WARDEN-WP-0032: flex-auth amendments to T02 and T03
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flex-auth reviewed ZONE-WP-0001 as the consuming PDP and two findings
land on the ops-warden consumer side:

T02 - fail_closed is not expressible by a PDP. Fail-open describes what
warden sign does when flex-auth is unreachable, so no decision exists to
carry it. The replacement for policy.enabled is two things: stance,
which arrives in the decision, and failure mode, which stays local and
is declared per zone.

T02 - build_flex_auth_registry.py:77 already emits a hardcoded
trust_zone: platform that no policy reads. Resolve that before
compiling zone membership rather than adding security_zone beside it.

T03 - the declaration must say whether a zone rides the actor (subject)
or the lane (resource); in the compiled registry an actor is both.

No flex-auth registry schema change is needed - metadata, labels and
attributes already flatten into the rego input.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-19 22:00:13 +02:00
parent 5e2f7dc939
commit b1070be644

View file

@ -82,6 +82,36 @@ re-establishing it is cheap precisely so this is a re-check rather than a re-do.
This closes `WARDEN-WP-0031-T05`.
**Amended by flex-auth 2026-08-19, reviewing `ZONE-WP-0001` as the PDP.** Two
constraints that change what this task can build, both argued in full at
`ZONE-WP-0001-T03` and `T04`:
1. **The zone-aware control splits across the boundary, it does not move.**
flex-auth will read compiled zone *membership* from the registry and apply the
per-zone *stance* from its policy package, returning an effect plus an
advisory annotation. What stays on the ops-warden side is the axis flex-auth
structurally cannot carry: **`fail_closed` is not expressible by a PDP.**
Fail-open describes what `warden sign` does when flex-auth is *unreachable*
no decision is rendered, so no compiled data and no policy rule can reach it.
So the replacement for `policy.enabled` is not one zone-derived boolean
either; it is (a) stance, which arrives *in the decision*, and (b) failure
mode, which stays a local ops-warden setting declared per zone. Plan for two,
or T02 will be built expecting flex-auth to answer something it cannot.
2. **The membership compiler is ops-warden's to change, and it has a name
collision to resolve first.** `scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py:77` already
emits `"trust_zone": "platform"` as a hardcoded constant on every
ssh-certificate resource. It is a first-class field on flex-auth's `Resource`,
it is surfaced into rego input, and **no policy package reads it**. Before
compiling zone membership, either retire that constant or deliberately
repurpose it — do not add `security_zone` beside a dormant `trust_zone` and
leave the next reader to guess which is real. That is the `ADR-0001`
second-source-of-truth failure in miniature, inside a generated artifact.
Good news for T03's cost: **no flex-auth registry schema change is required.**
`metadata`, `labels` and `attributes` already flatten into the rego input, so the
compiler can emit membership today.
```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0032-T03
status: wait
@ -90,7 +120,11 @@ state_hub_task_id: "fd642377-8d64-473c-b684-f8f1a842c223"
```
**Declare ops-warden's zones** in whatever format `ZONE-WP-0001-T05` settles,
alongside the existing posture descriptors. Carry the conformance rule:
alongside the existing posture descriptors. Per flex-auth's T05 amendment, this
declaration must also say whether a zone rides the **actor** (a flex-auth
subject) or the **lane** (a flex-auth per-actor resource) — in the compiled
registry an actor is both, and the compiler needs to be told which record
carries membership. Carry the conformance rule:
*accuracy, not altitude*. Declaring a stricter zone than can be evidenced is the
failure mode that looks like progress.