# ops-warden — PEP unreachable-engine stance map
#
# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md §6.4, §9.3, §9.7
# Rule of record: docs/adr/ADR-0009
# Validate: pytest tests/test_layer_conformance.py -k stance
#
# §6.4 obligation 3 requires a declared unreachable-engine stance that is total,
# scoped per zone, carries no implicit default and no per-call discretion, and is
# "published rather than held in code comments". §6.4 further requires every
# PEP-shaped consumer to PUBLISH its map so the maps can be inventoried. This
# file is ops-warden's, published because a map that lives only in a dataclass
# default is not published — it is merely written down.
#
# The property that makes this worth reading: it is asserted equal to the shipped
# default in src/warden/config.py (PolicyConfig.failure_modes) by
# tests/test_layer_conformance.py. A published map that may drift from the code
# is worse than none, because it invites reliance it cannot support.

schema_version: "0.1"
framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
# v0.7 is the accepted standard and the one in force. v0.8 is `proposed`: its
# assent round closed 2026-09-09 (GH-DEC-2026-011) with nine corrections applied,
# but the version is not yet accepted, so this declaration stays pinned to what
# binds. The one cell v0.8 would change is marked inline below rather than
# silently pre-adopted.
standard_version: "0.7"
standard_version_reviewed: "0.8"    # reviewed and assented; see history/2026-09-09-layer-model-v08-review.md
repository: ops-warden
pep_shape: true
declared_by: docs/adr/ADR-0009

protected_action: "SSH certificate issuance (warden sign / cert_command)"
decision_engine: access-engine        # flex-auth until the governed rename
scope: security-zone                  # security-zones_v0.1 membership of the TARGET workload

# Total by construction: every zone in security-zones_v0.1, plus the two
# non-zone outcomes. No implicit default — an unlisted value is a config error,
# not a permissive fallback.
stance:
  z0-experimental: fail_open
  z1-operational:  fail_open
  z2-protected:    fail_open
  z2-continuity:   fail_open
  z3-critical:     fail_closed
  # DECLARED GAP under security-layer-model v0.8 §6.4 obligation 3 (GH-DEC-2026-011,
  # net-kingdom@64394e9): unknown is not a zone and MUST resolve to fail_closed.
  # ops-warden ASSENTED to that rule — we went looking for the §5.1 read-only
  # diagnostic its reversal clause predicts and do not have one, because this map
  # governs `warden sign`, a credential-issuing side effect.
  #
  # The cell has not been flipped, and the reason is measured rather than argued:
  # 0 of 3 signing targets resolve to a zone, so converting today would fail closed
  # on essentially every certificate whenever the engine is unreachable — including
  # the certificate an operator needs to reach the host and repair it. That is
  # ADR-0006's rejected configuration reached from another direction.
  #
  # We asked for a coverage-gated transitional fail_open and were DECLINED: a
  # sanctioned transitional fail_open is indistinguishable at runtime from the
  # stance the rule forbids. Our second preference was adopted instead — §13.1 now
  # carries a Coverage column, and this repo's figures are its first entries.
  #
  # So this is tracked non-conformance with a route, not an exemption.
  # Route: WARDEN-WP-0040. Register row: §13.1, marked.
  unknown:         fail_open          # non-conformant at v0.8; see above
  not-applicable:  fail_closed

# What happens when the stance is applied. §6.4 obligation 1 requires a decision
# record for a protected side effect; where the engine is unreachable there is no
# decision to hold, so ops-warden records the APPLICATION OF THE STANCE instead.
# See the assessment note: obligation 1 as written admits no such case.
on_apply:
  recorded_fields:
    - policy_zone
    - policy_failure_mode
    - policy_decision_id   # present only where a decision was actually rendered
    - outcome
  written_to:
    - "signatures log (src/warden/ca.py)"
    - "audit.jsonl (src/warden/audit.py)"
  never_recorded: "any secret material, any certificate private key"

# §6.4 obligation 2 — the verdict is never cached. Input claims (zone membership,
# compiled from the flex-auth registry snapshot) are cached under their own
# freshness rules; the answer is not.
# Classification coverage, published beside the stance because v0.8 §6.4
# obligation 3 now requires it and because ops-warden asked for the column.
# Coverage is DISCLOSURE, never a transitional licence: it does not soften this
# map's stance, does not gate it, and never makes the marked cell conformant.
# Self-measured; regenerate with `python scripts/report_coverage.py`.
classification_coverage:
  measured: "2026-09-09"
  attribution: self-measured
  signing_targets:
    resolved: 0
    unknown: 3
    not_applicable: 1
  routing_lanes:
    resolved: 3
    unknown: 18
    not_applicable: 12

verdict_caching: none
input_claim_caching: "registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json, rebuilt by scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py"

# §6.4 obligation 4 — reconstructability, bounded by §9.6. ops-warden's audit
# emission on this lane is deliberately non-atomic and therefore ATTRIBUTIVE, not
# load-bearing: no control branches on the presence of a signing record
# (`warden activity` displays it; nothing gates on it). Registered in §13.
reconstructability:
  bound: "§9.6 attributive — completeness is not claimed"
  declared_at: wiki/AuditTrail.md

# §9.7.2 — the certificate-verification PEP has no active revocation channel.
# A previously allowed certificate remains usable until its enforced TTL expires,
# so the visibility deadline is exactly the maximum issued lifetime per actor type.
revocation_visibility:
  boundary: "SSH certificate verification at the target host"
  mechanism: ttl_expiry
  revocation_channel: none
  deadline_hours:
    adm: 48
    agt: 24
    atm: 8
  note: >-
    No CRL or KRL distribution exists. Host-side authorization belongs to
    railiance-infra; shortening or actively recalling this window is a joint
    design question, not an implied capability of ops-warden.

# §9.6 — signing evidence is attributive, not load-bearing. Measurement as of
# 2026-09-04 found three signature records across 79 calendar days, concentrated
# on only two active days (1 event on 2026-06-17; 2 within 40 minutes on
# 2026-08-22). That bursty operator-driven sample cannot support a useful rate
# threshold, so cadence is explicitly deferred instead of fabricated.
emission_cadence:
  classification: attributive
  status: deferred
  measured_as_of: "2026-09-04"
  observed_window:
    first: "2026-06-17T23:18:33Z"
    last: "2026-09-04T21:21:30Z"
    signature_records: 3
    active_signature_days: 2
    daily_counts:
      "2026-06-17": 1
      "2026-08-22": 2
  reason: "operator-driven issuance is too sparse and bursty for a meaningful rate threshold"