diff --git a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8bb760
--- /dev/null
+++ b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+id: WARDEN-WP-0033
+type: workplan
+title: "Native lane handoff — review secrets-engine's catalog admission, and fix what it exposed"
+domain: infotech
+repo: ops-warden
+status: active
+owner: ops-warden
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+planning_priority: P1
+depends_on_workplans:
+  - WARDEN-WP-0030
+created: "2026-08-21"
+updated: "2026-08-21"
+---
+
+# WARDEN-WP-0033 — Native lane handoff
+
+On 2026-08-20 `secrets-engine` accepted five of ops-warden's seven interim
+proxy lanes for catalog admission (`SECRETS-WP-0006`, decision
+`ae676382-1826-4e04-aa4e-bb77990c7a0d`), rejected two with reasons ops-warden
+agrees with, drafted the five entries itself rather than waiting for the offered
+contribution, and asked for a line-by-line review of the non-secret metadata.
+
+In the same hour `railiance-platform` closed the `RISK-F-0009` coverage gap and
+asked ops-warden for two things back.
+
+This workplan is the response to both, plus the defect the review turned up in
+ops-warden's own grading model — which is the most consequential item here and
+would not have been found without the second pair of eyes.
+
+## Why a workplan and not an adhoc
+
+Four counterparties are waiting, one deliverable is a **cross-repo interface**
+another repo will consume on a schedule, and the review carries approval
+semantics — `secrets-engine` holds interim proxy ownership open until each lane
+has approved native verification. The convention reserves adhocs for low-risk
+work completed directly; this is none of those.
+
+## Tasks
+
+```task
+id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T01
+status: progress
+priority: high
+```
+
+**Review the five drafted catalog entries and reply.**
+`issue-core-ingestion-api-key`, `reuse-surface-hub-write-token`,
+`openrouter-llm-connect`, `forgejo-admin-api-token`,
+`email-connect-transactional` at `secrets-engine@784be97`.
+
+Review the axes they asked for: owner-repo coordinates, field grouping, workload
+consumers, rotation/deactivation owners, delivery intent. Verify claims against
+the authoritative `railiance-platform` CCRs — **never against a secret read**;
+`bao kv get` on any of these paths is the 2026-07-16 vector and three of the five
+are `risk: high`.
+
+Accept their two rejections. `openbao-api-key` is a routing template rather than
+one lane and `key-cape-oidc-login` belongs to key-cape — that is `ADR-0005`
+applied to ops-warden by someone else, correctly.
+
+```task
+id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T02
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+**Correct ops-warden's per-path risk grading — the defect T01 exposed.**
+
+`secrets-engine` graded `issue-core-ingestion-api-key` **high**; ops-warden grades
+it **standard**, and deliberately: WP-0032-T05 regraded it *down* on 2026-08-19,
+operator-sanctioned, because `test_high_risk_lanes_classified` asserted standard
+and was judged right — "ordinary internal workload secrets are standard".
+
+That reasoning was incomplete, and CCR-2026-0002 says so explicitly: the path
+carries **both** `ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY` **and** `GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN`, a Forgejo
+backend token, and the CCR records keeping both as a deliberate field-set
+decision.
+
+**The root cause is structural, not a single bad call.** ops-warden grades a
+*lane* by its headline field — the catalog carries one `fetch_command` naming one
+field and no `fields` list at all — but the disclosure unit is the **path**: a
+`bao kv get` returns every field stored there. So a lane can be graded on its
+least dangerous contents. `ADR-0007` says every lane carries an explicit grade;
+it does not say the grade must cover everything a read of that path would
+disclose, and it should.
+
+Fix the grade, then fix the model that produced it: record `fields` per lane and
+grade on the union. Check the other 25 lanes for the same shape.
+
+```task
+id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T03
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+**Emit the generated high-risk data-path artifact for `railiance-platform`.**
+
+They asked for a versioned artifact of concrete high-risk data paths
+(`id` + `data_path` + catalog revision) to consume instead of hand-maintaining
+the deny list — the half of the `RISK-F-0009` fix ops-warden explicitly declined
+to build *for* them. Emitting the artifact is not the same as amending their
+policy: they still own what to deny. That boundary is the point of `ADR-0002`
+and must survive this task.
+
+Must be generated, never hand-edited, and must carry the catalog revision so a
+consumer can tell what it was derived from. Depends on T02 — publishing the deny
+set before fixing the grades would ship the wrong list to a consumer who will
+apply it.
+
+```task
+id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T04
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+
+**Route the coding-agent issuance identity question.**
+
+`RAILIANCE-WP-0017` is blocked on defining a distinct coding-agent issuance
+identity and proving deny-wins when that identity is combined with workload read.
+They asked ops-warden to route ownership.
+
+Route it; do not absorb it (`ADR-0005`, `ADR-0003`). ops-warden owns actor
+identity for `adm`/`agt`/`atm` **SSH certificates** and nothing else — a coding
+agent's OpenBao issuance identity is an IAM question. The likely owner is
+`key-cape`, with `user-engine` and `zone-engine` both plausibly involved. Say so
+with reasoning rather than guessing, and record the answer either way.
+
+Note the interaction with `ADR-0004`: the agent read-boundary already depends on
+`WARDEN_AGENT_ID` being set, which is an honour-system marker on the ops-warden
+side. A real issuance identity is what would make that boundary hold on the
+OpenBao side too, so ops-warden is an interested consumer, not a bystander.
+
+## Related
+
+- `secrets-engine` `SECRETS-WP-0006` — catalog admission, decision `ae676382`
+- `RISK-F-0009` — closed by railiance-platform 2026-08-21; 0 uncovered
+- `railiance-platform` `RAILIANCE-WP-0022` (boundary coverage), `RAILIANCE-WP-0017`
+- `ADR-0002`, `ADR-0003`, `ADR-0004`, `ADR-0005`, `ADR-0007`
+- `WARDEN-WP-0030` — the delegation register these five lanes retire from