---
id: NK-WP-0048
type: workplan
title: "Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light"
domain: infotech
repo: net-kingdom
status: active
flavor: implementation
owner: claude-code
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-10-08"
updated: "2026-10-10"
depends_on: []
related_repos:
  - ops-mason
  - ops-warden
  - key-cape
  - railiance-platform
  - informed-decision
state_hub_workstream_id: "e31f3f9d-0748-5137-b0a3-7b3ca46a66eb"
---

# NK-WP-0048 - Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light

## Why

The founder's direction (2026-10-08): setting up a security integration of a
kind that has been done before should be easy, meaning accept the case, then
ops-mason arranges it and ops-warden follows through. Setting up a new kind
needs ample documentation and tests and an informed-decision, because its shape
is part of the security architecture.

Today every integration is hand-built: per-client helper scripts, per-lane
custody, founder checklists. The trigger was KEY-WP-0038 (Forgejo as an OIDC
client), whose next step was going to be yet another hand-written rollout
script.

This plan continues the pattern work of NK-WP-0008 (pattern infospace),
NK-WP-0009 (tutorials) and NK-WP-0030 (scenario composition). It turns patterns
into **SecurityCaseTypes** that ops-mason and ops-warden can execute. Canon:
`canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md` (proposed).

Companion plans: ops-mason `MASON-WP-0010` (materialization) and ops-warden
`WARDEN-WP-0044` (follow-through).

## Tasks

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "930ac3e9-20ec-5473-98cd-3fe8fddb730f"
```

### T01 — Accept the terminology and the canon

Founder review of `canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md`, including its
section 10 open questions. On acceptance the canon status goes from `proposed`
to `accepted`.

2026-10-08: accepted by the founder (in session). Canon status `accepted`;
section 10's open questions are carried forward to the first type (T04, T05).

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "19c25d96-a55c-58f0-9168-3fdbc4955fc2"
```

### T02 — Inventory the de-facto types already built by hand

Read-only. List every security integration built so far and group them by shape.
Known starting points:

- browser OIDC relying parties on key-cape: informed-decision-approver,
  coulomb-social, user-engine portal, openbao-admin, and Forgejo (pending)
- confidential service clients with `client_credentials`: secrets-engine
  approval, requester and openbao clients, approval-engine operator
- workload KV read lanes on OpenBao: the railiance-platform credential lane
  designs and CCRs, for example `railiance-backup-offsite-lane`
- short-lived SSH certificates through ops-warden (`warden sign`)
- tunnelled operator access (ops-bridge)

For each: the repositories involved, the hand-built steps, attended human steps,
custody paths, verification evidence, and rollback (if any). Output
`docs/security-case-type-inventory.md`, ranking candidate types by how often the
shape recurs and how much manual work each instance costs today.

2026-10-08: done, `docs/security-case-type-inventory.md`. 36 of 37 CCRs are
already `request_type: workload-kv-read`, a de-facto type reviewed each time as
if it were new. Browser clients: 5 hand-built plus Forgejo, each with its own
rollout script. Confidential service clients need a registration plus two or
three KV-read CCRs each. A forge read identity is needed in bulk by
ORGREF-WP-0002-T06. Recommendation: oidc-browser-relying-party first (unblocks
the forge), workload-kv-read second (largest payoff), then forge-read-identity.

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T03
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T01]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e487975b-73b1-516c-971d-da4cbbb93063"
```

### T03 — Schema, template and validator

- `canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json` and
  `security-case_v0.1.schema.json`
- `security-case-types/_template/` with `type.yaml`, `README.md` and tests to copy
- a validator, extending `tools/security-scenario-composer/`, that checks a type,
  checks a case against its type, and renders the case into the composer's
  deterministic plan (still `execution.permitted: false`)

Acceptance: the validator rejects missing sections, secret-shaped parameter
values, unpinned providers and cases against non-`implemented` types, with tests
for each.

2026-10-08: done. `canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json` and
`security-case_v0.1.schema.json`; `tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py`
(`validate-type`, `validate-case`, `render`, reusing the scenario composer);
`security-case-types/_template/` (a valid, runnable example type over
`net-kingdom.local-identity`, with README sections, an example case and tests that
travel with every copy). 31 tests pass, including the composer's existing suite.

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T04
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T02, NK-WP-0048-T03]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "2fffe112-7d55-5680-9952-78d74f44f87f"
```

