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+---
+id: user-engine-openbao-runtime-custody
+demand_source: net-kingdom/workplans/NK-WP-0023-T05
+consumer_repo: net-kingdom
+credential_type: openbao-approle-kv
+status: proposed
+created: "2026-07-30"
+updated: "2026-07-30"
+---
+
+# Construction plan: user-engine OpenBao runtime custody
+
+## 1. Demand
+
+The live portal edge marker and identity-provisioner service token are
+bootstrap Kubernetes Secrets without an authoritative rotation source.
+`user-engine` and `identity-provisioner` need the same runtime behavior with
+OpenBao as authority and External Secrets Operator as delivery mechanism.
+
+## 2. Existing-structure survey
+
+- `Secret/user-engine-runtime` in namespace `user-engine` contains only
+  `proxy-secret`.
+- `Secret/identity-provisioner-client` in namespace `user-engine` and
+  `Secret/identity-provisioner-token` in namespace `sso` carry the two copies
+  of the provisioner service token.
+- The applications already consume only Secret references; no code or
+  Deployment interface change is required.
+- The established `rapp-qonto` bridge proves that railiance01 External Secrets
+  must currently use AppRole against the OpenBao instance on CoulombCore;
+  railiance01 service-account tokens cannot use that instance's Kubernetes
+  auth mount.
+- Existing activity-core stores and policies are unrelated and must not be
+  widened or reused across this identity boundary.
+
+## 3. Proposed changes
+
+| # | Action | Object | Rationale |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | create | KV path `platform/workloads/user-engine/runtime` | One authoritative workload path with fields `PROXY_SECRET` and `PROVISIONER_TOKEN` |
+| 2 | create | policy `workload-kv-read-user-engine-runtime` | Read and metadata access only to the exact KV v2 path |
+| 3 | create | AppRoles `external-secrets-user-engine` and `external-secrets-sso-user-engine` | Separate revocable bootstrap identities for the two consuming namespaces |
+| 4 | deliver | AppRole bootstrap Secrets in `external-secrets` | Write-only Mason delivery; 15-minute tokens, 30-minute maximum, eight uses |
+| 5 | create | namespace-restricted ClusterSecretStores for `user-engine` and `sso` | Prevent either identity from becoming a general cross-namespace store |
+| 6 | create | three ExternalSecrets targeting the existing Secret names | Preserve application interfaces while changing authority |
+| 7 | migrate | existing values into the KV path through a wrapped platform-admin process | Read source and write destination in one process; never return either value |
+| 8 | verify | metadata, rollout, positive/negative authentication, and rotation rehearsal | Record field names, readiness, denial, and rollout only |
+| 9 | retire | manual Secret-copy/bootstrap procedure | ExternalSecret becomes the sole writer and rotation path |
+
+The migration does not mint a new application capability. It moves two
+existing values into governed custody. Same-cluster Kubernetes auth remains
+the target after OpenBao moves to reef-railiance.
+
+## 4. Review and optimization
+
+- Separate AppRoles avoid widening one namespace identity across `sso` and
+  `user-engine`.
+- Both policies resolve to one exact path, avoiding duplicate values and
+  divergent rotation.
+- Existing Secret names and keys remain stable, limiting rollout risk.
+- A wrapped migration process is required because printing, downloading, or
+  staging either value would create a new disclosure path.
+- Reversal deletes the ExternalSecrets/stores/AppRoles and restores the
+  protected pre-migration Secret snapshots during the bounded rollback window.
+- Rotation changes the OpenBao fields, waits for all three ExternalSecrets,
+  and rolls the provisioner and portal together; failed synchronization stops
+  before either Deployment changes.
+
+## 5. Executive summary
+
+**One-line ask:** approve moving the existing user-engine edge marker and
+provisioner token into one exact OpenBao workload path, delivered by two
+namespace-specific, revocable External Secrets AppRoles.
+
+**Who gets access:** only External Secrets through
+`external-secrets-user-engine` and `external-secrets-sso-user-engine`.
+Application pods continue to receive only their existing namespaced Secrets.
+
+**To what:** read-only access to exactly
+`platform/workloads/user-engine/runtime`; no sibling workload or tenant path.
+
+**For how long:** each AppRole login receives a 15-minute token with a
+30-minute maximum and eight uses. AppRole secret IDs persist for ESO continuity
+until rotated or same-cluster Kubernetes auth replaces the bridge.
+
+**Blast radius:** compromise permits impersonating the internal provisioner
+client and/or the portal trusted marker, but grants no direct OpenBao sibling
+read, directory administrator password, user password, MFA seed, or platform
+role. Revoke both AppRole secret IDs, rotate both runtime values, and roll the
+two workloads.
+
+**Cost to reverse:** delete three ExternalSecrets, two stores, two AppRoles,
+their bootstrap Secrets, and one exact policy/path; restore the protected
+pre-migration Kubernetes Secret snapshots. No database or identity record
+changes.
+
+**Decision needed:** approve as proposed, reject, or return with changes.
+Approval authorizes custody migration and bounded rotation rehearsal, never
+printing or otherwise disclosing either value.