Fix attended login result auditing and reconcile blocked workplans

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0e6ef-4273-7fc2-8741-dc96b3e5fe0d

pep-stance.yaml

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ on_apply:
 # a register that cannot detect its own staleness is only as good as the last
 # re-measure, and this one was stale by eight lanes before the test caught it.
 classification_coverage:
-  measured: "2026-09-21"
+  measured: "2026-09-28"
   attribution: self-measured
   signing_targets:
     resolved: 0

src/warden/cli.py

@@ -1212,6 +1212,7 @@ def _access_proxy(
     goes to stderr so --fetch stdout carries only the secret.
     """
     from warden.proxy import (
+        AttendedLoginError,
         ProxyError,
         build_wrapped_fetch,
         caller_auth_present,
@@ -1350,6 +1351,8 @@ def _access_proxy(
         f"[dim]proxy {action}: {entry.id} → {entry.owner_repo} "
         f"(caller identity; value not persisted)[/dim]"
     )
+    rc = 10 if is_login else 5
+    outcome = "login_failed" if is_login else "error"
     try:
         if is_login:
             rc = proxy_attended_login_exec(resolved, child_argv=child_argv)
@@ -1381,9 +1384,12 @@ def _access_proxy(
             rc = 0
         else:
             rc = proxy_fetch(resolved)
+        outcome = "ok" if rc == 0 else "error"
     except ProxyError as e:
+        if isinstance(e, AttendedLoginError):
+            rc, outcome = e.exit_code, e.outcome
         err.print(f"[red]{e}[/red]")
-        raise typer.Exit(5)
+        raise typer.Exit(rc)
     finally:
         try:
             write_audit(
@@ -1393,6 +1399,8 @@ def _access_proxy(
                 domain=domain,
                 action=action,
                 decision_id=decision_id,
+                exit_code=rc,
+                outcome=outcome,
             )
         except OSError as e:
             err.print(f"[yellow]audit write failed:[/yellow] {e}")
@@ -1564,6 +1572,10 @@ def access(
                 f"  {label:<8} : [dim]{proxy} --exec -- <reviewed-command>[/dim]  "
                 "[yellow](contained login + command; output suppressed)[/yellow]"
             )
+            console.print(
+                "  contract : reviewed command must be silent; any stdout/stderr "
+                "fails closed. Redirect both streams inside the reviewed command."
+            )
         else:
             console.print(
                 f"  {label:<8} : [dim]{proxy} --fetch[/dim]  "

src/warden/proxy.py

@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ class ProxyError(Exception):
     """Raised when a proxy fetch cannot be performed safely."""
 
 
+class AttendedLoginError(ProxyError):
+    """Value-free phase result for the attended command envelope."""
+
+    def __init__(self, message: str, *, exit_code: int, outcome: str):
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.exit_code = exit_code
+        self.outcome = outcome
+
+
 def _has_shell_pipe(cmd: str) -> bool:
     """True when ``cmd`` contains an unquoted shell pipe operator."""
     in_single = in_double = False
@@ -144,6 +153,7 @@ def write_audit(
     action: str,
     decision_id: Optional[str],
     exit_code: Optional[int] = None,
+    outcome: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> Path:
     """Append a metadata-only audit record. Never contains a secret value (G2)."""
     state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -157,6 +167,7 @@ def write_audit(
         "subject": os.environ.get("WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT", "").strip() or "operator",
         "policy_decision_id": decision_id,
         "exit_code": exit_code,
+        "outcome": outcome or ("ok" if exit_code in (None, 0) else "error"),
     }
     record.update(recording_time())
     with log_path.open("a") as f:
@@ -171,10 +182,11 @@ def write_audit(
             subject=record["subject"],
             target=need_id,
             decision_id=decision_id,
-            outcome="ok" if exit_code in (None, 0) else "error",
+            outcome=record["outcome"],
             source="access",
             owner_repo=owner_repo,
             domain=domain,
+            exit_code=exit_code,
         )
     except Exception:
         pass
@@ -443,9 +455,10 @@ def proxy_attended_login_exec(
                 resolved.argv[0], env=env, possible_output=login_output
             )
             status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
-            raise ProxyError(
+            raise AttendedLoginError(
                 "attended login failed closed before command handoff; any possible "
-                f"issued session was contained and {status}"
+                f"issued session was contained and {status}",
+                exit_code=10, outcome="login_failed",
             )
 