### T04 — Define the first type: browser OIDC relying party

`security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/`, version 1.0:

- parameters: client id, display name, exact redirect URIs, scopes, client type
  (confidential or public), MFA pin, the groups the consuming service maps,
  custody path for the secret (confidential only), consuming service and its
  owner
- composition: key-cape client registration (key-cape declares it as a playbook
  capability), secret minting into custody (railiance-platform), LLDAP group
  existence and membership (net-kingdom identity-provisioner), handover to the
  consuming service
- materialization (ops-mason) and follow-through (ops-warden) sections
- verification: discovery lists the redirect URI; a test sign-in returns the
  expected claims for one human; anonymous access to the custody path is denied
- rollback: remove exactly this client and its custody path
- README: threat model, MFA rationale, why redirect URIs are exact, which steps
  still need an attended login and how that is minimised
- reference instances: informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine
  portal, openbao-admin

Acceptance: complete per canon section 3, tests green, status `proposed`.

2026-10-08: done. `security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/` 1.0 (proposed):
`type.yaml` with 12 parameters (the custody reference is required only for
confidential clients), composition over key-cape's new
`key-cape.oidc-client-registration` declaration (contract PASS, `maturity:
planned`), materialization and follow-through, verification and rollback, all
conditional on client type where it matters. One attended step,
`register-client`, justified by the live registry being a Kubernetes Secret.
README with threat model, alternatives, an honest fit table (portal and vergabe
fit; Forgejo is the first confidential case; openbao-admin, coulomb.social and
informed-decision-approver do not fit 1.0), and known limits. Examples: Forgejo
(checked against the accepted request) and a public portal. The validator gained
`when` / `required_when` conditions and provider discovery. 43 tests pass.
ops-mason's and ops-warden's sections are drafted in the type. Their owners
review them in MASON-WP-0010-T01 and WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 before acknowledgment
(T05).

