Check the OpenBao half of the read-boundary; route RISK-F-0004
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agent-high-risk-boundary denies 5 data paths, covering 6 of ops-warden's 17
high-risk lanes. Eight high-risk lanes with concrete KV paths are not denied,
four of which were already graded high before the 2026-08-19 regrade — the
divergence is pre-existing and the regrade only made the lists comparable.

This is the layer that matters most: warden access exits 7 for all 17, but that
protects only the ops-warden path. The policy protects a direct bao kv get,
which is the 2026-07-16 vector.

Routed to risk-nexus as RISK-F-0004 with fix_owner railiance-platform, since the
policy is theirs. Live confirmation outstanding — ops-warden's OpenBao token is
expired, so this is a static file-vs-catalog comparison and the finding says so
rather than implying it was verified against the server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-20 07:11:03 +02:00
parent 9fc5a735c6
commit 50e185ed7b
2 changed files with 25 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -120,4 +120,4 @@
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T03 | wait | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T04 | wait | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T05 | done | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T06 | wait | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T06 | progress | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |

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@ -256,9 +256,30 @@ ungraded lane being committed. Four regression tests cover it.
maturity-derived default: an experimental-context lane may be explicitly
accepted, which is a graded decision rather than an omission.
**Still open on this task:** whether the maturity-derived default replaces the
`ungraded` sentinel entirely (waits on `ZONE-WP-0001-T03`), and verifying
OpenBao's `agent-high-risk-boundary` policy covers these paths.
**Second layer checked 2026-08-20 — it does not cover them.** The OpenBao side
was compared statically (policy file vs catalog): `agent-high-risk-boundary`
denies 5 data paths covering **6** of the **17** high-risk lanes. Eight
high-risk lanes with concrete KV paths are not denied — and **four of those were
already graded `high` before the regrade**, so the divergence is pre-existing
rather than something the grading introduced. It had simply never been
comparable before.
This matters more than the ops-warden half: `warden access` exits 7 for all 17,
but that only protects the ops-warden path. The OpenBao policy is what protects a
direct `bao kv get`, which is the actual 2026-07-16 vector.
Routed to `risk-nexus` as **`RISK-F-0004`**, `fix_owner: railiance-platform`
the policy is theirs, and ops-warden does not amend another repo's control.
**Live confirmation still outstanding.** ops-warden's OpenBao token is expired
(`bao token lookup` → 403), so `bao policy read` and `bao token capabilities`
could not be run and the deployed policy may differ from the file. A
capabilities-only verification script is ready and needs an operator
`bao login -method=oidc` to run; it is deliberately capabilities-only, never a
read.
**Still open:** whether the maturity-derived default replaces the `ungraded`
sentinel entirely (waits on `ZONE-WP-0001-T03`).
## Related