Five rules that governed this repo lived in wiki prose, a workplan, and a
comment at the top of catalog.yaml. All were followed; none was addressable.
A reader outside ops-warden could not cite one, could not tell whether it was
current, and — the point of this change — could not tell whether it was ours
to change or someone else's that we merely obey.
ADR-0001 The routing catalog is a pointer layer, never a second copy
ADR-0002 ops-warden is a transparent conduit, never a secret broker
ADR-0003 Cover gaps, but never silently own them
ADR-0004 High-risk lanes refuse raw value streaming to agent sessions
ADR-0005 Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else
Each carries owner: ops-warden, which is the load-bearing field. It says we
follow the rule AND we are responsible for changing it — by superseding ADR,
never an in-place edit. The failure this prevents runs both ways: a rule we own
mistaken for inherited canon never gets fixed, because we wait for an owner who
does not exist; inherited canon mistaken for ours gets quietly bent, and the
drift is invisible until it breaks a repo that trusted the canonical version.
Rules we follow but do not own — NetKingdom canon, the IAM profile, the
credential-management standard, the-custodian's ADR-001 workplan convention —
are cited, never copied into docs/adr/. Copying them would recreate exactly the
second-source-of-truth failure ADR-0001 exists to prevent. architecture.md also
now flags the three-digit/four-digit ADR-001 vs ADR-0001 collision, which is
itself an ours-versus-inherited confusion waiting to happen.
Publication verified rather than assumed: all five render through policy-nexus
tools/render.py, and owner reaches the reader in three places — the page eyebrow
(render.py:346), the index Owner column (build_site.py:123,137), and the
publication manifest. build_site.py:179 makes title/status/owner required, so
ownership cannot be dropped on the way out. policy-nexus publishes and never
writes back; docs/adr/ stays the source of truth.
Documentation adapted: SCOPE.md gains a Governing rules section and an orientation
entry; .claude/rules/architecture.md replaced its stub with the ADR index, the
owned-versus-inherited rule, and ADR-over-wiki precedence; finding-routing.md's
ADR-gap section closed; catalog.yaml's no-double-source header now cites ADR-0001
rather than the originating workplan.
uv run pytest -q → 338 passed, 4 deselected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two estate repos now own things ops-warden had been handling in-repo by
default. New rule .claude/rules/finding-routing.md, wired into CLAUDE.md.
The correction it encodes: on 2026-08-17 flex-auth reported a live
authorization bypass directly to ops-warden — in the service our own pre-sign
gate consults. We answered the design question and wrote the recommendation
into wiki/NetKingdomSecurityMap.md, and did not route the finding.
rapp-postgres filed it, which is why RISK-F-0001 reads
reported_via: rapp-postgres despite ops-warden being a first-hand recipient
and the affected PEP. That is the exact failure risk-nexus/INTENT names:
findings landing in whichever document was open. A wiki section answers a
question; it carries no severity, owner, date, or review that fires when
nobody looks. Answering and routing are not alternatives.
Also recorded: the delegation register is explicitly NOT a findings feed
(risk-nexus wants a register small enough to read); severity/disclosure/
escalation stay unset when we route, because the reporter says what is true
and that repo says how bad it is; and a blocker is a claim about the world at
a date — RISK-F-0001 invalidated one of ours in a day.
Offers warden plan (WP-0029) to risk-nexus for its unwritten escalation duty:
a shipped classifier for what must reach the operator personally, decided by
properties rather than instinct, carrying reasons and a typed act.
Flags but does not close the policy-nexus gap: ops-warden has no ADRs, yet
carries rules that govern other repos (no-double-source, conduit-not-broker,
interim-by-default, agent read-boundary). They sit in wiki prose and are
therefore unpublishable and uncitable. Structural call, left to the operator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ship posture-aware access planning: organization_posture=build (axis C),
catalog freshness warnings, warden plan verdicts, localhost founder desk,
and playbook/agent guidance that retire /tmp file-drop patterns.
Compose route catalog + handoff rather than a second routing layer.
Sync AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/rules from updated project_rules
templates: workplan-first session protocol, legacy terminology footnote,
and GET /workplans/ examples.
secrets-engine (SECRETS-WP-0003) shipped a native secret-exec front door
(`secrets-engine route/exec`, decision e6381a56) and asked ops-warden to route to it.
Bernd's call: route-primary, proxy-fallback — surface the secrets-engine exec as the
primary path for owned lanes, keep `warden access --exec` as a transparent fallback.
T1 — RouteEntry gains exec_owner/exec_command/pointer_command (+ has_native_exec),
screened for secret material like the other handoff fields. whynot-design-npm-publish
points its native exec at secrets-engine. `warden access` renders Primary (secrets-engine
exec) + Fallback (warden proxy); route/access JSON gain the fields and a native-exec-aware
next_action. Tests added; 217 pass, lint clean.
T2 — credential-routing.md adds secrets-engine as the secret-exec owner (route primary,
proxy fallback); SCOPE adds secrets-engine to Related Repos and records the npm lane as
production-exercised (@whynot/design@0.4.0); playbook leads with secrets-engine exec and
fixes the fallback one-liner (--field NPM_AUTH_TOKEN, --no-policy) per whynot-design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WP-0014 made ops-warden the operator access front door (warden access --fetch/--exec
proxies an exec_capable secret as the caller), but every discovery surface still told
the pre-WP-0014 "SSH certs only, pointer not key" story — so agents like whynot-design
never found the proxy and concluded they had to message ops-warden for a token value.
Messaging/discoverability only; the conduit security model is unchanged (no custody,
no broker).
T1 — CLI: `warden route` table warden column is now three-valued (issue/assist/route);
route + access JSON gain warden_role + exec_capable and a proxy-aware next_action;
`warden access` closing line leads with "ops-warden can fetch this for you as the
caller" for exec_capable lanes (route-only lanes keep "owner vends").
T2 — .claude/rules/credential-routing.md reframed (lead + routing table role column);
SCOPE one-liner + a second capability block for the access front door.
T3 — registered the State Hub capability "Operator access front door (caller-identity
fetch proxy)" (the hub had no ops-warden security capability at all); messaged
whynot-design the corrected `warden access "npm auth token" --fetch/--exec` path.
210 tests pass, lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md: warden access contract, conduit-vs-broker
boundary, the three guardrails + catalog secret guard, lane semantics.
- AccessRouting.md: issue/route/assist roles; reconciled the anti-pattern
table so the transparent conduit no longer contradicts it.
- credential-routing.md rule: added warden access + "standing broker
forbidden, transparent --fetch sanctioned" anti-pattern.
- INTENT.md: pointer→assist charter extension. SCOPE.md: implemented
list + Getting Oriented + maturity A4→A5 (Availability).
- history decision record for the proxy-mode choice and guardrails.
WP-0014 finished (T1–T5). 172 passed, lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Align agent files with on-disk workplan prefixes (infer from workplan ids)
- Set workplan domain to registered domain_slug; add topic_slug where applicable
- Repair frontmatter delimiter formatting; migrate legacy task status literals
- Regenerate AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/rules from State Hub templates
Implements WARDEN-WP-0010 (charter + pointer catalog). ops-warden issues
short-lived SSH certificates and routes every other credential need to the
subsystem that owns it — no desk metaphor, one execution lane.
- wiki/AccessRouting.md: role/boundary, issue-vs-route matrix, anti-patterns
- registry/routing/catalog.yaml: machine-readable pointer layer (6 active + 1
draft). No-double-source rule enforced structurally — authored steps/cert_command
only on the warden_executes:true SSH entry; every wiki_ref anchor resolves
- wiki/CredentialRouting.md: catalog-keyed index + no-duplicate-interfaces note
- INTENT/SCOPE/AGENTS/repo-boundary/capability: aligned to the new framing;
SCOPE notes A3 -> A4 lands with WP-0011 warden route CLI
- WP-0011/0012 + WP-0010: state_hub id writeback; WP-0010 marked done
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Post-WP-0007 reassessment and SCOPE/README updates
- AGENTS.md + workplan-convention task status canon migration
- examples/warden.production.example.yaml for production OpenBao
- Archive WP-0004 through WP-0007 to workplans/archived/260617-*
- WP-0008 T1/T3/T4 done; T2/T5 wait on operator/flex-auth
Update SCOPE and README to reflect the shipped warden CLI, fill agent
rules for stack/architecture/boundary, archive finished workplans
0001–0003, and register WP-0004 in State Hub.