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T05
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T04, MASON-WP-0010-T01, WARDEN-WP-0044-T01]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3d987d3d-0797-538b-86e4-51185a327ae2"
```

### T05 — Acknowledge the type through informed-decision

Prepare the Decision Memo from the type's README and `type.yaml` and submit it
through informed-decision's production intake. On acknowledgment the type
moves to `acknowledged`.

2026-10-08: Decision Memo prepared. Hub decision `e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09`.
`security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/`: `packet.md` (question,
one act, what acknowledging does not do, the shape, alternatives, attended
steps, limits, evidence), `build_intake.py` and the built `intake.json` (memo
class `decision-record`, review group `net-kingdom-admins`, resolves the hub
decision on answer). The envelope passes informed-decision's own
`validate_submission`. Queuing it is an attended operator step, a write inside
the production dispatcher pod:

    kubectl -n state-hub exec -i deploy/state-hub-memo-dispatch -- \
      python -m api.services.memo_dispatch --queue /data/private enqueue --envelope /dev/stdin \
      < security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json

The answer then appears for review in informed-decision.

2026-10-08: queued by the founder (`pending`, `queued`) after one refusal: the
first envelope's idempotency key was not State Hub's stable
`state-hub.<decision>.<memo>` form, and the builder now validates against both
sides. The dispatcher delivered it to informed-decision (ledger 7 → 8
delivered). T05 waits for the founder's answer in informed-decision, which
resolves hub decision `e418263e`.

2026-10-08: ops-mason's review (MASON-WP-0010-T01) folded into the type, still
1.0 `proposed`: `secret_ref` is no longer a parameter, the type derives
`platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}`; policies are
`workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso` and
`workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}`, each with a templated
body (`read` on that one data path); new `openbao_role`
`external-secrets-keycape-{client_id}` (Kubernetes auth, ESO service account,
15m, no default policy); catalog entry `{consuming_service}-keycape-client`;
the two rollback steps on the KV path collapse into one metadata delete. The
schema and validator now require a `body` on policy and role items. 105 tests
pass. Two consequences: the delivered memo describes the type before these
changes (a case-set custody reference, two differently named policies, no ESO
role), so the founder answers on a superseded shape unless the memo is
re-sent; and Forgejo's custody path moves from the accepted request's proposed
`platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client` to
`platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo`, which key-cape (KEY-WP-0038) and
railiance-apps (RAPPS-WP-0016-T02) need to adopt in T06. ops-warden's review
(WARDEN-WP-0044-T01) is still in progress.

2026-10-08: revised memo `nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r2` built
(`packet.md`, `intake.json`, packet `sha256:af6435e2…`); it states that it
supersedes the first memo and passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's
validation. It needs a new memo id because the dispatcher refuses new content
under a delivered idempotency key (`idempotency_conflict`). Queuing it is the
same attended step as above. Both memos serve hub decision `e418263e`; the
first answer resolves it, so the first memo must not stay open: an accept on it
would acknowledge the superseded shape, and a decline would resolve the
decision against r2. Close it with `return` (a reviewer verb that requests a
new revision and does not resolve the hub decision; only accept and decline
do), commenting that r2 supersedes it, then answer r2. `withdraw` exists in
the vocabulary but is not offered to reviewers, and lifecycle `revise` only
applies to lifecycle-registered memos, not intake-delivered ones.

2026-10-09: the founder reports r2 enqueued and the first memo returned. At
close, hub decision `e418263e` still showed `open` (not verified whether r2
was answered or the answer is still in transit; the dispatcher ledger was not
read). ops-warden's review (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01, ops-warden
`history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md`, d470f2e) arrived at
21:25, before r2 was built, and is not in r2. Required before WARDEN-WP-0044-T02:
R1 a per-step `lane` (missing: identity-provisioner caller credential,
railiance-platform broker grant), R2 canon meaning of `warden_executes: true`
(caller proxy, caller identity, no standing ops-warden token; ADR-0002), R3 a
per-step `value_handling`. Refinements R4 (one type-level catalog lane instead
