`warden plan` scored needs by keyword overlap with no notion of what the
caller wanted to DO, so "generate a successor secret and CAS-write it to two
custodians" matched the lane that READS that path and inherited its
`autonomous` verdict -- answered with --out/--exec/--wrap.
Two counterparties reported it in two days. key-cape distrusted the output on
principle and was right to; railiance-platform, answering as the write
authority being wrongly bypassed, said plainly that `founder_required` is the
verdict it should have returned and that until it is fixed a plan result must
not stand in for the owner's answer.
A mutating need on a lane ops-warden does not permanently own can no longer
reach any branch returning `autonomous`: it becomes `founder_required` with
an approve act naming the write owner, or `unroutable` with a CCR stub when
the lane admits no rotation route. Commands carry no read transport either
way, which is the half that made the wrong verdict actionable.
The ownership test does the work a verb list cannot. SSH certificate
issuance is itself a mutating act, so `delegation.mode: permanent` -- not the
absence of a verb -- separates ops-warden's own front door from someone
else's custody. A regression asserts `warden sign` still proceeds; a guard
that refused our own lane would be worse than the defect it fixes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C
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Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C
Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
key-cape corrected two blockers that had stopped being true after our
2026-08-28 source-read:
- rapp-qonto-keycape-client: `keycape service-token` (2026-09-05) is the
native exchange the blocker recorded as absent, and `keycape verify-client`
(2026-09-08) is rotation step 3 as one command. Narrowed to steps 1-2 --
successor generation and the CAS write -- rather than cleared, as they
asked. rotation.automatable -> false so a future executable driver is not
told a lane with no admitted custody transport is drivable; the per-step
truth moves into the steps.
- key-cape-oidc-login: ownership ACCEPTED by key-cape, so verified moves from
asked-and-waiting to owner-confirmed. Lane stays interim -- acceptance
covers the identity half, while the fetch_command yields an OpenBao token
whose mount, role mapping and enforcement are not key-cape's.
Two tests pinned `key-cape-oidc-login` to sitting `asked-and-waiting`, so
answering the question broke them -- they failed on good news. Both now
assert the property instead: an unverified blocker is stale regardless of
date, over whatever lanes are in that state.
Verifying the routing answer against our own front door turned up a defect:
`warden plan` returns `autonomous` for a custody *write* and answers it with
read transports, because it has no read-versus-mutate intent. Recorded as
WARDEN-WP-0038 (proposed) -- the WP-0033-T06 shape, as a class this time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1276224@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
