#!/usr/bin/env bash
# gen-secrets.sh — generate all bootstrap secrets for the net-kingdom SSO/MFA platform
#
# Usage:
#   ./gen-secrets.sh [OUTPUT_DIR]
#
# Generates all pre-cluster secrets and writes them to OUTPUT_DIR (default: ./secrets).
# Output files are structured by component to mirror the KeePassXC entry layout.
#
# WARNING: The secrets/ directory must NEVER be committed to git.
#          After entering values into KeePassXC, shred the generated files:
#            find secrets/ -type f -exec shred -u {} \;
#
# PI_ENCFILE is NOT generated here — it must be produced inside the privacyIDEA
# container after deployment:
#   Follow ../k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md; do not generate missing recovery keys.
# Extract the resulting file, store it in KeePassXC as a binary attachment on the
# privacyIDEA/PI_ENCFILE entry, then create the k8s secret from it.

set +x
set -euo pipefail
umask 077

OUT_DIR="${1:-./secrets}"

if [[ -e "$OUT_DIR" || -L "$OUT_DIR" ]]; then
    echo "ERROR: $OUT_DIR already exists. Preserve it for reconciliation or choose a new path." >&2
    exit 1
fi

# Helpers
rnd_hex()  { openssl rand -hex  "$1"; }
rnd_b64()  { openssl rand -base64 "$1" | tr -d '\n/+=' | head -c "$2"; }

mkdir -p \
    "$OUT_DIR/privacyidea" \
    "$OUT_DIR/postgres" \
    "$OUT_DIR/lldap" \
    "$OUT_DIR/authelia" \
    "$OUT_DIR/keycape" \
    "$OUT_DIR/breakglass"

# ── privacyIDEA ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PI_SECRET_KEY="$(rnd_hex 32)"   # 64 hex chars — Flask/PI app secret
PI_PEPPER="$(rnd_hex 16)"       # 32 hex chars — password hashing pepper
PI_DB_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)"   # 40 printable chars — DB password
PI_ADMIN_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)"

cat > "$OUT_DIR/privacyidea/secrets.env" <<EOF
# privacyIDEA secrets — KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/privacyIDEA
# Entry: pi-admin          → username=pi-admin  password=PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD
# Entry: database          → username=privacyidea  password=PI_DB_PASSWORD
# Entry: SECRET_KEY        → password=PI_SECRET_KEY (no username)
# Entry: PI_PEPPER         → password=PI_PEPPER (no username)
# Entry: PI_ENCFILE        → binary attachment (generate AFTER container deploy)

PI_SECRET_KEY=$PI_SECRET_KEY
PI_PEPPER=$PI_PEPPER
PI_DB_PASSWORD=$PI_DB_PASS
PI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$PI_ADMIN_PASS

# PI_ENCFILE: generate with:
#   Follow ../k8s/privacyidea/KEY-RECOVERY.md; do not generate missing recovery keys.
#   Export existing keys with enckey-bootstrap.sh and an explicit private custody root.
# Then store pi.enc as a binary attachment in KeePassXC → net-kingdom/privacyIDEA/PI_ENCFILE
EOF

# ── PostgreSQL ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PG_ROOT_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)"
# privacyIDEA DB user reuses PI_DB_PASS (single source of truth)
# Note: no keycloak DB user — Keycloak was replaced by the Authelia+LLDAP+KeyCape stack.

cat > "$OUT_DIR/postgres/secrets.env" <<EOF
# PostgreSQL secrets — KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/PostgreSQL
# Entry: postgres root     → username=postgres  password=PG_ROOT_PASSWORD
# Entry: privacyidea user  → username=privacyidea  password=PI_DB_PASSWORD (copy from privacyIDEA entry)

PG_ROOT_PASSWORD=$PG_ROOT_PASS
# PI_DB_PASSWORD is in privacyidea/secrets.env — do NOT copy here; link in KeePassXC
EOF