of a per-case entry, which conflicts with ops-mason's item 5), R5 (ESO Ready gate
before bind-env), R6 (exact accepted memberships), R7 (mfa-pinned and
secret-delivered checks). Next: if r2 was accepted, fold R1-R3 and R5-R7 in as
a follow-up and settle R4 between ops-warden and ops-mason before T06; if not,
hold r2, fold them in and build r3.
 key-cape and railiance-apps were told about Forgejo's new custody
path.

2026-10-09: r2 was not answered (hub decision `e418263e` open; dispatcher 9
delivered), so r2 is held and r3 replaces it. ops-warden withdrew R4 for R4′
(message a66a9204): one catalog entry per case with its body templated in the
type. Folded in:

- Canon section 3: a narrow meaning of `warden_executes: true` (caller proxy,
  caller identity, no standing credential; ops-warden ADR-0002), plus per-step
  `lane`, `value_handling` and an optional `ready_check`. A catalog entry body is
  now required, like policy and role bodies.
- Schema and validator enforce all of these.
- The type: lanes `identity-provisioner-groups` and
  `keycape-client-secret-generate` (both new) and `key-cape-oidc-login`;
  `mint-secret` is `generated_in_custody`; a Ready gate on `deliver-secret`;
  `ensure-groups` adds exactly the accepted case's memberships; new checks
  `secret-delivered` and `mfa-pinned`; the catalog-entry body follows R4′.
- 110 tests pass.

Memo r3 (`nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r3`, packet
`sha256:726dfc01…`) passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation.
The founder queues it with the same command, returns r2 with a comment that r3
supersedes it, then answers r3.

Prerequisites for T06, not for T05:
- the two new lanes, each through its owner;
- a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner image containing
  630ebfd (the deployed one is main-6c4fcaf from 2026-09-24, without
  `/v1/groups/ensure`).

ops-mason's request to create LLDAP group `fluid-telegram-operators` (message
259ec26d) was answered: not possible from here by that path; the founder creates
it in the LLDAP admin UI.

2026-10-09: ops-warden finished its side of WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 (message
`58d33f40`, commit 0e7ceb8): the revised type conforms to `warden case
check-type`, with no further changes asked of the type. This acknowledges that
review. Its later addendum R8 (message `af274783`, ops-warden
`history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md`) showed that lane
`identity-provisioner-groups` cannot exist as declared: the provisioner's only
HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits
only user-engine pods, so a caller-proxy lane would act as user-engine. Taken
option 1 (ops-warden's recommendation): `ensure-groups` and its rollback are
attended, in the `register-client` session on `key-cape-oidc-login`, run inside
the provisioner pod; no token is read. Option 2 (an operator credential of its
own on the provisioner) stays open for a later version. `warden case
check-type` now reports only `keycape-client-secret-generate`
(railiance-platform) as missing. 89 tests pass.

Hub decision `e418263e` was still open, so memo r4
(`nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4`, packet `sha256:452ea421…`)
replaces r3; it passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. The
founder queues it with the same command, returns r2/r3 if still open with a
comment that r4 supersedes them, then answers r4.

Prerequisites for T06 are now: lane `keycape-client-secret-generate`
(railiance-platform), and a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner
image containing 630ebfd.

2026-10-09: done. The founder queued r4 (`pending`, `queued`), returned r3 as
superseded and accepted r4 in informed-decision. informed-decision's hub
write-back is off in production (`INFD_HUB_WRITEBACK` unset), so net-kingdom
resolved hub decision `e418263e` from the founder's report, naming memo r4 in
the rationale. The type is `acknowledged`; it becomes `implemented` with T06.

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T06
status: wait
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T05, NK-WP-0048-T08, NK-WP-0048-T09, MASON-WP-0010-T03, WARDEN-WP-0044-T03]
blocking_reason: "Type1.2 architecture has a confirmed source-only founder acknowledgment; canonical1.1 remains unchanged/default and the1.2 reference case stays proposed. Needs explicit version selection/reference-source integration without normal admission bypass, closed owner adapters plus global/native receipt verifier (WARDEN-WP-0044-T03), independently verified six-object structural materialization and CCR42 claims/created-only provenance, exact broker/case/source reconciliation, then separately authorized native mint/delivery and attended registry/consumer verification. Source acknowledgment, a bundle or local tests do not prove implemented/materialized/live status."
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d9b26bcf-a7c6-59a2-92a0-f913d76a203c"
```

