risk-nexus accepted the offer to match their convention rather than grow a second
one, and published it: 14d critical/high, 30d medium, 60d low, nothing auto-closing
on staleness alone. Their preference — point warden route gaps at those windows and
the two registers agree without a shared mechanism — is better than a joint tool.
blocker_stale_days() now maps lane risk onto those windows. A flat 14 would have
been wrong in both directions: too aggressive for a low-risk pointer, and it treated
an admin PAT lane the same as one.
ungraded takes the shortest window, not the longest. ADR-0007 makes an absent grade
a defect and ADR-0008 makes a grade cover the whole path, so a lane nobody graded is
the one whose blocker deserves least trust. Encoding that as 60 days would have been
the fail-open default this repo already fixed once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 90-day --stale-days default on `warden route gaps` was not a loose threshold,
it was an inert one: the delegation register was created 2026-08-15, so it could
not have fired before November. It was inherited from the catalog pointer cadence
and applied to a claim with a completely different half-life.
Two changes. DEFAULT_BLOCKER_STALE_DAYS = 14 now governs interim blockers, while
DEFAULT_STALE_DAYS = 90 keeps governing pointer freshness -- "is this the right
owner and page" is quarterly, "has the owner answered" is not. 14 is calibrated
on blockers that actually cost something: ten days for the secrets-engine lanes,
one for RISK-F-0001, roughly fifty for FLEX-WP-0007.
The second change matters more. `reviewed` records when someone touched an entry,
which is indistinguishable from re-checking it -- six lanes read as freshly
reviewed today because I typed in them. `verified:` now says how the claim was
established, and asked-and-waiting explicitly does NOT count: that is the state
the secrets-engine blocker sat in for ten days while looking current. A lane in
that state is stale at zero days old, and key-cape-oidc-login proves it works.
8 of 14 interim lanes are honestly marked unverified rather than given a fresh
date they did not earn.
--fail-on-stale exits 3 for a cron or gate. No CI test on age: a date-triggered
failure breaks the build for whoever commits next instead of whoever owns the
blocker. The CI test is structural -- every interim lane must record how it was
verified -- so it fails on the commit that introduces the omission.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_catalog_gaps_lists_only_interim asserted openbao-api-key was an interim
cover. It encoded the same classification the entry did, so it defended the
wrong answer rather than catching it -- the second time this session a test has
held a judgement still (see ADR-0008).
The staleness test added in T03 did its job on the first real change: it failed
the moment the catalog moved without the generated artifact being re-emitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
secrets-engine reviewed our catalog metadata while drafting their five entries
and graded issue-core-ingestion-api-key and reuse-surface-hub-write-token high.
We had both as standard, and had deliberately regraded them DOWN on 2026-08-19.
They are right. Both paths carry a second credential our grade never looked at --
GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN (CCR-2026-0002, a deliberate field-set decision) and a
dual-consumer webhook HMAC (CCR-2026-0005). Neither is recovered by rotating the
credential the lane is named after.
The defect is structural: we graded the lane by its headline field, but a read
returns every field at the path. Worse, the evidence was already in the CCRs we
cite as authoritative -- not missing, unread -- and a test asserted the wrong
answer, so a correct first-pass grade got overruled by it.
ADR-0008 records the rule: a grade covers every field its path discloses.
ADR-0007 is unchanged and still governs; this says what the grade is of.
Six of the remaining standard lanes have no KV path. Two have paths and no field
evidence; per ADR-0008 they are stated as unknown rather than assumed, and left
for operator-sanctioned grading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mechanism behind RISK-F-0003 was sharper than the finding described.
is_high_risk was risk == "high", but risk was never absent at the model layer:
RouteEntry.risk carried a dataclass default of "standard". An omitted grade was
not unhandled, it was actively resolved to the permissive value — fail-open by
construction, which is why nothing ever warned.
The default is now "ungraded" and is_high_risk returns true for anything outside
an explicit low-risk vocabulary (standard / low / accepted). An omitted grade and
an unrecognised grade from a newer catalog both resolve to high, so the boundary
fails safe in both directions rather than reading an unknown value as permission.
test_every_repo_catalog_lane_is_explicitly_graded is the CI gate that stops an
ungraded lane being committed, per ADR-0007: absence is not a grade.
"accepted" is in the low-risk vocabulary deliberately, ready for the
maturity-derived default — an experimental-context lane may be explicitly
accepted, which is a graded decision rather than an omission.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every execution position is now explicit. Catalog entries carry
delegation.mode (permanent / native / interim) with intended owner and
blocker. warden route gaps lists the interim set. Promotion requires
the ownership question. Doctrine lives in AccessRouting.md; the
register was published to the named owner repos.
RAILIANCE-WP-0011-T03: point reuse-surface-hub-write-token catalog,
playbook, and tests at bao kv get on platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets;
kubectl documented as break-glass only.
REUSE_SURFACE_TOKEN is custody of the Railiance01 K8s secret reuse-surface-env,
not OpenBao. Workers blocked on hub register can now discover the lane via
warden route find and obtain it through the documented kubectl handoff.
