# Operator Access Assist — `warden access`

> The operator front door for **every** NetKingdom credential need. ops-warden
> issues the SSH lane directly and **assists** with the rest: it tells you exactly
> how to obtain a credential and — for `exec_capable` lanes — proxies the fetch
> *as you*, without ever holding, persisting, or logging the value.

Shipped in WARDEN-WP-0014. This extends the routing charter from a **pointer layer**
("who owns it") to an **assist layer** ("here is exactly how to get it, gated and
audited"). It does **not** move secret custody into ops-warden.

---

## Three roles, one front door

| Role | Lane | Command | What ops-warden does |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Issue** | SSH cert (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`) | `warden access ssh…` → `warden sign` | Executes — signs the cert |
| **Assist (advise)** | any credential need | `warden access <need>` | Renders the owner, auth method, path, command skeleton, policy gate |
| **Assist (proxy)** | `exec_capable` lanes (OpenBao, login) | `warden access <need> --fetch / --exec` | Runs the owner's tool **as the caller**; value never touches warden |

```console
# advisory — works with no config; never fetches a value
$ warden access "npm token" --domain coulomb_social
# --- sanctioned transports (WP-0026 T02): value never hits stdout ---
# write the value to a mode-0600 file
$ warden access "npm token" --domain coulomb_social --field NPM_AUTH_TOKEN --path <p> --fetch --out ./npm.token
# run a child command with the secret in its env only (à la `op run`)
$ warden access "npm token" --field NPM_AUTH_TOKEN --exec -- npm publish
# return a single-use OpenBao wrapping token to unwrap in your own context
$ warden access "npm token" --path <p> --wrap        # then: bao unwrap <token>
# interactive login (login lane): no token required, no secret-read gate
$ warden access "login oidc" --domain coulomb_social --fetch
# masked status: presence, length, short hash — never the value (WP-0026 T03)
$ warden access "npm token" --path <p> --fingerprint     # ‹hidden len=40 sha256:1a2b3c4d›
```

> **Raw `--fetch` to stdout is the anti-pattern.** It is refused when stdout is
> captured or piped (a logged-context disclosure risk); pass `--unsafe-stdout` only
> for an interactive human terminal. Prefer `--out` / `--exec` / `--wrap`.

> **`--fingerprint` is defense-in-depth, not a boundary.** It masks warden-mediated
> output so two parties can compare `sha256` prefixes to confirm they hold the same
> value (e.g. that a rotation landed) without either seeing it. It only masks
> *warden's* output — raw `bao kv get <path>` bypasses it entirely. The real boundary
> is OpenBao policy plus capabilities-safe verify (T01) and the no-stdout transports.

`--json` gives a stable, secret-free shape for agentic operators.

---

## The conduit-vs-broker boundary (the security model)

There are two very different things "secret transits warden" can mean. One is
sanctioned; the other is forbidden by the NetKingdom responsibility model
(`net-kingdom/docs/responsibility-map.md`: ops-warden *"must not become a universal
secret broker — runtime secrets remain OpenBao; authorization remains flex-auth"*).

**Sanctioned — transparent conduit.** ops-warden runs the owner's tool with the
**caller's own identity**, streams the value straight to the caller, and retains
nothing. It holds no standing credential and stores no value. This is the `vault exec`
/ `op run` shape.

**Forbidden — standing broker.** ops-warden holding its own long-lived secret-read
token, caching fetched values, becoming a service every operator's secrets flow
through and rest in. That recreates the single high-value target the model exists to
prevent, and duplicates OpenBao.

`warden access` is built as the first and forbids the second by construction.

---

## The three guardrails (enforced in code)

| | Guardrail | How it is enforced |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **G1** | **Caller identity, never warden's** | The proxy runs the owner's tool with the caller's own environment; ops-warden injects no token of its own. Secret lanes require the caller to already hold a credential (`caller_auth_present`), else they fail with the auth pointer. |
| **G2** | **Transit only — no persistence/logging of values** | Sanctioned transports keep the value off stdout: `--out` writes it to a mode-0600 file, `--exec` injects it into a child process env, `--wrap` returns a single-use OpenBao wrapping token (not the value). Raw `--fetch` to stdout is refused for captured/piped output (`--unsafe-stdout` overrides for a human terminal). warden never writes the value to disk or log; the audit record is **metadata only**. (WP-0026 T02) |
| **G3** | **Policy gate before fetch** | `check_fetch_policy` (flex-auth) runs before every secret-lane fetch. Zone membership selects stance and local failure mode; an unresolved workload uses the explicit `unknown` profile. The retired `--no-policy` flag is rejected, so this gate has no CLI bypass. |

The catalog side enforces a fourth, upstream guard: **handoff fields are templates,
never values.** `_assert_no_secret_material` rejects any known token prefix or
high-entropy run in a catalog handoff field, so a secret can never leak into the
git-tracked, agent-visible catalog.

---

## Lanes

Each catalog entry declares a `lane`:

- **`secret`** (default) — read a value. Requires caller auth (G1) and runs the
  flex-auth secret-read gate (G3). Value transits via inherit-stdout (`--fetch`) or
  child env (`--exec`).
- **`login`** — interactive auth bootstrap (OIDC/MFA). **No** caller-auth precheck
  (you have no token yet — that is the point) and **no** secret-read gate (it
  establishes the identity the gate would need). Runs interactively as the caller;
  `--exec` is rejected; the token lands in the caller's own store and warden never
  captures it.

---

## What proxying requires

- An `exec_capable` catalog entry with a resolvable `fetch_command`.
- For `secret` lanes: the caller already authenticated (`VAULT_TOKEN`/`BAO_TOKEN` or
  `~/.vault-token`) and a loadable `warden.yaml` (for policy posture + audit sink).
- All `<…>` placeholders resolved — `warden access` **refuses to run a half-templated
  command** rather than guess an owner-confirmed resource name. Supply `--domain`,
  `--field`, and `--path` as needed.

Audit lands in `state_dir/access-audit.log` (JSON lines, metadata only: who, need id,
owner, domain, action, policy decision id — never a value).

---

## See also

- `wiki/AccessRouting.md` — issue / route / assist roles
- `wiki/CredentialRouting.md` — which subsystem owns each need
- `registry/routing/catalog.yaml` — handoff fields + lanes
- `wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md` — the flex-auth gate (shared with the SSH lane)
- `.claude/rules/credential-routing.md` — agent-facing routing + anti-patterns
- `history/2026-06-27-operator-access-assist-charter.md` — the proxy-mode decision