flex-auth enforced its ops-warden pin (FLEX-WP-0016 T03) and the gate verified
clean against it: readiness exits 0, decision:f3f7c88f9585582a, anonymous
/v1/check now 401. Everything needed to set policy.enabled: true was in place.
It stays false, by decision. policy.enabled is a single repo-wide boolean, and
with fail_closed: true it makes flex-auth a hard dependency of every warden
sign — including the certs the ops-bridge tunnels depend on, one of which
carries the policy call itself. Uniform enforcement across an estate being
actively rebuilt hardens the access needed to perform the rebuild.
The repo already refuses one-dimensional posture: WP-0015 shipped environment
and maturity axes, WP-0029 added organization_posture. A global flag ignores all
three. ADR-0006 records that enforcement belongs to a zone, and binds future
work — a zone-blind enforcement flag is out of order, not merely unwise.
WARDEN-WP-0032 drafts the zone model, leading with the ownership question:
whether this is ops-warden's to own or NetKingdom canon to consume (ADR-0005).
WP-0031 is finished with T05 cancelled and resuming as WP-0032-T05.
Also replaces the hand-run kubectl port-forward with a managed ops-bridge
tunnel, flex-auth-ops-warden-railiance01 (-L 19090:10.43.1.165:8080).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CoulombCore is being retired, so the docs stop using it as the reference host:
state-hub-coulombcore examples become state-hub-railiance01, and the reuse-surface
playbook no longer attributes bao.coulomb.social to it — that resolves to
92.205.62.239, which is railiance01. The openrouter lane keeps its factual note
about ESO on the CoulombCore cluster, with a retirement flag for its owner.
Also corrects this session's own error. The WP-0031 evidence blamed the
Unauthorized on a local-port collision between k3s-api-coulombcore and
k3s-api-haskelseed. That was wrong: the haskelseed tunnel is a reverse forward,
where local_port is a destination rather than a listener, so they never competed.
16443 was simply CoulombCore's k3s — a different cluster whose client CA does not
know that cert. The wrong reason had already gone to flex-auth, so it is
corrected in the file rather than quietly dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
flex-auth's binding names system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden, and that
ServiceAccount did not exist. deploy/kubernetes/caller-identity.yaml creates it
plus its namespace — no RBAC, automount off; it is never used to call the
Kubernetes API, only to be TokenReviewed. Applied to the railiance01 cluster.
Operator warden.yaml now uses caller_auth mode: command (kubectl create token,
audience flex-auth, 10m). Gate exits 0 live against a port-forward of the pin:
HTTP 200, effect=allow, decision:f3f7c88f9585582a.
The evidence is not that allow — warn allows anonymous callers too. It is that
the pin's "caller authentication warning" count held at 4 across two
authenticated runs. That is the ADHOC-2026-08-17-T01 condition.
Also gives the readiness probe a structurally complete context, so a deny means
the policy said no rather than the probe being malformed.
policy.enabled stays false. T05 waits on flex-auth setting callerAuth.mode:
enforce (their FLEX-WP-0016 T03).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
flex-auth's flex-auth-ops-warden pin (FLEX-WP-0016) TokenReviews the caller and
binds resource.system: ops-warden to system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden.
policy.py posted /v1/check with no Authorization header, so the pin logs
"caller authentication warning" and can only run callerAuth.mode: warn — which,
under ADHOC-2026-08-17-T01, is exactly what blocks policy.enabled: true.
- policy.caller_auth (none | file | env | command) + src/warden/caller_identity.py:
token resolved per call, never cached, written, or logged (ADR-0002)
- both check_sign_policy and check_fetch_policy attach the bearer header; an
unobtainable token fails closed rather than retrying anonymously
- scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py: read-only gate, prints length and a
truncated fingerprint only, distinguishes 401 (audience/binding) from 403
- example config: caller_auth block, and flex_auth_url corrected — it pointed at
flex-auth.flex-auth.svc, a Service that does not exist
- WARDEN-WP-0031, PolicyGatedSigning caller-identity section and flip sequence
Default stays mode: none, so behaviour is unchanged until an operator opts in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
