Fix attended login result auditing and reconcile blocked workplans
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Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0e6ef-4273-7fc2-8741-dc96b3e5fe0d
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-28 09:44:49 +02:00
parent 940e164c9b
commit 4c3a0f4d3a
11 changed files with 260 additions and 32 deletions

View file

@ -1212,6 +1212,7 @@ def _access_proxy(
goes to stderr so --fetch stdout carries only the secret.
"""
from warden.proxy import (
AttendedLoginError,
ProxyError,
build_wrapped_fetch,
caller_auth_present,
@ -1350,6 +1351,8 @@ def _access_proxy(
f"[dim]proxy {action}: {entry.id} → {entry.owner_repo} "
f"(caller identity; value not persisted)[/dim]"
)
rc = 10 if is_login else 5
outcome = "login_failed" if is_login else "error"
try:
if is_login:
rc = proxy_attended_login_exec(resolved, child_argv=child_argv)
@ -1381,9 +1384,12 @@ def _access_proxy(
rc = 0
else:
rc = proxy_fetch(resolved)
outcome = "ok" if rc == 0 else "error"
except ProxyError as e:
if isinstance(e, AttendedLoginError):
rc, outcome = e.exit_code, e.outcome
err.print(f"[red]{e}[/red]")
raise typer.Exit(5)
raise typer.Exit(rc)
finally:
try:
write_audit(
@ -1393,6 +1399,8 @@ def _access_proxy(
domain=domain,
action=action,
decision_id=decision_id,
exit_code=rc,
outcome=outcome,
)
except OSError as e:
err.print(f"[yellow]audit write failed:[/yellow] {e}")
@ -1564,6 +1572,10 @@ def access(
f" {label:<8} : [dim]{proxy} --exec -- <reviewed-command>[/dim] "
"[yellow](contained login + command; output suppressed)[/yellow]"
)
console.print(
" contract : reviewed command must be silent; any stdout/stderr "
"fails closed. Redirect both streams inside the reviewed command."
)
else:
console.print(
f" {label:<8} : [dim]{proxy} --fetch[/dim] "

View file

@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ class ProxyError(Exception):
"""Raised when a proxy fetch cannot be performed safely."""
class AttendedLoginError(ProxyError):
"""Value-free phase result for the attended command envelope."""
def __init__(self, message: str, *, exit_code: int, outcome: str):
super().__init__(message)
self.exit_code = exit_code
self.outcome = outcome
def _has_shell_pipe(cmd: str) -> bool:
"""True when ``cmd`` contains an unquoted shell pipe operator."""
in_single = in_double = False
@ -144,6 +153,7 @@ def write_audit(
action: str,
decision_id: Optional[str],
exit_code: Optional[int] = None,
outcome: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Path:
"""Append a metadata-only audit record. Never contains a secret value (G2)."""
state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@ -157,6 +167,7 @@ def write_audit(
"subject": os.environ.get("WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT", "").strip() or "operator",
"policy_decision_id": decision_id,
"exit_code": exit_code,
"outcome": outcome or ("ok" if exit_code in (None, 0) else "error"),
}
record.update(recording_time())
with log_path.open("a") as f:
@ -171,10 +182,11 @@ def write_audit(
subject=record["subject"],
target=need_id,
decision_id=decision_id,
outcome="ok" if exit_code in (None, 0) else "error",
outcome=record["outcome"],
source="access",
owner_repo=owner_repo,
domain=domain,
exit_code=exit_code,
)
except Exception:
pass
@ -443,9 +455,10 @@ def proxy_attended_login_exec(
resolved.argv[0], env=env, possible_output=login_output
)
status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
raise ProxyError(
raise AttendedLoginError(
"attended login failed closed before command handoff; any possible "
f"issued session was contained and {status}"
f"issued session was contained and {status}",
exit_code=10, outcome="login_failed",
)
try:
@ -455,23 +468,33 @@ def proxy_attended_login_exec(
resolved.argv[0], env=env, possible_output=b""
)
status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
raise ProxyError(
"attended command could not start; the login session was " + status
raise AttendedLoginError(
"attended command could not start; the login session was " + status,
exit_code=11, outcome="child_failed",
) from exc
child_output = _output_bytes(child)
revoked = _revoke_contained(
resolved.argv[0], env=env, possible_output=child_output
)
if child.returncode != 0 or child_output.strip():
# Even whitespace is output. The separator added by _output_bytes is not.
if child.stdout or child.stderr:
status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
raise ProxyError(
"attended command failed closed because it returned a failure or "
f"unexpected output; the login session was {status}"
raise AttendedLoginError(
"attended command produced output; reviewed commands must remain "
f"silent (redirect both streams); the login session was {status}",
exit_code=12, outcome="child_output",
)
if child.returncode != 0:
status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
raise AttendedLoginError(
f"attended command exited non-zero; the login session was {status}",
exit_code=11, outcome="child_failed",
)
if not revoked:
raise ProxyError(
"attended command completed but session revocation could not be confirmed"
raise AttendedLoginError(
"attended command completed but session revocation could not be confirmed",
exit_code=13, outcome="revoke_unconfirmed",
)
return 0
finally:
@ -480,7 +503,11 @@ def proxy_attended_login_exec(
if root_created:
root.rmdir()
except OSError as exc:
raise ProxyError("attended login private storage cleanup failed") from exc
raise AttendedLoginError(
"attended login private storage cleanup failed; inspect the prior phase "
"before retrying the reviewed command",
exit_code=14, outcome="cleanup_failed",
) from exc
def _capture_value(resolved: ResolvedFetch) -> str: