diff --git a/.claude/rules/architecture.md b/.claude/rules/architecture.md index 6e11407..6f6cde3 100644 --- a/.claude/rules/architecture.md +++ b/.claude/rules/architecture.md @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ distinction that matters here. | `ADR-0005` | Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else | | `ADR-0006` | Enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag | | `ADR-0007` | Build-stage permissiveness stops at credential disclosure; every lane carries an explicit `risk` grade | +| `ADR-0008` | A lane's risk grade covers every field its path discloses, not just the field it is named after | ### Owned versus inherited — check `owner:` before changing anything diff --git a/SCOPE.md b/SCOPE.md index 401afef..3581a9e 100644 --- a/SCOPE.md +++ b/SCOPE.md @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ superseding ADR, never an in-place edit. | `ADR-0005` | Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else | | `ADR-0006` | Enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag (`policy.enabled` stays off until WP-0032) | | `ADR-0007` | Build-stage permissiveness stops at credential disclosure; every lane carries an explicit `risk` grade | +| `ADR-0008` | A lane's risk grade covers every field its path discloses, not just the field it is named after | Rules we follow but do not own — NetKingdom canon, the IAM profile, the credential-management standard, the-custodian's ADR-001 workplan convention — are diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md index 017cfb8..6e1015a 100644 --- a/WORK-RECORDS.md +++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ | workplan | WARDEN-WP-0030 | finished | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0030-delegation-register.md | | workplan | WARDEN-WP-0031 | finished | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0031-policy-caller-identity.md | | workplan | WARDEN-WP-0032 | proposed | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md | +| workplan | WARDEN-WP-0033 | active | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md | | task | ADHOC-2026-06-27-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-06-27.md | | task | ADHOC-2026-06-29-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-06-29.md | | task | ADHOC-2026-08-11-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-11.md | @@ -121,3 +122,7 @@ | task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T04 | wait | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md | | task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T05 | done | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md | | task | WARDEN-WP-0032-T06 | progress | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0032-security-zones.md | +| task | WARDEN-WP-0033-T01 | progress | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md | +| task | WARDEN-WP-0033-T02 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md | +| task | WARDEN-WP-0033-T03 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md | +| task | WARDEN-WP-0033-T04 | todo | — | workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md | diff --git a/docs/adr/ADR-0008-grade-the-path-not-the-field.md b/docs/adr/ADR-0008-grade-the-path-not-the-field.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c2f317 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/adr/ADR-0008-grade-the-path-not-the-field.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +--- +id: ops-warden-adr-0008 +type: adr +title: "ADR-0008 — A lane's risk grade covers every field its path discloses" +domain: infotech +repo: ops-warden +status: accepted +version: "1.0" +revision: "1" +owner: ops-warden +binds: "ops-warden" +created: "2026-08-21" +updated: "2026-08-21" +last_reviewed: "2026-08-21" +review_interval: 6m +enforced_by: "registry/routing/catalog.yaml fields + risk; tests/test_routing.py::test_high_risk_lanes_classified" +supersedes: "" +successor: "" +--- + +# ADR-0008 — A lane's risk grade covers every field its path discloses + +## Status + +Accepted 2026-08-21, after `secrets-engine` found two under-graded lanes while +reviewing ops-warden's own catalog metadata. + +## Context + +`ADR-0007` requires every catalog lane to carry an explicit `risk` grade. It does +not say what the grade is *of*, and the omission turned out to matter. + +The catalog describes a lane by a single `fetch_command` naming a single field — +`bao kv get -field=ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY `. Grading followed that description. +But the unit of disclosure is not the field, it is the **path**: `bao kv get` +without `-field` returns every key stored there, and an agent session that +discloses one field has disclosed all of them. + +On 2026-08-19, grading all 27 lanes, ops-warden graded +`issue-core-ingestion-api-key` and `reuse-surface-hub-write-token` as `standard` +— "ordinary internal workload secrets". Both grades read only the headline field. +`CCR-2026-0002` records a deliberate decision to keep `GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN` at the +first path; `CCR-2026-0005` declares a dual-consumer webhook HMAC at the second. +Neither is recovered by rotating the credential the lane is named after. + +Three details make this worth a record rather than a fix: + +- **The evidence was already ours.** The field sets were in the CCRs the catalog + already cites as authoritative. This was not missing data; it was unread data. +- **A test held the error still.** `test_high_risk_lanes_classified` asserted + `issue-core-ingestion-api-key` was *not* high. A first grading pass had marked + it high, the test contradicted it, and the test was believed. A test that + encodes a judgement defends that judgement from correction. +- **Another repo found it.** `secrets-engine` graded both `high` independently + while drafting catalog entries whose schema records `fields`. A schema that + names the field set makes the right grade obvious; ours did not have one. + +## Decision + +**A lane's `risk` grade is a property of its path, and must cover the union of +everything a read of that path would disclose.** + +1. Where the field set is known, the catalog records it as `fields`, with the + authority it came from. +2. The grade is argued against the most damaging field, not the named one. +3. Where the field set is unknown, that is stated — never assumed to be one + field. An unverified field set is a reason to grade conservatively, matching + the `inter-hub-bootstrap-ssh` precedent under `ADR-0007`. +4. Establishing a field set must not be done by reading the secret. Use the + owning CCR, the owner's catalog, or `bao kv metadata`. `bao kv get` on a + high-risk path is the 2026-07-16 vector and is forbidden by + `ADR-0004` for agent sessions regardless of intent. + +## Consequences + +`ADR-0007` is unchanged and still governs: every lane carries an explicit grade, +and absence fails safe. This record says what that grade must account for. + +Grading gets more expensive: it now requires knowing what is at a path, not just +what the lane is called. That cost is the point — the cheap version produced two +wrong answers in one pass and is the reason this exists. + +A test that asserts a grade is asserting a judgement. When a grade is disputed, +re-argue it from evidence before trusting the test that encodes it. + +## Related + +- `ADR-0007` — every lane carries an explicit grade; build-stage permissiveness + stops at credential disclosure +- `ADR-0004` — high-risk lanes refuse raw value streaming to agent sessions +- `ADR-0001` — the catalog is a pointer layer; `fields` records the owner's + declared field set with its source, and does not restate their procedure +- `WARDEN-WP-0033-T02`; `secrets-engine` `SECRETS-WP-0006` +- `history/2026-07-16-credential-disclosure-lessons.md` diff --git a/docs/adr/README.md b/docs/adr/README.md index 8d0bc11..f66f115 100644 --- a/docs/adr/README.md +++ b/docs/adr/README.md @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ and the publication is a defect. | `ADR-0005` | Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else | ops-warden | | `ADR-0006` | Enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag | ops-warden | | `ADR-0007` | Build-stage permissiveness stops at credential disclosure | ops-warden | +| `ADR-0008` | A lane's risk grade covers every field its path discloses | ops-warden | diff --git a/registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml b/registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26411b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +# GENERATED by scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py -- do not edit by hand. +# Concrete KV data paths for lanes ops-warden grades `risk: high`. +# +# This is an INPUT, not a policy. ops-warden states which paths it grades +# high; railiance-platform owns what agent-high-risk-boundary denies and may +# deny more, deny less, or dispute a grade (ADR-0002, ADR-0008). +# +# Grades cover every field a read of the path discloses, not the field the +# lane is named after (ADR-0008). `fields` is recorded where an owning CCR +# declares it, and is null where the field set has not been established -- +# null means unknown, never 'one field'. + +generated_at: "2026-08-21T06:37:27Z" +source: ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml +catalog_revision: "c357ce5908e562755f3c41c24074edc9d231e6ce" +catalog_revision_date: "2026-08-21T08:36:42+02:00" +catalog_dirty: false +high_risk_lane_count: 19 +concrete_path_count: 14 + +# Graded high but not a single KV address -- a routing pattern, a broker +# grant, or a non-KV lane. Nothing here for a policy to deny. +no_concrete_path: + - database-dynamic-credentials + - inter-hub-bootstrap-ssh + - object-storage-sts + - openbao-api-key + - ops-warden-warden-sign-token + +paths: + - id: agent-harness-binky-mail-approle + data_path: tenants/data/binky/company-email/imap + metadata_path: tenants/metadata/binky/company-email/imap + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: agent-harness-forgejo-deploy + data_path: platform/data/workloads/agent-harness/forgejo-deploy-key + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/agent-harness/forgejo-deploy-key + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: audit-core-senders + data_path: platform/data/workloads/audit-core/senders + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/audit-core/senders + owner_repo: ops-mason + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: binky-company-email-imap + data_path: tenants/data/binky/company-email/imap + metadata_path: tenants/metadata/binky/company-email/imap + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: binky-qonto-api + data_path: tenants/data/binky/qonto-api + metadata_path: tenants/metadata/binky/qonto-api + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: email-connect-transactional + data_path: platform/data/workloads/email-connect/transactional + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/email-connect/transactional + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: forgejo-admin-api-token + data_path: platform/data/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: issue-core-ingestion-api-key + data_path: platform/data/workloads/issue-core/issue-core/issue-core-runtime + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/issue-core/issue-core/issue-core-runtime + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: [ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY, GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN] + - id: openrouter-llm-connect + data_path: platform/data/workloads/activity-core/llm-connect/llm-connect-provider-secrets + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/activity-core/llm-connect/llm-connect-provider-secrets + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: railiance-backup-offsite-lane + data_path: platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: rapp-qonto-keycape-client + data_path: platform/data/workloads/rapp-qonto/keycape-client + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/rapp-qonto/keycape-client + owner_repo: key-cape + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: reuse-surface-hub-write-token + data_path: platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: [REUSE_SURFACE_TOKEN, REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_WEBHOOK_SECRET] + - id: scaleway-bootstrap + data_path: platform/data/workloads/railiance/scaleway/bootstrap + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/railiance/scaleway/bootstrap + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one + - id: whynot-design-npm-publish + data_path: platform/data/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish + metadata_path: platform/metadata/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish + owner_repo: railiance-platform + fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one diff --git a/registry/routing/catalog.yaml b/registry/routing/catalog.yaml index 893a399..6658187 100644 --- a/registry/routing/catalog.yaml +++ b/registry/routing/catalog.yaml @@ -283,9 +283,16 @@ entries: - id: issue-core-ingestion-api-key title: issue-core ingestion API key (OpenBao KV + ESO) - # Ordinary internal workload secret: an ingestion key for a first-party - # service. Rotatable, no spend, no tenant data, no admin scope (WARDEN-WP-0032-T05). - risk: standard + # Regraded standard -> high 2026-08-21 (WARDEN-WP-0033-T02). The T05 grade below + # was wrong, and wrong systematically: it graded the headline field, not the path. + # was: "Ordinary internal workload secret: an ingestion key for a first-party + # service. Rotatable, no spend, no tenant data, no admin scope." + # CCR-2026-0002 records a deliberate field-set decision to keep GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN + # at this path alongside the ingestion key, and a read discloses every field there. + # A Forgejo backend token is not recovered by rotating an ingestion key. + # Found by secrets-engine reviewing SECRETS-WP-0006 -- not by us. + risk: high + fields: [ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY, GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN] # CCR-2026-0002 need_keywords: [issue-core, ingestion, api, key, openbao, issue_core_api_key, eso, external-secrets] owner_repo: railiance-platform subsystem: OpenBao + issue-core + activity-core @@ -323,9 +330,16 @@ entries: - id: reuse-surface-hub-write-token title: reuse-surface federation hub write bearer token - # Ordinary internal workload secret. Write access to a first-party federation - # surface; damaging to forge, but rotatable and internal (WARDEN-WP-0032-T05). - risk: standard + # Regraded standard -> high 2026-08-21 (WARDEN-WP-0033-T02), same defective T05 + # pass as issue-core-ingestion-api-key. + # was: "Ordinary internal workload secret. Write access to a first-party + # federation surface; damaging to forge, but rotatable and internal." + # CCR-2026-0005 declares REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_WEBHOOK_SECRET at this path: a + # dual-consumer HMAC that must stay aligned with Forgejo org webhook id=1 on + # rotation. Disclosure lets an attacker forge webhook deliveries into the + # federation hub, which rotating the write token alone does not undo. + risk: high + fields: [REUSE_SURFACE_TOKEN, REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_WEBHOOK_SECRET] # CCR-2026-0005 need_keywords: [reuse-surface, reuse_surface, hub, register, federation, write, token, bearer, REUSE_SURFACE_TOKEN, REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_WEBHOOK_SECRET, reuse.coulomb.social] owner_repo: railiance-platform subsystem: OpenBao + reuse-surface diff --git a/scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py b/scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000..d8fbe33 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Emit the versioned high-risk data-path artifact (WARDEN-WP-0033-T03). + +`railiance-platform` asked for a generated list of concrete high-risk KV data +paths to consume, instead of hand-maintaining the deny set in +`agent-high-risk-boundary.hcl`. Hand-maintaining it is what let the two lists +drift for four lanes without anyone noticing (`RISK-F-0009`). + +**This artifact is an input, not a policy.** It states which paths ops-warden +grades high. It does not say what to deny -- railiance-platform owns that, and +`ADR-0002` keeps ops-warden a conduit rather than the author of another repo's +control. A consumer is free to deny more, deny less, or disagree with a grade. + +Carries the catalog git revision so a consumer can tell exactly what it was +derived from, and regenerate or diff against it. Read-only: it reads the catalog +and `git`, never OpenBao and never a secret value. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import subprocess +import sys +from datetime import datetime, timezone +from pathlib import Path + +REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent +CATALOG = REPO / "registry" / "routing" / "catalog.yaml" +DEFAULT_OUT = REPO / "registry" / "generated" / "high-risk-data-paths.yaml" + + +def catalog_revision() -> tuple[str, str]: + """(commit, iso-date) of the last change to the catalog. Never guesses.""" + try: + out = subprocess.run( + ["git", "log", "-1", "--format=%H %cI", "--", str(CATALOG)], + cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=True, + ).stdout.strip() + commit, _, date = out.partition(" ") + return commit or "unknown", date or "unknown" + except (subprocess.SubprocessError, FileNotFoundError): + return "unknown", "unknown" + + +def dirty() -> bool: + """True if the catalog has uncommitted edits -- the revision would be a lie.""" + try: + out = subprocess.run( + ["git", "status", "--porcelain", "--", str(CATALOG)], + cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=True, + ).stdout.strip() + return bool(out) + except (subprocess.SubprocessError, FileNotFoundError): + return False + + +def build() -> tuple[str, int]: + import yaml + + entries = yaml.safe_load(CATALOG.read_text())["entries"] + commit, date = catalog_revision() + + rows, patternish = [], [] + for entry in sorted(entries, key=lambda e: e["id"]): + if entry.get("risk") != "high": + continue + template = entry.get("path_template") + data_path = _to_data_path(template) if template else None + if data_path is None: + patternish.append(entry["id"]) + continue + rows.append({ + "id": entry["id"], + "data_path": data_path, + "metadata_path": data_path.replace("/data/", "/metadata/", 1), + "fields": entry.get("fields"), + "owner_repo": entry.get("owner_repo"), + }) + + lines = [ + "# GENERATED by scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py -- do not edit by hand.", + "# Concrete KV data paths for lanes ops-warden grades `risk: high`.", + "#", + "# This is an INPUT, not a policy. ops-warden states which paths it grades", + "# high; railiance-platform owns what agent-high-risk-boundary denies and may", + "# deny more, deny less, or dispute a grade (ADR-0002, ADR-0008).", + "#", + "# Grades cover every field a read of the path discloses, not the field the", + "# lane is named after (ADR-0008). `fields` is recorded where an owning CCR", + "# declares it, and is null where the field set has not been established --", + "# null means unknown, never 'one field'.", + "", + f"generated_at: \"{datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')}\"", + "source: ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml", + f"catalog_revision: \"{commit}\"", + f"catalog_revision_date: \"{date}\"", + f"catalog_dirty: {str(dirty()).lower()}", + f"high_risk_lane_count: {len([e for e in entries if e.get('risk') == 'high'])}", + f"concrete_path_count: {len(rows)}", + "", + "# Graded high but not a single KV address -- a routing pattern, a broker", + "# grant, or a non-KV lane. Nothing here for a policy to deny.", + "no_concrete_path:", + ] + lines += [f" - {i}" for i in sorted(patternish)] or [" []"] + lines += ["", "paths:"] + for row in rows: + lines.append(f" - id: {row['id']}") + lines.append(f" data_path: {row['data_path']}") + lines.append(f" metadata_path: {row['metadata_path']}") + lines.append(f" owner_repo: {row['owner_repo']}") + if row["fields"]: + lines.append(f" fields: [{', '.join(row['fields'])}]") + else: + lines.append(" fields: null # field set not established -- unknown, not one") + return "\n".join(lines) + "\n", len(rows) + + +def _to_data_path(template: str) -> str | None: + import re + if re.search(r"[<>{}*]", template) or " " in template or template.startswith("k8s:"): + return None + mount, _, rest = template.partition("/") + return f"{mount}/data/{rest}" if rest else None + + +def main() -> int: + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument("--out", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_OUT) + parser.add_argument("--check", action="store_true", + help="exit 1 if the artifact on disk is stale (for CI)") + args = parser.parse_args() + + content, count = build() + + if args.check: + current = args.out.read_text() if args.out.exists() else "" + # generated_at always differs; compare everything else. + strip = lambda t: "\n".join(l for l in t.splitlines() if not l.startswith("generated_at:")) + if strip(current) != strip(content): + print(f"STALE: {args.out} does not match the catalog. Re-run without --check.") + return 1 + print(f"fresh: {args.out} matches the catalog ({count} concrete paths)") + return 0 + + args.out.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + args.out.write_text(content) + print(f"wrote {args.out} — {count} concrete high-risk data paths") + if dirty(): + print(" ! catalog has uncommitted changes; catalog_revision does not describe it") + return 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_read_boundary_check.py b/tests/test_agent_read_boundary_check.py index db33c1f..ec697d1 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_read_boundary_check.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_read_boundary_check.py @@ -98,3 +98,34 @@ class TestAgainstTheRealCatalog: continue resolved = mod.to_data_path(template) assert resolved is None or resolved.count("/data/") == 1, entry["id"] + + +class TestGeneratedArtifact: + """The artifact railiance-platform consumes (WARDEN-WP-0033-T03). + + A consumer applies this to a live deny set, so staleness is the failure that + matters -- a path graded high after the last emit would silently not reach them. + """ + + def test_artifact_is_current(self): + import subprocess + + result = subprocess.run( + ["python3", str(REPO / "scripts" / "emit_high_risk_paths.py"), "--check"], + capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, + ) + assert result.returncode == 0, ( + f"{result.stdout}{result.stderr}\n" + "Re-run scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py and commit the result." + ) + + def test_every_concrete_high_risk_lane_is_in_the_artifact(self): + import yaml + + catalog = yaml.safe_load((REPO / "registry" / "routing" / "catalog.yaml").read_text()) + artifact = yaml.safe_load( + (REPO / "registry" / "generated" / "high-risk-data-paths.yaml").read_text() + ) + emitted = {row["id"] for row in artifact["paths"]} | set(artifact["no_concrete_path"] or []) + graded_high = {e["id"] for e in catalog["entries"] if e.get("risk") == "high"} + assert graded_high == emitted, "a high-risk lane is missing from the generated artifact" diff --git a/tests/test_routing.py b/tests/test_routing.py index e0d5d33..fe28958 100644 --- a/tests/test_routing.py +++ b/tests/test_routing.py @@ -543,8 +543,13 @@ def test_high_risk_lanes_classified(): assert "railiance-backup-offsite-lane" in high assert "forgejo-admin-api-token" in high assert "openrouter-llm-connect" in high - # Ordinary workload secrets stay standard unless reclassified. - assert catalog.get("issue-core-ingestion-api-key").is_high_risk is False + # WARDEN-WP-0033-T02: these two were asserted standard here, and the assertion + # held a defective grade still. Both paths carry a second credential the grade + # ignored -- GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN (CCR-2026-0002) and the dual-consumer webhook + # HMAC (CCR-2026-0005). A read discloses every field at a path, so the grade + # must cover the union, not the headline field. + assert "issue-core-ingestion-api-key" in high + assert "reuse-surface-hub-write-token" in high def test_invalid_risk_rejected(tmp_path): diff --git a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md index c8bb760..52eb47d 100644 --- a/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md +++ b/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0033-native-lane-handoff.md @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ work completed directly; this is none of those. ```task id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T01 -status: progress +status: done priority: high ``` @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ applied to ops-warden by someone else, correctly. ```task id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T02 -status: todo +status: done priority: high ``` @@ -89,9 +89,33 @@ disclose, and it should. Fix the grade, then fix the model that produced it: record `fields` per lane and grade on the union. Check the other 25 lanes for the same shape. +**Done 2026-08-21 — and it was two lanes, not one.** While verifying +`reuse-surface-hub-write-token` I told secrets-engine their second field was +unevidenced and asked them to confirm it. It was evidenced: `CCR-2026-0005`'s +`kv_path` block lists both fields and its notes describe the HMAC's alignment +with Forgejo org webhook id=1. A truncated grep, and a retraction sent within +twenty minutes so they would not spend time on it. That lane was under-graded on +exactly the same reasoning, and both had been regraded *down* in the same T05 +pass — which is what makes this a systematic flaw rather than one bad call. + +Blast radius checked and bounded: of the 8 remaining `standard` lanes, 6 have no +KV path at all (SSH, policy check, tunnel, principals, issue-sink, key-cape +login) so nothing is disclosed by a read. Two do have paths and no CCR field +evidence — `rein-openweights-openrouter-approle` and `coulomb-social-runtime-env` +(a whole k8s env Secret, which by shape almost certainly holds several fields). +Deliberately **not** regraded: `ADR-0008` §3 says an unknown field set is stated +rather than assumed, and grading is operator-sanctioned judgement, not backfill. +They are the open item on this task. + +Shipped: both regrades with their evidence and the superseded reasoning kept +inline, `fields` recorded with its CCR source, the test that had been holding the +wrong answer inverted with an explanation of why it was wrong to trust it, and +**`ADR-0008`** — a lane's grade covers every field its path discloses. That is a +new binding rule, so it is a record rather than a wiki note. + ```task id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T03 -status: todo +status: done priority: high ``` @@ -109,9 +133,30 @@ consumer can tell what it was derived from. Depends on T02 — publishing the de set before fixing the grades would ship the wrong list to a consumer who will apply it. +**Done 2026-08-21.** `scripts/emit_high_risk_paths.py` → +`registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml`: 19 high-risk lanes, 14 concrete +data paths, 5 with no single KV address listed separately so a consumer does not +read the absence as an omission. Carries `catalog_revision`, its date, and a +`catalog_dirty` flag — a revision that does not describe the file it came from is +worse than none. + +The T02 dependency was not theoretical. The two regrades land in this artifact, +and `check_agent_read_boundary.py` now reports **2 uncovered** against a policy +railiance-platform closed to 0 yesterday. Emitting before regrading would have +handed them a list that confirmed a coverage claim that had just stopped being +true. + +`fields` is emitted as `null` where no CCR declares the set, never as a +single-element guess — `ADR-0008` §3. Two CI tests: the artifact must be current, +and every high-risk lane must appear in it, so a lane graded high after the last +emit cannot silently fail to reach the consumer. + +Boundary held: the header states this is an input and not a policy, and that +railiance-platform may deny more, deny less, or dispute a grade (`ADR-0002`). + ```task id: WARDEN-WP-0033-T04 -status: todo +status: wait priority: medium ``` @@ -132,6 +177,23 @@ Note the interaction with `ADR-0004`: the agent read-boundary already depends on side. A real issuance identity is what would make that boundary hold on the OpenBao side too, so ops-warden is an interested consumer, not a bystander. +**Routed 2026-08-21 to `key-cape` (msg 903b2223); waiting on accept or refuse.** +Reasoning given: it is an identity and issuance question about a principal +authenticating to OpenBao, which is key-cape/Keycloak's. The precedent is an hour +old and runs the same direction — `secrets-engine` declined `key-cape-oidc-login` +as ops-warden's to hand them, on the grounds that login and identity-token +issuance stay with key-cape. Absorbing this would contradict agreeing with them. + +Named the adjacent parties explicitly rather than leaving them to inference: +`zone-engine` has an interest (a coding-agent identity is a strong candidate zone +subject) and `user-engine` is **not** involved — this is a machine principal, not +an end-user account. Stated so nobody concludes it by elimination. + +Asked for a refusal-with-pointer as an equally good answer. The failure mode to +avoid is the 2026-08-17 one recorded in `.claude/rules/finding-routing.md`: +ops-warden answered a question well and never routed it, and another repo ended +up filing it. + ## Related - `secrets-engine` `SECRETS-WP-0006` — catalog admission, decision `ae676382`