---
id: rapp-qonto-openbao-approle-bridge
demand_source: reef-railiance/workplans/REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-T01
consumer_repo: rapp-qonto
credential_type: openbao-approle-kv
status: built
approved_by: Bernd Worsch
approved_at: "2026-07-27"
created: "2026-07-27"
updated: "2026-08-22"
---

# Construction plan: rapp-qonto OpenBao AppRole bridge

## 1. Demand

`rapp-qonto` needs non-interactive, read-only delivery of the existing Binky
Qonto API credential from `tenants/binky/qonto-api` into its dedicated
Kubernetes namespace. External Secrets Operator should authenticate directly
to OpenBao and mint short-lived tokens; neither the application nor a
ClusterSecretStore should hold a long-lived OpenBao token.

## 2. Existing-structure survey

Live OpenBao state was checked on 2026-07-27:

- auth mounts include `kubernetes/`; its configured API endpoint is the
  cluster-local `https://10.43.0.1:443`;
- existing Kubernetes roles are `external-secrets-activity-core`,
  `external-secrets-issue-core`, and `external-secrets-reuse-surface`;
- policy `workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api` already exists and is scoped to
  the existing tenant credential;
- the `tenants/` KV v2 mount and `tenants/binky/qonto-api` value already
  exist; this plan does not create or read the value;
- existing cluster stores use an interim static-token pattern, despite the
  Kubernetes roles existing;
- `CCR-2026-0009` proposed a duplicate
  `workload-kv-read-qonto-assistant` policy and the transitional
  `qonto-assistant` namespace/name.

Topology verification established that this OpenBao instance runs on
Coulombcore while the consumer runs on railiance01. Its existing Kubernetes
auth mount validates Coulombcore service-account tokens and cannot validate a
railiance01 token. A cross-cluster Kubernetes auth mount would additionally
require stable TokenReview API reachability and a reviewer identity across the
cluster boundary.

The existing read policy satisfies the requested data scope exactly. Reuse it;
do not create the duplicate policy from CCR-2026-0009. Use a dedicated AppRole
as a transitional bridge because it does not couple authentication to the
wrong Kubernetes API. Retain same-cluster Kubernetes workload authentication
as the target when secret custody and workload placement are unified.

## 3. Proposed changes

| # | Action | Object | Reuse-vs-new rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | reuse | policy `workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api` | Already grants the exact required read scope; a second equivalent policy adds drift without isolation |
| 2 | create | AppRole `external-secrets-rapp-qonto` | Dedicated non-human bridge; policy #1, token TTL 15 minutes, maximum TTL 30 minutes, bounded token uses |
| 3 | deliver | Kubernetes Secret `external-secrets/openbao-rapp-qonto-approle` | Holds only the AppRole role ID and secret ID for ESO; created through the approved Mason delivery path, never committed or logged |
| 4 | create | `ClusterSecretStore/openbao-rapp-qonto` | Uses AppRole #2 and secret #3 against the `tenants` KV v2 mount; namespace condition permits only `rapp-qonto` |
| 5 | modify | `rapp-qonto` ExternalSecret | Map remote fields `API_USER` -> `QONTO_LOGIN` and `API_KEY` -> `QONTO_SECRET_KEY`; no values enter Git or logs |
| 6 | retire | proposed `openbao-qonto-assistant` static-token store | Superseded before deployment; avoids a long-lived OpenBao token in a Kubernetes Secret |
| 7 | propose | ops-warden catalog entry `rapp-qonto-workload-kv` | Pointer to the built AppRole lane, `warden_executes: false`, initially `draft` |
| 8 | record | migration residual | Replace the AppRole bridge with same-cluster Kubernetes auth when OpenBao custody or workload placement is unified |

No underlying Qonto secret is created, changed, printed, or rotated.

