catalog: draft binky-qonto-api lane + playbook (CCR-2026-0008)

Tenant Qonto bank API front door for binky-control read-only MCP; stays
draft until policy apply, founder provision, and capabilities-safe verify.
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-07-21 21:26:25 +02:00
parent 507bbef6ea
commit 5d30220cc5
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@ -421,6 +421,35 @@ entries:
- "Re-run email-connect read-only scan with warden access --exec / env inject; confirm metadata-only evidence under binky-control/mailmeta/."
- "Verify capabilities-safe on tenants/data/binky/company-email/imap; if EXPOSED taint was set, clear custom_metadata after rotation."
- id: binky-qonto-api
title: Binky Qonto bank API credentials (read-only MCP)
need_keywords: [binky, qonto, bank, api, finance, cost-run-rate, mcp, organization]
owner_repo: railiance-platform
subsystem: OpenBao + qonto-mcp-server
warden_executes: false
wiki_ref: wiki/playbooks/binky-qonto-api.md#worker-checklist
canon_ref: binky-control/integrations/qonto-mcp.md
reviewed: "2026-07-21"
status: draft
risk: high
# CCR-2026-0008: policy + OIDC role pending apply; founder Red provision
# (DEC-2026-004 / OH-2026-003) unblocks BINKY-WP-0005-T05 first read-only pull.
# Read-only is harness tool allow-list — Qonto keys are not scope-limited server-side.
auth_method: "caller's own OpenBao token (OIDC netkingdom role binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read)"
path_template: "tenants/binky/qonto/api"
fetch_command: "bao kv get -field=QONTO_API_KEY tenants/binky/qonto/api"
exec_capable: true
lane: secret
rotation:
method: rotate
owner: binky-control
automatable: false
steps:
- "In the Qonto dashboard, revoke the old API key and mint a new one under /settings/integrations (do not paste it into chat or Git)."
- "`bao kv put tenants/binky/qonto/api QONTO_API_KEY=@file` (and QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID=@file if the org id changed); shred the mode-0600 input file(s)."
- "Re-run qonto-mcp-server read-only pull with warden access --exec; update binky-control finance/CostRunRate.md metadata only."
- "Verify capabilities-safe on tenants/data/binky/qonto/api; if EXPOSED taint was set, clear custom_metadata after rotation."
- id: agent-harness-forgejo-deploy
title: agent-harness Forgejo deploy key (write sandbox; binky-control at cutover)
need_keywords: [agent-harness, forgejo, deploy, key, ssh, executor-sandbox, railiance, binky-control, deploy-key]

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@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ EXPOSED taint: `wiki/playbooks/exposed-taint.md` · `warden taint <id>`.
| Catalog `id` | Routing focus | Playbook |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `binky-qonto-api` | tenant Qonto API on `tenants/binky/qonto/api` (CCR-2026-0008) | `wiki/playbooks/binky-qonto-api.md` |
| `object-storage-sts` | NK-WP-0007 STS vending path | `wiki/playbooks/object-storage-sts.md` |
| `database-dynamic-credentials` | OpenBao database secrets engine | `wiki/playbooks/database-dynamic-credentials.md` |

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@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
# Binky Qonto bank API
Date: 2026-07-21
Catalog: `binky-qonto-api` (status `draft` until provision; `risk: high`)
Owner: `railiance-platform` (CCR-2026-0008) · consumer need: `binky-control`
Workplan: BINKY-WP-0005 · Decision: DEC-2026-004 (approved)
API credentials for the company Qonto account so the self-hosted
`qonto/qonto-mcp-server` can run **read-only** balance and transaction pulls for
control-plane finance feeds (`finance/CostRunRate.md`, Finance Steward rhythm).
**Payments and transfers are Red lane forever** — never allow-list write/payment
tools in the harness. Qonto API keys are not scope-limited server-side; read-only
is enforced at the harness tool allow-list.
---
## Provider (Qonto — non-secret)
| Setting | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Dashboard | Qonto web app → `/settings/integrations` |
| Auth shape | API key + organization ID |
| MCP server | `qonto/qonto-mcp-server` (self-hosted; not the hosted OAuth connector) |
| Env names only | `QONTO_API_KEY`, `QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID` |
Design (variant decision, read-only boundary, consumers):
`binky-control/integrations/qonto-mcp.md`
## OpenBao pointers
| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Mount | `tenants` |
| Path | `tenants/binky/qonto/api` |
| Fields | `QONTO_API_KEY`, `QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID` |
| Policy | `workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api` |
| OIDC role | `binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read` (`groups=net-kingdom-admins`) |
| Risk | `high` |
---
## Worker checklist
1. Login as caller (after CCR-2026-0008 policy + role applied):
```bash
bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read
```
2. Fetch via sanctioned transport (never paste into chat):
```bash
warden access binky-qonto-api --all --no-policy --exec -- \
qonto-mcp-server
# or dual-field inject when wiring a harness session:
# warden access binky-qonto-api --all --no-policy --exec -- \
# env | grep -E '^QONTO_' | sed 's/=.*/=<set>/'
```
Until catalog is `active` and resolvable, use bao as caller with files:
```bash
umask 077
bao kv get -field=QONTO_API_KEY tenants/binky/qonto/api > /tmp/qonto.key
bao kv get -field=QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID tenants/binky/qonto/api > /tmp/qonto.org
chmod 600 /tmp/qonto.key /tmp/qonto.org
export QONTO_API_KEY="$(cat /tmp/qonto.key)"
export QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID="$(cat /tmp/qonto.org)"
shred -u /tmp/qonto.key /tmp/qonto.org
```
3. Run **read-only** MCP tools only (organization, accounts, transactions,
statements metadata). Do **not** invoke card, invoicing, request, or transfer
tools.
4. Store **metadata-only** evidence under `binky-control/finance/` (update
`CostRunRate.md` TBC rows; no bulk statement dumps in git).
Agents (`WARDEN_AGENT_ID` set): raw value stream refused (exit 7). Use `--out` /
`--exec` / `--wrap` / `--fingerprint`.
---
## Verify (capabilities-safe)
```bash
LANE=$(bao token create -policy=workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api -ttl=2m -field=token)
bao token capabilities "$LANE" tenants/data/binky/qonto/api # read
bao token revoke "$LANE"
DEFAULT=$(bao token create -policy=default -ttl=2m -field=token) # deny of create is also pass
bao token capabilities "$DEFAULT" tenants/data/binky/qonto/api # deny
bao token revoke "$DEFAULT"
```
Never use `bao kv get` for deny tests.
---
## Founder provision (Red lane)
```bash
# In Qonto dashboard: /settings/integrations → create API key, note organization ID
# values only in mode-0600 files, never argv/chat
umask 077
# key into /tmp/qonto.key, org id into /tmp/qonto.org — private terminal only
bao kv put tenants/binky/qonto/api \
QONTO_API_KEY=@/tmp/qonto.key \
QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID=@/tmp/qonto.org
shred -u /tmp/qonto.key /tmp/qonto.org
```
Also note **plan tier + monthly fee** for `binky-control/finance/CostRunRate.md`
row 4 (and desk-rent amount for row 1 from recent debits when first pull runs).
Then re-verify capabilities, promote catalog to `active`, set CCR
`access_frontdoor.resolvable: true` / `readiness: ready`.
## Rotation
```bash
warden rotate-guide binky-qonto-api
```
## See also
- `binky-control/integrations/qonto-mcp.md`
- `wiki/playbooks/tenant-secret-onboarding.md`
- CCR-2026-0008 in railiance-platform
- DEC-2026-004 / OH-2026-003 in binky-control