diff --git a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0034-layer-model-v07-conformance.md b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0034-layer-model-v07-conformance.md
index 7d779ab..81a8f19 100644
--- a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0034-layer-model-v07-conformance.md
+++ b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0034-layer-model-v07-conformance.md
@@ -198,6 +198,36 @@ current access-engine implementation, received the decision-lifetime semantics
 question (message `02c99a74`). No implementation or policy decision was assigned
 to another owner by these messages.
 
+**One of three answered, 2026-09-09.** `flex-auth` answered the decision-lifetime
+question as `FLEX-DEC-2026-004` (flex-auth commit `6a6464f`), and answered it
+rather than declining it: a decision lifetime shorter than the certificate TTL is
+meaningful, but only as authority to **issue**, never as authority to **use** an
+already-issued certificate. The action is `sign` and it completes at issuance, so
+the decision is consumed once the certificate exists and no field in the decision
+record reaches the artifact. 15m against a 48h `adm` certificate was never an
+inconsistency to reconcile — the question mistook a decision lifetime for a
+credential lifetime.
+
+Two obligations land on this side and are accepted: no replay of an allow past
+`expires_at`, and a fresh Check per sign. The second is where the value is, and it
+is real rather than nominal because claims are not cached PDP-side (deadline 0 for
+the claim class), so a revoked principal stops obtaining *new* certificates
+immediately.
+
+`pep-stance.yaml` §9.7.2 is unchanged and stays here: flex-auth explicitly declined
+to move the residue to their side, on the ground that a PDP recalling an issued
+credential would be "the same shape of lie as fail-open". Declining it was the
+right call even though absorbing it would have made their record look tidier.
+
+The TTL lever they named — capping requested TTL per actor class or zone, already a
+policy input since `ttl_out_of_bounds` is denied before OpenBao is reached — is
+noted and deliberately not requested. Shortening `adm` from 48h has an operator
+cost, and issuance on this lane is too sparse (3 signature records across 79 days,
+`pep-stance.yaml` `emission_cadence`) to price it from intuition.
+
+T05 stays `wait` on the remaining two: `ops-mason` (no stance map published) and
+`railiance-infra` (KRL distribution versus TTL expiry). Neither has replied.
+
 ## Related
 
 Review 2026-09-05: reviewed the pending implementation and fixed the identity
diff --git a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0037-whynot-design-forgejo-npm-lane.md b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0037-whynot-design-forgejo-npm-lane.md
index a1db405..38a4d5b 100644
--- a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0037-whynot-design-forgejo-npm-lane.md
+++ b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0037-whynot-design-forgejo-npm-lane.md
@@ -79,3 +79,33 @@ authenticated exact-version lookup proved that Forgejo's remote integrity
 matches the local dry-run. T03 waits only on rotating the dedicated package
 token and proving the next fresh version through `whynot-design-npm-publish`;
 the package migration itself is complete.
+
+**2026-09-09 — field claim corrected, path routed.** `secrets-engine` (msg
+`15f0c0ca`) corrected two things and declined a third, all correctly.
+
+The KV field is `npm_token`. `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` is the environment variable their
+publication-scope policy injects, and ops-warden had copied the env var in as the
+field name — so the catalog's `fetch_command` named a field that does not exist
+and could only ever have failed. Corrected in `registry/routing/catalog.yaml` and
+`wiki/playbooks/whynot-design-npm-publish.md` from the owner's statement rather
+than re-derived here. This was `ADR-0001`'s failure mode rather than a typo: a
+pointer layer restating an owner's procedure and getting a detail wrong.
+
+The endpoint claim already agreed; `delivery_config.npm.registry` has been the
+Forgejo URL throughout.
+
+The **path** is routed to `railiance-platform` and the catalog is unchanged pending
+their answer. Which location backs the lane for reads is custody state they own;
+`secrets-engine` has no lane read authority to confirm it and refused to rewrite a
+production lane pointer from a coordination message (`SECRETS-WP-0006-T06`). Their
+reasoning is right, and asserting our own pointer is authoritative because it is
+ours would route around it. The ask names a location only and flags that a
+`bao kv get` answer would be the 2026-07-16 disclosure vector on a `risk: high`
+lane.
+
+`ready: false` is not being read as path evidence: a source checkout with no
+production authority reports not-ready regardless of which path the catalog names.
+
+T03 still waits on the human rotation of the dedicated Forgejo package token; the
+path question does not block that, it determines whether the pointer is correct
+once it rotates.
diff --git a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0039-explicit-policy-refusal.md b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0039-explicit-policy-refusal.md
index bda2c13..5476108 100644
--- a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0039-explicit-policy-refusal.md
+++ b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0039-explicit-policy-refusal.md
@@ -74,3 +74,31 @@ authorized by this workplan alone. HFACT-WP-0001-T03 consumes this return.
 Validation: 429 tests passed (4 integration tests deselected by the repository default); Ruff passed for changed Python files. Full tests used the declared phase-memory source and an isolated temporary memory store. The focused policy/proxy suite passed 69 tests. The existing authenticated SSH policy probe still returns HTTP 200/ALLOW, decision:f3f7c88f9585582a; the credential-owner request returns 403. No CA issue or credential read was performed by these probes.
 
 Installed verification: source guard present after refreshed owner installation (`19bb75c`). `warden access forgejo-admin-api-token --exec --field API_TOKEN -- true` exits 4 with explicit HTTP 403 before credential transport or child execution. The previous fail-open warning is absent. The probe requested no output value; no credential was fetched. T01/T02 are complete; T03 owns the remaining exact policy-binding admission.
+
+**T03 routed 2026-09-09.** Asked `flex-auth` whether an admitted contract exists
+for a delegated credential read where the caller (ops-warden) and the resource
+owner differ, since that is exactly the shape drawing the live 403. Three outcomes
+were named as equally acceptable answers, with no preference stated between the
+first two: an existing contract to conform to; no contract yet, making this a
+design question they should raise rather than one ops-warden invents a shape for;
+or that there should be **no** such contract — the interim proxy transport is
+itself the defect and the answer is to finish the native handoff
+(`WARDEN-WP-0033` / `SECRETS-WP-0006`).
+
+The third is a real possibility and was not argued against. Eleven catalog lanes
+are ops-warden proxies with a named intended owner precisely because no owner
+front door exists; if delegated reads should not be made policy-admissible, that
+shortens WP-0033 rather than blocking it.
+
+Two fixes were explicitly ruled out in the message rather than left unmentioned:
+broadening the ops-warden caller binding so it may read other systems' resources,
+and relabelling `resource.system` as ops-warden so the existing binding matches.
+The second is worse — it would make the audit trail assert ops-warden owns
+credentials it deliberately does not, which is the claim `ADR-0002` exists to
+prevent, achieved by editing a field instead of making an argument.
+
+The refusal stays in place until an answer yields positive evidence plus
+wrong-caller, wrong-owner and wrong-tenant negatives. No grant was requested.
+`secrets-engine` was told this bears on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 and on how many lanes
+stay proxied; `gate-house` was told it may reach how the signing lane's
+approval-consume is built (GH-DEC-2026-005).