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docs: record the answered custody authority on the qonto lane

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railiance-platform answered the routing question (msg 7c7228ac): steps 1-2
are executed by the platform operator attended, through the governed
openbao-platform-admin-login lane with a unique metadata receipt path, under
founder_required attended OIDC via netkingdom role=platform-admin. Nothing
else in that repo carries write authority against platform/workloads/.

The blocker narrows again -- the AUTHORITY is answered, the ARTIFACT is not.
A two-custodian CAS rotation with a service restart is a distinct
version-guarded operation needing its own reviewed CCR, which is theirs to
write once an owner asks for the rotation. That question is now with
key-cape; ops-warden connected the two and did not ask on their behalf.

Their executable precedent for the identical two-custodian shape is cited so
a rapp-qonto rotation script is not built from a bare `bao kv patch` -- the
provider/consumer consistency reason key-cape gave when declining to ship a
wrapper, which railiance-platform endorsed unprompted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1276224@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-10 08:02:10 +02:00
parent 66db87e6ae
commit a942ce805d
2 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions
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6
registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml
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@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
# declares it, and is null where the field set has not been established --
# null means unknown, never 'one field'.
generated_at: "2026-09-09T12:43:48Z"
generated_at: "2026-09-10T05:54:39Z"
source: ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml
catalog_revision: "83fdd08f881ce6a5bd9c3fbcb4dc79d1ab62b4d5"
catalog_revision_date: "2026-09-09T14:43:44+02:00"
catalog_revision: "406446f7bb38efadf85849756c067a124902a2ec"
catalog_revision_date: "2026-09-10T07:54:39+02:00"
catalog_dirty: false
high_risk_lane_count: 24
concrete_path_count: 15

4
registry/routing/catalog.yaml
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@ -772,8 +772,8 @@ entries:
delegation:
mode: interim
intended_owner: key-cape
blocked_on: "Narrowed 2026-09-08 to rotation steps 1-2 only: successor generation and the CAS write to both custodians (platform/workloads/rapp-qonto/keycape-client field client_secret, and sso/keycape-rapp-qonto-client key client-secret) remain custody/deployment acts with no admitted execution and rollback contract, and no admitted ops-warden lane authorizes them. The key-cape-native exchange now exists (keycape service-token, 2026-09-05, KEY-WP-0014-T03) and step 3 verification exists as one command (keycape verify-client, 2026-09-08, including predecessor rejection and identical-secret detection); both are documented in key-cape/docs/native-authentication.md. The prior blocker recorded both as absent, which was accurate on 2026-08-28 and is not accurate now — corrected by key-cape (msg 08d42f47). Re-checked against key-cape source 2026-09-08."
reviewed: "2026-09-08"
blocked_on: "Narrowed again 2026-09-09: the AUTHORITY is answered, the ARTIFACT is not. railiance-platform (msg 7c7228ac) confirmed steps 1-2 are theirs: executed by the platform operator attended, never by ops-warden, secrets-engine autonomously, or any unattended agent; transport is the governed openbao-platform-admin-login lane invoked only through `warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- <command>` with a unique metadata receipt path (RPF-WP-0017 output containment); authority is founder_required attended OIDC via netkingdom role=platform-admin. What is still missing is a reviewed rotation CCR — a two-custodian CAS rotation with a service restart is a distinct version-guarded operation, not an implementation detail of this lane, and it must name the CAS precondition and expected version on both custodians, sibling-field preservation, the restart window, bounded predecessor retention, and the reconcile-to-same-version failure step. That CCR is railiance-platform to write under RPF-WP-0035 once an owner asks for the rotation; ops-warden has asked key-cape whether to schedule it. Executable precedent for the same two-custodian shape: railiance-platform scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py, with its dated receipt under docs/evidence/ and review packet under docs/credential-lane-designs/. Prior (2026-09-08) narrowing to rotation steps 1-2 only: successor generation and the CAS write to both custodians (platform/workloads/rapp-qonto/keycape-client field client_secret, and sso/keycape-rapp-qonto-client key client-secret) remain custody/deployment acts. The key-cape-native exchange now exists (keycape service-token, 2026-09-05, KEY-WP-0014-T03) and step 3 verification exists as one command (keycape verify-client, 2026-09-08, including predecessor rejection and identical-secret detection); both are documented in key-cape/docs/native-authentication.md. The prior blocker recorded both as absent, which was accurate on 2026-08-28 and is not accurate now — corrected by key-cape (msg 08d42f47). Re-checked against key-cape source 2026-09-08."
reviewed: "2026-09-09"
verified: owner-confirmed
risk: high
workload_ref: