fix(routing): state-hub lane uses Kubernetes auth, not an AppRole

The construction plan proposed an AppRole from a survey written with no
OpenBao session. The phase-4 live survey found kubernetes/ auth already
enabled on this cluster with four external-secrets-* roles using it, and
the founder ruled for it on 2026-08-27.

The pod authenticates with its own projected ServiceAccount token, so the
lane has no role_id/secret_id to deliver, store, or rotate. Bound to
state-hub/state-hub and deliberately not to default, which would grant
the lane to every pod in the namespace.

Policy and role are built and capability-verified. Entry stays draft: the
KV path holds no token until paste_once_provision delivers one, and the
ServiceAccount does not exist yet (STATE-WP-0084-T02).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3377672@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 15463ccf-238f-4e13-b163-93aa25c6d166

registry/generated/high-risk-data-paths.yaml

@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
 # declares it, and is null where the field set has not been established --
 # null means unknown, never 'one field'.
 
-generated_at: "2026-08-22T23:31:10Z"
+generated_at: "2026-08-26T19:56:48Z"
 source: ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml
-catalog_revision: "0fae0904ce8d8694338dd53a8a79abec5fec788d"
-catalog_revision_date: "2026-08-23T01:31:05+02:00"
+catalog_revision: "3a4333d850295d2bed39136bfe53f786564eec03"
+catalog_revision_date: "2026-08-26T21:56:44+02:00"
 catalog_dirty: false
-high_risk_lane_count: 21
+high_risk_lane_count: 24
 concrete_path_count: 14
 
 # Graded high but not a single KV address -- a routing pattern, a broker
@@ -23,11 +23,14 @@ concrete_path_count: 14
 no_concrete_path:
   - database-dynamic-credentials
   - inter-hub-bootstrap-ssh
+  - net-kingdom-lldap-bind-credential
+  - net-kingdom-privacyidea-admin-token
   - object-storage-sts
   - openbao-api-key
   - openbao-platform-admin-login
   - openbao-shamir-recovery-ceremony
   - ops-warden-warden-sign-token
+  - state-hub-forge-derivation-read
 
 paths:
   - id: agent-harness-binky-mail-approle

registry/routing/catalog.yaml

@@ -574,6 +574,44 @@ entries:
         - "Verify capabilities-safe on the data path (`bao token capabilities`); run a restore drill against a re-encrypted artifact."
         - "After rotation, clear EXPOSED taint: remove custom_metadata exposed_at/exposed_version (see `warden taint railiance-backup-offsite-lane`)."
 
+  - id: state-hub-forge-derivation-read
+    title: Forgejo read-only token for State Hub projection derivation
+    # Organisation-wide repository read: if the value leaks, every private
+    # repository is readable. Read-only, no write, no admin, no persistence —
+    # but the breadth is the grade (approved knowingly 2026-08-26).
+    risk: high
+    workload_ref:
+      applicability: applicable
+      unknown_reason: "The state-hub deployment has no authoritative workload identity declaration yet; the AppRole is the identity until it does."
+    need_keywords: [state-hub, statehub, forge, forgejo, derivation, derive, projection, private, repository, clone, FORGE_READ_TOKEN, ADR-012, work-records, unreadable, kubernetes-auth]
+    owner_repo: ops-mason
+    subsystem: OpenBao + Forgejo
+    warden_executes: false
+    wiki_ref: wiki/playbooks/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md#worker-checklist
+    canon_ref: ops-mason/plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md
+    reviewed: "2026-08-26"
+    status: draft
+    delegation:
+      mode: native
+      intended_owner: ops-mason
+      blocked_on: "Policy and Kubernetes auth role built and capability-verified 2026-08-27 (MASON-WP-0003-T02). Still draft: the KV path holds no token until paste_once_provision delivers one, and ServiceAccount state-hub/state-hub does not exist yet (STATE-WP-0084-T02). Promote to active once both land."
+      reviewed: "2026-08-26"
+      verified: unverified
+    # ops-warden routes this and executes nothing: it issues SSH certificates
+    # only and owns no secret store. ops-mason builds the structure; the forge
+    # owner mints the value; paste_once_provision delivers it.
+    auth_method: "Kubernetes auth (role state-hub-forge-derivation, ServiceAccount state-hub/state-hub) from the in-cluster state-hub workload"
+    path_template: "platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation (field FORGE_READ_TOKEN)"
+    rotation:
+      method: rotate
+      owner: ops-mason
+      automatable: false
+      steps:
+        - "Mint a replacement read-only token in Forgejo — repository read, organisation-wide, no other scope."
+        - "Deliver it to platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation, field FORGE_READ_TOKEN, via paste_once_provision. ops-mason does not handle the value."
+        - "Revoke the previous token in Forgejo."
+        - "Confirm a derivation pass still reads a known private repository; rotation must not require a chart change or a redeploy."
+
   - id: forgejo-admin-api-token
     title: Forgejo operator/admin API token (PAT)
     need_keywords: [forgejo, admin, pat, package, prune, FORGEJO_ADMIN_TOKEN, forgejo-package-prune, forgejo-tegwick, webhook, forgejo-npm]

