Add WP-0030 delegation register; refresh INTENT and SCOPE

Founder directive: ops-warden works with, never replaces or duplicates,
secrets-engine / tenant-engine / user-engine. Covering an unfilled gap is
acceptable only as a tracked interim with a named intended owner.

- INTENT §9 "Cover gaps, but never silently own them"; success criterion 7;
  tenant-engine and user-engine added to the literacy table; non-goal on
  permanently owning another component's lane
- WP-0030 (proposed): delegation: metadata, backfill, warden route gaps,
  promotion gate, publish the register to owner repos
- history/2026-08-11-delegation-surface-assessment.md: 2 of 24 lanes carry
  exec_owner; 11 proxies record no intended owner
- SCOPE refreshed to 2026-08-11 (was 6 workplans behind); completeness C5 -> C4

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

INTENT.md

@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ ops-warden should be fluent in the platform architecture documented in
 | **OpenBao** | Runtime secrets — API keys, dynamic creds, leases, audit | Instruct custody paths; SSH engine is signing backend only; proxy reads as caller when `exec_capable` |
 | **secrets-engine** | Owner-native secret-exec (`secrets-engine exec`) | Route provisioned exec lanes (e.g. npm publish); ops-warden does not hold tokens |
 | **railiance-platform** (credential broker) | Scoped lease grants (`credential exec`) | Route `warden-sign` token needs; ops-warden does not mint OpenBao tokens |
+| **tenant-engine** | Tenant/client secret custody and front door | Route tenant lanes once fronted; ops-warden's current tenant proxies are interim (§9) |
+| **user-engine** | End-user identity and account lifecycle | No ops-warden lane today; route rather than absorb |
 | **ops-warden** | Operational SSH certificates — short-lived host access | **Own and issue** this lane |
 | **ops-bridge** | Tunnel transport — consumes certs via `cert_command` | Primary consumer; document integration |
 | **railiance-infra** | Host principals, force-command, SSH hardening | Instruct host-side deployment; do not own Ansible |
@@ -201,6 +203,31 @@ must know the current posture, state it in its answers, and tighten defaults
 when the posture graduates (first customer data, first non-founder operator,
 production tier). Posture is declared configuration, not tribal knowledge.
 
+### 9. Cover gaps, but never silently own them
+
+*(added 2026-08-11, founder directive — see WARDEN-WP-0030)*
+
+ops-warden **works with, and never replaces or duplicates**, secrets-engine,
+tenant-engine, user-engine and the other NetKingdom security components.
+
+It may nonetheless *cover* a need that no component systematically provides yet —
+that is a legitimate service, and the `warden access` proxy makes it cheap. The
+danger is precisely that cheapness: an absorbed need looks permanent, stops
+registering as a missing capability, and quietly turns a routing layer into a
+second secrets broker.
+
+So every execution position other than SSH issuance is **interim by default**:
+
+- record the component that *should* own the front door, and what is missing
+- treat the cover as a tracked gap, not as ownership
+- delegate the moment that component ships its front door, keeping the proxy
+  only as a fallback (`exec_owner` / `exec_command` — the WP-0019 pattern)
+
+A gap ops-warden covers silently is worse than a gap it refuses, because the
+refusal is visible and the cover is not. Filling the gap properly — with the
+owner's governance, custody, and policy — is the goal; ops-warden holding the
+lane is the temporary means.
+
 ---
 
 ## Credential flow (target mental model)
@@ -267,6 +294,9 @@ ops-warden is succeeding when:
 5. Non-SSH secrets remain **out of ops-warden storage** — only documented paths.
 6. Security blockers can be classified by environment posture, workload maturity,
    owner route, and non-secret evidence instead of by vague credential risk.
+7. Every ops-warden execution position is explicitly **permanent** (SSH issuance) or
+   explicitly **interim** with a named intended owner and blocker — so gaps ops-warden
+   covers stay visible as gaps and can be handed back.
 
 ---
 
@@ -279,6 +309,9 @@ ops-warden is succeeding when:
 - Host-side SSH configuration deployment
 - **Duplicating or restating another subsystem's procedure** — routing material
   points at the owner's docs; it does not fork them
+- **Permanently owning a lane that belongs to another component** — covering an
+  unfilled gap is acceptable and expected; keeping it after the owner can front it,
+  or holding it without recording that it is interim, is not (§9)
 - SSO / Teleport at scale (trigger per Access Management Directive §6.2)
 
 ---