# ── LLDAP ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
LLDAP_JWT_SECRET="$(rnd_hex 32)"       # 64 hex chars — LLDAP JWT signing key
LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # 40 printable chars — ld-admin, LLDAP's configured super-admin (sealed fallback)
# Per-consumer directory accounts (Service Identity SI-3, NK-WP-0054-T05). The human `admin`
# password is personal and is never generated into custody.
LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)"    # svc-authelia, read-only bind
LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)"     # svc-keycape, read-only bind
LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # svc-privacyidea, read-only resolver bind
LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # svc-provisioner, lldap_admin (exception SI-X6)

cat > "$OUT_DIR/lldap/secrets.env" <<EOF
# LLDAP secrets — KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/LLDAP
# Entry: jwt-secret        → password=LLDAP_JWT_SECRET (no username)
# Entry: ld-admin          → username=ld-admin  password=LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS
# Entries: svc-authelia, svc-keycape, svc-privacyidea, svc-provisioner → LLDAP_SVC_*_PASS
#
# Each consumer binds with its own account: apply-service-secrets.py (Authelia, provisioner),
# keycape/create-secrets.py and privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py read their key from this file.

LLDAP_JWT_SECRET=$LLDAP_JWT_SECRET
LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS=$LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS
LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS=$LLDAP_SVC_AUTHELIA_PASS
LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS=$LLDAP_SVC_KEYCAPE_PASS
LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS=$LLDAP_SVC_PRIVACYIDEA_PASS
LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS=$LLDAP_SVC_PROVISIONER_PASS
EOF

# ── Authelia ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET="$(rnd_hex 32)"           # 64 hex chars — session JWT signing
AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET="$(rnd_hex 32)"        # 64 hex chars — session cookie encryption
AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY="$(rnd_b64 48 64)" # 64 printable chars — SQLite encryption
AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET="$(rnd_hex 32)"      # 64 hex chars — OIDC HMAC
AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET="$(rnd_b64 32 40)" # 40 printable chars — Authelia→KeyCape OIDC client secret
# OIDC issuer private key: generated by authelia/create-secrets.sh on first run,
# or set AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE to a path below and generate with:
#   openssl genrsa -out secrets/authelia/oidc_private_key.pem 2048

cat > "$OUT_DIR/authelia/secrets.env" <<EOF
# Authelia secrets — KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/Authelia
# Entry: jwt-secret             → password=AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET (no username)
# Entry: session-secret         → password=AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET (no username)
# Entry: storage-encryption-key → password=AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (no username)
# Entry: oidc-hmac-secret       → password=AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET (no username)
# Entry: keycape-client-secret  → password=AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET (no username)
# Entry: oidc-private-key       → binary attachment oidc_private_key.pem
#
# AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET is the plaintext — authelia/create-secrets.sh hashes
# it with bcrypt before storing in the K8s Secret.
# The same plaintext goes into KeyCape's config as authelia.clientSecret.

AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET=$AUTHELIA_JWT_SECRET
AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET=$AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET
AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET=$AUTHELIA_OIDC_HMAC_SECRET
AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET=$AUTHELIA_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET
# AUTHELIA_OIDC_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE=  # leave blank — authelia/create-secrets.sh will generate
EOF

# ── KeyCape ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# KeyCape has no generated secrets here:
#   key.pem      — RSA signing key, generated by keycape/create-secrets.sh on first run
#   Factor JWT — delivered through RPF-WP-0040 ESO, never stored in this directory.
# We create the directory and a placeholder file so operators know to check it.

cat > "$OUT_DIR/keycape/secrets.env" <<EOF
# KeyCape secrets — KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/KeyCape
# Entry: jwt-signing-key   → binary attachment key.pem  (generated by keycape/create-secrets.sh)
# Factor credential: owner-managed ESO mount; no personal admin token.
#
# This file is a placeholder. No values to set here manually.
# First-bootstrap create-secrets.sh generates only a missing signing key.
EOF

# ── Break-glass ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
BG_PASS="$(rnd_b64 32 40)"

cat > "$OUT_DIR/breakglass/secrets.env" <<EOF
# Break-glass secrets — KeePassXC group: net-kingdom/Break-glass
# Entry: break-glass       → username=break-glass  password=BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD
# Entry: recovery-otp      → TOTP seed (enroll manually after Keycloak is up)

BREAKGLASS_PASSWORD=$BG_PASS
EOF

# Values and even prefixes must stay out of normal output and shell tracing.
printf '%s\n' 'Bootstrap service files generated with private permissions.'
printf '%s\n' 'Encrypt to the registered public age recipient, verify off-host recovery, then remove plaintext.'
printf '%s\n' 'Never paste these files into chat, logs, metadata or Git.'