstrap.py --rotate-bind --from-openbao` rewrites only `BINDPW` on the service bind from OpenBao -(attended platform-admin) and requires `--verify-user`. Correction: `pi-admin` signs in with a password; the MFA -proof is the `--verify-user` login through the resolver. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** `svc-privacyidea` live: CCR-2026-0055 approved; founder-run setup and verify passed (KV v1, value -proven current by LLDAP sign-in, no workload role) and `realm_bootstrap.py --rotate-bind --from-openbao` wrote the -resolver from OpenBao with an `admin` MFA proof ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-svc-privacyidea-bind/README.md); -a first apply wrote the same value but its check got a code that was not `admin`'s; both MFA prompts now name the user). -All four service binds are held in OpenBao: `svc-provisioner`, `svc-authelia` and `svc-keycape` ESO-delivered, -`svc-privacyidea` by attended write-through (founder decision 2026-10-31 amends the done criterion accordingly). -No bind rotation needs the custody copy decrypted. The custody copy keeps the current values as a fallback. - the env. - -## Synthetic verification instead of a founder sign-in - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T05 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T04] -state_hub_task_id: "bb511d1e-6d5d-56d1-9030-2e0d94006a16" -``` - -A synthetic test user with an OTP seed held in OpenBao, and a journey that signs in through Authelia -and KeyCape with MFA and resolves through privacyIDEA. Reuse the identity-provider journey acceptance. -The executor runs it as the check between consumers and reverts on failure. - -**2026-10-31, founder decision: split into T05 (runner), T08 (synthetic stack on real pinned images), -T09 (synthetic user and seed in OpenBao) and T10 (unattended live run).** T05 is now the runner only: -a stdlib journey that drives KeyCape `/authorize` (PKCE, `acr_values=urn:netkingdom:aal2`), Authelia -`/api/firstfactor` and its OIDC authorization, the KeyCape callback and OTP form (KeyCape validates the -code through privacyIDEA), and the KeyCape token exchange, then verifies the ID token's signature and -`assurance` (aal2, `otp`). Secrets come from files or descriptors, never argv; the receipt is value-free -and names the first failed step. All three consumer binds are on the path (`svc-authelia` at first -factor, `svc-keycape` at the callback, `svc-privacyidea` at the OTP check); `svc-provisioner` is not. - -**Done when:** the runner and its tests (in-process fakes per bind, fail-closed at the named step, no -secret in the receipt) pass in the identity-provider journey acceptance workflow. - -**2026-10-31, implemented:** `sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/journey.py` (stdlib; RS256 verified against -KeyCape's JWKS without third-party packages; `host_map` for an in-cluster executor) with 26 tests in -`test_journey.py`. Each broken bind fails closed at its step (`svc-authelia` → `authelia_first_factor`, -`svc-keycape` → `keycape_callback`, `svc-privacyidea` → `keycape_otp`), and a sign-in without an OTP -challenge, an aal1 token or a tampered signature fails. Green locally and in the workflow's pinned -`python:3.12-slim` image with the network off; the job is added to `identity-journeys.yaml`. -**Done:** the workflow's `provider` job passed on `0b0c6c9` (run 719). Next: T08. - -## Synthetic identity stack on pinned images - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T08 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T05] -state_hub_task_id: "02611880-9ea4-5c9d-a5ab-b50847608f92" -``` - -A throwaway stack on the pinned production images (LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA, KeyCape), published on -127.0.0.1 only, with generated values and production-shaped binds (`svc-authelia`, `svc-keycape`, -`svc-privacyidea`), a synthetic user with a TOTP token, and the T05 runner against it. Extends the -`bind-split-rehearsal.py` pattern. - -**Done when:** the journey passes on the healthy stack and fails closed, at the expected step, for a -deliberately broken bind of each of the three consumers, with value-free receipts. - -**Done 2026-10-31** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t08-synthetic-stack/README.md)): -`sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/stack.py` + `pi_fixture.py` on the four pinned images. Healthy passes -(aal2, `otp`, signature verified); `svc-authelia` fails closed at `authelia_first_factor`, `svc-keycape` -at `keycape_token` (KeyCape binds at token time, not at the callback: mapping corrected), and -`svc-privacyidea` at `keycape_otp`, **but only after privacyIDEA's resolver cache expired** (live -`CACHE_TIMEOUT` 120 s; the first journey after the break passed). Each scenario passes again after the -password is restored. Also: privacyIDEA refuses