- warden/mask.py: fingerprint()/mask_value() — presence, length, 8-char sha256
prefix; never the value.
- proxy.proxy_fetch_fingerprint + `warden access --fingerprint`: masked status view
(presence/length/hash) that emits no value, so it bypasses the T02 stdout guard.
Lets two parties compare sha256 prefixes to confirm a shared value without seeing
it (e.g. rotation landed).
- documented as defense-in-depth (raw bao bypasses it) in OperatorAccessAssist.md
and the module docstring.
- tests: tests/test_mask.py + CLI fingerprint test. 299 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T01 (done): canonical capabilities-based verify pattern in the fleet promotion
checklist (catalog-lane-promotion.md) and applied to the railiance-backup and
forgejo-admin lane playbooks. Verification proves allow/deny via
`bao token capabilities` against the KV v2 data path, never `bao kv get`; a denied
default-policy token-create is a pass, not a privileged-fallback trigger.
T07 (progress): lessons-learned note for the 2026-07-16 CCR-2026-0004 disclosure
(three root causes). Live re-verify + rotation block remain (depend on T06).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the 2026-07-16 CCR-2026-0004 verify disclosure incident. Strand A:
capabilities-based verification, safe access transport, masking (defense-in-depth),
agent read-boundary, EXPOSED taint convention, and a structured-but-advisory
rotation/re-establishment guidance registry surfaced via warden. Strand B deferred.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
