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8 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
e5b72a6b30 MASON-WP-0015-T02/T03: construct grant installed and probed; Scaleway placeholders created
All 31 live probes pass on the stored policy (sha256 969d7aae). The repo file
is trimmed to the stored bytes. platform/suppliers/scaleway/{bootstrap,backup,
mas-tem-relay} created at v1 with placeholders, values never read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 64827407-e196-4ce3-b70c-76e7b537493f
2026-10-18 12:04:12 +02:00
482a08b40e MASON-WP-0015-T03: deny comma-string token_policies in ops-mason-construct
Live probe showed token_policies=workload-kv-read-x,default passes the
workload-kv-read-* glob as one string. Login denies held; this closes the
role-policy limit. Reinstall required.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 64827407-e196-4ce3-b70c-76e7b537493f
2026-10-18 11:59:04 +02:00
e7a368af0f MASON-IN-0005: restore ops-mason as the OpenBao builder (ops-mason-construct)
Founder decision 2026-10-18, "build, but never log in": a plan-scoped grant
that writes workload-kv-read-* policies, external-secrets-* and AppRole role
definitions, and create-only placeholder KV under platform/{workloads,suppliers},
and denies role-id, secret-id, token creation and all value reads, so the
MASON-IN-0004 chain stays broken. Adds bao-session.sh build, policy tests,
INTENT/AGENTS alignment and MASON-WP-0015. Not installed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 64827407-e196-4ce3-b70c-76e7b537493f
2026-10-18 11:48:27 +02:00
2ef0101412 WP-0009-T05 invariant (ii) verified; survey policy covers keycape-services roles; Forgejo plan re-rendered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 55028ae3-4914-4bd1-8f5c-815f3527aef0
2026-10-10 14:13:02 +02:00
6b177270d3 Replace ops-mason-build with read-only ops-mason-survey grant (MASON-IN-0004)
Founder decision 2026-10-07, option (c)+(a): ops-mason surveys and verifies
only. Policy/role writes, secret-id minting and token creation go through the
founder-attended railiance-platform delegated applier. ops-mason-build retired
to policies/retired/ (never installed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 769b1afd-4330-4c86-96b2-e510e26db42b
2026-10-07 10:44:24 +02:00
d020413d7a feat(mason): describe stored credentials, and stop the grant rewriting itself
custody-inventory.py walks operators/ and platform/workloads/, prints
each path's description, owner, consumers and recovery path, and marks
any missing them. Metadata only, never a value, so it runs under
ops-mason-build and can be handed to anyone orienting themselves. First
run: 21 paths, 17 undescribed.

Described the four this session touched, including on_loss — the field
whose absence meant the LLDAP predecessor's recovery path had to be
worked out from first principles while locked out.

ops-mason-build gains create/update on */metadata/*, since a description
is documentation rather than a value. delete stays absent: deleting a
metadata entry destroys every version of the secret beneath it.

It also now denies itself sys/policies/acl/ops-mason-build. Without that
the policy was advisory — a token that can write policies can delete its
own denials, so the claim that OpenBao enforces "never read a value" was
not true as written. An exact path outranks the glob, so changing what
ops-mason may do is now an operator act, visible as one in the audit log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 15463ccf-238f-4e13-b163-93aa25c6d166
2026-08-28 11:43:08 +02:00
7bd230c06a feat(mason): operators/ custody mount and its access policy
operators/ enabled as KV v2; operator-custody grants read/write on it.

Kept separate from platform-admin rather than folded in, though that
would have been one stanza. platform-admin lists the mounts an
administrator operates *on*; operators/ is the one mount an
administrator keeps things *in*. Separating them lets custody move
independently of administration, which is what the S6 trust stage
(two-of-three independent recovery control) requires and which cannot be
retrofitted once the grant is buried inside platform-admin.

Delete is deliberately absent from the policy. A credential is retired
by writing its successor, and KV v2 keeps the prior version — the
history that did not exist when the LLDAP predecessor was overwritten in
a browser password manager on 2026-08-27 and lost for good.

ops-mason-build verified behaviourally, not just by capability strings:
metadata reads succeed, `kv get` on the forge token returns permission
denied, and enabling a mount returns permission denied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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2026-08-28 11:18:06 +02:00
f90644e8c0 feat(mason): scoped, named OpenBao sessions instead of borrowing yours
Handing an agent an operator session gives it everything you have, for
as long as you have it, and every action lands in the audit log as you.

scripts/bao-session.sh grant <task> mints a separate token into
~/.claude-bao-token — your ~/.vault-token is untouched and the two
revoke independently. 45 minutes, max one hour, display_name
claude-<task> so an audited action is attributable to a piece of work.

policies/ops-mason-build.hcl is what makes the scope real. It allows the
phase-2 survey (sys/mounts, sys/auth, policy list), policy and auth-role
creation, KV metadata reads, and short-lived test tokens for positive
and negative capability checks. It denies every read of */data/* on
platform, operators and secret.

That denial is the point: SCOPE.md says ops-mason never touches secret
values, and until now that was a promise kept by whoever was driving.
An explicit deny outranks any grant, including one added to this policy
later by mistake. The one time the line was crossed is recorded in
plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md §8; under this policy it would
have been refused rather than recorded.

sys/mounts/* is deliberately absent — enabling a mount is a
railiance-platform act, and a grant that needed it should be recognised
as a broader thing rather than folded in here.

Also fixes the WSL2 login trap: bao login's browser launch fails under
gio, so the script prints the URL plainly instead of appearing to hang.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3377672@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 15463ccf-238f-4e13-b163-93aa25c6d166
2026-08-28 11:04:26 +02:00