audit-core assented to the approval evidence half with conditions and
corrected the rationale twice. Both corrections were against wording this
standard had taken from that repository's INTENT rather than its contract.
- §4 catalogues audit-core as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 named it
as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without listing it — a §11 defect in the standard
itself, which audit-core raised.
- §9.4 rationale rewritten to cite docs/integrity.md rather than INTENT
principle 6: an in-database chain detects a rewritten payload only if the
attacker does not recompute the suffix, which a database owner can, and even
with external attestation the store is not WORM or object lock. tamper
evidence is conditional on live preconditions.
- §9.4 gained emission atomicity as approval-engine's obligation, and the
prohibition on audit-core exposing an approval-validity query — a boundary
audit-core stated unprompted, applying §6.1 to itself.
- §9.6 added, estate-wide: evidence proves alteration and truncation, not
omission at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact and
verification reports intact. "The audit record proves it happened" is unsound
and is replaced with the sound form.
- §13 gained two gaps: stronger approval custody (unassigned — deciding whether
approvals need archival custody distinct from other sources is doctrine work
not yet done) and emission atomicity (approval-engine).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
tegwick
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