         try:
@@ -455,23 +468,33 @@ def proxy_attended_login_exec(
                 resolved.argv[0], env=env, possible_output=b""
             )
             status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
-            raise ProxyError(
-                "attended command could not start; the login session was " + status
+            raise AttendedLoginError(
+                "attended command could not start; the login session was " + status,
+                exit_code=11, outcome="child_failed",
             ) from exc
 
         child_output = _output_bytes(child)
         revoked = _revoke_contained(
             resolved.argv[0], env=env, possible_output=child_output
         )
-        if child.returncode != 0 or child_output.strip():
+        # Even whitespace is output. The separator added by _output_bytes is not.
+        if child.stdout or child.stderr:
             status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
-            raise ProxyError(
-                "attended command failed closed because it returned a failure or "
-                f"unexpected output; the login session was {status}"
+            raise AttendedLoginError(
+                "attended command produced output; reviewed commands must remain "
+                f"silent (redirect both streams); the login session was {status}",
+                exit_code=12, outcome="child_output",
+            )
+        if child.returncode != 0:
+            status = "revoked" if revoked else "revocation could not be confirmed"
+            raise AttendedLoginError(
+                f"attended command exited non-zero; the login session was {status}",
+                exit_code=11, outcome="child_failed",
             )
         if not revoked:
-            raise ProxyError(
-                "attended command completed but session revocation could not be confirmed"
+            raise AttendedLoginError(
+                "attended command completed but session revocation could not be confirmed",
+                exit_code=13, outcome="revoke_unconfirmed",
             )
         return 0
     finally:
@@ -480,7 +503,11 @@ def proxy_attended_login_exec(
             if root_created:
                 root.rmdir()
         except OSError as exc:
-            raise ProxyError("attended login private storage cleanup failed") from exc
+            raise AttendedLoginError(
+                "attended login private storage cleanup failed; inspect the prior phase "
+                "before retrying the reviewed command",
+                exit_code=14, outcome="cleanup_failed",
+            ) from exc
 
 
 def _capture_value(resolved: ResolvedFetch) -> str:

tests/test_proxy.py

@@ -330,6 +330,76 @@ def test_cli_login_lane_rejects_persistent_fetch(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
     assert "requires --exec" in r.output
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "phase,code,outcome",
+    [
+        ("success", 0, "ok"),
+        ("missing_helper", 10, "login_failed"),
+        ("login_failed", 10, "login_failed"),
+        ("login_start", 10, "login_failed"),
+        ("child_start", 11, "child_failed"),
+        ("child_failed", 11, "child_failed"),
+        ("child_output", 12, "child_output"),
+        ("child_whitespace", 12, "child_output"),
+        ("revoke_failed", 13, "revoke_unconfirmed"),
+        ("cleanup_failed", 14, "cleanup_failed"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_cli_attended_result_and_both_audits(monkeypatch, tmp_path, phase, code, outcome):
+    _proxy_env(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "home", lambda: tmp_path)
+    calls = []
+    sentinel = b"hvs.NONPRODUCTION_RESULT_SENTINEL"
+
+    def fake_run(argv, **kw):
+        calls.append(argv)
+        helper = Path(kw["env"]["HOME"]) / ".vault-token"
+        if argv[:2] == ["bao", "login"]:
+            if phase == "login_start":
+                raise OSError("client unavailable")
+            if phase != "missing_helper":
+                helper.write_bytes(sentinel)
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                argv, 1 if phase == "login_failed" else 0, sentinel, b""
+            )
+        if argv == ["reviewed-child"]:
+            if phase == "child_start":
+                raise OSError("child unavailable")
+            output = {"child_output": sentinel, "child_whitespace": b" \n"}.get(phase, b"")
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                argv, 9 if phase == "child_failed" else 0, b"", output
+            )
+        assert argv == ["bao", "token", "revoke", "-self"]
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            argv, 1 if phase == "revoke_failed" else 0, b"", b""
+        )
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr("warden.proxy.subprocess.run", fake_run)
+    if phase == "cleanup_failed":
+        def fail_cleanup(*args):
+            raise OSError("cleanup unavailable")
+        monkeypatch.setattr("warden.proxy.shutil.rmtree", fail_cleanup)
+    result = runner.invoke(
+        app, ["access", "login oidc", "--domain", "coulomb_social",
+              "--exec", "--", "reviewed-child"]
+    )
+    assert result.exit_code == code, result.output
+    assert sentinel.decode() not in result.output
+    if code == 10:
+        assert ["reviewed-child"] not in calls
+    if phase not in ("login_start", "cleanup_failed"):
+        assert calls[-1] == ["bao", "token", "revoke", "-self"]
+    if phase != "cleanup_failed":
+        assert not (tmp_path / ".warden-attended-login").exists()
+    for name in ("access-audit.log", "audit.jsonl"):
+        raw = (tmp_path / "state" / name).read_text()
+        assert sentinel.decode() not in raw
+        records = [json.loads(line) for line in raw.splitlines()]
+        login = next(record for record in records if record["action"] == "login")
+        assert login["exit_code"] == code
+        assert login["outcome"] == outcome
+
+
 def test_attended_login_refuses_read_only_home_before_auth(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
     monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "home", lambda: tmp_path)
     monkeypatch.setattr(

wiki/playbooks/openbao-platform-admin-login.md

@@ -33,8 +33,10 @@ workload KV-read lane and it does not provision a secret value.
    and remain silent. Warden self-revokes the session and removes the helper on
    every success or failure path.
 
-   Safety does not rely on `-no-print`. Any client or child output, helper
-   persistence defect, non-zero exit, or revocation/cleanup defect fails closed.
+   Safety does not rely on `-no-print`. Login output stays contained and is
+   accepted only after successful helper persistence. Any child output (including
+   whitespace), persistence defect, non-zero exit, or revocation/cleanup defect
+   fails closed.
    Captured bytes are never returned, logged, excerpted, hashed, or fingerprinted.
    Do not paste a token into chat, State Hub, a shell argument, or a handoff file.
    Root is offline break-glass authority, not a fallback for failure.
@@ -53,6 +55,34 @@ mount, `platform-admin` role, and allowed callback with `railiance-platform` and
 `key-cape`. Do not retry with a workload-specific OIDC role: it is intentionally
 incapable of OpenBao control-plane administration.
 
+## Exit status and audit
+
+After argument/configuration validation, the contained envelope returns:
+
+| Exit | Audit outcome | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 0 | `ok` | Login, silent child, self-revocation and cleanup succeeded. |
+| 10 | `login_failed` | Login or private-home preflight failed; child did not run. |
+| 11 | `child_failed` | Child could not start or exited non-zero. |
+| 12 | `child_output` | Child emitted stdout/stderr, even whitespace; takes precedence over child exit failure. |
+| 13 | `revoke_unconfirmed` | Child succeeded silently, but self-revocation was not confirmed. |
+| 14 | `cleanup_failed` | Private storage cleanup failed; overrides the prior phase. |
+
+Both `access-audit.log` and `audit.jsonl` record the Warden exit code and phase
+outcome, never captured bytes. Revocation warnings accompany child failures too.
+Codes 11–14 do not establish that the child made no changes: check its permitted
+metadata receipt before retrying. A zero exit from `bao token revoke -self` is
+Warden's revocation confirmation; no post-revoke lookup is used. An arbitrary
+lookup failure would not prove revocation.
+
+On the WSL workstation, use the ops-bridge `openbao-ui-railiance01` tunnel at
+`http://127.0.0.1:18200` for `BAO_ADDR` and `VAULT_ADDR`, with the founder's TTY
+and a working browser opener (`xdg-open`, or the configured OpenBao browser).
+`bao.coulomb.social` serves a public notice, not OpenBao. The captured OIDC output
+is not a browser fallback. Check the opener before starting an attended login.
+The reviewed child must redirect both streams if its tools normally print success
+messages; it should write only approved, value-free evidence to its own receipt.
+
 ## Authority
 
 - OpenBao policy and role owner: `railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md`

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0027-credential-governance-lockdown.md

@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Tamper-resistant credential governance + mass rotation/lockdown (Strand B)"
 domain: infotech
 repo: ops-warden
-status: active
+status: blocked
 flavor: implementation
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: custodian
 planning_priority: medium
 planning_order: 27
 created: "2026-07-16"
-updated: "2026-08-23"
+updated: "2026-09-28"
 state_hub_workstream_id: "21528e8d-a049-523d-9ae1-da7a27cb8bbf"
 ---
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Strand A makes accidental disclosure structurally hard and gives every lane
 layer: turning that advisory guidance into one-command action and hardening policy
 governance against silent drift or malicious change.
 
-## Status: active, narrowly on T02
+## Status: blocked on T02 (reviewed 2026-09-28)
 
 Activated by the operator on 2026-08-22 after the second activation gate became
 concrete. `RAILIANCE-WP-0024-T03` now requires an approved recovery window,
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ heavyweight machinery.
 Activation is deliberately narrow. No mass-disclosure incident triggers T01,
 and no fleet policy currently mandates T03's signed policy-manifest reconcile.
 Those tasks remain `cancel`; cancellation here continues to mean deferred, not
-abandoned. T02 alone is `progress`.
+abandoned. T02 alone was activated; it now waits on a fresh attended drill.
 
 ## Activation gate (promote to `ready` only when ≥1 holds)
 
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ each verified capabilities-safe, taint cleared only on success.
 
 ```task
 id: WARDEN-WP-0027-T02
-status: progress
+status: wait
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "cae498ee-6307-5d32-9f1b-a471cfcc2536"
 ```
@@ -287,3 +287,12 @@ manifest, and an attended reconcile can restore it.
   approved ops-bridge unattended-signing design may still re-evaluate it
   cert_command cutover
 - `secrets-engine` `SECRETS-WP-0004` — the parked AppRole apply/handoff
+
+### 2026-09-28 loose-end review
+
+T02 now waits and the workplan is blocked. Source containment acceptance is
+already complete in railiance-platform's archived RPF-WP-0017; it is not a live
+drill receipt. The terminal August scenario remains consumed. Completion still
+requires a fresh platform-driven attended emergency seal/unseal scenario, fresh
+platform/infra/master receipts and a new founder GO. The cancelled T01/T03 stay
+cancelled. No ceremony, rotation or production mutation was performed.

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0034-layer-model-v07-conformance.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Layer model v0.7 conformance — state the deadline, bind the agent boundary, steward the estate's newest rule"
 domain: infotech
 repo: ops-warden
-status: active
+status: blocked
 flavor: implementation
 depends_on:
   - WARDEN-WP-0030
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ planning_priority: P1
 depends_on_workplans:
   - WARDEN-WP-0030
 created: "2026-08-29"
-updated: "2026-09-21"
+updated: "2026-09-28"
 state_hub_workstream_id: "ae3ff76f-883d-5e2f-b6aa-144d61e8fdef"
 ---
 
@@ -336,3 +336,12 @@ layer-conformance script, and the declaration-route CLI smoke check pass.
 - `security-layer-model_v0.7.md` §3.4, §6.4, §9.6, §9.7, §11, §13.1
 - `net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md` v0.2
 - `ADR-0002`, `ADR-0003`, `ADR-0004`, `ADR-0005`, `ADR-0009`, `ADR-0010`
+
+### 2026-09-28 loose-end review
+
+T05 remains wait; the workplan is blocked on the two outstanding owner answers.
+The local ops-mason checkout still has no published stance map, and the available
+railiance-infra workplans/docs contain no KRL-versus-TTL acceptance or refusal.
+The flex-auth decision-lifetime answer remains accepted. Warden's declaration,
+TTL-bound tests and fresh-check behavior are complete; inventing an owner answer
+would not satisfy T05. No certificate lifetime or revocation policy was changed.

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0036-attended-login-openbao-output.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ status: finished
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: attended-login-openbao-output
 created: "2026-09-01"
-updated: "2026-09-01"
+updated: "2026-09-28"
 state_hub_workstream_id: "d844c96e-152d-53fa-bff6-e072125ef66c"
 ---
 
@@ -41,3 +41,28 @@ OpenBao platform-admin operation with deterministic self-revocation.
 Completed 2026-09-01. The installed CLI completed the governed Policy Nexus
 Forgejo source bootstrap with all child output contained, then revoked and
 removed its isolated helper session.
+
+### 2026-09-28 contained-result correction (existing T01/T02)
+
+Addressed the September 21 attended-login failure/audit report under the existing
+handoff repair and verification tasks. Failed envelopes now use distinct
+non-zero codes 10–14 for login, child failure, child output, unconfirmed revocation
+and cleanup failure. Both audit files retain the actual Warden exit code and
+phase outcome. Any child bytes, including whitespace, fail closed; the access
+advisory now states the silent-child requirement and the playbook documents codes,
+retry limits and the WSL tunnel/browser requirements.
+
+The pre-change checkout already raised exit 5 on ProxyError, so the reported
+historical exit-zero failure was not reproduced here. The actual reproduced defect
+was unconditional success auditing; the new CLI regression covers failed login
+with returncode zero but missing persistence as well as non-zero login, start
+failures, child output/failure, revocation and cleanup. Revocation still checks
+revoke-self's exit status; it does not misinterpret an arbitrary failed lookup as
+proof. The September 23 platform return confirms revoke-self is already granted.
+
+Validation: focused proxy suite 48 passed; full suite 483 passed, 4 integration
+tests deselected by repository default; changed Python files pass Ruff. No live
+OIDC, credential read or production operation was used. The earlier September 1
+live operation remains historical evidence, not a live validation of this change.
+Automated endpoint/browser preflight and OIDC URL presentation remain optional
+inbox suggestions, outside these completed handoff acceptance criteria.

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0037-whynot-design-forgejo-npm-lane.md

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Repoint the whynot-design npm lane to Forgejo"
 domain: infotech
 repo: ops-warden
-status: active
+status: blocked
 flavor: planning
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: whynot-design-forgejo-npm-lane
 created: "2026-09-04"
-updated: "2026-09-27"
+updated: "2026-09-28"
 state_hub_workstream_id: "42a097db-1c24-558e-a724-030bb2b4443e"
 ---
 
@@ -174,3 +174,12 @@ T03 remains wait and the founder's no-rotation hold remains effective.
 Resume only on the SECRETS-WP-0006-T06 migration receipt, then rotate through
 the dedicated package lane and prove a fresh publish plus exact npm view.
 Do not treat the September 16 OpenRouter key-check receipt as npm acceptance.
+
+### 2026-09-28 loose-end review
+
+Workplan state corrected to blocked to match T03's wait and the September 27
+owner return. The governed catalog field and path are already correct. The
+founder's no-rotation hold remains binding until SECRETS-WP-0006-T06 supplies
+native governed-consumer migration evidence; a dedicated token rotation and a
+fresh package publish/exact-version lookup then remain. No credential fetch,
+rotation or publication was attempted.

