--- id: NET-WP-0021 type: workplan title: "Cut over NetKingdom identity to railiance01 and retire CoulombCore" domain: infotech repo: net-kingdom status: ready owner: codex topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-07-27" updated: "2026-07-27" --- # NET-WP-0021 - railiance01 identity cutover and CoulombCore retirement Move the authoritative lightweight NetKingdom identity stack from CoulombCore (`92.205.130.254`) to railiance01 (`92.205.62.239`) without losing users, groups, MFA enrollments, signing/encryption material, or the ability to roll back. The two servers currently run independent copies of KeyCape, Authelia, LLDAP, privacyIDEA, and `net-kingdom-pg`. Public KeyCape DNS already points to railiance01, while Authelia, LLDAP, and privacyIDEA DNS still points to CoulombCore. Retirement is forbidden until state equivalence, end-to-end login, backup restoration, and an observed rollback window pass. ## T01 - Freeze the migration contract and inventory both stacks ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T01 status: todo priority: high ``` Capture secret-free inventories of deployments, image digests, configuration keys, database schemas/counts, PVCs, ingress, certificates, backup schedules, DNS, and external consumers on both clusters. Identify the authoritative source for every state set and record expected maintenance/write-freeze behavior. Compare public JWKS fingerprints and all client registrations without printing private configuration. Done when every component and state owner has a source, destination, verification method, rollback source, and explicit decision on whether railiance01 is already equivalent or requires migration. ## T02 - Prove recoverable backups before changing state ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T02 status: wait priority: high ``` Create fresh, encrypted backups for CoulombCore LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA, `net-kingdom-pg`, KeyCape configuration/signing key, and required Kubernetes Secrets. Preserve privacyIDEA encryption material with its database. Validate backup manifests, checksums, custody, retention, and a non-production restore drill. Never emit secret values into Git, State Hub, logs, or chat. Done when restore evidence proves the migration can be reversed from independent custody. ## T03 - Reconcile persistent identity state onto railiance01 ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T03 status: wait priority: high ``` Under a bounded write freeze, compare and migrate the authoritative `net-kingdom-pg` data and any non-database LLDAP, Authelia, or privacyIDEA state. Preserve user/group identifiers, password hashes, MFA token serials, realms, resolver mappings, encryption keys, and audit-relevant timestamps. Do not blindly overwrite newer railiance01-only configuration such as the `rapp-qonto-client`; merge and verify it explicitly. Done when source/destination counts and semantic probes agree and restart tests pass on railiance01. ## T04 - Align configuration, secrets, and internal dependencies ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T04 status: wait priority: high ``` Reconcile KeyCape, Authelia, LLDAP, and privacyIDEA configuration and secret references on railiance01 through approved custody lanes. Verify KeyCape uses only railiance01 cluster-local dependencies, signing-key continuity is preserved, service clients remain registered, and no runtime dependency points back to CoulombCore. Done when an automated dependency graph and negative search prove there are no hidden CoulombCore runtime dependencies. ## T05 - Run full pre-cutover identity conformance ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T05 status: wait priority: high ``` Using TLS-preserving direct resolution to railiance01, verify health, discovery/JWKS, authorization-code + PKCE login, MFA, tenant/group/role claims, OpenBao OIDC login, `rapp-qonto` client credentials, wrong-secret and wrong-scope denial, logout/session behavior, and restart recovery. Include the platform-root and Binky tenant paths without exposing tokens. Done when all critical human and service flows pass and rollback criteria are machine-readable. ## T06 - Cut over remaining DNS with monitored rollback ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T06 status: wait priority: high ``` Lower TTL where needed and move `auth.coulomb.social`, `lldap.coulomb.social`, `pink.coulomb.social`, and `pink-account.coulomb.social` to `92.205.62.239`. Confirm certificate, ingress, resolver, and normal-DNS flows from multiple resolvers. Keep CoulombCore intact but prevent divergent writes during a defined observation window. Roll back DNS if critical authentication or MFA gates fail. Done when normal DNS consistently resolves to railiance01 and the observation window passes without fallback traffic or state divergence. ## T07 - Retire CoulombCore identity workloads reversibly ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T07 status: wait priority: high ``` After T01-T06, scale the old KeyCape, Authelia, LLDAP, and privacyIDEA deployments to zero and suspend old backup jobs/ingress. Preserve manifests, PVCs, database, Secrets, and encrypted final backup during a rollback retention period. Confirm no DNS, ingress, client, monitor, or traffic still targets the old services. Deletion of old workloads, PVCs, database clusters, or secret material is a separate destructive action permitted only after the retention period and an explicit recorded approval. Done when CoulombCore serves no identity traffic and remains recoverable during the retention window. ## T08 - Final deletion and closure ```task id: NET-WP-0021-T08 status: wait priority: medium ``` After explicit approval, expiry of the rollback retention window, and one successful railiance01 restore/restart drill, remove the retired CoulombCore identity resources and stale DNS/monitoring/configuration. Record what was deleted, backup retention, recovery limits, final topology, and operational runbooks. Run `statehub fix-consistency`. Done when railiance01 is the sole authoritative identity stack, all evidence is reconciled, and the workplan is marked finished. ## Safety gates - No retirement before a tested backup and restore path exists. - No database overwrite before authoritative-source and divergence analysis. - No privacyIDEA restore without its matching encryption material. - No normal-DNS cutover before direct-resolution end-to-end verification. - No PVC/database/Secret deletion as part of the reversible retirement step. - Final deletion always requires an explicit human approval distinct from DNS cutover approval.