a reused TOTP time step, so the runner gained -`min_time_step`. Consequence for T06/T10: the between-consumers check for `svc-privacyidea` must wait out -or clear the resolver cache, and the attended `--rotate-bind` MFA proof has the same blind spot. - -## Synthetic user and seed in OpenBao - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T09 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -decision_id: 91323969-43fa-460f-9e0a-2b8cd44bdc9a -intervention_note: "Founder runs the live setup (LLDAP user, privacyIDEA token, OpenBao KV) under a CCR." -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T08] -state_hub_task_id: "1f788455-f79e-5630-bede-ec3218f6969d" -``` - -An unprivileged live user (for example `syn-journey`, no groups), its own privacyIDEA TOTP token, and -password and seed held in OpenBao with coding agents fenced, a dedicated KeyCape public client for the -journey, prepared as `bind-lane.py`-style setup/verify helpers under a CCR. Founder-run. - -**Done when:** setup and verify pass live and one founder-started journey run passes with a receipt. - -**2026-10-31, prepared for founder decision** (`sso-mfa/k8s/synthetic-journey/T09-RUNBOOK.md`): -CCR-2026-0057 (railiance-platform, proposed; `attended-service-credential-delivery`, KV -`platform/workloads/net-kingdom/synthetic-journey/syn-journey` fields `PASSWORD`, `TOTP_SEED`, no workload -reader), SecurityCase `security-cases/nk-synthetic-journey.yaml` (public PKCE client, MFA pinned), and -`lane.py` setup/verify/teardown with 8 fake-backed tests. Identity route: attended owner trial by `admin` -(the route the NK-WP-0049 retirement names for test identities), not User Engine onboarding; name -`syn-journey` under a proposed `syn-` convention (SI §5), declared `SERVICE`, status `planned`. -Open, recorded: KeyCape marks every token `principal_type: human`; KeyCape has no per-client group gate. -Waiting on: CCR approval, case acceptance, founder run of the runbook. - -**Done 2026-10-31** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t09-synthetic-identity/README.md)): CCR-2026-0057 -approved; case accepted; client registered; founder-run `lane.py setup` and `verify` passed. The live journey -reached aal2 (`pwd`+`otp`, signature verified) against `kc.coulomb.social`. Two lane fixes on the way: privacyIDEA -tokens are looked up by serial, and enrollment uses a privacyIDEA-generated key, because `pi-admin`'s `action=*` -enables `totp_force_server_generate`, which silently replaced the supplied key (reproduced on 3.12.2). One -partial run was removed with `lane.py teardown`. Next: T10 needs the executor identity (T03) and a -`workload-kv-read` request for it. - -## Unattended live journey - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T10 -status: done -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T03, NK-WP-0056-T09] -state_hub_task_id: "a68252da-46f7-52eb-81d3-942ddd9ecb9b" -``` - -The executor identity (T03) reads the journey secrets from OpenBao itself and runs the journey as the -check between consumers; failure triggers the revert path. - -**Done when:** the journey runs unattended against live with no person involved, and fails closed -against a deliberately broken bind on a synthetic directory (T08). - -**2026-10-31, prerequisites:** - -- Done: the `sso` ingress rules for executor pods were applied by the founder and read back live. -- Done: railiance-platform CCR-2026-0059 drafted (`c9b68ea`, `proposed`). It is the journey read with its own role, - `net-kingdom-bind-executor-syn-journey-read`. It widens CCR-2026-0057; standing reader (founder decision). -- Two executor gaps found while drafting it: - 1. **Two roles.** The executor logs in to OpenBao once (`openbao.k8s_role`) and reads the bind and the journey with - that token. railiance-platform keeps one role per lane and never combines policies, so the executor needs a - second login for the journey read: a `journey.k8s_role` and its own `OpenBao` client, revoked like the first. - 2. **Audience.** CCR-2026-0058 and CCR-2026-0059 bind audience `openbao`. The rapp Job projects only the default - API-audience token, so it also needs an `openbao`-audience projected token, and `openbao.jwt_file` must point - to it. -- Both need an executor change, a new image and a new pin. - -**2026-10-31, gaps fixed** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-openbao-lanes/README.md)): - -- `1cdc18f`: one OpenBao client per lane, and one role for both lanes is refused. -- Every login is revoked at exit, also when setup fails. -- A third gap was found and fixed: the 15m token is shorter than the 20m budget, so clients now log in again before - the lease ends, re-reading the rotating JWT. -- Synthetic pilot with per-lane tokens: completed and reverted, `all_met`. Examples re-pinned. -- rapp `368fee4`: - - a second projected token with audience `openbao`; - - the config names both CCR roles; - - the renderer refuses other roles and the API token; - - tests tie the roles to the platform CCRs. -- The founder chose a standing journey reader. CCR-2026-0059 records it (railiance-platform `98a8b08`). - -Done since: - -- The image for `4815c58` is `sha256:716dccef6707deb570e19cc2b3edfda4298f9bce580685896bc9320f186bf6b3`. - - The identity-journeys executor tests passed in CI. - - The executed files in the image are byte-identical to the repo and to the admission pins. - - It is pinned in the rapp (`c107afc`, pushed). -- CCR-2026-0059 was approved by the founder as platform-owner and net-kingdom-owner (railiance-platform `831a0f9`). - -**2026-10-31, lanes live** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-executor-lanes/README.md)), founder-run -with `T10-LANES-RUNBOOK.md`: - -- The rapp's standing objects are deployed. `sso/nk-bind-executor` has uid `bd15569c…`, and the Role matches the - ceiling. -- The bindings of CCR-2026-0058 and CCR-2026-0059 are confirmed (railiance-platform `b4bafb0`). -- `executor-lanes.py setup`: - - both policies applied; - - `cas_required` set; - - the standing journey-read role created; - - the write role absent; - - the agent fence holds. -- The first setup stopped because platform-admin has no `patch` on `platform/*`. It now uses a metadata write that - names only `cas_required`, with a before/after guard (`12c9b2d`). -- `verify`: the journey token reads only its path, with a lease of at most 15m. A wrong ServiceAccount, a wrong - audience and a login to the write role are all denied. - -**2026-10-31, journey-only mode** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/README.md)): - -- `cli.py --journey-only` is read-only and needs no admission: - - it logs in with the journey-read role only; - - it builds no Kubernetes or directory client and makes no approval or audit call; - - exit codes: `0` pass, `1` fail closed, `4` refused. -- The admission check and this mode share `operations.journey_from_kv`. 45 executor tests. -- Synthetic proof on the T08 stack with a journey-only OpenBao token: - - healthy: pass; - - broken svc-authelia bind: fail closed at `authelia_first_factor`; - - restored: pass; - - the journey token cannot read the bind; - - `all_met`, no values. - - This is T10's fail-closed proof. -- rapp: `templates/journey-job.yaml` and `render_job.py --journey-only`: - - the config holds only `openbao` (no role) and `journey`; - - the Job mounts only the openbao-audience token; - - founder-run with `make journey`. - -The image for `9a81123` is `sha256:550bb9d0db89716835b501b4bc822b9588aa63ea15d0e59c61f6a1768b3f16ee`. Its executed -files are byte-identical to the repo, and it is pinned in the rapp (`9cb19d9`). - -The first live `make journey` was refused at setup (`URLError`). `make netcheck` showed that k3s applies -NetworkPolicy to a new pod about 3 s late. The executor now waits up to 30 s for OpenBao's `sys/health` before its -first login (`15c9cdb`). The image `sha256:71da4a51e331cb82a5bde1e44025dc3b1b7ea4019dd9dbd64e7196cd3dd21471` is -verified and pinned in the rapp. - -**Done 2026-10-31** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t10-journey-only/README.md)): - -- The founder started `make journey`, which created Job `sso/bounded-executor-journey-20261031-194719`. -- It ran unattended against live with no person in the journey and passed all eight steps to an `aal2` ID token - (`pwd` + `otp`), with the signature verified. `effects: false`. The runner's hash equals the repo. -- The fail-closed half is the synthetic proof: a broken svc-authelia bind fails at `authelia_first_factor`. -- CCR-2026-0059 is now `verified`. - -For T06, separately: the approval-engine and audit-core replies, and the token Secret. - -## Executor runtime: core runner - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T11 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T01, NK-WP-0056-T03] -state_hub_task_id: "24121a14-92d8-577c-a651-992afcbdb4cc" -``` - -The executor itself, in net-kingdom (founder decision 6d1adce9): - -- consume one admission through the approval-engine carrier (independent GET, digest check, aal2 check, consume once); -- refuse outside the window or ceiling; -- run the pinned steps one consumer at a time, with checks after each mutating step, settle times, revert on - failure, the budget (wall time, attempts) and an `on_unknown: stop`; -- emit `execution.run.started` and the receipt (PDP `not-evaluated` for the pilot). - -Tested against in-process fakes for the carrier, operations and audit sink. - -**Done when:** the runner passes its tests, including revert on a failed check, budget exhaustion, a stale or -reused approval, and a step outside the ceiling. Every refusal must happen before any effect. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** `bounded-executor/executor.py` with 23 tests (`bounded-executor/tests/test_executor.py`; fakes -for carrier, operations, checks, trust, audit, clocks), modelled on approval-engine's real object and consume -response. Refusals before any effect cover: - -- an invalid admission; -- another executor; -- source drift; -- unsatisfied trust; -- an unknown operation; -- outside the window, or a window shorter than the budget; -- a binding digest or actor mismatch; -- a non-human, aal1 or unlisted approver; -- an already-consumed approval. - -Consume: - -- an unclear consume is read back and never repeated; -- an idempotent response is refused; -- with no audit custody, no run. - -Failure handling: - -- a failed check reverts in reverse order, each revert proving the restored state with its own checks; -- a clean revert retries within `attempts`; -- a failed revert, or a revert check that fails, stops and alerts; -- an unknown outcome stops without reverting; -- budget exhaustion and the kill switch revert; -- settle times are waited and counted; -- a receipt-custody failure is reported. - -Receipts carry no operation values. - -Standard and validator change: BEA-9 now applies to revert steps, which name their own checks; examples regenerated. - -## Executor runtime: pilot operations and packaging - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T12 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T11, NK-WP-0056-T08] -state_hub_task_id: "815cc63a-a2a0-5b8f-83ae-2b80e37ea8f5" -``` - -The pilot's operations: - -- OpenBao read and CAS write of the next version; -- LLDAP self-rotation of the bind; -- ExternalSecret force-sync and its status check; -- Deployment restart and rollout check; -- the synthetic journey. - -Run them on the T08 synthetic stack, including a revert. Add the Containerfile and image workflow in -net-kingdom. The `rapp-bounded-executor` package is created with `rmgr rapp wrap`, and the founder creates the -Forgejo remote. It runs one Job per admission in `sso` with an egress-only NetworkPolicy. - -**Done when:** a synthetic rotation completes and a deliberately failing one reverts, with receipts. - -**Done 2026-10-31** ([evidence](../docs/evidence/2026-10-31-nk56-t12-synthetic-pilot/README.md)). -`bounded-executor/operations.py`: - -- the OpenBao KV v2 CAS client; -- LLDAP self-rotation, the same operation forward and in revert; -- the Kubernetes ExternalSecret force-sync and status check, and the rollout restart that raises `RolloutFailed`; -- the pilot checks. - -`bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py`: rotation `completed`, and a one-off wrong delivery `reverted` in declared order -with the earlier value restored. 29 tests. - -Findings: - -- CCR-2026-0058's `required_parameters` refused reads. Corrected in railiance-platform; needs re-approval. -- Revert steps now run in declared order (BEA-10). -- Definite failures revert; unknown outcomes stop. -- Receipts carry error types. - -The image part moved to T13 (split agreed 2026-10-31). - -## Executor runtime: packaging - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T13 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T12] -state_hub_task_id: "7355e4a2-95cc-5860-a0b0-52978b8501e0" -``` - -The CLI entry point for one admission: - -- reads the admission, the approval id and the configuration; -- uses Kubernetes auth to OpenBao; -- uses the in-cluster Kubernetes and audit sender; -- ships the pinned `lldap_set_password` in the image. - -Also: the Containerfile and the Forgejo image workflow in net-kingdom, and the `rapp-bounded-executor` package -(`rmgr rapp wrap`, founder creates the Forgejo remote). The package holds one Job per admission in `sso` with the -T03 ServiceAccount, Role and an egress-only NetworkPolicy. - -**Done when:** the image builds in the workflow, the rapp renders and passes `server-dry-run` against a synthetic -manifest check, and nothing is applied. - -**2026-10-31, in progress.** Done in net-kingdom: - -- `bounded-executor/cli.py` (exit codes 0/3/4/5/6), `clients.py` (approval-engine GET/consume, audit-core - `POST /v1/events` with `Idempotency-Key`); -- events now carry `occurred_at`, which audit-core requires; -- `Containerfile`: pinned Python and LLDAP stages, hash-locked requirements, UID 10001; builds locally; -- `.forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml`, and the executor tests are in `identity-journeys.yaml`; -- the pilot example pins the executed files (`executor.py`, `operations.py`, `journey.py`). 35 tests. - -**2026-10-31, rapp reshaped.