Hand the zone model to zone-engine; keep WP-0032 as the consumer side
zone-engine is seeded and owns the security zone model as ZONE-WP-0001. Under ADR-0005 ops-warden implements one lane narrowly and routes the rest, and an estate-wide enforcement model is not a lane to absorb — it was ops-warden's deferred flip that exposed the gap, not ops-warden's model to define. WARDEN-WP-0032 is rewritten as the consumer side: hand the estate inputs to ZONE-WP-0001-T02 (27 catalog lanes, the actor inventory, the three posture axes, the three controls the model must express, and the compiled-registry path), then replace policy.enabled with a zone-aware control and amend ADR-0006 to say ops-warden follows the model rather than owning it. ADR-0006 and SCOPE updated to point at zone-engine, which joins the related repositories table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
b845f4b51e
commit
8c58f8bfa1
4 changed files with 65 additions and 187 deletions
5
SCOPE.md
5
SCOPE.md
|
|
@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ for the rest.
|
|||
| WP | Status | Focus |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| WP-0027 | `backlog` | Tamper-resistant credential governance + mass rotation/lockdown (Strand B follow-on to WP-0026) |
|
||||
| WP-0032 | `proposed` | Security zones — scope enforcement to bands of differing rigidity (`ADR-0006`); unblocks the pre-sign gate |
|
||||
| WP-0032 | `proposed` | Adopt security zones as a consumer — retire the global `policy.enabled` (model owned by `zone-engine`) |
|
||||
| WP-0030 | `proposed` | Delegation register — record intended owner + blocker on every interim lane, `warden route gaps`, promotion gate |
|
||||
|
||||
Remaining production distance is also in other repos' lanes (see Known gaps).
|
||||
|
|
@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ Remaining production distance is also in other repos' lanes (see Known gaps).
|
|||
`callerAuth.mode: enforce` (FLEX-WP-0016) — the gate is **ready and verified**
|
||||
(`decision:f3f7c88f9585582a`, anonymous `/v1/check` -> 401). `policy.enabled`
|
||||
remains **false by decision**, not by blocker: `ADR-0006` scopes enforcement to
|
||||
security zones, which WP-0032 defines. Re-check with
|
||||
security zones, which `zone-engine` defines (`ZONE-WP-0001`). Re-check with
|
||||
`scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py`
|
||||
- **Workload posture:** WP-0015 shipped (standard, descriptors, `warden policy`,
|
||||
conformance checker, dev doubles); canon landing owner-driven
|
||||
|
|
@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ Downstream: `ops-bridge` (primary), kaizen agents, CI automations, human operato
|
|||
| `secrets-engine` | Owner-native secret-exec front door (`secrets-engine exec/route`); ops-warden routes provisioned secret lanes to it (WP-0019) and holds 6 more as interim proxies pending its front doors |
|
||||
| `tenant-engine` | Intended owner of tenant/client secret front doors; ops-warden holds 3 tenant lanes as interim proxies (WP-0028 pattern, WP-0030 register) |
|
||||
| `user-engine` | End-user identity/account lifecycle; no ops-warden lane today — route rather than absorb |
|
||||
| `zone-engine` | Owns the security zone model and exception lifecycle (`ADR-0006`); ops-warden is its first consumer |
|
||||
| `state-hub` | Workplan registry |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -120,3 +120,4 @@
|
|||
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T03 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
|
||||
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T04 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
|
||||
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T05 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
|
||||
| task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T06 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ created: "2026-08-19"
|
|||
updated: "2026-08-19"
|
||||
last_reviewed: "2026-08-19"
|
||||
review_interval: 6m
|
||||
enforced_by: "warden.yaml policy.enabled; scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py; WARDEN-WP-0032"
|
||||
enforced_by: "warden.yaml policy.enabled; scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py; zone-engine ZONE-WP-0001; WARDEN-WP-0032"
|
||||
supersedes: ""
|
||||
successor: ""
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ does not enable a fail-closed authorization gate globally. Before
|
|||
differing rigidity, each declaring what is enforced, what is advisory, and what
|
||||
is exempt — and the gate must be scoped to them.
