Show the OpenBao identity warden access evaluates
reuse-surface-hub-write-token does not select a caller. The data plane uses the ambient token, which can be the coding-agent role denied by agent-high-risk-boundary while an attended platform-admin lookup still shows read. Advisory and proxy output now report that entity, role, and policies without the token. CCR-2026-0005 still has no OIDC binding for workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime. Assistant: grok Assistant-Session: 01a13b2d-0bc1-7a91-ab1d-325bcfb09bf0
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@ -663,7 +663,13 @@ entries:
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# reuse/reuse-surface-runtime SecretSynced to reuse-surface-env on Railiance01;
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# positive + negative access verified. Production consumer is ESO; warden access
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# proxies reads as the caller and never holds the value.
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auth_method: "caller's own OpenBao token (operator OIDC via key-cape, or a token carrying workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime)"
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# Data-plane identity is whichever token the OpenBao CLI resolves
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# (BAO_TOKEN, then VAULT_TOKEN, then ~/.vault-token). That is not the
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# flex-auth caller. CCR-2026-0005 does not bind an OIDC role to
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# workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime; the only live binding is the
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# ESO Kubernetes role reuse-surface-runtime-eso. platform-admin must not
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# receive the scoped policy. See the playbook.
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auth_method: "ambient OpenBao token (BAO_TOKEN, then VAULT_TOKEN, then ~/.vault-token); no OIDC role binds workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime"
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path_template: "platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets"
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fetch_command: "bao kv get -field=REUSE_SURFACE_TOKEN platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets"
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policy_ref: "flex-auth check secret.read:reuse"
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