# Railiance Offsite Backup Lane

Date: 2026-07-16  
Catalog: `railiance-backup-offsite-lane` (status `active`, `resolvable: true`, `risk: high`)  
Owner: `railiance-platform` (CCR-2026-0004)

Nextcloud WebDAV upload token and URL for age-encrypted offsite backups (Option A).
Used by `railiance-backup` (workstation) and `forgejo-backup` (platform).

---

## OpenBao pointers

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Mount | `platform` |
| Path | `platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane` |
| Fields | `NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN` (primary fetch), `NC_WEBDAV_URL`, `AGE_PRIVATE_KEY` (recovery escrow) |
| Policy | `workload-kv-read-railiance-backup-offsite-lane` (operator OIDC) |
| Agent policy | `agent-high-risk-boundary` — **deny** data-read; metadata only |
| OIDC role | `railiance-backup-workload-kv-read` (`groups=net-kingdom-admins`) |
| Risk | `high` (upload token + age recovery escrow) |

---

## Worker checklist

1. **Login** (caller identity — ops-warden adds no credential):

   ```bash
   bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=railiance-backup-workload-kv-read
   ```

2. **Export for a backup run** (sanctioned transports — never paste into chat):

   ```bash
   # Preferred: file or exec injection via warden
   warden access railiance-backup-offsite-lane --no-policy --out /tmp/nc.token
   # or:
   warden access railiance-backup-offsite-lane --no-policy --exec -- env | grep -v .
   ```

   If you must use raw bao in an interactive human shell (not an agent session):

   ```bash
   export RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN=$(
     bao kv get -field=NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane
   )
   export RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_WEBDAV_URL=$(
     bao kv get -field=NC_WEBDAV_URL platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane
   )
   ```

3. **Proxy via warden access** (catalog active + resolvable):

   ```bash
   warden access railiance-backup-offsite-lane --no-policy --fetch --out /tmp/nc.token
   # Primary field is NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN. AGE_PRIVATE_KEY is recovery escrow only.
   ```

4. **Run backup**:

   ```bash
   # workstation custodian DB + config
   bin/railiance backup

   # Forgejo production (from railiance-platform checkout)
   tools/cmd/forgejo-backup
   ```

`AGE_PRIVATE_KEY` in the same path is recovery escrow — fetch only for restore drills.
**Agents** (`WARDEN_AGENT_ID` set) cannot stream raw high-risk values; use `--out` /
`--exec` / `--wrap`. See `wiki/playbooks/agent-read-boundary.md`.

---

## Verify the lane (capabilities-safe — never read the value)

Prove allow/deny with `bao token capabilities`, **not** `bao kv get`. Reading the
value to "confirm" it triggered the 2026-07-16 disclosure of `NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN` /
`NC_WEBDAV_URL` / `AGE_PRIVATE_KEY` (see `history/2026-07-16-credential-disclosure-lessons.md`).

```bash
# Positive: lane policy identity can read the data path
LANE=$(bao token create -policy=workload-kv-read-railiance-backup-offsite-lane -ttl=2m -field=token)
bao token capabilities "$LANE" platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane
#   → expect: read
bao token revoke "$LANE"

# Negative: default-only identity is denied (no value is read)
DEFAULT_TOKEN=$(bao token create -policy=default -field=token)   # if this is denied, that IS the pass — do NOT fall back
bao token capabilities "$DEFAULT_TOKEN" platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane
#   → expect: deny
bao token revoke "$DEFAULT_TOKEN"

# Agent boundary: data deny, metadata allow
AGENT=$(bao token create -policy=agent-high-risk-boundary -ttl=2m -field=token)
bao token capabilities "$AGENT" platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane   # deny
bao token capabilities "$AGENT" platform/metadata/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane # read
bao token revoke "$AGENT"
```

The capability lists contain no secret material — safe to record on
`CCR-2026-0004` as promotion evidence. Full pattern:
`wiki/playbooks/catalog-lane-promotion.md#capabilities-safe-lane-verification`.

### Evidence recorded 2026-07-16 (WP-0026 T07)

| Check | Result |
| --- | --- |
| Policy `workload-kv-read-railiance-backup-offsite-lane` present | pass |
| OIDC role `railiance-backup-workload-kv-read` bound to `net-kingdom-admins` + lane policy | pass |
| Lane-policy token capabilities on data path | `read` |
| Default-policy token capabilities on data path | `deny` |
| Agent-boundary token on data / metadata | `deny` / `read` |
| Field presence (keys only, lengths; no values) | `NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN`, `NC_WEBDAV_URL`, `AGE_PRIVATE_KEY` present |
| EXPOSED taint on version 2 | set (see `warden taint railiance-backup-offsite-lane`) |
| Rotation guidance | `warden rotate-guide railiance-backup-offsite-lane` |

---

## Taint / rotation

```bash
warden taint railiance-backup-offsite-lane
warden rotate-guide railiance-backup-offsite-lane
```

Rotation of exposed values is the **operator's optional call** (buildup mode);
promotion is not blocked on rotation. After rotation, clear `exposed_*`
custom_metadata keys (`wiki/playbooks/exposed-taint.md`).