|
||||
|
||||
Concretely, until WARDEN-WP-0032 defines the zone model:
|
||||
Concretely, until `zone-engine`'s `ZONE-WP-0001` defines the zone model:
|
||||
|
||||
- `policy.enabled` stays `false`. Its readiness is evidence, not a mandate.
|
||||
- A gate that is *ready* is recorded as ready. Readiness is not a reason to
|
||||
|
|
@ -94,7 +94,9 @@ the zone model rather than merged with a caveat in its description.
|
|||
|
||||
- `WARDEN-WP-0031` — the calling side that made the flip possible (T05 deferred
|
||||
under this ADR)
|
||||
- `WARDEN-WP-0032` — the zone model this record defers to
|
||||
- `zone-engine` `ZONE-WP-0001` — the zone model this record defers to, seeded
|
||||
2026-08-19 as the owning repo
|
||||
- `WARDEN-WP-0032` — ops-warden's consumer-side adoption
|
||||
- `wiki/WorkloadSecurityPosture.md` — the two axes already shipped (WP-0015)
|
||||
- `wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md` — the gate itself
|
||||
- `history/2026-08-19-flex-auth-caller-identity-evidence.md` — readiness evidence
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
id: WARDEN-WP-0032
|
||||
type: workplan
|
||||
title: "Security zones — bands of enforcement rigidity, and where they live"
|
||||
title: "Adopt security zones as a consumer — retire the global policy.enabled"
|
||||
domain: infotech
|
||||
repo: ops-warden
|
||||
status: proposed
|
||||
|
|
@ -9,112 +9,41 @@ owner: ops-warden
|
|||
topic_slug: netkingdom
|
||||
planning_priority: P1
|
||||
depends_on_workplans:
|
||||
- WARDEN-WP-0015
|
||||
- WARDEN-WP-0029
|
||||
- WARDEN-WP-0031
|
||||
created: "2026-08-19"
|
||||
updated: "2026-08-19"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# WARDEN-WP-0032 — Security zones
|
||||
# WARDEN-WP-0032 — Adopt security zones as a consumer
|
||||
|
||||
`ADR-0006` defers `policy.enabled: true` until enforcement can be scoped to a
|
||||
zone. This workplan builds the model it defers to, and — first — settles who
|
||||
owns it.
|
||||
zone. **The zone model itself is no longer ops-warden's work.** It moved to
|
||||
`zone-engine` as `ZONE-WP-0001` on 2026-08-19, where it belongs under `ADR-0005`
|
||||
— ops-warden implements one lane narrowly and routes the rest, and an
|
||||
estate-wide enforcement model is not a lane it should absorb.
|
||||
|
||||
## The problem, precisely
|
||||
What stays here is the consumer side: ops-warden was the repo whose deferred
|
||||
flip exposed the gap, it holds the controls the model must be able to express,
|
||||
and it is the first consumer the model has to satisfy.
|
||||
|
||||
ops-warden can express *how exposed* something is and *how mature* it is. It
|
||||
cannot express *how rigidly this band of the estate is governed right now*.
|
||||
## What ops-warden owes zone-engine
|
||||
|
||||
| Axis | Shipped | Answers |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Environment posture (`dev`/`test`/`prod`) | WP-0015 | Where does this run? |
|
||||
| Workload maturity (`M0`–`M3`) | WP-0015 | How ready is this workload? |
|
||||
| `organization_posture: build` | WP-0029 | What state is the org in? |
|
||||
| **Enforcement stance** | **missing** | **Is this control enforced here, and what happens when it fails?** |
|
||||
Inputs, not designs. `ZONE-WP-0001-T02` derives the model from the real estate,
|
||||
and most of that estate is ops-warden's:
|
||||
|
||||
Because the fourth is missing, every enforcement control ops-warden ships is a
|
||||
repo-wide boolean. `policy.enabled` is the first to become flippable, and
|
||||
flipping it would make flex-auth a hard dependency of every `warden sign` —
|
||||
including the certificates the ops-bridge tunnels depend on, one of which
|
||||
carries the policy call itself. Across an estate mid-refactor that hardens
|
||||
exactly the access needed to perform the refactor.
|
||||
|
||||
The three existing axes *describe*. Nothing *decides*. A zone is the object that
|
||||
decides.
|
||||
|
||||
## What already exists — do not reinvent these
|
||||
|
||||
Four estate mechanisms are adjacent, and getting the relationships right is most
|
||||
of the design work.
