Six inbound messages attended, three of them carrying real asks.
flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-004 answers WARDEN-WP-0034-T05's decision-lifetime
question: a decision lifetime shorter than the certificate TTL is meaningful,
but only as authority to ISSUE, never to USE an already-issued certificate.
The question had mistaken a decision lifetime for a credential lifetime. They
declined to move the §9.7.2 revocation residue to their side; that refusal is
right and the stance map is unchanged. T05 still waits on ops-mason and
railiance-infra.
WARDEN-WP-0039-T03 routed to flex-auth: is there an admitted contract for a
delegated credential read where caller and resource owner differ? Three
outcomes named as equally acceptable, including that there should be no such
contract and the interim proxy transport is itself the defect -- which would
shorten WP-0033 rather than block it. Two easy fixes ruled out in writing:
broadening the caller binding, and relabelling resource.system as ops-warden
so the binding matches. The second would make the audit trail assert we own
credentials we deliberately do not, by editing a field instead of making an
argument.
WARDEN-WP-0037: npm path routed to railiance-platform, catalog unchanged
pending their answer. secrets-engine refused to resolve it from a
coordination message and was right; asserting our own pointer is
authoritative because it is ours would route around that. The ask names a
location only, and flags that a `bao kv get` answer would be the 2026-07-16
disclosure vector on a risk: high lane.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1276224@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
The standard is accepted at v0.7, with SECURITY-COMPANION.md v0.2 as its
operative form. Four ops-warden findings were adopted between v0.4 and v0.7 —
§9.1's two marks, §5's Tooling scope rule, §6.4 obligation 1's second limb, and
§13.1's existence — and both ops-warden declaration artifacts are now cited in
the text as the estate's reference forms.
INTENT.md gains frontmatter (layer: Staff, pep_shaped: true) because §11 requires
a machine-readable declaration and prose cannot distinguish a declaration from a
transcribed review. The note now covers the agent principal (§3.4), the PEP
shape, the attributive evidence position, and the role the companion assigns:
the estate is told to ask ops-warden which lane, which credential, which route.
SCOPE.md records what is actually shipped against v0.7 and the honest conformance
state — declared gap, which is tracked non-conformance, not conformance.
The assessment checked every obligation against shipped code rather than intent.
Three gaps survive:
- §9.7.2 requires a PEP to state one revocation visibility deadline. Ours is
unstated, and the honest value is uncomfortable: the cert TTL, up to 48h. A
cert outlives revocation of the decision that authorized it — no CRL, no KRL
distribution. That is a design property never written down, which is exactly
what §9.7.2 exists to force into the open.
- §3.4 rule 1 forbids standing credentials and requires issued, attributable
authority. ADR-0004's boundary keys on WARDEN_AGENT_ID, which an agent sets
about itself. key-cape now issues a real coding-agent identity, so the
ops-warden half can stop being advisory.
- §9.6 cadence remains undeclared. Attributive, so SHOULD not MUST, but silence
through two reviews is the one outcome that is not defensible.
WARDEN-WP-0034 addresses all three, plus the discoverability gap the companion
creates and two items to route rather than absorb.
402 tests pass, ruff clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YWBMovyFoy9RRrfL7zKvPJ
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 4014535@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: d0036016-73e8-4da1-8e47-563e3ab39a3c