### T06 — First KnownSecurityCase: Forgejo

Write `security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml` from the parameters the
founder accepted in KEY-WP-0038-T01 (`key-cape/docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml`),
so that acceptance carries over as the case acceptance. ops-mason materializes it;
ops-warden follows through and verifies it. The type becomes `implemented` once
this reference case is live.

This replaces the hand-built path proposed for KEY-WP-0038-T02.

2026-10-09: case written, `security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml`, status
`accepted`: the example's parameters plus the founder's 2026-10-08 acceptance of
the key-cape request (owner and founder), with the custody-path derivation
covered by the type's acknowledgment (memo r4). It validates and renders (plan
`execution.permitted: false`; three attended steps on `key-cape-oidc-login`);
it needs `--allow-unimplemented` until it is live, since it is the case that
makes the type `implemented`. A test keeps it equal to the type's example.
Still open before it runs: ops-mason renders and builds it (MASON-WP-0010-T02,
T03, unblocked by T05), ops-warden plans and runs it (WARDEN-WP-0044-T02, T03),
railiance-platform's `keycape-client-secret-generate` lane (asked by ops-mason
`789feb39` and ops-warden `d9f889b1`, both unread), and a founder-approved
identity-provisioner rollout containing 630ebfd.

2026-10-09: identity-provisioner rolled out, founder-approved in session:
`main-630ebfd` (`sha256:bafb4860…`, built by the image workflow) replaces
`main-6c4fcaf` (`sha256:ffacd5d7…`; only change: 630ebfd, additive). Applied
with `kubectl set image` on the Deployment only (generation 17 → 18, 1/1 Ready);
the file's Service, NetworkPolicies and Ingress were not reapplied. Verified in
the pod: `ensure_service_groups` and `revoke_service_groups` present, `/readyz`
200; no token used, no group changed. Rollback: `kubectl -n sso set image
deploy/identity-provisioner provisioner=forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:ffacd5d790a5b7800e0535f3aa95b7de52c7a68e4f575b9192c3e1622fa672c2`.
The pin in `sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml` follows.

2026-10-09: ops-warden closed WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 and shipped `warden case plan`
(T02, message `06303d1d`); the accepted Forgejo case is refused until ops-mason
materializes it, and a materialized copy plans cleanly once
`keycape-client-secret-generate` exists. Its observation that `bind-env` carries
a literal `KEYCAPE_<CLIENT_ID>_CLIENT_SECRET`: the validator now renders a
`{param:env}` format spec (upper case, `-` as `_`, as `keycape-client.py`
derives the name) and rejects unknown specs, and follow-through and rollback
text is now checked for unknown placeholders too (patch-level, canon section 6).
The type keeps the literal until ops-warden's planner (`text.format`) renders the
spec as well; asked of ops-warden. 53 tests pass.

2026-10-10: ops-warden rendered `{param:env}` in `warden case plan`
(23ba584, message `c1df14b7`; other specs and `!conversion` refused). The type
adopts it as a 1.0 patch (canon section 6): `bind-env` and its rollback now read
`KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET`. ops-mason reports the Forgejo case
rendered and built (message `1ebddae9`; CCR drafts handed to railiance-platform),
so T06 now waits on the platform apply, the mint-secret lane and the attended
register-client session.

2026-10-10: key-cape adopted the type's custody path (key-cape ab5cccd, message
`88a4559c`): `docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml` and KEY-WP-0038-T02 name
`platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo`, field `CLIENT_SECRET`, delivered as
`sso/keycape-forgejo-client` through `external-secrets-keycape-forgejo`, and the
`forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client` proposal is withdrawn. This matches the type and
the Forgejo example; no change needed here.

2026-10-10: key-cape's type-composition review (key-cape 6038483, message
`8e5ed5f6`) found the composition sound with two blocking findings, taken as a
1.0 patch (stricter validation and documentation, canon section 6):
R1, redirect URIs now refuse `?` and `#` in the type pattern and in
`keycape-client.py`'s `REDIRECT` (KeyCape refuses `?` at startup and the single
replica would stop); R2, `allowed_scopes` always includes `groups`, the renderer
refuses `access_groups` without it, and `access_groups` now says the consumer
enforces the gate because KeyCape has none; R3, `mfa_required` "false" means the
per-user privacyIDEA policy; R4, register-client's justification records the
restart for every client, the quiet window, and that the rendered registry must
pass KeyCape's client validation before it. The accepted Forgejo case and both
examples still validate; 116 tests pass.
Open, needs a decision: R2's verification step that the consumer enforces the
group gate is a new verification step, hence 1.1 (minor), and the validator pins
cases to the exact type version, so the accepted 1.0 Forgejo case would need
re-pinning. Also open with key-cape: a KeyCape entry point that validates a
rendered client registry without starting the server; until then
`keycape-client.py` mirrors the redirect rule.