|
||||
|
||||
**`net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md`** — the closest
|
||||
structural analogue and the model to follow: six orthogonal axes, graduated
|
||||
levels, a per-repo declaration file (`tenancy.yaml`) carrying current /
|
||||
implemented / target vectors with evidence and a review date, and §6
|
||||
"conformance is accuracy, not altitude". Its §14 adoption stance is
|
||||
*"structure, not tooling"* — a direct precedent about sequencing, and one this
|
||||
workplan should not quietly break.
|
||||
|
||||
**Reefs** (`repo-manager/docs/RailianceAppDeploymentGuide.md`) — `reef-railiance`,
|
||||
`reef-storage`, named in a rapp's `bound_reefs`. These are **substrate**
|
||||
placement zones with real risk statements attached (`reef-railiance` carries a
|
||||
single-node/shared-control-plane residual risk requiring explicit acceptance).
|
||||
A security zone is *not* a reef — reef answers *where does it run*, zone answers
|
||||
*how rigidly is it governed* — but they are correlated, and a taxonomy that
|
||||
ignores reefs will fight them. Also note repo-manager's own ADR-0006: *topology
|
||||
is not readiness*. The same caution applies here: **placement is not posture.**
|
||||
|
||||
**flex-auth** — the PDP, `service_class: latency-critical`, which already
|
||||
consumes a *compiled registry snapshot*
|
||||
(`registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json`, built by
|
||||
`scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py`). This matters enormously for T03: zone
|
||||
membership can reach the decision point by compilation, with no runtime lookup
|
||||
and no new service in the request path.
|
||||
|
||||
**`warden plan`** (WP-0029) — already classifies a need as `autonomous` /
|
||||
`founder_required` / `unroutable` from properties of the thing, returning the
|
||||
`reasons` that produced the verdict. Zone-aware enforcement should extend this
|
||||
verdict machinery rather than grow a parallel one.
|
||||
|
||||
## The question that changes everything else: who owns this?
|
||||
|
||||
Three placements are defensible. **T01 settles it before any modelling**,
|
||||
because the answer changes who writes T02–T05 and in which repo they live.
|
||||
|
||||
**(a) NetKingdom canon + per-repo declaration.** A `security-zones_v0.1.md`
|
||||
standard beside `tenancy-posture_v0.1.md`; each repo declares its lanes'
|
||||
zones in a `zones.yaml` the way it already declares `tenancy.yaml`; flex-auth
|
||||
enforces from the compiled registry. ops-warden drafts and offers, exactly as it
|
||||
did for the WP-0015 maturity model. *Strongest fit to precedent; no new runtime
|
||||
dependency; matches "structure, not tooling".*
|
||||
|
||||
**(b) A new `zone-engine` repo.** A runtime authority owning zone identity,
|
||||
membership, and lifecycle, in the family of `tenant-engine` / `user-engine` /
|
||||
`secrets-engine` — each of which has a boundary contract in canon. *Justified
|
||||
if and only if zone membership needs minting, an API other components query, or
|
||||
— the real candidate — **time-boxed exceptions with expiry and an audit trail of
|
||||
who widened what**. A standing classification does not need an engine; a
|
||||
relaxation that must expire probably does.*
|
||||
|
||||
**(c) flex-auth policy data.** Zones as attributes in the policy package, no new
|
||||
artefact anywhere. *Cheapest, and wrong if zones must govern controls flex-auth
|
||||
does not evaluate — the agent read-boundary (ADR-0004) and `warden desk`
|
||||
escalation are ops-warden-side and would fall outside.*
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommendation to be tested in T01, not assumed:** start at (a), and name
|
||||
(b) as an explicit promotion with a written trigger, rather than seeding an
|
||||
engine before the model exists. An empty `zone-engine` would end up defining
|
||||
zones by accident — through whatever its first schema happened to be — which is
|
||||
the failure `ADR-0001` names in a different register. The counter-argument
|
||||
deserves a fair hearing: if time-boxed refactor exceptions are in scope from day
|
||||
one, (b) may be right immediately, because an expiring grant is state and state
|
||||
wants an owner.
