docs: record attended login containment evidence

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a0290b-3241-74c3-b868-6049545af836

docs/evidence/RAILIANCE-WP-0026-T01-ops-warden-receipt.json

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "interface": "railiance.attended-login-containment-receipt",
+  "version": 1,
+  "task_id": "RAILIANCE-WP-0026-T01",
+  "owner": "ops-warden",
+  "source_repo": "ops-warden",
+  "source_revision": "0fae0904ce8d8694338dd53a8a79abec5fec788d",
+  "created_at": "2026-08-22T23:31:17Z",
+  "disposition": "ready_for_owner_review",
+  "focused_test": {
+    "command": "uv run pytest -q tests/test_proxy.py tests/test_plan.py",
+    "passed": true,
+    "passed_count": 42,
+    "failed_count": 0
+  },
+  "repository_verification": {
+    "command": "uv run pytest -q",
+    "passed": true,
+    "passed_count": 390,
+    "deselected_count": 4,
+    "lint_command": "uv run ruff check .",
+    "lint_passed": true
+  },
+  "acceptance_outcomes": {
+    "private_helper_preflight_before_auth": true,
+    "read_only_home_refused_before_oidc": true,
+    "login_child_and_revocation_stdio_contained": true,
+    "unexpected_stdout_and_stderr_fail_closed": true,
+    "possible_issuance_triggers_contained_self_revocation": true,
+    "helper_cleanup_is_deterministic": true,
+    "persistent_login_only_handoff_refused": true
+  },
+  "live_oidc_performed": false,
+  "live_drill_authorized": false,
+  "secret_values_observed": false,
+  "sensitive_material_recorded": false
+}

registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml

@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 # declares it, and is null where the field set has not been established --
 # null means unknown, never 'one field'.
 
-generated_at: "2026-08-22T18:54:51Z"
+generated_at: "2026-08-22T23:31:10Z"
 source: ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml
-catalog_revision: "e3b9b1620c67236d7ba2c53512e7113819ea20a9"
-catalog_revision_date: "2026-08-22T20:54:45+02:00"
+catalog_revision: "0fae0904ce8d8694338dd53a8a79abec5fec788d"
+catalog_revision_date: "2026-08-23T01:31:05+02:00"
 catalog_dirty: false
 high_risk_lane_count: 21
 concrete_path_count: 14

workplans/WARDEN-WP-0027-credential-governance-lockdown.md

@@ -189,6 +189,29 @@ matrix is in
 platform snapshot/driver and master quorum contracts remain required before the
 fully parameterized read-only preflight.
 
+**Live attempt terminal NO-GO 2026-08-23.** All owner receipts and the final
+read-only preflight became green, and the operator opened the exact bounded
+window with decision `449a697a-5303-4582-aa9e-b0bc8b35ab2d`. The platform
+driver stopped before seal when attended OIDC succeeded but the read-only agent
+home prevented token-helper persistence and the underlying client emitted the
+short-lived credential into captured output despite `-no-print`. The credential
+was immediately self-revoked. Independent metadata confirmed OpenBao remained
+initialized and unsealed with zero unseal progress; no seal, unseal, reboot,
+restore, policy, PVC, or workload mutation occurred. NO-GO decision
+`85724c0c-e70f-4e2f-a8c6-a9cb1ea6331b` supersedes and consumes the GO; the
+scenario and its receipts cannot be reused.
+
+The direct remediation interface is `RAILIANCE-WP-0026-T01`. Ops-warden commit
+`0fae0904ce8d8694338dd53a8a79abec5fec788d` replaces the persistent login-only
+handoff with a contained login-plus-reviewed-command envelope. It proves a
+private writable helper before OIDC, captures login/child/revocation stdout and
+stderr, fails closed on any output or persistence defect, self-revokes, and
+removes the helper. No live OIDC was used for verification. The value-safe
+owner receipt is
+`docs/evidence/RAILIANCE-WP-0026-T01-ops-warden-receipt.json`; a future drill
+requires owner acceptance, fresh receipts, a new scenario id, and a new human
+decision.
+
 ## Task: Tamper-evident policy governance + reconcile
 
 ```task