coulomb/ops-warden
4
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases 2 Packages Wiki Activity Actions

ADR-0006: enforcement is zone-scoped; defer the policy.enabled flip
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
Details
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 1s
Details

Browse source 
flex-auth enforced its ops-warden pin (FLEX-WP-0016 T03) and the gate verified
clean against it: readiness exits 0, decision:f3f7c88f9585582a, anonymous
/v1/check now 401. Everything needed to set policy.enabled: true was in place.

It stays false, by decision. policy.enabled is a single repo-wide boolean, and
with fail_closed: true it makes flex-auth a hard dependency of every warden
sign — including the certs the ops-bridge tunnels depend on, one of which
carries the policy call itself. Uniform enforcement across an estate being
actively rebuilt hardens the access needed to perform the rebuild.

The repo already refuses one-dimensional posture: WP-0015 shipped environment
and maturity axes, WP-0029 added organization_posture. A global flag ignores all
three. ADR-0006 records that enforcement belongs to a zone, and binds future
work — a zone-blind enforcement flag is out of order, not merely unwise.

WARDEN-WP-0032 drafts the zone model, leading with the ownership question:
whether this is ops-warden's to own or NetKingdom canon to consume (ADR-0005).
WP-0031 is finished with T05 cancelled and resuming as WP-0032-T05.

Also replaces the hand-run kubectl port-forward with a managed ops-bridge
tunnel, flex-auth-ops-warden-railiance01 (-L 19090:10.43.1.165:8080).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-19 20:31:28 +02:00
parent 661176e37a
commit cbf6828061
7 changed files with 273 additions and 9 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

19
wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md
View file

@ -254,6 +254,25 @@ truncated fingerprint, never the value, so its output is safe to paste into a
handoff message. A live `401` means the token was sent but rejected (audience or
binding); `403` means it authenticated but may not represent `system: ops-warden`.
### Enablement is deferred by decision (ADR-0006)
`policy.enabled` is **false, and that is a decision rather than a blocker.** The
gate is ready: flex-auth's pin runs `callerAuth.mode: enforce`, the readiness
gate exits 0 against it, and an anonymous `/v1/check` returns 401.
It is not enabled because `policy.enabled` is one boolean over the whole repo,
and with `fail_closed: true` it makes flex-auth a hard dependency of every
`warden sign` — including the certs the ops-bridge tunnels depend on, one of
which carries the policy call. Uniform enforcement across an estate under active
refactor hardens the access needed to perform the refactor.
`ADR-0006` scopes enforcement to security zones; `WARDEN-WP-0032` defines them.
Do not set `policy.enabled: true` outside that model — a zone-blind enablement
is out of order under the ADR, not merely inadvisable.
The sequence below is retained as the *mechanics*, for whoever enables the gate
for a zone once zones exist.
### Flip sequence
1. Configure `caller_auth`; `check_policy_caller_identity.py` exits 0 offline.