# T06 runbook: the live pilot rotation under one admission (founder-run) NK-WP-0056-T06. The executor rotates `svc-authelia`'s LLDAP bind. Your only part *in the run* is the admission: you approve it at aal2 in informed-decision. Everything before that (sections 1 to 5) is one-time go-live of the standing paths. Section 7 is the run. Each step prints a value-free result. Paste it back, and claude-code verifies it read-only and records it. **Commands:** - Admin steps use `K="kubectl --kubeconfig $HOME/.kube/config-railiance01"`. - OpenBao steps need `bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=platform-admin` (MFA) first. - Always run `git pull --ff-only` in a repo before using it. | # | What | Where | Changes | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Owner ingress (T16) | approval-engine, audit-core, rapp | two NetworkPolicies; read-only netcheck | | 2 | Custody | railiance-platform | approve CCR-2026-0060, -0061, -0063; apply policies and roles, ESO; mint the KeyCape client secret | | 3 | Accept the case | State Hub decision | `security-cases/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml` becomes `accepted` | | 4 | KeyCape client | net-kingdom | bind the env var and register the client in one KeyCape restart | | 5 | Audit sender | audit-core | mint and seed the `nk-bounded-executor` token | | 6 | Admission | net-kingdom (claude-code) | `admissions/BEA-2026-0002.yaml` for the window you choose | | 7 | The run | rapp, net-kingdom | request, approve at aal2, open the window, run, close the window, verify | ## 1. Owner ingress (T16) Apply each owner's policy object on its own. Live approval-engine also has `informed-decision-review-ingress`, which is not in its file. Applying the whole file would therefore be a broader change than this step. ```bash K="kubectl --kubeconfig $HOME/.kube/config-railiance01" cd ~/approval-engine && git pull --ff-only python3 -c "import yaml,sys; yaml.safe_dump([d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(open('deploy/networkpolicies.yaml')) if d and d['metadata']['name']=='approval-engine-bounded-executor'][0], sys.stdout)" > /tmp/ae-bx.yaml $K apply --dry-run=server -f /tmp/ae-bx.yaml && $K apply -f /tmp/ae-bx.yaml ``` audit-core: run step 1 of audit-core `docs/bounded-executor-receipts.md`, "Founder runbook — nk-bounded-executor sender". It applies `audit-core-nk-bounded-executor-ingress` the same way. Then prove the path from an executor-labelled pod. It holds no token and makes no login: ```bash cd ~/rapp-bounded-executor && git pull --ff-only make netcheck KUBECTL="$K" ``` Expected, on the last lines: `"approval_engine_health": 200`, `"audit_core_health": 200` and `"informed_decision_tcp": "ok"`, alongside the existing OpenBao, KeyCape and Authelia columns. ## 2. Custody (railiance-platform) Follow railiance-platform's go-live runbook for the three requests (path in its hub message "NK-WP-0056-T06 custody go-live"): - approve CCR-2026-0060, -0061 and -0063 with the approve tool; - apply the policies, roles and ESO objects; - mint the KeyCape client secret into `platform/workloads/keycape/nk-bind-executor-approval` without printing it; - check that the ExternalSecret `sso/keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-client` reports `Ready=True`. Section 4 needs that `Ready` immediately before it runs. ## 3. Accept the service-client case Answer State Hub decision `59d570ef` ("Accept SecurityCase nk-bind-executor-approval"). claude-code then records the acceptance in the case file. The case type requires owner and founder acceptance; you are both. ## 4. KeyCape: bind and register in one restart KeyCape runs one replica with strategy Recreate. Changing its env is itself a restart, and registering a confidential client whose secret is not bound makes the next start fail closed. So: pause the rollout, bind, register, then resume. That is one restart, with both changes (key-cape R4). Run it in a quiet minute: in-flight sign-ins are dropped. ```bash cd ~/net-kingdom && git pull --ff-only K="kubectl --kubeconfig $HOME/.kube/config-railiance01" $K -n sso get externalsecret keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-client -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}'; echo # True C=$(mktemp); python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py client-from-case security-cases/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml > "$C" B=$HOME/.local/share/key-cape/verified-bin/e2b5fa1 # check-config binary from the deployed image (T09 runbook) test -x "$B/keycape" || { mkdir -p "$B"; cid=$(docker create forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:9e082dca78f65a4af3e92d3de3705b99e49ca9b298d9562ad0d37511c4306f8d); docker cp "$cid:/keycape" "$B/keycape"; docker rm "$cid"; } # keycape-client.py uses its built-in kubeconfig through 127.0.0.1:16444, exactly as in the T09 runbook; # it pins the cluster identity and refuses another cluster. $K -n sso rollout pause deployment/keycape $K -n sso patch deployment keycape --type=json -p '[ {"op":"test","path":"/spec/template/spec/containers/0/name","value":"keycape"}, {"op":"add","path":"/spec/template/spec/containers/0/env/-","value":{"name":"KEYCAPE_NK_BIND_EXECUTOR_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET","valueFrom":{"secretKeyRef":{"name":"keycape-nk-bind-executor-approval-client","key":"client-secret"}}}}]' python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py inspect --client-file "$C" # -> "deployment_env_bound": true, "change_needed": true; note before.uid and before.resource_version ``` Then put the noted values into the apply line, in place of `UID` and `RV`: ```bash python3 sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py apply --client-file "$C" \ --case-acceptance "security-cases/nk-bind-executor-approval.yaml (accepted, hub decision in section 3)" \ --check-config "$B/keycape" --expected-uid UID --expected-resource-version RV $K -n sso rollout resume deployment/keycape $K -n sso rollout status deployment/keycape --timeout=180s ``` If `apply` refuses, nothing in the registry changed. Undo the env patch before resuming: run `$K -n sso rollout undo deployment/keycape`, then `$K -n sso rollout resume deployment/keycape`, and paste the refusal. claude-code then runs the type's verification. The executor's request Job (section 7) performs the token exchange per scope. The excess-scope refusal, the custody denials and the RBAC can-i denial are read-only checks. ## 5. Audit sender Run steps 2 to 4 of audit-core's founder runbook (see section 1): preflight, the silent seed under `warden access ... --exec`, and its receipt. The seed needs CCR-2026-0063 applied (section 2). ## 6. Admission (claude-code prepares, you check) claude-code runs, for the window you name (at most 2 h): ```bash python3 bounded-executor/prepare_admission.py --id BEA-2026-0002 --commit 9bd7bf0 \ --not-before 2026-11-05T09:00:00Z --hours 2 --out admissions/BEA-2026-0002.yaml ``` It commits the file. The pins are the files inside the pinned image (`sha256:2926d7d9…`, built from `9bd7bf0`). Read it: the plan, the checks, the revert steps, the budget and the window are what you will approve. ## 7. The run ```bash K="kubectl --kubeconfig $HOME/.kube/config-railiance01" cd ~/rapp-bounded-executor && git pull --ff-only && cd ~/net-kingdom && git pull --ff-only A=~/net-kingdom/admissions/BEA-2026-0002.yaml CFG=$(mktemp --suffix=.json) python3 -c "import json; c=json.load(open('$HOME/rapp-bounded-executor/examples/config.pilot.json')); c['trust_satisfied']=['runtime_secret_trust','runtime_identity_trust']; json.dump(c, open('$CFG','w'), indent=2)" # trust_satisfied is your attestation, recorded in the run's result: OpenBao custody and KeyCape identity are healthy ``` **7a. Request.** The executor files the approval as `service:nk-bind-executor` and presents it in informed-decision: ```bash cd ~/rapp-bounded-executor && make request ADMISSION=$A CONFIG=$CFG KUBECTL="$K" # -> {"outcome": "presented", "approval_id": "...", ...}; note the approval_id ``` **7b. Approve.** Open the memo in informed-decision and approve it. You must be signed in at aal2 (OTP in this login). **7c. Open the window.** This creates CCR-2026-0058's write role for this admission only: ```bash cd ~/net-kingdom && bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=platform-admin W=$(sha256sum ~/railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0058-*.yaml | cut -d' ' -f1) J=$(sha256sum ~/railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0059-*.yaml | cut -d' ' -f1) E=docs/evidence/$(date +%F)-nk56-t06-pilot; mkdir -p "$E" python3 tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py window-open --admission $A --write-ccr-sha256 "$W" \ --journey-ccr-sha256 "$J" --receipt "$E/01-window-open.json" # {"status": "window_opened", ...} ``` **7d. Run.** Put the approval id from 7a in place of `APPROVAL`: ```bash cd ~/rapp-bounded-executor && make run ADMISSION=$A APPROVAL_ID=APPROVAL CONFIG=$CFG KUBECTL="$K" make run-status ADMISSION_ID=BEA-2026-0002 KUBECTL="$K" $K -n sso logs job/bounded-executor-bea-2026-0002 > ~/net-kingdom/$E/02-result.json ``` The last line of the log is the value-free result: | Exit | Result | Meaning | | --- | --- | --- | | 0 | `completed` | rotated, delivered, restarted, journey passed | | 3 | `reverted` | a check failed, and the previous value is back, checked | | 4 | `refused` | nothing was spent | | 5 | `stopped`, `unknown` or `revert_failed` | the alert names the step | | 6 | consumed but not in custody | — | **Kill switch**, at any moment of the run: ```bash $K -n sso delete job bounded-executor-bea-2026-0002 ``` The executor finishes the step in flight, then reverts what it changed (grace period = the budget). Before consume it refuses and spends nothing. **7e. Close the window** right after the result, or at window end at the latest: ```bash cd ~/net-kingdom && python3 tools/service-binds/executor-lanes.py window-close --admission $A \ --receipt "$E/03-window-close.json" # {"status": "window_closed", ...} ``` **7f. Tell claude-code.** It does the rest read-only: - it confirms the run's started event and receipt in audit-core (operator read by `correlation_id`); - it validates the pair against receipt schema v0.1; - it runs the posture-feedback report over the receipts (T07); - it records the evidence and closes T06.