RAILIANCE-WP-0009 T06 / RAILIANCE-WP-0010 T06 (CCR-2026-0002, CCR-2026-0003):
both OpenBao KV paths are live, ESO delivers the Secrets in cluster, and
positive/negative access verification is audit-logged. Catalog entries gain
concrete zero-placeholder handoffs (exec_capable, resolvable); draft tables
and playbook gates updated; routing tests repointed to still-draft lanes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Document the railiance-platform credential broker as the owner-native path
for scoped VAULT_TOKEN needs. Add catalog entry, playbook, and doc updates
so warden route find ranks the broker lane first; manual export remains a
documented fallback only.
secrets-engine (SECRETS-WP-0003) shipped a native secret-exec front door
(`secrets-engine route/exec`, decision e6381a56) and asked ops-warden to route to it.
Bernd's call: route-primary, proxy-fallback — surface the secrets-engine exec as the
primary path for owned lanes, keep `warden access --exec` as a transparent fallback.
T1 — RouteEntry gains exec_owner/exec_command/pointer_command (+ has_native_exec),
screened for secret material like the other handoff fields. whynot-design-npm-publish
points its native exec at secrets-engine. `warden access` renders Primary (secrets-engine
exec) + Fallback (warden proxy); route/access JSON gain the fields and a native-exec-aware
next_action. Tests added; 217 pass, lint clean.
T2 — credential-routing.md adds secrets-engine as the secret-exec owner (route primary,
proxy fallback); SCOPE adds secrets-engine to Related Repos and records the npm lane as
production-exercised (@whynot/design@0.4.0); playbook leads with secrets-engine exec and
fixes the fallback one-liner (--field NPM_AUTH_TOKEN, --no-policy) per whynot-design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
railiance-platform finished provisioning the whynot-design npm publish lane
(CCR-2026-0001, commit 8f617fc: active, readiness=ready, resolvable=true, positive
fetch + negative denial verified). First concrete warden access --fetch-resolvable
non-SSH lane — end-to-end proof of the WP-0014 conduit + WP-0017 discoverability.
T1 — catalog entry whynot-design-npm-publish (active, exec_capable) with the
owner-confirmed zero-placeholder handoff: path platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/
npm-publish (the superseded whynot-design/whynot-design/... form is not used), field
NPM_AUTH_TOKEN, OIDC role whynot-design-workload-kv-read, policy + flex-auth ref. Added
wiki/playbooks/whynot-design-npm-publish.md.
T2 — RouteEntry.resolvable (active + exec_capable + no <…> placeholder), surfaced in
route/access --json; Catalog.find resolves an exact catalog-id first so
`warden access whynot-design-npm-publish` is deterministic. Tests added; fixed a
no-match test query that substring-collided (no ⊂ whynot). 213 pass, lint clean.
T3 — notified whynot-design (zero-placeholder command + resolvable gate + path
correction) and confirmed activation to railiance-platform. Sibling lanes stay draft
per their deferral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WP-0014 made ops-warden the operator access front door (warden access --fetch/--exec
proxies an exec_capable secret as the caller), but every discovery surface still told
the pre-WP-0014 "SSH certs only, pointer not key" story — so agents like whynot-design
never found the proxy and concluded they had to message ops-warden for a token value.
Messaging/discoverability only; the conduit security model is unchanged (no custody,
no broker).
T1 — CLI: `warden route` table warden column is now three-valued (issue/assist/route);
route + access JSON gain warden_role + exec_capable and a proxy-aware next_action;
`warden access` closing line leads with "ops-warden can fetch this for you as the
caller" for exec_capable lanes (route-only lanes keep "owner vends").
T2 — .claude/rules/credential-routing.md reframed (lead + routing table role column);
SCOPE one-liner + a second capability block for the access front door.
T3 — registered the State Hub capability "Operator access front door (caller-identity
fetch proxy)" (the hub had no ops-warden security capability at all); messaged
whynot-design the corrected `warden access "npm auth token" --fetch/--exec` path.
210 tests pass, lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds optional assist-layer fields (auth_method, path_template,
fetch_command, exec_capable, policy_ref) to RouteEntry, parsed and
secret-screened in catalog.py. Handoff fields are templates/pointers
only — _assert_no_secret_material rejects known token prefixes and
high-entropy runs, and exec_capable requires a fetch_command. The
openbao-api-key entry is populated as the reference example (covers the
coulomb_social npm shape).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add platform-secret playbooks for issue-core ingestion, OpenRouter llm-connect,
object-storage STS, and database dynamic credentials. Extend the routing catalog
with draft entries and implement `warden route list --stale` for quarterly drift
review. Document the review cadence in AccessRouting and mark the workplan finished.
Add a read-only `warden route` command group (list/show/find) that reads
registry/routing/catalog.yaml and tells a worker which subsystem owns a need
and which wiki/canon doc to follow. ops-warden still executes exactly one lane
(SSH); routed entries return a pointer and never call any subsystem.
- src/warden/routing/: models.py + catalog.py loader; enforces the
no-double-source rule (non-SSH entries with steps/cert_command fail validation),
dup-id and schema checks.
- route list (active-only unless --all, --tag), route show (SSH appends steps +
cert pattern; routed ends with "next action on <owner> — see <wiki_ref>"),
route find (keyword ranking, --json).
- tests/test_routing.py: load/validation, find ranking, CLI JSON shapes, plus a
drift guard (every wiki_ref anchor resolves; every entry has a reviewed date).
- Docs: wiki/AccessRouting.md CLI section, README quick reference, SCOPE A3 -> A4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