|
||||
|
||||
Under `ADR-0005` ops-warden does not absorb an estate-wide model on its own
|
||||
authority. A zone model only ops-warden honours is worth much less than one
|
||||
flex-auth enforces and secrets-engine reads.
|
||||
- **27 routing catalog lanes** (`registry/routing/catalog.yaml`) with `risk`,
|
||||
`status`, and `delegation` already on each — the likeliest membership inputs.
|
||||
- **The actor inventory** (`adm` / `agt` / `atm`) and its TTL policy.
|
||||
- **The three posture axes already shipped** — environment and maturity
|
||||
(WP-0015), `organization_posture` (WP-0029) — including the honest answer to
|
||||
whether `organization_posture` should be folded into zones rather than run
|
||||
beside them.
|
||||
- **Three controls the model must be able to express**: the flex-auth pre-sign
|
||||
gate (`policy.enabled` + `fail_closed`), the agent read-boundary on
|
||||
`risk: high` lanes (`ADR-0004`), and the `warden plan` escalation verdicts.
|
||||
- **The compiled-registry path** (`scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py`) — how
|
||||
membership can reach flex-auth without a lookup in a latency-critical decision
|
||||
path.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -124,111 +53,56 @@ status: todo
|
|||
priority: high
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Settle ownership and placement.** Take the three options above to
|
||||
`net-kingdom` (canon) and `flex-auth` (the PDP that would enforce), with the
|
||||
time-boxed-exception question stated explicitly since it is what decides
|
||||
between (a) and (b). Record the outcome as a decision with its reasoning — if
|
||||
it lands outside ops-warden, this workplan's remaining tasks move to the owning
|
||||
repo and ops-warden keeps only its consumer-side tasks.
|
||||
**Hand the estate inputs to `ZONE-WP-0001-T02`.** Not a design proposal — the
|
||||
lanes, actors, axes, and controls above, with the exceptions ops-warden already
|
||||
knows do not fit cleanly (the interim delegation lanes from WP-0030 are the
|
||||
obvious candidates: a lane covered on someone else's behalf may not sit in the
|
||||
same zone as one ops-warden owns outright).
|
||||
|
||||
Deliverable: a decision record, and coordination messages sent. Do not model
|
||||
anything before this closes.
|
||||
Include the `organization_posture` fold-in question honestly, including the case
|
||||
against keeping it.
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: WARDEN-WP-0032-T02
|
||||
status: todo
|
||||
status: wait
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Derive the zones from the real estate, not from first principles.** Walk the
|
||||
27 catalog lanes, the actor inventory (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`), and the workloads
|
||||
carrying posture descriptors, and find the bands that actually exist. The test
|
||||
of the model is that it partitions today's estate without a residue of
|
||||
exceptions; the exceptions found are the most informative output.
|
||||
**Replace `policy.enabled` with a zone-aware control.** Waits on
|
||||
`ZONE-WP-0001-T03` and `T05`. Reads the zone of the actor being signed for and
|
||||
that zone's failure mode. Ship deprecation and migration in the same change —
|
||||
leaving both is the second-source-of-truth failure `ADR-0001` exists to prevent.
|
||||
|
||||
Must answer explicitly:
|
||||
Re-run `scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py` before enabling anything: the
|
||||
WP-0031 evidence (`decision:f3f7c88f9585582a`, 2026-08-19) will be stale, and
|
||||
re-establishing it is cheap precisely so this is a re-check rather than a re-do.
|
||||
|
||||
- Is a zone a property of the **actor**, the **lane**, the **workload**, or the
|
||||
**moment**? The CoulombCore decommission shows the last one is real and is the
|
||||
hardest to model — a time-boxed relaxation is a different object from a
|
||||
standing zone, and conflating them produces a permanent hole with a
|
||||
temporary-sounding name.
|
||||
- Do zones **compose with or fold in** the three existing axes? A fourth
|
||||
independent axis multiplies states; absorbing `organization_posture` may be
|
||||
the honest move.
|
||||
- How do zones relate to **reefs**? Correlated, not identical. Say so in the
|
||||
model rather than leaving readers to assume either.
|
||||
This closes `WARDEN-WP-0031-T05`.