** `~/rapp-bounded-executor` is at `forgejo-remote:coulomb/rapp-bounded-executor` (`4517aaf`; rebased onto the Forgejo stub, so local hashes changed): - -- Standing objects in `sso`: - - `manifests/rbac.yaml`, a byte-identical copy of `sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml`. A test fails on - drift; `make ceiling-sync` copies it. - - `manifests/networkpolicy.yaml`: no ingress. Egress only to DNS, the API server (node `/32`, 6443), LLDAP 17170, - KeyCape 8080, Authelia 9091, OpenBao 8200, approval-engine 8080 and audit-core 8080. - - No Namespace, Deployment, Service, probes or database. -- `templates/job.yaml` and `tools/render_job.py` render one ConfigMap (admission + config) and one Job per admission, - named `bounded-executor-`: - - `make run` uses `kubectl create`, so a second run of the same admission fails; - - `backoffLimit: 0`; `activeDeadlineSeconds` = min(budget + 300 s, time left in the window); - - projected SA token, no automount; - - approval-engine and audit-core bearers come from an ESO Secret `bounded-executor-tokens`; - - the renderer refuses a placeholder digest, a window that is not open, another executor, secret-like config - keys and token paths that differ from the mounts. -- `declarations/rapp.yaml` names no database. `rmgr rapp validate` passes. 12 tests. -- `docs/runtime-contract.md` and `docs/platform-handoffs.md` list what must exist before T06. - -Server dry run with the limited `ops-mason-builder` identity: - -- ServiceAccount and NetworkPolicy: admitted. -- Role, RoleBinding and the per-admission ConfigMap and Job: `Forbidden` for that identity, so the founder runs them. -- The SSH path (`kubectl` on railiance01) can't read the k3s kubeconfig. The Makefile therefore takes - `KUBECTL=...`. - -Left: - -- DONE 2026-10-31, founder: full server dry run with the admin kubeconfig. The ServiceAccount, Role, RoleBinding and - NetworkPolicy were applied server-side as a dry run, and the synthetic BEA-2026-0001 ConfigMap and Job were created - as a dry run. Nothing was persisted. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** - -- The image workflow for `ba9d266` succeeded, and the digest - `sha256:8f40f998738789aec21898fe2a36fda56f33c6ae2bb5749f88583d4d70f070c2` is pinned in the rapp (`e9a943b`). -- `check-oci-image.sh` found the manifest, and `rmgr rapp validate` passes. 13 rapp tests. -- `rmgr rapp pin-image` only scans `manifests/`, so the pin went in by hand. A test keeps the Makefile, Job template - and declaration pins equal. -- Nothing was applied. - -Follow-up outside the done criteria: - -- DONE 2026-10-31: the founder created the Forgejo repo with a README stub. The local commits were rebased onto it - (the local README kept) and pushed; HEAD is `e779a22`. - -Follow-up 2026-10-31 for T10/T06 reachability: - -- `netpol-sso.yaml` gained `allow-bounded-executor-to-{lldap-api,keycape,authelia}`, which admit only executor pods, - on 17170, 8080 and 9091; never LDAP 3890. Tests: `test_netpol.py`, plus a rapp test that its in-namespace - egress equals these admissions. Prepared in source, not applied. -- Live reads (limited identity): - - OpenBao's chart policy admits every namespace on 8200, so nothing is needed there. - - approval-engine is deployed but admits only secrets-engine and namespaces labelled - `railiance.io/approval-engine-client=true`, and none are. - - audit-core has no ingress from `sso`. - - Both owners were asked for pod-scoped rules; see the rapp's `docs/platform-handoffs.md`. - -## Executor approval identity: service-client case type - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T14 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T13] -state_hub_task_id: "ec87ed9f-9604-5843-af08-bc771a58712d" -``` - -approval-engine only accepts an approval request whose `binding.actor` equals the caller's KeyCape token subject -(approval-engine `docs/bounded-execution-admission-carrier.md`). The executor therefore files its own request, the -founder approves it, and the executor consumes it. For that it needs its own KeyCape confidential client. - -KeyCape has no generic service-client registration. Each existing client was registered by its own script -(`approval-clients-rollout.py`, `secrets-engine-openbao-client-rollout.py`). The canon route is a new security case -type, `oidc-service-client` 0.1, next to `oidc-browser-relying-party`: - -- `client_credentials` grant, resource audience, service subject, tenant, roles, scopes, a token lifetime of at most - 15m; -- the client secret minted straight into OpenBao custody, readable only by KeyCape and the consuming service; -- `keycape-client.py` support for building the client from such a case; -- the first case: `nk-bind-executor-approval` (audience `approval-engine`; scopes `approval:create`, - `approval:read` and `approval:consume`; subject `service:nk-bind-executor`; tenant `tenant:platform`). - -The split of T14 into T14, T18 and T19 is a founder decision (2026-10-31). - -**Done when:** - -- the type, its tests and the first case validate; -- `keycape-client.py` renders the service client and is tested; -- an acknowledgement packet is ready for the founder. - -Nothing is applied. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** SecurityCaseType `oidc-service-client` 0.1 is `proposed` (`security-case-types/oidc-service-client/`): - -- type, README and two test files; -- the first case `examples/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml`: audience `approval-engine`; scopes `approval:create`, - `approval:read` and `approval:consume`; subject `service:nk-bind-executor`; tenant `tenant:platform`; 15m; -- the consumer reads the secret natively through its own bound role (`sso/nk-bind-executor`, audience `openbao`), - with no Secret copy; -- new capability declaration `net-kingdom.keycape-service-client-registration`. - -`keycape-client.py` renders service clients in key-cape's canonical shape. Adopting `secrets-engine-approval` -reproduces key-cape's example record exactly. Both builders refuse missing parameters. - -Tests: 138 pass (type, browser type, validator, keycape-client). Memo `nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r1` -(`decision/`) passes informed-decision's intake validator and State Hub's dispatcher contract. Hub decision -`f8044f81`. - -Next: - -- reviews from ops-mason, ops-warden, key-cape and railiance-platform; -- the operator queues the memo; -- the founder acknowledges; -- the case is accepted and goes live, which makes the type `implemented` (as part of T18/T19). - -## Executor approval client and request phase - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T18 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T14] -state_hub_task_id: "37186772-2749-573f-bc68-1ccf6840b60b" -``` - -Executor code: - -- a fresh KeyCape token exchange per approval call (as secrets-engine does), with the client secret read through - an executor OpenBao lane (the case's custody); -- a `request` phase that creates the approval (`action: bounded-execution`, target admission id and digest, - `human_control: true`, `pdp_path: false`) and prints its id; -- the existing run phase then consumes it. - -Presenting the approval to the founder follows the alignment review's "present an existing approval" contract -([review](../docs/proposals/2026-10-31-decision-services-alignment-review.md), S1 informed-decision). - -**Done when:** the request and run phases are tested on fakes, and the new image is pinned. - -**2026-10-31, built:** - -- `b71f509`: `KeyCapeClientCredentials` (`client_secret_basic`, one scope per token, public Host for the in-cluster - URL, no redirects). -- `ApprovalEngine` takes a per-scope token provider and can create approvals. -- `cli.py --request` files the approval as `service:nk-bind-executor`: - - principal is the first approver's subject; - - target is the admission id and digest; - - validity is the admission window; - - `human_control` is on; - - `required_count` is the number of listed approvers; - - the client secret comes through its own OpenBao lane, is read once, and that login is revoked at once. -- audit-core's review found that the audit client rejected 202, the status of a first accept. The executor would - have stopped after consuming its approval. Fixed: 202 and 200 count as stored, and 409 is a distinct defect. - 58 executor tests. -- rapp `48566a6`: - - the config names the executor's own client, and the renderer requires it exactly; - - the run Job mounts only the audit-core bearer; - - `make request` adds a request Job. - -**Done 2026-10-31.** The image `sha256:c67cb04485ee53b910c2443f43eada0e80273ea879de6853e120a32415194a04` -(`7bd6033`) has executed files byte-identical to the repo. It is pinned in the rapp (`b90951a`). A live request -also needs T20 and T21. - -## Executor approval exercise against the real services - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T19 -status: todo -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T18] -state_hub_task_id: "dd9c9500-40a7-550e-9672-14b5705e99ed" -``` - -Run create, approve, consume, idempotent retry, a different digest, revoke-before-consume and a wrong scope against -approval-engine's real source and KeyCape's pinned image with synthetic keys (secrets-engine -`tools/exercise_approval_identity.py` pattern). Value-free receipt. - -**Done when:** the exercise passes and its receipt is recorded. - -## Executor audit sender - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T15 -status: todo -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T13] -state_hub_task_id: "a3e764ab-e545-5102-a4a7-a07e91ce3f6b" -``` - -audit-core accepts the `started` event and the receipt only from a registered sender (AUDIT-WP-0018-T02). Needed: - -- the versioned receipt schema, validator and fixtures (NK-WP-0040-T02 scope); -- the sender credential's custody, preferably an OpenBao read role for the executor rather than an ESO Secret; -- audit-core's registry entry and ingress rule. Facts sent 2026-10-31 (hub `ed03ba30`). - -**Done when:** a synthetic run's events are accepted by audit-core's real ingestion (202, duplicate 200, conflict -409, wrong source refused), and the live seed is prepared for the founder. - -## Owner ingress for the executor pod - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T16 -status: wait -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -blocked_on: message-from:approval-engine -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T10] -state_hub_task_id: "a08c6b82-be3f-5dca-82f7-b2a0ced6b335" -``` - -approval-engine (hub `39a3bffa`) and audit-core (hub `deea5bf8`, `ed03ba30`) each admit only namespace `sso` with -pod label `app.kubernetes.io/name=bounded-executor` on 8080. Our side: the rapp's egress policy and `make netcheck`. - -**Done when:** both rules are live and `make netcheck` (extended to both endpoints) shows them reachable from an -executor pod. - -## Founder approval path at aal2 - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T17 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T10] -state_hub_task_id: "0964e610-cad3-500c-bd75-4d2b0323e886" -``` - -The founder must add a human approval entry with an `aal2` token carrying `approval:approve` for audience -`approval-engine`. approval-engine names `informed-decision` as the approver surface. - -Find out whether that path exists and is usable today, and what a founder approval of one admission looks like end -to end. Then name the missing pieces and their owners. - -**Done when:** the approval path is described with evidence (works today, or what is missing and who owns it). - -**Done 2026-10-31** ([finding](../docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t17-founder-approval-path.md)): it does not work -today. - -- informed-decision is the live approver surface. It posts the human `approval:approve` entry. -- But its intake always creates the approval itself with `actor: informed-decision`, and refuses a pinned - `approval_id`. -- approval-engine only lets the actor create. -- The executor and BEA require the actor `service:nk-bind-executor`. - -Options: - -- A, recommended: informed-decision presents an existing approval filed by a registered submitter. -- B: relax the actor binding in the executor and BEA. -- C: a founder CLI approver. - -Founder decision needed before T14. - -## Service-client type revision r2 from the owner reviews - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T20 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T14] -state_hub_task_id: "e09162c4-01ea-540c-bbab-e8772f0f7ef5" -``` - -The 2026-10-31 reviews of `oidc-service-client` 0.1: - -- ops-mason: `ops-mason` `3c69a25`; -- ops-warden: `ops-warden` `95d31c3`, `history/2026-10-31-oidc-service-client-follow-through-review.md`; -- key-cape: `key-cape` `655d8d3`, `docs/oidc-service-client-type-review.md`; -- railiance-platform: `railiance-platform` `6858bef`, `docs/credential-lane-designs/oidc-service-client-review.md`. - -They ask for these changes before the founder acknowledges the type: - -- The ESO role gets `audience: openbao` and `token_explicit_max_ttl`; the ESO policy gets `lookup-self` and - `revoke-self`. -- The consumer role name must differ from its policy name: `keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}-workload-kv-read`. -- Refuse the `default` ServiceAccount and the `external-secrets` and `openbao` namespaces. -- **Same namespace:** KeyCape's ESO target sits in `sso`, the consumer's namespace. Add the verification - `consumer-cannot-read-delivered-secret` (an RBAC can-i denial) and correct the README. -- An excess scope is refused with `invalid_profile_usage`, not `invalid_scope` (key-cape R3). -- **Rotation:** the mint step only creates. Rotation is an attended platform-admin write, then an ESO refresh, then - a KeyCape restart (railiance-platform R5, ops-warden R5, key-cape R5). -- The catalog entry body gets the fields ops-warden R6 asks for. -- The `custody-allowed-to-consumer` wording must mention the two self-lifecycle grants. -- One restart per case: bind-env and register-client in one rollout (key-cape R4). -- Open questions: - - the workload name, `bounded-executor` or `net-kingdom-bind-executor` (ops-mason R9); - - `consumer_owner_repo` as `rapp-bounded-executor` (ops-warden R10); - - an independent claims check (ops-warden R8). - -Per-case CCRs are still required. railiance-platform drafted CCR-2026-0060 (KeyCape ESO reader) and CCR-2026-0061 -(the executor's reader). The broker must admit the type after acknowledgement (railiance-platform R1, ops-warden -R1). - -**Done when:** the type is at r2 with tests green, the memo r2 is validated, and the CCR names agree with the type. - -**Done 2026-11-01.