wiki/playbooks/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# State Hub Forge Derivation Read Token
+
+Date: 2026-08-26 (policy and auth role built and verified 2026-08-27)
+Catalog: `state-hub-forge-derivation-read` (status `draft` until the token and ServiceAccount land)
+Owner: `ops-mason` (built under `ops-mason/plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md`, approved 2026-08-26)
+
+Read-only Forgejo token so the State Hub can clone **private** repositories and
+derive their work records. `CUST-ADR-012` makes the forge the projection source;
+that premise held only for repositories central could read, and nine private
+repositories were invisible to derivation entirely (`STATE-WP-0083-T04`,
+2026-08-26).
+
+**This lane is a pointer.** ops-warden routes it and executes nothing: it issues
+SSH certificates only and owns no secret store. The AppRole, policy, and KV path
+are ops-mason's build; the token value is minted by the forge owner and
+delivered through `paste_once_provision`.
+
+**Ask first:** `warden plan "state hub read private repository" --json`.
+
+---
+
+## OpenBao pointers
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Mount | `platform` |
+| Path | `platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation` |
+| Secret field | `FORGE_READ_TOKEN` |
+| Policy | `workload-kv-read-state-hub-forge-derivation` (read on that path alone) |
+| Auth | Kubernetes auth role `state-hub-forge-derivation`, bound to ServiceAccount `state-hub/state-hub` (`token_ttl=15m`, `token_max_ttl=30m`) |
+
+**Forgejo token scope:** repository **read**, organisation-wide. No push, no
+administration, no other Forgejo resource. Approved at that breadth on
+2026-08-26 — the maintenance cost of per-repository grants lands on whoever adds
+a private repository later, and the leak radius (every private repository,
+read-only) was accepted knowingly. Reasoning in the construction plan §6.
+
+**Not the admin PAT.** `forgejo-admin-api-token` is a site-admin credential
+owned by `railiance-platform`. Reusing it here was considered and rejected: a
+projection that only reads must not hold an identity that can write.
+
+---
+
+## Worker checklist
+
+1. **Plan** (agents — always):
+
+   ```bash
+   warden plan "state hub read private repository" --json
+   # expect lane=state-hub-forge-derivation-read
+   ```
+
+2. **In-cluster consumers do nothing here.** The `state-hub` deployment receives
+   the credential as a Kubernetes Secret; `derive_from_forge()` picks it up on
+   its own. If derivation reports a repository as unreadable, the lane is the
+   thing to check — not the repository.
+
+3. **Never put the token in a clone URL.** Embedded userinfo lands in logs and
+   process listings. Use a credential helper or an HTTP header.
+
+4. **Reading the value directly** (operators, rare — verification only):
+
+   ```bash
+   bao kv get -field=FORGE_READ_TOKEN platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation
+   ```
+
+---
+
+## Verify the lane (capabilities-safe — never read the value)
+
+```bash
+# Positive: the lane identity can read the data path
+bao token capabilities <lane-token> platform/data/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation
+#   → expect: read
+
+# Negative: it can read nothing else, including the admin lane
+bao token capabilities <lane-token> platform/data/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin
+#   → expect: deny
+```
+
+Verified 2026-08-27 through a 2-minute test token, revoked after use: `read` on
+its own path; `deny` on `forgejo-admin`, on the shared `llm-connect` provider
+secrets, and on the parent metadata path (no listing).
+
+**Why Kubernetes auth and not an AppRole.** The construction plan proposed an
+AppRole; the phase-4 live survey found `kubernetes/` auth already enabled on
+this cluster, and the founder ruled for it on 2026-08-27. The pod authenticates
+with its own projected ServiceAccount token, so this lane has no `role_id`
+/`secret_id` pair to deliver, store, or rotate. The role binds to
+`state-hub/state-hub` and deliberately **not** to `default`, which would grant
+the lane to every pod in the namespace.
+
+The negative check is the one that matters. The whole argument for building this
+lane instead of reusing `forgejo-admin-api-token` is that it cannot do what that
+one can.
+
+---
+
+## Rotation
+
+Re-mint in Forgejo, then overwrite the KV field. Rotation must not require a
+chart change or a redeploy — if it does, the delivery in
+`STATE-WP-0084-T02` is wrong and should be fixed rather than worked around.
+
+1. Mint a replacement read-only token in Forgejo (same scope: repository read,
+   organisation-wide).
+2. Deliver it to `platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation`, field
+   `FORGE_READ_TOKEN`, via `paste_once_provision`.
+3. Revoke the previous token in Forgejo.
+4. Confirm a derivation pass still reads a known private repository.
+
+---
+
+## See also
+
+- `ops-mason/plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md` — the construction plan
+- `ops-mason/workplans/MASON-WP-0003-state-hub-forge-read-lane.md` — the build
+- `state-hub/workplans/STATE-WP-0084-forge-read-for-private-repositories.md` — the consumer
+- `wiki/playbooks/forgejo-admin-api-token.md` — the lane this one is deliberately not