2026-10-10: founder go for 1.1, so no 1.0 run overlaps. The type adds
verification `consumer-enforces-groups`, and hand-over now requires the consumer
to enforce `access_groups` (minor, canon section 6; risk class unchanged, no new
acknowledgment; history in the type README). The accepted Forgejo case and both
examples are re-pinned to `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1` before any apply; the
acknowledgment intake keeps `@1.0` as the record of what was acknowledged.
ops-mason's build and ops-warden's case-ref digest predate this and need a
re-render.

2026-10-10: ops-mason re-rendered the Forgejo case from `@1.1` (message
`22c6bba6`; plan digest `af1f4f81…`, no collisions) and rebuilt the bundle. The
rendered OpenBao objects are identical to 1.0, so the already applied
CCR-2026-0041 stands; 1.1 changes only consumer-side steps. key-cape shipped
`keycape check-config` (c528daa, message `a7b0aeff`): KeyCape's startup checks
without secret values, including the new duplicate-clientId rule.
`keycape-client.py --check-config <binary>` now runs it on the live and the
proposed registry, fed on stdin, and apply refuses a proposed registry that
fails; register-client's entry point names the option (1.1 patch). The deployed
image predates c528daa, so the binary is built from key-cape source for now.
Before the next KeyCape rollout (Forgejo register-client or the CCR-2026-0018
window), the attended operator runs `inspect --check-config` so the live
registry is checked too.

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T07
status: wait
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T06]
blocking_reason: "The next types follow once the first one is proven end to end."
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "c3c9c3ae-4f23-5ba7-9e6f-e63bcf29b9f7"
```

### T07 — Queue the next types

From the T02 ranking, open the next type drafts (likely the confidential service
client and the workload KV read lane), each to be acknowledged on its own.
Record which existing hand-built instances get adopted as cases, without
rewriting them in place.

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T08
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8e519082-dc8b-5e46-b660-03d03e55dcf6"
```

### T08 — identity-provisioner: ensure service-access groups

The type's `ensure-groups` step calls `identity-provisioner groups ensure --groups
<list> --members <group=user+user;...>`. The provisioner already has idempotent
`_ensure_group` and `_add_group`, but exposes only tenant-scoped operations. Add
the general operation (create if absent, add the listed memberships, never
remove others), its rollback (remove only this case's memberships), tests, and
the ops-warden route for its service identity.

2026-10-08: done. `identity-provisioner/provisioner.py` gained
`ensure_service_groups` (`POST /v1/groups/ensure`) and `revoke_service_groups`
(`POST /v1/groups/revoke`), behind the existing service-token check. Names
matching `tenant*`, `netkingdom-*` and `lldap_*` are reserved; members must
already exist; everything is validated before any change; memberships are read
back before success; nothing else is ever removed; groups are deleted only when
asked and empty. 7 new tests (39 in the provisioner suite). The type's
`ensure-groups` step and its rollback now name these endpoints. The ops-warden
route for the provisioner's service token belongs to WARDEN-WP-0044-T01.

```task
id: NK-WP-0048-T09
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "0ee12dfc-8260-5038-bd39-cc7fb4113be0"
```

### T09 — The `keycape-client` entry point and its declaration

Planned first as key-cape KEY-WP-0038-T04. Moved here because the machinery a
live registration needs already lives in net-kingdom, where KeyCape is deployed
(`sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/`): the contained kubectl, the cluster-identity pin and the
issuer pin. A copy in key-cape would drift.