** `oidc-service-client` is at 0.2 (`proposed`) with every review change applied (README history -lists them). Settled here: - -- `consuming_service` stays `bounded-executor`; -- the first case's `consumer_owner_repo` is `rapp-bounded-executor`. - -The consumer role is `keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}-workload-kv-read`. A new test checks CCR-2026-0060 and -CCR-2026-0061 against the rendered role and policy names (they agree). 141 related tests pass. - -Memo `nk-wp-0056-t14-oidc-service-client-r2` passes informed-decision's intake validator and State Hub's dispatcher -contract (hub decision `f8044f81`). The rapp follows the role rename (`828992e`). - -Next for the founder: queue memo r2 through the State Hub memo dispatcher and acknowledge the type. - -## Executor submits its admission memo to informed-decision - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T21 -status: done -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T18] -state_hub_task_id: "ae922bf8-067c-5d83-8129-4507639cfa24" -``` - -informed-decision built `present_existing` (`0e66a33`, INFD-WP-0010). The executor submits a memo through -`/v1/memos` that pins `approval_id` and the binding digest and carries the admission YAML as its packet. -informed-decision checks the approval by GET and presents it to the founder. - -Needed: - -- a projected token with audience `informed-decision-intake` in the request Job; -- a NetworkPolicy path to informed-decision's private listener on 8081; -- the request phase submitting the memo after creating the approval. - -Outside net-kingdom: - -- access-engine: review policy v13 hard-codes the requester `informed-decision`; -- key-cape: the informed-decision requester client needs `approval:read`; -- informed-decision: its registry entry and release (INFD-WP-0010-T02). - -**Done when:** the request phase files the approval and the memo, tested against informed-decision's real intake -validator. - -**Done 2026-11-01.** After creating the approval, `cli.py --request` composes one present_existing memo: - -- the packet is the admission YAML itself (informed-decision's choice); -- three required highlights cover the scope ceiling, the window and budget, and the plan with its revert; -- the intent restates the binding without the actor; -- the idempotency key is `nk-bind-executor.`. - -It is submitted to informed-decision's private intake with the projected `informed-decision-intake` token. Exit -codes: 0 presented; 7 requested but the memo was refused (the approval stays usable, and resubmitting is idempotent). - -Tests: - -- the envelope passes informed-decision's own `validate_submission` with the present_existing profile; -- the receipt is checked against the memo; -- a refused memo exits 7. - -61 executor tests. - -rapp (T21 commit): the request Job's projected token, the exact config section, and egress to informed-decision:8081. - -The service-identity declaration notes key-cape's prepared `approval:read` for informed-decision's requester. - -Live (founder-run, after the owners' releases): - -- access-engine policy v14; -- key-cape `approval:read`; -- informed-decision's registry row and its ingress for the executor pod; -- the executor image pin. - -## Pilot: unattended bind rotation under one admission - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T06 -status: todo -priority: high -assignee: claude-code -needs_human: true -intervention_note: "Founder signs the admission for the single live pilot rotation." -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T01, NK-WP-0056-T03, NK-WP-0056-T04, NK-WP-0056-T05, NK-WP-0056-T10, NK-WP-0056-T13, NK-WP-0056-T14, NK-WP-0056-T15, NK-WP-0056-T16, NK-WP-0056-T17, NK-WP-0056-T18, NK-WP-0056-T19, NK-WP-0056-T20, NK-WP-0056-T21] -state_hub_task_id: "6c3939f8-23a9-5f70-a3b1-94f4b291706b" -``` - -Rotate `svc-authelia`'s password with no person in the loop beyond the admission: generate into -OpenBao, set in LLDAP, let ESO deliver, restart, run the synthetic journey, revert on failure, emit a -receipt to audit-core. Rehearse on a synthetic directory first, then one live run under a -founder-signed admission. - -**Done when:** the live rotation completes or reverts on its own, within its budget, with a verified -receipt, and the founder's only action was the admission. - -## Budget and risk enforcement - -```task -id: NK-WP-0056-T07 -status: todo -priority: medium -assignee: claude-code -depends_on: [NK-WP-0056-T06] -state_hub_task_id: "a87c5edb-7604-5eba-9261-b1ed2ed16655" -``` - -Enforce the admission's budget and blast radius at run time (attempt and time limits, a kill switch the -founder holds, refusal when a check is missing), and feed outcomes and drift into posture feedback -(NK-WP-0031) so that recurring admissions can be reviewed in aggregate rather than one by one. - -**Done when:** a run that exceeds its budget or scope stops and reverts in a synthetic test, and the -pilot's receipts appear in a posture-feedback report.