# ops-mason-construct — build security structure; never become what it builds.
#
# Founder decision 2026-10-18 (MASON-IN-0005, supersedes the read-only
# resolution of MASON-IN-0004): ops-mason is the builder (INTENT.md, phase 4).
# It creates, changes and tears down policies, auth roles and KV structure
# for an approved construction plan. ops-warden routes to what it built.
#
# How the MASON-IN-0004 escalation stays closed: that chain was
# write policy -> bind role -> read role-id -> mint secret-id -> log in.
# This grant keeps the first two steps (the job) and holds none of the steps
# that turn a role into a login: no role-id, no secret-id, no token creation,
# no KV value reads. ops-mason can build a lane but cannot use one. The
# remaining risk, a built policy broader than its plan, is caught after the
# fact by a post-build check, policy text vs plan file (MASON-WP-0015-T04), and the
# audit log (display_name claude-*).
#
# Granted only by the founder's own OIDC session through
#   GRANT_POLICY=ops-mason-construct ./scripts/bao-session.sh grant <plan-task>
# as a 45-minute named token, after the plan is approved. Survey-only sessions
# keep using ops-mason-survey.
#
# Path priority (same note as ops-mason-survey.hcl): within one policy the most
# specific path wins, and a `+` segment loses to a literal one. The denies below
# are literal or more specific than the grants they bound.
#
# allowed_parameters: OpenBao matches a comma string ("workload-kv-read-x,default")
# against the glob as one value before splitting it (MASON-WP-0015-T03 probe,
# 2026-10-18), so token_policies containing a comma is denied outright. A JSON
# list is checked element by element; pass several policies that way.

# --- everything the survey grant can read -----------------------------------
path "sys/mounts" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

path "sys/auth" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

path "sys/policies/acl" {
  capabilities = ["list"]
}

path "auth/approle/role" {
  capabilities = ["list"]
}

path "auth/netkingdom/role/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

path "auth/jwt/role/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

path "auth/keycape-services/role/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

path "operators/metadata/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

path "sys/capabilities" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}

path "sys/capabilities-self" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}

path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}

# Every policy stays readable for the survey and for verification.
path "sys/policies/acl/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

# --- build: workload read policies ------------------------------------------
# The lane convention (railiance-platform/openbao/policies). Content is not
# constrainable in OpenBao; the post-build check compares it with the plan.
path "sys/policies/acl/workload-kv-read-*" {
  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete"]
}

# --- build: Kubernetes auth roles for External Secrets ----------------------
# Role may carry only workload-kv-read-* policies; legacy `policies` refused.
path "auth/kubernetes/role/external-secrets-*" {
  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]

  allowed_parameters = {
    "token_policies" = ["workload-kv-read-*"]
    "*"              = []
  }

  denied_parameters = {
    "policies"       = []
    "token_policies" = ["*,*"]
  }
}

path "auth/kubernetes/role/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

# --- build: AppRole role definitions (never credentials) --------------------
# Definition only. role-id and secret-id are denied below, so an AppRole
# lane's credential delivery stays a founder act.
path "auth/approle/role/+" {
  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete"]

  allowed_parameters = {
    "token_policies" = ["workload-kv-read-*"]
    "*"              = []
  }

  denied_parameters = {
    "policies"       = []
    "token_policies" = ["*,*"]
  }
}

# --- build: KV structure on the platform mount ------------------------------
# create without read/update: a new path can get placeholder values (`xxx`),
# an existing value can be neither read nor overwritten.
path "platform/data/workloads/*" {
  capabilities = ["create"]
}

path "platform/data/suppliers/*" {
  capabilities = ["create"]
}

# Describe, inventory and tear down paths (custom_metadata, metadata delete).
path "platform/metadata/workloads/*" {
  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]
}

path "platform/metadata/suppliers/*" {
  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]
}

path "platform/metadata/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}

# --- the grant cannot widen itself or every token ---------------------------
path "sys/policies/acl/ops-mason-construct" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "sys/policies/acl/ops-mason-survey" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "sys/policies/acl/default" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "sys/policies/acl/root" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

# --- never become what it builds ---------------------------------------------
path "auth/approle/role/+/role-id" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/approle/role/+/secret-id" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/approle/role/+/secret-id/*" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/approle/role/+/secret-id-accessor/*" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/approle/role/+/custom-secret-id" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/token/create" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/token/create/*" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "auth/token/create-orphan" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

# --- never read a value --------------------------------------------------------
path "platform/data/*" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "operators/data/*" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

path "secret/data/*" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}

# Not granted, on purpose: sys/mounts/* and sys/auth/* (no new mounts or auth
# methods), auth/token/revoke (other tokens), operators/ and secret/ writes,
# any policy outside workload-kv-read-*, any role outside the two shapes above.