2026-10-08: done. `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py` derives the KeyCape
client record from a case (`client-from-case`). It adds or removes exactly one
client with the existing safeguards (byte-preserving merge, exact match or
refuse, shared-reference refusal, compare-and-swap, read-back, contained errors),
requires the Deployment env binding first for confidential clients, and requires
the case acceptance record for `apply` instead of a per-client founder decision
id. 15 tests, including a regression showing that the vergabe case reproduces
its hand-built registration exactly; all 71 helper tests pass. Declaration
`capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml` (contract
PASS, `maturity: implemented`) replaces key-cape's draft. The type now pins it,
and for confidential clients adds `deliver-secret` (delivery from custody into
the sso namespace) and `bind-env` (Deployment env), attended in the same session
as `register-client`. The per-client helpers stay until their clients are
adopted as cases.

2026-10-10 — NetKingdom owner review of the execution seam, source only:
ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c
was reviewed against INTENT, SecurityCase canon, acknowledged type1.1, current
case and owner source. docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md supports
the closed adapter/receipt direction with explicit versioned schema, structural
materialization provenance, unchanged caller/session boundaries, safe CAS
reconciliation and exact-created-object rollback requirements. This is owner
review, not approval. Supporting file digests are in the adjacent sources JSON.

Current source exposes a circular wait: ops-mason T03 waits on mint while Warden
and the broker refuse a non-materialized case. Structural acceptance therefore
needs its own native pinned receipt before mint, not a successful mint before
materialized. The platform broker additionally pins type1.0 while Forgejo is
accepted at1.1; platform-owner alignment and tests are required, not an unchecked
version bypass. T06 remains wait. No case/type lifecycle status, grant, authority
or live runtime changed by this review. A proposed informed-decision would
adopt the source contract only; native materialization and execution acceptance
stay distinct.

Final proposal re-review: staged Warden proposal SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c
adds only the explicitly local reducer appendix, not an accepted wire protocol
or executor. The exact-final review and sources JSON supersede the earlier
1035f049... proposal review. Platform staged the exact type1.1 broker correction
with ten fake-backend subprocess checks (script SHA256
9576cd211cfc06526ec4cc9bd0a5b06f0f59287a68931bb2d6e3592a951ddc7d).
The next source work is the versioned closed adapter/receipt/materialization
contract, not another relaxation of the broker's status gate. Native work still
requires installed broker provenance, structural reader receipts, exact new
materialized-case bytes, caller grant/session revocation and verified execution.
No installed/native acceptance is inferred from that staged correction.

2026-10-11 — new source-only type1.2 architecture acknowledgment:
Confirmed native founder ACCEPT of infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1
at06:47:39Z, approval8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765. Exact frozen packet
0b377d647ca748cd03c92f9792396412048055d4bde9f7bb06ff6d413f7acd68 and submission
585cee731de30d2b37883a57abfd9eb32f023ee694e8d911989109d5caf80569; native receipt
retained in docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/.
The complete acknowledged1.2 source package is isolated under
security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party; default loader and
current accepted1.1 case remain untouched because load_type is single-version.
The new proposed1.2 case is NOT accepted/materialized/live and has no acceptance
fields. Actual reference-migration design approval is a separate Apps owner
receipt; no1.1 approval is inherited. Source-recording review/test proof and exact
next gates are in docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md.
T06 remains wait and T07 remains its existing dependent task; type is NOT
implemented and no first-case/native grant or broader workplan finish is asserted.

2026-10-11 — bounded explicit version selection source preparation for T06:
The validator now offers optional exact version_roots/--version-root VERSION=PATH
selection with duplicate/mismatch/traversal/symlink refusal and no fallback. The
default1.1 source and historicalacceptedcase hashes/ordinaryrefusal/preparation
render stayunchanged; actual1.1 is acknowledged, not implemented. Acknowledged1.2
ordinaryadmission also refuses; optionalpreparation remains nonexecuting.43local
validatorchecks pass and original1.1 CLIrenderbytes match exactly. Makerproof:
docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json.
FormalNetownerreview/reference-source integration and all existing native adapter,
provenance/broker/materialization/attendedproof gates remain; T06 stayswait, no
new residual or firstcase/typeimplementation/native grant is inferred.