# ops-warden — PEP unreachable-engine stance map # # Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md §6.4, §9.3 # Rule of record: docs/adr/ADR-0009 # Validate: pytest tests/test_layer_conformance.py -k stance # # §6.4 obligation 3 requires a declared unreachable-engine stance that is total, # scoped per zone, carries no implicit default and no per-call discretion, and is # "published rather than held in code comments". §6.4 further requires every # PEP-shaped consumer to PUBLISH its map so the maps can be inventoried. This # file is ops-warden's, published because a map that lives only in a dataclass # default is not published — it is merely written down. # # The property that makes this worth reading: it is asserted equal to the shipped # default in src/warden/config.py (PolicyConfig.failure_modes) by # tests/test_layer_conformance.py. A published map that may drift from the code # is worse than none, because it invites reliance it cannot support. schema_version: "0.1" framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model standard_version: "0.6" repository: ops-warden pep_shape: true declared_by: docs/adr/ADR-0009 protected_action: "SSH certificate issuance (warden sign / cert_command)" decision_engine: access-engine # flex-auth until the governed rename scope: security-zone # security-zones_v0.1 membership of the TARGET workload # Total by construction: every zone in security-zones_v0.1, plus the two # non-zone outcomes. No implicit default — an unlisted value is a config error, # not a permissive fallback. stance: z0-experimental: fail_open z1-operational: fail_open z2-protected: fail_open z2-continuity: fail_open z3-critical: fail_closed unknown: fail_open # versioned build profile (ADR-0009); explicit, never inferred not-applicable: fail_closed # What happens when the stance is applied. §6.4 obligation 1 requires a decision # record for a protected side effect; where the engine is unreachable there is no # decision to hold, so ops-warden records the APPLICATION OF THE STANCE instead. # See the assessment note: obligation 1 as written admits no such case. on_apply: recorded_fields: - policy_zone - policy_failure_mode - policy_decision_id # present only where a decision was actually rendered - outcome written_to: - "signatures log (src/warden/ca.py)" - "audit.jsonl (src/warden/audit.py)" never_recorded: "any secret material, any certificate private key" # §6.4 obligation 2 — the verdict is never cached. Input claims (zone membership, # compiled from the flex-auth registry snapshot) are cached under their own # freshness rules; the answer is not. verdict_caching: none input_claim_caching: "registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json, rebuilt by scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py" # §6.4 obligation 4 — reconstructability, bounded by §9.6. ops-warden's audit # emission on this lane is deliberately non-atomic and therefore ATTRIBUTIVE, not # load-bearing: no control branches on the presence of a signing record # (`warden activity` displays it; nothing gates on it). Registered in §13. reconstructability: bound: "§9.6 attributive — completeness is not claimed" declared_at: wiki/AuditTrail.md