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: WARDEN-WP-0032-T03
|
||||
status: todo
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
status: wait
|
||||
priority: medium
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Model stance and failure mode per zone per control.** For each control:
|
||||
enforced / advisory / exempt, *and* fail-closed or fail-open. The failure mode
|
||||
is the part with teeth — `fail_closed` is what turns a dead tunnel into an
|
||||
outage, and it is the reason `policy.enabled` was deferred.
|
||||
|
||||
Controls in scope at minimum: the flex-auth pre-sign gate (`policy.enabled`,
|
||||
`fail_closed`), the agent read-boundary on `risk: high` lanes (`ADR-0004`), and
|
||||
the `warden plan` escalation verdicts (WP-0029).
|
||||
|
||||
Prefer **compilation over runtime lookup** for anything flex-auth evaluates: it
|
||||
is latency-critical and already consumes a built registry snapshot. Adding a
|
||||
synchronous zone lookup to the decision path would be a regression dressed as an
|
||||
architecture.
|
||||
**Declare ops-warden's zones** in whatever format `ZONE-WP-0001-T05` settles,
|
||||
alongside the existing posture descriptors. Carry the conformance rule:
|
||||
*accuracy, not altitude*. Declaring a stricter zone than can be evidenced is the
|
||||
failure mode that looks like progress.
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: WARDEN-WP-0032-T04
|
||||
status: todo
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Declaration format and conformance rule.** Follow `tenancy.yaml`: a per-repo
|
||||
declaration, with evidence, a `reviewed` date and a `review_due`, and the §6
|
||||
rule carried over — **accuracy, not altitude**. A repo declaring a stricter zone
|
||||
than it can evidence is the failure mode to design against, because it is the
|
||||
one that looks like progress.
|
||||
|
||||
Include how a zone assignment is *changed*, and how that change is observed. A
|
||||
zone that can be quietly widened is not a boundary. If time-boxed exceptions
|
||||
exist, their expiry must be enforced by something, not by an intention.
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: WARDEN-WP-0032-T05
|
||||
status: todo
|
||||
status: wait
|
||||
priority: medium
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Make `policy.enabled` zone-aware and retire the global boolean.** The
|
||||
successor control reads the zone of the actor being signed for and that zone's
|
||||
failure mode. Ship deprecation and migration in the same change — leaving both
|
||||
is the second-source-of-truth failure `ADR-0001` exists to prevent.
|
||||
**Amend `ADR-0006`.** Once zones exist and enforcement scoping is owned by
|
||||
`zone-engine`, ADR-0006 must say that ops-warden *follows* the model rather than
|
||||
owning it — a superseding record, never an in-place edit. Update `SCOPE.md`,
|
||||
`wiki/WorkloadSecurityPosture.md`, and `wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md` with it.
|
||||
|
||||
This closes `WARDEN-WP-0031-T05`, cancelled under `ADR-0006`. Re-run
|
||||
`scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py` first: the WP-0031 evidence
|
||||
(`decision:f3f7c88f9585582a`, 2026-08-19) will be stale, and re-establishing it
|
||||
is cheap precisely so this is a re-check rather than a re-do.
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: WARDEN-WP-0032-T06
|
||||
status: todo
|
||||
priority: medium
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Close out honestly.** Update `SCOPE.md`, `wiki/WorkloadSecurityPosture.md`,
|
||||
and `wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md`. If the model landed in canon or in another
|
||||
repo, `ADR-0006` gains a successor or an amendment recording where enforcement
|
||||
scoping now lives — ops-warden follows it rather than owning it, and the ADR
|
||||
must say which.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deliberately out of scope
|
||||
|
||||
- **Network segmentation.** "Zone" is an overloaded word; this model is about
|
||||
*enforcement rigidity*, not routing or NetworkPolicy. Say so wherever the term
|
||||
first appears, or the two will be conflated within a quarter.
|
||||
- **Re-litigating the three existing axes.** They stay as they are unless T02
|
||||
finds a fold-in.
|
||||
- **Zones for anything ops-warden does not consume**, unless T01 hands the model
|
||||
to an owner who needs the wider scope.
|
||||
- `zone-engine` `ZONE-WP-0001` — the model, and where this work is led from
|
||||
- `ADR-0006` — enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag
|
||||
- `WARDEN-WP-0031` — the deferred flip and its readiness evidence
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue