Commit graph

6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
b9151e20da Hold the WARDEN-WP-0037-T03 rotation until secrets-engine moves the lane.
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 5s
The live publish path is the ungoverned legacy location; this runbook
rotates the governed one, so a rotation now would not reach it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703
2026-09-21 07:31:28 +02:00
baf53602ca Revert the npm field, re-measure coverage, and hold the layer divergence
Five inbox items worked, none of which changed a credential value or moved a
secret.

whynot-design-npm-publish: field reverted npm_token -> NPM_AUTH_TOKEN and the
path confirmed, on railiance-platform's attended, read-only, no-value field
enumeration (their docs/evidence/2026-09-10-npm-lane-field-resolution.json).
Exactly one field is present at the governed path. The 2026-09-09 change was
adopted from a coordination message and would have failed at the WP-0037-T03
rotation. The ungoverned second location is recorded as an explicit non-lane,
not deleted and not tidied away.

pep-stance coverage: published figures were stale by eight lanes (unknown
18->20, not_applicable 12->15) while resolved stayed at 3 — the denominator
moved, the classification did not. Caught by the test that asserts the published
block equals what report_coverage.py measures. tests/test_workload_join.py held
the same stale counts; both now measure the same populations.

rapp-qonto-keycape-client: blocker character updated — authority exists and is
unexercised by owner decision ("not yet", offer open), which is not the same as
no authority existing. Reopen triggers are events, never elapsed time.

flex-auth -> access-engine rename (WARDEN-IN-0003): access-engine added to the
policy-check lane's keywords so routing resolves under both names from today.
owner_repo deliberately not flipped — policy.py sends it as resource.system on
every /v1/check, and FLEX-DEC-2026-013 keeps runtime names as flex-auth.

layer declaration: INTENT.md says Staff, layer.yaml says staff, section 11 does
not say which governs. Neither changed; gate-house holds the ruling. Position in
docs/layer-declaration-precedence.md, wait in WARDEN-WP-0034-T06, and a comment
in layer.yaml telling the next session not to "fix" it — the divergence is the
evidence the ruling is made against.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703
2026-09-21 02:16:33 +02:00
c8be24b940 Classify open workplans with flavor (CUST-WP-0072).
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 2s
Set flavor on open workplans from origin/prose/status. Copy existing
depends_on aliases only. Do not promote residuals.

Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a09dc1-b21e-77e1-919e-fcad2f82b267
2026-09-14 15:50:43 +02:00
3aedd8f844 docs: record the answers received and the questions routed
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 1s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 2s
Six inbound messages attended, three of them carrying real asks.

flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-004 answers WARDEN-WP-0034-T05's decision-lifetime
question: a decision lifetime shorter than the certificate TTL is meaningful,
but only as authority to ISSUE, never to USE an already-issued certificate.
The question had mistaken a decision lifetime for a credential lifetime. They
declined to move the §9.7.2 revocation residue to their side; that refusal is
right and the stance map is unchanged. T05 still waits on ops-mason and
railiance-infra.

WARDEN-WP-0039-T03 routed to flex-auth: is there an admitted contract for a
delegated credential read where caller and resource owner differ? Three
outcomes named as equally acceptable, including that there should be no such
contract and the interim proxy transport is itself the defect -- which would
shorten WP-0033 rather than block it. Two easy fixes ruled out in writing:
broadening the caller binding, and relabelling resource.system as ops-warden
so the binding matches. The second would make the audit trail assert we own
credentials we deliberately do not, by editing a field instead of making an
argument.

WARDEN-WP-0037: npm path routed to railiance-platform, catalog unchanged
pending their answer. secrets-engine refused to resolve it from a
coordination message and was right; asserting our own pointer is
authoritative because it is ours would route around that. The ask names a
location only, and flags that a `bao kv get` answer would be the 2026-07-16
disclosure vector on a risk: high lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1276224@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
2026-09-09 16:40:46 +02:00
89b117f640 docs(workplan): persist Forgejo token rotation gate
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 1s
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a06d83-1cbc-71f2-b0dc-e0f48cedae43
2026-09-04 23:42:24 +02:00
81f28ff814 feat(routing): repoint whynot npm lane to Forgejo
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 1s
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a06d83-1cbc-71f2-b0dc-e0f48cedae43
2026-09-04 23:39:11 +02:00