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0039-explicit-policy-refusal.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ flavor: residual
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: custodian
 created: "2026-09-08"
-updated: "2026-09-08"
+updated: "2026-09-28"
 origin: residual
 origin_ref: HFACT-WP-0001
 state_hub_workstream_id: "ae44a935-6fca-514c-a385-4550dd2b1fe8"
@@ -106,3 +106,13 @@ wrong-caller, wrong-owner and wrong-tenant negatives. No grant was requested.
 `secrets-engine` was told this bears on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 and on how many lanes
 stay proxied; `gate-house` was told it may reach how the signing lane's
 approval-consume is built (GH-DEC-2026-005).
+
+### 2026-09-28 loose-end review
+
+T03 remains wait and the workplan remains blocked. Re-read the owner's finished
+FLEX-WP-0026: no admitted delegated-read binding exists, and its native OpenRouter
+contract explicitly does not close WARDEN-WP-0039-T03. FLEX-DEC-2026-015 also
+confirms resource.system is runtime policy vocabulary, not a repository rename.
+Retain the explicit refusal. A native owner route's success does not grant this
+interim proxy general delegated-read authority; exact positive and caller/owner/
+tenant negative evidence is still required for the route that replaces it.

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0040-unknown-zone-fail-closed-adoption.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Adopt unknown -> fail_closed behind signing-target classification coverage"
 domain: infotech
 repo: ops-warden
-status: proposed
+status: blocked
 flavor: planning
 depends_on:
   - WARDEN-WP-0032
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ depends_on_workplans:
   - WARDEN-WP-0032
   - WARDEN-WP-0034
 created: "2026-09-09"
-updated: "2026-09-09"
+updated: "2026-09-28"
 state_hub_workstream_id: "c8ee441e-1be1-5219-910c-e79ff23cc9ec"
 ---
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ So: coverage first, then the cell. That ordering is the whole holding of
 
 ```task
 id: WARDEN-WP-0040-T01
-status: todo
+status: wait
 priority: high
 state_hub_task_id: "611f0901-9fb5-5954-8dd0-a860c5f0cbec"
 ```
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ outcome this workplan exists to prevent.
 
 ```task
 id: WARDEN-WP-0040-T02
-status: todo
+status: wait
 priority: high
 state_hub_task_id: "54ad4864-7bcf-592e-a187-9239a81a0b11"
 ```
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ or the test fails — which is the property that makes the map worth publishing.
 
 ```task
 id: WARDEN-WP-0040-T04
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "222a8c5d-0c0f-5a1d-98d8-02be7dca3358"
 ```
@@ -154,3 +154,30 @@ adopted.
 T01–T03 are unchanged and still gate the conversion. Coverage is now measured
 rather than asserted (`scripts/report_coverage.py`), so T02's reporting obligation
 has a tool behind it and the published figure cannot drift from the register's.
+
+### 2026-09-28 loose-end review
+
+T04 is done: GH-DEC-2026-011 already answered both transition asks on September 9;
+the accepted coverage column and declared-gap disposition are recorded above.
+No additional response is required to meet that task's acceptance criterion.
+
+T01/T02 now wait; the workplan is blocked. Re-ran both coverage reports:
+signing targets = 0 resolved / 3 unknown / 1 not-applicable; routing lanes =
+3 resolved / 20 unknown / 15 not-applicable. Refreshed pep-stance.yaml's measured
+date. These figures describe the checked-in registry and local owner declarations,
+not a live PDP query. No zone membership was inferred or changed.
+
+The exact missing workload resolutions are `ops-bridge-tunnel` for
+`agt-state-hub-bridge`, `codex-interhub-bootstrap` for
+`agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap`, and `backup-daily` for `atm-backup-daily`.
+The seed inventory's `adm-example` is not an admitted repair actor.
+Warden's own workload declaration cannot classify those target workloads.
+T01 needs an owner-declared continuity actor/target and its authoritative
+z2-continuity resolution; T02 retains the owner-routing/declaration follow-up
+(ops-bridge, the Inter-Hub execution owner and the backup execution owner).
+Without it, changing unknown to fail_closed would deny their issuance during a
+PDP outage. Coverage reporting is complete, but owner coordination is not.
+
+T03 also remains gated on standard acceptance: the local authoritative
+net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md still says proposed.
+No superseding ADR or runtime stance change is warranted before these gates.