risk-nexus accepted the offer to match their convention rather than grow a second
one, and published it: 14d critical/high, 30d medium, 60d low, nothing auto-closing
on staleness alone. Their preference — point warden route gaps at those windows and
the two registers agree without a shared mechanism — is better than a joint tool.
blocker_stale_days() now maps lane risk onto those windows. A flat 14 would have
been wrong in both directions: too aggressive for a low-risk pointer, and it treated
an admin PAT lane the same as one.
ungraded takes the shortest window, not the longest. ADR-0007 makes an absent grade
a defect and ADR-0008 makes a grade cover the whole path, so a lane nobody graded is
the one whose blocker deserves least trust. Encoding that as 60 days would have been
the fail-open default this repo already fixed once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 90-day --stale-days default on `warden route gaps` was not a loose threshold,
it was an inert one: the delegation register was created 2026-08-15, so it could
not have fired before November. It was inherited from the catalog pointer cadence
and applied to a claim with a completely different half-life.
Two changes. DEFAULT_BLOCKER_STALE_DAYS = 14 now governs interim blockers, while
DEFAULT_STALE_DAYS = 90 keeps governing pointer freshness -- "is this the right
owner and page" is quarterly, "has the owner answered" is not. 14 is calibrated
on blockers that actually cost something: ten days for the secrets-engine lanes,
one for RISK-F-0001, roughly fifty for FLEX-WP-0007.
The second change matters more. `reviewed` records when someone touched an entry,
which is indistinguishable from re-checking it -- six lanes read as freshly
reviewed today because I typed in them. `verified:` now says how the claim was
established, and asked-and-waiting explicitly does NOT count: that is the state
the secrets-engine blocker sat in for ten days while looking current. A lane in
that state is stale at zero days old, and key-cape-oidc-login proves it works.
8 of 14 interim lanes are honestly marked unverified rather than given a fresh
date they did not earn.
--fail-on-stale exits 3 for a cron or gate. No CI test on age: a date-triggered
failure breaks the build for whoever commits next instead of whoever owns the
blocker. The CI test is structural -- every interim lane must record how it was
verified -- so it fails on the commit that introduces the omission.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_catalog_gaps_lists_only_interim asserted openbao-api-key was an interim
cover. It encoded the same classification the entry did, so it defended the
wrong answer rather than catching it -- the second time this session a test has
held a judgement still (see ADR-0008).
The staleness test added in T03 did its job on the first real change: it failed
the moment the catalog moved without the generated artifact being re-emitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three fixes, the first of which is my own botched edit from an hour ago.
1. The "six delivery modes" claim was never actually removed. I ran a str.replace
with no assertion on the result, it matched nothing, and the print said "ok".
The wrong claim sat in all seven lanes while I told secrets-engine it was
fixed. This edit asserts 5/1/1 and fails loudly otherwise.
2. Five lanes ACCEPTED (SECRETS-WP-0006, decision ae676382). The blocker now
records that secrets-engine holds the entry and that the interim proxy retires
on approved native verification in T05 -- not on acceptance. Retiring early
would drop the cover before the replacement is proven.
3. Two lanes REFUSED, and both refusals are right:
- key-cape-oidc-login: intended_owner corrected secrets-engine -> key-cape.
Login and identity-token issuance were never secrets-engine's. Not yet asked
of key-cape, and the record says so.
- openbao-api-key: not a delegable lane at all -- a <domain>/<workload>/<bundle>
routing template, not one secret lane, so there is no front door to own.
interim -> native with railiance-platform named: OpenBao is itself the front
door and this entry is a pointer to it, never an interim cover. It should
not have been inflating the interim count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
railiance-platform asked for a generated list to consume instead of hand-
maintaining agent-high-risk-boundary. Hand-maintaining it is what let the two
lists drift for four lanes in RISK-F-0009.
19 high-risk lanes, 14 concrete data paths, 5 without a single KV address listed
separately so absence does not read as omission. Carries catalog_revision and a
dirty flag. fields is null where unestablished, never a one-element guess.
The header states plainly that this is an input and not a policy: railiance-
platform owns the deny set and may deny more, less, or dispute a grade. ADR-0002
survives the handoff.
Two CI tests guard staleness, because a consumer applies this to a live control.
Note the immediate consequence of T02: 2 uncovered against a policy they closed
to 0 yesterday.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