## 4. Review notes

- **Naming:** steady-state `rapp-qonto` names replace the migration-only
  `qonto-assistant` names.
- **TTL/scoping:** 15-minute tokens match existing External Secrets roles;
  maximum TTL is 30 minutes and token uses are bounded. The
  ClusterSecretStore condition restricts consumers to one namespace.
- **Redundancy:** reuses the exact existing policy. This removes the duplicate
  policy proposed by CCR-2026-0009.
- **Compaction:** the draft static-token Qonto store is retired before it is
  deployed. Existing unrelated stores are untouched.
- **Consumer usability:** External Secrets performs authentication and
  delivery. The application consumes only a namespaced Kubernetes Secret.
- **Posture:** the lane accesses a high-risk bank credential, but it is
  read-only and the runtime exposes no financial write operation. Production
  still requires egress, audit, revocation, and failure-domain gates.
- **Credential custody:** the AppRole secret ID is a revocable bootstrap
  credential held only in a namespaced Kubernetes Secret accessible to ESO.
  It is not a Qonto credential and never enters Git, workplans, audit events,
  command output, or chat.
- **Migration:** this bridge is intentionally transitional. A cross-cluster
  TokenReview dependency is rejected for now because it expands networking,
  reviewer-identity, and failure-domain coupling.

## 5. Executive summary

**One-line ask:** allow External Secrets on railiance01 to use a dedicated,
revocable AppRole bridge to deliver the existing Binky Qonto read credential
to `rapp-qonto`, issuing only short-lived OpenBao tokens.

**Who/what gets access:** a new AppRole named
`external-secrets-rapp-qonto`. Its bootstrap identity is stored in
`external-secrets/openbao-rapp-qonto-approle` and referenced only by the
dedicated ClusterSecretStore. No application pod, human role, or unrelated
store receives the identity.

**To what:** read-only access through the existing
`workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api` policy to exactly
`tenants/binky/qonto-api`. Store use is limited to ExternalSecret resources in
the `rapp-qonto` namespace.

**For how long:** each AppRole login receives a 15-minute OpenBao token with a
30-minute maximum and bounded uses. The revocable AppRole secret ID persists
for ESO continuity until rotated or the bridge is retired; no OpenBao token
persists in Kubernetes.

**Blast radius if the identity is abused:** an attacker able to read the
AppRole bootstrap Secret could mint bounded, short-lived tokens and read the
Binky Qonto API credential. The OpenBao policy cannot read any sibling tenant
secret. Revoke/rotate the AppRole secret ID immediately; rotate the downstream
Qonto key too if it may have been read.

**Cost to reverse:** delete one AppRole, its bootstrap Kubernetes Secret, one
ClusterSecretStore, and the `rapp-qonto` ExternalSecret/derived Secret. The
existing human Qonto lane and underlying credential remain intact.

**Decision needed:** approve as proposed, reject, or send back to phase 1 with
changes. Approval authorizes the structural access lane only, never disclosure
or modification of the Qonto credential value.

**Previous decision:** the Kubernetes-auth design was approved by Bernd Worsch
on 2026-07-27. That approval does not authorize this revised AppRole design.

## 6. Build result

Build attempted 2026-07-27 and stopped during verification. The OpenBao role
was created, but the store login returned 403. Live topology inspection showed
that `bao.coulomb.social` resolves to Coulombcore (`92.205.130.254`), while the
ESO service account token belongs to railiance01 (`92.205.62.239`). The
existing `kubernetes/` auth mount therefore validates a different cluster.

The failed ClusterSecretStore, ExternalSecret, disposable namespace, and
mis-targeted OpenBao role were removed without reading a secret value. No live
object from the failed build remains.

The revised phase-2 recommendation is alternative 2: use the dedicated
AppRole bridge described above until the OpenBao/cluster boundary is unified.
The revised plan was explicitly approved by Bernd Worsch on 2026-07-27
(`go on`). Phase 4 may proceed.

## 7. Revised build result

Built and verified on 2026-07-27 through
`ops_mason.executor.build_approle_kv_lane`:

- reused policy `workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api`, scoped to exactly
  `tenants/binky/qonto-api`;
- created AppRole `external-secrets-rapp-qonto` with 15-minute token TTL,
  30-minute maximum TTL, eight token uses, and a revocable secret ID;
- delivered the role ID and secret ID directly into Kubernetes Secret
  `external-secrets/openbao-rapp-qonto-approle`; temporary local and remote
  delivery files were removed;
- created namespace-restricted
  `ClusterSecretStore/openbao-rapp-qonto`;
- synchronized `ExternalSecret/rapp-qonto` into
  `Secret/rapp-qonto-runtime`.

Metadata-only live verification reported the store `Valid`, the
ExternalSecret `SecretSynced`, and exactly two keys in the derived Secret. No
credential value was read, printed, committed, or recorded.

The bridge remains transitional. Replace it with same-cluster Kubernetes
authentication when OpenBao custody and workload placement are unified.